



22 February 2021

[REDACTED]

Reference: OIA-2020/21-0262

Dear [REDACTED]

Official Information Act request relating to assessments mentioned in RCOI Report

Thank you for your request made under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act), received by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) as a transfer from NZ Police on 17 December 2020. You requested:

"Please provide the two 2014 Police assessments noted in the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch massacre:

- 1. The Right-wing in New Zealand: Myth vs Reality*
- 2. Domestic Extremism: Unlikely but not out of the question*

If these items are already publicly available, please direct me to the location of these items. If there are similar, more recent assessments relating to the same subjects, please provide these as well."

I note the time limits for responding to your request were extended by 10 working days under section 15A of the Act to allow for further consultation on the response to your request. Following this, I am now in a position to respond.

Please find enclosed copies of the two documents requested. Some material has been withheld under the following sections of the Act:

- Section 6(a), to protect the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand,
- Section 6(c), to protect the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial, and
- Section 9(2)(a), to protect the privacy of individuals.

In considering these documents, I would note they were commenced by NZ Police and finalised by DPMC, hence the inclusion of the NZ Police logo on the documents.

In considering your request, I would note that the National Assessments Bureau (NAB) provides independent and impartial assessments on events and developments relevant to New Zealand's national security and international relations, with a particular focus on the global environment.

With regard to the part of your request for "similar, more recent assessments relating to the same subjects", I have interpreted this to be for other assessments produced by the NAB and distributed by DPMC. I have accordingly understood this part of your request to be for assessments that focused on domestic right-wing terrorist threats and/or other endemic domestic extremist trends. I can confirm only the two enclosed documents meet these criteria, insofar as your request relates to assessments distributed by DPMC. NAB's work includes providing assessments on all forms of extremism but this has primarily taken a global, rather than domestic, focus.

Where section 9 of the Act applies, in making my decision, I have taken the public interest considerations in section 9(1) of the Act into account.

You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to investigate and review my decision under section 28(3) of the Act.

This response will be published on DPMC's website during our regular publication cycle. Typically, information is released monthly, or as otherwise determined. Your personal information including name and contact details will be removed for publication.

Yours sincerely



Tony Lynch
**Deputy Chief Executive
National Security Group**

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**NATIONAL
ASSESSMENTS
COMMITTEE**

17 April 2014

**THE RIGHT WING IN NEW ZEALAND: MYTH VS REALITY
NAC 24/2013-14**

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE
INTELLIGENT POLICING, PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS
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The Uncertainty Yardstick

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NAC 24/2013-14

17 April 2014

THE RIGHT WING IN NEW ZEALAND: MYTH VS REALITY

Although a fringe element of New Zealand society, right wing groups garner media attention and a degree of notoriety through provocative actions. This paper examines the right wing phenomenon in New Zealand in order to inform decision-makers about the extent to which they pose, or not, a threat to domestic security.

Key Judgements

What's happening?

- **Far-right groups will continue to actively court media attention to promote their agendas, attract members, and raise funds. Provocative actions will occasionally focus public attention on far-right groups. (R)**

Why is this important?

- **Far-right groups and extreme right-wing individuals will continue to feature in the margins of New Zealand's socio-political landscape for the foreseeable future, although their numbers will likely remain low. (R)**

What it means for New Zealand

- **Overt far-right groups have to date posed no threat to domestic security. Extremists acting outside the sanction of established organisations are the key vector for harm associated with the far-right environment. (R)**
- **Sporadic acts of racially motivated violence will continue to occur in small numbers, but the rejection by wider society of extremist ideology means far-right groups will continue to be of minimal significance to security over the next three to five years. (R)**

Introduction

From origins in the late 1960s New Zealand's far right-wing has remained a fringe element within society, never wielding more than minimal influence based on infrequent yet provocative actions. But the persistent presence of the far-right, however minimal, demonstrates that perceptions of disenfranchisement and social isolation continue to attract small numbers of New Zealanders to far-right ideology. The spectrum of beliefs amongst the far-right ranges from anti-immigration activism to violent race hate and ideological affinity with aspects of Nazi Germany. Consequently, activities by far right-wing groups or individuals have varied in type and impact. The extreme right-wing (XRW) is a term referring to those prepared to use or support violence in furthering their ideology. Instances of racially motivated violence, though rare in New Zealand, have resulted in at least one homicide. Several instances of racially motivated violence have featured in media, to the likely detriment of New Zealand's international reputation. But the majority of far right-wing actions are non-violent and designed to draw attention to white supremacist messaging, typically through provocative yet lawful means such as street marches and leaflet drops. While it presents a confronting and sometimes intimidating image, the domestic far-right is characterised by discord and disorganisation. Despite the presence of a chaotic fringe element prone to criminality and extreme violence, there is no indication the far-right poses a significant risk to domestic security in the next three to five years. (R)

Background

2. The far-right environment currently centres upon two cohesive groups: the New Zealand National Front (NZNF) and Right Wing Resistance (RWR). While these two entities differ slightly in their objectives and modus operandi, both seek to influence policy through lawful channels including protests and self-produced media. The NZNF purports to be a 'political party seeking fundamental changes', and has historically made few public appearances beyond the annual Flag Day held at Parliament grounds. RWR portrays itself as a more active 'boots on the ground' alternative, and since its inception in 2009 has made use of more overt and provocative methods in attempts to influence public opinion. Mindful of public sentiment, both organisations have been careful to avoid explicit support for extreme viewpoints like ethnic cleansing, instead portraying themselves as supportive of the white working class through 'white pride' advocacy. Intertwined with the organised aspects of the far-right spectrum is the extreme right - a dynamic milieu of ex-prison inmates, anti-immigration activists, and extreme racists with a range of neo-Nazi beliefs. Membership and association across the far-right environment fluctuate and are difficult to assess; relationships between groups and individuals change regularly and are at times antagonistic. (R)

3. Many who consider themselves 'real skinheads' operate alone or in small, unaffiliated groups. These elements, which typically comprise extremist racists, often

view the relatively moderate actions and ideologies of organised groups like RWR with considerable contempt and on occasion commit violence against them. This fringe element lacks hierarchical control and is the source of occasional acts of racially motivated violence, such as the 2003 murder of South Korean tourist Jae Hyeon Kim. Small numbers of the far-right have served multiple prison sentences for serious crimes, giving rise to prison gangs such as *Kaos* and *Fourth Reich*; these are typically formed for protection and a sense of community whilst imprisoned. (R)

Ideology and influence

4. Far-right ideology encompasses a range of beliefs, which limits the ability of groups to retain significant numbers of recruits. The majority of the far-right spectrum holds pro-white and anti-immigration views, but does not necessarily subscribe to an extreme racist or separatist ideology. Drivers of radicalisation in the far-right spectrum are typically socio-economic in nature; members of the far-right and XRW often have histories of economic deprivation and social marginalisation. In general terms, far-right beliefs are driven by perceptions of social disadvantage and lack of influence. These perceptions translate to concerns over threats to traditional New Zealand culture and societal composition. Adherence to conspiracy theories is a common feature of far-right groups worldwide, as a vehicle for assigning threatening characteristics to opposing ideologies; a number of themes are present in far-right discourse. Concerns that a global 'anti-white agenda' will eventually affect a 'white genocide' are prevalent, as are assertions that mainstream political parties have betrayed New Zealanders through reckless immigration policy^{6(a)}

6(a) (R)

Hate crime: the murder of Jae Hyeon Kim

South Korean tourist Jae Hyeon Kim was murdered in 2003 by Shannon Flewelling and Hayden McKenzie, as he hitchhiked on the West Coast. Both Flewelling and McKenzie held extreme racist beliefs, and McKenzie was linked to the Fourth Reich XRW gang. As Flewelling strangled Kim, McKenzie used the German phrase 'nein blut', or 'no blood'. (R)

Flewelling went on to commit at least one further racially motivated assault before he was arrested for Kim's murder in 2008. The case is illustrative of the risk posed by some XRW fringe elements willing to use extreme violence. (R)

5. The far-right rejects mainstream political parties as corrupt and morally bankrupt, and looks to racial solidarity and traditional gender roles as the solution to the perceived decline of the state. Sectors of the far-right address this in differing ways; the National Front aspires to gain political office through conventional, legitimate means, while RWR acknowledges the established political system will never provide the outcomes it seeks. The far-right maintains an uneasy and often fractious relationship with the extreme right, whose belief structure is variously based on elements of extreme racism, sporadic adherence to aspects of Nazi ideology, and

unsophisticated interpretations of 'white' European history and mythology. Extremist beliefs tend to cause unease within the more conventional among the far-right, many of whom do not wish to be associated with overtly fascist ideology due to the detrimental effect to public perceptions. (R)

RWR: Election Disruption

In November 2011, RWR members entered a Christchurch electorate meeting and disrupted proceedings by heckling speakers whilst wearing camouflage fatigues and balaclavas. The event intimidated some, disgusted others, and gained considerable media attention for the group. Despite the relative success in raising the group's profile, the event has not been repeated and it is almost certain that 9(2)(a), 6(c) has difficulty in organising sufficient numbers to carry out such actions. (R)

6. New Zealand's far-right ideology is broadly analogous to that found in other English speaking nations, but it does not appear to be routinely influenced by foreign elements. Prominent Australian XRW figure 9(2)(a), 6(c) has visited New Zealand on several occasions to bolster links with local XRW groups, typically featuring as a keynote speaker at annual White Pride World Wide commemorations. Saleam was refused entry to New Zealand by Immigration New Zealand in October 2013. While internet access has allowed ease of communication with offshore groups, such contact has influenced tactical aspects rather than doctrinal elements. A notable example is the adoption of the *white rabbit* argument, whereby anti-fascist arguments are rebutted as being prejudicial to whites; it is commonly seen in the slogan 'anti-racist is a codeword for anti-white'. This concept was adopted through contact with the Australian Nationalist Alternative, which offered a basic form of media coaching to RWR. While some characteristics of far-right ideology are more weighted to local demographics (such as a negative focus on Asian immigration), the New Zealand far-right does not appear to have been an innovator in terms of ideology. (R)

Objectives and methodology

7. Objectives and operational characteristics of New Zealand far-right groups tend to vary, in keeping with the disparate nature of the far-right environment. Overarching objectives focus on immigration reform (in favour of selected nationalities) and the promotion of 'white' culture, which typically refers to selected aspects of New Zealand society with British origins. Despite having professed aspirations to participate in the national political system, neither the NZNF nor RWR have in recent history put forward candidates for parliamentary elections. 9(2)(a), 6(c)

But because far-right groups ultimately hold little regard for the established political system, efforts in gaining legitimate office are typically overshadowed by aspirations of overtly separatist nature. (R)

8. The RWR has long harboured ambitions of acquiring a private block of land on which to build a whites-only community, termed a 'land base'. The stated objective of this base is to build a concentration of members sufficient to influence local politics, whilst maintaining a 'European way of life'. To this end RWR has solicited donations since its inception, and members contribute small sums through automatic payments. The prospect of a viable land base in the next three to five years remains unlikely, due to low membership numbers, general disorganisation, and the parlous financial state of most RWR supporters. In line with the ambition to form a separatist community, XRW members have engaged in survivalist training activity. (R)

9. Media coverage is vital to far-right groups for maintaining recruitment and funding levels; as such, groups seek semi-regular media exposure through provocative yet non-violent acts. Annual 'flag days'¹, whereby members march on Parliament and deliver speeches, are the primary method for attracting media attention. RWR has periodically generated controversy through the distribution of anti-immigration and white pride leaflets, often in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities. Recent dialogue concerning a possible change of the national flag has been seized upon by the far-right as a vehicle for anti-Government and pro-nationalist activism. RWR members have defaced multiple electorate offices throughout New Zealand with posters promoting the group and criticising the Government for its perceived lack of integrity. (R)

10. Social media is a prominent feature of the XRW environment. The NZNF and RWR use websites to promote their ideologies and publicise events, while individual members often make use of social networking sites. RWR is notably open in its courting of public attention through its organisational blog, and the group occasionally gives advance notice of a provocative action through this medium. The *Stormfront*² forum is a major hub for far-right communications, although its reported penetration by law enforcement has seen a decline in use by New Zealand-based elements in recent times. Use of the ^{6(a)} platform has increased with more effective policing of content by Western services such as Facebook, and this uptake is likely to continue. (R)

Capability and intent

11. While there is no indication that NZNF or RWR sanction the offensive use of firearms, many XRW affiliates are unable to compete with adversaries in terms of physical violence. As such there is a noted propensity for XRW members to acquire and use firearms. ^{6(c)}

¹ Flag days typically consist of members marching a pre-planned route, wearing camouflage fatigues and shirts bearing a range of far-right associated insignia. The march generally terminates at a prominent landmark, where speeches are made. Participants carry a range of flags, including the New Zealand flag. (R)

² *Stormfront* is a prominent US-based neo-Nazi/race hate web forum. (R)

6(c)

9(2)(a), 6(c)

has unsuccessfully attempted to organise basic military weapons training for group members. (R)

12. In 2006 6(c), 9(2)(a) founded 6(c), 9(2)(a), which at the time claimed 'branches' in Canterbury and Waikato. Members trained to use semi-automatic weapons and survive in the wilderness. The training clearly indulged a militia mindset, and elements of the group reportedly desired a 'race war'; in 2009 the RWR blog site stated an aim of forming a resistance organisation able to 'stand up to a conventional army'. Interest in 6(c), 9(2)(a) waned rapidly, and presently consists of a handful of individuals in the North Island. Many XRW members are in close proximity to criminals and organised crime groups, enabling further access to illicit weapons, and it is almost certain that XRW affiliates will continue to acquire firearms through both licit and illicit channels. There is no indication that far-right groups have any intent to use firearms for a coordinated, offensive purpose; they will continue to be kept for protection and intimidation purposes. (R)

Outlook

13. Far-right groups and XRW individuals will continue to feature in the margins of New Zealand's socio-political landscape for the foreseeable future, although numbers will likely remain low due to New Zealand's moderate political landscape and tolerant attitudes to diversity. Far-right groups will continue to actively court media attention to promote their agendas, attract members, and raise funds. The far-right will continue to derive some doctrinal and tactical aspects through contact with foreign groups, but this is likely to remain minimal due to the unique aspects of New Zealand's social environment. Established, overt groups such as RWR and NZNF have to date posed no threat to domestic security; while their actions are often provocative and confronting to wider society, there is no information to suggest either group has the intent or capability to impose their ideology through illegitimate means. (R)

14. Small XRW groups or individuals acting outside the sanction of established organisations are the key vector for harm associated with the far-right. Small numbers within the far-right harbour extremist ideologies, and are prone to violence. Extremist racist acts are rare and have not routinely featured the use of firearms, but the relative ease of access to semi-automatic firearms means that a 'lone wolf' attack scenario remains a possibility. Acts of racially motivated violence will continue to occur sporadically and in small numbers. Although these acts are rarely planned or organised in advance they can have implications for reputational harm, particularly where foreign nationals are targeted. (R)

15. Far-right groups will continue attempts to promote forms of 'acceptable

racism' by emphasising conspiracy theorem, anti-establishment messaging, and ethnic solidarity. But wider society has not accepted the far-right viewpoint, and the groups will remain of marginal significance over the next three to five years. Despite its outwardly threatening appearance, the far-right is characterised by disorganisation, infighting, and bravado. (R)

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NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS COMMITTEE

20 November 2014

**DOMESTIC EXTREMISM: UNLIKELY BUT NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION
NAC 7/2014-15 (RESTRICTED)**



New Zealand
POLICE
Nga Pirihimana O Aotearoa

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE
INTELLIGENT POLICING, PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS
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NAC 7/2014-15

20 November 2014

DOMESTIC EXTREMISM: UNLIKELY BUT NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION

Domestic extremist incidents in New Zealand can be described as 'low frequency, high impact'. Specifically excluding Islamist extremism, this paper looks at the rest of New Zealand's extremism environment in order to increase and improve understanding of the risks these entities might pose to national security over the next three years.

What's happening?

- Although sporadic, New Zealand is not immune from violent domestic extremist activity. Successful attacks have included bombings, arson, industrial sabotage, and the use of poison. Motivations have focused on animal rights, the environment, racism, anarchy and foreign government representation in New Zealand. (R)
- The New Zealand environment includes people who are motivated by an ideology but have not necessarily developed the capability to conduct a violent attack, e.g. experienced activists, or those who have developed some level of capability but vary in terms of their level of motivation. (R)

Why is this important?

- New Zealand domestic security agencies have limited capability to identify individuals of security concern and taking appropriate actions to prevent or disrupt extremist attacks. New Zealand Police is unable to act unless a person's actions have met a criminal threshold and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service legislation limits it to focusing on acts of sabotage and subversion. (R)

What it means for New Zealand

- Should experienced activists, members of an organised criminal group or other disaffected individuals carry out an extremist act, it will almost certainly have a negative impact on people's perception of safety and national security. There may also be economic consequences if a commercial enterprise is targeted; possibly causing the company(s) involved to cease their operations here. (R)

Introduction

The death¹ of anarchist Neil Roberts outside the Wanganui building which housed the New Zealand Police (Police) computer system in 1982 and the bombing² of Wellington's Trades Hall building in 1984 are two of the best known examples of domestic extremist incidents in New Zealand. More recently, an extremist animal rights group claimed responsibility online for the arson at a fast food retail store in Upper Hutt, where the group's logo was found at the scene.³ Although incidents like these occur very rarely in New Zealand, international examples demonstrate how they can have a significant impact on society, for example, the bombing and massacre in Norway by Anders Breivik in 2011. (R)

2. An extremist is someone who advocates, supports or practices the use of violent physical force to further their ideology. They can come from anywhere across the political spectrum, such as the far-right (anti immigration or violent race hate) or the far-left (anti government or animal rights). Extremists may be acting alone (sometimes known as 'lone wolves') or may be part of a small group. As seen overseas, some experienced activists⁴ can progress to using violent tactics. (R)

3. The actions of experienced activists in New Zealand over the last five years have not resulted in any extremist incidents, despite generating widespread media attention and causing frustration for the individuals and organisations being targeted. There is currently no information to indicate experienced activists aligned to either the far-right or far-left pose a risk to New Zealand's national security in the next three years. The challenge for Police and other agencies is the ability to identify individuals or groups of security concern, as many of the characteristics and behaviours demonstrated by extremists are also found in the general population.⁵ (R)

Background

4. The 'temperature' of the domestic activism landscape can change very quickly, with experienced activists motivating to carry out 'direct action' in response to decisions

¹ Roberts was killed instantly when the gelignite bomb he was carrying exploded; nobody else was hurt. It remains unconfirmed whether Roberts attempted to kill himself or accidentally blew himself up. libcom.org/library/neil-roberts-wanganui-police-bomb. (U)

² Caretaker Ernie Abbott was killed after he picked up an unattended suitcase, causing the bomb inside it to explode. The main suspect, a middle-aged man seen carrying a suitcase near Trades Hall, has never been found. (U)

³ The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) claimed responsibility for damage to the KFC store in Upper Hutt, which was destroyed by fire in February 2014. The ALF logo was found at the scene. Enquiries are ongoing. (R)

⁴ A person who has had specific training and regularly takes a prominent role in organising and/or participating in protest activity which may include provocative tactics. (U)

⁵ United States Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Assessment. *Domestic Terrorists: Common Characteristics of Paths to Violence* (May 2014). (R)

made by government or organisations which they perceive are in opposition to their ideology. With the exception of events like the 1951 Waterfront Dispute and protest action during the 1981 Springbok Tour, the significant majority of domestic protest activity continues to be lawful and out of scope for this paper. Experienced activists in New Zealand regularly carry out 'non violent direct action' (NVDA), which is provocative tactics aimed at disrupting commercial activity; unlike their overseas counterparts who sometimes use NVDA as a springboard for violent attacks.⁶ (R)

5. Experienced activists in New Zealand have similar motivations to their counterparts overseas. The far-right in New Zealand, while containing a fringe element prone to criminality and extreme violence, is largely characterised by discord and disorganisation.⁷ (R)

6. The far-left is more prominent, better resourced and better organised. Experienced activists regularly hold tactics workshops (including operational security training), have an established network across the country and are known to travel overseas to attend international conferences and participate in campaigns with extremist groups, e.g. Zapatistas⁸ in Mexico, black-bloc anarchists⁹ in Switzerland and animal rights groups in Sweden. Far-left activists also have support from their counterparts offshore, e.g. when a group of experienced activists was arrested in New Zealand in 2007, solidarity protest actions were held in eight other countries.¹⁰ Police attending NVDA protests earlier this year have also witnessed examples of experienced activists mentoring younger activists who appear willing to 'test the boundaries'. These activities demonstrate an ongoing potential for security concern; however to date an extremist incident has not occurred. (R)

7. Individuals who become motivated by an extremist ideology outside the domestic activism environment are harder to identify and Police or other agencies often 'stumble across them' as a result of other activities, e.g. executing a search warrant to search for

⁶ Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. *Australia: terrorist and protest threat* (June 2014). Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). *Left-wing activism and extremism in the Netherlands* (October 2013) (R)

⁷ New Zealand Police. *The Right Wing in New Zealand: Myth vs. Reality* (April 2014). National Assessments Committee. (R)

⁸ The Zapatista Army of National Liberation, known as Zapatistas is a left-wing political and militant group based in Southern Mexico. (U)

⁹ So-called due to participants being dressed completely in black, often with their faces covered. (U)

¹⁰ Solidarity protests were also held in at least 10 centres across New Zealand. (U)

illicit drugs. While prone to acts of violence, acutely disaffected persons¹¹ are outside the scope of this paper due to their unpredictability, e.g. Russell John Tully who carried out the September shooting incident in Ashburton.¹² (R)

Intent and Capability

8. For someone to be considered an extremist threat there needs to be evidence of intent and capability. The most significant and ongoing intelligence gap relates to knowing a person's mindset; identifying their intent. Extremist individuals acting alone often do not share their plans and will take appropriate steps to conceal their activities from others, increasing the challenge for Police and other agencies to identify and disrupt their plans. (R)

9. In terms of capability, extremists usually plan to use either firearms or an improvised explosive device (IED). Access to legitimate or illicit firearms is common in New Zealand and while Police can revoke a person's Firearms Licence, they are limited in their ability to permanently deny a person from obtaining or using firearms.¹³ In terms of IEDs, it is relatively straightforward for anyone in New Zealand to develop some level of capability. The level of sophistication for any IED will reflect a person's knowledge, resources and imagination. A number of precursors or components can be purchased legitimately from local retail stores or online and instructional videos are widely available on the Internet. Military grade explosives are strictly controlled; however commercial grade explosives have previously been stolen from quarries. (R)

10. The majority of incidents attended by NZDF's Explosive Ordnance Division (EOD) which involve individuals relate to 'experimentalists' with very limited intent. In contrast, organised criminal groups often use IEDs as booby traps for protection of assets (illicit drugs). It continues to be rare for groups to use IEDs for deterrence or intimidation, or individuals who have malicious intent. (R)

¹¹ An Acutely Disaffected Person (ADP) is defined as an individual who is willing to stage a violent form of action to support their own agenda or perceived grievances. The term presupposes that affected individuals are incapable of acting in a reasoned or rational manner. The term also includes individuals who undertake violent or threatening acts, and who are profoundly intoxicated; adversely affected by a mental disorder; or harbour an excessive grudge. (IC)

¹² Tully shot and killed two WINZ staff, with a third staff member being seriously injured. Tully had perceived grievances about how WINZ staff had not been able to help him. (U)

¹³ New Zealand Police. *Firearms and Organised Crime: Illicit Supply, Possession and Use* (July 2014). (R)

11. Another capability which could be deployed by domestic extremists is the use of biological/chemical agents to target New Zealand's agricultural sector. The introduction of Rabbit Calicivirus Disease in 1997 demonstrated how easy this can be achieved by motivated individuals. (R)

12. While not necessarily an indicator of developing capability, the deliberate use of a hoax device signals a specific intent and can have a similarly disruptive or harmful impact on anyone in the vicinity. The deployment of a hoax device can also indicate a test event to monitor the response by emergency services. (R)

Possible Indicators

13. International research has identified some common factors¹⁴ which may indicate an individual is developing an extremist ideology. The factors apply irrespective of motivation but as mentioned above, some of the factors can also be found amongst experienced activists and the general population; they can only be considered alongside corroborated information indicating participation or support for violence. (R)

Some Common Factors:

- (i) exposure to violent ideology
- (ii) radicalisation to violence
- (iii) visible changes in behaviour
- (iv) justification for violence
- (v) observable preparation for violence (R)

14. The ever-increasing amount of information available via the Internet means a number of people in New Zealand have been exposed to a range of violent messaging, e.g. extreme animal rights groups or violent race hatred; however to date, specific incidents have been rare. The path from initial exposure towards radicalisation to violence continues to be extremely varied and remains an ongoing intelligence challenge for Police and other agencies. A number of experienced activists regularly espouse provocative rhetoric, but examples justifying violence are less common.¹⁵ Individuals or groups may demonstrate visible changes in behaviour from time to time; it is almost impossible to rely on this as an indicator of extremist behaviour. The most obvious indicator is observable preparation for violence; however this could occur very quickly; Police has to wait for a crime to occur and agencies like New Zealand Security Intelligence Service may be limited by their legislation in terms of whether they can monitor or detect the activity. (R)

¹⁴ Ibid. (R)

¹⁵ An example from a domestic anarchist publication in 2007 which refers to government agencies: '*.. given that any direct violent action against these establishments is of minimal consequence when compared to the degradation of humanity and environment that their existence depends upon*'. (R)

Outlook

15. There is currently no information to indicate experienced activists from the far-right or far-left are likely to motivate towards an extremist violent act in the next three years. Experienced activists across the spectrum are likely to continue with their current level of activity. Even with limited awareness a number of individuals remain of potential security concern due to their willingness to use provocative tactics, undertake ongoing training and interact with a range of groups offshore.¹⁶ (R)

16. Domestic security agencies will continue to be limited in their ability to proactively monitor, prevent or disrupt planned extremist attacks. A consequence of recent revelations by former US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden means attempts by the New Zealand Government to improve the capability of domestic security agencies, while valid, may in themselves serve as motivation for an extremist response. (R)

17. As with all types of activity described as criminal or of national security concern, the exponential growth of the Internet increases opportunities for anyone to access extremist material and allows like minded individuals anywhere in the world to connect and reinforce their ideas. (R)

18. If someone has the intent, the relatively permissive environment for purchasing firearms and/or IED components will allow them to develop actionable capability with minimal risk of discovery. Equally, a suitably motivated individual could access a range or poisons or similar material which could have a devastating effect on New Zealand's agricultural industry. An extremist act undertaken by an individual or small group is judged to be a realistic possibility. (R)

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¹⁶ Some of these groups are assessed to espouse an extremist ideology. (R)

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