






















## March 15 Royal Commission of Inquiry Recommendations Implementation Status








Status	Definition	Total recommendations
 <b>IMPLEMENTED</b>	The recommendation has been implemented according to Cabinet or ministerial direction. This may differ from the exact letter of the recommendation made by the Royal Commission. In some cases, changes that have been implemented will now become part of ongoing work.	<b>22</b>
 <b>INTEGRATED</b>	Work has been done to respond to the recommendation and this can be integrated into the relevant agency's ongoing work programme for completion.	<b>14</b>
 <b>NOT PROGRESSING</b>	The recommendation will not be implemented.	<b>8</b>






Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
1 <i>Ensure a Minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the counter-terrorism effort.</i>		<b>Decision:</b> The Minister for National Security and Intelligence will remain accountable for counter-terrorism. <b>Rationale:</b> The integrated nature of counter-terrorism within the wider national security and intelligence portfolio, as well as the number of portfolios involved, would make it difficult to carve counter-terrorism out from other portfolios. This is because threats like terrorism involve significant complexity, public interest, and dispersed levers, which warrants oversight and visibility by the Minister for National Security and Intelligence.
2 <i>Recommendation 2: establish a new national intelligence and security agency responsible for strategic intelligence and security leadership functions and designate the Chief Executive to be the intelligence and security advisor to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The agency would be responsible for, among other functions, system performance monitoring and reporting.</i>		<b>Decision:</b> A separate agency will not be established. The CE of DPMC has been designated as the National Security Advisor. The Prime Minister will agree with the CE of DPMC a series of mechanisms to drive the performance required on national security matters. <b>Rationale:</b> DPMC has made organisational changes to separate the department's national security functions from its risk, governance, and crisis management functions. This provides clear lines of leadership and accountability on national security matters and hazard/risk matters. While a new agency may have the advantage of a legal mandate, many of the issues identified by the Royal Commission relate to clarity of role, focused leadership, effective community engagement, effective business processes, and gaps in the current national security functions. These would not necessarily be solved by creation of new government infrastructure. There are already a set of performance monitoring, oversight, and reporting mechanisms in place for national security agencies. These include the Ombudsman, the Privacy Commissioner, the Auditor-General, and the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, as well as the Parliamentary Select Committee process. The Select Committee process for the NZSIS and GCSB is carried out by the Intelligence and Security Committee.







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		<p>Recommendation 5 below also refers to measures, in response to the Royal Commission, to update the Public Finance Act, requiring the NZSIS and GCSB to provide performance information that can be subject to performance audit by the Auditor-General.</p>
<p>3 <i>Recommendation 3: investigate alternative mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the Security and Intelligence Board including the establishment of an Interdepartmental Executive Board.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Alternatives mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the Security and Intelligence Board were investigated. The National Security Board has been established to replace the Security and Intelligence Board.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The establishment of the National Security Board, chaired by the CE DPMC as National Security Advisor, strengthens the collective leadership of the national security system.</p>
<p>4 <i>Develop and implement a public facing strategy that addresses extremism and preventing, detecting, and responding to current and emerging threats of violent extremism and terrorism.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The existing Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy (CT Strategy) was expanded in 2021 to have a more public-facing approach. This will be continued when it is next refreshed as part of the cross-agency counter-terrorism work programme.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> New Zealand's CT Strategy remains fit for purpose and will be refreshed in the near future. The CT Strategy was agreed by Cabinet in September 2019 and publicly released in April 2020. An expanded version was released publicly in June 2021, with more detail on some of the areas specifically mentioned by the Royal Commission.</p>
<p>5 <i>Amend the Public Finance Act 1989 to require intelligence and security agencies to provide performance information that can be subject to performance audit by Auditor-General.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The Public Finance Act 1989 will be amended as per this recommendation. The amendment is intended to take place when the Public Finance Act is next updated.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The former Finance Minister agreed that this recommendation should be implemented and that the best means to achieve this was to include this change in the next package of amendments to the Public Finance Act, which is expected to be considered for the 2025 legislative programme.</p> <p>While legislative reform is on a longer-term trajectory the NZSIS and GCSB will voluntarily provide performance information for audit by the Office of the Auditor-General. A trial audit of the agencies' performance information will occur for FY 2023/24, before standard auditing begins in FY 2024/25.</p>
<p>6 <i>Strengthen the role of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) so that it can provide better and informed cross-parliamentary oversight of the national security system (including the counter-terrorism effort) and priority setting, and members can access sensitive information as necessary for such oversight.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> This recommendation will be considered as part of the separate government response to the Independent Review of the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (ISA review).</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> In response to this recommendation and recommendations 10, 17 and part of 18, the scheduled review of the ISA was brought forward. Reviewers delivered their report in January 2023.</p> <p>The ISA review agreed with this recommendation and proposed wider reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) beyond that contemplated by the Royal Commission.</p>
<p>7 <i>Recommendation 7: Establish an Advisory Group on counter-terrorism, with its functions established in legislation.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> An advisory group will not be established.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The intent of recommendations 7 and 8 was to ensure that there is wider societal involvement in the counter-terrorism effort. In the time since the Royal Commission reported, mechanisms for hearing and incorporating community, civil society, local government, and private sector advice into counter-terrorism activities have significantly increased and improved.</p> <p>A separate advisory group would not yield sufficient further benefits to warrant the administrative burden, and overheads. National security agencies should utilise existing mechanisms to ensure that advice and views from communities, civil society, local government, and the private sector are appropriately sought and included in relevant outputs.</p>
<p>8 <i>Include in advice on the National Security Intelligence Priorities and in the annual threatscape report, a summary of the advice provided in the preceding year by Advisory Group and the actions taken in response.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> An advisory group will not be established and therefore its advice on the National Security Intelligence Priorities or an annual threatscape report will not be included.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Civil society views will be incorporated into advice on National Security Intelligence Priorities or threatscape reporting through existing channels.</p>






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<p>9 <i>Improve intelligence and security information sharing practices:</i></p> <p>a) <i>changing “need to know” principle across relevant public sector agencies, with special attention given to local government including the emergency management structures at the local and regional level.</i></p> <p>b) <i>oversee implementation of recommendations in 2019 Review of the New Zealand Security Classification System.</i></p>		<p><b>9A decisions:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Require the review of the ISA to include a requirement for the reviewers to consider “how the Act may best enable the intelligence and security agencies to appropriately and effectively cooperate and share information with New Zealand government agencies and other partners”. Findings are now being considered as part of the policy process to respond to the review of the ISA.</li> <li>2) Improve the ability to share information with local government through updates to the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (completed in 2023).</li> </ol> <p><b>Rationale:</b> These decisions will facilitate greater sharing of information held by government agencies.</p> <p><b>9B decisions:</b> The NZSIS’s Protective Security Requirements (PSR) Unit updated the New Zealand Classification System Policy in 2021/22.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The updated policy makes it easier for agencies to understand the existing classification system and apply classifications correctly and consistently.</p>
<p>10 <i>Amend the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 with respect to direct access agreements, to require the new national intelligence and security agency, and in the interim the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to regularly report to the responsible Minister for the counterterrorism effort on their establishment and implementation.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> This recommendation will be considered as part of the separate government response to the ISA review.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> In response to this recommendation and recommendations 6, 17 and part of 18, the scheduled review of the ISA was brought forward. Reviewers delivered their report in January 2023.</p> <p>The ISA review did not agree with this recommendation, believing it would not result in the change sought by the Royal Commission. Instead, it made other recommendations about direct access agreements that it suggested would improve the scheme.</p>
<p>11 <i>Direct chief executives of public sector agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort to consider whether they have an appropriate number of their employees that have security clearances and ensure that those staff have appropriate access to facilities and information management and technology systems as required.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Chief Executives’ ability to ensure staff are cleared and have access to facilities and systems will be facilitated by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishing a set of principles for enabling greater access to information,</li> <li>• encouraging non-traditional national security agencies to ensure they have appropriately cleared people in the right roles to meet relevant needs,</li> <li>• approval by the Prime Minister for more ministers to have access to relevant classified material as it relates to their portfolios, and</li> <li>• encouraging agencies to share information using secure information systems.</li> </ul> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Chief Executives have an existing, ongoing responsibility for ensuring appropriate staff have clearances and can access information relevant to their job.</p>
<p>12 <i>Develop and promote an accessible reporting system that enables members of the public to easily and safely report concerning behaviours or incidents to a single contact point within government.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> A separate system to report concerning behaviours and incidents will not be established.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Existing threat reporting channels are sufficient, and investment will be reprioritised.</p>
<p>13 <i>Develop and publish indicators and risk factors that illustrate for the public specific behaviours that may demonstrate a person’s potential for engaging in violent extremism and terrorism and update them regularly as the threatscape evolves.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> In 2022 the NZSIS developed and published <i>‘Kia mataara ki ngā tohu – Know the signs: a guide for identifying indicators of violent extremism’</i> on its website.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The guide raises awareness of some of the key warning signs and how to report concerning behaviour or activities. This will be updated as the nature of the violent extremist threat evolves, and new indicators emerge. The NZSIS uses the guide as an engagement tool, and it has also been utilised by other organisations to raise awareness among their own stakeholders.</p>

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<p>14 <i>Establish a programme to fund independent NZ-specific research.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The Government established <i>He Whenua Taurikura</i>, New Zealand's National Centre of Research Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in 2022, with initial funding through to the end of 2024/25. The centre has funded 24 Masters and PhD scholarships since 2022/23.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> This was to fund independent New Zealand specific research as recommended. Future funding will be subject to budget decisions.</p>
<p>15 <i>Create opportunities to improve public understanding on violent extremism and terrorism in NZ, with ongoing public discussions.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Opportunities to improve public understanding have continued, such as through the following initiatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the national counterterrorism hui (<i>He Whenua Taurikura</i>) held in 2021 and 2022,</li> <li>publication of the National Security Strategy,</li> <li>publication of the National Security Intelligence Priorities in 2021 and 2023 and a commitment to continue publishing,</li> <li>publication of the inaugural NZSIS Security Threat Environment Report (2023),</li> <li>research undertaken within the <i>He Whenua Taurikura</i> Centre of Research Excellence (see also recommendation 14), and</li> <li>a Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Strategic Fund (2022/23-2024/25), which was launched by DPMC in 2023 to support civil society and community organisations counter violent extremism and radicalisation.</li> </ul> <p>Further opportunities to meet the intent of this recommendation is part of the work of the multi-agency Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The recommendation requires an ongoing focus on creating opportunities.</p>
<p>16 <i>Direct the chief executive of the new national intelligence and security agency (Recommendation 2) to host an annual countering violent extremism and terrorism hui</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Two <i>He Whenua Taurikura</i> national hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism were held (in 2021 and 2022). In 2024 a decision was taken to cancel the 2023/2024 hui, but officials have been asked to focus on helping to build a broader public conversation on national security issues.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Funding provided to host these hui was time limited. However, the National Security Strategy's Programme of Action includes, as a major initiative for 2023-2025 'cultivating and sustaining a public conversation on national security' through initiatives such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>publishing an annual strategic overview of threats to New Zealand's national security,</li> <li>an annual ministerial address on national security,</li> <li>continuing to build relationships with civil society, including Iwi/Māori.</li> </ul>
<p>17 <i>Require in legislation:</i></p> <p>a. <i>the Minister for National Security and Intelligence to publish during every parliamentary cycle the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and refer them to the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee for consideration.</i></p> <p>b. <i>the responsible minister to publish an annual threatscape report; and the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee to receive and consider submissions on the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and the annual threatscape report.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> This recommendation will be considered as part of the separate government response to the ISA review.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> In response to this recommendation and recommendations 6, 10 and part of 18, the scheduled review of the ISA was brought forward. Reviewers delivered their report in January 2023.</p> <p>The ISA review agreed with the Royal Commission that an unclassified version of the National Security and Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs) should continue to be published but did not agree it should be required in law. DPMC has published two unclassified versions of the NSIPs so far in 2021 and 2023.</p> <p>The ISA review agreed there should be a legislative requirement to produce a classified annual threatscape report and publish an unclassified version of it, but recommended it be published by the National Assessments Bureau (NAB), instead of the responsible Minister. The ISA review agreed that the unclassified version of the annual threatscape report should support a public hearing and submissions to the ISC. NZSIS published a first Security Threat Environment Report in August 2023 which contributes to the intent of the recommendation for a public-facing threatscape report.</p>
<p>18 <i>Review all legislation related to the counterterrorism effort to ensure it is current and enables public sector agencies to operate effectively, prioritising consideration of the creation of precursor terrorism offences in the</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Specific legislative amendments already completed under this recommendation include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Act 2021 which added precursor offences such as planning and preparation of terrorist acts to the TSA and extended the terrorism finance provisions, and</li> <li>the Counter Terrorism Acts (Designations and Control Orders) Amendment Act 2023</li> </ul>




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<i>Terrorism Suppression Act, the urgent review of the effect of section 19 of the Intelligence and Security Act on target discovery and acceding to and implementing the Budapest Convention.</i>		<p>Work on accession to the Budapest Convention is ongoing with a view to acceding in 2025.</p> <p>Section 19 of the ISA was considered by the ISA review, which determined no change was required to the section. This aspect of the recommendation is complete.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The amendments and future work will help ensure New Zealand's legislation is and remains fit for purpose as the threat environment evolves.</p>
<p>19 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to make policies and standards and guidance for the firearms licensing system clear and consistent with legislation.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Police was directed update the necessary policies and operational standards.</p> <p>Highlighted changes include updating the Firearms Safety Code, a new version of the secure storage and transportation of firearms and ammunition guide, and a new shooting range guide.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The changes ensure the licencing system is clear and consistent with legislation.</p>
<p>20 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to introduce electronic system for processing firearms licence applications.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The electronic Firearms Registry went live on 24 June 2023* and changes to the Arms Act 1983 came into force that outline the obligation for the Commissioner of Police to operate a registry and the content of the Registry.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Section 104 of the Arms Legislation Act 2020 required the Commissioner to keep and operate a registry which also satisfies this recommendation.</p> <p>*The Government will review the registry as part of the coalition agreement between the National Party and Act</p>
<p>21 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to ensure firearms licensing staff have regular training and undertake periodic reviews of the quality of their work.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> In December 2021 Police introduced a three-phase learning and development programme, which was completed in 2023. Further training will be conducted as part of Police's ongoing business and as legislation amendments come into force.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Ongoing professional development of new and existing licensing staff will ensure consistency of quality and approach.</p>
<p>22 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to introduce performance indicators that focus on the effective implementation of the firearms licensing system.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Police has produced monthly performance indicators on licensing (for example, completed licence applications versus demand, application processing times, number of licence holders registered, and number firearms registered).</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The Firearms Safety Authority has been given oversight and performance monitoring functions to ensure decision makers have the right information at their disposal, and have awareness of the wider regulatory system, to best direct interventions.</p>
<p>23 <i>Direct Police (or other relevant entity) to require two new processes for applicants who have lived outside of New Zealand for substantial periods of time in the ten years preceding the application.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The new processes have been introduced. Applicants are now required to provide a list of countries stayed in for a period of 14 days or more at any one time over the previous five years.</p> <p>These are based on the Arms Amendment Regulations 2021 that came into force on 1 February 2022. The regulations are also clear that the applicant's provision of contact details of their next of kin/near relative applies to persons who may be overseas. There is provision for refusal of an application for insufficient information or if contact cannot be made with appropriate referees.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> This provides stronger requirements for information on overseas activity.</p>
<p>24 <i>Introduce mandatory reporting of firearms injuries to Police by health professionals</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Mandatory reporting will not be pursued.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Section 92 of the Arms Act 1983 already requires health practitioners to consider reporting firearms injuries if they believe a licence holder should not be permitted to use or possess firearms due to a health condition. This requirement came into effect on 24 December 2020 shortly after the RCOI report was presented to Parliament on 8 December 2020.</p>
<p>25 <i>Direct the Ministry of Social Development to work with relevant public sector agencies to facilitate coordinated access to ongoing recovery support for affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) established the <i>Kaiwhakaoranga</i> Specialist Case Management Service (the Service) in 2019. The Service has also administered the Christchurch Mosque Attack Assistance Programme (the Programme). Both the Service and the Programme end on 30 June 2024.</p>

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		<p><b>Rationale for ending the service:</b> Over the last five years, many families have become more confident in dealing independently with government agencies and self-source the support they need. From 1 July 2024 people will continue to access support directly through the core services of both government and non-government agencies.</p>
<p>26 Investigate establishing a Collective Impact Network and Board or other relevant mechanism that enables agencies, non-government organisations and affected whānau, survivors and witnesses to agree a specific work programme to provide ongoing wrap-around services</p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The Collective Impact Board was established in May 2021. The Board formally ceased work in November 2023. The Board, made up of community and government agency representatives, identified and raised 40 themes on its work programme, and made 11 recommendations to the <i>Kaiwhakaoranga</i> Service on wrap-around support to the affected community. The Board published the Collective Trauma Response and Recovery report to help inform wrap-around support should a similar tragedy occur.</p> <p><b>Rationale for ending the Board's role:</b> The Board's role was intended to be time limited.</p>
<p>27 Direct the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in collaboration with relevant public sector agencies to discuss with affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack what, if any, restorative justice processes might be desired and how such processes might be designed and resourced.</p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Further work on restorative justice processes will not be progressed.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The Government has adopted a restorative approach regarding the affected community. This has been through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the establishment of wraparound coordinated support to the affected community, and</li> <li>• opportunities for the affected community to have their voices heard throughout the delivery of services and the Government's response to the Royal Commission Report.</li> </ul> <p>The community has had opportunities to have its voice heard through the legal process, such as victim statements at the sentencing of the convicted terrorist and the ongoing Coronial Inquiry. This approach is consistent with other jurisdictions, which did not provide for alternative restorative approaches but provided for the ongoing needs of the community throughout their responses to terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>28 Announce that the Minister for Social Development and Employment and the Ministry of Social Development have responsibility and accountability for coordinating a whole-of-government approach to building social cohesion, including social inclusion.</p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The former Associate Minister for Social Development and Employment was given this responsibility in April 2021 alongside the Ministry of Social Development.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> MSD led a whole-of-government approach to building social cohesion resulting in the development of <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion Strategic Framework and tools and resources (outlined further in recommendation 29 below).</p>
<p>29 Direct MSD to discuss and collaborate with communities, civil society, local government, and the private sector on the development of a social cohesion strategic framework and the monitoring and evaluation regime.</p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> MSD developed <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion Strategic Framework (and a suite of tools and resources) designed to support individuals, communities, businesses, local government, and the cultural sector to build social cohesion.</p> <p>This work was heavily informed by a series of public engagements including joint engagement with the Ministry of Justice and Department of Internal Affairs, targeted engagement with stakeholders from diverse communities, Māori engagement and community hui.</p> <p>MSD will continue to report on social cohesion indicators with the next report due at the end of 2024.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion Strategic Framework was launched in October 2022. The tools and resources are now available on MSD's website.</p>
<p>30 Investigate options for an agency focused on ethnic communities and multiculturalism and establish a fit for purpose organisational design that will encompass the current functions expected of the Office of Ethnic Communities.</p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The Ministry for Ethnic Communities was established in July 2021 and has a work programme that advances this recommendation.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> This decision was taken to increase government focus on ethnic communities.</p>

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<p>31 <i>Prioritise development of appropriate measures and indicators (such as the Living Standards Framework) of social cohesion, including social inclusion</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> As part of the release of <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> tools and resources, the <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion measurement framework was developed. MSD will continue to report on social cohesion indicators with the next report due at the end of 2024.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The framework helps us to understand and measure social cohesion in New Zealand through multiple data sources.</p>
<p>32 <i>Require public sector agencies to prioritise the collection of data on ethnic and religious demographics to support analysis and advice on the implications of New Zealand's rapidly changing society, inform better policy making and enhance policy evaluation.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Statistics NZ is currently leading the review of the ethnicity data standard. The data standard is expected to be rolled out in 2025.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Once implemented, the new standard will ensure government agencies are collecting data on ethnicity in a consistent way, making the data more useful for policy making and analysis.</p>
<p>33 <i>Direct the chief executives of the public sector agencies involved in the counterterrorism effort to continue focusing efforts on significantly increasing workforce diversity, including in leadership roles, and in consultation with the Advisory Group on counterterrorism (recommendation 7).</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> In 2023 DPMC working with the Public Service Commission (PSC) led a baselining exercise of agencies involved in national security and produced a dashboard on diversity.</p> <p>An action under the National Security Strategy's Programme of Action is to develop workforce diversity and inclusion.</p> <p>National security agencies also contribute reporting to the PSC as part of <i>Papa Pounamu</i>.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> Baselining of data will help drive efforts to increase workforce diversity.</p>
<p>34 <i>Public Service Commissioner to publish annual reporting on progress made by agencies against the Papa Pounamu commitments, particularly agencies involved in counterterrorism.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> In response to this recommendation, PSC now produces an annual report on progress being made across the Public Service to implement diversity and inclusion initiatives and programmes.</p> <p>For 2023, the report was expanded to also focus on pay equity. The third system level annual report on the Public Service's progress on the diversity, equity, and inclusion was published at the end of May 2024.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> This recommendation provided an opportunity to consolidate how diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives are progressed across the Public Service.</p>
<p>35 <i>Public Service Commissioner to continue efforts on significantly increasing workforce diversity and attracting diverse talent for public service leadership roles at 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tiers</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> In 2023 <i>Fostering diverse leadership</i> became a focus area for the <i>Papa Pounamu</i> work programme. Government agencies are required to report on workforce and leadership composition in their annual reports and provide more details on actions under their diversity, equity, and inclusion plans.</p> <p>The collation of the annual Public Service workforce data also means that the participation of underrepresented groups in senior leadership and workforce can be monitored. This approach is supported by the Public Service Act.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> In 2022, <i>Papa Pounamu</i> reviewed the focus areas to determine what would make the most impact. It was agreed to make <i>Fostering diverse leadership</i> a new focus.</p>
<p>36 <i>Invest in opportunities for young New Zealanders to learn about their role, rights and responsibilities and on the value of ethnic and religious diversity, inclusivity, conflict resolution, civic literacy and self-regulation.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Existing education programmes have been leveraged to meet the intent of this recommendation. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Social and emotional learning (SEL) Pilot Programme.</b> SEL enhances students' capacity to integrate skills, attitudes, and behaviours so they can deal effectively with daily tasks and challenges.</li> <li>• The ENGAGE programme is part of the wider SEL programme and develops children's self-regulation skills through games. Funding for the ENGAGE programme has been agreed by Cabinet through the Emerging Priorities Fund (\$19.7m for June 2023 – June 2027).</li> <li>• <b>Community Learning Hubs.</b> These Hubs were funded in Christchurch in 2020, to provide workshops and information to support ethnic communities' engagement with the education system. Following the Christchurch pilot, the initiative has since been expanded to Auckland, Hamilton, Palmerston North, Wellington, and Dunedin. Funding of \$6.411m has been provided from 2022 – 2026 to maintain the Hubs and fund an impact evaluation of the model.</li> </ul>

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		<p><b>Rationale:</b> There are existing initiatives in the education system to help young New Zealanders learn about their role, rights and responsibilities in a diverse society.</p>
<p>37 <i>Create opportunities for regular public conversations led by the responsible minister – for all New Zealanders to share knowledge and improve their understanding of social cohesion and the value that ethnic and religious diversity can contribute to a well-functioning society.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> This work has been progressed through the development of <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion strategic framework.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> As part of the development of <i>Te Korowai Whetū</i> Social Cohesion Strategic Framework and other tools and resources, MSD led engagement on social cohesion across a diverse range of communities including with over 600 stakeholders over ten months. This included 53 community events and hui (in-person and online), online surveys, email submissions and wānanga.</p>
<p>38 <i>Require all public sector community engagement to be in accordance with New Zealand's Open Government Partnership commitments and in particular:</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> DPMC's Policy Project team led the development of a policy community engagement tool, for use by agencies engaging on the government response to the Royal Commission. Use of the tool by agencies has enhanced the quality of engagement with communities and stakeholders.</p> <p>The Public Service Commission has committed to developing guidance supporting the use of the community engagement tool by the Public Service for significant initiatives.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The development and use of the tool will lift the quality of agencies' community engagement. Enhanced engagement practice will lift the contribution of communities in the development of services and policies that affect them. Development of further guidance by the PSC will extend good engagement practice across public sector agencies.</p>
<p>39 <i>Amend legislation to create hate-motivated offences in:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>the Summary Offences Act 1981 that correspond with the existing offences of offensive behaviour or language, assault, wilful damage and intimidation; and</i></li> <li>2. <i>the Crimes Act 1961 that correspond with the existing offences of assaults, arson and intentional damage</i></li> </ol>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The Law Commission has been asked to proceed with a review of legal responses to hate motivated offences. The Law Commission will report back to the Minister of Justice in due course.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The Law Commission is well-placed to conduct an independent review into whether New Zealand should have standalone hate crime offences or continue to consider hate motivation as an aggravating factor at sentencing.</p>
<p>40 <i>Repeal section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 and insert a provision in the Crimes Act 1961 for an offence of inciting racial or religious disharmony, based on an intent to stir up, maintain or normalise hatred, through threatening, abusive, or insulting communications with protected characteristics that include religious affiliation.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> No amendments to legislation on hate speech will be made. The reference to hate speech has been removed from the Law Commission's work programme.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> The Government has committed not to change hate speech legislation under the coalition agreement between the National Party and New Zealand First.</p>
<p>41 <i>Amend the definition of "objectionable" in section 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 to include racial superiority, racial hatred and racial discrimination.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Recommendation 41 will not be progressed as work on hate speech (recommendation 40) has stopped and these two recommendations were intended to be a package.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> If Recommendation 41 were to be progressed in isolation, it would raise the risk of duplication and inconsistency of offences between section 131 of the Human Rights Act and the Classification Act.</p>



Recommendation (summary)	Status	Decision or approach to implementation
<p>42 <i>Direct New Zealand Police to revise the ways in which they record complaints of criminal conduct to capture systematically hate-motivations for offending and train frontline staff</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Police established <i>Te Raranga “The Weave”</i> in July 2021. This is a four-year programme to improve Police’s response to, and reduce the harm caused by, hate-motivated crimes and incidents. When funding for this programme ends in June 2025 this will be fully integrated into Police’s ongoing activities.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> This is to continue progressing work to support victims, witnesses, and communities to recognise, and report hate crime, align partner agencies to reduce the harm caused by hate crime, and train police staff to recognise, record, respond to and resolve hate-motivated crime if it occurs.</p>
<p>43 <i>Ensure a minister is given responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the response</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> The former and current Governments assigned a Lead Coordination Minister. This role will be disestablished.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> There is no longer a need for a Lead Coordination Minister once the coordinated, cross-government phase has concluded.</p>
<p>44 <i>Establish an Implementation Oversight Advisory Group.</i></p>		<p><b>Decision:</b> Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group, was established in June 2021 and members’ terms end in June 2024.</p> <p><b>Rationale:</b> There is no longer a need for a ministerial advisory group once the coordinated, cross-government response phase has concluded.</p>