Aotearoa's National Security Strategy: Secure Together Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki

1. New Zealand is deeply engaged in our region and the world. With this connection comes opportunity, prosperity, and a more diverse country. Our openness to the world is part of our identity – one of our greatest strengths and sources of resilience.

2. But like other countries, New Zealand is affected by global trends and an increasingly complex international security environment. Where we as New Zealanders once saw ourselves as largely protected from threats by geography, we now experience a virtual distance measured in seconds and keystrokes. Threats are reaching New Zealanders more directly.

3. In recent years, New Zealand communities have seen and felt the impacts of national security events first hand. Horrific terrorist attacks, growing disinformation, and cyber-attacks on critical national infrastructure have all left indelible marks. Other harms, such as foreign interference, may be less visible but are no less harmful to our security. These challenges demonstrate that threats to our security can have international or domestic origins and, increasingly, these two elements are intertwined.

4. This is just as true for our Blue Ocean Continent, Te Moana-nui-a-Kiwa. Together with our Pacific neighbours through the 2018 Boe Declaration we have recognised an array of challenges to regional security, including external interference and coercion, cyber vulnerabilities, and transnational crime, as well as the threat of climate change to all aspects of the Pacific’s way of life. We must continue to work together on these shared challenges.

5. Our national security depends on the rules-based international system – the institutions, rules, and norms that shape how New Zealand works with the world, how our voice is heard, and our interests realised.

6. The rules-based system is under sustained pressure from several sources. This makes it more difficult to foster international cooperation on emerging challenges and to prevent cross-border threats. These threats are not future challenges – they are already impacting the lives of New Zealanders and New Zealand’s national security today.

7. These challenges mean it is time to update our approach to national security – that we need a new level of focus on protecting New Zealand from threats that would do us harm.

8. Government’s approach to national security is based on New Zealand’s unique character and values. This starts with affirming the foundation of te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi. This Strategy reflects government’s duty, under kāwanatanga (governance), to protect all New Zealanders. It is a starting point for forging a stronger relationship between Māori and the Crown in national security – a korowai (cloak) of protection that both parties can weave together. We are committed to developing a national security community that promotes:

9. New Zealand is a liberal democracy that upholds human rights and civil liberties, and is committed to being a good global citizen, supporting the rules-based system, and working with our international partners.

10. Even in a disrupted world, we seek opportunities. We cut an independent path and at the same time make common cause with those who share our interests and values. Our partnerships are vital to being able to protect the national security of New Zealand and to promote our national security interests regionally and globally.

11. Our vision for national security is positive and intergenerational. It is about building a secure and resilient society that enables New Zealanders’ diverse ways of life and pursuit of opportunities.

12. Government’s approach to national security focuses on prevention – to the greatest degree possible, getting ahead of threats to New Zealand whether they have domestic or international origins. Acting early at home and overseas is critical to protecting our security. Treating threats early results in less harm for the whole of New Zealand. This complements a consistent focus on building resilience and readiness when prevention is not possible.

13. We can all play a role in national security. Working together is essential. This includes cooperation across New Zealand society as well as internationally. While government is responsible for national security, New Zealanders, our communities, iwi and hapū, the private sector, academia, media, central and local government, and our ally and international partners all contribute to a more secure New Zealand.

14. Working together across New Zealand society means talking to people more openly about national security. This begins with enhanced transparency from government where possible. While some information should remain classified to protect New Zealand’s interests, sources, and methods, government can make more information available and accessible to New Zealanders. A more informed society is a more resilient society, and this Strategy serves as a foundation for developing this conversation.

15. The national security community must also be more joined-up. This involves stronger leadership and clearer ways to hold government to account.

16. New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy adopts a new approach, incorporating the lessons of the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques. It also takes a significant step forward in transparency, openly describing the national security challenges we face and the work of the national security community.

17. Part I describes New Zealand’s security outlook and a new approach to national security. This includes outcomes and priorities, with a Programme of Action that sets out steps towards meeting these priorities.

18. Part II describes government’s work in protecting New Zealanders through examination of 12 dynamic and evolving core issues – those issues that have the greatest impact on our national security interests. It also recognises broader drivers of insecurity – connected issues – which can have national security implications.

19. We will adapt to a changing world and build a more secure New Zealand together.

20. New Zealand faces a fundamentally more challenging security outlook.

21. We live in an era of disruption. Climate change poses an existential challenge, especially for our Pacific partners. Existing and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) provide opportunities, but also amplify threats from both countries and criminals.

22. We live in a more contested world. Who has power, and even more importantly how they exercise it, will continue to have consequences for New Zealand, the Pacific, and our global interests. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to have far-reaching consequences, from exacerbating food and energy insecurity to stoking global inflation.

23. Pressure is likely to grow for countries like New Zealand, whose security and prosperity depend on a cooperative landscape. Countries are seeking to advance competing visions for regional and global orders. This strategic competition is increasingly out in the open, including in the Pacific and other areas where strategic interest is growing, like space and Antarctica.

24. Democracies also face challenges at home. This includes growing feelings of distrust and disenfranchisement, rooted in rising economic inequality and discontent. Disinformation and foreign interference exacerbate these trends.

25. These kinds of threats reach New Zealanders more directly. This is why it is important for New Zealanders to be empowered with information, to increase risk awareness and resilience.

26. Our security outlook is defined by the intersection of three key challenges:

27. These trends will all impact us significantly in their own right, but it is the dynamic and unpredictable ways in which they interact that may have the most profound effects. This is likely to include less multilateral cooperation on some of the most pressing issues of our time, and pose unique challenges for open societies like ours.

28. The rules-based system is fundamental to our national security. It has meant stability and predictability, has largely reflected our liberal democratic values and interests, and enabled cooperation on a range of issues.

29. Strategic competition emerges out of the dynamic between those countries seeking to challenge and reshape aspects of the current rules-based system and those that seek to uphold it. Though the United States and China are often considered to be at the forefront of this competition, it is by no means limited to these countries. Others can also be influential in shaping the future.

30. If strategic competition intensifies, New Zealand may face a less predictable, more contested international system that is less aligned with our values and interests on issues like human rights.

31. Supporting the present rules-based system is more important than ever. This includes support for the rules-based system in the Pacific, which has real impacts on how we and our Pacific partners are able to pursue our interests and protect our people.

32. Some of the most significant challenges to the rules-based system come from authoritarian countries violating rules and norms – including undermining the sovereignty of smaller countries – and efforts to change, erode, or reinterpret the rules themselves.

33. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a direct challenge to the United Nations Charter and state sovereignty, and the source of great human suffering. But even before this invasion, we witnessed Russia challenging other states’ sovereignty, engaging in globally disruptive cyber-attacks, and seeking to undermine democratic elections in Europe and the United States. The impacts of its efforts to spread disinformation around the world have been seen in New Zealand and the Pacific. All of these actions create significant and wide-reaching disruptions.

34. China’s rise is a major driver of geopolitical change. China can play a significant role in addressing global challenges and is an important relationship for New Zealand. Our national interests require continued engagement with China, and cooperation where our interests converge. At the same time, China has become more assertive and more willing to challenge existing international rules and norms. We have seen the building of military bases in disputed areas of the South China Sea, and the use of economic coercion. Chinese state-sponsored actors have exploited cyber vulnerabilities in New Zealand in ways that undermine our security.

35. Our wider Indo-Pacific region is at the centre of strategic competition. There are concerns over potential flashpoints including Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. North Korea continues to destabilise the Korean Peninsula. In any of these instances, even tensions that fall short of full conflict could have unpredictable but significant impacts on trade and supply chains, with global effects, including for New Zealand and the rules-based international system.

36. More broadly, the erosion of the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture has negatively impacted strategic stability.

37. Climate change is the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of Pacific peoples, with increasingly severe impacts including sea-level rise, more extreme weather events, freshwater shortages, pressure on food stocks, and migration – both internal and cross-border.

38. Additional challenges in the Pacific come together as compounding pressures, including development challenges, demographic and resource pressures, economic issues like indebtedness and inflation, transnational threats, and more. This layering of challenges also reduces the region’s resilience to the negative effects of strategic competition.

39. Increasing great power attention to the region brings opportunity in terms of finance and investments. But how these investments are made matters. We encourage countries from beyond the region to work through existing architecture, support Pacific priorities, and to be transparent with their intentions.

40. China’s development cooperation has become a key lever to achieve its long-term ambitions in the Pacific. Its efforts to develop ports and airports in the region bring the possibility that these could become dual-use facilities (serving both civilian and military purposes) or fully fledged military bases in the future, which would fundamentally alter the strategic balance in the region. The 2022 China-Solomon Islands security agreement and ongoing attempts to create new groupings in the Pacific demonstrate China’s ambition to link economic and security cooperation, create competing regional architectures, and expand its influence with Pacific Island countries across policing, defence, digital, and maritime spheres.

41. Sustained engagement by the United States and other like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific and the Pacific is critical for New Zealand’s security.

42. Unfolding competition is likely to continue to promote increased cooperation among smaller groupings of like-minded countries, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and the AUKUS security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

43. As the number of groupings in the Indo-Pacific continues to grow, New Zealand remains committed to working closely with a range of partners to preserve an open, inclusive, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, both through opportunities to deepen our cooperation with close partners and by upholding ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) centrality.

44. These challenges to cooperation mean it will be difficult to create new rules of the road for emerging issues, from ethical standards around AI, to norms on geo-engineering in response to the climate crisis, among others.

45. New Zealand has long had to protect itself from a variety of global transboundary challenges that have the potential to cross our border and impact individuals, iwi and hapū, our communities, businesses, and both central and local government. Transboundary threats increasingly intersect with each other in complex ways, and technology can extend their reach.

46. As we know from the tragic terrorist attacks on our own soil, New Zealand is not immune from the threat of violent extremism and terrorism. The overall trend in developed countries is towards smaller-scale attacks by lone actors using easily obtainable weapons. There is no single pathway to radicalisation and then violence. In the online environment, individuals will continue to engage with content that reinforces personal grievances, normalises violence, and exposes them to violent extremist material.

47. Disinformation will continue to pose ongoing threats to democracy and social cohesion around the world, with the potential to undermine the integrity of elections and the peaceful transition of power.

48. Foreign interference – an act by a foreign state, often acting through a proxy, that is intended to influence, disrupt or subvert national interests by deceptive, corruptive or coercive means – and espionage will remain a major challenge for liberal democracies worldwide. New Zealand and our Pacific neighbours are and will remain targets of foreign interference and espionage, with some countries likely to keep trying to penetrate our government networks, acquire sensitive research, co-opt influential figures, monitor dissidents, and influence media for their own benefit. Known interference activities have been targeted at New Zealand’s political, academic, media and private sectors, and communities.

49. Powerful global suppliers remain focused on growing the illicit drug market in New Zealand. We will continue to be exposed to networks dealing in illicit firearms, human trafficking and people smuggling, and other forms of transnational organised crime. Technologies will enable these groups and networks to engage in illicit activities and transactions with growing anonymity, skill, and ease.

50. The cyber domain is increasingly a theatre for strategic competition and profit. The likelihood and disruptive impacts of malicious cyber activities impacting information systems, telecommunication networks, and information technology infrastructures is growing.

51. Emerging technologies such as AI, biotechnologies, robotics, and quantum computing are developing rapidly and create opportunities, but can also be used to enable or commit harmful activity and have the potential to create highly disruptive social and economic changes. Countries will face stark choices related to research and supply chains.

52. New Zealand has an expansive maritime area of responsibility and faces a variety of challenges in maritime security, including threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and maritime claims that are inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Competition for marine resources in our region is increasing, exacerbated by climate change, marine pollution, biosecurity threats, and over-exploitation.

53. This dynamic mix of strategic competition and transnational threats forms a challenging context. Many of these trends disproportionately affect open societies.

54. Globally, there is a sense that governments are not able to solve the most pressing issues of our time, from immigration to economic inequities. This has led to populist movements, which have moved several democracies towards more illiberal approaches. Disinformation is an exacerbating factor, becoming relevant where vulnerabilities already exist.

55. New Zealand is not immune from the root causes undermining democracy elsewhere, including growing wealth inequality, decreasing trust in institutions, and a decreasing sense of belonging, including among young people and those historically marginalised.

56. The pandemic has demonstrated that the exercise of state powers in ways that affect people’s daily lives can produce extreme reactions. This cycle may well play out again in countries around the world with regards to climate change policies, and responses to other emerging threats that may require changes to our ways of life.

57. Even in the face of new challenges, we believe that democracy is the most resilient form of government, and we will continue to protect our open society for future generations.

58. National security is fundamental to New Zealand's prosperity and wellbeing. To sustain strong foundations, we need a clear sense of what we want to protect at home and abroad – a positive, intergenerational vision and a set of interests that reflect who we are as a country, including our unique history, culture, and values.

59. The agencies of the national security community bring together a range of tools – diplomacy, defence, intelligence, law enforcement, and more – to promote and protect these interests.

60. To work towards our vision of a secure and resilient New Zealand requires protecting New Zealand from threats (Outcome 1), a resilient society that is informed and engaged on national security challenges (Outcome 2), and an effective national security community (Outcome 3).

61. The national security community has identified the highest priority actions to make progress toward each of these three outcomes. These priority actions recognise the pressing need to adapt to meet the challenges of our evolving security environment. Each requires continuous improvement, including capability building and investment in partnerships.

62. A Programme of Action describes how government will advance these priorities over the next two years. After this establishment phase, government will issue a Programme of Action on an annual basis.

63. In all the work the national security community undertakes, it will be guided by the following principles:

64. This section describes government's Programme of Action to advance the Strategy's three priorities over 2023-2025. Following this establishment phase, government will release future Programmes of Action on an annual basis.

65. This Programme of Action sets out:

66. Delivering on the Strategy’s priorities for change will foster a more effective national security community, better able to work together with New Zealanders and international partners.

67. Building a more secure and resilient New Zealand depends on the national security community carrying this momentum across the key priority areas identified in the Strategy for years to come. The Strategy can only deliver change if it is enabled by the right capabilities, legislation and regulation, structures, and partnerships.

68. New Zealanders being engaged and informed on national security issues is critical to building a more resilient society. This section explains New Zealand's twelve core issues – those challenges that most directly impact our national security interests.

69. This is not an exhaustive list of everything the national security community does. Instead, it covers the main challenges that the people working in national security deal with on a daily basis to protect New Zealanders. Specific events may arise that cut across several of these issue areas.

71. These core issues span drivers of insecurity, methods used by threat actors, and the domains that we are trying to protect, forming a highly interconnected set.[1]

72. For many of these issues, the national security community has established policies and strategies in place. This overarching National Security Strategy complements these policies and strategies and will help guide updates to them over time. Other issues represent emerging challenges to our national security for which policy is currently being developed. This set of core issues will continue to evolve as new national security challenges emerge.

73. In addition to the core issues, this section also recognises a number of broader drivers of insecurity, or connected issues – those that may have national security implications through their scale and magnitude. Examples of connected issues particularly relevant to our security outlook include climate change; biosecurity and human health; social instability; and inequality, debt, and corruption. These are areas in which other sectors of government have frontline responsibilities, and so the national security community must enhance how it connects with these sectors and must be consistently attendant to these issues.

74. Government is responsible for the security of our country and all New Zealanders. Government recognises that some communities are particularly vulnerable to certain threats, and that communities also have unique expertise to offer in addressing them. For many of these issues government cannot act alone – it must work together with both domestic and international partners to effectively address these challenges and protect New Zealanders.

75. Addressing strategic competition and challenges to the rules-based system requires drawing on all tools of statecraft and working closely with international partners.

76. New Zealand’s approach to building readiness and resilience at home is addressed through a number of different policy areas, such as work to counter foreign interference, which can be exacerbated by strategic competition. Similarly, government is taking a range of actions to prepare for challenges to New Zealand’s maritime security and economic security that stem from increased competition.

77. Internationally, the government supports international institutions, systems, and international law, rules, and principles that reinforce our values and interests – such as the promotion of the rights and obligations enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and broader regimes.

78. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, New Zealand acted swiftly with unprecedented diplomatic, economic, and military support for Ukraine’s defence. This has included implementation of sanctions and travel bans, NZDF deployments, and support of Ukraine’s legal case against Russia at the International Court of Justice.

79. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) consistently works to maintain presence and respond to concurrent security events at home, in our region, and further afield. This requires having the capabilities and interoperability to effectively do so, and working with regional partners to support their own security.

80. Consistent efforts to support and build architecture, rules, and norms feature across our approaches to all other core issues, as each of these areas relies on the resilience of the rules-based system.

81. Government takes a long-term, strategic view to ensure New Zealand is prepared and responsive in assessing and managing emerging, sensitive, and critical technologies. Its approach is focused on enabling New Zealand and New Zealanders to maximise the benefits of technological innovation, while managing any threats and disruptions it might bring.

82. Government has developed tools to protect New Zealand businesses and society from the risks of such technology. For example, since 2020 there have been processes in place to assess the risks posed by potential overseas investments in New Zealand businesses that research, develop, produce, or maintain sensitive technology. If significant risks to national security and public order are found, government has the ability to block investments or create appropriate safeguards by imposing conditions on an investment transaction.

83. Government also works internationally to better understand and mitigate the impact of these technologies. This includes:

84. Government is seeking to support a whole-of-society approach to build understanding and resilience against the harms of disinformation. This is led primarily by those outside government in recognition of the need to maintain openness and uphold the right to freedom of expression.

85. This whole-of-society approach has three key initiatives:

86. To ensure that New Zealand is well-positioned to understand and be attendant to the impact of this issue, government has also created a new intelligence priority focused on the national security implications of disinformation.

87. The Countering Foreign Interference Work Programme focuses on managing risks to our democratic institutions and civil and political rights, to economic prosperity (especially protecting our critical infrastructure and sensitive technology), and building our resilience to economic coercion.

88. Acting early to prevent and reduce the impact of foreign interference and espionage means engaging with a wide range of groups – communities, researchers, elected officials, businesses, and other organisations – to increase understanding, raise awareness of the risks, and support better risk management. Government initiatives to advance these goals include:

89. Government continually reviews our policy and regulatory settings to maintain our resilience against foreign interference. It has undertaken reforms to manage foreign investment risks, limit foreign political donations, ensure the security of our telecommunications networks, and limit the export of strategic goods, such as military goods and materials that could be used in the production of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

90. The Countering Foreign Interference Work Programme will continue to consider how to make New Zealand more resilient, for example through the development of stronger policy and regulatory settings. This includes considering measures to promote greater transparency of foreign country activity and the adequacy of relevant criminal offences.

91. New Zealand’s Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy focuses on bringing our nation together to protect all New Zealanders, with prevention as a priority.

92. New Zealand's approach to preventing and countering all forms of terrorism and violent extremism is based on te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi, human rights, open government norms, and the principle of proportionality.

93. Initiatives introduced in response to the Royal Commission Report, which enable us to act early to prevent and reduce the threat of terrorism, include:

94. While government maintains primary responsibility, all New Zealanders can play a role in preventing and countering violent extremism. The annual He Whenua Taurikura hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism brings together a wide range of participants and perspectives, to collectively examine challenges and opportunities, share insights and expertise, and advance solutions.

95. New Zealand also works closely with international partners in regional and multilateral initiatives to contribute to global efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism. New Zealand is a member of the Australia-New Zealand Counter Terrorism Committee, which enables trans-Tasman cooperation. New Zealand, alongside France, also leads the global implementation of the Christchurch Call to Action to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.

96. The New Zealand Transnational Organised Crime Strategy 2020-2025 provides the framework for a coordinated response to prevent and disrupt TNOC that includes government, private sector, communities, and international partners.

97. The Strategy coordinates a range of initiatives aimed at bringing stakeholders together, increasing our understanding and awareness of TNOC, and aligning priorities to disrupt TNOC threats impacting New Zealand. Activities include:

98. New Zealand has a very strong enforcement approach, working closely with our international partners to target and disrupt TNOC networks. The Resilience to Organised Crime in Communities work programme complements these efforts in focusing on the domestic context, addressing social drivers of organised crime, wellbeing harms, and building community resilience against organised crime.

99. Government is developing a strategic approach to protecting New Zealand’s economic security focused on:

100. Across all this work, government is conscious of the need to manage risks while maintaining the flexible economic settings that have underpinned economic growth over many years.

101. New Zealand’s economic security depends on the actions of individuals and businesses across New Zealand. Central and local government can support this through building the community’s awareness of, and capability to manage the problem.

102. The core of New Zealand’s Pacific Resilience Approach is partnership. How New Zealand works with Pacific partners continues to be as important as what we do. The national security community will continue to listen and reflect on what our Pacific partners are telling us of their experiences, share our own challenges and perspectives, coordinate across issues and work together to build shared resilience to the pressures our region faces.

103. The Pacific Resilience Approach recognises that national security risks often have a range of underlying social, political, economic, and environmental drivers. New Zealand has committed to providing over NZ$1.8 billion in development assistance to Pacific countries between 2021-22 and 2023-2024 (budget years), in areas ranging from climate finance, education, health systems, governance and democracy, infrastructure development, and more.

104. Government’s climate finance commitment is NZ$1.3 billion for 2022-2025, of which at least half will go to the Pacific region. The NZDF is improving its capabilities to support responses to challenges in the region, including the increasing number of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions associated with climate change.

105. The NZDF’s Pacific Leader Development Programme implemented in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu supports the development of bespoke leadership frameworks and training to enhance the professionalism of security personnel.

106. Additional resilience building programmes include:

107. New Zealand conducts regular maritime surveillance in the Pacific to protect fisheries. Patrolling also strengthens maritime security through gathering intelligence to disrupt transnational organised crime.

108. New Zealand’s Maritime Security Strategy articulates how New Zealand delivers maritime security for our nation and region. This requires that the right people, processes, policies, systems, and laws are in place to prevent and reduce harm from threats. Government has allocated funding to build this capability.

109. Deterrence plays a large role in preventing maritime security threats. This is achieved through visible and sustained maritime patrol efforts covering New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone and the high seas, with a particular focus on the South Pacific, and including the Southern Ocean. This presence is currently provided primarily through Navy patrol vessels and the new Air Force P8-A patrol aircraft alongside the inshore surface patrol capabilities operated by Customs and the Police.

110. New Zealand’s regulatory and law enforcement agencies are ready to impose financial or physical costs on those who actively undermine New Zealand’s maritime security interests. The Maritime Powers Act 2022 provides New Zealand law enforcement agencies with powers to enforce New Zealand’s criminal law in international waters.

111. New Zealand delivers maritime security through a whole-of-government approach coordinated by the National Maritime Coordination Centre, and through partnering internationally. For example, the NZDF contributes alongside partners to securing maritime lines of communication and promoting UNCLOS. In New Zealand, government works with local iwi, the private sector, and community organisations.

112. In January 2021, government established the Border Executive Board to strengthen existing collaboration of border agencies and to develop a Border Sector Strategy. Border security is supported by the Transnational Organised Crime Strategy and the Maritime Security Strategy.

113. Within New Zealand, managing border security relies on agencies working together. Initiatives such as the Joint Border Analytics Team and the interagency Integrated Targeting and Operations Centre bring staff together from border agencies to share information and expertise, identify and target risks to our borders, and disrupt and reduce threats.

114. Visa application assessments play a vital role in preventing national security risk at the border, as well as offshore passenger screening and intervention. In addition, the Mass Arrivals Prevention Strategy helps agencies to manage the risk of maritime mass arrivals and supports our international commitment to prevent people smuggling.

115. Border agencies seek, where possible, to manage or neutralise risk offshore before it gets to New Zealand. This is achieved through close cooperation with international partners. Collaboration and information sharing about threats improves collective understanding of the challenges New Zealand faces.

116. Since the publication of New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy 2019, government has undertaken a range of measures to influence the cyber security environment and enhance New Zealand cyber security capability.

117. The bulk of cyber security capability and effort occurs outside government, with individuals and private organisations working to protect their data, networked devices, and infrastructure.

118. Government invests in multiple ways to assist the wider public and business communities through:

119. Government work is currently focused on strengthening the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure; improving cyber incident reporting, access to information, and support available to New Zealand organisations and individuals; lifting collaboration between government and industry; and developing a strong and capable cyber workforce. New Zealand needs to ensure it has the right cyber capabilities and tools to be able to advance its national security interests.

120. Government also works with international partners on cyber security issues, including on cross-border cybercrime and on cyber capacity building, particularly in the Pacific, and cooperation to promote a free, open, and secure internet. Law enforcement agencies work with international partners, including by sharing information and intelligence to prevent cyber attacks at source in other countries.

121. Government’s new National Space Policy outlines the values and objectives underpinning New Zealand’s space policies, including protecting and advancing our national security interests.

122. Government’s approach to managing threats from or to space includes:

123. New Zealand actively cooperates with international partners on space issues. Since 2015, New Zealand has been a member of the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) defence initiative alongside Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. CSpO’s goal is to improve defence coordination, to ensure that space remains safe, secure, and accessible to all.

124. The effects of climate change will have major impacts on food and energy security, and human health and wellbeing. In future years, it will increasingly aggravate population displacement, economic dislocation, and resource scarcity. Tensions will grow both within and among countries as they attempt to secure their interests in a changing environment.

125. Delayed global policy action against climate change is likely to continue. Inequalities and social divisions will be exacerbated not only by the physical impacts of climate change, but also by poorly planned and executed mitigation and adaptation policies. Key areas of concern will be impacts on water, sea levels, food, health, critical infrastructure, and biodiversity. Pressure may increase to deploy risky geo-engineering techniques to prevent further warming.

126. At a regional level, water stress, flooding, and extreme weather events will be acutely felt at home and in the Pacific. This will increase Pacific Island countries’ already high economic burden of adaptation. There will likely be increasing needs for disaster relief operations in the area.

127. Harmful pests, plants, and diseases entering New Zealand can damage human and animal health and wellbeing, impose additional burdens on biodiversity and health systems, and harm New Zealand’s economy, environment, and diverse ways of life. They can also have significant economic implications, limiting access to export markets, and can endanger taonga plants and native species, upset delicate ecosystems, spoil our waterways, destroy wilderness areas, and at their extreme, prevent us from freely moving around our country.

128. Pandemics, like COVID-19 and influenza H1N1 2009 (swine flu), result in tragic loss of life, have long-term health consequences, and are a drain on economies and human development worldwide, with long-term political and security implications. While foremost a public health issue, the recent pandemic has contributed to political tensions, emboldened extremists, and heightened division.

129. Social cohesion is where all individuals and groups in society have a sense of belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition, and legitimacy. Socially cohesive societies are those in which people have high levels of trust in one another and in institutions. This is important for social stability, a healthy society, and New Zealand’s collective security and wellbeing.

130. Liberal democracies, like New Zealand, are based on principles of trust – between individuals, communities, and the institutions of governance within a population. When any of these dimensions of trust are weakened, social cohesion is threatened. This loss of cohesion can pose significant risks to democracies and drive instability through disengagement and societal fragmentation, creating vulnerabilities to foreign interference, extremism, and civil unrest.

131. Inequality of income, wealth, education, health, and opportunity has grown and will continue to grow within countries. This inequity drives social discontent, which can undermine social cohesion and contribute to a lack of trust in governments and institutions around the world.

132. Inequality among countries is also high and expected to continue to grow over the next two decades. Economic conditions in developing economies continue to deteriorate, posing a significant threat to their stability. The debt burden in the developing world has been further aggravated by the pandemic and will increasingly become unsustainable for a range of countries. This increases vulnerability to foreign powers and potential for exploitation.

133. The challenges of corruption and kleptocracy are receiving increased attention because of the global reach of Russian money working in tandem with state power, and other countries undertaking similar influence activities. Corruption of elites remains a concern, including when it comes from foreign powers and in the context of development projects. New Zealand and our region are not immune from this challenge.

134. The world today is contending with a range of complex and disruptive security challenges. In order to thrive, we will need to draw on all of our strengths as a country, both within and beyond our borders.

135. New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy lays out a vision to help us navigate this dynamic security environment. It reinforces the need for us to be clear-eyed on risks, prepared for change, and to put in place the right capability to be effective. The earlier we can act, the more harm we can prevent.

136. Government’s ability to truly deliver on this Strategy – and the whole-of-society vision it embodies – depends on working together with New Zealand society and with our valued international partners.

137. The National Security Strategy embeds this approach for the long term. It underscores the need to raise awareness of national security issues and lays a foundation for all parts of our society to work together to lift our resilience.

138. This Strategy is not an end. It is just the beginning. Our approach to national security and the specific issues of greatest concern will continue to evolve and adapt.

139. The national security community is committed to the work that lies ahead and to protecting Aotearoa New Zealand as a free, open, and democratic society for future generations.