



27 May 2021

[Redacted]

Ref: OIA-2020/21-0563

Dear [Redacted]

Official Information Act request relating to assessment mentioned in RCOI Report

Thank you for your request made under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act), received as a partial transfer from the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) on 4 May 2021. The part transferred to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) asks for:

"...THREE: Paragraph 17: "Several high quality assessments focused on New Zealand's domestic terrorism environment were produced during this time (2013–2014) through the National Assessments Committee. These included a report by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service... which discussed the terrorist threat posed by the extreme right-wing." I request a copy of this report..."

I believe the report referred to in your request is an assessment prepared by the National Assessments Committee titled "The Right Wing in New Zealand: Myth vs Reality" (17 April 2014). Please find a copy of this document enclosed. It was commenced by New Zealand Police and finalised by DPMC, hence the inclusion of the Police logo on the assessment. Some material has been withheld under the following sections of the Act:

- Section 6(a), to protect the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand,
- Section 6(c), to protect the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial, and
- Section 9(2)(a), to protect the privacy of individuals.

In making my decision, I have taken the public interest considerations in section 9(1) of the Act into account.

You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to investigate and review my decision under section 28(3) of the Act.

This response will be published on DPMC's website during our regular publication cycle. Typically, information is released monthly, or as otherwise determined. Your personal information including name and contact details will be removed for publication.

Yours sincerely

[Redacted signature]

Dan Eaton
**Acting Deputy Chief Executive
National Security Group**

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**NATIONAL
ASSESSMENTS
COMMITTEE**

17 April 2014

**THE RIGHT WING IN NEW ZEALAND: MYTH VS REALITY
NAC 24/2013-14**

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE
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The Uncertainty Yardstick

Intelligence assessments often deal not in statements of fact or precise calculations, but in judgements based on the careful weighing of information that may be incomplete, opaque or uncertain in its credibility.

Assessments issued by the National Assessments Committee, and by its constituent agencies, express this uncertainty by the deliberate and consistent use of language to convey probabilities. As used in assessment reporting, this language has precise meaning as defined by the following probability ranges.

Qualitative Statement	Associated Probability Range
Remote/Highly Unlikely	<10%
Improbable/Unlikely	15-20%
Realistic Possibility	25-50%
Probable/Likely	55-70%
Highly /Very Probable/Likely	75-85%
Almost Certain	>90%

The gaps between one probability range and the next are intentional, as a means of encouraging precision in judgements about probability.

The terms used here, and their associated probability ranges, are also used by some of New Zealand's overseas intelligence partners, and have been adopted here in order to promote consistency internationally.

THE RIGHT WING IN NEW ZEALAND: MYTH VS REALITY

Although a fringe element of New Zealand society, right wing groups garner media attention and a degree of notoriety through provocative actions. This paper examines the right wing phenomenon in New Zealand in order to inform decision-makers about the extent to which they pose, or not, a threat to domestic security.

Key Judgements

What's happening?

- **Far-right groups will continue to actively court media attention to promote their agendas, attract members, and raise funds. Provocative actions will occasionally focus public attention on far-right groups. (R)**

Why is this important?

- **Far-right groups and extreme right-wing individuals will continue to feature in the margins of New Zealand's socio-political landscape for the foreseeable future, although their numbers will likely remain low. (R)**

What it means for New Zealand

- **Overt far-right groups have to date posed no threat to domestic security. Extremists acting outside the sanction of established organisations are the key vector for harm associated with the far-right environment. (R)**
- **Sporadic acts of racially motivated violence will continue to occur in small numbers, but the rejection by wider society of extremist ideology means far-right groups will continue to be of minimal significance to security over the next three to five years. (R)**

Introduction

From origins in the late 1960s New Zealand's far right-wing has remained a fringe element within society, never wielding more than minimal influence based on infrequent yet provocative actions. But the persistent presence of the far-right, however minimal, demonstrates that perceptions of disenfranchisement and social isolation continue to attract small numbers of New Zealanders to far-right ideology. The spectrum of beliefs amongst the far-right ranges from anti-immigration activism to violent race hate and ideological affinity with aspects of Nazi Germany. Consequently, activities by far right-wing groups or individuals have varied in type and impact. The extreme right-wing (XRW) is a term referring to those prepared to use or support violence in furthering their ideology. Instances of racially motivated violence, though rare in New Zealand, have resulted in at least one homicide. Several instances of racially motivated violence have featured in media, to the likely detriment of New Zealand's international reputation. But the majority of far right-wing actions are non-violent and designed to draw attention to white supremacist messaging, typically through provocative yet lawful means such as street marches and leaflet drops. While it presents a confronting and sometimes intimidating image, the domestic far-right is characterised by discord and disorganisation. Despite the presence of a chaotic fringe element prone to criminality and extreme violence, there is no indication the far-right poses a significant risk to domestic security in the next three to five years. (R)

Background

2. The far-right environment currently centres upon two cohesive groups: the New Zealand National Front (NZNF) and Right Wing Resistance (RWR). While these two entities differ slightly in their objectives and modus operandi, both seek to influence policy through lawful channels including protests and self-produced media. The NZNF purports to be a 'political party seeking fundamental changes', and has historically made few public appearances beyond the annual Flag Day held at Parliament grounds. RWR portrays itself as a more active 'boots on the ground' alternative, and since its inception in 2009 has made use of more overt and provocative methods in attempts to influence public opinion. Mindful of public sentiment, both organisations have been careful to avoid explicit support for extreme viewpoints like ethnic cleansing, instead portraying themselves as supportive of the white working class through 'white pride' advocacy. Intertwined with the organised aspects of the far-right spectrum is the extreme right - a dynamic milieu of ex-prison inmates, anti-immigration activists, and extreme racists with a range of neo-Nazi beliefs. Membership and association across the far-right environment fluctuate and are difficult to assess; relationships between groups and individuals change regularly and are at times antagonistic. (R)

3. Many who consider themselves 'real skinheads' operate alone or in small, unaffiliated groups. These elements, which typically comprise extremist racists, often

view the relatively moderate actions and ideologies of organised groups like RWR with considerable contempt and on occasion commit violence against them. This fringe element lacks hierarchical control and is the source of occasional acts of racially motivated violence, such as the 2003 murder of South Korean tourist Jae Hyeon Kim. Small numbers of the far-right have served multiple prison sentences for serious crimes, giving rise to prison gangs such as *Kaos* and *Fourth Reich*; these are typically formed for protection and a sense of community whilst imprisoned. (R)

Ideology and influence

4. Far-right ideology encompasses a range of beliefs, which limits the ability of groups to retain significant numbers of recruits. The majority of the far-right spectrum holds pro-white and anti-immigration views, but does not necessarily subscribe to an extreme racist or separatist ideology. Drivers of radicalisation in the far-right spectrum are typically socio-economic in nature; members of the far-right and XRW often have histories of economic deprivation and social marginalisation. In general terms, far-right beliefs are driven by perceptions of social disadvantage and lack of influence. These perceptions translate to concerns over threats to traditional New Zealand culture and societal composition. Adherence to conspiracy theories is a common feature of far-right groups worldwide, as a vehicle for assigning threatening characteristics to opposing ideologies; a number of themes are present in far-right discourse. Concerns that a global 'anti-white agenda' will eventually affect a 'white genocide' are prevalent, as are assertions that mainstream political parties have betrayed New Zealanders through reckless immigration policy^{6(a)}

6(a) . (R)

5. The far-right rejects mainstream political parties as corrupt and morally bankrupt, and looks to racial solidarity and traditional gender roles as the solution to the perceived decline of the state. Sectors of the far-right address this in differing ways; the National Front aspires to gain political office through conventional, legitimate means, while RWR acknowledges the established political system will never provide the outcomes it seeks. The far-right maintains an uneasy and often fractious relationship with the extreme right, whose belief structure is variously based on elements of extreme racism, sporadic adherence to aspects of Nazi ideology, and

Hate crime: the murder of Jae Hyeon Kim

South Korean tourist Jae Hyeon Kim was murdered in 2003 by Shannon Flewollen and Hayden McKenzie, as he hitchhiked on the West Coast. Both Flewollen and McKenzie held extreme racist beliefs, and McKenzie was linked to the Fourth Reich XRW gang. As Flewollen strangled Kim, McKenzie used the German phrase 'nein blut', or 'no blood'. (R)

Flewollen went on to commit at least one further racially motivated assault before he was arrested for Kim's murder in 2008. The case is illustrative of the risk posed by some XRW fringe elements willing to use extreme violence. (R)

unsophisticated interpretations of 'white' European history and mythology. Extremist beliefs tend to cause unease within the more conventional among the far-right, many of whom do not wish to be associated with overtly fascist ideology due to the detrimental effect to public perceptions. (R)

6. New Zealand's far-right ideology is broadly analogous to that found in other English speaking nations, but it does not appear to be routinely influenced by foreign elements. Prominent Australian XRW figure 9(2)(a), 6(c) has visited New Zealand on several occasions to bolster links with local XRW groups, typically featuring as a keynote speaker at annual White Pride World Wide commemorations. Saleam was refused entry to New Zealand by Immigration New Zealand in October 2013. While internet access has allowed ease of communication with offshore groups, such contact has influenced tactical aspects rather than doctrinal elements. A notable example is the adoption of the *white rabbit* argument, whereby anti-fascist arguments are rebutted as being prejudicial to whites; it is commonly seen in the slogan 'anti-racist is a codeword for anti-white'. This concept was adopted through contact with the Australian Nationalist Alternative, which offered a basic form of media coaching to RWR. While some characteristics of far-right ideology are more weighted to local demographics (such as a negative focus on Asian immigration), the New Zealand far-right does not appear to have been an innovator in terms of ideology. (R)

RWR: Election Disruption

In November 2011, RWR members entered a Christchurch electorate meeting and disrupted proceedings by heckling speakers whilst wearing camouflage fatigues and balaclavas. The event intimidated some, disgusted others, and gained considerable media attention for the group. Despite the relative success in raising the group's profile, the event has not been repeated and it is almost certain that 9(2)(a), 6(c) has difficulty in organising sufficient numbers to carry out such actions. (R)

Objectives and methodology

7. Objectives and operational characteristics of New Zealand far-right groups tend to vary, in keeping with the disparate nature of the far-right environment. Overarching objectives focus on immigration reform (in favour of selected nationalities) and the promotion of 'white' culture, which typically refers to selected aspects of New Zealand society with British origins. Despite having professed aspirations to participate in the national political system, neither the NZNF nor RWR have in recent history put forward candidates for parliamentary elections. 9(2)(a), 6(c)

But because far-right groups ultimately hold little regard for the established political system, efforts in gaining legitimate office are typically overshadowed by aspirations of overtly separatist nature. (R)

8. The RWR has long harboured ambitions of acquiring a private block of land on which to build a whites-only community, termed a 'land base'. The stated objective of this base is to build a concentration of members sufficient to influence local politics, whilst maintaining a 'European way of life'. To this end RWR has solicited donations since its inception, and members contribute small sums through automatic payments. The prospect of a viable land base in the next three to five years remains unlikely, due to low membership numbers, general disorganisation, and the parlous financial state of most RWR supporters. In line with the ambition to form a separatist community, XRW members have engaged in survivalist training activity. (R)

9. Media coverage is vital to far-right groups for maintaining recruitment and funding levels; as such, groups seek semi-regular media exposure through provocative yet non-violent acts. Annual 'flag days'¹, whereby members march on Parliament and deliver speeches, are the primary method for attracting media attention. RWR has periodically generated controversy through the distribution of anti-immigration and white pride leaflets, often in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities. Recent dialogue concerning a possible change of the national flag has been seized upon by the far-right as a vehicle for anti-Government and pro-nationalist activism. RWR members have defaced multiple electorate offices throughout New Zealand with posters promoting the group and criticising the Government for its perceived lack of integrity. (R)

10. Social media is a prominent feature of the XRW environment. The NZNF and RWR use websites to promote their ideologies and publicise events, while individual members often make use of social networking sites. RWR is notably open in its courting of public attention through its organisational blog, and the group occasionally gives advance notice of a provocative action through this medium. The *Stormfront*² forum is a major hub for far-right communications, although its reported penetration by law enforcement has seen a decline in use by New Zealand-based elements in recent times. Use of the ^{6(a)} platform has increased with more effective policing of content by Western services such as Facebook, and this uptake is likely to continue. (R)

Capability and intent

11. While there is no indication that NZNF or RWR sanction the offensive use of firearms, many XRW affiliates are unable to compete with adversaries in terms of physical violence. As such there is a noted propensity for XRW members to acquire and use firearms. ^{6(c)}

¹ Flag days typically consist of members marching a pre-planned route, wearing camouflage fatigues and shirts bearing a range of far-right associated insignia. The march generally terminates at a prominent landmark, where speeches are made. Participants carry a range of flags, including the New Zealand flag. (R)

² *Stormfront* is a prominent US-based neo-Nazi/race hate web forum. (R)

6(c)

9(2)(a), 6(c)

has unsuccessfully attempted to organise basic military weapons training for group members. (R)

12. In 2006 6(c), 9(2)(a) founded 6(c), 9(2)(a), which at the time claimed 'branches' in Canterbury and Waikato. Members trained to use semi-automatic weapons and survive in the wilderness. The training clearly indulged a militia mindset, and elements of the group reportedly desired a 'race war'; in 2009 the RWR blog site stated an aim of forming a resistance organisation able to 'stand up to a conventional army'. Interest in 6(c), 9(2)(a) waned rapidly, and presently consists of a handful of individuals in the North Island. Many XRW members are in close proximity to criminals and organised crime groups, enabling further access to illicit weapons, and it is almost certain that XRW affiliates will continue to acquire firearms through both licit and illicit channels. There is no indication that far-right groups have any intent to use firearms for a coordinated, offensive purpose; they will continue to be kept for protection and intimidation purposes. (R)

Outlook

13. Far-right groups and XRW individuals will continue to feature in the margins of New Zealand's socio-political landscape for the foreseeable future, although numbers will likely remain low due to New Zealand's moderate political landscape and tolerant attitudes to diversity. Far-right groups will continue to actively court media attention to promote their agendas, attract members, and raise funds. The far-right will continue to derive some doctrinal and tactical aspects through contact with foreign groups, but this is likely to remain minimal due to the unique aspects of New Zealand's social environment. Established, overt groups such as RWR and NZNF have to date posed no threat to domestic security; while their actions are often provocative and confronting to wider society, there is no information to suggest either group has the intent or capability to impose their ideology through illegitimate means. (R)

14. Small XRW groups or individuals acting outside the sanction of established organisations are the key vector for harm associated with the far-right. Small numbers within the far-right harbour extremist ideologies, and are prone to violence. Extremist racist acts are rare and have not routinely featured the use of firearms, but the relative ease of access to semi-automatic firearms means that a 'lone wolf' attack scenario remains a possibility. Acts of racially motivated violence will continue to occur sporadically and in small numbers. Although these acts are rarely planned or organised in advance they can have implications for reputational harm, particularly where foreign nationals are targeted. (R)

15. Far-right groups will continue attempts to promote forms of 'acceptable

racism' by emphasising conspiracy theorem, anti-establishment messaging, and ethnic solidarity. But wider society has not accepted the far-right viewpoint, and the groups will remain of marginal significance over the next three to five years. Despite its outwardly threatening appearance, the far-right is characterised by disorganisation, infighting, and bravado. (R)

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