



Proactive Release

The following document has been proactively released by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), on behalf of Hon Judith Collins KC, Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to RCOI's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques:

Concluding the Coordinated Government Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques

The following documents have been included in this release:

Title of paper: Concluding the Coordinated Government Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques (FPS-24-SUB-0019 refers)

Title of minute: Report of the Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee: Period Ended 28 June 2024 (CAB-24-MIN-0240 refers)

Title of minute: Concluding the Coordinated Cross-government Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques (FPS-24-MIN-0019 refers)

Some parts of this information release would not be appropriate to release and, if requested, would be withheld under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act). Where this is the case, the relevant section of the Act that would apply has been identified. Where information has been withheld, no public interest has been identified that would outweigh the reasons for withholding it.

Key to redaction codes:

- section 9(2)(f)(iv), to maintain the confidentiality of advice tendered by or to Ministers and officials
- section 9(2)(g)(i), to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinion

Office of the Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee

Concluding the Coordinated Government Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques

Proposal

- 1 I propose to bring an end to the coordinated cross-government response effort to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on the Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 (the Royal Commission) and direct government agencies involved in the response to complete any remaining work as part of their ongoing work programmes. To facilitate this proposal, I seek Cabinet consideration of two outstanding decisions. This paper also serves as a final report back on the government response to the Royal Commission's report (the report).

Relation to government priorities

- 2 The proposal advances the Government's priority of efficient, effective, and responsive public services focused on delivery, while improving outcomes for New Zealanders, including people affected by the attacks, by ensuring work to respond to the Royal Commission continues to be embedded.

Executive Summary

- 3 In 2021 Cabinet agreed to establish a coordinated cross-government work programme to respond to the report [SWC-21-MIN-0188].¹ Time-limited funding for governance and coordination, as well as to support the Ministerial Advisory Group, Kāpuia, ends on 30 June 2024.
- 4 The response work programme is well advanced, and it is now possible to bring the coordinated cross-government response effort to an end. Remaining work to respond to individual recommendations can be completed by relevant government agencies as set out in **appendix A**. To facilitate this decision, I recommend that Cabinet agrees not to establish a new National Security and Intelligence Agency (recommendation 2 of the report) and to cease work on the business case for a system for public reporting of concerning behaviours and incidents linked to potential violent extremism (recommendation 12 of the report).
- 5 Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group, has expressed its disappointment at my intention to end the coordinated cross-government response effort out of concern for public safety and welfare of the affected community. Kāpuia disagrees with the intention not to implement recommendations 2 and 12 of the report. I have responded substantively to Kāpuia's concerns by letter.

¹ The report is entitled: Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch Masjidain on 15 March 2019

Background

- 6 The Royal Commission was established in 2019. It was asked to inquire into what state sector agencies knew about the 15 March terrorist's activities before the attacks, how relevant information had been handled, any failure to meet required standards, and what could be done to prevent future attacks. The report found there had been no failure of information-sharing by national security agencies that could have prevented the attacks, but that issues of leadership, accountability and transparency needed to improve. It found that New Zealand Police (Police) had failed to meet required standards in administration of the firearms licencing system and recommended changes to make it more efficient and effective.
- 7 The Royal Commission delivered its report (the report) in November 2020 with recommendations covering four areas of interest: counter-terrorism and national security, firearms licencing, support for the affected community, and promoting social cohesion and inclusion. Many of the recommendations were intended to bring about longer-term changes which were expected to be integrated into future ways of working by government and the public service.
- 8 In December 2020, Cabinet accepted the Royal Commission's findings and agreed in principle² to its 44 recommendations [CAB-20-MIN-0516]. Early initiatives were focused on ways to promote social cohesion [CAB-20-MIN-0513]. This was followed by a longer-term work programme which aimed to commence work on all recommendations by 2023, and for as many as possible to be integrated into ongoing work programmes by that time [SWC-21-MIN-0188]. Time-limited funding was provided to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) to June 2024 to support cross-government coordination and governance of the response and provide a secretariat function for the Ministerial Advisory Group, Kāpuia.

Government is in a position to conclude the coordinated cross-government response effort to the Royal Commission's recommendations

- 9 It has been more than three years since the coordinated cross-government work programme was established. A total of 22 recommendations have been fully implemented and a further 14 have been addressed, with some remaining work still to be integrated into ongoing work programmes. Since this Government was formed my ministerial colleagues and I have made decisions on six recommendations where work should not progress further (see **appendix A**). If Cabinet agrees to the proposals in this paper, a further two would not be implemented, bringing it to a total of eight.
- 10 I invite Cabinet to agree to conclude the coordinated, cross-government response effort by 30 June 2024, in line with the conclusion of time-limited funding. My view is that the work done so far is now sufficiently well advanced that further coordination would not achieve better delivery of remaining work. Resources should now be directed to bedding in the improvements that have

² In agreeing in principle, Cabinet agreed to consider all recommendations. Implementation is based on ministerial or Cabinet direction on how best to meet the intent of recommendations.

started as part of the Royal Commission response. I have separately advised Kāpuia that its role will conclude when members' terms end on 9 June.

- 11 This decision will not mean stopping all work on individual recommendations. Where agreed, remaining work set out in **appendix A** should be carried out by the relevant government agency, reporting to their ministers or to Cabinet, in the usual way. It is my expectation that government agencies will also work to integrate wider lessons learned from the report's findings, such as enhanced public engagement on national security issues and further stewardship of social cohesion initiatives.

Changes have been made to improve leadership and accountability on national security

- 12 The Royal Commission made recommendations intended to drive stronger leadership and strategic direction of the national security system, and for more accountable decision making. This intent is being addressed through the enhanced governance across national security by the Chief Executive-level National Security Board (NSB)³ and implementation of the National Security Strategy (the strategy) and associated Programme of Action, which Cabinet approved in July 2023 [CAB 23-MIN-0343]. The strategy incorporates the lessons of the Royal Commission to drive stronger collective leadership on national security issues. This includes acting early, working together with communities and international partners, and leading an integrated approach to national security.
- 13 A key change to deliver enhanced national security outcomes has been to re-establish the former Security and Intelligence Board as the NSB. The Board's role is to integrate national security agencies' efforts around the implementation of the strategy and provide stewardship of the national security system. The new Board provides a 'national security system view' and strategic advice to government to help ensure that the right capability, legislation and regulation, and partnerships and structures are in place.

A new National Intelligence and Security Agency is not necessary to improve leadership and accountability on national security

- 14 The Royal Commission recommended establishing a new national intelligence and security agency (NISA) with its roles and functions set out in legislation (recommendation 2).⁴ The report envisaged that the Chief Executive of the new agency would also act as the national adviser on intelligence and security, thereby enhancing the status of national security decision making in government. The agency would focus solely on national security threats and intelligence issues rather than across the broad range of hazards and risks that DPMC manages.

³ Members are Chief Executives of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Police, New Zealand Customs Service, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Security Bureau, the Ministry of Defence, the New Zealand Defence Force, the Treasury, Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, and Ministry of Transport.

⁴ In 2023, the previous Government considered options to address recommendations 2 and 3 together but did not reach a final decision.

- 15 The Prime Minister has decided to designate the Secretary and Chief Executive of DPMC as the National Security Adviser but is proposing not to establish a new agency. I invite Cabinet to agree to this proposal. At the time of the Royal Commission, DPMC's National Security Group (NSG) had system leadership responsibilities across all hazards as well as national security risks and threats. Since then, the department has restructured into two groups with NSG solely focused on national security policy, assessments, and implementation of the strategy.
- 16 Building on organisational changes already made by DPMC removes the need to create the infrastructure of a new agency, streamlining rather than adding complexity to government. While a new agency may have the advantage of a legal mandate, many of the issues identified by the Royal Commission relate to clarity of role, focused leadership, effective community engagement and business processes, and gaps in the current national security functions. These would not necessarily be solved by the creation of a new agency.
- 17 Designating the Chief Executive of DPMC as the National Security Advisor has the advantage of keeping security and intelligence and risk accountabilities in one place and reducing disruption. The designation formalises the Chief Executive's current responsibilities and the Prime Minister intends to agree with the Chief Executive a series of mechanisms to drive the performance required on national security matters.

The National Security Board will provide stronger leadership across government on national security issues

- 18 The Royal Commission also recommended considering more formal arrangements for the then Security and Intelligence Board. In doing so, it aimed to lift the collective accountability of the Board. The report considered that a role for the group should be to align, and co-ordinate work, planning and budgets of national security agencies. The new National Security Board will provide this stronger leadership and will drive collective accountability to ministers. It will now be chaired by the Chief Executive of DPMC in his role as the National Security Advisor.

The counter-terrorism effort is more focused on the evolving threat environment

- 19 The Royal Commission found that intelligence agencies had been slow to adapt to the evolving terrorist threat environment. Its recommendations to improve the counter-terrorism effort focused on leadership and accountability, improving social license, improving engagement with civil society and ensuring legislation was fit for purpose. In response counter-terrorism agencies⁵ have made changes to their counter-terrorism work programme. This has involved efforts to build public trust in the counter-terrorism system through focused engagement with survivors and at-risk communities and prioritising capability in front-line agencies. Future effort should include addressing any capability

⁵ These are the agencies that make up the Counterterrorism Coordination Committee which reports to the National Security Board. CTCC agencies are: DPMC (Chair), NZSIS (including CTAG), GCSB, Ministry of Transport, Department of Internal Affairs, Police, Customs, the Civil Aviation Authority, MBIE, NZDF, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Social Development, Department of Corrections, and the National Emergency Management Agency.

gaps and vulnerabilities, which were not the focus of the Royal Commission recommendations.

20 s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] In response to the report, several legislative changes have been made to make New Zealand’s counter-terrorism legislation more fit for purpose. The Minister of Justice will report to Cabinet separately on options for a fuller review of legislative settings.

A new system for reporting concerning behaviours and incidents is not needed; existing public reporting channels are sufficient

21 The Minister of Police has considered advice on the government’s response to Recommendation 12 which was to ‘develop and promote an accessible reporting system that enables members of the public to easily and safely report concerning behaviours or incidents to a single contact point within government’. In 2022 Cabinet approved s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted] tagged operating contingency for Vote Police as part of Budget 22 for the initiative Reporting System for Concerning Behaviours and Incidents [CAB-22-MIN-0129]. s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

22 I invite Cabinet to agree not to progress this initiative because this Government is satisfied existing channels for the public to report concerning behaviours and incidents are sufficient and that this investment can be reprioritised. Government agencies, such as Police and the NZSIS, will continue to deliver current services through existing channels and agencies will continue to respond appropriately where required. In consultation with the Minister, I am seeking Cabinet’s agreement to cease all further work on the cross-agency establishment of a new reporting system and close the remaining tagged operating contingency with funding returned to the Crown.

Police has modernised the firearms licensing system

23 The Royal Commission’s firearms recommendations aimed to create a more effective and consistently applied firearms licencing system. Between 2021 and 2023 Police completed all but one of the proposed regulatory changes under the umbrella of the Arms Transformation Programme. These include better alignment between policies and operational standards with legislation, the electronic Firearms Registry⁷ and training, and performance monitoring. This has modernised the firearms licencing regime in line with the report’s recommendations. The remaining recommendation in this area, on mandatory reporting of firearms injuries by health professionals, will not be implemented as the Associate Minister of Justice is satisfied current reporting requirements are sufficient.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

⁷ To be reviewed in accordance with the coalition agreement between the National Party and Act.

The response has addressed social cohesion recommendations, including its connection to national security

- 24 The Royal Commission included social cohesion recommendations into its report due to public feedback during consultation. It found that polarised societies were more likely see radicalising ideologies develop and flourish. Several of its recommendations have been addressed by leveraging work that is already underway, such as the ongoing *Papa Pounamu* programme led by the Public Service Commission to increase public sector diversity. Other work includes a new data standard for use by the public sector to collect ethnicity data, which will be rolled out in 2025.
- 25 In recognition of the link between social cohesion and national security, 'social instability' has been included as one of four 'connected issues', that could be broader drivers of insecurity, under the National Security Strategy.

Government is addressing recommendations on hate-motivated offending

- 26 A subset of the report's recommendations on social cohesion were to address hate speech and hate-motivated offending. The report sought to clarify and strengthen legal protections. The Government will not make changes to hate speech legislation,⁸ but the Minister of Justice has directed the Law Commission to proceed with a review of legislation on hate crime. This work is in the initial stages and the Minister will consider a response when the Law Commission reports back, likely to be later in the Parliamentary term.
- 27 Police is also improving its operational response on hate-motivated offending. In 2021 Police stood up a four-year programme *Te Raranga* ("the Weave") to reduce the harm caused by hate-motivated offending. The programme has embedded hate-motivated crime training into many areas of policing and future work will help communities recognise and report hate-motivated crime and access resources to seek help.

The response has prioritised the community most affected by the attacks

- 28 A comprehensive range of support services for survivors, families and witnesses has been provided in the five years since the terrorist attacks. This includes support through the *Kaiwhakaoranga* Specialist Case Management Service (the Service), hosted by MSD, to help coordinate and deliver government support to the affected community. **Appendix B** provides an overview of these forms of support. Due to the level and scope of the support provided to survivors, families, and witnesses to help people recover, I have decided not to proceed with further discussion with the community on restorative justice options. **Appendix C** provides more information on why I came to this decision.
- 29 *Kaiwhakaoranga* and some other services are ending on 30 June. Some of these have been in place since shortly after the attacks. I recognise that some members of the community, including children and youth, will need longer-

⁸ In accordance with the coalition agreement between the National Party and NZ First. In March 2024 the Minister of Justice formally asked the Law Commission to remove review of legislation on hate speech from its forward work programme.

term support and note that this will be provided on a case-by-case basis. In recognition of these ongoing needs, Hon Matt Doocey, the Member of Parliament for Waimakariri, will be the ongoing government point of contact for this affected community.

A permanent memorial

- 30 The Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH), the Ministry for Ethnic Communities and Christchurch City Council, have engaged with survivors and families on the option of a National Memorial. There is strong support for such a memorial. The Ministry of Culture and heritage is doing further work on cost estimates and funding options for Cabinet decisions later in 2024.

Annual Commemoration

- 31 The affected community has also identified annual recurrence of the Adhan broadcast as an appropriate form of public remembrance of the attacks. MCH has facilitated the broadcast of the Adhan on the anniversary for the last three years and has committed to encourage media outlets to continue broadcast it for up to a decade after the attacks.

Cost-of-living implications

- 32 There are no cost-of-living implications from the proposals in this paper.

Financial implications

- 33 The Reporting System for Concerning Behaviours and Incidents Tagged Operating Contingency will be closed with the balance of funding remaining being returned to the Crown. A permanent national memorial, which will be the subject of future decisions, will require additional funding.

Legislative implications

- 34 There are no legislative implications arising from the proposals in this paper.

Impact Analysis

Regulatory Impact Statement

- 35 None of the recommendations in this paper involve the potential introduction of new legislation, or changes to or the repeal of existing legislation.

Climate Implications of Policy Assessment

- 36 The proposals in this paper do not require a CIPA.

Population Implications

- 37 Decisions on the way the national security system is organised to prevent and respond to threats, such as terrorist attacks, has implications for the safety and security of all New Zealanders. However, the Royal Commission's

recommendations have specific relevance to communities affected by the 15 March attacks and other terrorist incidents, such as the Lynn Mall attack.

- 38 The themes covered by the Royal Commission are also relevant to the wider Muslim community and other minority communities. New Zealanders belonging to these communities have reported facing discrimination and safety issues based on their ethnicity or religious belief. While these issues cannot be solved through this response, the responses to some recommendations in the report are intended to help to address them.

Human Rights

- 39 There are no direct Bill of Rights implications arising from the proposals in this paper. Since the outset of the response, affected communities' interests and needs have been considered and communities have been consulted on issues that affect them. Relevant initiatives to respond to the Royal Commission such as work on preventing and countering violent extremism have considered human rights implications.
- 40 The Human Rights Commission offered comment on this paper and has drawn attention to broader human rights implications, particularly for affected families. These include broader economic, cultural, and social rights, and the right to remedy for victims of terror attacks and their families. These concerns are broader than the scope of this paper, which is about the coordinated response to the recommendations made by the Royal Commission.

Consultation

- 41 The following agencies were consulted in the development of this paper: the Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand Police, NZSIS, GCSB, Ministry of Education, Ministry for Ethnic Communities, Statistics NZ, Ministry for Social Development, Ministry of Justice, Public Service Commission, the Department of Corrections, the Treasury and the Ministry of Culture and Heritage.
- 42 Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group, was also consulted and disagrees with my intention to wrap up the coordinated cross-government response at this time. The feedback is included below in full. I have taken this into account in the preparation of this paper, and I have written to Kāpuia in response explaining government decisions. Kāpuia's feedback on this paper will be published online in due course, as well as their final report dated 24 April, and my response to it.

Kāpuia's comment

Kāpuia is very disappointed and concerned at the direction the Government is now taking on the response to the Royal Commission. Kāpuia acknowledges positive changes have come from the response; however, it considers the decisions outlined in this paper risk reversing that progress, and the threats faced by New Zealanders could increase. Kāpuia continues to believe a new national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 2) is central to making New Zealand safer. Gaps the Royal Commission identified across the national security system still need to be addressed including ensuring effective community engagement and more transparent performance monitoring, reporting and

oversight mechanisms. Kāpuia considers there should be an annual conversation between the Prime Minister and the National Security Advisor, on national security priorities and that those priorities are made public and annually reported on.

Kāpuia strongly supports the connection between social cohesion and national security highlighted by the Royal Commission. Social cohesion should not be securitised, but the Government should act early to support inclusion and reduce the risk of radicalisation. Kāpuia believes addressing racism and discrimination for all communities, including through the education system, is a vital part of this work. A clear and accessible pathway for the public to report concerns and assurance they are being acted on must also be delivered (Recommendation 12); the existing mechanisms are not adequate. Kāpuia is very concerned that ending the coordinated and wrap-around support (Recommendation 25) and making a decision on restorative justice (Recommendation 27) without discussing options with the affected community, will lead to negative outcomes.

Communications

- 43 Officials have developed a communications plan for this response. I will be the spokesperson for decisions on concluding the coordinated, cross-government response. Queries on individual recommendations will be directed to the relevant ministers.

Proactive Release

- 44 This paper will be proactively released following public communications about its content. Redactions will be made in line with the provisions of the Official Information Act 1982.

Recommendations

The Lead Coordination Minister for the Government Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on the Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 recommends that the Committee:

Concluding the coordinated cross-government response effort

- 1 **Note** that on 29 November 2021 Cabinet agreed to establish a longer-term work programme to respond to the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques, which aimed to commence work on all recommendations by 2023, and for as many as possible to be integrated into ongoing work programmes by that time [SWC-21-MIN-0188];
- 2 **note** the progress made across government to respond to the recommendations made by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist attack on Christchurch Mosques;
- 3 **agree** to conclude the coordinated, cross-government response effort by 30 June 2024;

- 4 **agree** that work on individual recommendations that are not yet complete should be progressed by the relevant government agencies as part of their ongoing work programmes, reporting to relevant ministers or Cabinet as required;
- 5 **note** that Hon Matt Doocey, Member of Parliament for Waimakariri, will be an ongoing government point of contact for the affected community;
- 6 **agree** in principle to establish a national memorial commemorating the victims of the 15 March terrorist attacks;
- 7 **note** that establishing a national memorial will require additional funding, and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage will seek agreement for funding the project later in 2024;

Improving national security system leadership and accountability

- 8 **agree** not to establish a National Security and Intelligence Agency;
- 9 **note** that the Prime Minister has designated the Secretary and Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet as the National Security Advisor and that the Prime Minister will agree with the National Security Advisor a series of mechanisms to drive performance on national security matters;
- 10 **note** that the former Security and Intelligence Board has been reestablished as the National Security Board to provide collective accountability for implementing the National Security Strategy and is chaired by the Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in his role as National Security Advisor;

Public reporting of concerning violent extremism and terrorism related behaviours and incidents

- 11 **note** that on 11 April 2022 Cabinet [CAB-22-MIN-0129] agreed to establish the *Reporting System for Concerning Behaviours and Incidents Tagged Operating Contingency*, with drawdown of funding from 2023/24 subject to Cabinet approval of an Implementation Business Case [CAB-22-MIN-0129];

- 12 **note** s9(2)(f)(iv) [REDACTED]

- 13 **agree** to close the government's response to Recommendation 12 of the Royal Commission report with all work on the cross-agency establishment of a new reporting system to cease, with no further work required;

- 14 **agree** to close the Reporting System for Concerning Behaviours and Incidents Tagged Operating Contingency with the balance of remaining funds as set out below to be returned to the Crown:

	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27 & Outyears
Reporting System for Concerning Behaviours and Incidents Tagged Operating Contingency		-	s9(2)(f)(iv)		

Public and stakeholder engagement

- 15 **note** that the Lead Coordination Minister has responded by letter to advice provided by Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group, in the context of this paper and in their final report; and
- 16 **invite** the Lead Coordination Minister to make a public announcement about the overall approach described in this paper.

Authorised for lodgement

Hon Judith Collins, KC

Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

Proactively Released

Appendix A: List of Royal Commission recommendations and implementation status (A3)

Proactively Released

Appendix B: Support provided to the affected community (A3)

Proactively Released

Appendix C: restorative justice decision further information

I have determined that no further work will be done to explore restorative justice processes with the affected community.⁹ The following factors were considered:

Restorative Justice is a broad concept and was not defined in the Royal Commission's report

- Restorative justice can encompass a range of related victim-centred processes. More recently, the practice of restorative justice has been applied beyond direct communication between victims and perpetrators to address wider issues such as restoring community balance and social cohesion.
- The Royal Commission's report suggested that a restorative justice process could address the ongoing needs of the community and provide opportunities for accountability, healing, and for the affected community to have a voice. The government response has enabled this.

The Government has supported the affected community's needs

- Nine government agencies have been responsible for providing services to meet the needs of the affected community. Support provided includes:
 - **Education assistance** – roles were established in schools to connect and support affected communities, community learning hubs were set up to support migrant families' engagement with the education system, financial support was put in place for students at risk and to improve security and safety at Muslim early learning centres.
 - **Housing** – alternative housing solutions were sourced for families whose housing needs had changed following the attacks.
 - **Immigration** – a permanent resident visa was established for the affected community to support with their recovery, and free access to independent immigration advice.
 - **Wraparound support services** -
 - The Kaiwhakaoranga Case Management Service was established in April 2019 as an opt-in service to provide wraparound coordinated support to the affected community in key areas such as financial advice, education and training, employment, school attendance, health, wellbeing and social support, and housing.
 - The Collective Impact Board¹⁰ strengthened coordination across agencies and advocated for the needs of the affected community.
 - **Mental health support** – including culturally appropriate virtual therapy sessions, GP visits, establishment of a Muslim Wellbeing Ōtautahi team,

⁹ The Royal Commission recommended that the Government direct the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, witnesses and survivors of the terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced.

¹⁰ CIB was active from May 2021 to November 2023. It enabled public sector agencies, non-government organisations and the affected community agree a work programme for wrap-around services.

and cultural competency training for the health workforce. Te Whatu Ora increased funding for existing services like the Christchurch Resettlement Service.

- **General health support** – provisions have included treatment and rehabilitative support, weekly compensation for physical injuries or to support dependents, permanent injury compensation, and one-off payments for those who were eligible for ACC support.
- **Social and community support** – the Ministry for Ethnic Communities and other agencies have supported the community in Christchurch to engage with government. A fund was established to support the community to provide feedback on the government work programme in response to the Royal Commission's report.
- **Victim and legal support** – provisions have included legal aid, counselling, support for court attendance, travel, and other costs associated with being a victim of a serious crime.

Legal processes have enabled people to have their voices heard

- The ongoing Coronial Inquiry¹¹ has enabled the community and first responders to build a collective understanding of what happened on 15 March and the emergency response. The public hearings in late 2023 enabled bereaved families to have their voices heard and understand what happened to their loved ones.
- Additional financial support was provided to enable participation in this process. In recognition of the special circumstances of this case, the Victim Assistance Scheme delivered through the Ministry of Justice was extended to include witnesses. Families of the deceased, victims of gunshot wounds, and witnesses attending the inquest could access the maximum grant funding available.

Comparable jurisdictions have not pursued restorative justice options

- Similar jurisdictions (Canada¹², Norway¹³ and the UK¹⁴) have provisions for restorative justice within their criminal justice systems but have not employed these provisions in their responses to terrorist attacks or create a separate restorative justice process.

ACC provision

- I also considered the concerns that have been raised about access to cover under the ACC (Accident Compensation Corporation) scheme. Victims and advocates have continued to raise concerns about ACC access, including perceived inequality¹⁵ and mental injury. Any expansion of the ACC scheme would require legislative change which would have wider impacts for the health and welfare systems. A number of services for the affected community have been provided in addition to existing ACC entitlements.

¹¹ The first phase inquest was held for seven weeks from October to December 2023 and will continue again in May 2024.

¹² Quebec City Mosque attack (2017)

¹³ Oslo and Utøya attacks (2011)



¹⁴ 7/7 attacks in London (2005) and the Manchester Arena bombing (2017)



¹⁵ This includes cover for witnesses of the attack who do not receive compensation for mental injury as well as differing levels of entitlements and length of support.






Appendix A - List of Royal Commission recommendations and implementation status


Key*






*Totals are based on Cabinet agreement to the proposals in this Cabinet paper to not implement recommendations 2 and 12.






Status	Definition	Total recommendations
 IMPLEMENTED	The recommendation has been implemented according to Cabinet or ministerial direction. This may differ from the exact letter of the recommendation made by the Royal Commission. In some cases, changes that have been implemented will now become part of ongoing work.	22
 INTEGRATED	Work has been done to respond to the recommendation and this can be integrated into the relevant agency's ongoing work programme for completion.	14
 NOT PROGRESSING	The recommendation will not be implemented.	8







Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
1 <i>Ensure a Minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the counter-terrorism effort.</i>		<p>Decision: The Minister for National Security and Intelligence will remain accountable for counter-terrorism.</p> <p>Rationale: The integrated nature of counter-terrorism within the wider national security and intelligence portfolio, as well as the number of portfolios involved, would make it difficult to carve counter-terrorism out from other portfolios. This is because threats like terrorism involve significant complexity, public interest, and dispersed levers, which warrants oversight and visibility by the Minister for National Security and Intelligence.</p>
2 <i>Recommendation 2: establish a new national intelligence and security agency responsible for strategic intelligence and security leadership functions and designate the Chief Executive to be the intelligence and security advisor to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The agency would be responsible for, among other functions, system performance monitoring and reporting.</i>		<p>Decision: A separate agency will not be established. The CE of DPMC has been designated as the National Security Advisor. The Prime Minister will agree with the CE of DPMC a series of mechanisms to drive the performance required on national security matters.</p> <p>Rationale: DPMC has made organisational changes to separate the department's national security functions from its risk, governance, and crisis management functions. This provides clear lines of leadership and accountability on national security matters and hazard/risk matters.</p> <p>While a new agency may have the advantage of a legal mandate, many of the issues identified by the Royal Commission relate to clarity of role, focused leadership, effective community engagement, effective business processes, and gaps in the current national security functions. These would not necessarily be solved by creation of new government infrastructure.</p> <p>There are already a set of performance monitoring, oversight, and reporting mechanisms in place for national security agencies. These include the Ombudsman, the Privacy Commissioner, the Auditor-General, and the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, as well as the Parliamentary Select Committee process. The Select Committee process for the NZSIS and GCSB is carried out by the Intelligence and Security Committee.</p>







Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
		<p>Recommendation 5 below also refers to measures, in response to the Royal Commission, to update the Public Finance Act, requiring the NZSIS and GCSB to provide performance information that can be subject to performance audit by the Auditor-General.</p>
<p>3 <i>Recommendation 3: investigate alternative mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the Security and Intelligence Board including the establishment of an Interdepartmental Executive Board.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Alternative mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the Security and Intelligence Board were investigated. The National Security Board has been established to replace the Security and Intelligence Board.</p> <p>Rationale: The establishment of the National Security Board, chaired by the CE DPMC as National Security Advisor, strengthens the collective leadership of the national security system.</p>
<p>4 <i>Develop and implement a public facing strategy that addresses extremism and preventing, detecting, and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism.</i></p>		<p>Decision: The existing Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy (CT Strategy) was expanded in 2021 to have a more public-facing approach. This will be continued when it is next refreshed as part of the cross-agency counter-terrorism work programme.</p> <p>Rationale: New Zealand's CT Strategy remains fit for purpose and will be refreshed in the near future. The CT Strategy was agreed by Cabinet in September 2019 and publicly released in April 2020. An expanded version was released publicly in June 2021, with more detail on some of the areas specifically mentioned by the Royal Commission.</p>
<p>5 <i>Amend the Public Finance Act 1989 to require intelligence and security agencies to provide performance information that can be subject to performance audit by Auditor-General.</i></p>		<p>Decision: The Public Finance Act 1989 will be amended as per this recommendation. The amendment is intended to take place when the Public Finance Act is next updated.</p> <p>Rationale: The former Finance Minister agreed that this recommendation should be implemented and that the best means to achieve this was to include this change in the next package of amendments to the Public Finance Act, which is expected to be considered for the 2025 legislative programme.</p> <p>While legislative reform is on a longer-term trajectory the NZSIS and GCSB will voluntarily provide performance information for audit by the Office of the Auditor-General. A trial audit of the agencies' performance information will occur for FY 2023/24, before standard auditing begins in FY 2024/25.</p>
<p>6 <i>Strengthen the role of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) so that it can provide better and informed cross-parliamentary oversight of the national security system (including the counter-terrorism effort) and priority setting, and members can access sensitive information as necessary for such oversight.</i></p>		<p>Decision: This recommendation will be considered as part of the separate government response to the Independent Review of the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (ISA review).</p> <p>Rationale: In response to this recommendation and recommendations 10, 17 and part of 18, the scheduled review of the ISA was brought forward. Reviewers delivered their report in January 2023.</p> <p>The ISA review agreed with this recommendation and proposed wider reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) beyond that contemplated by the Royal Commission. §9(2)(f)(iv)</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>
<p>7 <i>Recommendation 7: Establish an Advisory Group on counter-terrorism, with its functions established in legislation.</i></p>		<p>Decision: An advisory group will not be established.</p> <p>Rationale: The intent of recommendations 7 and 8 was to ensure that there is wider societal involvement in the counter-terrorism effort. In the time since the Royal Commission reported, mechanisms for hearing and incorporating community, civil society, local government, and private sector advice into counter-terrorism activities have significantly increased and improved.</p> <p>A separate advisory group would not yield sufficient further benefits to warrant the administrative burden, and overheads. National security agencies should utilise existing mechanisms to ensure that advice and views from communities, civil society, local government, and the private sector are appropriately sought and included in relevant outputs.</p>














Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
<p>8 <i>Include in advice on the National Security Intelligence Priorities and in the annual threatscape report, a summary of the advice provided in the preceding year by Advisory Group and the actions taken in response.</i></p>		<p>Decision: An advisory group will not be established and therefore its advice on the National Security Intelligence Priorities or an annual threatscape report will not be included.</p> <p>Rationale: Civil society views will be incorporated into advice on National Security Intelligence Priorities or threatscape reporting through existing channels.</p>
<p>9 <i>Improve intelligence and security information sharing practices:</i></p> <p>a) <i>changing “need to know” principle across relevant public sector agencies, with special attention given to local government including the emergency management structures at the local and regional level.</i></p> <p>b) <i>oversee implementation of recommendations in 2019 Review of the New Zealand Security Classification System.</i></p>		<p>9A decisions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Require the review of the ISA to include a requirement for the reviewers to consider “how the Act may best enable the intelligence and security agencies to appropriately and effectively cooperate and share information with New Zealand government agencies and other partners”. Findings are now being considered as part of the policy process to respond to the review of the ISA. 2) Improve the ability to share information with local government through updates to the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (completed in 2023). <p>Rationale: These decisions will facilitate greater sharing of information held by government agencies.</p> <p>9B decisions: The NZSIS’s Protective Security Requirements (PSR) Unit updated the New Zealand Classification System Policy in 2021/22.</p> <p>Rationale: The updated policy makes it easier for agencies to understand the existing classification system and apply classifications correctly and consistently.</p>
<p>10 <i>Amend the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 with respect to direct access agreements, to require the new national intelligence and security agency, and in the interim the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to regularly report to the responsible Minister for the counterterrorism effort on their establishment and implementation.</i></p>		<p>Decision: This recommendation will be considered as part of the separate government response to the ISA review.</p> <p>Rationale: In response to this recommendation and recommendations 6, 17 and part of 18, the scheduled review of the ISA was brought forward. Reviewers delivered their report in January 2023.</p> <p>The ISA review did not agree with this recommendation, believing it would not result in the change sought by the Royal Commission. Instead, it made other recommendations about direct access agreements that it suggested would improve the scheme. s9(2)(f)(iv)</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>
<p>11 <i>Direct chief executives of public sector agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort to consider whether they have an appropriate number of their employees that have security clearances and ensure that those staff have appropriate access to facilities and information management and technology systems as required.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Chief Executives’ ability to ensure staff are cleared and have access to facilities and systems will be facilitated by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establishing a set of principles for enabling greater access to information, • encouraging non-traditional national security agencies to ensure they have appropriately cleared people in the right roles to meet relevant needs, • approval by the Prime Minister for more ministers to have access to relevant classified material as it relates to their portfolios, and • encouraging agencies to share information using secure information systems. <p>Rationale: Chief Executives have an existing, ongoing responsibility for ensuring appropriate staff have clearances and can access information relevant to their job.</p>
<p>12 <i>Develop and promote an accessible reporting system that enables members of the public to easily and safely report concerning behaviours or incidents to a single contact point within government.</i></p>		<p>Decision: A separate system to report concerning behaviours and incidents will not be established.</p> <p>Rationale: Existing threat reporting channels are sufficient, and investment will be reprioritised.</p>





Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
<p>13 <i>Develop and publish indicators and risk factors that illustrate for the public specific behaviours that may demonstrate a person's potential for engaging in violent extremism and terrorism and update them regularly as the threatscape evolves.</i></p>		<p>Decision: In 2022 the NZSIS developed and published '<i>Kia mataara ki ngā tohu – Know the signs: a guide for identifying indicators of violent extremism</i>' on its website.</p> <p>Rationale: The guide raises awareness of some of the key warning signs and how to report concerning behaviour or activities. This will be updated as the nature of the violent extremist threat evolves, and new indicators emerge. The NZSIS uses the guide as an engagement tool, and it has also been utilised by other organisations to raise awareness among their own stakeholders.</p>
<p>14 <i>Establish a programme to fund independent NZ-specific research.</i></p>		<p>Decision: The Government established <i>He Whenua Taurikura</i>, New Zealand's National Centre of Research Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in 2022, with initial funding through to the end of 2024/25. The centre has funded 24 Masters and PhD scholarships since 2022/23.</p> <p>Rationale: This was to fund independent New Zealand specific research as recommended. Future funding will be subject to budget decisions.</p>
<p>15 <i>Create opportunities to improve public understanding on violent extremism and terrorism in NZ, with ongoing public discussions.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Opportunities to improve public understanding have continued, such as through the following initiatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the national counterterrorism hui (<i>He Whenua Taurikura</i>) held in 2021 and 2022, • publication of the National Security Strategy, • publication of the National Security Intelligence Priorities in 2021 and 2023 and a commitment to continue publishing, • publication of the inaugural NZSIS Security Threat Environment Report (2023), • research undertaken within the <i>He Whenua Taurikura</i> Centre of Research Excellence (see also recommendation 14), and • a Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Strategic Fund (2022/23-2024/25), which was launched by DPMC in 2023 to support civil society and community organisations counter violent extremism and radicalisation. <p>Further opportunities to meet the intent of this recommendation is part of the work of the multi-agency Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee.</p> <p>Rationale: The recommendation requires an ongoing focus on creating opportunities.</p>
<p>16 <i>Direct the chief executive of the new national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 2) to host an annual countering violent extremism and terrorism hui</i></p>		<p>Decision: Two <i>He Whenua Taurikura</i> national hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism were held (in 2021 and 2022). In 2024 a decision was taken to cancel the 2023/2024 hui s9(2)(g)(i) but officials have been asked to focus on helping to build a broader public conversation on national security issues.</p> <p>Rationale: Funding provided to host these hui was time limited. However, the National Security Strategy's Programme of Action includes, as a major initiative for 2023-2025 'cultivating and sustaining a public conversation on national security' through initiatives such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • publishing an annual strategic overview of threats to New Zealand's national security, • an annual ministerial address on national security, • continuing to build relationships with civil society, including Iwi/Māori.
<p>17 <i>Require in legislation:</i></p> <p>a. <i>the Minister for National Security and Intelligence to publish during every parliamentary cycle the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and refer them to the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee for consideration.</i></p> <p>b. <i>the responsible minister to publish an annual threatscape report; and the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee to receive and consider submissions on the National Security and</i></p>		<p>Decision: This recommendation will be considered as part of the separate government response to the ISA review.</p> <p>Rationale: In response to this recommendation and recommendations 6, 10 and part of 18, the scheduled review of the ISA was brought forward. Reviewers delivered their report in January 2023.</p> <p>The ISA review agreed with the Royal Commission that an unclassified version of the National Security and Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs) should continue to be published but did not agree it should be required in law. DPMC has published two unclassified versions of the NSIPs so far in 2021 and 2023.</p> <p>The ISA review agreed there should be a legislative requirement to produce a classified annual threatscape report and publish an unclassified version of it, but recommended it be published by the National Assessments Bureau (NAB), instead of the responsible Minister. The ISA review agreed that the unclassified version of the annual threatscape report should support a public hearing and submissions to the ISC. NZSIS published a first Security Threat Environment Report in August 2023 which contributes to the intent of the recommendation for a public-facing threatscape report.</p>

Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
<p><i>Intelligence Priorities and the annual threatscape report.</i></p>		
<p>18 <i>Review all legislation related to the counterterrorism effort to ensure it is current and enables public sector agencies to operate effectively, prioritising consideration of the creation of precursor terrorism offences in the Terrorism Suppression Act, the urgent review of the effect of section 19 of the Intelligence and Security Act on target discovery and acceding to and implementing the Budapest Convention.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Specific legislative amendments already completed under this recommendation include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Act 2021 which added precursor offences such as planning and preparation of terrorist acts to the TSA and extended the terrorism finance provisions, and the Counter Terrorism Acts (Designations and Control Orders) Amendment Act 2023 <p>Work on accession to the Budapest Convention is ongoing with a view to acceding in 2025.</p> <p>Section 19 of the ISA was considered by the ISA review, which determined no change was required to the section. This aspect of the recommendation is complete.</p> <p>Rationale: The amendments and future work will help ensure New Zealand's legislation is and remains fit for purpose as the threat environment evolves.</p>
<p>19 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to make policies and standards and guidance for the firearms licensing system clear and consistent with legislation.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Police was directed update the necessary policies and operational standards.</p> <p>Highlighted changes include updating the Firearms Safety Code, a new version of the secure storage and transportation of firearms and ammunition guide, and a new shooting range guide.</p> <p>Rationale: The changes ensure the licencing system is clear and consistent with legislation.</p>
<p>20 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to introduce electronic system for processing firearms licence applications.</i></p>		<p>Decision: The electronic Firearms Registry went live on 24 June 2023* and changes to the Arms Act 1983 came into force that outline the obligation for the Commissioner of Police to operate a registry and the content of the Registry.</p> <p>Rationale: Section 104 of the Arms Legislation Act 2020 required the Commissioner to keep and operate a registry which also satisfies this recommendation.</p> <p>*The Government will review the registry as part of the coalition agreement between the National Party and Act</p>
<p>21 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to ensure firearms licensing staff have regular training and undertake periodic reviews of the quality of their work.</i></p>		<p>Decision: In December 2021 Police introduced a three-phase learning and development programme, which was completed in 2023. Further training will be conducted as part of Police's ongoing business and as legislation amendments come into force.</p> <p>Rationale: Ongoing professional development of new and existing licensing staff will ensure consistency of quality and approach.</p>
<p>22 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to introduce performance indicators that focus on the effective implementation of the firearms licensing system.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Police has produced monthly performance indicators on licensing (for example, completed licence applications versus demand, application processing times, number of licence holders registered, and number firearms registered).</p> <p>Rationale: The Firearms Safety Authority has been given oversight and performance monitoring functions to ensure decision makers have the right information at their disposal, and have awareness of the wider regulatory system, to best direct interventions.</p>
<p>23 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to require two new processes for applicants who have lived outside of New Zealand for substantial periods of time in the ten years preceding the application.</i></p>		<p>Decision: The new processes have been introduced. Applicants are now required to provide a list of countries stayed in for a period of 14 days or more at any one time over the previous five years.</p> <p>These are based on the Arms Amendment Regulations 2021 that came into force on 1 February 2022. The regulations are also clear that the applicant's provision of contact details of their next of kin/near relative applies to persons who may be overseas. There is provision for refusal of an application for insufficient information or if contact cannot be made with appropriate referees.</p> <p>Rationale: This provides stronger requirements for information on overseas activity.</p>

Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
<p>24 <i>Introduce mandatory reporting of firearms injuries to Police by health professionals</i></p>		<p>Decision: Mandatory reporting will not be pursued.</p> <p>Rationale: Section 92 of the Arms Act 1983 already requires health practitioners to consider reporting firearms injuries if they believe a licence holder should not be permitted to use or possess firearms due to a health condition. This requirement came into effect on 24 December 2020 shortly after the RCOI report was presented to Parliament on 8 December 2020.</p>
<p>25 <i>Direct the Ministry of Social Development to work with relevant public sector agencies to facilitate coordinated access to ongoing recovery support for affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack</i></p>		<p>Decision: The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) established the <i>Kaiwhakaoranga</i> Specialist Case Management Service (the Service) in 2019. The Service has also administered the Christchurch Mosque Attack Assistance Programme (the Programme). Both the Service and the Programme end on 30 June 2024.</p> <p>Rationale for ending the service: Over the last five years, many families have become more confident in dealing independently with government agencies and self-source the support they need. From 1 July 2024 people will continue to access support directly through the core services of both government and non-government agencies.</p>
<p>26 <i>Investigate establishing a Collective Impact Network and Board or other relevant mechanism that enables agencies, non-government organisations and affected whānau, survivors and witnesses to agree a specific work programme to provide ongoing wrap-around services</i></p>		<p>Decision: The Collective Impact Board was established in May 2021. The Board formally ceased work in November 2023. The Board, made up of community and government agency representatives, identified and raised 40 themes on its work programme, and made 11 recommendations to the <i>Kaiwhakaoranga</i> Service on wrap-around support to the affected community. The Board published the Collective Trauma Response and Recovery report to help inform wrap-around support should a similar tragedy occur.</p> <p>Rationale for ending the Board's role: The Board's role was intended to be time limited.</p>
<p>27 <i>Direct the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Further work on restorative justice processes will not be progressed.</p> <p>Rationale: The Government has adopted a restorative approach regarding the affected community. This has been through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the establishment of wrap-around coordinated support to the affected community, and • opportunities for the affected community to have their voices heard throughout the delivery of services and the Government's response to the Royal Commission Report. <p>The community has had opportunities to have its voice heard through the legal process, such as victim statements at the sentencing of the convicted terrorist and the ongoing Coronial Inquiry. This approach is consistent with other jurisdictions, which did not provide for alternative restorative approaches but provided for the ongoing needs of the community throughout their responses to terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>28 <i>Announce that the Minister for Social Development and Employment and the Ministry of Social Development have responsibility and accountability for coordinating a whole-of-government approach to building social cohesion, including social inclusion.</i></p>		<p>Decision: The former Associate Minister for Social Development and Employment was given this responsibility in April 2021 alongside the Ministry of Social Development.</p> <p>Rationale: MSD led a whole-of-government approach to building social cohesion resulting in the development of <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion Strategic Framework and tools and resources (outlined further in recommendation 29 below).</p>
<p>29 <i>Direct MSD to discuss and collaborate with communities, civil society, local government, and the private sector on the development of a social cohesion strategic framework and the monitoring and evaluation regime.</i></p>		<p>Decision: MSD developed <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion Strategic Framework (and a suite of tools and resources) designed to support individuals, communities, businesses, local government, and the cultural sector to build social cohesion.</p> <p>This work was heavily informed by a series of public engagements including joint engagement with the Ministry of Justice and Department of Internal Affairs, targeted engagement with stakeholders from diverse communities, Māori engagement and community hui.</p> <p>MSD will continue to report on social cohesion indicators with the next report due at the end of 2024.</p> <p>Rationale: <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion Strategic Framework was launched in October 2022. The tools and resources are now available on MSD's website.</p>

Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
<p>30 Investigate options for an agency focused on ethnic communities and multiculturalism and establish a fit for purpose organisational design that will encompass the current functions expected of the Office of Ethnic Communities.</p>		<p>Decision: The Ministry for Ethnic Communities was established in July 2021 and has a work programme that advances this recommendation.</p> <p>Rationale: This decision was taken to increase government focus on ethnic communities.</p>
<p>31 Prioritise development of appropriate measures and indicators (such as the Living Standards Framework) of social cohesion, including social inclusion</p>		<p>Decision: As part of the release of <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> tools and resources, the <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion measurement framework was developed. MSD will continue to report on social cohesion indicators with the next report due at the end of 2024.</p> <p>Rationale: The framework helps us to understand and measure social cohesion in New Zealand through multiple data sources.</p>
<p>32 Require public sector agencies to prioritise the collection of data on ethnic and religious demographics to support analysis and advice on the implications of New Zealand's rapidly changing society, inform better policy making and enhance policy evaluation.</p>		<p>Decision: Statistics NZ is currently leading the review of the ethnicity data standard. The data standard is expected to be rolled out in 2025.</p> <p>Rationale: Once implemented, the new standard will ensure government agencies are collecting data on ethnicity in a consistent way, making the data more useful for policy making and analysis.</p>
<p>33 Direct the chief executives of the public sector agencies involved in the counterterrorism effort to continue focusing efforts on significantly increasing workforce diversity, including in leadership roles, and in consultation with the Advisory Group on counterterrorism (recommendation 7).</p>		<p>Decision: In 2023 DPMC working with the Public Service Commission (PSC) led a baselining exercise of agencies involved in national security and produced a dashboard on diversity.</p> <p>An action under the National Security Strategy's Programme of Action is to develop workforce diversity and inclusion.</p> <p>National security agencies also contribute reporting to the PSC as part of <i>Papa Pounamu</i>.</p> <p>Rationale: Baselining of data will help drive efforts to increase workforce diversity.</p>
<p>34 Public Service Commissioner to publish annual reporting on progress made by agencies against the Papa Pounamu commitments, particularly agencies involved in counterterrorism.</p>		<p>Decision: In response to this recommendation, PSC now produces an annual report on progress being made across the Public Service to implement diversity and inclusion initiatives and programmes.</p> <p>For 2023, the report was expanded to also focus on pay equity. The third system level annual report on the Public Service's progress on the diversity, equity, and inclusion was published at the end of May 2024.</p> <p>Rationale: This recommendation provided an opportunity to consolidate how diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives are progressed across the Public Service.</p>
<p>35 Public Service Commissioner to continue efforts on significantly increasing workforce diversity and attracting diverse talent for public service leadership roles at 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tiers</p>		<p>Decision: In 2023 <i>Fostering diverse leadership</i> became a focus area for the <i>Papa Pounamu</i> work programme. Government agencies are required to report on workforce and leadership composition in their annual reports and provide more details on actions under their diversity, equity, and inclusion plans.</p> <p>The collation of the annual Public Service workforce data also means that the participation of underrepresented groups in senior leadership and workforce can be monitored. This approach is supported by the Public Service Act.</p> <p>Rationale: In 2022, <i>Papa Pounamu</i> reviewed the focus areas to determine what would make the most impact. It was agreed to make <i>Fostering diverse leadership</i> a new focus.</p>
<p>36 Invest in opportunities for young New Zealanders to learn about their role, rights and responsibilities and on the value of ethnic and religious diversity, inclusivity, conflict resolution, civic literacy and self-regulation.</p>		<p>Decision: Existing education programmes have been leveraged to meet the intent of this recommendation. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social and emotional learning (SEL) Pilot Programme. SEL enhances students' capacity to integrate skills, attitudes, and behaviours so they can deal effectively with daily tasks and challenges.

Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The ENGAGE programme is part of the wider SEL programme and develops children's self-regulation skills through games. Funding for the ENGAGE programme has been agreed by Cabinet through the Emerging Priorities Fund (\$19.7m for June 2023 – June 2027). Community Learning Hubs. These Hubs were funded in Christchurch in 2020, to provide workshops and information to support ethnic communities' engagement with the education system. Following the Christchurch pilot, the initiative has since been expanded to Auckland, Hamilton, Palmerston North, Wellington, and Dunedin. Funding of \$6.411m has been provided from 2022 – 2026 to maintain the Hubs and fund an impact evaluation of the model. <p>Rationale: There are existing initiatives in the education system to help young New Zealanders learn about their role, rights and responsibilities in a diverse society.</p>
<p>37 Create opportunities for regular public conversations led by the responsible minister – for all New Zealanders to share knowledge and improve their understanding of social cohesion and the value that ethnic and religious diversity can contribute to a well-functioning society.</p>		<p>Decision: This work has been progressed through the development of <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion strategic framework.</p> <p>Rationale: As part of the development of <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion Strategic Framework and other tools and resources, MSD led engagement on social cohesion across a diverse range of communities including with over 600 stakeholders over ten months. This included 53 community events and hui (in-person and online), online surveys, email submissions and wānanga.</p>
<p>38 Require all public sector community engagement to be in accordance with New Zealand's Open Government Partnership commitments and in particular:</p>		<p>Decision: DPMC's Policy Project team led the development of a policy community engagement tool, for use by agencies engaging on the government response to the Royal Commission. Use of the tool by agencies has enhanced the quality of engagement with communities and stakeholders.</p> <p>The Public Service Commission has committed to developing guidance supporting the use of the community engagement tool by the Public Service for significant initiatives.</p> <p>Rationale: The development and use of the tool will lift the quality of agencies' community engagement. Enhanced engagement practice will lift the contribution of communities in the development of services and policies that affect them. Development of further guidance by the PSC will extend good engagement practice across public sector agencies.</p>
<p>39 Amend legislation to create hate-motivated offences in:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> the Summary Offences Act 1981 that correspond with the existing offences of offensive behaviour or language, assault, wilful damage and intimidation; and the Crimes Act 1961 that correspond with the existing offences of assaults, arson and intentional damage 		<p>Decision: The Law Commission has been asked to proceed with a review of legal responses to hate motivated offences. The Law Commission will report back to the Minister of Justice in due course.</p> <p>Rationale: The Law Commission is well-placed to conduct an independent review into whether New Zealand should have standalone hate crime offences, or continue to consider hate motivation as an aggravating factor at sentencing.</p>
<p>40 Repeal section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 and insert a provision in the Crimes Act 1961 for an offence of inciting racial or religious disharmony, based on an intent to stir up, maintain or normalise hatred, through threatening, abusive, or insulting communications with protected characteristics that include religious affiliation.</p>		<p>Decision: No amendments to legislation on hate speech will be made. The reference to hate speech has been removed from the Law Commission's work programme.</p> <p>Rationale: The Government has committed not to change hate speech legislation under the coalition agreement between the National Party and New Zealand First.</p>

Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
<p>41 <i>Amend the definition of “objectionable” in section 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 to include racial superiority, racial hatred and racial discrimination.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Recommendation 41 will not be progressed as work on hate speech (recommendation 40) has stopped and these two recommendations were intended to be a package.</p> <p>Rationale: If Recommendation 41 were to be progressed in isolation, it would raise the risk of duplication and inconsistency of offences between section 131 of the Human Rights Act and the Classification Act.</p>
<p>42 <i>Direct New Zealand Police to revise the ways in which they record complaints of criminal conduct to capture systematically hate-motivations for offending and train frontline staff</i></p>		<p>Decision: Police established <i>Te Raranga “The Weave”</i> in July 2021. This is a four-year programme to improve Police’s response to, and reduce the harm caused by, hate-motivated crimes and incidents. When funding for this programme ends in June 2025 this will be fully integrated into Police’s ongoing activities.</p> <p>Rationale: This is to continue progressing work to support victims, witnesses, and communities to recognise, and report hate crime, align partner agencies to reduce the harm caused by hate crime, and train police staff to recognise, record, respond to and resolve hate-motivated crime if it occurs.</p>
<p>43 <i>Ensure a minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the response</i></p>		<p>Decision: The former and current Governments assigned a Lead Coordination Minister. This role will be disestablished.</p> <p>Rationale: There is no longer a need for a Lead Coordination Minister once the coordinated, cross-government phase has concluded.</p>
<p>44 <i>Establish an Implementation Oversight Advisory Group.</i></p>		<p>Decision: Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group, was established in June 2021 and members’ terms end in June 2024.</p> <p>Rationale: There is no longer a need for a ministerial advisory group once the coordinated, cross-government response phase has concluded.</p>

Proactively Released


Overview of bespoke government support

FOR COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY THE 2019 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON CHRISTCHURCH MOSQUES

Identified funding

\$19.3m

Unique supports established for the affected community



\$11.8m

Financial support payments to victims and their families

\$8.4m

Government supports that are available to all NZers

NOTE: The total financial value of supports provided is unable to be fully quantified. The actual cost is likely much higher.

DELIVERED BY



Te Whatu Ora
Health New Zealand
Waitaha Canterbury




Types of services and supports




EDUCATION

- Roles in schools established to connect and support local communities affected by attacks.
- Christchurch community learning hubs helped migrant families engage with NZ education.
- Financial system aid for at-risk students and to improve security and safety at Muslim early learning centres.



WRAP AROUND

- The Kaiwhakaoranga Case Management Service provided proactive support for a wide range of services including access to employment and training, financial assistance, housing, immigration, and other social supports.
- The Collective Impact Board improved coordination between agencies and advocated for the community's needs over time.



HEALTH

MENTAL HEALTH SUPPORT

- Te Whatu Ora funded a Muslim Wellbeing Ōtautahi team and worked with the affected community to improve cultural capability of services, such as virtual therapy and GP visits.
- Increased funding for existing services.

GENERAL HEALTH SUPPORT

- Funding for health services, to support physical and mental health needs including specialist health services for mental wellbeing and clinical interventions for people impacted by the attacks.
- Funded GP visits for Canterbury-based affected community members.



COMMUNITY

Funding to help the affected community engage with government agencies.



HOUSING

Alternative housing options were sourced for families after the attack when current housing was no longer suitable for them.



VICTIM + LEGAL

- Legal counsel to assist victims during prosecution proceedings.
- Funding for legal representation at the coronial inquiry.



IMMIGRATION

Permanent resident visa and funding for licensed immigration advisors to aid recovery.



Cabinet

Minute of Decision

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Report of the Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee: Period Ended 28 June 2024

On 1 July 2024, Cabinet made the following decisions on the work of the Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee for the period ended 28 June 2024:

[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

FPS-24-MIN-0019	Concluding the Coordinated Cross-government Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques Portfolio: Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques	CONFIRMED
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Rachel Hayward
Secretary of the Cabinet



Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee

Minute of Decision

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Concluding the Coordinated Cross-government Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attacks on Christchurch Mosques

Portfolio Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

On 25 June 2024, the Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee:

Concluding the coordinated cross-government response effort

- 1 **noted** that on 29 November 2021, Cabinet agreed to establish a longer-term work programme to respond to the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques (the Royal Commission), which aimed to commence work on all recommendations by 2023, and for as many as possible to be integrated into ongoing work programmes by that time [SWC-21-MIN-0188];
- 2 **noted** the progress made across government to respond to the recommendations made by the Royal Commission, as outlined in the paper under FPS-24-SUB-0019;
- 3 **agreed** to conclude the coordinated, cross-government response effort by 30 June 2024;
- 4 **agreed** that work on individual recommendations that are not yet complete should be progressed by the relevant government agencies as part of their ongoing work programmes, reporting to relevant Ministers or Cabinet as required;
- 5 **noted** that Hon Matt Doocey, Member of Parliament for Waimakariri, will be an ongoing Government point of contact for the affected community;
- 6 **noted** that further consideration will be given to the possible establishment of a national memorial commemorating the victims of the 15 March terrorist attacks, and that advice will be submitted to Ministers as appropriate;

Improving national security system leadership and accountability

- 7 **agreed** not to establish a National Security and Intelligence Agency;
- 8 **noted** that the Prime Minister has designated the Secretary and Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) as the National Security Advisor, and that the Prime Minister will agree with the National Security Advisor a series of mechanisms to drive performance on national security matters;

9 **noted** that the former Security and Intelligence Board has been reestablished as the National Security Board to provide collective accountability for implementing the National Security Strategy, and that it is chaired by the Chief Executive of DPMC in his role as National Security Advisor;

Public reporting of concerning violent extremism and terrorism related behaviours and incidents

10 **noted** that on 11 April 2022, the previous government agreed to establish the *Reporting System for Concerning Behaviours and Incidents Tagged Operating Contingency*, with drawdown of funding from 2023/24 subject to Cabinet approval of an Implementation Business Case [CAB-22-MIN-0129];

11 **noted** s9(2)(f)(iv) [Redacted]

12 **agreed** to close the Government’s response to Recommendation 12 of the Royal Commission’s report, with all work on the cross-agency establishment of a new reporting system to cease, with no further work required;

13 **agreed** to close the *Reporting System for Concerning Behaviours and Incidents Tagged Operating Contingency*, with the balance of remaining funds as set out below to be returned to the Crown:

	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27 & Outyears
Reporting System for Concerning Behaviours and Incidents Tagged Operating Contingency	-	s9(2)(f)(iv)	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

Public and stakeholder engagement

14 **noted** that the Lead Coordination Minister has responded by letter to advice provided by Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group, in the context of the paper under FPS-24-SUB-0019 and in their final report;

15 **invited** the Lead Coordination Minister to make a public announcement about the overall approach, as outlined in the paper under FPS-24-SUB-0019.

Janine Harvey
Committee Secretary

Present:
Rt Hon Christopher Luxon
Rt Hon Winston Peters (Chair)
Hon David Seymour
Hon Nicola Willis
Hon Judith Collins
Hon Todd McClay

Officials present from:
Office of the Prime Minister
Office of the Chair
Officials Committee for FPS