



Proactive Release

The following documents have been proactively released by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), on behalf of Hon Judith Collins KC, Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques:

RCOI documents

The following documents have been included in this release:

Title of aide memoire: Meeting with Kāpuia on 16 April 2024

Title of briefing: Concluding the coordinated cross-government response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques

Title of aide memoire: Meetings with the March 15 affected community on Friday 10 May 2024

Title of briefing: Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch Attacks: Restorative Justice

Title of aide memoire: Meetings with Muslim Community Leaders on Tuesday 12 March 2024

Title of aide memoire: Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch Attacks: Responsible Ministers meeting on 1 May

Title of aide memoire: Update on the Royal Commission response

Title of briefing: Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mosque Attacks: Proposed Approach

Title of document: Briefing to the Incoming Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques.

Title of aide memoire: Letter outlining priorities for the government response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the attack on Christchurch Mosques

Title of aide memoire: Meeting with Chair of Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group



Title of aide memoire: Meeting with Ministerial Advisory Group, Kāpuia

Title of aide memoire: Meeting with IWCNZ on Monday 4 March 2024

Title of aide memoire: Meeting with Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand

Title of aide memoire: He Whenua Taurikura Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Hui - Cancellation

Some parts of this information would not be appropriate to release and, if requested, would be withheld under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act). Where this is the case, the relevant section of the Act that would apply has been identified. Where information has been withheld, no public interest has been identified that would outweigh the reasons for withholding it.

Key to redaction codes:

- section 6(a), to protect the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand
- section 6(d), to maintain the safety of any person
- section 9(2)(a), to protect the privacy of individuals
- section 9(2)(c), to protect the health or safety of members of the public
- section 9(2)(f)(iv), to maintain the confidentiality of advice tendered by or to Ministers and officials
- section 9(2)(g)(i), to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinion
- section 9(2)(g)(ii), to prevent improper pressure or harassment
- section 18(d), the information requested is or will soon be publicly available.



Coversheet

Aide-Mémoire: Meeting with Kāpuia on 16 April 2024

Date:	12/04/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-1077
		Security Level:	In Confidence
		Priority level:	Routine

	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	Note the talking points	16/04/2024

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director, National Security National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement and Relationships National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	✓

Departments/agencies consulted on Briefing
Talking points consulted with MSD, NZIC, DPMC, NZ Police, MoJ

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: Yes

Aide-Mémoire

Meeting with Kāpuia on 16 April 2024

To:	Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		
From:	Bridget White, Executive Director, National Security Group	Date:	12/04/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-1077	Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. To provide you with background and suggested talking points for your meeting on 16 April 2024 with Kāpuia – the Ministerial Advisory Group on the Government's Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCOI) into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques.

Background

2. Kāpuia is meeting in-person on 16 April 2024 – this will be their final in-person meeting before their term is concluded. You will be joining the meeting online; your office has been provided with details of the virtual meeting link.
3. You have been invited to meet with Kāpuia for 30 minutes, from 9:15am to 9:45am. We recommend you open with approximately 5 minutes of introductory remarks, followed by 25 minutes for questions and answers. Suggested talking points are provided for your consideration at **Attachment A**.
4. You will be supported at the meeting by officials familiar with the RCOI response – Bridget White, Executive Director of the National Security Group, and s9(2)(g)(ii) Chief Advisor, Engagement and Relationship Management.


Kāpuia's priorities

5. Kāpuia members will have views on how the group can support the embedding of the current response into agencies' 'core business', and how accountability for outstanding recommendations can be sustained into the future. In particular, they will likely raise issues such as:
 - The Government's approach to hate speech;
 - National security system legislative and regulatory reform;
 - Support to the affected community including recommendation 27 on restorative justice;

- Cancellation of the He Whenua Taurikura Counter-Terrorism hui;
 - Whether government cuts will impact national security; and
 - Findings of the Inspector General on Intelligence and Security (IGIS) on GCSB's hosting of a foreign capability.
6. In your meeting with Kāpuia on 28 February 2024, you commissioned the group to deliver a final report that reflects on the group's involvement in the response. The report will also identify elements of success in the RCOI response and where there are still gaps. You also asked Kāpuia to provide feedback on the draft advice to Cabinet on the future of the response.
7. Kāpuia may wish to raise the priorities they are considering for their final report, including:
- Keeping the needs of survivors of the attack at the heart of the response;
 - Establishing a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) or ensuring there is a clear plan to address issues of system leadership, transparency, resource prioritisation and coordination that NISA was intended to resolve;
 - Ensuring genuine community engagement continues; and
 - Continued need for focus on social cohesion and its link to national security.

Next steps

8. We recommend you note the talking points at **Attachment A**.

 Bridget White Executive Director, National Security National Security Group	Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques
11 / 04 / 24/...../.....

Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A:	Talking points for meeting with Kāpuia	In Confidence

*Attachment A is withheld in full under section 9(2)(g)(i)



Coversheet

Briefing: Concluding the coordinated cross-government response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques

Date:	30/05/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-1226
		Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE
		Priority level:	ROUTINE

	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	agree to recommendations	5 June
	sign response letter to the Chair of Kāpuia	7 June

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement and Relationships	s9(2)(a)	✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Principal Advisor	s9(2)(a)	

Departments/agencies consulted on Briefing

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: Yes

Briefing

Concluding the coordinated cross-government response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques

To: Hon Judith Collins KC
Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

Date	30/05/2024	Security Level	IN CONFIDENCE
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Purpose

1. This briefing provides you with materials to support conclusion of the coordinated, cross government response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques (the Royal Commission). This includes:
 - a. a draft Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee (FPS) paper, and proposed talking points;
 - b. a draft letter of response to Kāpuia on their final report and feedback on the Cabinet paper; and
 - c. a draft press release should you agree to make a public announcement about the conclusion of the coordinated response.

Executive Summary

2. You will present a Cabinet paper to the Foreign Policy and National Security Committee (FPS) on 25 June on concluding the coordinated, cross-government response to the Royal Commission. It will then go to Cabinet on Monday 1 July. The paper sets out the case for concluding the response and seeks Cabinet agreement to two outstanding recommendations. These are:
 - a. agreeing not to establish a National Intelligence and Security Agency, thereby, not implementing recommendation 2 of the Royal Commission's Report; and
 - b. agreeing not to proceed with a system for the public to report concerning behaviour or incidents of a violent extremist nature, thereby not implementing recommendation 12.
3. There is substantial stakeholder and media interest in the decision to conclude the response and issues related to it, such as changes to service provision for the affected community. We recommend you announce the conclusion of the response via a press release shortly after Cabinet decisions.

Briefing: Concluding the coordinated cross-government response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques

DPMC-2023/24-1226

4. A draft letter of response to Kāpuia on their final report and feedback on the Cabinet paper is also included as an attachment to this briefing. Although Kāpuia concludes on Sunday 9 June, you can direct the group to publish their report and your letter after Cabinet meets. Officials recommend this approach.

Recommendations

We recommend you:

Draft Cabinet paper

1. **note** the attached paper seeks Cabinet agreement to end the coordinated, cross-government response and agree to outstanding decisions on recommendations 2 and 12 of the Royal Commission report that require Cabinet consideration;
2. **agree** to undertake ministerial consultation on the attached draft Cabinet paper noting the list of recommended ministers in attachment B, subject to any changes you wish to make; **YES / NO**

Responding to Kāpuia's final report

3. **sign** the attached response letter to the Chair of Kāpuia, Ms Arihia Bennett and send the letter before 7 June, the last weekday of the group's service; **YES / NO**
4. **direct** officials to publish Kāpuia's final report and your response to it and the group's feedback on the Cabinet paper after you have made a public announcement on Cabinet's decisions; **YES / NO**

Communications

5. **note** that community stakeholders have expressed concern to you, the Prime Minister and others ministers about changes to support for the affected community. Proposed response letters have been provided separately;
6. **agree** to issue a press release shortly after Cabinet decisions have been made; and **YES / NO**

Proactive release

7. **agree** to proactively release this report, subject to any appropriate withholding of information required under the Official Information Act 1982. **YES / NO**

<p>Bridget White, Executive Director National Security Group</p>
<p>...../...../.....</p>

<p>Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques</p>
<p>...../...../.....</p>

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Background

- 5 In December 2023 you directed officials to conclude the coordinated cross-government response effort to respond to the Royal Commission by June 2024. This direction was in line with the end of time limited funding for the coordination effort. On 1 May you chaired a meeting of ministers responsible to discuss and confirm the direction of outstanding recommendations.

Cabinet Paper

- 6 DPMC has drafted a Cabinet FPS paper seeking Cabinet's agreement to conclude the response (**attachment A**). This has been consulted with all agencies responsible for the response and with Kāpuia.
- 7 We recommend that you consult ministerial colleagues on the paper from 5-18 June and take it to the FPS on 25 June, followed by Cabinet on 1 July. To assist your consultation a list of ministers responsible for recommendations is provided in **attachment B**.

The draft Cabinet paper is the final government report back on the Royal Commission response

- 8 The attached paper proposes to end the coordinated cross-government response effort, which will not compromise delivery of remaining agreed work. The paper and its appendices also serve as a final report back on the response to Cabinet. It notes that the response's final implementation status is:
- a. 22 recommendations are implemented;
 - b. 14 recommendations have some remaining work that can be integrated into ongoing work programmes; and
 - c. six recommendations will not be implemented, due to decisions by ministers, and if Cabinet agrees to the paper's proposals, a further two will not be implemented bringing the total to eight.

The paper seeks Cabinet agreement on two outstanding recommendations

Institutional arrangements for national security (recommendation 2 of the report)

- 9 The Prime Minister has outlined his preferred approach on national security institutional arrangements which is not to establish a national intelligence and security agency. His intention is to address the Royal Commission's intent of lifting leadership and accountability of national security agencies without adding complexity to government. As Lead Coordination Minister you have an opportunity to seek Cabinet's agreement to this approach. The proposal is to:

- a. not establish a national intelligence and security agency, thereby not implementing recommendation 2 of the Royal Commission's report. In recognition of the need to help drive accountability in response to the Royal Commission, the Prime Minister has agreed to designate the Chief Executive of

DPMC as the National Security Advisor, which would formalise the CE's current responsibilities for national security.

- 10 In addition, the Prime Minister has agreed that the Chief Executive-level National Security Board should be strengthened, which responds to recommendation 3 of the report. While a decision is not being sought, Cabinet will be invited to note that the Board has been strengthened since the Royal Commission's report was released. It is now collectively responsible for implementation of the national security strategy and Chaired by the CE of DPMC in his role as National Security Advisor.

A public reporting system (recommendation 12 of the report)

15. You also have an opportunity to seek Cabinet agreement to stop work on a business case to develop the system for reporting concerning violent extremist and counterterrorism related behaviours and incidents, and return the balance of the tagged contingency for this work to the Crown. This would mean not implementing recommendation 12.
16. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Police will be prepared to support your discussion with the FPS on these issues.
17. **Attachment C** provides draft FPS talking points. Officials will update these following ministerial consultation if necessary.

The draft Cabinet paper also incorporates feedback from Kāpuia

18. Kāpuia's feedback on the Cabinet paper was provided to DPMC officials on 28 May to enable officials to consider and reflect their concerns in the draft paper. We understand the Chair will send you the feedback on 30 May. Kāpuia's key feedback is:
 - a. that a National Intelligence and Security Agency should be established;
 - b. that there should be strong monitoring, performance, and oversight mechanisms in place for national security agencies;
 - c. that government should continue to focus on social cohesion, and combatting racism and discrimination;
 - d. that a system for the public to report concerning violent extremism and terrorism-related behaviours and incidents should be established; and
 - e. concern that the ending the response effort now could reverse positive changes made as a result of the response.
19. Some of these points are addressed in the Cabinet paper itself. In addition, we have provided you with a draft letter of response to the Chair of Kāpuia (**attachment D**).

Addressing Kāpuia and other stakeholder concerns

We recommend responding to Kāpuia on its final report and its Cabinet feedback before 7 June

20. The attached draft letter to the Chair of Kāpuia responds to the group's final report and their feedback on the draft Cabinet paper. The letter aims to be comprehensive and respond to all the key issues that have been raised. Kāpuia's final report also included an annex which commented on all 44 recommendations and in some cases made further recommendations as to how these could be progressed. We note the draft response letter does not respond to each recommendation in detail as the approach to recommendations is clearly set out in the draft Cabinet paper and its appendices, which Kāpuia has seen.
21. Friday 7 June is the final weekday before the group's role ends and we recommend sending a response letter before that date. As the letter covers issues that will be considered by Cabinet, we recommend advising the Chair that you will ask officials to publish the letters and responses after any public announcement of decisions (i.e., in early July). Kāpuia members are obliged under their Code of Conduct to:
- act in accordance with process and protocols agreed or mandated by the Lead Coordination Minister and the Chair(s); and
 - maintain and safeguard the confidentiality of information submitted to them or obtained in carrying out their role.

Stakeholders are concerned about changes to support for the affected community

22. Members of groups associated with the 15 March affected community have also written to you and the Prime Minister to express their concern about support ending for the community. Draft responses to these letters will be provided separately. The responses aim to assure stakeholders that appropriate support for individuals will be provided and that officials are working to ensure a smooth transition to normal delivery of services.

Communications

23. There will be media interest in Cabinet's decisions. s9(2)(g)(i)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
24. To ensure the Government's decisions are well understood, we propose that you issue a press release shortly after Cabinet meets (see **attachment E**). This will announce the conclusion of the coordinated response and link to more detailed information on the DPMC website, which will provide an overview of the response and how each recommendation has been addressed.

Treaty of Waitangi considerations and te ao Māori perspective

24. Consultation at the outset of the government response included engagement to understand how Māori views and perspectives could help guide the response. Following discussions with the Iwi Chairs Forum, He Hoa Mahi Tahī (colleagues working together as one) was established. This was a multiagency partnership where the range of Māori needs and interests across the Royal Commission response were shared.

Financial implications

25. There are no financial implications associated with this briefing. The attached Cabinet paper proposes returning the balance of a tagged contingency to the Crown.

Next steps

26. Officials are available to discuss this paper with you. A timeline of next steps is provided below.

Table 1: Timeline

Steps	Timing
Ministerial Consultation	Wednesday 5 June to Tuesday 18 June
Paper lodged with Cabinet office	Thursday 20 June
Consideration by FPS Committee	Tuesday 25 June
Consideration by Cabinet	Monday 1 July

Table 2: Attachments

Attachments	Title	Security classification
Attachment A	Draft Cabinet Paper	IN CONFIDENCE
Attachment B	List of ministers responsible for recommendations	UNCLASSIFIED
Attachment C	Talking points for Foreign Policy and National Security Committee	IN CONFIDENCE
Attachment D	Draft letter of response to Kāpuia's final report	UNCLASSIFIED
Attachment E	Draft press release on ending the coordinated cross-government response	UNCLASSIFIED

Attachment A: Draft Cabinet Paper

See separate attachment

*The draft Cabinet Paper (Attachment A) is withheld in full as the final Cabinet paper will be published soon on the publications page on DPMC's website.

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Attachment B: list of ministers responsible for recommendations

Minister	Royal Commission recommendations
Rt Hon Christopher Luxon , Prime Minister and Minister for National Security and Intelligence	Responsible for recommendations 1-4, 6-9A, 10-11, 14-17.
Hon Nicola Willis , Minister of Finance	Responsible for recommendation 5
Hon Nicola Willis , Minister for the Public Service	Responsible for recommendation 33-35, 37-38
Hon Mark Mitchell , Minister of Police	Responsible for recommendations 12, 42
Hon Paul Goldsmith , Minister of Justice	Responsible for recommendation 18, 39, 40
Hon Nicole McKee , Associate Minister of Justice (firearms)	Responsible for recommendations 19-24
Hon Louise Upston , Minister for Social Development and Employment	Responsible for recommendations 25-26, 28-29, 31, 37 <i>MSD has substantial involvement with the affected community</i>
Hon Melissa Lee , Minister for Ethnic Communities	Responsible for recommendation 30 <i>MEC has substantial involvement with the affected community</i>
Hon Andrew Bayly , Minister for Statistics	Responsible for recommendation 32
Hon Brooke van Velden , Minister of Internal Affairs	Responsible for recommendation 41
<i>Your responsibilities</i>	
Lead Coordination Minister	Responsible for recommendations 27 (restorative justice), 44 (Kāpuia)
Minister responsible for NZSIS and GCSB	Responsible for recommendations 9B (information sharing), 13 (informing the public about indicators of violent extremism)

*Attachment C is withheld in full under section 9(2)(g)(i)

Attachment D: Draft letter of response to Kāpuia’s final report

See separate attachment

*The draft letter of response to Kāpuia’s final report (Attachment D) is refused under section 18(d) as it will soon be publicly available.

*The draft press release (Attachment E) is refused under section 18(d).

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Aide-Mémoire

Meetings with the March 15 affected community on Friday 10 May 2024

To:	Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		
	Hon Matt Doocoy Minister for Mental Health		
From:	Bridget White Executive Director National Security Group	Date:	2/05/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-1193	Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. This aide-mémoire provides material to support your meetings with Muslim community leaders and members of the 15 March affected community in Christchurch on 10 May 2024, including:
 - profiles on the community organisations you will be meeting with (**Attachment A**); and
 - talking points for your meetings with Muslim community leaders, families of the shuhada and bullet injured survivors (**Attachment B**).

Background

2. Following requests from organisations representing those affected by the 15 March terrorist attack in Christchurch, you asked officials to arrange a meeting with Muslim community leaders, bereaved families and bullet injured survivors. DPMC has recommended a series of short meetings with several different groups. These meetings will enable you to:

- share the Government’s approach to the response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the March 15 terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques (Royal Commission) report;
- share your decision on restorative justice (recommendation 27); and
- introduce Minister Doocoy as the ministerial point of contact for the affected community and clarify your respective ministerial roles.

Meetings with Muslim community leaders and March 15 bereaved families and bullet injured on Friday 10 May

3. The March 15 affected community is diverse. It includes over 600 individuals of different ethnicities, languages, cultures, education levels and socioeconomic situations. There are sometimes differing perspectives on issues related to the attacks; no single organisation or body speaks for the whole affected community.
4. You will hold three meetings between 2:00 pm and 4:30 pm with a range of groups. A description of the organisations is provided in **Attachment A**.

Location:	Christchurch Multicultural Recreation and Community Centre, 455 Hagley Avenue, Christchurch	
Time	Activity	Speakers
1.55	MINISTERS ARRIVE	
2-2.30	Meeting with Imams and representatives from community organisations: Muslim Association Canterbury, March 15 Whānau Trust and Sakinah Trust (25 max)	Introduction from Bridget White Remarks from Hon Judith Collins KC Remarks from Hon Matt Doocoy Questions and answers Bridget White closes
2.30-2.40	BREAK	
2.40-3.30	Session #1 with bereaved families and bullet injured (40 max)	Introduction from Bridget White Remarks from Hon Judith Collins KC

Aide Mémoire: Meetings with the March 15 affected community on Friday 10 May 2024	DPMC-2023/24-1193
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		Remarks from Hon Matt Doocey Questions and answers Bridget White closes
3.30-3.40	BREAK	
3.40-4.30	Session #2 with bereaved families and bullet injured (40 max)	Introduction from Bridget White Remarks from Hon Judith Collins KC Remarks from Hon Matt Doocey Questions and answers Bridget White closes
4.30	MINISTERS LEAVE	

5. We suggest that for each of these meetings you make brief introductory remarks and invite participants to guide the discussion. Separate introductory remarks for the meeting with Muslim community leaders (2:00 – 2:30) and for the meetings with bereaved families and bullet injured (2:40 – 4:30) are provided in **Attachment B**, along with responsive talking points.
6. You will be accompanied throughout the day by DPMC officials familiar with the government response to the Royal Commission – Bridget White, Executive Director of the National Security Group and s9(2)(g)(ii) Chief Advisor for Engagement and Relationship Management. DPMC has also arranged for agency officials to answer questions on individual cases. Attending agencies include:
- Accident Compensation Corporation;
 - Homes and Communities Kāinga Ora;
 - Immigration New Zealand;
 - Ministry for Ethnic Communities;
 - Ministry of Social Development; and
 - New Zealand Police.

Community members may wish to raise concerns with you

7. s9(2)(g)(i)

[Redacted content]

8. Areas of ongoing concern for the community are summarised under two key themes: support for the affected community, and the coordinated response to the Royal Commission.

Support for the affected community

9. As a result of the attack, the community faces long-term social, health, and financial impacts. You were recently briefed on these issues and ongoing agency efforts to address them in April 2024 as part of advice informing your decision on Recommendation 27 (restorative justice) [DPMC 2023/24-1099]. Concerns may be raised with you about how services and supports have been delivered, and what residual support will be available following the conclusion of specialist wrap-around support, including:

- Ongoing support for the cumulative and ongoing effects of trauma on mental health;
- Victims and advocates have continued to raise concerns about ACC cover;
- Perceived inequity on immigration decisions and outcomes for individuals;
- Financial compensation has been raised by some in the affected community and advocates;
- Commemoration of 15 March – some in the affected community want to ensure that the attacks are marked appropriately; and
- Support available for the Coronial Inquiry – the first phase of the hearing will reconvene to complete evidence on 20 May 2024. The Ministry of Justice announced to the community on 17 April there will be a reduction in the support previously made available through the Coronial Inquiry Victims Assistance Scheme, including funding for travel for people overseas.

The coordinated government response to the Royal Commission

10. Key areas of interest for the affected community relating specifically to the government response include:

- the overall direction of the response;

Aide Mémoire: Meetings with the March 15 affected community on Friday
10 May 2024

DPMC-2023/24-1193

- restorative justice processes for the affected community;
- the approach to recommendations on hate speech and hate crimes; and
- potential changes to the firearms safety authority, and legislation relating to firearms.

11. You may wish to inform the affected community of your decision to conclude work on Recommendation 27. This decision is likely to be met with disappointment by some within the community, notably organisations and individuals who have advocated for the government to consider additional restorative measures, including financial compensation. Talking points on Recommendation 27 and the related issue of compensation are provided in **Attachment B**.

12. DPMC officials are in contact with community members and other agencies to keep informed of community concerns and reactions to Royal Commission-related announcements. Officials from agencies attending on 10 May will meet ahead of the event to discuss ways to ensure the event is constructive and results in the most positive outcomes possible for members of the affected community.

Next steps

13. We recommend you note the contents of this paper, including organisation profiles and talking points in Attachments A and B.

Attachments:	
Attachment A:	Profiles of 15 March community organisations
Attachment B:	Talking points with the 15 March affected community

Contact for telephone discussion			
Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact
Bridget White	Executive Director, National Security Group		
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement and Relationships National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Principal Advisor, Engagement and Relationships National Security Group		


Aide Mémoire: Meetings with the March 15 affected community on Friday 10 May 2024	DPMC-2023/24-1193
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Attachment A: Profiles of 15 March community organisations

Muslim Association of Canterbury (MAC)

A non-profit organisation overseeing matters related to the Al Nur Mosque, dedicated to fostering a deeper understanding of Islam. It operates as a regional association under the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ).


s9(2)(a)



Linwood Islamic Trust

A non-profit organisation overseeing matters related to the Linwood Islamic Centre, dedicated to enhancing understanding of Islam. Unlike MAC, it operates independently and is not affiliated as a regional association under FIANZ.


s9(2)(a)



15 March Whānau Trust

Established following the attacks to support families impacted by the mosque attacks in Christchurch. The Trust consists of members who have been directly impacted by the attack and works closely with families through advocacy and other supports including wellbeing and financial support for children with sports, school camps, internships, and scholarships.


s9(2)(a)



Sakinah Community Trust

A women-led organisation comprising of widows, mothers, and daughters of those killed in the attack. The Trust supports the development of long-term community response and engagement towards shifting societal attitudes to build a better community where we all belong.

s9(2)(a)



*Attachment B is withheld in full under section 9(2)(g)(i)

Aide Mémoire: Meetings with the March 15 affected community on Friday
10 May 2024

DPMC-2023/24-1193



Coversheet

Briefing: Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch Attacks: Restorative Justice

Date:	19/04/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-1099
		Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE
		Priority level:	Routine

Action sought	Deadline
<p>Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques</p> <p>Agree to your preferred option: Option 1 – No further work is required to explore restorative justice processes with the affected community; Option 2 – Officials progress discussions with the affected community about what, if any, restorative justice process should take place. Agree to update your Ministerial colleagues on your decision at the responsible Minister's meeting on 1 May 2024; and Agree to forward this advice to Hon Matt Doocey, Minister for ACC and Mental Health.</p>	24 April 2024

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor Engagement and Relationships, Risk and Systems Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	✓

Departments/agencies consulted on Briefing
DPMC worked closely with the Accident Compensation Corporation, the Ministry of Social Development and Te Whatu Ora on the development of this advice.

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

<p>Comment for agency</p>

Attachments: Yes

Briefing

Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch Mosque Attacks: Restorative Justice

To: Hon Judith Collins KC

Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

Date	15/04/2024	Security Level	IN CONFIDENCE
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Purpose

To provide advice to support your decision on recommendation 27 from the Report on the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 (the Royal Commission Report).

Executive Summary

1. In January 2024, you agreed to conclude the coordinated response to the Royal Commission Report by June 2024, when time limited funding for this function ends. Transitioning away from a coordinated response does not mean stopping all work on the Royal Commission recommendations. There are 12 Royal Commission recommendations which still require ministerial decision-making to progress or conclude. You will be meeting with responsible Ministers on 1 May 2024 to discuss outstanding decisions.
2. You are responsible for recommendation 27 – this briefing provides advice on this recommendation to support your decision-making and discussion on 1 May.
3. Recommendation 27 recommended that DPMC (in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies) discuss with affected whānau, witnesses, and survivors of the terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced. Discussions on this issue were delayed so the affected community could focus their time and energy on the ongoing Coronial Inquiry.
4. The Government's response to the attacks has adopted a restorative approach, as it sought to meet the affected communities' ongoing needs and provide opportunities for the affected community to have their voices heard. In addition to the wrap-around supports, the Government response to the attacks placed the affected community at the centre of the response [CAB-20-MIN-0516] in the way in which it implemented the recommendations and strove to meet the intent of the Report.

5. Two options are proposed for your consideration. Each option contains risk and will impact the affected community. The options have been assessed against four criteria: wellbeing of the community, timeliness, financial implications, and risks.

- **Option 1: no further work is undertaken on this recommendation, but community support will be continued through localised support:** This option would provide the affected community with a final decision but no further specific conversations at a community level about future restorative justice processes. s9(2)(g)(i)

However, this option would acknowledge the significant work already undertaken by the Government to take a restorative, community-centric approach. There are also mitigating factors, including that there will be ongoing engagement and discussions between individuals/families with unmet needs and relevant agencies about addressing their specific concerns. There are no additional resources or funding implications associated with this option.

- **Option 2: officials progress discussions with the affected community about what, if any, restorative justice process should be followed.** This option would provide the opportunity to test the adequacy of support provided, confirm how restorative justice is defined, and enable agencies to understand if there are any gaps in the needs of the community. s9(2)(g)(i)

– and any further support would also have financial and resourcing implications.

6. Given the work that has been undertaken to date, and the fiscal environment, officials recommend Option 1. It will be important to ensure that the community has ongoing access to the services and support they need, to mitigate the risks associated with not progressing this work. This approach is consistent with the jurisdictions we explored, who did not provide alternative restorative approaches but provided for the ongoing needs of the community through other means. This may be something you wish to discuss with Minister Doocey.

7. Subject to your decision, DPMC officials will provide you with talking points to support discussions about your decision and how it fits with the broader approach to supporting the affected community at the meeting of responsible Ministers on 1 May 2024. DPMC is also developing a communication plan to support decisions on the coordinated response to the Royal Commission, including recommendation 27.


Recommendations

We recommend you:

1. **note** that the Royal Commission Report recommended the Government direct DPMC in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, witnesses and survivors of the terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced;
2. **note** that discussions with the affected community on recommendation 27 have not progressed due to the Coronial Inquiry currently underway;
3. **note** that the Government response has worked to identify and meet the ongoing needs of the affected community and enable the affected community to have their voices heard through a number of forums;
4. **agree** to your preferred option:
 - 4.1. Option 1 – No further work is required to explore further restorative justice processes with the affected community **(recommended)**. **YES / NO**

OR

 - 4.2. Option 2 – Officials progress discussions with the affected community about what, if any, further restorative justice process should take place; **YES / NO**
5. **agree** to update your Ministerial colleagues on your decision at the responsible Ministers' meeting on 1 May 2024; and **YES / NO**
6. **agree** to forward this advice to Hon Matt Doocey, Minister for ACC and Minister for Mental Health. **YES / NO**



Bridget White
Executive Director, National Security

18 / 04 / 2024

Hon Judith Collins KC
Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

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Background

8. In 2020, the Royal Commission recommended (recommendation 27) that the Government:

direct the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in collaboration with relevant Public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, witnesses and survivors of the terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced.

9. As the Lead Coordination Minister, you are responsible for recommendation 27. In January 2024, we provided you with initial advice on the work done to respond to this recommendation. The advice noted that the intent of the recommendation had been met by the Government response and the broader wraparound support put in place for the affected community. The Government response also provided multiple avenues for the affected community to have their voices heard and influence the response. However, a specific discussion on restorative justice has not taken place.

10. Decisions on outstanding recommendations are required by June 2024, to inform Cabinet decisions on the coordinated response to the Royal Commission. The approach to outstanding recommendations will be discussed at the meeting of responsible Ministers on 1 May 2024, to inform Cabinet decisions.

11. To support this discussion and your decision on recommendation 27, this paper provides:

- information on restorative justice approaches;
- detail about the support provided for the affected community; and
- options for this recommendation.

Understanding restorative justice in relation to this recommendation

12. Since 2021, DPMC has progressed work to understand how restorative justice might apply in this context, including:

- compiling information about restorative justice in New Zealand and overseas,
- holding workshops with relevant agencies to develop a stocktake of government support to the affected community and explore options for restorative justice,
- reviewing comparable options to support victims of terrorism in other jurisdictions (Canada¹, Norway² and the UK³), and
- understanding what the affected community have said about restorative justice in other forums.

13. In 2022, DPMC sought to progress discussions with the affected community on restorative justice. At the same time, preparation for the Coronial Inquiry for the

¹ Quebec City Mosque attack (2017)

² Oslo and Utøya attacks (2011)

³ 7/7 attacks in London (2005) and the Manchester Arena bombing (2017)

Christchurch Masjidan Attack was consuming the affected community's time. In consultation with relevant organisations, it was agreed that any discussions on restorative justice would be paused to enable the community to focus on the Coronial Inquiry and to avoid engagement fatigue. The Coronial Inquiry is still ongoing.

Restorative justice is a broad concept and was not defined in the context of the Royal Commission Report

14. Restorative justice is a broad concept encompassing a range of related victim-centred processes. More recently, the practice of restorative justice has been increasingly applied beyond direct victims and perpetrators to address wider issues including restoring community balance and social cohesion.
15. The Royal Commission Report suggested that establishing a restorative justice process could address the ongoing complex needs of the community and provide an opportunity for accountability, to heal, for the affected community to have a voice. At the time the Royal Commission Report was written the criminal and coronial processes were unclear, including any restorative justice implications or opportunities arising from those processes.
16. Formal restorative justice processes requires both parties to be willing, able, and safe to participate – and should not be initiated where there is a risk of further harm. A restorative justice process was not offered at the time of the criminal case. s9(2)(a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It is unlikely the convicted terrorist will be able to engage in a formal restorative justice process effectively and safely.
17. Other jurisdictions officials explored had provisions for restorative justice meetings within their criminal justice systems. However, no process took place in any of these terrorist attacks, nor was a broader restorative justice process established for the victims of the specific terrorist events. Furthermore, the UK rarely encourages victim/perpetrator restorative justice processes for terrorism due to the risks, including interference with the offenders' rehabilitation, negative media coverage, and entrenchment of extremist ideologies.
18. A common theme across the jurisdictions' responses was supporting those affected by these attacks, to manage the trauma they experienced and provide mental health assistance.
19. Officials' interactions with the affected community and stakeholders to date have highlighted that the varying definitions of restorative justice have resulted in differing levels of understanding and expectations about what can be achieved through this recommendation. Many in the affected community believe it should include discussions about compensation.
20. In reviewing the different concepts of restorative justice and the Royal Commission Report, DPMC considers that there are two themes, including:
 - achieving justice through a dialogue of understanding; and
 - addressing harm by meeting the needs of the victims.

21. This approach has not been tested with the affected community. However, we assess that, as detailed in this paper, the Government response to the affected community has supported the themes above.

The Government effort has focused on supporting the needs of the affected community

22. Like the other judications we explored, following the attacks, the Government made a commitment to place the affected community needs at the centre of its response. Nine agencies have been responsible for providing services and supports to meet the ongoing needs of the affected community.

23. DPMC has worked with these agencies to develop an overview of support provided through the immediate response to the attacks and the Government's Royal Commission work programme. It has identified more than \$39 million⁴ of general and specific support and services, has been provided to the affected community.⁵ The total financial value is unable to be fully quantified as agencies cannot disaggregate support delivered through existing systems. It is estimated that the actual cost is likely much higher.

24. The types of support provided to the affected community includes:

- **Education assistance** – specific roles were established in schools to connect and support local communities impacted by the attacks; community learning hubs were established to support migrant families' engagement with the New Zealand education system; and financial support was provided to support students at risk and to improve security and safety at Muslim early learning centres.
- **Housing** – alternative housing solutions were sourced for families following the attack when an existing housing situation was unsuitable for their changed needs.
- **Immigration** – a permanent resident visa was established for the affected community to support with their recovery; and funding for independent immigration advice.
- **Wraparound support:**
 - a) The Kaiwhakaoranga Case Management Service was established in April 2019 as an opt-in service to provide wraparound coordinated support to the affected community in key areas such as financial advice, education and

⁴ Over the 2018/19 to 2024 year to date.

⁵ The Ministry of Social Development; the New Zealand Police; ACC; Te Whatu Ora; the Ministry of Justice including Victim Support; Immigration New Zealand; the Ministry of Ethnic Communities; Kāinga Ora; and the Ministry of Education.

training, employment, school attendance, health, wellbeing and social support, and housing.

b) The Collective Impact Board⁶ strengthened coordination across agencies and advocated for the needs of the affected community.

- **Mental health support** – a range of services and supports were put in place for the affected community alongside cultural capability development for the health workforce to support engage with Muslim communities. Services include virtual therapy sessions to access cultural appropriate support from across New Zealand, GP visits, and the establishment of the Muslim Wellbeing Ōtautahi team (a culturally appropriate and multilingual mental health and wellbeing support for the Muslim community). Te Whatu Ora also increased funding for existing services like the Christchurch Resettlement Service.
- **General health support** – this included treatment and rehabilitative support; weekly compensation for physical injuries or to support dependents; permanent injury compensation; and one-off payments for those who were eligible for ACC support.
- **Social and community support** – the Ministry for Ethnic Communities and other agencies worked closely with the community in Christchurch to support their ability to engage with government. A fund was established to support the community to provide feedback to the Government on the work programme emerging from the Royal Commission Report's findings.
- **Victim and legal support** – this included legal aid, counselling, support for court attendance, travel, and other costs associated with being a victim of a serious crime.

25. Service delivery has been enhanced by increased collaboration between government agencies, NGO providers, and the Muslim community. Many of these efforts and lines of collaboration will have an enduring impact on the way social services are delivered in Canterbury.

26. The New Zealand public also donated \$22.7 million to the affected community. This was distributed to the affected community through Victim Support and the Christchurch Foundation.

The legal processes have enabled the community to have their voices heard

27. The Coronial Inquiry⁷, while still ongoing, has enabled the community and first responders to build a collective understanding of what happened on 15 March and the emergency response. The public hearing enabled many of the bereaved families to have their voices heard, hear from a range of perspectives, and understand what

⁶ CIB was established in May 2021, in response to recommendation 26 from the Royal Commission Report, to enable public sector agencies, non-government organisations and the affected community to agree a specific work programme to provide ongoing wrap-around services. The Board ended on 25 November 2023.

⁷ The first phase inquest was held for seven weeks from October to December 2023 and will continue again in May 2024.

happened to their loved ones. The public hearing also provided for informal restorative meetings between the first responders and victims, with further meetings planned.

28. Additional financial support was provided to enable effective participation in this process. In recognition of the special circumstances of this case, the Victim Assistance Scheme delivered through the Ministry of Justice was extended to include witnesses present at the mosques during the attack. Families of the deceased, victims of gunshot wounds, and witnesses attending the inquest could access the maximum grant funding available.
29. The criminal case also provided the affected community the opportunity to read their victim impact statements to the convicted terrorist.

The government response has provided multiple avenues for the community to have their voices heard and influence policy

30. The affected community has had extensive engagement with Ministers and agencies throughout the response. This has provided opportunities for the affected community to raise concerns directly with decision-makers, and to influence policy making and the design and delivery of services.
31. Furthermore, as part of the coordinated response, the Government established Kāpuia and the Collective Impact Board to facilitate direct community input and ensure that communities' voices were heard.
32. The Royal Commission response has resulted in fundamental changes to how government, communities, and businesses respond to, and engage with ethnic and religious communities in New Zealand. Public and targeted engagements have been conducted throughout the coordinated response. Agencies were supported by the development of a Policy Community Engagement Tool⁸ and a Cross-agency Outreach Group was established to improve the quality of community engagement. Key initiatives developed include the National Security Strategy; and Te Korowai Whetū – Social Cohesion Strategic Framework, which provides a framework for how all of society can work together to support a safer more cohesive society.
33. To address diversity issues identified by communities, noting that bias and discrimination can create barriers to accessing services and support, the public sector has also developed:
 - a) the Papa Pounamu Public Service work programme, which sets the diversity and inclusion work programme for the wider Public Service, and
 - b) an ethnic communities graduate programme.

⁸ In response to recommendation 38 in the Royal Commission Report, the Policy Project within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was commissioned to develop the Tool.

There are still outstanding concerns for the community

34. Over time, the needs of the affected community have reduced, but ongoing support is still required. The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) reports that, of the community members engaging with their services, many have had their immediate needs resolved or addressed.
35. There are families that have unmet needs and who will continue to be supported by relevant agencies. Many of the remaining issues are now similar to those faced by migrant and former refugee populations around New Zealand: income support, immigration, housing, employment, education, and access to government services.
36. There are some concerns that continue to be raised by the affected community that officials have worked understand, and address where possible, including:
- **The cumulative and ongoing effects of trauma on mental health** – this is consistent with the international research on the ongoing mental health needs of victims of terrorism. While support is in place, some in the affected community have raised concerns about the accessibility and entitlements across the different providers which can create confusion and frustration; and a lack of culturally-appropriate services and support and trauma-informed therapy – especially for men and youth.
 - **ACC cover** – victims and advocates have continued to raise concerns about ACC cover, including perceived inequality⁹ and mental injury. Concerns about mental injury cover were also raised by victims of the LynnMall terror attack. Any expansion of the ACC scheme would require legislative change which would have significant cost implications and impacts for the health and welfare systems (which are already under pressure). The previous Government made the decision not to review the legislation due to cost implications, and in light of the other support in place to address any gaps in need.
 - **Perceived inequity on immigration decisions and outcomes for individuals** – Immigration New Zealand has facilitated considerable family reunification for members of the affected community. However, there are many who feel that they have not received the same level as support as others, with some families feeling disadvantaged by longstanding requirements on travel documentation.
 - **Compensation** – financial compensation has been raised by some in the affected community and advocates. In 2020, Raf Manji¹⁰ recommended to the Government a \$34.8 million compensation package for families of the deceased, those injured, and witnesses. The previous Government did not consider progressing work on compensation or one-off payments to the affected community, given the existing compensation regime for personal injury under ACC and the victim support scheme. Where there were gaps in the current

⁹ This includes cover for witnesses of the attack who do not receive compensation for mental injury; as well as differing levels of entitlements and length of support.

¹⁰ Christchurch City Councillor and Deputy Mayor at the time of the attacks, advocate for the community and advisor to the Christchurch Foundation.

compensation regime for victims the Government focused on supporting access to services. In all three jurisdictions, financial assistance was delivered through general compensation and support programs available for the victims of violent crime. However, separate financial compensation regimes were not established as a response to the attacks.

- **Commemoration of 15 March** – some in the affected community want to ensure that the attacks are marked appropriately. We understand that the Ministry for Culture and Heritage is providing advice to their Minister on options for commemorating the attack.

The affected community will continue to be supported

37. The Kaiwhakaoranga Service funding is time limited until June 2024, and the Minister for Social Development and Employment has recently agreed for the Service to end as scheduled at the end of June 2024. MSD is working on a plan to communicate this decision to the affected community.
38. At the commemorations for the 5th anniversary of 15 March, some in the affected community were introduced to Minister Doocey, who the Prime Minister has nominated as the ongoing ministerial point of contact for the affected community. Work is underway to guide how Minister Doocey will provide ongoing support to the affected community. This will be provided following the responsible Ministers' meeting.
39. The Muslim Wellbeing Ōtautahi team¹¹, Christchurch Resettlement Services, Canterbury Refugee Resettlement and Resource Centre, and other community groups will continue to support the affected community. The communication plan for the end of the coordinated response will highlight support that will continue to be available to the affected community.

Options for taking forward Recommendation 27

40. Given this context, DPMC have assessed two options for taking forward recommendation 27 against four criteria: supporting the community's wellbeing, timeliness of delivery, fiscal responsibility and reputational risks, including judicial review.
41. The options assessed are outlined at Attachment A and summarised below:
- **Option 1: no further work is undertaken on this recommendation, but community support will be continued through localised support:** This option would provide the affected community with a final decision but would not enable a further specific conversation at the community level about restorative justice processes. s9(2)(g)(i)

¹¹ The contract for service is due to be renewed in June 2025, which has created uncertainty for the affected community.

s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]. However, this option would acknowledge the significant work already undertaken by the government to take a community-centric approach. There are also mitigating factors, including that there will be ongoing engagement and discussions between individuals/families with unmet needs and relevant agencies about addressing their specific concerns. There are no additional resources or funding implications associated with this option.

- **Option 2: officials progress discussions with the affected community about what, if any, restorative justice process should be followed.** This option would provide the opportunity to test the adequacy of support provided, confirm how restorative justice is defined, and enable agencies to understand if there are any gaps in the needs of the community. s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

[redacted] There would also likely be trade-offs across agencies around other work priorities.

42. Given the work that has been undertaken to date, and the fiscal environment, officials recommend Option 1. It will be important to ensure that the community has ongoing access to the services and support they need, to mitigate the risks associated with not progressing this work. This approach is consistent with the international judgements we explored, who did not provide alternative restorative approaches but provided for the ongoing needs of the community through other means. This may be something you wish to discuss with Minister Doocey.

43. Should you wish to proceed with Option 2, officials will prepare advice on how this could be delivered, including a budget and scope for discussions with the affected community. Following discussion, officials will be able to provide further advice and financial implications for developing any proposed recommendations.

Next steps

44. Subject to your decision, officials will prepare talking points to support a discussion about recommendation 27 at the responsible Ministers meeting on 1 May 2024.

45. DPMC will also provide you with a communications plan to support the final decisions on all the Royal Commission recommendations, and the coordinated response. This will include an update on how agencies are communicating with, and informing, the affected community on the ways in which they can continue to access support services.

Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A:	Options assessment for recommendation 27	In confidence

Attachment A: Options assessment for recommendation 27

	Supports the communities' needs	Timeliness	Fiscal responsibility	Risks
<p>Option 1: No further work is required to explore restorative justice processes with the affected community</p>	<p>x</p> <p>Affected community unable to share their ongoing/unmet needs at a community level specifically through the RCOI context.</p> <p>The cumulative impact for this decision alongside other decisions about social supports and the coordinated response is likely to cause stress for the affected community.</p>	<p>✓✓</p> <p>Decision could be announced quickly providing certainty for the community.</p>	<p>✓✓</p> <p>No additional resources or funding required.</p>	<p>x</p> <p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p> <p>Ongoing and future needs may not be addressed, creating increased demand on services that cannot be met. However this will be mitigated by ongoing agency-level engagement with impacted families and individuals about their specific unmet needs.</p> <p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p>
<p>Option 2: Discuss with the affected community what, if any, restorative justice process is required.</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>Provides the opportunity to test the effectiveness of supports provided to date and assess what needs of the affected community have not been met.</p> <p>May help support a smooth transition of social support from the current model to core business.</p> <p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>Initial conversations could be progressed quickly however the timeframe for this conversation could be protracted.</p>	<p>xx</p> <p>Further funding and resources required.</p> <p>Specialist restorative justice expertise likely to be required.</p> <p>Trade-offs across agencies around other priorities.</p>	<p>✓/x</p> <p>The affected community may not be able to reach consensus on the restorative justice process, or outcomes from the process may be unworkable or unsustainable.</p> <p>Community expectations will need to be carefully managed to</p> <p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p> <p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p>

Proactively Released



Aide-Mémoire

Meetings with Muslim Community Leaders on Tuesday 12 March 2024

To:	Rt Hon Christopher Luxon Prime Minister		
From:	Bridget White Executive Director National Security Group	Date:	8/03/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-904	Security Level:	In confidence

Purpose

1. This aide-mémoire provides material to support meetings with Muslim community leaders in Christchurch on 12 March, between 3.00pm - 6.00pm with:
 - s9(2)(a) and the Muslim Association of Canterbury;
 - s9(2)(a) and the Linwood Islamic Trust;
 - 15 March Whānau Trust; and
 - Sakinah Community Trust.
2. The meetings will enable you to:
 - build familiarity with leaders within the affected community and learn about their priorities and concerns; and
 - share the Government's intention and approach to concluding the Government's response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the March 15 Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques (Royal Commission) report.
3. You will be accompanied by Rebecca Kitteridge, Chief Executive of DPMC, s9(2)(g)(ii), Chief Advisor Engagement and Relationships, Risk and System Governance Group, DPMC, and s9(2)(g)(ii). Talking points will be provided separately.
4. You will be meeting during Ramadan. Cultural guidance to support your interactions with members of the Muslim community is at **Attachment A**.

Background

5. On Friday 15 March 2019, convicted terrorist Brenton Tarrant carried out a racially-motivated attack at two mosques in Christchurch – Al Nur Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre. Over 100 people were shot and 51 people – the ‘shuhada’¹ – died. The shuhada range in age from 3 years old, to 77 years old and represent 11 nationalities. This event remains New Zealand’s most deadly domestic terrorist attack. 15 March 2024 marks the fifth anniversary of the attack.
6. The attacks were a nationally significant event. They challenged New Zealanders’ sense of national identity, and international perceptions of New Zealand as a country. In the aftermath of the event, different faith, ethnic groups (including Māori and iwi) and the wider public unified in support of New Zealand’s Muslim communities.
7. s9(2)(c) [REDACTED]. In late 2023, the affected community participated in the first phase inquest for the Coronial Inquiry. The inquest allowed the community to share their experiences of the day and understand the emergency response immediately following the 15 March attacks. s9(2)(c) [REDACTED]
8. Uncertainty around plans to carry forward the Government’s response to the report of the Royal Commission is also a source of concern for the community. In particular, the community is concerned about losing access to specialist wrap-around support services established following the attack, when the current funding term ends in June. s9(2)(g)(i) [REDACTED]
9. Your engagement with the affected community on Tuesday 12 March and Friday 15 March will help to provide reassurance of the Government’s commitment to honouring the memory of the 15 March shuhada, to supporting the affected community, and to addressing the root causes of the 15 March terrorist attack.

The affected community comprises diverse individuals and groups

10. The affected community is diverse. It includes over 600 individuals of different ethnicities, languages, cultures, education levels and socioeconomic situations. There are sometimes differing perspectives on issues related to the attacks within the community.
11. No single organisation or body speaks for the whole affected community. On 12 March you will meet with community organisations and leaders representing the two Christchurch mosques and members of the affected community, including the 15 March Whānau Trust, the Muslim Association of Canterbury, and the Sakinah Community Trust. A description of each organisation and its constituency is provided in **Attachment B**.

¹ Shuhada is the Arabic word for martyr. In this context, it refers to those killed by the terrorist attack on 15 March 2019 and is commonly used by affected community members.

Meetings with community leaders on Tuesday 12 March

12. A series of 45-minute meetings have been scheduled as follows:

Time	Organisation	Representatives
3.00 – 3.45 pm	Imam Al Noor Mosque & Muslim Association of Canterbury	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED] [MAC TBC]
3.45 – 4.30 pm	Imam Linwood Islamic Centre & Linwood Islamic Trust	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED] [Linwood Trust TBC]
4.30 – 5.00 pm	Break	
5.00 – 5.45 pm	15 March Whānau Trust	[representatives TBC]
5.45 – 6.30 pm	Sakinah Community Trust	[representatives TBC]

13. We suggest that for each of these meetings you make brief introductory remarks and invite community leaders to guide the discussion. Talking points are provided separately.

Community leaders may wish to raise concerns with you

14. Areas of ongoing concern for the community are summarised under two key themes: support for the affected community, and the coordinated response to the Royal Commission.

Support for the affected community

15. As a result of the attack, the community faces social, cultural, spiritual, health, and financial impacts. Concerns may be raised with you about how services and supports have been delivered. Including:

- **The eligibility criteria** for Accident Compensation Corporation and the availability of social support for victims – especially for people who witnessed the attack but were not physically injured.
- Some in the community consider the government should provide **financial compensation** to victims of the attacks.
- Some community members face a range of barriers to **access suitable mental health support**, compounded by the long-term nature of trauma.
- Support available for the **Coronial Inquiry** and **immigration**.

16. The mental health and specific needs of the community are supported by the holistic wrap-around system provided by the Kaiwhakaoranga Specialist Case Management Service. The Service's proactive engagement with the affected community has enabled the timely and coordinated access to services and supports from government and non-government agencies, including access to employment and training, financial assistance, housing,

immigration, and other social supports. Funding for the Kaiwhakaoranga Specialist Case Management Service ends in June 2024.

17. In addition to the concerns outlined above, social agencies working directly with the community report that many other issues are similar to those faced by migrant and former refugee populations around New Zealand: income support, immigration, housing, employment, education, and access to government services.

The coordinated response to the Royal Commission

18. Key areas of interest for the affected community relating specifically to the government response include:

- the overall direction of the response,
- restorative justice processes for the affected community,
- the approach to recommendations on hate speech and hate crimes, and
- potential changes to the firearms safety authority, and legislation relating to firearms.

19. Talking points specific to these Royal Commission issues are also provided.

Next steps

20. We recommend you note the contents of this paper, including cultural guidance and organisation profiles in Attachments A and B.

Bridget White
Executive Director
National Security Group

07/03/2024

Rt Hon Christopher Luxon
Prime Minister

...../...../.....

Attachments:	
Attachment A:	Cultural expectations and customs for engaging with Muslim communities
Attachment B:	Profiles of community organisations

Attachment A – Cultural expectations and customs for engaging with Muslim communities

The following provides a general guide to help understand the social customs common to many Muslim communities in New Zealand.

Ramadan

- In Islamic tradition, Ramadan is a time of reflection encouraging Muslims to participate in charity, fasting and prayer. Muslims abstain from food and drink between the time of sunrise to sunset.
- For Muslims, fasting during Ramadan is a way to purify the soul and strengthen one's connection with Allah. Fasting is one of the Five Pillars of Islam (Belief, Worship, Fasting, Almsgiving and Pilgrimage).
- A common Arabic greeting for Muslims worldwide during Ramadan is 'Ramadan Mubarak!' ('Have a blessed Ramadan'). You can also say 'Ramadan Kareem' ('Have a generous Ramadan').
- In 2024, Ramadan will run from approximately March 11 to April 10. Exact dates are not confirmed until immediately prior. The Islamic calendar is lunar-based. This means the dates of festivals like Ramadan change each year.

Iftar

- Iftar is the evening meal that Muslims consume to break their fast during the holy month of Ramadan. It is a time of celebration and gratitude. Muslims gather with family and friends to break their fast together and share a meal.
- Iftar is not only a time for physical nourishment but also for spiritual reflection and worship.
- Hospitality is extremely important to Muslim communities and the host has responsibilities, including providing food and beverages (alcohol is prohibited).
- No refreshments will be provided at the meetings to respect the fasting period, however refreshments will be available for those who are not participating upon request.

Dress

- There are variations but in general conservative dress (for women, covering shoulders and legs). If attending a masjid (mosque), women will also need to cover their head.
- We advise women attendees to bring a shawl or scarf that can be used to cover one's head, in the event you are invited to enter the mosque.

- Shoes should not be worn in a mosque. You should prepare to have socks or stockings as bare feet are also discouraged.

Meeting people of the opposite sex

- Islam encourages both men and women to act with modesty. For some, this will mean that direct eye contact and touching (including shaking hands), is avoided between men and women who are not related.
- You can usually take your prompt from the other person such as by waiting to see whether they first offer their hand to shake. If a woman does not offer her hand, you can place your right hand over your heart and nod your head in greeting.
- Some women may not feel comfortable being alone or speaking with a male who is not a family member.
- Some women may be more confident speaking with women only or speaking to strangers through a male family member.


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Attachment B – Profiles of community organisations

Muslim Association of Canterbury (MAC)

A non-profit organisation overseeing matters related to the Al Nur Mosque, dedicated to fostering a deeper understanding of Islam. It operates as a regional association under the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ).


s9(2)(a)



Linwood Islamic Trust

A non-profit organisation overseeing matters related to the Linwood Islamic Centre it is dedicated to enhancing understanding of Islam. Unlike MAC, it operates independently and is not affiliated as a regional association under FIANZ.


s9(2)(a)



15 March Whānau Trust

Established following the attacks to support families impacted by the mosque attacks in Christchurch. The Trust consists of members who have been directly impacted by the attack and works closely with families through advocacy and other supports including wellbeing and financial support for children with sports, school camps, internships and scholarships.


s9(2)(a)



Sakinah Community Trust

A women-led organisation comprising of widows, mothers, and daughters of those killed in the attack. The Trust supports the development of long-term community response and engagement towards shifting societal attitudes to build a better community where we all belong.

s9(2)(a)

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Coversheet

Aide-Mémoire: Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch Attacks: Responsible Ministers meeting on 1 May

Date:	26/04/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-1101
		Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE
		Priority level:	ROUTINE

	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	Note the contents of this Aide-Mémoire and attachments	30 April 2024

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement and Relationships, Risk and Systems Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	✓

Attachments	Title	Classification
Attachment A	Table of outstanding recommendations	RESTRICTED
Attachment B	Agenda – Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mosque Attacks: Ministers' Meeting	IN CONFIDENCE
Attachment C	Annotated agenda – Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mosque Attacks: Ministers' Meeting	IN CONFIDENCE
Attachment D	Draft Cabinet paper	RESTRICTED

*Attachment C is withheld in full under section 9(2)(g)(i).

*The Draft Cabinet Paper (Attachment D) is withheld in full as the final Cabinet paper will be published soon on the publications page on DPMC's website.

ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CHRISTCHURCH ATTACKS: RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS MEETING ON 1 MAY

To	Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques				
Date	26/04/2024	Due date	30/04/2024	Security level	IN-CONFIDENCE

Purpose

This paper provides you with background information to support your meeting with ministerial colleagues, on 1 May 2024.

Background

1. This meeting will assist delivering on the government's intention to conclude the coordinated government response effort on the Royal Commission of Inquiry report (Royal Commission of Inquiry) by June 2024. It is an opportunity to discuss and agree on the approach to the 12 recommendations that require decisions.
2. You have a pre-meeting with officials at 5:30PM on 30 April to discuss the meeting. This will be an opportunity to discuss the proposed approach to the meeting, including the Agenda (**Attachment B**) and Annotated Agenda (**Attachments C**) and answer any questions you may have.
3. DPMC officials available to support you at your 1 May meeting are Bridget White, Director of the National Security Group, s9(2)(g)(ii) Chief Advisor Engagement and Relationship, Risks and Systems Governance Group and s9(2)(g)(ii) Principal Advisor, National Security Group.

The responsible Ministers' meeting

4. The purpose of this meeting is to confirm the approach to all 12 outstanding recommendations from the Royal Commission report. To achieve this, we recommend you and your ministerial colleagues:
 - Agree an approach to all 12 recommendations that require ministerial or Cabinet decisions;
 - Discuss any risks associated with these recommendations and concluding the coordinated government response effort in June 2024; and
 - Agree an approach to communicating the Government's decision to concluding the RCOI response in June 2024.
5. Kāpuia indicated you may receive their final report around 24 April. A summary of the report will be prepared and provided to you separately, including any further talking points. The final report will be shared with agencies so that Ministers can

be briefed on any implications pertinent to their recommendation ahead of the 1 May meeting.

Ministers attending

6. You will be joined in this meeting by seven Ministers covering nine portfolios.

Minister	Portfolio
Rt Hon Christopher Luxon	Prime Minister Minister for National Security and Intelligence
Rt Hon Winston Peters	Deputy Prime Minister
Hon Nicola Willis (TBC)	Minister for Public Service
Hon Louise Upston	Minister of Social Development and Employment
Hon Mark Mitchell (Also standing in for Minister Goldsmith who cannot attend)	Minister of Police Justice (on behalf of Minister Goldsmith)
Hon Matt Doocey	Minister for Mental Health
Hon Melissa Lee	Minister for Ethnic Communities
Hon Brooke van Velden	Minister of Internal Affairs
Hon Nicole McKee	Associate Minister of Justice (firearms)

7. Ministers attending will discuss the outstanding recommendations in their portfolios and how they intend to address them. To ensure there is time to discuss all 12 recommendations we recommend maintaining the timing proposed in the annotated agenda.
8. Ministers Upston and Lee are attending due to the role played by the Ministry of Social Development and Employment and Ministry for Ethnic Communities in supporting the affected community and broader social cohesion recommendations. Minister Doocey is attending due to the role he will play in supporting members of the affected community at a local level.
9. Deputy Prime Minister Peters' office requested his attendance on Wednesday 24 April. Minister Peters is not responsible for any of the recommendations to be discussed, but he is likely to take an interest in recommendations 1, 2, and 3, which are about ministerial oversight (rec 1) and institutional arrangements on national security (recs 2, 3). Mr Peters will be the only minister attending from NZ First.

Proposed structure for the meeting

10. We suggest you structure the meeting as follows:

- Prime Minister /Minister for National Security - recommendations 1,2, 3, 4, 7,8 16


- Minister Mitchell (delegated to speak for Minister Goldsmith on recommendation 18) – recommendations 12, 18
 - Minister McKee – recommendation 24
 - Minister Collins – recommendation 27
 - Minister van Velden – recommendation 41
11. You are responsible for recommendation 27, restorative justice and will need to update your colleagues on your decision. In addition, to advise DPMC officials provided you on 18 April 2024 (DPMC -2023/24-1099), the Annotated Agenda provides suggested talking points.
12. At the conclusion of speaking to your recommendation we recommend you ask Minister Doocey to speak to his role as the ministerial point of contact for the community. This role will be important in continuing to provide support to the affected community. We understand that Minister Doocey recently met with officials to discuss how they can support him in his role.

Draft Cabinet paper

13. The attached draft Cabinet paper (**Attachment D**) seeks agreement to conclude the coordinated response to the Royal Commission's report and reflects on the progress made so far. There are a number of placeholders which will be updated following confirmation of decisions and any further discussion with you following the 1 May meeting.

Next steps

14. Officials are available to discuss this approach in the meeting on 30 April 2024. Following this meeting the annotated agenda can be updated if required.
15. If you are comfortable with the proposed agenda, we recommend your office send it, and **Attachment A**, to the offices of all ministers who will attend the meeting.
16. Following the 1 May meeting, officials will consult all relevant agencies to update the Cabinet paper, reflecting decisions made. We will also consult the draft Cabinet paper with Kāpuia, as discussed when you met the group on 16 April.
17. Your office will receive a copy of the Cabinet paper for ministerial consultation on 23 May. It is scheduled to be considered by the Foreign Policy and National Security Committee on 18 June.



Bridget White
Executive Director, National Security Group

Date: 24 April 2024

Attachment A: Table of outstanding recommendations

*Attachment A includes information on decisions that had either been confirmed or that DPMC understood were likely to be made by ministers, based on information available at the time. In some cases, decisions were confirmed after the meeting on 1 May 2024.

Proactively Released

Attachment B: Agenda - Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mosque Attacks: Ministers' Meeting

Proactively Released

Attachment C: Annotated Agenda - Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mosque Attacks: Ministers' Meeting

Proactively Released

Attachment D: Draft Cabinet Paper

Proactively Released

Table of Government decisions on outstanding recommendations

Recommendation (summary)	Lead Minister	Decision	Rationale
1	Prime Minister	Minister NSI will be formally designated as the lead minister for Counterterrorism	The integrated nature of counter-terrorism within the wider national security and intelligence portfolio, as well as the number of portfolios involved, would make it difficult to carve counter-terrorism out from other portfolios. This is because threats like terrorism involve significant complexity, public interest, and dispersed levers, which warrants oversight and visibility by the Minister for National Security and Intelligence.
2	Prime Minister	A National Intelligence and Security Agency will not be established. The Prime Minister has decided to maintain the current arrangement whereby the CE of DPMC leads the Government's national security function.	Changes have been made in DPMC since the Royal Commission reported. In line with DPMC recommendations, DPMC has separated the department's national security functions from its risk, governance, and crisis management functions. This provides clear lines of leadership on these two functions. The Prime Minister will further strengthen this model by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> formally designating the CE of DPMC the National Security Adviser with a clear Cabinet-agreed mandate, and agreeing with the CE of DPMC a series of mechanisms to drive the performance required. These decisions are the least disruptive and avoid the need to create the infrastructure of a new agency, thereby streamlining rather than adding complexity to the system. The approach does not prevent a future government considering a NISA in future it was warranted. The delineation of national security and hazard/risk functions addresses issues identified by the Royal Commission on the number of hats worn by the CE of DPMC.
3	Prime Minister	The Prime Minister has decided not to establish an Interdepartmental Executive Board, but to formalise membership and responsibilities of the National Security Board (NSB) via a Cabinet mandate.	Since the report was delivered, DPMC has made changes to the National Security Board (its Chair, governance support, and focus on the National Security Strategy) to strengthen the collective leadership of the national security system. The Prime Minister's decision builds on these changes without creating additional agency infrastructure.
4	Minister for National Security and Intelligence	The Minister NSI has directed officials to incorporate this work into future advice to the Minister NSI on a refresh of the existing CT Strategy. This will be done through the cross-agency Counter-Terrorism Work Programme coordinated by DPMC and overseen by the National Security Board.	New Zealand's current counterterrorism strategy was agreed by Cabinet in September 2019 and publicly released in April 2020. An expanded version was released publicly in June 2021, with more detail on some of the areas specifically mentioned by the Royal Commission. The strategy is still fit for purpose and will be refreshed in the near future. In addition to expanding the CT Strategy, DPMC led work in 2022 to develop a specific draft Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Strategic Framework (PCVE Strategic Framework). In line with recommendation 4, this framework – still in draft - was designed collaboratively with a multi-sector working group comprised of government agencies, researchers and academics, civil society, and community representatives.
7, 8	Minister for National Security and Intelligence	An advisory group will not be established.	The Minister NSI has decided that a separate Advisory Group of the nature recommended by the Royal Commission would not yield sufficient benefits to warrant the administrative burden, and overheads. Instead, the minister has directed national security agencies to utilise existing mechanisms to ensure that advice and views from communities, civil society, local government, and the private sector are appropriately sought and included in relevant outputs. In the time since the Royal Commission reported, mechanisms for hearing and incorporating community, civil society, local government, and private sector advice into counter-terrorism activities have significantly increased and improved. This is now embedded in the culture of national security agencies.

	<i>preceding year by Advisory Group and the actions in response.</i>			
12	<i>Develop and promote an accessible reporting system that enables members of the public to easily and safely report concerning behaviours or incidents to a single contact point within government.</i>	Minister of Police	Subject to Cabinet agreement, a new reporting system will not be established	<p>The Minister of Police is proposing that officials to cease work on the business case to develop a new reporting system. Cabinet agreement to this decision is being sought as part of the Cabinet paper on ending the cross-government, coordinated response the Lead Coordination Minister will submit in June.</p> <p>Reporting of concerning behaviour will continue through existing channels, including Police's 111 and 105 channels and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service online threat reporting channel.</p>
16	<i>Direct the chief executive of the national intelligence and security agency (recommendation 2) to host an annual countering violent extremism and terrorism hui.</i>	Minister for National Security and Intelligence	This recommendation has been implemented through two national hui. Officials have been directed to pursue further opportunities to enhance public dialogue on national security issues as part of their ongoing work programme.	Cultivating and sustaining a public conversation on national security more broadly is a key element of the Programme of Action set out in the National Security Strategy, and later adopted by the National Security Board as its work programme. There are a range of critical private sector, academic, local government and community stakeholders that can help us boost our resilience to the wide range of national security threats we face.
18	<i>Review all legislation related to the counterterrorism effort to ensure it is current and enables public sector agencies to operate effectively.</i>	Minister of Justice	The Minister of Justice will report to Cabinet separately in July with proposals for progressing this work	<p>The Minister of Justice will report to Cabinet separately in July 2024 with options for a legislative review. This review will build on legislative amendments already made under this recommendation, which include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Act 2021 which added precursor offences such as planning, and preparation of terrorist acts to the TSA and extended the terrorism finance provisions.• The Counter Terrorism Acts (Designations and Control Orders) Amendment Act 2023 <p>Work on accession to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is ongoing. The Minister of Justice agreed in a meeting with officials in March to prioritise the Accession Bill and table in July with a view to acceding by the end of the year or in early 2025.</p>
24	<i>Introduce mandatory reporting of firearms injuries to New Zealand Police by health professionals.</i>	Minister of Justice	Mandatory reporting will not be introduced.	<p>Section 92 of the Arms Act already requires health practitioners to consider reporting firearms injuries if they believe a licence holder should not be permitted to use or possess firearms due to a health condition. This requirement came into effect on 24 December 2020 shortly after the RCOI report was presented to Parliament on 8 December 2020. Police data shows that this section may already be working to address the concerns underlying the recommendation.</p> <p>Prior to transfer of responsibility Police & Health undertook consultation & analysis. There is no evidence mandatory reporting reduces gun violence. Additionally, there are concerns it could deter people from seeking medical care & associated privacy concerns and risks to/burden on health practitioners.</p>
27	<i>Direct DPMC in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, survivors and witnesses what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how these might be designed and resourced.</i>	Lead Coordination Minister	Further work to consider restorative justice processes as part of the Royal Commission response will not be progressed	<p>The Lead Coordination Minister has agreed that the Government has adopted a restorative approach regarding the affected community throughout the response. This has been through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• the establishment of wraparound coordinated support to the affected community, and• opportunities for the affected community to have their voices heard throughout the delivery of services and the Government's response to the Royal Commission Report. <p>The Minister has also considered the opportunities members of the community have had through the legal process, such as through the victim statements at the sentencing of the convicted terrorist and the ongoing Coronial Inquiry.</p> <p>This approach is consistent with other jurisdictions, which did not provide alternative restorative approaches but provided for the ongoing needs of the community through their response.</p>
41	<i>Amend the definition of "objectionable" in section 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act</i>	Minister of Internal Affairs	Changes to the definition of 'objectionable' in the Classification Act will not be progressed	this recommendation was part of a package with recommendation 40 on amending hate speech legislation. If Recommendation 41 were to be progressed in isolation, it would raise the risk of duplication and inconsistency of offences between section 131 of the Human Rights Act and the Classification Act.

<i>1993 to include racial superiority, racial hatred, and racial discrimination.</i>			
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Attachment B: Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mosque Attacks: Ministers' Meeting

Agenda

Date/Time	1/05/2024 7.00pm – 8.00pm
Venue	Cabinet Committee Room, Level 8, Beehive
Chair	Hon Judith Collins KC, Lead Coordination Minister
Attendees	Rt Hon Christopher Luxon, PM and Minister for National Security and Intelligence Rt Hon Winston Peters, DPM Hon Nicola Willis, Minister Responsible for the Public Service (TBC) Hon Louise Upston, Minister of Social Development and Employment Hon Mark Mitchell, Minister of Police Hon Matt Doocey, Minister for Mental Health (<i>first half only</i>) Hon Melissa Lee, Minister for Ethnic Communities Hon Brooke van Velden, Minister of Internal Affairs Hon Nicole McKee, Associate Minister of Justice (Firearms)
Apologies	Hon Paul Goldsmith, Minister of Justice (delegated discussion on recommendation 18 to Hon Mark Mitchell)

Item	Topic	Timing
1	Welcome and introduction	3 mins
2	Outstanding decisions <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Prime Minister Luxon - rec 1, 2 and 3• Prime Minister Luxon (Minister for National Security and Intelligence) - rec 4,7,8, 16• Minister Mitchell - rec 12• Minister Mitchell (for Minister Goldsmith) - rec 18• Minister Mckee - rec 24• Minister Collins - rec 27• Minister van Velden - rec 41	45 mins
3	Timing and announcement of decisions <ul style="list-style-type: none">• To agree to an approach to public communications and engagement on final decisions.	10 mins
4	Closing and any other business	2 mins

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Coversheet

Aide-Mémoire: Update on the Royal Commission response

Date:	19/04/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-1111
		Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE
		Priority level:	Routine

	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	Note advice	1 May 2024

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement and Relationships, Risk and Systems Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Senior Advisor, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(a)

Departments/agencies consulted on Briefing
The Department of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice and New Zealand Police

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: Yes

Aide-Mémoire

Update on the Royal Commission response

To:	Hon Judith Collins KC Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		
From:	Bridget White, Executive Director, National Security Group	Date:	19/04/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-1111	Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE

Purpose

This aide-memoire provides an update on Royal Commission report recommendations that require decisions by Ministers and that will be discussed at the Responsible Ministers' meeting on 1 May 2024.

Progressing advice on outstanding recommendations

1. In January 2024, you agreed to conclude the coordinated response to the Royal Commission report by 30 June 2024, when time limited funding for the coordination of the response ends [DPMC 2023/24-647].
2. There are 12 Royal Commission recommendations which require ministerial decision-making – one of which you are responsible for (recommendation 27 on restorative justice). You will be meeting with Responsible Ministers on 1 May 2024 to confirm how the outstanding recommendations will be progressed or concluded. To support this discussion, DPMC and relevant agencies have updated the status of the 12 remaining recommendations (see **Attachment A**). Officials will update this table ahead of the 1 May meeting as appropriate.
3. Officials have provided you advice in a separate paper to support your decision on recommendation 27 ahead of the responsible Ministers meeting [DPMC 2023/24-1099]. The advice outlines how the Government's response has in many ways adopted a restorative approach, as it sought to meet the affected communities' ongoing needs and provide opportunities to have their voices heard. The paper presents two options for your consideration.

Responsible Ministers' meeting on 1 May 2024

4. Ministers with portfolios supporting the affected community, Minister for Social Development and Employment, and the Minister for Ethnic Communities, have also been invited to attend. This will help to support clear, consistent and coordinated messaging on the conclusion of the coordinated response.
5. The following Ministers are confirmed to attend the meeting:

- Rt Hon Christopher Luxon, Prime Minister and Minister National Security and Intelligence
- Hon Brooke Van Velden, Minister of Internal Affairs
- Hon Louise Upston, Minister of Social Development and Employment
- Hon Mark Mitchell, Minister of Police and delegate for Hon Paul Goldsmith, Minister of Justice
- Hon Matt Doocoy, Minister for Mental Health and ACC, MP for Waimakariri
- Hon Melissa Lee, Minister for Ethnic Communities
- Hon Nicole McKee, Associate Minister of Justice (firearms)
- TBC Hon Nicola Willis, Minister Responsible for the Public Service

Next steps

6. DPMC will provide an annotated agenda and draft Cabinet paper, to support your attendance at the Responsible Ministers meeting. This will include updates to the attached table as necessary. You will also be meeting with DPMC officials on the 30 April to discuss any questions you may have ahead of the Responsible Ministers' meeting.



Bridget White
Executive Director,
National Security Group

18 / 04 / 2024

Hon Judith Collins KC
Lead Coordination Minister for the
Government's Response to RCOI's
Report into the Terrorist Attack on
the Christchurch Mosques

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Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A:	List of recommendations requiring decisions	In confidence

Attachment A: List of recommendations requiring decisions

*Attachment A includes information on decisions that had either been confirmed or that DPMC understood were likely to be made by Ministers, based on information available at the time. In some cases, decisions were confirmed after the meeting on 1 May 2024.

Proactively Released

Table of Government decisions on outstanding recommendations

Recommendation (summary)	Lead Minister	Decision	Rationale
<p>1 <i>Ensure a Minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the counter-terrorism effort.</i></p>	<p>Prime Minister</p>	<p>Minister NSI will be formally designated as the lead minister for Counterterrorism</p>	<p>The integrated nature of counter-terrorism within the wider national security and intelligence portfolio, as well as the number of portfolios involved, would make it difficult to carve counter-terrorism out from other portfolios. This is because threats like terrorism involve significant complexity, public interest, and dispersed levers, which warrants oversight and visibility by the Minister for National Security and Intelligence.</p>
<p>2 <i>Establish a new national intelligence and security agency that is well-resourced and legislatively mandated to be responsible for strategic intelligence and security leadership functions. Designate the Chief Executive of this agency as the intelligence and security advisor to the Prime Minister.</i></p>	<p>Prime Minister</p>	<p>A National Intelligence and Security Agency will not be established.</p> <p>The Prime Minister has decided to maintain the current arrangement whereby the CE of DPMC leads the Government's national security function.</p>	<p>Changes have been made in DPMC since the Royal Commission reported. In line with DPMC recommendations, DPMC has separated the department's national security functions from its risk, governance, and crisis management functions. This provides clear lines of leadership on these two functions.</p> <p>The Prime Minister will further strengthen this model by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> formally designating the CE of DPMC the National Security Adviser with a clear Cabinet-agreed mandate, and agreeing with the CE of DPMC a series of mechanisms to drive the performance required. <p>These decisions are the least disruptive and avoid the need to create the infrastructure of a new agency, thereby streamlining rather than adding complexity to the system.</p> <p>The approach does not prevent a future government considering a NISA in future it was warranted.</p> <p>The delineation of national security and hazard/risk functions addresses issues identified by the Royal Commission on the number of hats worn by the CE of DPMC.</p>
<p>3 <i>Investigate alternative mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the National Security Board including the establishment of an Interdepartmental Executive Board.</i></p>	<p>Prime Minister</p>	<p>The Prime Minister has decided not to establish an Interdepartmental Executive Board, but to formalise membership and responsibilities of the National Security Board (NSB) via a Cabinet mandate.</p>	<p>Since the report was delivered, DPMC has made changes to the National Security Board (its Chair, governance support, and focus on the National Security Strategy) to strengthen the collective leadership of the national security system. The Prime Minister's decision builds on these changes without creating additional agency infrastructure.</p>
<p>4 <i>Develop and implement a public facing counterterrorism strategy that addresses extremism and preventing, detecting, and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism.</i></p>	<p>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</p>	<p>The Minister NSI has directed officials to incorporate this work into future advice to the Minister NSI on a refresh of the existing CT Strategy.</p> <p>This will be done through the cross-agency Counter-Terrorism Work Programme coordinated by DPMC and overseen by the National Security Board.</p>	<p>New Zealand's current counterterrorism strategy was agreed by Cabinet in September 2019 and publicly released in April 2020. An expanded version was released publicly in June 2021, with more detail on some of the areas specifically mentioned by the Royal Commission. The strategy is still fit for purpose and will be refreshed in the near future.</p> <p>In addition to expanding the CT Strategy, DPMC led work in 2022 to develop a specific draft Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Strategic Framework (PCVE Strategic Framework). In line with recommendation 4, this framework – still in draft - was designed collaboratively with a multi-sector working group comprised of government agencies, researchers and academics, civil society, and community representatives.</p>
<p>7, 8 <i>Direct the chief executive of the national intelligence and security agency (recommendation 2) to establish an Advisory Group to the National Security Board on counterterrorism, with its functions established in legislation.</i></p> <p><i>Include in advice on the National Security Intelligence Priorities and in the annual threatscape report, a summary of the advice provided in the</i></p>	<p>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</p>	<p>An advisory group will not be established.</p>	<p>The Minister NSI has decided that a separate Advisory Group of the nature recommended by the Royal Commission would not yield sufficient benefits to warrant the administrative burden, and overheads. Instead, the minister has directed national security agencies to utilise existing mechanisms to ensure that advice and views from communities, civil society, local government, and the private sector are appropriately sought and included in relevant outputs.</p> <p>In the time since the Royal Commission reported, mechanisms for hearing and incorporating community, civil society, local government, and private sector advice into counter-terrorism activities have significantly increased and improved. This is now embedded in the culture of national security agencies.</p>

	<i>preceding year by Advisory Group and the actions in response.</i>			
12	<i>Develop and promote an accessible reporting system that enables members of the public to easily and safely report concerning behaviours or incidents to a single contact point within government.</i>	Minister of Police	Subject to Cabinet agreement, a new reporting system will not be established	The Minister of Police is proposing that officials to cease work on the business case to develop a new reporting system. Cabinet agreement to this decision is being sought as part of the Cabinet paper on ending the cross-government, coordinated response the Lead Coordination Minister will submit in June. Reporting of concerning behaviour will continue through existing channels, including Police's 111 and 105 channels and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service online threat reporting channel.
16	<i>Direct the chief executive of the national intelligence and security agency (recommendation 2) to host an annual countering violent extremism and terrorism hui.</i>	Minister for National Security and Intelligence	This recommendation has been implemented through two national hui. Officials have been directed to pursue further opportunities to enhance public dialogue on national security issues as part of their ongoing work programme.	Cultivating and sustaining a public conversation on national security more broadly is a key element of the Programme of Action set out in the National Security Strategy, and later adopted by the National Security Board as its work programme. There are a range of critical private sector, academic, local government and community stakeholders that can help us boost our resilience to the wide range of national security threats we face.
18	<i>Review all legislation related to the counterterrorism effort to ensure it is current and enables public sector agencies to operate effectively.</i>	Minister of Justice	The Minister of Justice will report to Cabinet separately in July with proposals for progressing this work	The Minister of Justice will report to Cabinet separately in July 2024 with options for a legislative review. This review will build on legislative amendments already made under this recommendation, which include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Act 2021 which added precursor offences such as planning, and preparation of terrorist acts to the TSA and extended the terrorism finance provisions. • The Counter Terrorism Acts (Designations and Control Orders) Amendment Act 2023 Work on accession to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is ongoing. The Minister of Justice agreed in a meeting with officials in March to prioritise the Accession Bill and table in July with a view to acceding by the end of the year or in early 2025.
24	<i>Introduce mandatory reporting of firearms injuries to New Zealand Police by health professionals.</i>	Minister of Justice	Mandatory reporting will not be introduced.	Section 92 of the Arms Act already requires health practitioners to consider reporting firearms injuries if they believe a licence holder should not be permitted to use or possess firearms due to a health condition. This requirement came into effect on 24 December 2020 shortly after the RCOI report was presented to Parliament on 8 December 2020. Police data shows that this section may already be working to address the concerns underlying the recommendation. Prior to transfer of responsibility Police & Health undertook consultation & analysis. There is no evidence mandatory reporting reduces gun violence. Additionally, there are concerns it could deter people from seeking medical care & associated privacy concerns and risks to/burden on health practitioners.
27	<i>Direct DPMC in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, survivors and witnesses what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how these might be designed and resourced.</i>	Lead Coordination Minister	Further work to consider restorative justice processes as part of the Royal Commission response will not be progressed	The Lead Coordination Minister has agreed that the Government has adopted a restorative approach regarding the affected community throughout the response. This has been through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the establishment of wraparound coordinated support to the affected community, and • opportunities for the affected community to have their voices heard throughout the delivery of services and the Government's response to the Royal Commission Report. The Minister has also considered the opportunities members of the community have had through the legal process, such as through the victim statements at the sentencing of the convicted terrorist and the ongoing Coronial Inquiry. This approach is consistent with other jurisdictions, which did not provide alternative restorative approaches but provided for the ongoing needs of the community through their response.
41	<i>Amend the definition of "objectionable" in section 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act</i>	Minister of Internal Affairs	Changes to the definition of 'objectionable' in the Classification Act will not be progressed	this recommendation was part of a package with recommendation 40 on amending hate speech legislation. If Recommendation 41 were to be progressed in isolation, it would raise the risk of duplication and inconsistency of offences between section 131 of the Human Rights Act and the Classification Act.

<i>1993 to include racial superiority, racial hatred, and racial discrimination.</i>			
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Proactively Released



Coversheet

RESPONSE TO THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE MOSQUE ATTACKS: PROPOSED APPROACH

Date:	18 January 2024	Report No:	DPMC 2023/24-647
		Security Level:	RESTRICTED
		Priority level:	ROUTINE

	Action sought	Deadline
Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	agree to recommendations	25 January

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Julian Grey	Acting Executive Director, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement, and Relationships		✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Principal Advisor		

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: Yes

Briefing

RESPONSE TO THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE MOSQUE ATTACKS: PROPOSED APPROACH

To: Minister's Title and Portfolio			
Date	18/01/2024	Security Level	RESTRICTED

Purpose

1. This briefing provides advice on how to take forward the Government's response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch Mosque Attacks (Royal Commission). It provides advice on remaining decisions that sit in your portfolio as Lead Coordination Minister and offers recommendations on how you could provide overall direction on the Government's approach to remaining work, including by working with other Ministers to align and coordinate the decisions in their portfolios.
2. DPMC officials will seek a meeting with you to discuss engaging with the affected community, including victims, families, and witnesses who continue to live with the aftermath of 15 March.

Executive Summary

3. The Royal Commission made wide-ranging recommendations for changing the way government approaches national security in its broadest sense. Many of the lessons raised by the Royal Commission have been taken on board and have informed organisational changes, work on clearer accountabilities and responsibilities, improvements in transparency and public engagement, and development of New Zealand's first National Security Strategy and Programme of Action.
4. With these changes in place or underway, there is an opportunity to bring the government response to a conclusion by June 2024 without losing the essence of the Royal Commission's intent or lessons learned from the attacks. This will involve making a number of outstanding decisions, which are described in this paper and **Attachment A**. It is in the interests of those affected by the attacks for government to finalise decision-making on the response.
5. s9(2)(f)(iv)
6. Reflecting this progress and the changed context, this paper sets out a proposed approach for you as Lead Coordination Minister to shape the remainder of the

Briefing: Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Mosque Attacks: proposed approach.	DPMC 2023/24-647
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response. It also provides DPMC's views on how outstanding recommendations in your and other Ministers' portfolios could be addressed.

Response coordination and decisions required by other Ministers

7. There are currently 11 recommendations that require direction by other Ministers, and three that require decisions by you. Decisions for other Ministers are in the areas of counterterrorism and national security, firearms safety, and hate speech. **Attachment A** provides an outline of the progress on all 44 recommendations, and what is needed on remaining recommendations.
8. To ensure decisions related to outstanding recommendations are aligned, you may wish to convene a meeting of the relevant Ministers to discuss an approach to remaining work, including what to continue and what should be stopped. DPMC can support you with this, and work with other agencies to ensure all Ministers are prepared in advance to participate.
9. You may also choose to commission DPMC to prepare a draft Cabinet paper for consideration before June 2024. This would confirm what changes have been made as a result of the response, the Government's approach to the remainder of work, what further initiatives will be implemented and what will be stopped. Such a paper could constitute/include the Government's "final report" on the RCOI response.

Decisions are required by you, as Lead Coordination Minister

10. You are responsible for recommendation 44 on the Ministerial Advisory Group Kāpuia. We recommend ending Kāpuia in June s9(2)(f)(iv) and in line with a conclusion of the response. We recommend you meet the Kāpuia Chair to convey this decision.
11. The previous Lead Coordination Minister led on recommendation 27 – which is for government to discuss potential restorative justice options for those affected by the attacks. This is an important issue for the affected community – s9(2)(g)(i) Overall, we consider that the way victims, family, and witnesses have been supported through the response could be considered restorative, meaning that the intent of the recommendation has been met, albeit indirectly. Due to the importance of this issue, officials will provide separate advice and a proposed engagement plan.
12. This paper also includes advice for your consideration on recommendation 38 regarding community engagement. The previous Lead Coordination Minister instructed all agencies involved in the response to use a best practice tool (the Policy Community Engagement Tool) to guide their public engagement. The tool is supporting agencies to improve their engagement capability. For continuity we recommend this guidance stays in place until the response concludes.
13. Finally, it provides advice on work underway to develop a Response Outcomes Framework, which was intended to evaluate the response. This was not a recommendation but a business case for a framework was commissioned by the

previous Government. Officials consider that events have since overtaken the need for this framework as similar outcomes are now being measured through other mechanisms. Implementation would also require further funding. We therefore recommend not progressing it further.

Recommendations

We recommend you:

Response coordination

- 1. **Note** the progress made on the government’s response to the Royal Commission’s report, as outlined at Attachment A;
- 2. **Agree** that the overall government response to the Royal Commission report should shift from a “response” phase to conclusion by June 2024; **YES / NO**
- 3. **Note** that, to conclude the government response, 14 recommendations will require Ministerial direction and 11 of these are in other Ministerial portfolios;
- 4. **Agree** to convene a meeting with relevant Ministers to ensure a cohesive response to remaining recommendations; **YES / NO**
- 5. **Direct** officials to work with your office to convene this meeting; **YES / NO**
- 6. **Direct** officials to prepare a draft Cabinet paper for consideration before June 2024, which would confirm the Government’s approach to remaining work on the Royal Commission response. **YES / NO**

Ministerial Advisory Group Kāpuia (recommendation 44)

- 7. **Agree** to conclude Kāpuia’s role on 9 June when members’ terms end, and to commission Kāpuia to prepare a final report with insights and lessons learned on the Royal Commission to be delivered before this date; **YES / NO**
- OR OR
- 8. **Agree** to conclude Kāpuia now which would mean the group would not meet again; **YES / NO**
- 9. **Agree** to meet with the Chair of Kāpuia, Arihia Bennet to convey your decision and discuss Kāpuia’s recent letter of advice; **YES / NO**

Restorative justice (recommendation 27)

- 10. **Note** that the Royal Commission recommended a discussion with affected family, witnesses, and survivors of the terrorist attack what, if any restorative justice approaches may be suitable;

11. s9(2)(f)(iv) [Redacted]

12. **Note** officials' view that due to the level of support through programmes and direct funding, the intent of recommendation 27 has been largely met, albeit indirectly;

13. **Note** that officials will prepare more detailed advice on addressing this recommendation, s9(2)(f)(iv) [Redacted]

Community engagement (recommendation 38)

14. **Note** that the previous Lead Coordination Minister instructed agencies to use the Policy Community Engagement tool to guide their public engagement on the Royal Commission;

15. **Agree** that, for continuity, this instruction should stand until the response concludes; **YES / NO**

Response Outcomes Framework

16. **Agree** that work on a draft Response Outcomes Framework should be concluded. **YES / NO**

Engagement with the affected community

17. **Note** officials have provided separate briefing with advice on engaging with community representatives, including in advance of the upcoming fifth anniversary of the March 15 attacks.

Julian Grey
Acting Executive Director
National Security Group
...../...../.....

Hon. Judith Collins
Lead Coordination Minister for the
Government's Response to the Royal
Commission's Report into the Terrorist
Attacks on the Christchurch Mosques
...../...../.....

Background

The government has improved its approach to national security and other areas covered by the Royal Commission

14. The Royal Commission made 44 recommendations that covered counterterrorism and the national security system¹, the firearms licencing system, social cohesion and inclusion, and support for those affected by the attacks. The recommendations were designed to improve the way the government carried out its national security functions and to enhance community resilience to avoid similar terrorist attacks. The previous Government accepted the report, its findings, and all its recommendations in principle. It established the current work programme in which all recommendations are being addressed in some way. There are a total of 12 government agencies with responsibility for recommendations and a corresponding 12 ministerial portfolios² [CAB-21-MIN-0503].
15. Through implementation of the report's recommendations, and other initiatives, many of the lessons raised in the report have been taken on board. It has informed organisational changes in DPMC for clearer accountability, improvements in transparency and public engagement by national security agencies, and development of New Zealand's first National Security Strategy and Programme of Action. The National Security Strategy embeds the lessons of 15 March by focussing on early action, prevention, and working together with international partners and across New Zealand society to be responsive to New Zealand's evolving threat environment. The Strategy's Programme of Action is now being implemented by national security agencies³ and will help inform policy advice for ministers.
16. National security agencies have also improved transparency through publication of unclassified versions of the National Security and Intelligence Priorities (in 2021 and 2023) and the inaugural National Security Threat Environment Report by NZSIS in August 2023.
17. Other key initiatives include hosting of two national hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism, which have brought together experts, communities, and government, and establishment of a countering violent extremism community fund. The Ministry of Social Development launched a *Social Cohesion Strategic Framework (Te Korowai Whetū)* in 2022, along with tools and resources for government and communities. In addition, Statistics NZ and the Ministry for Ethnic Communities (MEC)

¹ The report was focussed on counterterrorism but recognised that counterterrorism could not be separated from the wider national security system and that some recommendations should be applied to the system overall.

² Under the current government these are: Prime Minister, Minister National Security and Intelligence, Minister of Police, Minister of Justice, Minister Responsible for NZSIS, Minister Responsible for GCSB, Minister of Social Development and Employment, Minister of Ethnic Communities, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister for the Public Service, Minister of Statistics, Associate Minister of Justice.

³ National security agencies are DPMC, NZ Defence Force, NZSIS, NZ Customs Service, The Treasury, Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, NZ Police, GCSB, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Transport.

are developing a data collection standard that will enable government to collect better data on population diversity, which will be finalised and rolled out in 2024.

18. The role Kāpuia has played is to meet and hear from agencies as they have developed policy responses. This has helped agencies to build social licence and buy-in through early engagement and consultation on work programmes and has improved the accessibility of public-facing documents.
19. With these changes in place or underway, **there is an opportunity for you to** bring the government response to a conclusion by June 2024, while still meeting the Royal Commission's intent and lessons set out in the report. It is in the interests of those affected by the attacks for government to finalise decision-making on the response.
20. Concluding the response by June would not only embed the lessons of the report but recognises the evolution of the threat environment since 2019 and emerging areas of focus for the system. Issues such as foreign interference and disinformation have become more prominent, alongside other issues set out in the 2023 National Security and Intelligence Priorities and the National Security Strategy. The different fiscal environment is also likely to constrain the ability to invest in new initiatives. Some work will need to continue at departmental level, such as progress on information-sharing among agencies and with local government and embedding organisational changes that have been made in DPMC to help drive leadership and accountability of the national security system.

Direction on remaining issues will enable the government response to conclude by mid-2024

21. To date a total of 21 Royal Commission recommendations have been implemented and/or integrated into ongoing agency work programmes, while 23 recommendations are still considered 'in progress'. Of these remaining 23, **three (recommendations 27, 38 and 44) require your consideration to confirm how to proceed, and 11 recommendations need direction by other Ministers**. Work to implement the other ten recommendations can be progressed at departmental level unless you or other Ministers wish to redirect effort.
22. A full list of all 44 recommendations and a summary of progress is included as **attachment A**. This is colour coded to highlight recommendations for which you are directly responsible, as well as those where the decision-maker is another Minister. The table includes DPMC's views on how outstanding recommendations could be approached. However, we are aware that most responsible Ministers have not yet received detailed advice on these recommendations. We will work with your office to ensure you are kept up to date on advice as it is provided to other response Ministers.
23. The remainder of this briefing is divided into three sections:
 - Section one covers the range of decisions that other Ministers will need to consider in the first half of 2024. Most of these are in the realm of counterterrorism and national security, as well as firearms safety and hate speech. These outstanding issues provide context to inform your decisions as Lead Coordination Minister.

- Section two addresses specific decisions that require your consideration, namely on the role of Kāpuia, restorative justice, community engagement best practice and a draft Response Outcomes Framework.
- Section three highlights relevant community and stakeholder interest in the response.

Section one: Direction required by other Ministers

24. The decision-makers on the 11 key outstanding decisions noted above are the **Prime Minister**, including in his role as **Minister for National Security and Intelligence**, the **Minister of Police**, the **Minister of Justice**, the **Minister of Internal Affairs**, and the **Minister for the Public Service Commission** (who co-leads with the Prime Minister on recommendations on reform of the national security system). While detailed information on what is required is provided in **Attachment A**, some context on this work is provided below.

Most of the remaining decisions required are on counterterrorism and the national security system

25. The Prime Minister has responsibility for three recommendations on structure and leadership of the national security system (recommendations 1, 2, 3), and one on building public dialogue and social licence on national security issues (recommendation 16 on convening a national hui on countering violent extremism).

26. As Minister for National Security and Intelligence he has responsibility for a further three recommendations on the development of a new strategy on countering terrorism and violent extremism and establishing an advisory group on counterterrorism (recommendations 4, 7, 8).

27. The Minister of Police leads on recommendation 12, the multi-agency initiative for an accessible system to report behaviour or incidents with potential links to violent extremist behaviour. s9(2)(f)(iv)



Z Police plans to provide advice on this initiative to the Minister of Police in early 2024.

28. The Minister of Justice is responsible for recommendation 18 on reviewing counterterrorism legislation to ensure it is responsive to the evolving threat environment. DPMC supports a review given the evolution of terrorist activity since the Terrorism Suppression Act was introduced in 2002. The Minister has agreed to receive detailed advice on an approach to reviewing legislation in the second quarter of 2024.

There is one outstanding firearms recommendation, which may shift from the Police to the Justice portfolio

Briefing: Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Mosque Attacks: proposed approach.	DPMC 2023/24-647
---	------------------

29. The Minister of Police also currently leads on recommendation 24 which recommends introducing mandatory reporting of firearms injuries by health professionals. This is the only remaining firearms recommendation to be finalised. s9(2)(f)(iv)

Under the National-Act Coalition Agreement responsibility for this, along with other firearms policy issues, may shift to the Justice portfolio.

30. Under the National-Act Coalition Agreement there is also commitment to review the electronic firearms registry, which was set up in response to recommendation 20 of the Royal Commission. However, as this recommendation is already implemented, any future changes to the registry would be considered as part of core business.

The decision to stop work on changes to hate speech legislation impacts on two Royal Commission recommendations

31. The Royal Commission's recommendations on legal responses to hate include recommendation 39 (on hate motivated offences), recommendation 40, which was to create a provision in the Crimes Act 1961 for an "offence of inciting racial or religious disharmony" and recommendation 41, which was to "expand the definition of 'objectionable' in the Classifications Act to include racial superiority, hatred, and discrimination". The issues in these recommendations were collectively referred to the Law Commission in February 2023.

32. In accordance with the National-NZ First Coalition Agreement, the Minister of Justice agreed in December that the Government would not make any change to hate speech legislation and instructed the Law Commission to remove a review of legislation from its forward work programme. This means that recommendation 40 of the Royal Commission will not be implemented.⁴

33. The decision also impacts on recommendation 41, as without changes to hate speech legislation, expanding the definition of "objectionable" in the Classifications Act would create a legal inconsistency.

Four Royal Commission recommendations have been transitioned into the government's response to the Review of the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (ISA 2017).

34. In addition to the decisions required above, we note four recommendations that have not yet been fully implemented but are no longer being considered as part of the Royal Commission response. These are recommendations 6, 10, and parts of recommendations 17 and 18, which call for amendments to the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (ISA). In response to the Royal Commission, the scheduled independent review of the ISA was brought forward, and the report was delivered in February 2023. Policy advice to respond to the ISA review, including issues in these recommendations, will be provided to the Minister for National Security and

⁴ s9(2)(f)(iv)

Intelligence. Further information on how these are being addressed is provided against recommendations 6, 10, 17, and 18 in **Attachment A**.

A meeting with Ministers responsible for outstanding recommendations would set the direction for the remainder of the response

35. We recommend discussing these remaining recommendations with the relevant portfolio Ministers in early 2024. This would allow decision-makers to gain a common understanding of what is needed and align decisions with Government priorities and timeframes, for example what to continue and what to stop. DPMC is available to assist and provide additional briefing as required. Agencies have advised us that Ministers will be briefed in detail on these issues at various times in early 2024 – if you choose to proceed, DPMC will work with agencies to ensure Ministers are appropriately prepared to participate in a meeting.

36. You may also wish to include other Ministers, such as the Minister for Social Development and Employment and the Minister for Ethnic Communities due to their roles regarding the affected community.

Section two: Direction required by you as Lead Coordination Minister

37. In addition to your role in shaping the overall direction of the response, as Lead Coordination Minister you are currently responsible for three recommendations which require decisions:

- Recommendation 44 on the Ministerial Advisory Group Kāpuia, and its future role to June 2024.
- Recommendation 27 on potential restorative justice approaches for those affected.
- Recommendation 38 on community engagement.

38. You are also responsible for a decision on any future work on a Response Outcomes Framework to evaluate the response.

We recommend concluding the role of the Ministerial Advisory Group Kāpuia

39. Kāpuia was set up in response to recommendation 44 of the Royal Commission's report. It is made up of 28 members from diverse communities across New Zealand, almost half of whom identify as Muslim. Kāpuia's role has been to provide advice to the Lead Coordination Minister on the design of the Government's implementation plan and its roll-out. The former Lead Coordination Minister attended most Kāpuia meetings to engage with the group and hear their advice.

40. The Chair of Kāpuia, Arihia Bennett (Chief Executive of Ngāi Tahu), wrote to you on 28 November 2023 outlining which areas of the response the group saw as outstanding. The letter stated that more focused effort was needed to ensure communities were safe and free from hate and discrimination. It also raised concerns about the long-term support needs of the affected community. This is important feedback and reinforces the link between national security community resilience.

However, these issues will not be solved solely through the Royal Commission response and can be seen as part of ongoing government efforts.

41. We recommend responding to this letter once you have determined your preferred approach to concluding Kāpuia. We would also recommend meeting with the Chair of Kāpuia to convey your decision, which would be an opportunity to discuss any involvement Kāpuia could have in this process. Kāpuia meetings for 2024 are currently scheduled for 28 February, 16 April, and a concluding meeting on 23 May. Your decision will enable the Kāpuia secretariat (within DPMC) to confirm the schedule of meetings.

42. Kāpuia members' terms end on 9 June ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)}

[Redacted]

43. Two options for your consideration are:

- **Option 1: conclude the role of Kāpuia now.** ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)}

[Redacted]

- [Redacted]

- **Option 2: conclude the role of Kāpuia on 9 June** when the members' terms ends and commission Kāpuia to deliver a final report before then. This report could include a final set of insights on the response, the value of community advisory groups such as Kāpuia for similar responses, lessons learned, and, potentially, advice on where the government's future focus on national security issues should lie. This option would recognise the group's mana and contribution and provide an opportunity to hear from a range of community voices.

- ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)}

[Redacted]

44. On balance we recommend option 2, as it enables Kāpuia to round out its contribution to the government response and could support your engagement with the affected community. Subject to your decision, we will draft a response to Kāpuia for your consideration, which can include commissioning of a final report. We also recommend that you have a meeting with the Chair of Kāpuia to outline your decision and discuss the approach for finalising the response and the involvement of Kāpuia.

Addressing recommendation 27 on restorative justice

45. Recommendation 27 asks the government to: *discuss with affected family, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced.* Restorative justice is a broad concept encompassing a range of victim-centred processes. Increasingly, restorative justice processes are applied beyond direct victims and perpetrators to address wider issues after an offence, with the aim of restoring balance and ‘putting things right’ for the societies and communities impacted by wrongdoing.⁵

46. Restorative justice was not an immediate priority for the affected community, and work was delayed until the community had capacity to engage with this recommendation. In the interim, DPMC undertook significant research and analysis of restorative justice to support decision-making which was shared with the previous Lead Coordination Minister in July 2023. This advice summarised support already extended to the affected community, noted community expectations, and provided comparisons of how international partners (the UK, Norway, and Canada) have supported victims of terror events.

47. s9(2)(f)(iv)
[Redacted]

The intent of recommendation 27 has been met indirectly, s9(2)(f)(iv)
[Redacted]

48. Tailored government funding and support for those affected was established immediately after the attacks and continues to support ongoing recovery. This is mostly coordinated through the Ministry of Social Development. The affected community also engaged in, and helped shape the direction of, the government’s response to the Royal Commission. The Coronial Inquiry is providing further opportunities for the affected community to process and understand the events of the attack. Collectively, this work is assisting the affected community to recover.

49. s9(2)(f)(iv)
[Redacted]

⁵ s9(2)(a)
Legal restorative justice processes require both parties to be willing, able and safe to participate – these conditions are unlikely to be met.

⁶ New Zealand is a sponsor to Resolution 73/305. The resolution emphasised Member States’ commitment to victims, particularly by calling for the development of comprehensive assistance plans for victims of terrorism, to address their immediate, short-term and long-term relief and rehabilitation needs.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

[Redacted text block]

You will receive separate advice to help you decide how this recommendation could be concluded

51. This issue is nuanced, and we will provide separate advice for addressing it, building on the issues outlined above, as well as a communications and engagement plan. This advice will also outline how this work meets New Zealand’s international obligations and agreements on supporting victims of terrorism.

Concluding recommendation 38 on community engagement

52. This recommendation aims to enable greater citizen participation in government decision-making. It encourages all public sector community engagement to be in accordance with New Zealand’s Open Government Partnership commitments. This recommendation relates to work that is already underway by the Public Service Commission to deliver on New Zealand’s fourth Open Government Partnership (OGP) National Action Plan.

53. To help meet the intent of this recommendation DPMC’s Policy Project led the pilot and development of a Policy Community Engagement Tool, which the former Lead Coordination Minister instructed should be used by agencies carrying out engagement as part of the government response to the Royal Commission. We recommend this instruction stay in place until the response concludes, for continuity. The tool will remain available as a resource to agencies.

We do not recommend continuing work on a Response Outcomes Framework

54. In November 2021, the then Lead Coordination Minister outlined his intention to report back to Cabinet with a proposal for a framework to monitor the government’s response to the Royal Commission [CAB-21-MIN-0503]. This was not a recommendation of the Royal Commission but was commissioned to support implementation of the government’s response.

55. DPMC was commissioned to develop a Response Outcomes Framework which would show how the implementation of the government’s response had contributed to lasting change. A draft framework, including possible measures and a capability and maturity model, was developed. This was focussed on outcomes, aligned to the previous Government’s vision for the response of a “safe and inclusive” New Zealand. Cabinet

⁷ The Royal Commission did not consider this to be within the scope of their Terms of Reference.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

[Redacted text block]

Briefing: Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Mosque Attacks: proposed approach.	DPMC 2023/24-647
--	-------------------------

considered a draft in August last year [CAB-23-MIN-0398] and directed officials to finalise the Framework.

56. Indicators to measure the impact of the response have been drawn from existing government data sources including the census and regular public attitude surveys. Evaluating the response against these measures, the draft framework can help identify areas where the impact of the response has been greatest, as well as areas where future attention may be warranted to improve the safety and security of New Zealanders. The complex social nature of the proposed indicators, combined with the frequency of reporting, indicates that a 3-5-year evaluation period is required before any change would be apparent.
57. A significant amount of work would still need to be done to develop the framework. This would include identifying how gaps in existing data sources could be addressed and determining agency reporting responsibilities. Additional resources, including specialist monitoring and evaluation expertise, would be required to finalise the framework.
58. Separate to this, officials have begun working on ways to monitor outcomes in other national security contexts, including as part of implementing the National Security Strategy and the work ongoing work of the interagency Counterterrorism Coordination Committee. These may fulfil some of what the Response Outcomes Framework was intended to do.
59. To date, costs and resources required to develop the framework have been met from discrete Royal Commission funding. Therefore, any decision to progress the Response Outcomes Framework would require further funding beyond June 2024. Because of this as well as the significant level of work still required to complete development of the framework, and the passage of time before any significant reporting would be available we do not recommend further development of the framework.

Section three: Stakeholder interest

60. We expect the affected community, other stakeholders, and Kāpuia, will seek early assurances of the Government's continued commitment to the intent of the Royal Commission's report. Areas of particular interest are likely to include outstanding recommendations around national security leadership, legal responses to hate and firearms reform. Supporting the long-term needs of families, victims, and witnesses is also an area of continued interest.

Next steps

61. Officials are available to discuss aspects of this paper further with you as well as engaging with the affected community.
62. If you agree that it would be useful to discuss the Government's overall approach with your Ministerial colleagues, officials will support your meeting with further briefing as required.

63. Once you have determined your preferred direction, officials propose to prepare a draft Cabinet paper, in consultation with all response agencies, outlining the direction for the remainder of the response. The paper would demonstrate how the government has implemented recommendations and how this will continue to be embedded under business-as-usual settings, any further work that is agreed before June, and any work that should stop.

Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A	List of Royal Commission recommendations and implementation status	RESTRICTED

Proactively Released

Attachment A: List of recommendations and implementation status

Refer to attached A3

Proactively Released

Attachment A: List of Royal Commission recommendations and implementation status

Key

- **DECISIONS REQUIRED** are marked in red.
- **GREYED OUT BOXES** are used for recommendations where further ministerial decisions are not required in order to progress work (i.e. they can be progressed at departmental level or is already implemented or integrated into BAU) are listed in.
- **BLUE TEXT** is used to highlight where you are the lead portfolio minister in your capacity as Minister Responsible for the NZSIS or GCSB. This applies to recommendations 5, 9, 11, and 13.

Recommendation (summary)	Portfolio	Status	Advice and context
DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 1 <i>Ensure a Minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the counter-terrorism effort.</i>	Prime Minister	Commenced	s9(2)(g)(i)
DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 2 <i>Establish a new national intelligence and security agency.</i> Recommendation 3 <i>Investigate alternative mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the Security and Intelligence Board including the establishment of an Interdepartmental Executive Board.</i>	Prime Minister and Minister for the Public Service	Commenced	

Recommendation (summary)	Portfolio	Status	Advice and context
<p>DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 4 <i>Develop and implement a public facing strategy that addresses extremism and preventing, detecting, and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism.</i></p>	<p>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</p>	<p>In progress</p>	<p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p>
<p>Recommendation 5 <i>Amend the Public Finance Act 1989 to require intelligence and security agencies to provide performance information that can be subject to performance audit by Auditor-General.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Finance / Minister GCSB & NZSIS</p>	<p>In progress</p>	
<p>Recommendation 6 <i>Strengthen the role of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee so that it can provide better and informed cross-parliamentary oversight of the national security system (including the counter-terrorism effort) and priority setting, and members can access sensitive information as necessary for such oversight.</i></p>	<p>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</p>	<p>Integrated into the government response to the ISA Review 2017</p>	
<p>DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 7 <i>Establish an Advisory Group on counterterrorism, with its functions established in legislation.</i></p> <p>Recommendation 8 <i>Include in advice on the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and in the annual threatscape report, a summary of the advice provided in the preceding year by Advisory Group and the actions that have been taken in response to that advice.</i></p>	<p>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</p>	<p>Commenced</p>	

Proactively Released

Recommendation (summary)	Portfolio	Status	Advice and context
<p>Recommendation 9 <i>Improve intelligence and security information sharing practices:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) <i>changing “need to know” principle across relevant public sector agencies to facilitate information sharing, information sharing,</i>b) <i>oversee implementation of recommendations in 2019 Review of the New Zealand Security Classification System</i>	<p>Minister for National Security and Intelligence (9A)</p> <p>Minister responsible for NZSIS (9B)</p>	<p>In progress</p> <p>9A in progress 9B implemented</p>	<p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p>
<p>Recommendation 10 <i>Amend the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 with respect to direct access agreements, to require the new national intelligence and security agency, and in the interim the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to regularly report to the responsible Minister for the counterterrorism effort on their establishment and implementation.</i></p>	<p>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</p>	<p>Integrated into the government response to the ISA Review 2017</p>	
<p>Recommendation 11 <i>Direct chief executives of public sector agencies involved in the counterterrorism effort to consider whether they have an appropriate number of their employees that have security clearances and ensure that those staff have appropriate access to facilities and information management and technology systems as required.</i></p>	<p>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</p> <p>Minister responsible for GCSB</p>	<p>In progress</p>	
<p>DECISION REQUIRED</p> <p>Recommendation 12 <i>Develop and promote an accessible reporting system that enables members of the public to easily and safely report concerning behaviours or incidents to a single contact point within government.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Police</p>	<p>In progress</p>	

Proactively Released

Recommendation (summary)	Portfolio	Status	Advice and context
Recommendation 13 <i>Develop and publish indicators and risk factors that illustrate for the public specific behaviours that may demonstrate a person's potential for engaging in violent extremism and terrorism and update them regularly as the threatscape evolves.</i>	Minister for National Security and Intelligence Minister Responsible for NZSIS	Integrated into an ongoing work programme	s9(2)(g)(i)
Recommendation 14 <i>Establish a programme to fund independent NZ-specific research.</i>	Minister for National Security and Intelligence	Implemented	
Recommendation 15 <i>Create opportunities to improve public understanding on violent extremism and terrorism in NZ, with ongoing public discussions.</i>	Minister for National Security and Intelligence	Integrated into an ongoing work programme	
DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 16 <i>Direct the chief executive of the new national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 2) to host an annual countering violent extremism and terrorism hui</i>	Prime Minister	Implemented*	
Recommendation 17 <i>Require in legislation:</i> a. <i>the Minister for National Security and Intelligence to publish during every parliamentary cycle the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and refer them to the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee for consideration.</i> b. <i>the responsible minister to publish an annual threatscape report; and the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee to receive and consider submissions on the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and the annual threatscape report.</i>	Minister for National Security and Intelligence	Integrated into the government response to the ISA Review 2017	

Proactively Released

Recommendation (summary)	Portfolio	Status	Advice and context
<p>DECISION REQUIRED</p> <p>Recommendation 18</p> <p><i>Review all legislation related to the counterterrorism effort to ensure it is current and enables public sector agencies to operate effectively, prioritising consideration of the creation of precursor terrorism offences in the Terrorism Suppression Act, the urgent review of the effect of section 19 of the Intelligence and Security Act on target discovery and acceding to and implementing the Budapest Convention.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Justice</p>	<p>In progress</p> <p>Part of this recommendation has been integrated into the government response to the ISA Review 2017</p>	<p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p> <p><i>Proactively Released</i></p>
<p>Recommendation 19</p> <p><i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to make policies and standards and guidance for the firearms licensing system clear and consistent with legislation.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Police</p>	<p>Integrated into an ongoing work programme</p>	
<p>Recommendation 20</p> <p><i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to introduce electronic system for processing firearms licence applications.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Police</p>	<p>Integrated into an ongoing work programme</p>	
<p>Recommendation 21</p> <p><i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to ensure firearms licensing staff have regular training and undertake periodic reviews of the quality of their work.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Police</p>	<p>Integrated into an ongoing work programme</p>	
<p>Recommendation 22</p> <p><i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to introduce performance indicators that focus on the effective implementation of the firearms licensing system.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Police</p>	<p>Integrated into an ongoing work programme</p>	
<p>Recommendation 23</p> <p><i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to require two new processes for applicants who have lived outside of New Zealand for substantial periods of time in the ten years preceding the application.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Police</p>	<p>Integrated into an ongoing work programme</p>	

Recommendation (summary)	Portfolio	Status	Advice and context
<p>DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 24 <i>Introduce mandatory reporting of firearms injuries to New Zealand Police by health professionals.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Police (or Associate Minister of Justice)</p>	<p>In progress</p>	<p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p>
<p>Recommendation 25 <i>Direct the Ministry of Social Development to work with relevant public sector agencies including New Zealand Police, the Accident Compensation Corporation, the Ministry of Justice, Immigration New Zealand and non-government organisations to facilitate coordinated access to ongoing recovery support for affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack, including assigning each whānau, survivor or witness a continuing single point of contact who will navigate all required Public sector support on their behalf.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Social Development</p>	<p>Implemented</p>	
<p>Recommendation 26 <i>Investigate establishing a Collective Impact Network and Board or other relevant mechanism that enables agencies, non-government organisations and affected whānau, survivors and witnesses to agree a specific work programme to provide ongoing wrap-around services.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Social Development</p>	<p>Implemented</p>	
<p>DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 27 <i>Direct the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced.</i></p>	<p>Lead Coordination Minister</p>	<p>Commenced</p>	
<p>Recommendation 28 <i>Announce that the Minister for Social Development and Employment and the Ministry of Social Development have responsibility and accountability for coordinating a whole-of-government approach to building social cohesion, including social inclusion.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Social Development</p>	<p>Implemented</p>	
<p>Recommendation 29 <i>Direct MSD to discuss and collaborate with communities, civil society, local government, and the private sector on the development of a social cohesion strategic framework and the monitoring and evaluation regime.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Social Development</p>	<p>Implemented</p>	
<p>Recommendation 30 <i>Investigate the machinery of government options for an agency focused on ethnic communities and multiculturalism and establish a fit for purpose organisational design that will encompass the current functions expected of the Office of Ethnic Communities.</i></p>	<p>Minister for Ethnic Communities</p>	<p>Implemented</p>	
<p>Recommendation 31 <i>Prioritise development of appropriate measures and indicators (such as the Living Standards Framework) of social cohesion, including social inclusion.</i></p>	<p>Minister of Social Development</p>	<p>Implemented</p>	

Recommendation (summary)	Portfolio	Status	Advice and context
Recommendation 32 Require public sector agencies to prioritise the collection of data on ethnic and religious demographics to support analysis and advice on the implications of New Zealand’s rapidly changing society, inform better policy making and enhance policy evaluation.	Minister of Statistics and Minister for Ethnic Communities	In progress	s9(2)(g)(i)
Recommendation 33 Direct the chief executives of the public sector agencies involved in the counterterrorism effort to continue focusing efforts on significantly increasing workforce diversity, including in leadership roles, and in consultation with the Advisory Group on counter-terrorism (recommendation 7).	Minister for Public Service	In progress	
Recommendation 34 Public Service Commissioner to publish annual reporting on progress made by agencies against the Papa Pounamu commitments, particularly agencies involved in CT.	Minister for Public Service	Integrated into an ongoing work programme	
Recommendation 35 Public Service Commissioner to continue efforts on significantly increasing workforce diversity and attracting diverse talent for public service leadership roles at 1st, 2nd and 3rd tiers.	Minister for Public Service	Integrated into an ongoing work programme	
Recommendation 36 Invest in opportunities for young New Zealanders to learn about their role, rights and responsibilities and on the value of ethnic and religious diversity, inclusivity, conflict resolution, civic literacy and self-regulation	Minister for Education	In progress	
Recommendation 37 Create opportunities for regular public conversations led by the responsible minister –for all New Zealanders to share knowledge and improve their understanding of social cohesion and the value that ethnic and religious diversity can contribute to a well-functioning society.	Minister of Social Development	Implemented	
DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 38 Require all public sector community engagement to be in accordance with New Zealand’s Open Government Partnership commitments and in particular: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. require agencies to be clear about the degree of influence that community engagement has on associated decision-making by indicating to communities where the engagement sits on the International Association for Public Participation IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum; and 2. encourage agencies to undertake more “involve” and “collaborate” levels of engagement in accordance with the International Association for Public Participation IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum. 	Lead Coordination Minister	In progress	

Recommendation (summary)	Portfolio	Status	Advice and context
Recommendation 39 <i>Amend legislation to create hate-motivated offences in:</i> 1. <i>the Summary Offences Act 1981 that correspond with the existing offences of offensive behaviour or language, assault, wilful damage and intimidation; and</i> 2. <i>the Crimes Act 1961 that correspond with the existing offences of assaults, arson and intentional damage</i>	Minister of Justice	Commenced	s9(2)(g)(i)
Recommendation 40 <i>Repeal section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 and insert a provision in the Crimes Act 1961 for an offence of inciting racial or religious disharmony, based on an intent to stir up, maintain or normalise hatred, through threatening, abusive or insulting communications with protected characteristics that include religious affiliation.</i>	Minister of Justice	Not implemented	
DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 41 <i>Amend the definition of "objectionable" in section 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 to include racial superiority, racial hatred and racial discrimination.</i>	Minister of Internal Affairs	Commenced	
Recommendation 42 <i>Direct New Zealand Police to revise the ways in which they record complaints of criminal conduct to capture systematically hate-motivations for offending and train frontline staff</i>	Minister of Police	In progress	
Recommendation 43 <i>Ensure a minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the response</i>	Prime Minister	Implemented	
DECISION REQUIRED Recommendation 44 <i>Establish an Implementation Oversight Advisory Group.</i>	Lead Coordination Minister	Implemented	



Briefing to the Incoming Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

Date

4 December 2023

Priority

Routine

Security classification

~~IN CONFIDENCE~~

Introduction

Welcome to your role as Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques.

This briefing sets out the:

- background information on the Royal Commission report and recommendations (see also Annex A)
- context for this portfolio, your roles and responsibilities, and how the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) can support you;
- key areas of focus requiring consideration or decisions within the first few months, while building towards the fifth anniversary of the attacks on 15 March 2024; and
- our interest in having early discussions with you on the Government's future response to the Royal Commission report.

Following the delivery of this Royal Commission's report and its 44 recommendations, a cross-government work programme was initiated to improve New Zealand's national security system and counter-terrorism effort, enhance community safety and to build social cohesion and inclusion. There are 17 agencies involved in the Government's response.

DPMC is:

- the coordinating agency;
- responsible to you on two recommendations related to community engagement (Recommendation 27 – with the 15 March community, and Recommendation 38 – with all communities); and
- responsible to the Minister for National Security and Intelligence, and is responsible or responsible with other agencies for 17 recommendations relating to national security and preventing and countering terrorism.

DPMC is available to support you as required:

- as Lead Coordination Minister (a role established in response to Royal Commission Recommendation 43) – by ensuring agencies are aware of related issues and progress, reporting to ministers and to the public on the overall response progress;
- on matters relating to the appointment of and providing the secretariat support to the ministerial advisory group on the implementation and oversight of the Government response, known as Kāpuia (established under Recommendation 44);
- through the Policy Community Engagement Tool, to encourage all public sector community engagements to be consistent with the Open Government Partnership and the International Association for Public Participation IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum¹ (under Recommendation 38);
- preparing information and options for discussing restorative justice processes with the whānau, survivors and witnesses of the attack (under Recommendation 27); and

¹ The International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) spectrum of Inform-Consult-Involve-Collaborate-Empower.

- developing an inter-agency outcomes framework to assess the impact of the response to the Royal Commission's report and recommendations – the Response Outcomes Framework.

There are numerous stakeholders interested in the Government's Royal Commission response, including the affected community, faith and ethnic organisations, and others interested in the recommended changes to the national security system and to enhancing social cohesion. These stakeholders will be pleased a Lead Coordination Minister has been appointed and will continue to seek information about the Government's priorities for the response.

We would like an early opportunity to meet with you and to provide you with advice on potential areas of focus for the Royal Commission response over the next Parliamentary term, including:

- Seeking **your priorities** for the Government's response to the Royal Commission report and recommendations. To support your decisions on this, we will provide a separate paper seeking your direction and priorities for the future of the Royal Commission response. Matters to be canvassed in this future response paper are likely to include possible timeframes for decisions on key pieces of work, concerns of the whānau, survivors and witnesses of the attack (affected community), and governance and oversight of the response. This may result in a Cabinet paper in 2024.
- Working with other ministers to ensure **public conversations** are well-informed and engaged on national security threats, with the intention of building trust and social cohesion across all communities living in New Zealand.
- Supporting the Minister of National Security and Intelligence to respond to **17 recommendations on counter-terrorism and New Zealand's national security system** in that portfolio.
- Supporting other ministers to respond to the Royal Commission's other recommendations.
- Options for you regarding the **Response Outcomes Framework**, for monitoring and evaluating the overall response to the Royal Commission report, which Cabinet agreed should proceed to business case development for report back early in 2024 [DPMC-2023/24-123].
- Unless you wish to reframe its role earlier, **an independent ministerial advisory group - Kāpuia** - is in place and will continue to provide advice on the Government response (as expected under Recommendation 44) for the remainder of current members' terms. Current funding for Kāpuia concludes on 30 June 2024.

Support to the 15 March affected community has been at the heart of the response and they will possibly seek an early indication of the Government's ongoing support. Three of the 44 Royal Commission recommendations directly relate to the affected community:

- The Ministry of Social Development leads on –
 - the Kaiwhakaoranga Specialist Case Management Service (Recommendation 25, which coordinates services for the affected community) and
 - the former Collective Impact Board (established under Recommendation 26, this board has concluded its work this month).
- DPMC currently leads on options for discussions with the affected community on restorative justice processes (Recommendation 27).

The following table summarises pressing matters for this portfolio; these are further discussed later in this document:

	For Action	For Awareness
December	<p>You and the Prime Minister may receive early questions on the Government's ongoing commitment to the Royal Commission report and response work programme.</p> <p>Suggested talking points will be available for any immediate questions to you and the Prime Minister.</p> <p>Briefing and discussion with officials on current progress and future priorities for the Royal Commission response work programme. A separate briefing will be submitted to support discussions.</p>	<p>In addition to this BIM, you will receive two letters from Kāpuia regarding the future of the response to the Royal Commission report.</p> <p>s9(2)(g)(ii)</p> <p>DPMC, MFAT, the Ministry for Ethnic Communities and other agencies are engaging directly with Jewish, Palestinian, Arab and Muslim communities in New Zealand – who are all reporting a rapidly declining sense of security and safety in their communities in New Zealand.</p> <p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p> <p>The Chairperson of Kāpuia will seek a meeting with you in December, to discuss Kāpuia's priorities, its letters to you and its future role. Kāpuia will invite you to meet in February 2024, if not before then.</p>
December/ January	<p>Options will be proposed and decisions sought on government and ministerial engagements with the affected community in the lead up to the fifth anniversary of the attacks on 15 March 2024.</p> <p>Discussion on the possible future of Kāpuia and its governance.</p> <p>Respond to Kāpuia's letters of advice.</p>	<p>Initial decisions for 2024 discussions (not yet commenced) with the affected community on possible restorative justice processes (Recommendation 27) will also be required. A separate paper will be submitted on this, and officials will be available to discuss these options.</p>

February/ March	You will be invited to attend Kāpuia’s first meeting for 2024, likely to be scheduled for late February.	Proactive release of this BIM and the letters of advice from Kāpuia to the incoming government and responses to Kāpuia.
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Your roles and responsibilities

Response coordination

In 2020, and in response to Recommendation 43 of the Royal Commission report, a Lead Coordination Minister for the Government’s Response to the Royal Commission’s Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques was appointed. The letter of appointment for that Minister stated the role would have the “lead coordinating role” on the implementation of the Royal Commission’s recommendations, and that this would include convening a group of Ministers to respond to the recommendations and to coordinate the wider government response and any resulting work programme.

To deliver on this expectation, the previous Lead Coordination Minister has:

- Coordinated liaison with relevant ministers and reporting, including public reporting, on the progress of the Government response;
- Overseen and liaised with Kāpuia, including regularly meeting with the advisory group and coordinating Government responses to Kāpuia’s letters of advice; and
- Supported Ministerial colleagues’ responses on specific recommendations – e.g. as co-lead with the Minister of Police on New Zealand Police’s work on Recommendation 12 (for a public reporting system for concerning behaviours and incidents), and the planned report-back to Cabinet.

Portfolio lead

The Lead Coordination Minister has had portfolio responsibility for:

- Recommendation 27 - that conversations on restorative justice should occur with the 15 March affected community.
- Recommendation 38 - that Government agencies are expected to use the IAP2 framework to support community engagement.
- Recommendation 44 - that there should be an independent oversight advisory group, Kāpuia. Kāpuia provides advice to you on how agencies are implementing the Royal Commission report, gaps and opportunities in the Government’s response programme, and feedback to response agencies. You are responsible for the appointments, terms of reference and funding of Kāpuia, as well as for responding to Kāpuia’s letters of advice.
 - The current appointments of Kāpuia members conclude 9 June 2024, and funding for Kāpuia and the secretariat supporting it concludes 30 June 2024.

- If you wish Kāpuia to run for a longer period, we would appreciate an early opportunity to discuss matters related to future appointments and resourcing.
- Alternatively, the Government could direct Kāpuia should conclude earlier than 9 June 2024.

Related Ministerial portfolios

You will receive updates and advice on Royal Commission recommendations from the GCSB and NZSIS in your capacity as Minister Responsible for those agencies.

The Prime Minister, in his capacity as Minister for National Security and Intelligence, will also receive Royal Commission advice and updates from DPMC on the 17 recommendations that fall within that portfolio.

Other key colleagues with responsibility for significant areas of ongoing Royal Commission-related work and with whom you may want to engage early include:

- Minister of Justice
- Minister of Police
- Minister for Ethnic Communities
- Minister for Social Development and Employment
- Minister of Internal Affairs
- Minister of Immigration
- Minister of Education.

Subsequent briefings will provide further advice on potentially convening a meeting of ministers responsible for Royal Commission work.

Engagement

In addition to meeting the affected community after the Royal Commission report was accepted, the then Lead Coordination Minister, together with the then Minister for Diversity, Inclusion and Ethnic Communities, led a series of hui with Muslim, wider ethnic and faith, and other communities around the country in 2021.

Those Ministers also engaged with affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the attack and representatives of the wider Christchurch community in September 2022. The then Lead Coordination Minister, who was also the Minister of Immigration, most recently met with the affected community in Christchurch on 13 September 2023. You and your colleagues will be invited to consider further engagement with the affected community, supported by officials.

Whilst the Minister for Ethnic Communities could undertake significant engagement with the affected community, you may wish to also consider a having a member of the Government who is well-known in Christchurch to support you as a conduit with this community.

Background – the Royal Commission response

Fifty-one people were killed in the terrorist attack on 15 March 2019, many more were injured, and it was perpetrated on people during peaceful religious observance. New Zealanders' sense of safety was affected by violence and terrorism in a way that had not previously been experienced in New Zealand. The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 was established to investigate the terrorist's activities before 15 March 2019.

Information about the inquiry and the report are attached (see **Annex A**).

The Government response to date

The vision adopted by the previous Government for the response to the Royal Commission was a **diverse, inclusive, and safe Aotearoa New Zealand**. Guiding principles for the response to the report were set as follows:

- Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its principles will guide the response.
- Survivors of the attack and affected whānau will be at the centre of the response.
- We will strive for safer communities and a New Zealand that's more inclusive, with equal protections for all.
- We will be accountable and forward looking.
- We will be proactive in reaching out to communities.
- We will take practical actions that make a difference to people's lives.

To help give effect to these principles, wide-ranging community engagement and advice from Kāpuia have informed policy and operational responses.

The response to the report and recommendations was phased:

- On 7 December 2020, the Government accepted the Royal Commission report, agreed with the report's findings, agreed in-principle with the report's 44 recommendations and approved initial funding for initiatives which could be implemented rapidly².
- On 8 December 2020, the Prime Minister apologised in Parliament for failings identified in the Royal Commission report and announced the Government's response³.
- On 8 March 2021, Cabinet agreed a phased approach for the response, that a ministerial advisory group (under Recommendation 44, and later named Kāpuia) would report to the Lead Coordination Minister, and that a Collective Impact Board (Recommendation 26) would be established.
- A more comprehensive long-term response work programme was confirmed by Cabinet on 29 November 2021, and this has been publicly reported on.

² CAB-20-MIN-0513 Minute and CAB-20-MIN-0516 Minute refer.

³ [Prime Minister's comments on Royal Commission into Christchurch Terror Attack | Beehive.govt.nz](#), 8 December 2020.

Response coordination for system-level change

A Royal Commission Response Steering Group (the steering group) was established within government to support the inter-agency coordination and delivery of the Royal Commission response work programme. Chaired by DPMC, the steering group includes representatives from the 17 agencies leading work on the response and meets regularly to share updates on agencies' progress, as well as enabling DPMC to report progress to the Lead Coordination Minister.

As Lead Coordination Minister, you will be supported by advice from DPMC. While the response to the Royal Commission report and recommendations continues (until Cabinet decides the response has concluded), funding for this support concludes on 30 June 2024. DPMC's Chief Executive would welcome an early opportunity to discuss your priorities for the response, as well as any potential resourcing required if applicable.

Kāpuia

The Lead Coordination Minister has previously regularly attended Kāpuia meetings and the Chair of Kāpuia is always available to discuss Kāpuia's advice with you. Kāpuia provides advice to you on progress and concerns regarding the Government's response to Royal Commission report, and provides feedback directly to government agencies at various stages of the policy process. Kāpuia currently has 28 members who bring a diverse set of experiences to the group (a range of ages, faith, ethnic, cultural backgrounds and geographic areas), with about half of members identifying as Muslim. Members are appointed until 9 June 2024, and funding for Kāpuia concludes 30 June 2024. Kāpuia is currently chaired by Arihia Bennett (the Chief Executive of Ngāi Tahu).

Kāpuia has provided seven formal letters of advice (all published online⁴). Key items of interest for Kāpuia are the ongoing needs of the affected community, the importance of implementing the recommended reforms of the national security system, and reducing racism and discrimination in New Zealand. Kāpuia has separately written to you advising its recommended priorities for the Royal Commission response.

Strategic context and current challenges

New Zealand faces a range of complex and disruptive security challenges that are impacting individuals and communities more directly than ever before. These challenges are changing rapidly and span terrorism and violent extremism, foreign interference, and disinformation and identity motivated personal attacks through social media meaning people are feeling less safe. The Royal Commission's report canvases a spectrum of recommended societal and system changes - from national security and preventing and countering violent extremism through to increasing community safety, social cohesion and inclusion.

In 2022 and 2023, a series of strategic documents were published. At the social end of that spectrum, these included:

⁴ <https://www.dPMC.govt.nz/our-programmes/special-programmes/kapuia-ministerial-advisory-group/advice-kapuia>

- The Education Review Office (ERO) published its Long-Term Insights Briefing in March 2023 - ***Education For All Our Children: Embracing Diverse Ethnicities***. This highlights racism and discrimination being experienced by ethnic communities and especially children and young people in New Zealand - too often this is not taken seriously by their school. ERO's findings demonstrate the long-term nature of some of the recommendations of the Royal Commission's report on the need to address concerns through education and of building a more cohesive society.
- ***Social Cohesion in Aotearoa New Zealand 2022*** is a high-level plan produced by the Ministry of Social Development on what social cohesion looks like in New Zealand and how we can get there – for government, organisations, communities, and people to understand and increase social cohesion in their own lives and work.

Towards the national security and preventing violent extremism side of the spectrum, these included:

- ***New Zealand's Security Threat Environment 2023*** provides the first comprehensive assessment on the threats of violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage facing contemporary New Zealand, this was released in August 2023.
- ***Let's talk about our national security*** – the 2023 national security Long-Term Insights Briefing, published by DPMC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, on behalf of National Security Board (NSB)⁵ Chief Executives. It aims to build greater awareness and understanding among New Zealanders about national security issues and threats of concern to the national security community and the public.
- New Zealand's first ***National Security Strategy - Secure Together***, was released in August 2023 to better protect New Zealand from increasing national security threats. The Strategy provides overarching direction to the national security community, led by DPMC, to support Ministers in navigating a more challenging security environment. The Strategy outlines a **vision** for a secure and resilient New Zealand, describes our country's security outlook, and sets out our **national security interests and outcomes**. The Strategy also describes the **12 core national security issues** that most directly affect our national security interests and that agencies work on every day, which span terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organised crime, foreign interference, cyber security, and more.
- The ***2023 National Security Intelligence Priorities*** are linked to the National Security Strategy. These 14 priorities reflect where agencies' intelligence resources should be prioritised to best support decision-making on national security.

Some stakeholder groups and Kāpuia have called for specific **decisions on national security reforms** – for there to be greater clarity about who is responsible for leading these strategic changes, developing comprehensive implementation plans, and developing monitoring programmes. This is discussed further under Immediate Priorities.


Concerns from the affected community are also ongoing, and include:

⁵ The National Security Board is composed of the 11 Chief Executives of the national security community and the Executive Director of DPMC's National Security Group. In addition to DPMC, its membership includes the Government Communications Security Bureau, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Customs Service, New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Police, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Treasury and Ministry of Transport.

- The community continues to grieve and trauma is manifesting in different ways over time. s9(2)(a)
- While the immediate needs of this community were met early, the community is concerned there are continuing and evolving issues facing at least some of them. The circumstances of the impacted families have also changed, especially as children grow and some widows look for work.
- The Coronial Inquiry process currently underway is making the community more aware of the trauma their loved ones faced during the attack (the first hearing in Christchurch commenced 24 October and runs to 15 December this year).

You will receive a separate briefing on overall progress and proposed next steps.

The graph below provides an 'at a glance' indication of progress on the response to the 44 recommendations as of October 2023. Annex A sets out the full text of the recommendations.



COMMENCED

Work is underway to stand up a programme of work to respond to a recommendation, including provision of advice to ministers and/or Cabinet. However, ministerial or Cabinet direction has not yet been received.

IN PROGRESS

Ministerial or Cabinet direction on the work has been given and implementation work is progressing.

IMPLEMENTED

The specific work to implement the recommendation, in line with ministerial or Cabinet direction, is completed. Further work may be required to integrate the initiative into ongoing work programmes.

INTEGRATING

Where relevant, the work is being – or has been- integrated into an agency's ongoing work programme.

Immediate priorities

While there has been good progress on the response to the Royal Commission's report, the graph above shows significant work is still required to fully address all the recommendations.

Recommended decisions for the first three months

With some resourcing for the response to the Royal Commission report and recommendations concluding 30 June 2024, the Government will need to take some decisions early in the new term:

- how the Government chooses to approach the remainder of the response to the Royal Commission report and its priorities;
- messaging for meetings with the 15 March affected community and other key stakeholders, who will expect advice from the Government on its focus and priorities for the response;
- the future role of (and potentially appointments to) Kāpuia; and
- timing and scope issues related to options for integrating the response into business-as-usual activity for government agencies.

Related to these discussions, will be any additional investment necessary to continue or complete the response. Some of your Ministerial colleagues will probably also be having discussions on initiatives under their portfolios, which may include work on:

- Recommendations 2 and 3 (on national security reform – led by DPMC);
- Recommendation 12 (a public reporting system for concerning behaviours and incidents – business case development led by NZ Police);
- Recommendation 16 (He Whenua Taurikura annual hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism – led by DPMC to the Minister for National Security and Intelligence, funding concludes 2023/24); and
- Recommendation 18 (a review of all counter-terrorism legislation – led by the Ministry of Justice).

Recommendations 2 and 3 – national security reform

The Royal Commission report recommended establishing a National Intelligence and Security Agency with a legislative mandate to provide strategic national security leadership functions (Recommendation 2). The Royal Commission also recommended investigating alternative mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the Chief Executives' Security and Intelligence Board to enhance strategic coordination across the system (Recommendation 3).

Changes to improve the national security system and enhance leadership mechanisms are underway. This has included rethinking the role and function of the Security and Intelligence Board, now renamed the National Security Board, which provides strategic governance at a Chief Executive level of the efforts of the national security community, by driving and implementing the National Security Strategy. The Board has agreed a new work programme driven by the Strategy, new agency responsibilities for the 12 core national security issues, and it has expanded membership to reflect the broader array of national security challenges facing New Zealand.

The National Security Group in DPMC is also being reconfigured to better support the Board and to better integrate intelligence and policy functions, which will deliver improved support to ministers.

The Chief Executive of DPMC will discuss these changes with the Prime Minister at an early opportunity.

Early engagements on the Royal Commission response

The previous Lead Coordination Minister regularly met with Kāpuia, whether in-person or online. Your attendance at the next Kāpuia meeting would be an excellent opportunity to meet the group and engage on the Government's priorities. Kāpuia will hold its next meeting in February 2024 (if not sooner). It expects to hold three meetings prior to 30 June 2024 and we will confirm these dates for your diary when they are available.

The third annual **He Whenua Taurikura hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism**, originally planned for December 2023, has been postponed to 2024. This conference is part of the response to the Royal Commission report and was established in response to Recommendation 16. It will have approximately 300 invited attendees. The Prime Minister and Lead Coordination Minister attended the first two hui. Officials will discuss with you whether you are able to attend this third hui.

Meeting with the affected community and stakeholders

The first phase inquest of the Coronial Inquiry into the deaths that occurred on or after 15 March 2019, runs from 24 October to 15 December 2023. This is raising many issues of concern for families of the deceased, victims and other members of the affected community s9(2)(a) - between the event, the Royal Commission of Inquiry, the court case and sentencing and now the Coronial Inquest).

Some members of the affected community will seek assurances that there will be a continued and dedicated government focus on the Royal Commission response, and especially on their ongoing needs. We propose a visit to Christchurch ahead of the fifth anniversary of the mosque attacks (15 March 2024) and Ramadan (which is likely to commence on or soon after 10 March 2024) and look forward to discussing options for this with you.

You are likely to receive early invitations to meet with key stakeholder groups from a variety of different communities, including national organisations from the Muslim, Jewish and other communities at risk of terrorism and violent extremism. DPMC can provide you with advice and support to engage with these groups.

Looking ahead – the response to the Royal Commission report

Ahead of engagements with the affected community and key stakeholders, and to inform potential approaches to any Budget 2024 processes, an early indication of the Government's intended commitment to the Royal Commission response work programme would be very helpful. These communities have sought constructive dialogue with government agencies, including around supporting them to feel safer, to help overcome discrimination, and on system improvements to support equitable outcomes. Since 2021, the response work programme and engagements with communities have also highlighted the complexity and scope of the issues raised by the Royal Commission report, and the need to make New Zealand safer and more inclusive.

As noted, a separate paper for you will discuss progress to date and options for the future priorities of the response. Significant progress has been made in a wide range of areas in the three years since the Royal Commission's report was received by Government. However, not all of the recommendations have been addressed formally and others will take time to incorporate into ongoing activities within government agencies and more broadly.

We will prepare options for discussion with you on the Royal Commission's recommendations to enable you to form a judgement on these and levels of continued focused government attention and resources for the response, together with related options on leadership and coordination, continuing a ministerial advice and oversight group, integration of the response, and monitoring and evaluation. You may also wish for us to provide you with advice and options on transitioning the response from a dedicated work programme to an approach that is integrated into business-as-usual activity for government agencies.

Recommendation 27

The Royal Commission report proposed the Government discusses restorative justice processes with the affected community (Recommendation 27). While such processes are used between individuals in the justice system, broader restorative processes are also used to support communities to heal and move forward after traumatic events. s9(2)(a) [REDACTED], although this was not a recommendation per se of the Royal Commission.

A response to this recommendation has not yet been activated, but officials would appreciate an early opportunity to discuss some of the issues and options with you. A separate paper will propose pathways forward s9(2)(f)(iv) [REDACTED]

Immediate upcoming papers

To support discussions on the matters raised above, the following papers will be submitted after this BIM:

- The future of the Government response to the Royal Commission report and recommendations, including: a more detailed status update on progress made on the 44 Royal Commission recommendations, options for future Royal Commission response priorities (and potential resourcing implications), and the future of Kāpuia.

- Options for meetings with the affected community, including for progressing restorative justice discussions with the affected community (Recommendation 27) and ongoing leadership of this workstream.
- Briefing on the development of a draft Response Outcomes Framework approved by Cabinet in 2024, and related business case development to measure the ongoing impact of the Royal Commission response.

Funding and reporting is managed by DPMC

DPMC administers all appropriations within Vote Prime Minister and Cabinet. Funding for support for the Royal Commission Lead Coordination Minister sits within the Advice and Support Services Multi-Category Appropriation. All that funding, including for Kāpuia, is time limited.

DPMC is responsible for coordinating the annual accountability process, responses for the Governance and Administration Select Committee hearings, and funding proposals. As part of the Estimates of the Appropriations passed by Parliament, performance measures are attached to funding within your portfolio. This includes an annual Ministerial satisfaction survey which you will be asked to complete, although we appreciate feedback at any time.

Proactively Released

Annex A - The Royal Commission report

The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 was established to investigate the individual's activities before 15 March 2019 and to look into:

- a) what Public sector agencies knew about the individual, before 15 March 2019;
- b) what Public sector agencies did (if anything) with that knowledge;
- c) whether there was anything else Public sector agencies could have done to prevent the terrorist attack; and
- d) what else Public sector agencies should do to prevent such terrorist attacks in the future.

The Royal Commission had to make findings on:

- a) whether Public sector agencies had information that could have alerted them to the terrorist attack;
- b) how Public sector agencies worked with each other and shared information;
- c) whether Public agencies failed to anticipate the attack because of an inappropriate focus of counter-terrorism resources;
- d) whether Public sector agencies failed to meet required standards or were in some way at fault; and
- e) any other matters necessary to provide a complete report.

The Royal Commission had to make recommendations on:

- a) what improvements should be made to the way Public sector agencies gather, share and analyse information;
- b) how Public sector agency systems or operational practices could be improved to prevent future terrorist attacks; and
- c) any other matters to provide a complete report.

These recommendations could include changes to legislation (except firearms legislation), policy, rules, standards or practices.

The Royal Commission could not inquire into:

- a) the guilt or innocence of any individual who has been, or may be, charged with offences in relation to the terrorist attack;
- b) amendments to firearms legislation;
- c) activities of organisations outside of the Public sector, such as media platforms; and
- d) how Public sector agencies responded to the terrorist attack once it had begun.

The Royal Commission **started on 10 April 2019** and began receiving evidence on 13 May 2019. The inquiry had several overlapping phases from establishment to engagement with communities, research and evidence gathering, holding evidential interviews, analysis and deliberations, and report development and presentation. The final report to the Governor-General was delivered on **26 November 2020**.

Consolidated findings from the RCOI

Whether Public sector agencies had information that could have alerted them to the terrorist attack? and how Public sector agencies worked with each other and shared information?

- The only information about the individual that was known by New Zealand Public sector agencies before 15 March 2019 that could or should have alerted them to the terrorist attack was the email sent by the individual to the Parliamentary Service. The Parliamentary Service acted appropriately within a period of time that was reasonable in the circumstances in response to the email sent just before the terrorist attack.
- There was no failure in information sharing.

Whether Public agencies failed to anticipate the attack because of an inappropriate focus of counter-terrorism resources?

- The concentration of counter-terrorism resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism before the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service's baselining project began in 2018 was not based on an informed assessment of the threats of terrorism associated with other ideologies; and did not result from a system-wide decision that counter-terrorism resources should continue to be allocated almost exclusively to the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism. It was therefore inappropriate. But the concentration of resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism did not contribute to the individual's planning and preparation for his terrorist attack not being detected.

Whether Public sector agencies failed to meet required standards or were in some way at fault?

- No Public sector agency involved in the counter-terrorism effort failed to meet required standards or was otherwise at fault in respects that were material to the individual's planning and preparation for his terrorist attack not being detected.
- New Zealand Police failed to meet required standards in the administration of the firearms licensing system.

The Royal Commission Recommendations

There are **themes and issues** that weighed heavily on the Royal Commission as it considered recommendations including the need to confront and engage openly with hard issues. The Royal Commission looked at Public sector activities involving the firearms licensing system, the counter-terrorism effort and social cohesion and embracing diversity. Each of these was characterised by limited political ownership and an absence of public discussion. These themes underpinned the Royal Commission's four areas for change:

- **Strong government leadership and direction are required** to provide effective oversight and accountability of the counter-terrorism effort and position New Zealand (and in particular the Public sector) to respond and adapt to New Zealand's increasingly diverse population and to effect the social shift that over time will help to achieve a safe and inclusive New Zealand.

- **Engaged and accountable government decision-making** will enable Public sector policies, programmes and services to be designed and delivered that meet the requirements of New Zealand’s increasingly diverse society. The Public sector mindset must shift to value communities’ input into decisions, transparency and engaging in robust debate.
- **Everyone in society has a role in making New Zealand safe and inclusive** but there is no common understanding of what those roles are, how they relate to each other and what they should be seeking to achieve. The Government will have to ensure that New Zealand’s counter-terrorism effort is valued by the people it seeks to protect and that it promotes consistent messages about the benefits of diversity and an inclusive society.
- **New Zealand needs fit for purpose laws and policies** for intelligence terrorism, hate crime offences, hate speech and better recording of reports of hate crime.

The Royal Commission stated in Part 19 of the report that they provide benefits that support one another; are designed to achieve system and social change, with many of the recommendations underpinned by the principle of continuous improvement; should be read in the context of the whole report, are a package and are not suitable for piecemeal implementation.

The Royal Commission then made 44 recommendations under the following headings:

- Improving New Zealand’s national security system
- Improving New Zealand’s counter-terrorism effort.
- Improving New Zealand’s firearms licensing system.
- Supporting the ongoing recovery needs of affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack.
- Improving New Zealand’s response to our increasingly diverse population resulting in work to enhance social cohesion, education, and inclusion and reduce hate motivated speech and crime.

The Royal Commission recommended the Government:

1	Ensure a minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the counter-terrorism effort.
2	Establish a new national intelligence and security agency that is well-resourced and legislatively mandated to be responsible for strategic intelligence and security leadership functions including: <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) a chief executive who is designated as the intelligence and security adviser to the prime minister and to Cabinet and chairing the Security and Intelligence Board or the potential new governance body (Recommendation 3);b) operating as the sector lead and coordinator for strategic intelligence and security issues;c) developing a counter-terrorism strategy which includes countering violent extremism (Recommendation 4);d) providing strategic policy advice to the responsible minister(s) on intelligence and security issues;e) intelligence assessment and horizon scanning supported by deep expertise;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">f) leading the engagement with communities, civil society, local government and the private sector on strategic intelligence and security issues;g) ensuring the counter-terrorism effort conforms to New Zealand's domestic and international human rights obligations;h) leveraging the emergency management structures at the local and regional levels;i) system performance monitoring and reporting; andj) accountability to the minister for the performance of the counter-terrorism effort (Recommendation 1).
3	<p>Investigate alternative mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the Security and Intelligence Board including the establishment of an Interdepartmental Executive Board as provided for by the Public Service Act 2020 to, amongst other things:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) align and coordinate the work, planning and budgets across relevant Public sector agencies addressing all intelligence and security issues;b) report to the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee, including on current and emerging risks and threats, on a quarterly basis;c) in relation to the counter-terrorism effort:<ul style="list-style-type: none">i. recommend to Cabinet the strategy for preventing and countering extremism, violent extremism and terrorism developed by the national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 4); andii. ensure the activities to implement the strategy for addressing extremism and preventing, detecting and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism are identified, coordinated and monitored
4	<p>Develop and implement a public facing strategy that addresses extremism and preventing, detecting and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) is led by the new national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 2);b) is developed in collaboration with communities, civil society, local government and the private sector;c) sets the purpose and the direction of the strategy, with goals, milestones and performance measures;d) sets priorities for the counter-terrorism effort across Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery;e) defines roles and responsibilities for public sector agencies, communities, civil society, local government and the private sector to implement the strategy across Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery;f) has oversight from the responsible minister (Recommendation 1); andg) is reviewed within three years of publication in collaboration with public sector agencies, communities, civil society, local government, the private sector and the Advisory Group on Counter-Terrorism (Recommendation 7).

5	Amend the Public Finance Act 1989 to require the intelligence and security agencies to provide performance information that can be the subject of performance audit by the Auditor-General.
6	Strengthen the role of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee so that it can provide better and informed cross-parliamentary oversight of the national security system (including the counter-terrorism effort) and priority setting, and members can access sensitive information as necessary for such oversight.
7	Direct the chief executive of the new national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 2) to establish an Advisory Group on Counter-Terrorism : <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) responsible for providing advice to the National Intelligence and Security Agency and the Security and Intelligence Board or its replacement (Recommendations 2 and 3); andb) with functions to be established, in legislation as soon as practicable, but without delaying its establishment.
8	Direct the Chief Executive of the new National Intelligence and Security Agency (Recommendation 2) to include in advice on the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and in the annual threatscape report (Recommendation 17), a summary of the advice provided in the preceding year by Advisory Group on Counter-Terrorism (Recommendation 7) and the actions that have been taken in response to that advice.
9	Direct the new National Intelligence and Security Agency (Recommendation 2), and in the interim the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to improve intelligence and security information sharing practices , including: <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) driving a change in approach to the need-to-know principle across relevant public sector agencies, with special attention given to local government including the emergency management structures at the local and regional level, to ensure it enables rather than just restricts information sharing; andb) overseeing the implementation, within six months, of recommendations in the 2018 Review of the New Zealand Security Classification System:<ul style="list-style-type: none">i. expanding the classification system principles to provide that no information may remain classified indefinitely and that, where there is doubt as to the classification level, information is classified at the lower level;ii. revising and strengthening public sector agency guidance and developing training;iii. adopting a topic-based approach to systematic declassification of historic records; andiv. developing indicators of function and performance of the classification system.
10	Amend the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 with respect to direct access agreements, to require the new national intelligence and security agency, and in the interim the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to regularly report to the responsible minister for the counter-terrorism effort on their establishment and implementation.

11	Direct chief executives of public sector agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort to consider whether they have an appropriate number of their employees that have security clearance and ensure that those staff have appropriate access to facilities and information management and technology systems to be able to review relevant material as required.
12	Develop and promote an accessible reporting system that enables members of the public to easily and safely report concerning behaviours or incidents to a single contact point within government.
13	Develop and publish indicators and risk factors that illustrate for the public specific behaviours that may demonstrate a person's potential for engaging in violent extremism and terrorism and update them regularly as the threatscape evolves.
14	Establish a programme to fund independent New Zealand-specific research on the causes of, and measures to prevent, violent extremism and terrorism with the following provisions: <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) the national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 2) should be provided with a multi-year appropriation for research funding;b) research priorities and grant recipients should be selected by a panel comprising officials from the new national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 2) and representatives from the Advisory Group on Counter-Terrorism (Recommendation 7), with Advisory Group representatives forming the majority of the selection panel; andc) grant recipients should be encouraged to publish and present the results of their research at the annual hui on issues related to extremism and preventing, detecting and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism (Recommendation 16).
15	Create opportunities to improve public understanding of extremism and preventing, detecting and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism in New Zealand, led initially by the Minister for National Security and Intelligence, and including ongoing public discussions on: <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) the nature of New Zealand's counter-terrorism effort, including current risks and threats and how public sector agencies protect New Zealanders from the threat and risk of terrorism;b) who is involved in the counter-terrorism effort and their roles, recognising that communities, civil society, local government and the private sector are all part of the counter-terrorism effort, including, but not limited to, being important sources of information;c) the need to strike the balance between the privacy of individuals and the safety of individuals and communities and to understand the social licence for public sector agencies to engage in counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism activities;d) supporting the public to understand how to respond when they recognise the concerning behaviours and incidents that may demonstrate a person's potential for engaging in violent extremism and terrorism; and

	<p>e) how social cohesion, social inclusion and diversity contribute to an effective society.</p>
16	<p>Direct the Chief Executive of the new National Intelligence and Security Agency (Recommendation 2) to host an annual hui, to bring together relevant central and local government agencies, communities, civil society, the private sector and researchers (Recommendation 14) to create opportunities to build relationships and share understanding of countering violent extremism and terrorism.</p>
17	<p>Require in legislation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) the Minister for National Security and Intelligence to publish during every parliamentary cycle the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and refer them to the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee for consideration;b) the responsible minister (Recommendation 1) to publish an annual threatscape report; andc) the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee to receive and consider submissions on the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and the annual threatscape report.
18	<p>Review all legislation related to the counter-terrorism effort (including the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and the Intelligence and Security Act 2017) to ensure it is current and enables public sector agencies to operate effectively, prioritising consideration of the creation of precursor terrorism offences in the Terrorism Suppression Act, the urgent review of the effect of section 19 of the Intelligence and Security Act on target discovery and acceding to and implementing the Budapest Convention.</p>
19	<p>Direct New Zealand Police (or other relevant entity) to make policies and operational standards and guidance for the firearms licensing system clear and consistent with legislation.</p>
20	<p>Direct New Zealand Police (or other relevant entity) to introduce an electronic system for processing firearms licence applications.</p>
21	<p>Direct New Zealand Police (or other relevant entity) to ensure firearms licensing staff have regular training and undertake periodic reviews of the quality of their work.</p>
22	<p>Direct New Zealand Police (or other relevant entity) to introduce performance indicators that focus on the effective implementation of the firearms licensing system. Key indicators should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) regular performance monitoring of firearms licensing staff to ensure national standards are met; andb) public confidence in the firearms licensing system is increased (as measured by New Zealand Police citizens' satisfaction survey reports or similar mechanism).

23	<p>Direct New Zealand Police (or other relevant entity) to require two new processes in the case of applicants who have lived outside of New Zealand for substantial periods of time in the ten years preceding the application:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) applicants should be required to produce police or criminal history checks from countries in which they have previously resided; andb) Firearms Vetting Officers should interview family members or other close connections in other countries using technology if the applicant does not have near relatives or close associates living in New Zealand.
24	<p>Introduce mandatory reporting of firearms injuries to New Zealand Police by health professionals.</p>
25	<p>Direct the Ministry of Social Development to work with relevant public sector agencies including the Accident Compensation Corporation, Immigration New Zealand, the Ministry of Justice, New Zealand Police and non-government organisations to facilitate coordinated access to ongoing recovery support for affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack, including assigning each whānau, survivor or witness a continuing single point of contact who will navigate all required public sector support on their behalf.</p>
26	<p>Investigate establishing a Collective Impact Network and Board or other relevant mechanism that enables public sector agencies, non-government organisations and affected whānau, survivors and witnesses to agree a specific work programme to provide ongoing wrap-around services to affected whānau, survivors and witnesses.</p>
27	<p>Direct the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, witnesses and survivors of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced.</p>
28	<p>Announce that the Minister for Social Development and Employment and the Ministry of Social Development have responsibility and accountability for coordinating a whole-of-government approach to building social cohesion, including social inclusion.</p>
29	<p>Direct the Ministry of Social Development to discuss and collaborate with communities, civil society, local government and the private sector on development of a social cohesion strategic framework and monitoring and evaluation regime.</p>
30	<p>Investigate the machinery of government options for an agency focused on ethnic communities and multiculturalism and establish a fit for purpose organisational design that will encompass the current functions expected of the Office of Ethnic Communities and enable the new responsible public sector agency to focus on and deliver the following functions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) advise the government and public sector agencies about priorities and challenges that affect ethnic communities' wellbeing;b) collate and use data to analyse, monitor and evaluate public sector efforts to improve the wellbeing of ethnic communities, what those efforts should be and how they should be prioritised; and

	<p>c) develop an evaluation framework that incorporates performance indicators that examine the impact and effectiveness of government policies and programmes on the wellbeing of ethnic communities.</p>
31	<p>Prioritise the development of appropriate measures and indicators (such as the Living Standards Framework) of social cohesion, including social inclusion.</p>
32	<p>Require public sector agencies to prioritise the collection of data on ethnic and religious demographics to support analysis and advice on the implications of New Zealand's rapidly changing society, inform better policy making and enhance policy evaluation.</p>
33	<p>Direct the chief executives of the public sector agencies involved in the counter - terrorism effort to continue focusing efforts on significantly increasing workforce diversity, including in leadership roles, and in consultation with the Advisory Group on Counter-terrorism (Recommendation 7).</p>
34	<p>Encourage the Public Service Commissioner to publish an annual report that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) provides a comprehensive view of progress by the public sector on the Papa Pounamu commitments including the identification of areas where those public sector agencies are performing well, areas where improvements can be made and critical insights across all agencies about where to direct their efforts; andb) prioritises reporting on progress made by the public sector agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort.
35	<p>Encourage the Public Service Commissioner to continue focusing efforts on significantly increasing workforce diversity and attracting diverse talent for public service leadership roles at the first, second and third-tiers.</p>
36	<p>Invest in opportunities for young New Zealanders to learn about their role, rights and responsibilities and on the value of ethnic and religious diversity, inclusivity, conflict resolution, civic literacy and self-regulation.</p>
37	<p>Create opportunities for regular public conversations led by the responsible minister – the Minister for Social Development and Employment - for all New Zealanders to share knowledge and improve their understanding of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) social cohesion including social inclusion, and the collective effort required to achieve these; andb) the value that cultural, ethnic and religious diversity can contribute to a well-functioning society.
38	<p>Require all public sector community engagement to be in accordance with New Zealand's Open Government Partnership commitments and in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) require agencies to be clear about the degree of influence that community engagement has on associated decision-making by indicating to communities where the engagement sits on the International Association for Public Participation IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum; and

	<p>b) encourage agencies to undertake more "involve" and "collaborate" levels of engagement in accordance with the International Association for Public Participation IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum.</p>
39	<p>Amend legislation to create hate-motivated offences in: the Summary Offences Act 1981 that correspond with the existing offences of offensive behaviour or language, assault, wilful damage and intimidation; and the Crimes Act 1961 that correspond with the existing offences of assaults, arson and intentional damage.</p>
40	<p>Repeal section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 and insert a provision in the Crimes Act 1961 for an offence of inciting racial or religious disharmony, based on an intent to stir up, maintain or normalise hatred, through threatening, abusive or insulting communication with protected characteristics that include religious affiliation.</p>
41	<p>Amend the definition of "objectionable" in section 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 to include racial superiority, racial hatred and racial discrimination.</p>
42	<p>Direct New Zealand Police to revise the ways in which they record complaints of criminal conduct to capture systematically hate-motivations for offending and train frontline staff in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) identifying bias indicators so that they can identify potential hate crimes when they perceive that an offence is hate-motivated;b) exploring perceptions of victims and witnesses so that they are in a position to record where an offence is perceived to be hate-motivated; andc) recording such hate-motivations in a way which facilitates the later use of section 9(1)(h) of the Sentencing Act 2002.
43	<p>Ensure a minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the response to and implementation of all our recommendations and announce the appointment.</p>
44	<p>Establish an Implementation Oversight Advisory Group that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) includes representatives of communities, civil society, local government, the private sector, affected whānau, survivors and witnesses and our Muslim Community Reference Group;b) provides advice to the responsible minister on the design of the government's implementation plan and its roll-out; andc) publishes its advice to enhance transparency.

Annex B – Glossary

Terms commonly used in your portfolio include:

DPMC	The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Kāpuia	The Ministerial Advisory Group on the Government’s Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques, and established to give effect to Royal Commission Recommendation 44
Royal Commission	The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques on 15 March 2019
Response	The Government response to the report of Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019
The 15 March affected community	Term used to describe the affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack.
The attack	The terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019

Proactively Released



Coversheet

Aide-Mémoire: Letter outlining priorities for the government response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the attack on Christchurch Mosques

Date:	25/01/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-666
		Security Level:	[IN CONFIDENCE]
		Priority level:	[URGENT]

	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	Forward the attached letter to the Prime Minister, outlining your priorities for the government response to the royal commission.	ASAP

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Julian Grey	Acting Executive Director National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement, and Relationships Risk and System Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	✓

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: **Yes**

Aide-Mémoire

Letter outlining priorities for the government response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the attack on Christchurch Mosques

To:	Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		
From:	Julian Grey, Acting Executive Director	Date:	25/01/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-666	Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. This aide-mémoire provides you with a letter to share with the Prime Minister (**Attachment A**), outlining how you will achieve your priorities as Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques. This is in response to your request for such a letter on 22 December and follows DPMC's initial response on 24 December.

Next steps

2. We recommend you forward this letter to the Prime Minister.
3. Officials will work with your office to arrange a meeting with you, to discuss your preferred direction on engaging with stakeholders relevant to the government's response to the royal commission.

s9(2)(a)
Julian Grey Acting Executive Director National Security Group
25/01/2024

Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques
...../...../.....

Attachment A: Letter to the Prime Minister on your priorities for the government response to the royal commission

Dear Prime Minister

I have undertaken to set out my priorities in my capacity as Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mosque Attacks. This letter provides you an overview of these priorities, and how I intend to deliver on them.

My top priority for this portfolio is to conclude the government response by June 2024, while ensuring the essence of the Royal Commission's intent and lessons learnt from the attacks are appropriately addressed.

The terrorist attack on Al-Nur and Linwood Mosques on 15 March 2019 was an immensely traumatic event for this country and one that will have a lasting effect, particularly for our Muslim community. The Royal Commission of Inquiry delivered its report in November 2020, and I believe it is in the interests of those affected by the attacks for government to finalise decision-making on its response.

A timeline outlining how I plan to deliver on this priority is below:

February 2024 **Commissioning an end of term report from Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group**

Kāpuia is an advisory group that provides independent advice to the Lead Coordination Minister on the government response. I plan to commission the group to deliver a final report, with insights and lessons learned on the Royal Commission, before the group concludes its term on 9 June 2024.

March 2024 **Meeting of responsible Ministers**

I intend to call a meeting of relevant Ministers to discuss outstanding areas of work across the royal commission response. This will ensure visibility and alignment across the government response, and alignment with our priorities as a government.

June 2024 **Cabinet to confirm the Government's approach to the Royal Commission response**

I plan to bring an item to Cabinet in June 2024, to confirm the Government's approach to the remaining response. This will include a timeline and confirm any final decisions on how work will be incorporated into agencies on-going work programmes.

I will measure success of this priority through:

- Timely delivery of milestones as outlined above;
- The successful conclusion or transition of work into agencies' ongoing activities;

- Decisions being taken on all 44 recommendations that includes either completion of the recommendation, agreement not to proceed or integration of work into an agency's work programme; and
- The response will be concluded in a way that is consistent with the intent of the Royal Commission of Inquiry and other related reviews.

I look forward to working with you on this priority as we deliver a safe, secure, and ambitious New Zealand.

Yours sincerely

Hon Judith Collins KC MP

Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques



Coversheet

Aide-Mémoire: Meeting with Chair of Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group

Date:	13 February 2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-603
		Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE
		Priority level:	ROUTINE

	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	Note the contents of this paper	20/2/2024

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement & Relationships Risk and System Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Advisor	s9(2)(a)	

Departments/agencies consulted on Briefing
N/A

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: Yes

Aide-Mémoire

Meeting with Chair of Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group

To:	Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		
From:	Bridget White	Date:	13/2/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-603	Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. This paper provides briefing to support your meeting with the Chair of Kāpuia, Arihia Bennett on Tuesday 20 February from 1:00-1:45PM, including:
 - Biography of Kāpuia Chair, Arihia Bennett (**Attachment A**)
 - Talking points (**Attachment B**)
 - A draft response to Kāpuia's letter dated 28 November 2023 (**Attachment C**)

Background

2. Kāpuia was established in response to Recommendation 44 of the Royal Commission's report: *establish an Implementation Oversight Advisory Group, that provides advice to the responsible Minister on the design of the Government's response, implementation plan, and its roll-out.*
3. In June 2021 the Cabinet Appointments and Honours Committee agreed to the appointment of the Chair and members of the Kāpuia for a maximum term of 3 years, commencing on 10 June 2021 and expiring no later than on 9 June 2024 [APH-21-MIN-0104]. Kāpuia was tasked to provide independent advice to the Lead Coordination Minister, including on:
 - work programme priorities;
 - the design of the Government's implementation plan; and
 - ongoing progress of the implementation plan and the initiatives delivered under it.
4. Kāpuia has 28 members, representing diverse communities across New Zealand. Some members were directly impacted by the 15 March 2019 attacks. Members are bound by a code of conduct to ensure discretion and integrity in their advice.

Meeting with Kāpuia Chair on Tuesday 20 February 2024.

5. This will be your first meeting with the Kāpuia Chair. A biography of Ms Bennett is provided as **Attachment A**. Ms Bennett will be accompanied by s9(2)(g)(ii), Head of the Kāpuia Secretariat, which is independent to, but hosted by, DPMC. You will be supported by Rebecca Kitteridge, Chief Executive of DPMC.
6. This meeting provides an opportunity for you to communicate your direction for the government response, your decision to conclude Kāpuia, and to discuss Kāpuia's work programme for the remainder of their term. Proposed talking points are provided in **Attachment B**.

The Chair will seek clarity on the future of Kāpuia

7. We do not expect the Chair to be surprised by your decision to conclude the group's role in June. s9(2)(g)(i)

You may wish to seek the Chair's advice on communicating your decision to the members, to help manage their expectations.

8. The Chair will likely invite you to join Kāpuia's next online hui on 28 February 2024. This will be Kāpuia's first meeting since the 2023 General Election and members will be eager to discuss how the Government's priorities will impact the Royal Commission future work programme. Attending this meeting would give you an opportunity to share your decision on the future of Kāpuia with the wider group, and to outline your priorities for the response. Officials will support your engagement should you wish to attend. The former Lead Coordination Minister usually attended for a short period at the end of Kāpuia meetings.

The Chair will raise areas of the response Kāpuia has flagged as requiring attention

9. In her letter to you on 28 November 2023, Ms Bennet outlined Kāpuia's priority areas of focus for the government response to the Royal Commission. These included next steps on:
 - a well-resourced and legislatively mandated agency responsible for strategic intelligence and security leadership;
 - clear accountability to ministers and the public, and leadership and assurance (across performance and capability) at the chief executive level;
 - publishing a strategic framework for preventing and countering violent extremism, to prepare for a future review of the countering violent extremism strategy;
 - actions and announcements arising from the review of the Intelligence and Security Act; and

- how those affected by the attack will be supported when response funding ends later this year.
10. The responsibilities for the areas of focus outlined above sit in other Ministerial portfolios, as such we recommend that you meet with your colleagues before directly responding to these points.
 11. You may wish to seek Ms Bennett's views on engaging with stakeholders and communities on the Government's intended direction, given her close involvement in the response.
 12. Talking points on these issues are provided in **Attachment B**.

The Chair will also wish to discuss Kāpuia's work programme to June and your response to their November letter

13. We have provided a draft response from you to Kāpuia's November letter (**Attachment C**), which outlines your direction for the response, your decision to conclude Kāpuia, and commissions the group to use the remainder of their term to deliver a final report (as you agreed in DPMC 2023/24-647).
14. You may wish to share the draft letter in confidence with the Chair ahead of your meeting. This will allow you to seek the Chair's input into the commissioning of the Kāpuia's final report, prior to forwarding it to the wider group.
15. We also suggest you inform the Chair that you will take a paper to Cabinet before June to finalise decisions on outstanding Royal Commission recommendations and confirm the Government's direction for the response. Should you wish to involve Kāpuia in this process, you could seek the Chair's views on how Kāpuia could support your decision-making. This will help inform Kāpuia's engagement with agencies on outstanding recommendations through to June 2024.

Next steps

16. We recommend that you share the draft letter (**Attachment C**) with the Chair via the Kāpuia Secretariat ahead of your meeting.
17. Once your letter is finalised we recommend that the Kāpuia letter, and your response, be published on the DPMC website. This has been an important element of the group's oversight function and is required under the group's Terms of Reference.
18. DPMC officials are available to discuss this meeting prior to its occurrence should you wish.



Bridget White
Executive Director
National Security Group

14/02/2024

Hon Judith Collins
Lead Coordination Minister for the
Government's Response to the Royal
Commission's Report into the
Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch
Mosques

...../...../.....

Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A:	Biography of Kāpuia Chair	Unclassified
Attachment B:	Proposed agenda and talking points to support your discussion with Kāpuia Chair	In Confidence
Attachment C:	Draft letter to Kāpuia	Unclassified

Proactively Released

*Attachment A is withheld in full under sections 6(d) and 9(2)(a)

Attachment B: Talking points

Suggested topics for discussion

- The Government's priorities for the response
- Kāpuia work programme and response to Kāpuia letter
- Next steps

s9(2)(g)(i) - next 3 pages withheld in full under section 9(2)(g)(i)



Attachment C: Draft letter in response to Kāpuia advice of 28 November 2023

s18(d)





Aide-Mémoire

Meeting with Ministerial Advisory Group, Kāpuia

To:	Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques (Hon Judith Collins)		
From:	Bridget White Executive Director, National Security Group	Date:	23/02/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-846	Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. To provide you with background and suggested talking points for your meeting on 28 February 2024 with Kāpuia – the Ministerial Advisory Group on the Government's Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCOI) into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques.
2. This paper also provides an updated letter of response to Kāpuia for your approval prior to the meeting, following your meeting with the Kāpuia Chair on 20 February.

Background

3. Kāpuia is meeting online on 28 February 2024 – this will be their first meeting since the formation of the new Government. Your office has been provided with details of the virtual meeting link.
4. You have been invited to meet with Kāpuia for 30 minutes, from 12:15pm to 12:45pm. We recommend you open with approximately 5 minutes of introductory remarks, followed by 25 minutes for questions and answers.
5. Suggested talking points are provided for your consideration at **Attachment A**. Brief biographical notes for the 28 Kāpuia members are provided at **Attachment D**.
6. The suggested talking points focus on your decision to conclude the group in June 2024, as well as the priority issues raised by the Kāpuia Chair (Arihia Bennett) in her letter of advice to you dated 28 November 2023 (**Attachment B**).

7. We suggest you use your opening remarks to share with the group your intentions for Kāpuia, including your decision to conclude Kāpuia when its current term ends on 9 June 2024. We expect Kāpuia members will be interested to understand your intentions for the remainder of the group's term, as this will inform their future work programme. We have provided you with talking points about the proposed final report for you to discuss with them.
8. We anticipate the group will be very interested in hearing your views on the direction of the RCOI response and how they can continue to play a meaningful and constructive role. In particular, they will likely raise issues such as:
 - Priorities for the government response
 - Your intended direction for Kāpuia
 - The Government's approach to hate speech
 - National security system legislative and regulatory reform
 - Support to the affected community including recommendation 27
 - He Whenua Taurikura Counter-Terrorism hui
9. Attachment A includes talking points on these issues.
10. In addition, Kāpuia will be interested in opportunities to engage in direction setting for the government response. We suggest you outline how Kāpuia can inform the development of your advice to Cabinet on the government's direction for the response. Members will have views on how the group can support the embedding of the current response into agencies' 'core business', and how accountability for outstanding recommendations can be sustained into the future.

Accompanying officials

11. You will be accompanied at the meeting by DPMC officials who will be available to support you with additional detail, including DPMC-led recommendations related to national security system reform, counter terrorism, and countering and preventing violent extremism. Officials will include:
 - Rebecca Kitteridge, Chief Executive
 - Bridget White, Executive Director National Security Group
 - Sean Bolton, Executive Director Risk and System Governance Group
 - s9(2)(g)(ii) RCOI Response, Engagement and Relationship Management, Risk System Governance Group
12. The National Security and Risk Systems Governance Groups preside over the delivery of RCOI recommendations in the national security and counter-terrorism space. This meeting will be Bridget and Sean's introduction to Kāpuia.

Response Letter to Kāpuia

13. Following your meeting with Kāpuia Chair Arihia Bennett, officials have provided an updated letter of response (**Attachment C**) to Kāpuia's November letter.
14. The letter informs Kāpuia of your intention to conclude the centrally coordinated response phase and focus on finalising decisions on outstanding

recommendations. It also provides guidance for how Kāpuia can support the conclusion of the current response phase, by delivering a final report back on the response. Some guiding principles for this report are also included.

- 15. We recommend that you sign and share this letter with Kāpuia prior to meeting with them. This will allow members to appropriately prepare and contribute to a constructive discussion on the day.

Next steps

- 16. DPMC officials are available to discuss this meeting prior to its occurrence, should you wish.
- 17. We recommend that you sign the letter at **Attachment C**, and share your letter with Kāpuia ahead of your meeting with them.


Bridget White Executive Director National Security Group
26/02/2024

Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch mosques
...../...../.....

Proactively Released

Attachments:	Title	Classification
Attachment A:	Talking points for meeting with Kāpuia	IN CONFIDENCE
Attachment B:	Kāpuia letter of advice from 28 November 2023	IN CONFIDENCE
Attachment C:	Ministerial letter of response to Kāpuia advice	IN CONFIDENCE
Attachment D:	Kāpuia members' biographical notes	IN CONFIDENCE

Contact for telephone discussion

Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact
Bridget White	Executive Director National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor, Engagement & Relationships, Risk and System Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Principal Advisor, Engagement & Relationships, Risk and System Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	

- *Attachment A is withheld in full under section 9(2)(g)(i)
- *Attachment D is withheld in full under sections 6(d) and 9(2)(a)

Letter (28/11/2023) from Chair of Kāpuia publicly available on DPMC website at:
www.dPMC.govt.nz/our-programmes/special-programmes/kapuia-ministerial-advisory-group/advice-kapuia

Attachment B: Kāpuia letter of advice from 28 November 2023

s18(d)

Proactively Released

Minister's response letter (29/02/2024) to Kāpuia publicly available on DPMC website at:
www.dPMC.govt.nz/our-programmes/special-programmes/kapuia-ministerial-advisory-group/advice-kapuia

Attachment C: Ministerial letter of response to Kāpuia advice

s18(d)

Proactively Released



Coversheet

Aide-Mémoire: Meeting with IWCNZ on Monday 4 March 2024

Date:	29/02/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-802
		Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE
		Priority level:	HIGH

	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	Note the content of this paper	29 February 2024

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Chief Advisor Engagement, Risk & System Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Policy Advisor	s9(2)(a)	

Departments/agencies consulted on Briefing
N/A

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: Yes

Aide-Mémoire

Meeting with IWCNZ on Monday 4 March 2024

To:	Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		
From:	Bridget White, Executive Director, National Security Group	Date:	29/02/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-802	Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. This paper provides you with background, context and suggested talking points for your upcoming meeting with the Islamic Women's Council of New Zealand (IWCNZ) on Monday 4 March. This pack includes:
 - Talking points (**Attachment A**);
 - Biographies of IWCNZ representatives (**Attachment B**); and
 - Overview of IWCNZ priorities and concerns as outlined in a presentation to agencies on 18 July 2023 (**Attachment C**).

Details of the meeting

2. You are meeting with IWCNZ on Monday 4 March from 2.00pm – 2.30pm. Participating representatives from IWCNZ are Aliya Danzeisen (National Coordinator), Dr Maysoon Salama (former National Coordinator), and Janet MacCallister (administrative support). Biographies of the key attendees are provided in **Attachment B**. You will be supported by Andy George, Counter Terrorism Strategic Coordinator, National Security Group, DPMC.
3. The IWCNZ National Coordinator wrote to you on 19 January 2024 requesting this meeting. IWCNZ would like to discuss the organisation's concerns and how the government can improve outcomes for Muslim women in New Zealand, including improving financial security, the health care system, and the public service.

Background on IWCNZ and its interests

4. IWCNZ is a national organisation that aims to empower Muslim women. The group formed in 1991, catering specifically to the needs of New Zealand Muslim women. It recognises all Muslim women in New Zealand as its members.
5. IWCNZ has also been a key stakeholder in the aftermath of the 15 March attacks and the subsequent government response to the Royal Commission, working closely with senior officials and government representatives to advocate for Muslim women and communities affected by the attacks. Aliya Danziesen and Dr Maysoon Salama also sit on Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group on the government's response to the Royal Commission.
6. Ms Danziesen attended your on-line meeting with Kāpuia on February 28th where a number of questions were raised by the group. Dr Salama was unable to attend the meeting. Questions raised by the group focused on how the government will continue to support the affected community and diverse communities and, ensure effective leadership and governance for the national security system. In responding, you confirmed you are waiting for advice from officials before answering the questions raised.
7. Alongside their priorities outlined above and further below, the group may also seek to understand your direction and priorities for the government response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attacks on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019 (the Royal Commission). We anticipate IWCNZ will be interested in understanding the Government's direction for the response, decisions on outstanding recommendations, and specific workstreams including on hate speech and hate crimes. The group is also likely to ask about your planned engagements with the affected community.

8. s9(2)(g)(i)

IWCNZ released a policy paper outlining their priority areas to support Muslim women

9. IWCNZ released a policy paper in 2022, outlining their priority areas to support Muslim women to thrive in the New Zealand context. The paper, "*An Aotearoa New*

Zealand that Values Muslim Women – Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality”, was shared with the former Lead Coordination Minister.

10. In her letter to you, Aliya notes that the group have updated and expanded on this original paper. DPMC has not been able to obtain a copy of the group’s updated policy paper. We will provide you with additional advice should we be provided a copy of the paper prior to this meeting.
11. IWCNZ’s priorities as outlined in the 2022 paper “*An Aotearoa New Zealand that Values Muslim Women – Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality*”, include three priority areas:
 - **Financial security for Muslim women in New Zealand**, for example through the removal of barriers to employment, home ownership, and business loans. IWCNZ also note that Muslim communities do not have access to most community funding, as they cannot use proceeds from gambling or lotteries.
 - **Transforming the healthcare system to support the needs of Muslim women in New Zealand**, including support for Muslim women to participate in physically active lifestyles, culturally appropriate and accessible mental health services, and support for spiritual wellbeing.
 - **A public service that works for the public, including Muslim women**, for example by improving cultural competence in the public service, addressing racism and bullying in the education system, the provision of publicly funded services tailored for Muslim women and an increase in political participation and representation on Boards and in politics.

DPMC coordinated a meeting between IWCNZ and senior officials in 2023 to discuss IWCNZ’s policy paper

12. On 18 July 2023, senior officials, including several CEs, met with IWCNZ for an inter-agency discussion on how to improve outcomes for Muslim women and girls through policy making.
13. Attendees at this meeting included DPMC (DCE National Security), the Treasury (CE), the Ministry of Education (CE), the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (CE), the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (DCE), the Ministry for Ethnic Communities (CE), the Ministry for Women (CE), the Ministry of Social Development (CE), New Zealand Police (Deputy Commissioner), and the Public Service Commission (Deputy Commissioner).


14. We have provided an overview of the IWCNZ's presentation from this inter-agency discussion (**Attachment C**). The overview provides further insights into the experiences of Muslim women who are targeted, particularly Muslim women who wear hijabs.
15. The meeting provided an opportunity for officials to hear the lived experience of Muslim women in New Zealand and discuss solutions or programmes to address the issues raised. In addition to the three priority areas outlined above, the group also discussed broader concerns with immigration and education.
16. Following this meeting, agencies and IWCNZ agreed to work directly together on any next steps. Most actions involved agencies' agreeing to investigate or explore existing opportunities that could be tailored to improve outcomes across IWCNZ's priority areas. For example:
- The Ministry of Social Development agreed to explore the existing social sector commissioning action plan to support the delivery of social services specific to Muslim women.
 - The Ministry for Women also agreed to investigating the Women's Employment Action Plan, and how this might support opportunities for Muslim women.
 - Several CE's noted the impact IWCNZ's presentation had and suggested the group present to their policy teams to illustrate the experiences of Muslim Women in New Zealand.
17. While DPMC facilitated this initial discussion, the hui gave IWCNZ the opportunity to build relationships directly with officials working in policy areas relevant to the group's priorities.
18. Should IWCNZ raise issues outside your portfolios, we suggest you direct them to agencies or relevant portfolio ministers, as noted in the proposed talking points (Attachment A).

Next steps

19. We recommend you note the contents of this paper, including the talking points and biographies in Attachments A and B.

20. Should IWCNZ provide a copy of their updated policy paper prior to your meeting, DPMC will provide you with additional advice.

21. DPMC officials are available to discuss the contents of this Aide-Mémoire with you, should you wish.



Bridget White
Executive Director
National Security Group

29/02/2024

Hon Judith Collins
Lead Coordination Minister for the
Government's Response to the Royal
Commission's Report into the
Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch
Mosques

...../...../.....

Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A:	Talking Points	In confidence
Attachment B:	Biographies of IWCNZ representatives	Unclassified
Attachment C:	Overview of IWCNZ presentation from the inter-agency discussion	Unclassified

*Attachment A is partially withheld under section 9(2)(g)(i)
 *Attachment B is withheld in full under sections 6(d) and 9(2)(a)

Attachment A: Talking Points

Suggested topics for discussion:

- Introduction
- IWCNZ's priorities
- 15 March anniversary
- The Government's priorities for the response to the Royal Commission

s9(2)(g)(i) - next two pages withheld in full under s9(2)(g)(i)

Proactively Released

Attachment C: Overview of IWCNZ presentation from the inter-agency discussion

This summary was drafted by IWCNZ and distributed to agencies who attended the interagency hui on 18 July 2023.

Demographics

1. The small Muslim community (~1% of NZ) is ethnically superdiverse and distributed across New Zealand, mostly in Auckland, with other notable concentrations in Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton.
2. Demographic challenges, partially due to immigration policies: the Muslim community includes few elders (5% vs overall NZ 20%), and many youth (65% vs overall NZ 40%). **This means experienced leaders in the Muslim community are over-stretched, with impossible demands on their time.**

Burdens of targeting and hate

3. Muslim women, particularly hijabi (women wearing headscarves), are subject to **gendered Islamophobia**, including (i) physical attacks, as they are the most visible members of the Muslim community, and (ii) stereotypes such as denial of their own agency as people. We are “the” prime target of hate crimes – Muslim women commonly know many women who have been targeted, and the resulting trauma, fear and anxiety become burdens on whole communities who are already traumatised and under-resourced.
4. Even before the March 15 attacks, the Muslim community in NZ was dealing with **multiple layers of trauma**. For example, refugee trauma; culture shock as a small community; media attacks due to 9/11; family members caught overseas in conflict zones; the ‘othering of Muslims’; increasing irresponsible media sensationalism and bias, with the rise of ISIS; personal harassment as a result of then PM John Key’s inaccurate comments about jihadi brides; Trumpism and White Nationalism. March 15 had a huge and profound effect on the Muslim community throughout New Zealand, not just in Christchurch.
5. Hate did not stop after 15 March 2019; in fact, **our risks have increased**. Only a small fraction of hate incidents are reported.
6. We are **on the cusp of intergenerational trauma** from March 15 and before. We require empowerment and resources to prevent fraying of social cohesion for our families and whānau.

Challenges in resourcing & public services

7. The public service has a duty of care toward Muslim women and their families, due to the targeting they experience, but currently instead of support, the public service often adds to the burden. For example:

- a. Community development: **The community has access to very few state resources:** Less than 1% of contestable community funding is available to Muslims (and others) who cannot use gambling funds.
- b. Education: As the ERO report showed, teachers lack confidence in teaching our children. Our children experience consistent bullying and harassment, from classmates but also sometimes teachers, even well-meaning ones (eg singling out children as 'case studies' for a class).
- c. Youth mental health: young people do not want to burden their stressed and worried parents with the discrimination and harassment they face at school – but at the same time, if they discuss home problems with school counsellors, they are often made to feel that the issue is with their religion (or that the traumatic situation is so large the counsellor cannot assist). This identity suppression is a huge concern given the documented importance of cultural identity to wellbeing.
- d. Health system: lack of interpreters means poor health outcomes, as does culturally inappropriate care.

Community Outcomes

8. Mental Health: youth suicide and suicide ideation is increasing (ERO report: ~40% of Middle Eastern and African students have considered suicide in the past year). Social issues: divorce and business losses are increasing. Education: academic attainment is decreasing. Community: people are more hesitant to take on leadership roles.

Solutions and responses

9. When IWCNZ and state agencies have worked together, we've made good progress - for example: Books in Schools; Leadership Forum (supported by DPMC, MOW and MOE in 2022) and Police Training Manuals. **Muslim women are the best advisors to policy makers on their own lives** and those of their families.

Our ask of you:

10. Recognize the unique intersectionality of Muslim women's experiences; and **work with us**, to ensure our lived expertise, and valuable insights and perspectives, are not overlooked.
11. Take proactive measures to **prevent exclusion, harassment, and discrimination**; and address any instances promptly and effectively.
12. Take responsibility as a leader: **champion the causes of inclusion and equity of outcomes**; and foster cultures of respect and diversity.
13. **Hold staff accountable** for their actions and adherence to inclusive practices; and regularly **evaluate progress** and make necessary adjustments.

14. **Good intentions are not enough:** Encourage tangible actions and measurable outcomes.
15. Think about what would happen if you met an IWCNZ team member on the street: could you look her in the eyes and truly say 'I have used my creativity and time and resources to do all I can to eliminate anti-Muslim discrimination and exclusion in New Zealand?'

Proactively Released



Coversheet

Aide-Mémoire: Meeting with Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand

Date:	7/03/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-912
		Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE
		Priority level:	[Priority]

	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to Royal Commission Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	Discuss issues	

Name	Position	Telephone		1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director, National Security National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(a)	✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Principal Advisor, Engagement and Relationships	N/A	s9(2)(a)	

Departments/agencies consulted on Briefing
Talking points consulted with: MoJ; MSD; Immigration NZ; MFAT; DPMC.

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: Yes

Aide-Mémoire

Meeting with Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand

To:	Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		
From:	Bridget White Executive Director, National Security Group	Date:	7/03/2024
Briefing Number:	DPMC-2023/24-912	Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE

Purpose

1. This aide-mémoire provides you with background and talking points (**Attachment A**) to inform your discussion with Abdur Razzaq, Chairman of the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ).

Background

2. You are meeting with Abdur Razzaq, Chairman of FIANZ, from 10:30-11:00am on Thursday March 7, 2024. Mr Razzaq's biography is provided at **Attachment B**. You will be supported at this meeting by Andy George, Strategic Coordinator, Counter Terrorism, National Security Group, DPMC.
3. FIANZ is the peak body of Sunni Muslim organisations in New Zealand. Its objective is to build better understanding between the Muslim community and the various ethnic and religious communities in New Zealand.
4. FIANZ is a strong advocate for the Muslim community in New Zealand, including on a range of national security issues. FIANZ members have regularly contributed to the Royal Commission response by actively engaging, and working with, a range of government agencies. The organisation also conducts research and analysis on a range of national security issues, provides commentary on government policy and programmes, and convenes and coordinates Muslim leaders and organisations.
5. Mr Razzaq is a member of Kāpuia and recently attended your online meeting with Kāpuia on 28 February 2024. 9(2)(g)(i)

9(2)(g)(i)

Issues FIANZ may wish to raise

6. FIANZ has been instrumental in raising national awareness of issues facing Muslim communities in New Zealand following the March 15 Christchurch terrorist attacks. Most recently, FIANZ provided public commentary on the designation of the entirety of Hamas as a terrorist entity, New Zealand policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and new research findings on the early online social media activities of the March 15 terrorist.
7. As Chairman of FIANZ, Mr Razzaq has led advocacy and engagement with the government. He has served as a member of the New Zealand Police Muslim Advisory Group and maintains close relationships with the March 15 affected community in Christchurch.
8. We anticipate that Mr Razzaq will raise issues related to the Royal Commission response as well as wider concerns within the New Zealand Muslim community, including:
 - The establishment of a National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA);
 - Rising Islamophobic abuse and threats in New Zealand;
 - Israel-Hamas conflict.
9. FIANZ are the organisers of the March 15 Remembrance Iftar dinner that you will be attending in Christchurch. You may wish to ask Mr Razzaq about this event, including any messages he feels the community may wish to hear from you.

Next steps

10. We recommend you note the contents of this paper.

Bridget White
Executive Director
National Security Group

07/03/2024

Hon Judith Collins
Lead Coordination Minister for the
Government's Response to the Royal
Commission Report into the Terrorist
Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

...../...../.....

Attachments:	Title	Security classification
Attachment A:	Talking points for meeting with FIANZ	IN CONFIDENCE
Attachment B:	Biography – Abdur Razzaq	IN CONFIDENCE

Contact for telephone discussion			
Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Bridget White	Executive Director, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	✓
s9(2)(g)(ii)	Principal Advisor, Engagement and Relationships, Risk and Systems Governance Group	s9(2)(a)	

*Attachment A is withheld in full under section 9(2)(g)(i)
*Attachment B is withheld in full under sections 6(d) and 9(2)(a)



Coversheet

HE WHENUA TAURIKURA COUNTERING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM HUI – CANCELLATION

Date:	21/03/2024	Report No:	DPMC-2023/24-983
		Security Level:	IN CONFIDENCE
		Priority level:	Normal

	Action sought	Deadline
Rt Hon Christopher Luxon Prime Minister	Note decision	
Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		

Name	Position	Telephone	1 st Contact
Rebecca Kitteridge	Chief Executive Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet	s9(2)(a)	✓
Andy George	Strategic Coordinator, National Security Group	N/A	N/A

Minister's Office

Status:

Signed

Withdrawn

Comment for agency

Attachments: No

Aide-Mémoire

He Whenua Taurikura Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Hui – Cancellation

To:	Rt Hon Christopher Luxon Prime Minister		
	Hon Judith Collins Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques		
From:	Rebecca Kitteridge, Chief Executive, DPMC	Date:	21/03/2024
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Purpose

1. This briefing advises you of my decision to cancel the postponed He Whenua Taurikura hui, originally scheduled for 5-6 December 2023.

Background to the hui

2. The He Whenua Taurikura ('a country at peace') annual hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism (the hui) was funded by a specific appropriation for the three years from 2021 until 2023. The hui responds directly to Recommendation 16 from the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain (the Royal Commission).
3. The hui brings together approximately 300 participants from a diverse range of sectors: ethnic and faith communities, government, academia, business, community organisations. The purpose of the hui is to develop a mature national dialogue about countering violent extremism and terrorism and provides an opportunity to build relationships in a safe, supported environment, while working toward a collective goal of He Whenua Taurikura.
4. The third annual and final funded hui was scheduled to be held in December 2023 at Takina Convention Centre, Wellington, but was postponed in November as heightened tensions related to the Israel-Gaza conflict at that time made it unlikely that the hui would achieve the planned and intended outcomes that the majority of stakeholders seek from it.
5. When the decision was taken to postpone the hui, s 6(a)
New Zealanders had been experiencing increasing community tensions, threats and incidents of hate, antisemitism, and Islamophobia as a result of the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict. s 9(2)(g)(i)
Postponing the hui until 2024 provided an opportunity for the context to shift.

Decision to cancel the hui

6. I have considered DPMC advice on the following options for how to proceed with the hui:
 - a) Proceed with the hui in the same **format** as originally designed.
 - b) Hold a hui in a **significantly different format**.
 - c) **Not proceed** with the hui for 2024 and develop a new enduring approach.

Option A – Proceed with the same format

7. My decision in November 2023 to postpone the hui prioritised the safety and wellbeing of hui participants – including potential risk of damage to participants’ psychological safety – and the importance of maintaining strong relationships across a socially cohesive society, over the reputational risk of postponement or not proceeding with the hui. This outcome remains paramount.
8. Since I took this postponement decision, the geopolitical context has not changed and has arguably deteriorated. Tensions remain heightened and the conflict and its domestic repercussions are causing very significant practical difficulties and anxieties for people across the affected communities. The situation seems unlikely to improve over the next few months, so the risk of the hui being a flashpoint for potential conflict is still likely.
9. There is a view put forward by a number of community leaders that in this situation the importance of continuing with the hui as a means to address these issues has never been greater. However, others have also expressed significant concerns both for their own personal safety in attending such an event but also that the hui could be a focus for protest actions and heated arguments, driving further polarisation and conflict.
10. My consultation with agencies, including with the Chief Executive of the Ministry for Ethnic Communities, has been near unanimous in the view that the context and environment has not changed. There is a significant risk that holding the hui in the same large-scale, high-profile way that was done in 2021 and 2022 would result in a negative overall outcome rather than a positive one.

Option B – A hui with a different format and/or focus

11. DPMC has considered the possibility of hosting the hui in a different format while still meeting the intent of the Royal Commission’s Recommendation 16. We have investigated smaller scale options that would either:
 - a) Continue with a primary focus based around countering terrorism and violent extremism (probably a subset of this topic), but with a smaller, more specific group of attendees; or
 - b) Take a wider national security focus (still including countering terrorism and violent extremism as a significant topic), again with a more specific group of attendees.

12. We consider that a shift of focus or scaling or narrowing of attendees would neither meet the intent of Recommendation 16 nor fulfil communities' expectations for this event, and could result in a negative overall outcome rather than a positive one. We therefore do not recommend pursuing an alternate format for the hui for 2024.

Option C – Do not proceed with the hui; develop a new enduring approach

13. Considering the above options and contextual factors, I have decided with great reluctance that DPMC should not proceed with holding the hui in 2024. There may be criticism of my decision. Many community leaders are strong supporters of the hui, and its initial postponement was criticised on the basis that these leaders were not consulted. We expect similar criticism this time.
14. In addition, DPMC will not be able to recover some costs associated with planning the hui. It is also possible that a small number of participants may have incurred travel costs. DPMC will not be able to reimburse those who find themselves out of pocket.
15. This has been a very difficult decision. But, given the context, there is no perfect outcome. Communicating the factors behind this decision to key stakeholders will be essential. Important too will be demonstrating Government's continued commitment to countering terrorism and violent extremism. DPMC will work with other agencies and communities to develop a different enduring approach, one that will encourage a continuing national dialogue on these issues, as well as on national security issues more broadly.

Next steps

16. The hui was postponed in November 2023 and participants have not yet been advised of an alternative date. We will seek to advise communities and other participants of the decision to cancel the hui as soon as possible.
17. DPMC will lead communication with stakeholders and respond to any queries from media. Your office will be provided with reactive talking points.

Recommendations

We recommend you:

1. **Note** the decision to cancel the previously postponed He Whenua Taurikura hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism. **YES / NO**

<p><i>Rebecca Kitteridge</i></p> <p>Rebecca Kitteridge Chief Executive, DPMC</p>
<p><i>26 / 3 / 24</i></p>

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