

**From:** [AJ Jenkins](#)  
**To:** [Bettercdresponses \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0001 AllanJenkins Input to CD Review  
**Date:** Tuesday, 6 June 2017 4:30:45 p.m.

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Hi I wish to talk about the inability of CD following the Kaikoura earthquake, to issue a warning of a potential tsunami, particularly in comparison with Japan

I want to talk about why we have a CD , who have said they wont put their staff at risk in disaster situations, telling people who do, ( like police and firemen) what to do from a safe distance.

I want to ask why we have been misled by CD who stated that that Japan was going to abandon siren after their 2011 quake  
Also...why we were promised consultation with Wremo over sirens at the public meeting in Seatoun (when wremo was rolling out their blue line initiative) and why it never happened.

Also the failure of Wremo to issue a tsunami warning following the Kaikoura quake , why locals had to go door to door on the coast after the 1 hour delay while Wremo dithered, and I wish to share the experiences I had on on how people responded to the “ if its strong get gone “ slogan on our street ( I went door to door )  
Cheers Allan Jenkins



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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Submission MCDEM Review

My name is Allan Jenkins

I am a long term resident of Breaker Bay, Wellington

I am a past president of the Breaker Bay & Moa Point Progressive Association

I am a past convenor of the Wellington Clean Water Campaign

I am a past president of the Lyall Bay, Kilbirnie , Rongotai Prog Assoc.

I would like to talk about:

1. The history of community resilience in Breaker Bay .
2. The difficulties Breaker Bay residents have with the present Civil Defence organisation
3. How we can improve safety for South Coast locals .

#### Community Resilience

I have had a long association with the South Coast of Wellington. When I hear the catch phrase of “community resilience” bandied around in the media, I am reminded of similar phrases such as “user pays” and “trickle down theory”. The cynic in me says that community resilience is just a trendy catch phrase for being abandoned by the civil defence when talking about disaster management.

There are few other communities anywhere in New Zealand that have such a proud history of helping each other in times of natural, or man made disaster, as the communities on the Wellington Sth coast

I remember the Wahine Storm where waves were so huge they went a third of the way up the cliffs on Breaker Bay beach, cars and trucks were simply blown over , roofs lifted, and the Wahine was run across Barrets Reef.

I was there on the day, and I want never to see bodies bobbing around in the surf on Wellington beaches ever again.

On that day, Breaker Bay men Marten and Stuart Young risked all and went out in small craft to rescue the stricken passengers of the Wahine.

There have been other storms so bad that the roads were washed away completely, trapping locals for many days in the 1950s and 60s.

Our strong community in Breaker Bay has been at the forefront of many changes made to the area, our Hall one of the last in Wellington actually owned by the community, we fought for proper sewage treatment (for all of Wellington), built proper working penguin nests, and we led the charge to make Wahine Park and the Rangitatau Reserve. These are all initiatives that Breaker Bay locals have worked on.

We know real resilience, and it doesn't come from government funded PR companies.

Fast forward to the present, after the Kaikoura quake many of our locals didn't drive off without a sideways glance, as urged to by the Civil Defence "If It's Strong Get Gone..." they went door to door to make sure their neighbours were all right. Our BBMPPA treasurer Helen was out knocking on doors, while others fled, because someone had to do it.

The "If It's Strong Get Gone" mantra will destroy community resilience in Breaker Bay rather than foster it. It's a state-sanctioned invitation to not think about other people in need.

Over the last 26 years that I have been involved in various interactions with our Wemo / Wremo organisation, it has been evident to me that Wremo staff and WCC staff have had to learn as they go along, just like the residents.

I remember Fred Mecoy and Mike Mendonca telling Breaker Bay residents to use Seatoun school as a rally point after any big quake; trouble was they didn't realise that the school building in question was at sea level.

Their talk to the Breaker Bay community frightened some locals so much they moved away from the Bay, some went to Christchurch thinking it was safer...

Then there was the fiasco of the little Wemo truck with the hooter, and then the helicopter with the hooter that no one could hear, we all thought they were going to turn our water off.

To me, the final nail in the coffin of Civil Defence credibility was the disclosure from CD that they would not be going to the coastal communities following a quake as their terms of employment forbade CD to put staff or volunteers at risk. So we now have the ridiculous situation of CD directing police and fire brigades from the safety of their bunker on Capital Hill kilometers away.

In the 90s when the Breaker Bay locals realised that a quake / tsunami was a real threat, many got active, making escape paths behind their houses and stocking up with emergency kits up on the banks behind their houses. Bunnings were prevailed upon to donate emergency kits free of charge.

Locals investigated buying and using their own tsunami siren (like many areas of NZ)

Also there was much discussion regarding what the correct procedure is re warning neighbours , it always seems to end up that local members of the Prog. Assoc end up staying behind going door to door, doing the hard work while others flee.

I have read recent articles in the press re Civil Defence run workshops in Wellington to engender "community resilience"

A word often used by Wremo is resilience.

The "R" word is now used everywhere, often in ways that drain it of meaning and render it as trite.

There are researchers who have expertise in what resilience is and how we can foster resilience in our communities

From Norman Garnezy, a developmental psychologist and clinician at the University of Minnesota, we learn that the percentage of individuals showing natural human resilience in a given group is low, around 30% .

Also adverse events like earthquakes , floods and natural events can lessen the natural resilience of the already small cohort of people who possess this trait.

In the case of a quake-tsunami scenario, it could well happen that those with this natural resilience would take Civil Defence advice and leave immediately ,thereby leaving those less able to respond behind without any one to help them .

This confirms to me that the Civil Defence mantra of " If Its Long and Strong etc" could actually reduce community resilience.

This research helps explains why , after the Kaikoura quake the people whose doors I knocked on in my street did NOT evacuate .

The reality to me is that when such an event occurs , people will look to media outlets if they are confused, so in the Kaikoura scenario we had Susie Ferguson from the national radio continually hounding Wremo to make a call on evacuation.

People were waiting for Wremo to make up their minds

This is why Wellingtonians need immediate warning systems what ever they may be , just like Londoners had during the Blitz.

We also need much more commitment from WREMO of manpower, workshops, and grassroots support to teach everyone HOW they can each be more resilient.

Much more financial support and equipment supplied - before we can even begin

to talk about Being Resilient.

I applaud Wremo running community workshops to give people a post earthquake / tsunami survival plan, but worry that without a proper understanding of what resilience actually is, they abandon a large percentage of the population who we now know will not be able to evacuate immediately after a quake before the tsunami arrives .

According to this research there is still at least 60% of the population that won't be resilient and will need outside help to evacuate. Especially so in areas with elderly people, resthomes, and schools.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

The difficulties Breaker Bay residents have with the present Civil Defence organisation:

We want to be warned in a timely manner that a tsunami may be imminent. Not after 55 minutes as per the Kaikoura event.

We know that cellphones are not going to work, at best we only get Spark, we can't ever get Vodafone. A long quake will make the repeaters on the hills fail as the oil coolant in the transformers stop cooling the wires and then they automatically shut off, also, the sudden overload of calls from frantic people will also bring down the cell phone system.

Other media helps, but frankly for any system to work it has to be deployed immediately. In Japan in 2011 the warning siren went off 15 seconds after the quake finished. A recent event in Japan had the sirens going off before the quake had finished, which was interesting to me because Dan Neeley from Wremo told us that Japan was going to abandon sirens following the 2011 disaster. Radio stations were great during the Kaikoura quake, but it took Wremo 55 min to make the call to evacuate, in spite of constant requests from National Radio. Then the waves were just starting to arrive on Lyall Bay beach, just as police were going door to door on the Lyall sea front warning people.

We have repeatedly requested sirens be installed on the south coast, and were promised a chance to meet with Wremo to discuss this at a Seatoun public meeting when the Wremo blue line policy was launched. Seatoun locals stated they would even self-fund a siren. Dan Neeley promised to set up a meeting, but it never happened. Years earlier Fred Mecoy promised to have safe (tall) buildings on the flat at Lyall Bay identified and marked, as tsunami shelters, but never made good on that promise.

After the Kaikoura quake many in Seatoun heard the siren from Lower Hutt and wondered why we didn't have one too. The tragedy now is that people expect sirens. Christchurch Council put in over a dozen very quickly after their quakes because a tsunami on the low lying Christchurch plains would have killed hundreds more people.

We have been given the same old party line re the reason MCDEM wont use sirens for many years. They have constantly used their Govt advisers GNS to back up their view, so we now have the once proud DSIR that made so many technical innovations in NZ, morphing into a GNS that is now using its considerable collective intelligence to find reasons not to use up to date warning technology in NZ!

The reasons we have been given is that siren are too easily ignored after a few false alarms, and that they were a failure in 2011 Japan.

This is wrong on both counts.

The research data I have is that sirens saved more lives in Japan 2011 than social media or TV (58% of those saved in one typical Japanese coastal town were saved

by siren).

Some in Japan ignored the siren and this fact has long been used by our civil defence here to discourage using sirens here.

The main difference between NZ and Japan is that the populated areas on the Japanese coastline have sea walls, some up to 10 metres high, as well as a ring fence of siren, sonar buoys, and other technology that now allows them to warn people of quakes before they even happen.

These walls have repelled many big waves.

Unfortunately the more recent lower 3 meter walls in Japan didn't repel the 2011 tsunami.

We have no seawalls, no sonar buoys, no sirens, etc. at all, and we are only too happy to be given warnings that don't eventuate in a wave.

There will always be those that will ignore warnings following an earthquake in NZ, but that does not excuse Govt from abandoning everyone else, who they are still duty bound to look after, by not installing proven warning systems that have worked through wars and natural disasters, in this case siren.

We are not saying sirens are a total solution, but given the total failure of recent MCDEM efforts, we feel sirens are needed on our coastline, at the very least.

### How we can improve safety for Sth Coast locals :

Breaker Bay has already done much to ready themselves for a possible tsunami, we expect a timely warning from CD, be it siren or some other technology available to all, that is not going to fail the moment it is really needed.

The Kaikoura quake was a great opportunity to see if Wrems "If It's Strong Get Gone" mantra would work, without the blaring warning of a siren.

Following the quake, I went door to door in Breaker Bay and was very interested in what I found.

No one had left the houses I visited.

Some people were in shock

Some were trying to use their iPhones to get guidance on what to do

Some hadn't realised it was even an earthquake

Some decided to stay put because Wremo took so long to issue an evacuation notice

Others slept right through the quake

The fact was and is, that the " If It's Strong Get Gone" didnt work.

We need a new-look Emergency Managment Organisation, that can make an immediate decisions during or following an earthquake , an automated warning system is needed, as we now know people won't evacuate if left to make their own decision about it.

Without a siren we will have the same stalwart Prog. Assoc people out there putting their owns lives at risk , as the waves start coming in, rounding up those who can't or won't evacuate, whilst others retreat without a sideways glance

We in Breaker Bay and the rest of the Sth coast, need siren to wake people, and confirm that they need to evacuate .

We also need to have an agreed protocol amongst neighbours , one suggestion is that everyone, and I mean everyone, checks the neighbour on either side of their property immediately following a quake, this has a double overlap effect and saves anyone from having to stay behind too long.

Another is for departing people to use their car horns to wake people.

To me the Civil Defence organisation is very like a large progressive association . We are both manned by mostly volunteers with a small management group many of whom are retired.

We are given the task of looking after the people in our area

We both get flack from time to time re our efficiency.

Yet we both do amazing things

But Civil Defence tsunami warnings to date are not one of those amazing things

I don't think this type of volunteer organisation structure is the right one for major natural disaster warning management.

To me the way forward with Civil Defence here is to use CD for community training, and for post disaster work.

GNS has to be freed from their present brief, and given a new one, to emulate the recognised leader in this field, Japan, and have a mechanised warning system that could be deployed immediately a quake strong enough to cause concern is recorded



by their Geonet network.

This task would be solely the responsibility of GNS and no more lengthy discussions with Wremo would be required.

The task of physically warning people in need, and being at the disaster affected areas would go to the network of fire brigades and police throughout the country, they already have 24 hour monitoring, good infrastructure, a network of fire stations (with siren) and police stations, both services have staff who will be more experienced in dangerous situations.

NZ CD would be of far greater use putting their resources into visiting communities before these events happen, and working with community groups to engender real resilience, by proper leadership.

After the event, they could be in the affected communities highlighting areas of need.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**From:** [Shaun](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMCI\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0002 Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand  
**Date:** Thursday, 8 June 2017 6:19:46 p.m.

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Hi Emily,  
Thank you for your email regarding the upcoming review of improvements in New Zealand's Civil Defence structure.

Having re-read my initial letter to the Minister, I would like it to count as my submission to the Technical Advisory Group. Although the concept clearly needs further elaboration, at this stage, the letter should suffice in conveying the concept and my thoughts on the matter.

Should further elaboration or feedback in some other be desired, I should be happy to accommodate if possible.

Although a New Zealand citizen, I usually reside in Canada, so there is no need to be heard in support of my submission.

Regards - Shaun

--- M.A.R.S.

"If your dreams don't scare you, they're not big enough." - EJ Sirleaf

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**From:** [Emily Stevenson \[DPMC\]](#)  
**To:** [Emily Stevenson \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** FW: Nationwide natural disaster preparedness  
**Date:** Wednesday, 14 June 2017 7:56:32 a.m.

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[UNCLASSIFIED]

**From:** Shaun <sup>s9(2)(a)</sup>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 14, 2017 9:53 AM  
**To:** Hon Gerry Brownlee  
**Subject:** Nationwide natural disaster preparedness

Dear Minister,

Earlier this year, when visiting my elderly grandmother in Whitianga, I happened across a Civil Defence open day regarding local tsunami threat awareness and preparedness

### **Tsunami preparedness**

This was fortuitous because a previous visit had coincided with an actual tsunami warning following the Kaikoura earthquake in November. Having been involved in not just that one, but other Whitianga tsunami alerts (curious in that I'm only there maybe ten days per year), it has become apparent that whilst locals evacuate to high ground in an orderly and timely manner, their preparedness abruptly ends there. Although they would likely survive a tsunami, they take with them little or nothing to drink and eat.

I raised this observation with CD/local government staff during various discussions at the open day and we concluded that, fortunately, an isolated event in a small town like Whitianga was well within the resources of the greater nation.

However if a small, cohesive town like Whitianga can't get organised enough to hold out in the hills independently for a few days, what does that infer about the rest of the country? And it's not like Whitianga residents don't have very good incentives to be ahead of the preparedness curve, it being public knowledge:

- the Kermadec Arc's 30 submarine volcanic centres are just off shore,
- White Island bubbles away continuously further down the coast,
- Mayor Island is 3000 years over due for an eruption according to its 120,000 year track record,
- New Zealand has had a magnitude six earthquake or greater every two years for the past two hundred years,
- Auckland is built on an isthmus of 48, albeit extinct, volcanoes,
- Our capital is built on a fault line,
- Christchurch sits on a previously unknown fault that produced an earthquake killing nearly 200 people, and costing 15% of GDP to repair,
- And Mercury Bay's unique double box shape would amplify any Whitiangi bound tsunami.

This begs the question, what would happen if Auckland had a significant natural disaster? What if unlike Whitianga only needing a few food drops, and sporadic medivacs, instead

Auckland's 1.5 million interwoven, isthmus trapped, "just in time" fed, externally powered and supplied population needed help? The likely closing of its airport and port not only hindering rescue efforts but also slashing tourism and exports thus exponentially magnifying the percentage hit on GDP.

### **Black hole**

I'm sure minds far superior to mine have already ruminated upon such doomsday scenarios. But here's the thing -and I say this with all due respect to the CD/local/central government personnel who continue to work tirelessly in this area- if central government had this sufficiently covered, I wouldn't have been driving my 87 year old grand mother up a hill at 3am wondering just how we might be fairing a few hours after any tsunami eventuates. Whitianga is a small town, but if Auckland had a natural disaster, or even Wellington, the rest of the nation would get sucked into its inescapable resourcing draining, black hole.

### **Bright side**

Despite the gloomy prognosis of our current state of nationwide natural disaster preparedness (and I stress national, as opposed to regional preparedness), I nevertheless think we're potentially in an extremely strong position. That strength stems directly from what makes Aotearoa unique anyway, our physical isolation, and our phenomenal agriculture sector.

Because others (even Australia) can't just jump to our aid, the determined Kiwi DIY mindset comes to the fore, and that can be harnessed (but not necessarily relied upon solely) to amazing effect as Christchurch illustrated. Furthermore, we have a relatively temperate climate (aiding survival) which affords an exceedingly strong agricultural sector, so we can feed ourselves. Thus, with community spirit (love), shelter, and food, Kiwis have all they need to recover from virtually any disaster.

After an actual event, the issue is surviving the intermediate aftermath. In a huge natural disaster, for the first day or two, there might be a lot of confusion, but neighbours look after each other, they share, they help, they co-operate. However, of concern to me, is the 2-21 day window that a truly massive disaster would shatter open. Once people have drained their pantries, and drunk the last drop from the hot water cylinder, patience and therefore social order starts to fray.

As I pointed out at the open day, order on New Zealand streets is not due solely to the "thin blue line." Out numbering police 400 to 1, it is the people who keep the peace because they wish it so. But should the social fabric become taut to the point of tearing, so too tears societal order. Therefore the challenge as I see it, is to reinforce the social fabric such that it may better withstand extreme conditions.

Although nationwide reinforcement/preparedness should be the only acceptable end result,

I don't think this can be achieved by trying focusing upon the whole simultaneously. Nor do I see any benefit in panicking the broader population, no matter how plausible a given disaster may be. Instead, perhaps we should work with small communities (e.g. Whitianga), to spark a chain reaction of systemic preparedness?

### **Proposed solution**

Although simple in concept (at least to my reckoning), the solution is somewhat more complex to explain, so I won't delve into the details here (although I'm happy to elaborate if required).

Just as "the government" can't do all disaster preparation without significant public buy-in, the public can't necessarily rally to an unspecified cause independently. Therefore I would like to start an initiative that is public, but works in concert with government strategies.

It's my belief that the financial impact of being prepared at a household level is inconsequential when annualised. But the national benefit of household preparedness is conceivably measurable in many 1000's of lives and countless billions of dollars. The major obstacles to achieving this desirable degree of societal insurance being household level budgeting and apathy - both surmountable via example and encouragement.

Whilst the police maintain social order by leveraging the innate human desire to discern right from wrong, I envisage leveraging modern society's predilection for social media, gaming, and reality TV. I believe such behaviours can be harnessed to promote both example and encouragement, thus bringing about widespread natural disaster preparedness at the household level.

Although not specifically part of social media, gaming, or reality TV, I believe Kapiti's Mayor Gurunathan has recognised the same human quirk. By enlisting hairdressers as earthquake ambassadors, Kapiti wants to leverage off the human need to communicate with, and help each other.

It could seem curious that a member of the public comes calling to offer, rather than ask for, central government help. And I realise the concept may sound a little left-field, but perhaps if the status quo had been sufficiently effective, we wouldn't be having this discussion. Thus, logic would suggest it may be time for something both additional, and new.

### **Congruence**

Assuming you can at least appreciate my passion, and that we seek the same eventual goal (nationwide preparedness for a severe natural disaster), all I require at this stage is acknowledgement of our congruence. For example, I'd like to discuss with Stacey and

Sally Rolton (owners of New World Whitianga), the plausibility of utilising their Christmas hamper program as a means of saving for a disaster kit in order to disperse the initial setup cost. I also have an online gaming contact in San Fransisco who has previously developed games specifically designed to marry social media and the society-centric hive mentality. i.e Exactly that which is required to organise a community towards a common goal. Thus when approaching such people, my position would be greatly enhanced if I can legitimately claim that central and local government are aware I seek to achieve something in concert with them for the national good. Realising that such a request is perhaps a bit open ended, to clarify, I'm not seeking wholesale unequivocal support, merely tacit understanding and theoretical approval.

Thank you for your time Minister, and I look forward to your response. In this regard whilst I recognise the courtesy of queuing for your consideration, Mother Nature doesn't necessarily hold to the same etiquette.

Kind regards - Shaun

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"If your dreams don't scare you, they're not big enough" - Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**From:** [DAVID & PAT INGRAM](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0003 Re: Review into better responses to natural disasters  
**Date:** Friday, 9 June 2017 11:49:13 a.m.  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

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Hello Emily

I have tried to send the submission but I cant get it to go through I am not computer savvy so I would like my original letter to be used instead

Thank you

Pat Ingram Dunedin

**From:** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 8, 2017 5:24 PM  
**To:** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]  
**Subject:** Review into better responses to natural disasters

[IN-CONFIDENCE]

Good afternoon

I note you have recently corresponded with the Minister for Civil Defence. As you may be aware, a Technical Advisory Group has been established to identify where improvements in New Zealand's Civil Defence structure could be made. As your letter to the Minister contained suggestions on improvements I am writing to inform you that public submissions are now open as part of this review.

On Friday 2 June the Minister of Civil Defence announced the terms of reference for the review into better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies, which can be found here:  
<http://www.dPMC.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

If you wish to have your say on any of the matters raised in the terms of reference, **you can make a submission by filling out the attached form**, and sending it to [bettercdresponses@dPMC.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dPMC.govt.nz). Please indicate in your submission if you would like to be heard in support of your submission. Alternatively, if you would like your original letter to the Minister of Civil Defence to count as your submission please advise

Please feel free to call me on **s9(2)(a)** if you wish to discuss this, or if I can be of assistance.

Kind regards

Emily Stevenson  
**Secretariat to Technical Advisory Group on Organisation of Civil  
Defence Responses**

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  
**s9(2)(a)**



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**From:** [Tracy Norfleet](#)  
**To:** s9(2)(a)  
**Subject:** FW: Tsunami warnings

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Dear Pat Ingram,

On behalf of Hon Gerry Brownlee, Acting Minister of Civil Defence, thank you for your email about your experience following the Kaikoura earthquake and suggesting a national tsunami warning system.

I have passed your comments to the Minister for his consideration.

Thank you for taking the time to write.

Kind regards,

Tracy Norfleet | Acting Private Secretary (Civil Defence)

T: s9(2)(a) F: s9(2)(a)

E: s9(2)(a)

[www.beehive.govt.nz](http://www.beehive.govt.nz)

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**From:** s9(2)(a)  
**Sent:** Sunday, 20 November 2016 8:31 p.m.  
**To:** G Brownlee (MIN); s9(2)(a)  
**Subject:** Tsunami warnings

Dear Mr Brownlee

I live just south of Dunedin in Waldronville

I was wakened by a neighbour and advised to leave as soon as possible on the morning of the earthquake at Kaikoura

With no official notification or respite centre open in Dunedin I contacted the Mayor Dave Cull later that day to ask why the residents of my coastal area were not informed

Within a short time I was contacted by Glenn Mitchell from the DCC who has kept me informed of what is happening re Tsunami Warnings etc of my area

I appreciate his efforts in doing and wish to acknowledge this and his ongoing communication with me

A national warning system would be much appreciated

Sincerely

Pat Ingram

Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows 10



**From:** [Peter TILLMAN](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0004 Re: Review into better responses to natural disasters  
**Date:** Friday, 9 June 2017 2:55:36 p.m.

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Emily,

I would like my letter to the Minister dated 17th November 2016, be included as PART of my Submission.

I have to revise Paragraph (1) ZONES, referring to POSTAL CODES (this will be in my Submission part 2)

I have some comments to make about the current CDD Advertising on TV (also included in Submission Part 2)

I WISH to ATTEND IN PERSON to answer any QUESTIONS that the Panel Might wish to ask.

I would appreciate sufficient notice of such a HEARING as I have to make arrangements to come from CHRISTCHURCH to Wellington.

Thank you,

Dr Peter Tillmann

On 08 June 2017 at 17:24 "Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]" <[bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)> wrote:

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Please feel free to call me on [s9\(2\)\(a\)](#) if you wish to discuss this, or if I can be of assistance.

Kind regards

Emily Stevenson

**Secretariat to Technical Advisory Group on Organisation of Civil  
Defence Responses**

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  
[s9\(2\)\(a\)](#)



**From:** [Peter TILLMAN](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0004 Re: Review into better responses to natural disasters  
**Date:** Friday, 9 June 2017 11:54:52 a.m.  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

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Thank you,  
I feel that the Response from the Minister was well AFTER the event and not IMMEDIATE as were the comments raised in my letter.  
However, I will look at the TERMS OF REFERENCE and SUBMIT if I think my Proposals (based on Personal Experience) will have any effect in FUTURE PLANNING

Dr Peter Tillman  
Founder Member of the JERSEY (Channel Islands) Emergency Response MEDICAL Team

On 08 June 2017 at 17:24 "Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencie [DPMC]" <[bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)> wrote:

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Kind regards

Emily Stevenson  
**Secretariat to Technical Advisory Group on Organisation of Civil Defence Responses**

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  
**s9(2)(a)**



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s9(2)(a)

17<sup>th</sup> November 2016

**Hon Gerry Brownlee,  
Minister Responsible for the Earthquake Commission  
Parliament Buildings  
Wellington**

Dear Minister,

**Earthquakes and TSUNAMI Warnings**

I am writing to you to say how sorry I am that once again our region has been hit by Earthquakes and Tsunami, but add that Kaikora is in the hand of a cable man, with a lot of experience (probably unwanted) in this area.

As a former member of the Jersey Major Incident Immediate Response Team, I am concerned that I have heard about a lot of unnecessary panic following UNSTRUCTURED advice, especially with regards to Evacuation "from the shoreline" with the TSUNAMI WARNINGS in the early hours of Sunday morning, November 13<sup>th</sup>. I suggest the following line of action in the future:

- 1) Assign each area a ZONE number,  
i.e. 1 for New Brighton, 2 for Sumner etc. ( using the recent "event" as a model)
  - (a) REMIND residents what emergency items they need
    - (i) in their home
    - (ii) in their car (remember medicines and pets!)
- 2) INFORM the all residents which ZONE they are in.

**3) After consultation with the Emergencies Services, Advice each ZONE the ESCAPE PROTOCOL for their region.**

**i.e. a) SIREN WARNINGS-**

**intermittent, WARNING**

**short, GET READY TO EVACUATE**

**long, EVACUATE, according to your protocol.**

**b) The Recommended area to make for,**

**c) the Best Route to take (Police to guide)**

**c) Prepare the AREA (b) for "incoming" (CD and Services to get food, toilets and shelter there).**

**4) In the event of a MAJOR EMERGENCY then the ESCAPE PROTOCOL for that Zone ONLY would be initiated. ONLY THOSE AREAS ADVISED (by RADIO, Police Load-hailers etc.) would move, thus saving congestion on the roads, panic, unnecessary evacuation etc.**

**I am sure that I am preaching to the Converted, but feel that I should write to you at this terrible time. I offer this humble letter as a means of CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM of a 78 year old Christchurch Resident.**

**As a former RNVR member, I was delighted to hear that the NAVY considered the Kaikoura Emergency MORE IMPORTANT than attending the 75<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the NZ Navy.**

**Yours sincerely,**

**Dr Peter Tillman,**

**Proud Kiwi-Pom, Senior and Perpetual Student of the University of Life.**

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

Name:	DR. P TILLMAN
Wish to be heard in support of this written submission Yes / <del>No</del>	
Contact details: (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)	
<small>s9(2)(a)</small>	
e-mail =	[REDACTED]
Submission (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):	
(1) See letter to MINISTER 17/11/2016	
(2) see e-mail to EMILY STEVENSON 9-6-2017	
<hr/>	
additionally - in my letter (1) above	
# 1) should be changed to	
Assign post area a zone	
number WITHIN THE EXISTING	
POSTAL BOUNDARIES	
ie. 1 for New Brighton 8061 etc	

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand

Written Submission Form

DR. P. TILLMAN

Submission:

(3) I am concerned that  
current CD TV commercial  
"When an earthquake happens.  
... .. DONT WAIT for  
an Official tsunami warning  
... .."

is giving the wrong information  
to the public WITHOUT emergency  
services being prepared.

If this is all part of a  
PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM  
which will be carried out late\*  
then this is a step in the right  
direction -



DR. P. TILLMAN

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

s9(2)(a)



COPY

(1)

17<sup>th</sup> November 2016

**Hon Gerry Brownlee,  
Minister Responsible for the Earthquake Commission  
Parliament Buildings  
Wellington**

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**Earthquakes and TSUNAMI Warnings**

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    - (ii) in their car (remember medicines and pets!)
  
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COPY

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**i.e. a) SIREN WARNINGS-**

**intermittent, WARNING**

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**Yours sincerely,**

**DR. P. TILLMAN**

**Dr Peter Tillman,**

**Proud Kiwi-Pom, Senior and Perpetual Student of the University of Life.**

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(1)



*[Handwritten initials]*

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

SUPPLEMENTARY  
1

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

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To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b>	DR P TILLMAN
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission Yes / No</b>	
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)	
<b>Q-mail -</b>	<i>[Redacted]</i>
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):	<p>(4) With the new BROADBAND / LANDLINE / WIFI phones in the case of a Disaster and the ELECTRICITY does NOT work will the Cell phones BLOCK the emergency response teams communications? ?</p>

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**From:** [Peter Davies](#)  
**To:** [Emily Stevenson \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0005 RE: Review into better responses to natural disasters  
**Date:** Friday, 9 June 2017 8:51:47 a.m.  
**Attachments:** [image002.jpg](#)

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Good morning Emily Stevenson

Thank you for your email dated June 08 and for the invitation to make a submission. I will be studying the terms of reference during the next few days in order to appraise myself sufficiently to ensure my response is appropriate.

Meanwhile I can say now that I will certainly avail myself of this opportunity and will be asking to be heard in support of my submission.

Kind regards

Peter Davies

s9(2)(a)

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**From:** Emily Stevenson [DPMC] s9(2)(a) **On Behalf Of** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]  
**Sent:** Thursday, 8 June 2017 5:24 PM  
**To:** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC] <bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz>  
**Subject:** Review into better responses to natural disasters

[IN-CONFIDENCE]

Good afternoon

I note you have recently corresponded with the Minister for Civil Defence. As you may be aware, a Technical Advisory Group has been established to identify where improvements in New Zealand's Civil Defence structure could be made. As your letter to the Minister contained suggestions on improvements I am writing to inform you that public submissions are now open as part of this review.

On Friday 2 June the Minister of Civil Defence announced the terms of reference for the review into better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies, which can be found here: <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

If you wish to have your say on any of the matters raised in the terms of reference, **you can make a submission by filling out the attached form**, and sending it to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz). Please indicate in your submission if you would like to be heard in support of your submission. Alternatively, if you would like your original letter to the Minister of Civil Defence to count as your submission please advise.

Please feel free to call me on s9(2)(a) if you wish to discuss this, or if I can be of assistance.

**From:** [Nick Watson](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMCI\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0006 Personal submission to Ministerial Review for better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies.  
**Date:** Friday, 9 June 2017 3:54:01 p.m.

---

Dear review team,

This is a personal submission made by Nicholas James Watson and not on behalf of any organisation. I have 11 years experience in Civil Defence and 5 years experience as a local emergency management officer. I have been involved in numerous deployments including Christchurch earthquakes and Kaikoura Earthquakes.

Outcome 1: I personally think the current response system is good however more work is needed to refine the expectations of both public and agencies. There is a huge variance of the skills and engagement at both local, group and national levels. At local level in my observations many of the other stakeholders understand at what level civil defence will be involved and what we can bring to the table however this can be very different from district to district depending on what the community and stakeholders require.

Outcome 2: I personally think the capability and capacity is very lacking in New Zealand. Not just at civil defence but multiple agencies and levels across New Zealand. We have CIMS courses developed for first responders but many aren't taught it. We have ITF for Civil Defence but the courses are yet to be finished so we don't have nationally consistent training which is very concerning. I think also having 16 groups all doing their own thing with capability and capacity is a danger as when a major incident such as kaikoura occurs the ministry of civil defence have no idea of who knows what and where they are. You do bring up a very valid point about specialist capabilities currently we are looking at the public information team at local level and all the other companies who have communications staff and how they could assist us. But again its only one local team doing it and not the entire country. Business continuity planning should be mandated for all government agencies including local government.

Outcome 3: I think currently the idea of a single lead role across any geographical area is a good idea however this should not take the responsibility away from the local government as the majority of the disasters civil defence is involved with are small and can be easily coordinated at local level. The ministry should have regional offices and have a greater influence at local level then control can be easily rolled up and the ministry have a greater understanding of what is occurring at local level. This is how it works in Ireland. I also think the act needs to have some level of protection for volunteers before a declaration as the vast majority of civil defence disasters are worked on with out the need for declaration.

Outcome 4: We have a very good system in New Zealand one of the best in the world. Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) has been in place since the early 90s. However it is not well known with the emergency services area. This should be mandatory for all personal. I think the best people for the job are the ones on the ground such as local government as the emergency services and civil defence personal can get on and do their job. This needs to be better supported by ministry.

Outcome 5: Currently all emergency services and stakeholder agencies use different platforms for communication. This is outdated now in the modern media age. There should be one communication channel for whole of government. Its far to messy the way we currently do business. Most modern news media now get far more intelligence from

social media than from government. The new public alerting package being put together by government is a huge leap forward in terms of how civil defence warns people. It would be great to tie this into social media so only one piece of warning is sent freeing up time to help the people who need it.

I think its very wise that the minister has initiated this review. However I think the current format for Civil Defence works. As a country we need to work smarter and more together. This doesn't have to be a huge change however it will need investment of time and money across a range of different agencies and organisations.

Kind Regards  
Nick Watson

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**From:** [katrina banks](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0007 Civil Defence - Submission from Katrina Banks Ex Civil Defence 19 Years  
**Date:** Saturday, 10 June 2017 9:59:46 a.m.  
**Attachments:** [Ministerial Review submission form - Civil Defence.pdf](#)

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Good Morning,

Please find my Submission.

As an Ex Civil Defence Member it gives me great pleasure to put forward some information and maybe you can get some information from this.

I did not want to personally present this but am happy for any one to contact me. I am presently working at Tauranga Hospital as an Administrator. My Mobile is s9(2)(a) and the email here is a good contact too.

Kind regards

Katrina Banks

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**Submission:**

Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am putting a submission forward as I am an Ex Civil Member. I spent 19 years as part of the North Shore Civil Defence Emergency Advanced First Aid Unit (Auckland) and then the Greater Auckland City Civil Defence Welfare Group.

In 1995 I started as member the North Shore Civil Defence Team. I was proud to be a member of that Team. We had a Rescue, First Aid, Welfare and Communications Teams. I attended 10 Training Sessions a Year, Guest Speaker Nights and Welfare Exercises.

The Welfare Exercises had us turning up to a Church Hall which was a Welfare Centre. We set this up with information and demonstrations of what to do in a disaster and waiting for the locals to turn up. We attracted a large group of people as the people of North Shore were very focused on being prepared and loved learning every thing including our Teams CPR Demonstrations.

Team Training was done by our Team Instructors who gave of their time. In my Team I ex Wellington Free Ambulance Instructor and A St Johns Trainer. We went over CPR every year and did a First Aid Course. On top of this we covered all subjects which were vital to our upgrading our First Aid Skills.

Over this time the soul purpose of the Civil Defence Members was to help and assist those who needed help in disaster. Our members from all works of life and ranged in age from 18 through to 70 years. When you have knowledge like this you just can not fail.

Today the Civil Defence has lost its soul and become an efficient corporate organisation. At a huge expense to the public image and they do not go out to the public much as you have TV ads. Well you know the public switch off from ads once they have been running for a while. I also believe the Kapiti Mayor was getting Hairdressers to spread the message with the coffee and perm. This is the worst why to do as these guys do not know the material and are also invested in the getting paid for the perm so are more interested in the hair that getting the CD message out there.

I have 2 service awards one from the North Shore Council at 7 years and a medal and certificate for over 10 years, I joined when I was 27 years old and retired around 47 years. So that is truly a waste considering controllers etc are 50-70 years old in the Civil Defence.

I hope this helps you and makes you understand that going back in time might be the answer to why things have gone so wrong.

Good Luck

Katrina Banks

**From:** [Gordon & Yvonne Payne](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0008 Re: Review into better responses to natural disasters  
**Date:** Sunday, 11 June 2017 10:37:09 a.m.  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

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Thank you for keeping me up to date.

Regards submissions I think the latter suggestion of my original letter to be forwarded as a submission, would be appropriate and I do not need to speak to my submission.

Gordon Payne

----- Original Message -----

**From:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)

**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)

**Sent:** Thursday, June 08, 2017 5:24 PM

**Subject:** Review into better responses to natural disasters

[IN-CONFIDENCE]

Good afternoon

I note you have recently corresponded with the Minister for Civil Defence. As you may be aware, a Technical Advisory Group has been established to identify where improvements in New Zealand's Civil Defence structure could be made. As your letter to the Minister contained suggestions on improvements I am writing to inform you that public submissions are now open as part of this review.

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Please feel free to call me on [s9\(2\)\(a\)](#) if you wish to discuss this, or if I can be of assistance.

Kind regards

Emily Stevenson

**Secretariat to Technical Advisory Group on Organisation of Civil  
Defence Responses**

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  
[s9\(2\)\(a\)](#)



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**From:** [Tracy Norfleet](#)  
**To:** [Gemma Stevenson \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** FW: Regards you urgent review of our Civil Defence systems - some aspects that haven't been in the public domain that you may not be aware of.  
**Date:** Tuesday, 29 November 2016 3:16:36 p.m.

---

Hi Gemma,

Please see new ministerial below for logging please (in the alerting category).

Thanks,  
Tracy

Tracy Norfleet | Acting Private Secretary (Civil Defence)

T: s9(2)(a)

E: s9(2)(a)

[www.beehive.govt.nz](http://www.beehive.govt.nz)

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**From:** Gordon & Yvonne Payne s9(2)(a)  
**Sent:** Friday, 25 November 2016 1:59 p.m.  
**To:** Todd Muller  
**Cc:** G Brownlee (MIN)  
**Subject:** Regards you urgent review of our Civil Defence systems - some aspects that haven't been in the public domain that you may not be aware of.

Firstly I applaud both of you, calling for an urgent review of our Civil Defence and how it interacts with councils and GNS. The current set-up is flawed in several aspects, which has been evident from several events, like Rena sinking to the beginning of the first Christchurch quakes and it astounds me that it has continued to muddle along. This problem is applicable to dealing with both earthquakes, tsunamis, but also volcanoes, and acute weather induced events. I particularly wanted to convey to you both a problem, you may or not be aware of, with so called email alerts. I haven't seen any mentioned in the public domain yet on this, followed by notes on issues/suggestions as to how we handle such events

At any given moment both tourists and nations are travelling about and it is crazy that every council sets their own standards and policies of implementation for civil defence. There should be a tight time frame to get changes up and running, in some cases this will require central funding as there has been immense procrastination for years with no standardisation on this issue.

#### **"Email Alerts"**

Currently if you go to any regional council civil defence web page and even GNS they invite the public to subscribe to both text alerts and email alerts, the latter should not be categorised as alerts and mislead the public, as the systems for emails are flawed in design and technology. I spoke to the appropriate staff at BOP Regional Council/Civil Defence about this several months ago and they conceded all ISP companies both national and international block/slow down such mass alerts considerably, through their anti-Spam software, protection systems. Hence for example when White Island had an eruption a few months ago, the email to me had a sent time and arrival time difference of over two hours, making it completely useless!! Both national and international ISP's I was told have been approached, but will not allow exceptions even for Civil Defence.

I was rung this morning by BOP Regional Council staff after some additional queries yesterday, and received a very comprehensive reply to my queries. Because of my call they admitted locally they were going to urgently change their web page this morning, such that emails were no longer seen as



an alert subscribing mechanism, rather a facility to received updates of events already alerted by other means. This needs to be consistent nationally and in I my view, accordingly requires a central government instruction to all other regions, to reflect through their council/civil defence web pages.

#### **Civil Defence Inward/Outward Communication in Major Events**

- As you both recognise it is too long winded in the chain of communication. Going from scientific bodies like GNS to National CD to Regional CD etc that can lead to a breakdown in the message accuracy not unlike the so called "Chinese rumour", we saw this with tsunami alerts for the north island, "east coast". Time is of the essence, we are losing too much precious time by our committee mentality. Scientific and technical people are the only ones skilled to call the shots, not council administrative staff co-opted into Civil Defence rolls, not even the police as they lack the appropriate knowledge/skill set at this phase when we want a timely and efficient decision making process.
- The alerts by various mechanisms should go to the public directly from a central command, that is manned 24/7, joint operation GNS/Civil Defence and ? Met Service. The convening of regional management groups or controllers should not impede initial alert issuing. Modern technology allows lots to be activated remotely using mobile network, wireless or satellite systems.
- Texts/sirens/**overriding broadcasts of radio television and phone systems** to issue alerts. Civil Defence handbooks say tune into your local radio but of en in the past we have many instances during the night where the stations do nothing but play loop music semi manned.
- We should not be trying to re-invent the wheel and consider adopting any appropriate systems with similar high risk nations- Japan, USA.

Gordon Payne  
s9(2)(a)

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**From:** [Steve Glassey](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** 0009 Review Submission: Private  
**Date:** Sunday, 11 June 2017 8:36:12 p.m.  
**Attachments:** [Ministerial Review.docx](#)

---

Please find attached my submission.

I am open to present/talk to the review panel at their discretion.

Regards

Steve Glassey

Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows 10

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

# Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

## Fundamental Flaws

There have been dozens of reviews regarding civil defence emergency management since the establishment of the Early Precautions Scheme in the 1930s. Fundamentally, nothing has changed from these reviews and the pending review may also have the same traditional effect of “re-arranging the chairs on the Titanic”.

There are five fundamental changes needed in my qualified opinion that is needed to provide the genesis for a new direction of emergency management in New Zealand and restore public and political confidence in the system, and create a world class emergency management system namely:

1. Establishment of an **Inspector-General Emergency Management**
2. Implementation of the international **Emergency Management Accreditation Program** (EMAP)
3. Implementation of an **Evidence Based Dynamic Doctrine**
4. Professionalisation of the sector with mandatory certification using the internationally recognised **Certified Emergency Manager** (CEM) credential.
5. **Restructure of the emergency management workforce** based on the NZ primary and secondary education system.

Without these, the sector will continue to be dysfunctional and prone to repeat the same errors over again; and citizens will continue to be put at risk.

In addition to these five, there are many enhancements that should be considered to compliment the above fundamental improvements.

## Inspector General Emergency Management

Section 95 of the CDEM Act 2002 makes it an offence for any person to fail to comply with a civil defence emergency management plan (including the national plan). The management and structure applied following the Canterbury earthquake was inconsistent to the National CDEM Plan, and it could well be argued that the Executive and Director acted ultra vires during the emergency accordingly. The check and balance is that the National Plan requires approval by Parliament hence, setting the ground rules for a national emergency which are agreed to. Acting then inconsistently to the plan with disregard, creates liability and the subsequent legality of decisions including those leading to the recovery could be challenged. I would suspect that the Executive had little or no knowledge of CDEM legislation prior to the national declaration and this is a deficiency in the legislation, that in the CDEM

Act 2002, it only requires local authorities (CDEM Groups) to have competently trained personnel (s.17(1)(b)), though Directors and National Controllers are to be suitably qualified and experienced (which is rather subjective).

Following on from Emergency Management Reform in Australia, the States of Victoria and Queensland both now have Inspector-Generals for Emergency Management to provide better oversight of the sector; however this may not address the checks and balance of the executive. It would be ideal to have national accountability system that comprises of:

1. An Office of Inspector-General of Emergency Management is created.
2. Requirement that all declared states of National Emergency are subject to a Royal Commission of Inquiry.
3. Requirement that all declared states of Local Emergency are subject to IG-EM review, in addition to those undertaken by the declaring authority.

That such Inquiries are not prohibited or forced to exclude matters of public interest (as done in the Royal Commission, i.e. the prohibition of reviewing emergency services/civil defence response).

It may be appropriate that the “response” phase of a national emergency are subject to a Royal Commission, and leave the review of recovery to the IG-EM. The Inquiry into the “response” phase should have the scope to investigate causal factors such as those from the “reduction” and “readiness” phases of emergency management.

The act should allow the Minister, on the recommendation of the Director may request a Commission of Inquiry into any matter pertaining to civil defence emergency management or direct the Inspector-General to do so.

With the recent formation of Fire & Emergency New Zealand, it may well be appropriate that a new Inspector-General is created to cover this agency’s activities, given it has no equivalent review body like Police (who have the IPCA) and Ambulance (Health & Disability Commissioner). Maybe an Inspector-General Fire & Emergency Management would be a proactive step to ensure there is better public accountability for emergency services. Given the former Director-General of Emergency Management of Australia (Mr Tony Pearce) is the Inspector-General Emergency Management for Victoria, I would suggest that he be engaged to provide advice to the Minister on forming such a position.

<http://www.igem.vic.gov.au/home/about+us/about+the+inspector+general+for+emergency+management/>

### Emergency Management Accreditation Program

The current Monitoring & Evaluation programme developed by MCDEM is sub-optimal at best. It has not international status or recognition, and largely is determined by self-evaluation often by users who themselves with no or little qualifications or experience in emergency management. The M&E result has little correlation with operational performance and it also focuses on the CDEM Groups leaving the Ministry and many government departments outside of any transparent accountability process. The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is an international generic emergency management specific accreditation system that is application to any level of emergency management (national/federal, state, local or agency). It is a peer reviewed process using highly experienced and qualified emergency managers and it promotes international networking and recognition. The time and money spent (wasted) on M&E is a debacle in itself, when a perfectly well tested and recognised international system (that is not US centric) is available and would allow NZ to be benchmarked globally. The need to have MCDEM and other key government agencies accountable under an external accreditation system that cannot be politically manipulated would ensure organisations are properly resourced and ready, whilst growing development and networking opportunities for emergency managements to participate in this global programme. The regulation could well be amended to ensure all mandated organisations must achieve and maintain EMAP accreditation and make their accreditation status publicly known (i.e. annual reports) as an accountability mechanism.

<https://www.emap.org/index.php/what-is-emap/the-emergency-management-standard>

### Evidence Based Dynamic Doctrine

Even before the After Action Report (AAR) is compiled, we know that, if things did not go well, the same issues of leadership, role clarity, communications, and training are likely to rear their repetitive heads. In New Zealand, numerous incidents (from the Napier Earthquake (1931), Ballantyne's Fire (1947), Wahine Ferry Sinking (1968), Pike River Mine Disaster (2010) to the CTV building quake collapse (2011)) all share similar lessons learned - but are they really learned? Each inquiry, though different in circumstance and environment, make recommendations – recommendations that have been previously identified, but never institutionalised. We promise the affected families and the public that these deficiencies will never be repeated – but they are. Why do we make the same mistakes, over and over throughout time? How often do we read historical After Action Reports? The lack of institutional and social memory could certainly be a factor, but how do we ensure that lessons identified are actually turned into lessons learned?

In a recent request of all After Action Reports for declared civil defence emergencies in New Zealand between 1960 and 2011 (n=170), only 56 (32.9 per cent) were provided, 80 (47 per cent) were unable to be located, 14 (8 per cent) were sourced from National Archive or private collections as the declaring authority did not have any records, 7 (4 per cent) were merged with other requests due to declaration overlap and 8 (5 per cent) could only provide peripheral information to the emergency. Some requests took several weeks or even months to locate, some were even withheld (rightly or wrongly under Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 exclusions). What this highlights is how can we learn lessons, if we don't even know what the lessons were if the reports are non-existent? Even the New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management's database of declared emergencies omits events and despite the requirement to Gazette each declaration, the Gazette Office was unable to provide a summary of declared events too – what a mess!

Like a stone being dropped into a pond, the ripples fade the farther away from the point of impact – just like lessons learned, the closer (geographically, politically or emotionally) we are to the lesson identified, the more likely we are to know of it. We simply do not learn from our lessons and we need a mechanism to identify the issues in real-time during an emergency, not realising in hindsight that yet again, the lesson identified has been repeated. How can we move from a culture of identifying lessons, to actually learning them dynamically and in a sustainable fashion?

In New Zealand, the term “doctrine” has started to emerge, with it formally being introduced in the revised Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) Manual (2014 edition) and defined as “the body of principles and practices that guide an agency's actions in support of their objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application” (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2014). The section explaining doctrine provides a flawed and over simplified model that assumes that doctrine informs training, which is applied in operations, which is updated from operational learning. There is no evidence to suggest this model is valid; In fact during a workshop held by the University of Canterbury (New Zealand) on exercise management science in 2013 was attended by experienced emergency managers (including military and civilian personnel) who as part of a discussion concluded that emergency management doctrine was vague at best. If such a model is in effect, why do we repeat over and over the same mistakes operationally? There are different types of doctrine including religious, political and military, the common characteristic of which is that they are written and codified – something that emergency management doctrine is not. Who controls doctrine? Is it formal or informal? Do we have a codified body of knowledge for emergency management? Is it evidence based, tradition or historically based? The continual use of doctrine in emergency management is meaningless, unless we define it – which, to date, we have not done.

Evidence based doctrine refers to a codified body of knowledge, based on evidence – not political or preferential views. The New Zealand Prime Minister’s Chief Science Advisor, Professor Sir Peter Gluckman has criticised New Zealand government officials for providing advice based on personal views, without any evidence (TV3 News, 2013). Evidence-based doctrine, commits to ensuring the codified body of knowledge is based on empirical research, not personal beliefs, opinions or agendas. However, doctrines are typically not updated in real-time which are the flaw in their existence, particular in an emergency management context. The development of an Evidence Based Dynamic Doctrine (figure 1), uses active research during an emergency to inform in real time better decision making and reduce the size of the lessons identified loop.




Figure 1: Evidence Based Dynamic Doctrine by Glassey, 2014.

The Evidence Based Dynamic Doctrine (EBDD) has five key elements:

1. Dynamic Incident Research within Incident Management Team
2. National (Centralised) Repository for After Action Reporting (*Puranga*)[secure access]
3. Pracademic Analysis
4. Codified Body of Knowledge (*Kaupapa*) [open access]
5. Evidence based approach to comprehensive emergency management

## **National Repository for After Action Reporting**

Following the response (and later in recovery too), a standardised after action reporting system ensures all incidents are captured in a secure document depository, where other officials can access reports. Incident data can also be shared with international databases such as EM-DAT operated by the Centre of Research for the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). However, After Action Reports are subject to bias and are generally not independent. In New Zealand, there is no requirement for authorities who declare a state of emergency to compile an After Action Report, and even if they do, there is no document standard, nor obligation to share it with the rest of the emergency management sector. A regulatory instrument should be created to ensure that After Action Reporting is conducted in a standardised fashion and ensure these updates can be centrally stored and shared securely within the sector.

## **Pracademic Analysis**

The *Pracademic* analysis is jargon for a process of analysis of research and other sources of information that is conducted jointly by practitioners and academics. Often there is a significant divide between these two groups and the lack of requirement for emergency managers to have a higher education compounds this division. Using a panel of practitioners and academics, After Action Reports along with other sources of information (such as research projects, inquiries, evaluations) are codified into an online body of knowledge (i.e. such as a wiki) which is regularly reviewed. This approach encourages practitioners and academics to work more closely together.

## **Codified Body of Knowledge**

This codified body of knowledge (CBOK) is open and available to the public and end users. It is hosted in an academic environment to afford it academic freedom and ensure it conforms to set contribution standards. It is this CBOK that is used in applying an evidence based approach to emergency management, including in emergency management teaching curricula. Over time, the CBOK will grow in volume making it an up-to-date and authoritative source of evidence based practices.

## **Evidence Based Approach**

A regulatory instrument then requires mandated organisations to consider an evidence based approach, as ultimately in a democratic environment decisions are often made based on politics, not evidence. The regulatory instrument should require decision makers to publicly disclose when they are not taking an evidence-based approach and outline their justification to do so. This also protects policymakers, as often they are constrained by budgets and this disclosure puts the decision making back to communities to determine what they want from their community leaders. For example, if



citizens are told there is no budget for an early warning system, but their municipality instead is upgrading a swimming pool, citizens are empowered to advocate for the warning system or accept they will have a reduced level of warning, in lieu of having a renovated pool. It is about encouraging communities to make informed decisions about the hazards they live with and choosing how best they are managed.

It also encourages policy decisions makers to greater engage with communities through deliberative democracy. The evidence based approach applies to all phases and cross cutting themes in comprehensive emergency management. It means from public education campaigns to human resource recruitment and selection, an evidence based approach is taken. Pilot projects which may not be evidence based can still continue to ensure innovative and creative solutions are trialled, however they would be done so in a more structured and validated fashion, in which results would be formally evaluated through Pracademic analysis to determine whether it is added to the codified body of knowledge.

#### **Dynamic Incident Research**

The system closes the loop, based on all the previous after action reports and research, starting at the time of a response. A Research Officer is embedded in the incident management team (generally in the Planning cell) who dynamically identifies critical evidence based considerations for the incident management team. The Research Officer primarily sources such considerations from the codified body of knowledge, or uses their independent research skills to investigate novel problems. Their goal is to identify the issues whilst the incident is unfolding, rather than to identify problems after the fact in the post mortem phase. This creates real-time risk management within the incident management system, rather than researchers only being engaged after the response to review in hindsight areas for improvement, as has been the case traditionally.

Every time the journey is made around the evidence based dynamic doctrine circuit, the lessons learned circle size reduces as previous mistakes and lessons should not be repeated. Additionally, the focus of the Dynamic Research should evolve from being less reactive, to being more proactive, with a reduction in the same issues being re-experienced during the response phase. As a result the Incident Research Officer will have more time to look at forecasted issues to resolve.

Without embedding dynamic research into the Incident Management Team, this model would only be an evidence based doctrine (which is better than just a doctrine, which is not necessarily evidence based). The Dynamic Research process carried out by the Incident Research Officer evolves the model to be an Evidence Based Dynamic Doctrine; it provides real-time correction and support to incident

planning to avoid the same mistakes from occurring time after time. It requires a special kind of researcher that has credibility and a personality compatible with front line responders – this will require specialised training for researchers, careful selection and plenty of exercising to create solid pre-event relationships so that research officers are seen as valuable contribution to the incident management team, not a hindrance with bad fashion sense and over philosophising in verbose academic ramblings.

The Evidence Based Dynamic Doctrine model finally creates a holistic solution that joins up fragmented but important elements. We do have after action report repositories, we do have researchers talking to practitioners, we do try to have scientific advice in response, and we do endeavour to follow best practice – but have been unable to draw the connections across these elements in a meaningful way.

### **Lessons Identified, lost, buried and learned**

In reality, we don't produce lessons learned reports. They are more likely to be lessons identified reports, as though there may be recommendations, they are not always practical to implement due to financial, social, political, environmental, cultural or other considerations. Lessons learned in a misnomer.

We generally have the following types of lesson related reports:

- Lessons Identified
- Lessons Lost
- Lessons Buried
- Lessons Learned

*Lessons Identified* reports are the most common, though they generally lack any consistent format or content (unless part of a system like the Lessons Learned Information Sharing or LLIS operated by the US Department of Homeland Security). They are generally produced by the agency and highlight areas of improvement, though there should be a greater emphasis to include what went well too.

*Lessons Lost* reports are those that have been compiled, but unable to be found or retrieved. The example of 47% New Zealand's declared civil defence emergency reports since 1960 being inaccessible highlights the need for a centralised repository.

*Lessons Buried* reports are not common, but they are the reports that contain criticism that is politically unpalatable and the agency goes to great lengths to prevent the report from being disclosed. This however does create the need for discussion around what should be included in

reports, the frankness of opinions and criticisms and the tension between openness and public accountability through freedom of information instruments.

*Lessons Learned* reports are rare. Though many agencies tout their after action reports as lessons learned reports, they are generally just lessons identified. Lessons learned reports generally take some years to truly compile as they not only show the lessons identified, but the changes recommended, implemented and most importantly evaluated.

In summary, lessons learned are a misnomer. We don't really learn them, we state them and over time social and institutional memory fades them into irrelevance. We fail to learn them in a sustainable manner because we do not have a system in place to store, analyse, disseminate and dynamically apply them. The development of the Evidence Based Dynamic Doctrine aims to develop a philosophy around real time correction and support to incident action planning during response, whilst providing an evidence based approach across the phases of comprehensive emergency management.

<https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/items/AJEM-30-03-04>

### Professional Certification

Following Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had lost credibility with the public and the emergency management sector. They carried at the time a 10% vacancy rate and their Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) were largely unqualified. As a result, FEMA introduced a credentialing framework and made it mandatory for all FCOs to hold and maintain the International Association of Emergency Managers Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) credential. This international professional credential is robust and stringently administered and held by many well recognised emergency managers, domestically and internationally. With the majority of Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management officials, Emergency Services Managers, and CDEM Group Officers not holding any tertiary level qualification in emergency management, it is no wonder we repeat the mistakes every disaster, time and time again. Under the EMAP program there has to be a program coordinator, and this person must be suitably qualified to lead such a program. The CEM allows an existing and internationally recognised credential that should be the pre-requisite for appointment to key roles such as CDEM Group Manager, Director, Controllers and senior government liaison (i.e. NZDF, Police, FENZ etc). The CEM not only requires qualifications and training, but also experience – something that a tertiary qualification on its own cannot provide. It also ensures the system is not subject to political interference or manipulation by officials given it is internationally administered and independent. It does have a NZ specific element within the compulsory examination, so any assumptions that it is US centric should be dismissed. Not only currently do we

have emergency managers within local and central government with no experience and qualifications in emergency management; the same can be said of allied organisations such as defence and emergency services. It is important to recognise that emergency service experience does not necessarily translate to emergency management experience. Often, even emergency managers in New Zealand are more like inconvenience managers when compared with international disaster responses which can often require major geographical area campaigns over months for hundreds of thousands of people. In recent experiences, I have found that it would appear that both Police and the Defence Force have no training or understanding in basic CDEM Law or the National CDEM Plan, such as the emergency powers, protections from liability etc. From my discussions with staff from such agencies, they admit that their promotional or career development frameworks do not cover the civil defence emergency management act, national CDEM Plan or associated regulations, guidelines or codes. Often only through being allocated the portfolio of civil defence do such officers get exposed to CDEM systems, laws and plans – however again, there is not requirement for these officers to be qualified in emergency management. It makes no sense that the people charged to protecting the thousands of lives within the community need no qualifications; yet a nurse or doctor looking after one life needs to be highly qualified.

Again, once an EMAP system is in place, this would require all these organisations to lift their game to ensure such training is institutionalised and ensure credentialed personnel are managing the phases of emergency management, and understanding of the legislative framework they are required to operate in.

CEM overview <http://www.iaem.com/page.cfm?p=certification/intro>

FEMA FCO requirement [https://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/8600\\_7.pdf](https://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/8600_7.pdf)

## Workforce Strategy

The lack of consistent pay rates, competency and qualifications required continue to compound the human resource environment within civil defence emergency management. Simply “if you pay peanuts, you get monkeys”, but without raising the professional bar, there is little justification to pay good rates if you have a workforce that is no minimal qualification – hairdressers are required to be more qualified in New Zealand than emergency managers. The CDEM Group model for staffing and shared services is inconsistent and leads to further fragmentation with some areas fully transitioned to a regional shared service model, through to less than ideal and supported structures. One proven and effective employment model in New Zealand is that of teachers. Teachers are required to be qualified and vetted, they then are employed by the Ministry of Education on a collective agreement that ensures parity of pay and ease of collective bargaining. However, they work for a school who has a board that ensures community engagement and direction (i.e. LTCCP), against standards which are externally audited through the Education Review Office. This is what we need for emergency management! The requirement for emergency managers to be qualified can be achieved by the CEM without the need of any waste of public funds; however some criminal/national security vetting would be required. The Boards already exist through the Joint Committees (i.e. Mayors) who receive community input into emergency management ensure deliberative democracy. However, the Emergency Management Office (i.e. the School), has to perform to agreed standards and such reviews are made public – this is the EMAP accreditation. This would mean there would be a national CDEM workforce, employed nationally, directed regionally, engaged locally, and audited internationally. Each CDEM Group would have an allocation of roles/levels just as schools are allocated teaching numbers etc i.e. the Manawatu-Wanganui CDEM Group may be assessed to require an Executive Emergency Manager (Level 1), Two senior Emergency Managers, one Emergency Manager and one provisional/trainee Emergency Manager. Such a tiered system would allow for better career progression and retention of institutional knowledge.

Registered Teacher	=	Emergency Manager with CEM®
Board of Trustees	=	Joint Committee (Mayors)
Ministry of Education	=	Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management

## Complimentary Enhancements

### Nuclear threat & security clearances

The National CDEM Plan and National Hazardscape Report omit Nuclear Threat (nuclear strike or nuclear winter), yet the Civil Defence Act 1960 created the Ministry of Civil Defence and its primary function was to prepare for this threat. It would appear that the sector's self-interest to divorce its image away from tin hats and air-raid sirens has in itself created a risk, that being the loss of social memory around the threat of nuclear incidents. The nuclear threat remains unchanged, in some ways it is the forgotten Tsunami – no one cared about Tsunami until Boxing Day 2004. At that time the risk (likelihood or consequence) had not changed, it just had been forgotten about and the political driver of emergency management was always based on the most recent experience, not necessarily the highest actual risk. With the move of MCDEM to DPMC, which philosophically is a good idea, it also has created the risk of officials being drawn the secretive nature of national security which became the catastrophic failure of the Department of Homeland Security as exposed by Hurricane Katrina. This also highlights the need that local government emergency managers should at least hold a confidential level national security clearance given the extremely probable need for civil defence emergency management to interface with the national security system in future events. Given the time it takes to process security clearances, especially higher ones, should a major event occur the bureaucracy intended to safeguard the nation may itself become the barrier to share information to respond effectively. The adoption of a national workforce as earlier recommended would also address this issue.

### Volunteers

The degradation of support to CDEM volunteers continues to be of concern. In 2004, there was NZ's largest civil defence rescue exercise (Exercise Pegasus04), conducted in Christchurch. Since then, there has been less and less focus support and respect provided for CDEM volunteers. The national network of some 16 accredited (NZ Response Teams) volunteer CDEM teams have been abandoned by the Ministry, leaving them without any national leadership, engagement or support. The Ministry needs to be better engage these volunteers and encourage them to fill the void of operational needs within the community. There is international work being undertaken by the United Nations on light rescue team accreditation, but there has been no engagement to light teams (NZRTs) in NZ, nor have they been updated on the disaster search marking system changes that occurred over 18 months ago – these are simply examples to illustrate the lack of engagement and communication these dedicated volunteers receive.

Such an auxiliary is critical for emergency management and reliance on FENZ should be taken with caution given the reason for one historical civil defence declared emergency was due to industrial

action taken by the Fire Service. Unlike Police, they are still able to strike – and while they are allowed to exercise that freedom, the risk shall remain (unless it is made law that they are unable to strike as done in s.69, Policing Act 2006).

## EMIS

EMIS is a dead horse. Stop flogging it. Bin it and start again.

Find something that works and has the confidence of the sector.

## Animal Disaster Law

I will make a separate submission in my capacity as CEO, Wellington SPCA on this area for improvement.

**Thank you for the opportunity to made a submission.** I wish you and the Minister to be bold, make the right changes even if it takes you out of your comfort zone and hope that this will be the last review of CDEM for the foreseeable future (do it once, do it right)

## Steve Glassey

Masters in Emergency Management (Animal Disaster Management) | Postgraduate Diploma in Emergency Management | IAEM Certified Emergency Manager | Fellow of the Emergency Planning Society | Graduate Certificate in Terrorism Safety & Security | Postgraduate Certificate in Public Management | National Certificate in Civil Defence Management | National Certificate in Urban Search & Rescue | Rescue 3 International Instructor Trainer (Rope, Swiftwater, Boat, Animal) | CIMS4 Instructor | NZ Fire Service Category II USAR Technician | Former UN Disaster Management Officer and MCDEM USAR Advisor | former NAWEM representative | former Chair, National Welfare Coordination Group | former Representative to the Officials Domestic & External Security Committee ODESC – *the Government official's highest crisis management team* as General Manager Emergency Management, Ministry of Social Development | Ministry of Civil Defence Long Service Award | National USAR Steering Committee Citation Award | EOC 200 & 300 Level Instructor | EMAP Assessor & Accreditation Manager | Former Commissioner IAEM Certification Commission | Higgins & Langley International Medal for Swiftwater Rescue recipient | 2016 IAEM Global Award Winner Industry Preparedness – SPCA Emergency Reserve programme | former Honorary Advisor to the Minister of Civil Defence, Hon. J. Carter |

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Steve Glassey
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): See attached/supplied

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence





## Wellington SPCA submission to the Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand

*“Pet ownership is the single most common factor associated with human evacuation failure that can be positively affected when the threat of disaster is imminent”*

(Heath & Linnabary 2015)

### Introduction

The current animal disaster legal framework in New Zealand is based primarily upon the Animal Welfare Act 1999 and Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. Both of these were written prior to Hurricane Katrina (2005) which was the genesis for modern animal disaster law with legislation being swiftly passed due to lessons learned, such as the Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act 2006. According to the Fritz Institute (2006) 44% of those who chose not to evacuate during this catastrophic event did so in part because they were unable to take their pets, as the federal policy was to leave pets behind at that time. Now in the USA, the PETS Act 2006 requires federal, state and local plans to include animal rescue, evacuation, sheltering and care. Closer to home, following the 2009 *Black Saturday* bushfires in Victoria the Royal Commission into this disaster found that human lives were lost as a direct result of animals not being able to be evacuated and pet owners returning prematurely to their properties to save their animals (World Society for the Protection of Animals 2014). By contrast, New Zealand's efforts to improve animal disaster laws has been sub-optimal with no changes to legislation to enhance animal welfare during emergencies and therefore provide better protection for animals and their human counter-parts. The recent Kaikoura earthquake provides an opportunity to reflect on whether our current framework for animal disaster law is effective and if not, how we can strengthen arrangements for future events.

### Observations

#### Coordination and Planning

The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 yielded a robust and forward thinking piece of legislation that has served the country well for most parts. A new National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, issued in 2003, included animal welfare, with local authorities in most cases being charged with this function for companion animals. However, 14 years on there still is no national animal emergency management plan and only a small handful of group level animal emergency management plans. The state of animal emergency management is under-focused, under-resourced and inconsistent. The NCDEM Plan Order 2015, is vague and places responsibility also for MPI to also regionally “coordinate” animal welfare for civil defence. Although the lead agency is compelled to have an emergency management plan for its responsibilities and take all necessary steps to ensure those functions are provided (s. 59, CDEM Act 2002), at a regional level they only need to “coordinate the plan”. In effect, no one person or organisation is directly responsible or accountable to develop the regional animal welfare emergency management plan – this is a major flaw in the framework. In contrast, the Victorian Government following the Royal Commission into the Black Saturday bushfires,

required the Department of Primary Industries to lead the preparation of a stand-alone animal welfare emergency management plan (White 2012) which was published in 2011, only two years after the disaster and recently relaunched. Six years after the Canterbury 2011 earthquake which experienced animal welfare related issues (Glassey & Wilson 2011; Potts & Gadenne 2014) and was the country's first declared state of national emergency, we have no such plan, still little progress, and the lessons learned are more lessons lost. Lessons lost being those learnings that have been identified but never acted upon (Glassey 2011). The total resource allocation for the Ministry for Primary Industries animal welfare emergency planning is 0.6 FTE which is completely underwhelming to meet the expectations placed upon the Ministry in the National CDEM Plan.

### Legal complexities of animal evacuation and disposal

It is important to first of all acknowledge that pursuant to section 6 of CDEM Act 2002 the Act does not affect the powers, duties or functions imposed on others. That is the powers of an Inspector or under the Animal Welfare Act 2002 remain unaffected even during a declared state of emergency under the CDEM Act 2002, however common sense should always prevail. In the context of animal evacuation, the CDEM Act 2002 allows for persons during a declared state of emergency to be directed by a Constable or Controller to enter premises (s.87) including a dwelling (home) or Marae (sacred tribal meeting place registered with the government) using force if required; and to seize or destroy an animal (s.92) or other property.

Once an animal comes into the possession of the SPCA as an approved organisation under the Animal Welfare Act 1999, the SPCA can rehome the animal or otherwise dispose of it after 7 days pursuant to section 141(1A) if the owner does not claim the animal. The National CDEM Plan Order 2015, however places the local authority as the organisation responsible for accommodation of companion animals, yet they (and all other animal related organisations in New Zealand other than the SPCA) do not have the legal authority to rehome unclaimed animals other than dogs (as local authority powers for disposal only extend to stray dogs found at large under the Dog Control Act 1990) and they have no powers for holding or disposal of displaced companion animals such as cats, rabbits and birds. There is no provision in the CDEM Act 2002 that provides for the disposal of seized items except for destruction, which would have to be done while a state of emergency is still in effect. This leaves only the provisions of disposal under section 141(1A) to give effect to rehoming (or otherwise) of unclaimed animals and this power only extends currently to the SPCA which is not responsible for accommodation of disaster displaced animals.

Microchipping is a critical tool in the reunification of animals during and following an emergency (American Microchip Advisory Council for Animals 2007; Glassey & Wilson 2011) and could be interpreted that the CDEM Act 2002 allows for the "marking" of animals such as microchipping under section 91 under the direction of a constable or controller during a declared state of emergency. However, this assumption could be challenged and it is important during a mass evacuation of animals that microchipping can be applied without owner consent to ensure reunification.

Whether a declaration of emergency is in effect or not, the SPCA Animal Welfare Inspector also has the power to take animals into possession that are at risk of imminent harm under section 127(5)(a); and in doing so a notice of entry must be left at the property under (s. 129) which is not practical for mass evacuations across multiple properties; and dwellings cannot be entered unless a search warrant has been issued (s.131), again not practical in a disaster response context. The Animal Welfare Act 1999 also provides an Inspector the power to mitigate suffering and prevent likely harm from occurring to an animal under section 130(1)(a).

Where animals are taken in by the SPCA (as an Approved Organisation), the requirements under section 141(1A) of the Animal Welfare Act 1999 state the animal must be kept for seven days and has prescribed expectations around attempting to locate the owners and/or giving them notice of disposal if the animal is not claimed. From overseas experiences including Hurricane Katrina, the American Bar Association created a model act for states to adopt to address the ownership, temporary holding, transferring and disposal of animals during and following a disaster. Their recommendation was that during a declared disaster, that the holding period was set at 30 days to allow for displaced owners to claim their animals; and that animals could not be transferred out of state without approval of the State Veterinarian (American Bar Association 2010). Thousands of animals were evacuated and transported across the United States following Hurricane Katrina, never to be reunited with their original families again and this prompted legal reforms (McNabb 2007). The model act also ensured that animals that were unable to be reunited could be legally rehomed with ownership being transferred. The SPCA as an approved organisation can legally rehome such unclaimed disaster affected; however other organisations do not have this authority and post-disaster rehoming through other organisations may lead to animal custody disputes as experienced after Hurricane Katrina.

### Mass Destruction of Animals

The CDEM Act 2002 does provide the power for the controller or a constable to destroy animals (s.91). Understanding the intrinsic value that animals have to people (World Society for the Protection of Animals 2014) and their importance as being seen as members of the family (Irvine 2009; Glassey 2010) and a psychosocial coping mechanism (Hunt et al. 2008; Heath 1999; Glassey 2010), not to mention the negative psychological impacts following the loss of a pet (Edmonds & Cutter 2008; Gerwolls & Labott 1994; Hunt et al. 2008; Leonard & Scammon 2007); though legal, it would be immoral, socially unacceptable and potentially career and politically limiting to destroy companion animals in an emergency. The availability of such unbridled power may give the impression that mass animal destruction is an acceptable emergency management practice, where that is far from the truth.

According to Irvine (2009), during Hurricane Katrina, Sherriff's Deputies were managing evacuees with their pets at the P. G. T. Beauregard Middle School. The Deputies assured the families they would take their pets to an animal shelter while families moved to the local high school. Some thirty-three dogs and cats were shot, execution style. A later forensic investigation found the animals had not been killed humanely and been left to bleed to death. To mitigate this lesson from repeating itself, it would be prudent to provide a safeguard that any destruction of animals only be undertaken after consultation with an Inspector appointed under the Animal Welfare Act 1999, not being a constable.

### Rescue Powers

#### **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

#### **85. Emergency powers of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups**

- (1) While a state of emergency is in force in its area, a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group may—
- (b) provide for the rescue of endangered persons and their removal to areas of safety:

The rescue of animals is important to human safety. The academic consensus that in an emergency, saving animals in effect saves human lives is a fundamental philosophy to contemporary emergency management doctrine. The inclusion of animals in section 85(1)(b) would help strengthen animal welfare emergency management arrangements to ensuring not just Animal Welfare Inspectors and Constables, had the emergency power to conduct rescues in a declared state of emergency. Even

recently in New Zealand, there have been frequent examples of people losing their lives in an attempt to rescue their companion animals (Barlow & Shadwell 2016; McBride 2016).

## Evacuation Powers

### **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

#### **86. Evacuation of premises and places**

If a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or any constable, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human life, that person or a person authorised by him or her may require, within the area or district in which the emergency is in force,—

- (a) the evacuation of any premises or place, including any public place; or
- (b) the exclusion of persons or vehicles from any premises or place, including any public place.

The inconsistent use of life and human life within the CDEM Act 2002 creates challenges as the interpretation of “life” may extend to animals, whereas “human life” is very specific. Requisitioning powers (section 90) under the CDEM Act 2002 is specific to “human life”, whereas evacuation provisions (section 89) uses “life” creating greater flexibility in interpretation. These discrepancies were raised as issues to government in 2010 and despite recent amendments to the CDEM Act in 2016, these and other animal emergency management issues continue to be ignored.

The refusal of public safety officials to allow companion animals to be evacuated alongside their human families is a leading cause of evacuation failure (Irvine 2009; Heath 2001; Glassey 2010; Fritz Institute 2006). The omission of animals in this section may also imply that animals cannot be excluded from a premise or place. This section should be for the preservation of human and animal life and that animals, persons or vehicles can be excluded for any premises or place.

## Entry Powers

### **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

#### **87. Entry onto premises**

If a state of emergency is in force in any area, a Controller or a constable, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller or constable, may enter on, and if necessary break into, any premises or place within the area or district in respect of which the state of emergency is in force if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the action is necessary for—

- (a) saving life, preventing injury, or rescuing and removing injured or endangered persons; or
- (b) permitting or facilitating the carrying out of any urgent measure for the relief of suffering or distress.

The current section that provides access onto properties and premises, including that of dwellings, refers to “life”, “persons” and “suffering or distress”. Without these terms being defined in the Act’s interpretation (section 2), and without case law, the act is silent in regards to its application to animals. To avoid ambiguity and to ensure the needs of animal welfare are assured, animals should be specified with animals being defined in the Act’s interpretation as the same as in the Animal Welfare Act 1999.

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## Requisition Powers

### Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002

#### 90. Requisitioning powers

- (1) This section applies if a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or a constable, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human life.

Though empirical evidence would suggest that the preservation of animal life during an emergency will positively influence the preservation of human life as earlier discussed, to avoid ambiguity the section should be amended to reflect a contemporary approach to emergency management law. During a declared state of emergency, this provides flexibility to the Controller and any constable, to effect requisitions to protect animals. For mass animal rescues during disasters such as those from intensive farming facilities and laboratories, specialist equipment and heavy machinery may be needed. The inability for public safety officials to be able to carry out specialist or logistically complex animal rescue operations may force animal activists through to pet owners to defy official advice and put themselves at harm's way as seen in numerous events such as the Buckeye Farm disaster in 2000 (Irvine 2009, p.48). It is in the interest of disaster response officials and politicians to mitigate this significant risk by ensuring animal disaster response is enabled with the same powers as those given for human disaster response.

As with the other emergency powers within the CDEM Act 2002, any constable may exercise such powers (except for those contained in section 85 which are exclusively conferred upon the Controller). SPCA and MPI Inspectors appointed under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 are already provided with the same powers as a constable under the act, except for the power of arrest or stopping a vehicle. The government already entrusts these officers with significant legal powers and it makes sense that during a time when police are going to be overwhelmed, the same powers are conferred upon them for animal welfare matters during a state of declared emergency.

## Codes of Welfare

The Animal Welfare Act 1999 makes provisions for Codes of Welfare to be established for species, industries or activities to ensure minimum animal welfare standards are set. Under the Act, they can be used as evidence of non-compliance with the Act, and they can also be used by the defence to prove they met minimum requirements and therefore were not in breach. Certain offences under the Act have a strict liability, meaning the prosecution needs only to prove the act of the offence (*actus reus*), not the guilty knowledge or intent (*mens rea*). Codes of Welfare often support the enforcement of strict liability offences, however they have also a defence caveat to applying these in circumstances of emergency, namely:

### Animal Welfare Act 1999

#### 13. Strict liability

- 2 (c) that the act or omission constituting the offence took place in circumstances of stress or emergency, and was necessary for the preservation, protection, or maintenance of human life;

What countless examples of recent disasters have proven, is that the saving of animals, in particular companion animals strongly correlates to increased evacuation compliance and subsequent increase in the protection of human life. The relationship between saving people and companion animals in an

emergency is intrinsically linked, and therefore the omission to save such animals indirectly places the human population in particular their owners and public safety responders at risk. The old attitude of “human lives before pets” is draconian and reflects a lack of understanding between the evidence that saving pets will actually save more human lives. Therefore, any omission to save companion animals in an emergency, is empirically contrary to the preservation, protection, or maintenance of human life. The defence clause under section 13(2)(c), should not be seen as an excuse for public safety officials, especially when emergency management purports to take an evidence based approach to its activities. Further effort is required to enhance animal emergency management within Codes of Welfare.

### Zoological vulnerability

Companion animals are the ones that are given the most attention in emergency management, given their strong bond to their human guardians and the paternalistic protective behaviours displayed by their guardians also. But companion animals are generally the least zoologically vulnerable when compared to intensively farmed animals reliant on automated feeding and environmental systems (Irvine 2009). There numbers may be so large that their rescue during emergencies may be logistically impossible, or it may simply be more cost effective for the producer to discard them as waste, rather considering these animals as sentient beings. It is important that legislative frameworks afford protection to these animals across the spectrum of comprehensive emergency management.

Following the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake, GNS Scientist Kevin Berryman observed the seabed was vertically displaced some 6 metres along the coastline, rendering crabs, fish and Paua trapped unable to return to the water (Clayton 2016). Other media reports corroborated these observations with crayfish and lobster also being observed stranded by the uplift and despite public officials warnings not to, community members returned to relocate the sea life back into water (Lewis 2016). There was significant backlash by the public to the government direction to stop the sea life rescue attempts with even a Ministry for Primary Industries fisheries officer threatening to arrest the Paua rescue volunteers (Gates 2016). With hundreds if not thousands of crabs, lobsters, fish and crayfish stranded and dying, no government agency took responsibility for the welfare of these animals, despite them being afforded the same protections under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 as companion animals (acknowledging that Paua however are not classified as animals and therefore not protected under the Animal Welfare Act 1999). Simplistically, the government sets the maximum number of fish that can be legally taken from the sea through a quota system or *allowable catch*. The efforts by the public to rescue the fish were treated as breaches of fishing quota by officials, whereas they in many cases were acting in the interests of animal welfare. It is unclear whether the provisions of section 16 (emergency measures) would be effective in enabling rescue of fish, those protected under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 or otherwise. In effect, there is no agency or body responsible for the welfare of these animals during an emergency and this gap needs to be addressed.

Research undertaken by Potts and Gadenne (2014) also noted that other animal groups such as hedgehogs, sea birds and turtles were negatively affected as a result of the Christchurch earthquakes and current animal emergency planning efforts struggle to cater for companion animals let alone other animal groups such as wildlife. Further research is needed around non-companion animal vulnerability to disasters in New Zealand and how these animals can be better protected in the future.

## Recommendations

To strengthen the existing animal disaster legislative framework in New Zealand, there are several improvements that could be made including:

1. Mandating the development and maintenance of animal welfare emergency management plans, both at the national and regional level; and ensure MPI is sufficiently resourced to do so.
2. Amending the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 to ensure animal protection measures are included in rescue, entry, evacuation, requisitioning and other relevant sections; and ensuring that Inspectors under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 can respond appropriately.
3. That microchipping of animals is specifically added as a power during an emergency and the recovery transition period
4. Limiting the power of animal destruction in recognition of international experiences
5. Educating public safety agencies (including government departments and military) around the importance of taking an inclusive approach to animals in emergency planning and evacuations
6. Revising and developing Codes of Welfare to incorporate animal welfare emergency management principles and developing a new *Code of Welfare for Animals in Emergencies*
7. Defining emergency welfare responsibility for unowned sentient animals (whether protected under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 or not), in particular those who are highly vulnerable to natural hazards.
8. As like in the US, ensuring response costs for animal emergency management are eligible under central government funding/reimbursement claims.

For the purposes of consolidation, consideration should be given to a specific regulation made under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 or Animal Welfare Act 1999, like that of the Pet Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act 2006 set in the United States. For further information, the following websites are provided:

<https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Reference/disaster/Pages/PETS-Act-FAQ.aspx>

[http://www.wagnpetsafety.com/pdf/Pet Parents and PETS ACT of 2006.pdf](http://www.wagnpetsafety.com/pdf/Pet%20Parents%20and%20PETS%20ACT%20of%202006.pdf)



## Conclusion

There is considerable evidence that substantiates the protective nature of humans towards animals, in particular companion animals. Well respected disaster management scholar Erik Auf der Heide (1989) stated that emergency planning should be based on “normal behaviour” not “correct behaviour”, in effect we should plan on the basis on how humans will likely react, not how we want them to react. On this basis, emergency managers need to place greater focus on ensuring that animals, companion animals are acknowledged as intrinsically linked to people. To achieve improved evacuation compliance and public confidence in response coordination, the welfare of animals during emergencies needs to be a core function and a priority of the response. To enable this change and designate accountability, New Zealand needs to heed the lessons of Hurricane Katrina and the Black Saturday Victorian bush fires and give urgency to strengthening the animal emergency management laws with amendments to the relevant acts or the passage of specific regulations to reflect international best practice and meet the expectations of its citizens.



**Steve Glassey** MEmergMgt PGDipEmergMgt PGCPM GCTSS CEM® FEPS

**Chief Executive Officer**

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## Annex A: Model Amendments to Legislation

1. That the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 be amended as follows:

### 2. Interpretation

**Auxiliary Officer** means an auxiliary officer within the meaning of the Animal Welfare Act 1999

**Director-General** means the Director-General within the meaning of the Animal Welfare Act 1999

**Inspector** means an inspector within the meaning of the Animal Welfare Act 1999.

### 85. Emergency powers of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups

(1) While a state of emergency is in force in its area, a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group may—

(b) provide for the rescue of endangered persons or animals and their removal to areas of safety:

### 86. Evacuation of premises and places

If a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or any constable, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human or animal life, that person or a person authorised by him or her may require, within the area or district in which the emergency is in force,—

(c) the evacuation of any premises or place, including any public place; or

(d) the exclusion of persons, animals or vehicles from any premises or place, including any public place.

### 87. Entry onto premises

If a state of emergency is in force in any area, a Controller, constable or an inspector, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller, constable or inspector, may enter on, and if necessary break into, any premises or place within the area or district in respect of which the state of emergency is in force if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the action is necessary for—

(a) saving animal or human life, preventing injury, or rescuing and removing injured or endangered persons or animals; or

### 90. Requisitioning powers

(2) This section applies if a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or a constable, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human or animal life.

**91. Power to give directions**

While a state of emergency is in force, a Controller, constable or an inspector, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller or constable, may—

- (a) direct any person to stop any activity that may cause or substantially contribute to an emergency;
- (b) request any person, either verbally or in writing, to take any action to prevent or limit the extent of the emergency.

**92. Power to carry out inspections, etc**

1. While a state of emergency is in force-

- (a) A Controller, constable or an inspector, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller or constable, may examine, mark, seize, sample, secure, disinfect, or destroy any property, animal, or any other thing in order to prevent or limit the extent of the emergency.
- (b) An inspector, auxiliary officer or any person acting under the authority of an inspector or auxiliary officer, may microchip or otherwise mark any animal.
- (c) A Controller or any constable destroying any animal must consult with an inspector from an approved organisation before such destruction is undertaken, and only in such circumstances where it is reasonable to do so.

2. That the Animal Welfare Act 1999 be amended as follows:

**2. Interpretation**

**State of emergency** has the same meaning as in section 2 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

**141. Duties of Approved Organisations**

(7) While a state of emergency is in force, the Director-General may instruct approved organisations to extend the 7 day period under subsections (2) and (3) up to 30 days.

3. That the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 be amended as follows:

**75. Animal welfare**

(1) All animal owners, or persons in charge of animals, should develop their own plans to care for their animals during emergencies.

(2) At the national and CDEM Group levels, the Ministry for Primary Industries is the agency responsible for—

- (a) co ordinating the provision of the animal welfare services sub-function (including animal rescue, animal shelter, food, water, husbandry, reunification, and veterinary care and other essentials) for all animals, including companion animals, production animals, animals in research, testing, and teaching facilities, zoo and circus animals, wildlife, and any other animal as defined in section 2 of the Animal Welfare Act 1999; and
- (b) developing and maintaining the national animal welfare emergency plan; and
- (bb) developing and maintaining a regional animal welfare emergency plan for each CDEM Group; and
- (c) maintaining the Government's reporting and advisory capability on animal welfare in an emergency.

## **162. Government financial support to local authorities during response**

Government financial support for response activities focuses on costs incurred by local authorities to—

- (a) care for directly affected people and companion animals, including the costs of accommodating, transporting, feeding, and clothing people and companion animals as a result of an emergency; and
- (b) take the necessary precautions or preventive actions (whether by construction, demolition, or any other means) to reduce the immediate danger to human or animal life, where those precautions or actions were begun during the response period; and
- (c) take precautions or preventive actions aimed at reducing the potential consequences of an emergency where those precautions or actions were begun in the period immediately before the emergency.

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**From:** [Chris Carding](#)  
**To:** [Emily Stevenson \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re: FW: Review into better responses to natural disasters  
**Date:** Saturday, 24 June 2017 12:33:56 p.m.  
**Attachments:** [image002.jpg](#)

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----- Original Message -----

From: Chris Carding <sup>s9(2)(a)</sup>  
To: Chris Carding <sup>s9(2)(a)</sup>  
Date: 24 June 2017 at 12:14  
Subject: Re: FW: Review into better responses to natural disasters

Hi Emily

Thanks for the information and opportunity

Since my email to the Minister in September 2016 I have been working extensively with Auckland CDEM re better communication methods for us

The end result is very satisfactory and we now get good communication through the Whisper alerting system

Kawau is a unique situation with a relatively small first responder team

All our fire team members are our civil defence members and as a group we respond to all 111 and civil defence emergencies

By nature of our geographic location Kawau Islanders are very resilient and have excellent preparedness, we understand that if a major National emergency was to occur looking after ourselves for a period of time is a reality

So our main issue has been resolved ( real time heads up alerting )

If I was to offer any advice to National and regional teams it would be to listen to early feedback from stakeholders this communication problem has taken me around a year to get sorted , in hindsight could have taken a few days

Keep it simple and uncomplicated and have direct communication lines between National ,Regional , Community groups so we all get the same messages

I do like the approach of getting all NZs to take responsibility for themselves and be better prepared as individuals but support and assistance for CRGs is also important and CDEM have divorced themselves from these groups a wee bit over the last period especially around community response planning

Anyway thats my take on it

Cheers , have a great week

Chris Carding

On 23 June 2017 at 19:23 Chris Carding <sup>s9(2)(a)</sup> wrote:

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**From:** Emily Stevenson [DPMC] s9(2)(a) **On**  
**Behalf Of** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]  
**Sent:** Thursday, 8 June 2017 5:24 PM  
**To:** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]  
<bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz>  
**Subject:** Review into better responses to natural disasters

[IN-CONFIDENCE]

Good afternoon

I note you have recently corresponded with the Minister for Civil Defence. As you may be aware, a Technical Advisory Group has been established to identify where improvements in New Zealand's Civil Defence structure could be made. As your letter to the Minister contained suggestions on improvements I am writing to inform you that public submissions are now open as part of this review.

On Friday 2 June the Minister of Civil Defence announced the terms of reference for the review into better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies, which can be found here: <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

If you wish to have your say on any of the matters raised in the terms of reference, **you can make a submission by filling out the attached form**, and sending it to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz). Please indicate in your submission if you would like to be heard in support of your submission. Alternatively, if you would like your original letter to the Minister of Civil Defence to count as your submission please advise.

Please feel free to call me on s9(2)(a) if you wish to discuss this, or if I can be of assistance.

Kind regards

Emily Stevenson

**Secretariat to Technical Advisory Group on Organisation of  
Civil Defence Responses**

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

s9(2)(a)





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**Chris Carding**

**Civil Defence Coordinator & Rural Fire Rescue**

**Kawau Island**

s9(2)(a)

**Chris Carding**

**Civil Defence Coordinator & Rural Fire Rescue**

**Kawau Island**

s9(2)(a)

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## Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand Written Submission Form

Name: Shell Sanerive-Pere

Wish to be heard in support of this written submission No

Contact details: (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a)

I have been involved, on the ground level, in multiple Emergency Events and have gained experience and an ability to identify opportunities to improve the way Welfare coordinates services. While I work for s9(2)(a), this submission is a personal view and not an official representation from s9(2)(a). This has also provided learning opportunities for best practices.

1. *The underlying principle of “act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally” may not be suitable in all circumstances.*

There is a lack of connection in some of the events between the levels within the Emergency Management structure. A ground up approach does work but it requires the upper levels to understand how to support those on the ground. The breakdown in the Emergency Responses is not often caused by the ground level however breakdowns in the structure become obvious at that level. There must be better understanding, education, training and succession planning for the upper levels from the EOC up so they don't become the “noise”.

2. *Response capabilities are not necessarily deployed as promptly and seamlessly as possible, taking advantage of economies of scale and the experience of senior responders.*

Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery (the 4 Rs) – There is not enough emphasis on Recovery planning during the Reduction and Readiness phases locally, regionally and nationally. Welfare during the Response phase in an EOC can be reduced and undervalued resulting in difficulties with resourcing and communication. It needs to be clearly understood by all agencies involved and particularly the Incident Controllers at the time that Welfare will often grow to become the biggest part of Recovery but the work starts in the Readiness and Reduction phases. People matter.

Reduction needs to be considered more holistically by agencies involved to ensure thought and planning is given to not just Response and reducing the needs of individuals and communities in this phase but also Recovery. Recovery is referred to as continued delivery of welfare services to affected communities following an emergency to bring about the **immediate, medium-term and long-term holistic regeneration** of a community.

When we discuss Recovery in a Welfare context, it is often in isolation from the other 3Rs. The problem is that Welfare in response and recovery does not always fit with the pace that the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) may move. When EOCs disband Welfare is often left isolated and operating in Response while also operating in Recovery. When this has happened we have seen essential services, (for example logistics services in organising

donated goods, access to water and food and intel from the EOC and basic services like access to food and water needed by those working on the ground) removed too early. When to move to Recovery is also an area that we don't always do well, sometimes there is a rush to move into recovery when Welfare may not be ready and be still working in some of the Response phase. This was something that happened in Kaikoura. The EOC wound down and Welfare was still operating partially in Response. They then failed to adequately prepare to transition to recovery. A sign was placed at the bottom of the stairs in the EOC stating it was closed down and all enquiries should go to the RAC. This left the RAC isolated and acting as a one stop shop for everything. The town supply of food and water needed to have access away from the RAC, logistics was still needed and there was no RAC manager in place at that time. The agencies that were delivering services from the RAC were not told and left to discover this. We also saw the Welfare Centre which the defence force was running to feed people including the people from the required agencies closed down before the normal availability of food and water was fully sorted. Shutting down an EOC needs to be carefully planned and transitioned. It should not be a one size fits all approach.

*3. Volunteers may not be adequately supported by a professional emergency management force.*

An observation is that there was pressure to move to recovery quickly and give local ownership back. The issue here is local communities at the time do not realise fully that they do not have the resourcing to do this immediately and are often still working through personal impacts from the event. An example of this is not have a full local welfare advisory group, feeding intelligence into the Welfare Group Manager and effectively managing access to food parcels for people once the EOC wound down. This mean that the one lady who ran the local food bank was given the key to the cheese factory where town food and water supplies were stored to sort out food packages, then Red Cross being told that they should drop of a bulk of donated food boxes to the RAC to store so that people over the weekend could have access. If Recovery is transitioned properly from Response, logistics would have a planned approach and this situation would not occur. The weight placed on the woman was more than one person should have and the responsibility for access to a basic resource being done in an adhoc way places the public at risk.

*4. There is a need for timely, consistent and accurate communication to the public.*

The Thames Valley Emergency Management group have demonstrated on many occasions how "*act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally*" works and the issues seen in Christchurch and Kaikoura are not apparent in any of the events in this area. The weather bomb in 2002 really demonstrated the need to engage agencies and local organisations in planning and preparation including offering training and education across the Coromandel Peninsula. This has proven to have enabled this community to become resilient and knowledgeable. Recently we have seen 5 emergency events – Kaimarama (Whitianga) Fire, Tasman, Cook, Debbie and a bit of Donna. The leadership and the response and recovery activities demonstrated the importance of the locally lead management during these events. This team from different agencies made strong timely and sensible decisions. People and agencies knew their roles and the leadership from the Mayor and Incident Controllers was strong and clear. The communication to the public was available in different media formats

and was consistent, clear and concise. This comes down to the relationships laid down over time, shared ownership of emergency management and organisations supporting each other to do the right thing. There were clear shared goals in each event. Key, was that the EOC supported what the ground lead response was without getting in the way – hands off but readying support. Multi agency debriefs were focused on learning from each event and were multi-agency. In other areas where events have happened, the ability to move through the event smoothly and with surety has been compromised by lack of relationships, engagement, shared ownership, knowledge, training and experience. The Welfare Group have focused on the 4 Rs throughout the local engagement enabling the ability to respond to the needs of the community (many small communities in the area) regardless of how diverse these are.

It is important to have relationships prior to emergency events that are strong and focused with all agencies and people involved taking ownership and responsibility for what they must do. Relationships need to be at all levels across the key agencies with legislative requirements. At the local and community level, the Relationships in place and the preparedness through collective planning with a bottom-up approach to the 4Rs is paramount to successful Emergency Management. There are bigger benefits when the upper management levels support what is happening on the ground. The underlying principle of “act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally” works when training, experience and clear process is understood and followed at all levels across all agencies involved.

5. *Decisions are not necessarily made by adequately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the appropriate level of government, and supported by the best information possible in the circumstances.*

To ensure that Emergency Management works as intended, the appropriate training and development of identified people and providing them with experiential development for specified roles within an Emergency Response is imperative. Often people filling key roles may have had education and training but not experience so are left inexperienced and unsupported resulting in chaos within an EOC environment. This is often hindered further if the people filling these roles are not local ground level people or have been selected without giving true consideration to their suitability for that role (noting that there are occasions when there are no other options). As an example, in Kaikoura, a self-appointed Welfare Manager was asked to cover by the previous Welfare Manager who had finished their shift until the next person arrived. Both people had no actual experience the role but had training. When the appointed and suitably experienced and trained person arrived to fill the Welfare Manager role, the covering person self-appointed themselves to that position and refused vacate the position. This resulted in a poorly set up Welfare arm within the EOC with a bottle neck situation happening to information flows, communication accuracy and availability of accurate data. Health and Safety of the people within the Welfare Response Teams from different agencies that worked within the RAC was immediately at risk because simple resourcing requirements like access to drinking water or appointing a RAC manager were completely ignored because the Welfare Manager did not understand practically or use the simple and effective processes available like requisition forms for the Logistics teams. Education and Training must include succession planning that supports the gaining of

experience for newly trained people in the practical sense – perhaps alongside an experienced Welfare Manager in a real Emergency event. (Kaikoura Example).

Welfare Managers that do this role well are pivotal in the success of building the resilience of Welfare Services within communities. They have developed strong interagency relationships, have clarity on their individual responsibilities within an Emergency Response and have a strong knowledge of Welfare functions within an EOC Response environment. They know their role function, what supports need to be in place and can efficiently coordinate and lead the Welfare Groups. They also have active support networks.

Agencies that are charged with Welfare Sub-Functions need to ensure their organisation's National Training programmes are integrated and use the Emergency Management Training and Development process. This would ensure consistency of understanding and applications of procedures and responsibilities. Having consistently trained representatives from Agencies in the EOC Welfare and Civil Defence Centre Welfare roles is advantageous in an emergency event. There is a caveat to this – when someone is trained and understands the role, the expectation to fill that role during an emergency event needs to be balanced. An example: With the CDEM Plan changing in welfare response, Ministry of Social Development staff member who is trained in the Welfare Group Management role should not fill this role but should use their knowledge to support the Welfare Manager and the response. An MSD person may have training and experience prior to 2015 in managing a RAC but should not be expected to fill this role or the duties as their responsibilities have shifted. Their training, knowledge and experience will however support the RAC Manager. There should also be a requirement that these agencies are seated around the table at all levels when Welfare engagement is required regularly within the 4Rs. At a local level engaging with communities and other mandated agencies in developing and reviewing Community Response Plans needs to include the local authorities. Some localities would need to engage several local authorities in their planning. Thames Valley Emergency Operating area do this well.

Recovery is undervalued in the preparedness stage, so thought should be given to fully resourcing this role as a "Recovery Focus" from the ground up – across the 4Rs will enable recovery and resilience to be considered and planned for earlier.

- 6. Information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency, to determine the capacity and capabilities required for the response effort.*

Local resourcing is important, especially in the higher risk communities who will have events. This includes preparing a suitable venue for Emergency Responses and for Emergency Recovery. Having accurate information that is provided with as much time as possible, allows for the best possible decision making immediately prior and during an event.

The importance of established networks allows for efficient use of time, limits miscommunication, clarification of role responsibilities and supports the sharing of intelligence. In the response phase there is no coordination across agencies of when staff are rotated or replaced. There is often a reliance on staff sharing their own "business as usual" contacts. This creates or adds to chaos as people jockey for places within networks and to find new contacts as the handover information (if any) is invalid. A piece of work that

should be considered – particularly in Welfare should be group coordination in the initial 4 weeks. In Kaikoura, much of the intelligence was lost between agencies on the ground by people moving in and out of roles by their agency so the established networks were lost.

Ideally if key agencies worked together they could coordinate, develop and prepare interagency teams within the Welfare Response in a large event. An example that agency people on the ground, in a response have previously discussed has some merit. They would train together and plan together across the year; and they would make up the initial Welfare Response teams that would hit the ground together and make up the roistered teams. They would train with set deliverables in mind from day 1. They would ideally be fully resourced with duty equipment, like phones etc that are handed-over to the next shift. One contact number per agency, regardless of the people moving through the role, - would create one point of contact for key agency roles. Using this type of approach and preparation, time wasted in establishing networks and contacts is heavily reduced. Navigating and linking up to deliver an effective response has already been established enabling intelligence sharing and service delivery to happen more effectively. Commitment from key agencies with sub function responsibilities would be required to do this. It would be beneficial to require sub-function agencies to attend and be present at meetings, exercises and training so it becomes active partnership.

In summary:

1. The underlying principle of “act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally” is a fitting model. It requires all agencies with Emergency Management responsibilities to commit at all levels fully – not just when events happen.

Recommendations

- There needs to be a better and more coordinated approach from organisations and agencies to meet their responsibilities in the 4Rs.
  - Standardised baseline training could assist this. The efficiency and effectiveness of Response and Recovery is impacted by each agency having a lack of trained/experienced staff that all use and understand the basic universal CIMS and the structure and delivery of welfare within the Emergency Management environment.
2. Decisions are not necessarily made by adequately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the appropriate level of government, and supported by the best information possible in the circumstances

Recommendations

- Improved by ensuring all agencies are mandated to receive appropriate standardised training, development and opportunities to provide supported experiential training for succession purposes.
3. Volunteers may not be adequately supported by a professional emergency management force

Recommendations

- Could be improved substantially by training and development delivery of those professionals to understand capability and capacity of volunteer organisations.

- Provision of access to Emergency Management training for volunteers at local levels may also be beneficial.
4. Information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency, to determine the capacity and capabilities required for the response effort.

#### Recommendations

- Nationally consistent Resource Handbooks with nationally consistent forms and processes would help. Simplify templates that are standardised rather than having locally created forms like needs assessment and registration forms.
  - Be risk averse when understanding who personal information is being collected and shared with during an emergency event. Without a national template and appropriate framework regarding the collection, use and security of personal information there is strong risk when sharing this information and places the people we help and the agencies involved at risk.
5. There is a need for timely, consistent and accurate communication to the public.

#### Recommendations

- Clear roles, clear messaging and clearly identified leadership and leaders, using multiple media with statements specifying official release works and reduces confusion by the public without limiting the intended audience.
6. Response capabilities are not necessarily deployed as promptly and seamlessly as possible, taking advantage of economies of scale and the experience of senior responders.

#### Recommendations

- We have good and reasonable knowledge of areas in New Zealand that have higher likelihood of having an event happen. These areas should have resourcing to assist with Reduction and Readiness to get the Community engagement active and evolving. This will help to introduce the foundation of Response and Recovery planning at a local level early and integrate the 4Rs full
- Commitment from key agencies with sub function responsibilities would be required at all levels. It would be beneficial to require sub-function agencies to attend and be present at meetings (4Rs), exercises and training so it becomes active partnership. What hinders Emergency Management – Welfare with the 4Rs, is agencies with sub-function responsibilities or welfare responsibilities not having local representation or they do not attend relevant meetings.
- There needs to be a better and more coordinated approach from organisations and agencies to meet their responsibilities in the 4Rs.
- Standardised baseline training could assist this. The efficiency and effectiveness of Response and Recovery is impacted by each agency having a lack of trained/experienced staff that all use and understand the basic universal CIMS and the structure and delivery of welfare within the Emergency Management environment.



- Resource and Handbooks with nationally consistent forms and processes would help.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

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visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Peter Davies
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a) <span style="background-color: grey; color: grey;">[REDACTED]</span>
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Please see word document already sent by email

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

**By Peter Davies, July 2017 (I would like to be heard in support of my submission, please.)**

My background is in logistics, supply chain management, and facilities management. More recently I have been involved as part of a team preparing our retirement "Village Emergency Response Plan". (Whitby Lakes Retirement Village, Porirua with circa 150 residents, soon to increase to circa 200). Neighbour Mr Peter Turner (a civil engineer) has done research and been of assistance to me in preparing this submission.

Thank you for this opportunity to offer my thoughts on one aspect relating to your review.

**Overview:**

I do understand that your brief is a wide one and my point is only one of many issues that you and Civil Defence Organisations must consider and deal with when planning for emergencies

**Summary:**

I will confine myself to saying that in the event of disruption to the sewage system, a superior means of containing and disposing of human waste in an emergency to the method currently contemplated by Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office (WREMO) must be provided.

**Resident provided and managed composting toilets:**

When preparing our Village Emergency Plan, in 2015 our Residents' Association were disturbed to discover that Porirua City Council (PCC) and WREMO have NO plans to provide "portaloos" or chemical toilets for Wellington Region residents (such as were mobilised and serviced in Christchurch and we believe at Kaikoura). Instead WREMO recommend and plan for residents to buy "composting toilets", which WREMO and PCC expect residents to use and then dispose of contents (basically raw sewage) themselves in the event of disruption to sewage services.

**Composting toilet system not suitable in many situations:**

We met with Mr Bruce Pepperell in December 2015 to draw his attention to the difficulties in disposing of contents from composting toilets... specifically in retirement villages, but also generally in the wider community: apartments, hotels, hospitals, hostels, and other student accommodation, etc. Also in areas where there are small or no sections, or which have high water tables (where there may well be a vector for unacceptable public health/hygiene risk spread) etc.

**Specific issues:**

- **Composting toilet system:** The real difficulty for residents are the details of how and where they will empty raw sewage from toilet buckets – especially those who live in apartments. There are risks of contamination to access-ways (including lifts), not finding suitable ground for disposal, etc. Anecdotally, we believe that very few residents have purchased these.

**Suitable alternatives:**

- **Chemical toilets:** It's waste disposal that matters much more than the unit you use and that is why chemical toilets with their sealed disposal tub with chemically treated contents are preferable (for retirement village residents at least).
- **Black plastic bags:** Another solution would be to revert to the original advisory by WREMO, which was for residents to use a large black plastic bag spread over the toilet bowl and subsequently tied securely for disposal. (But WREMO have since rejected this method.) Of course, this method will require thought to be given to disposal.

**Logistics of supply and disposal:**

WREMO's Mr Pepperell did say that residents could choose whatever means they use... but remained adamant that Wellington would not supply or service any chemical toilets in an emergency. He said this decision is based on the difficulties WREMO envisage facing in distributing chemical portaloos and individual toilets and disposing of their contents because they anticipate significant and medium to long-term disruption to roads and other transport modes. Mr Pepperell explained that Wellington Region, with its limited transport corridors could not be expected to service chemical toilets as was done in Christchurch.

We acknowledge that Wellington's geography has its own special difficulties but believe the purpose of creating regions to deal with emergencies is to identify and find solutions to deal with any special difficulties. We do not accept that making victims of emergencies responsible for their own sewage containment and disposal is a "solution".

**Conclusion: WREMO should take responsibility...**

WREMO (and councils) should not simply pass the problem of sewage disposal to residents to fend for themselves in the event of a major disaster. Uncontrolled individual disposal of composting toilet contents will present a massive health hazard to residents throughout Wellington Region. A plan must be made to solve expected logistics problems.

Accordingly, I wrote to the then Minister of Civil Defence (Hon Minister G Brownlee) with these comments and asked him to please "ask some qualified and practical person to look into this". This submission is based on the email I sent to the Minister in November 2016.

Whilst I do realise there are other important issues before you, I am delighted that this high-powered Ministerial Review has been commissioned and hope you will give my submission consideration as part of your deliberations.

I can make our **detailed notes** (mainly gathered and recorded by my neighbour Peter Turner) available if required. These include learning based on Christchurch experience plus notes covering use and disposal relating to **chemical toilets**, **composting toilets**, and **plastic bags** together with costing estimates, etc.

Thank you...

Peter Davies

s9(2)(a)



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<b>Name:</b> Murray Dudfield
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Submission attached

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28<sup>th</sup> June 2017

Submission to:

## Ministerial Review

### BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCIES IN NEW ZEALAND

**'Plan for the future because that is where you are going to spend the rest of your life.'**  
Mark Twain

Attention; Hon Nathan Guy  
Minister of Civil Defence  
Parliament Buildings  
WELLINGTON

Contact details for this submission are:

Murray Dudfield ONZM, MInstD, MNZIF

s9(2)(a)

[Redacted contact details]

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Introductory comments

- 1) Thank you for the opportunity to submit to the Ministerial Review for Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies.
- 2) When the Advisory Group considers this submission I am available to attend and be heard in support of my submission.

## About the Submitter

- 3) I was the National Rural Fire Officer for the National Rural Fire Authority in New Zealand 1990 to 2014 and the Chairperson of the New Zealand National Rural Fire Advisory Committee for 23 years.
- 4) I was a founding member of the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) formed in 1993. I was an AFAC Council member until 2014 and Chairperson of its Rural Land Management Strategic Group for ten years prior to 2010.
- 5) I was appointed a Member of the NZ Order of Merit in 1999 and an Officer of the NZ Order of Merit in 2015. In 2014 I was awarded a United Nation FAO Certificate of Excellence for exemplary service to International Cooperation in Wildland Fire Management. I was a board member of the Australia Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre 2007 to 2014, a board member of the Otago Rural Fire Authority 2014 to 2017 and the current Forest Fire Committee Chairperson for the NZ Institute of Forestry.
- 6) In my role as the National Rural Fire Officer I sponsored and led a multiagency group in the development of the NZ Coordination Incident Management System (CIMS). CIMS was endorsed in 1998 for use by emergency management agencies in the management of incidents.
- 7) This submission is also centered on the many years of international forest and rural fire management experience while working with colleagues in the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Fiji, Cook Islands, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Philippines, Indonesia and within the FAO group of the United Nations.

## Introduction

- 8) Most emergency incidents are managed locally and are typically handled by local emergency management response personnel within a single jurisdiction. The majority of responses need go no further. In other instances incidents that begin with a single response within a single jurisdiction can rapidly expand to multidisciplinary, multijurisdictional levels requiring significant additional resources and operational support.
- 9) One uneasiness with the 1998 Blue Book (ISBN NO: 0-908920-32-6) for the NZ Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) was that it made only a minor reference to a flexible

core mechanism for coordinated and collaborative functions that must be positioned above the Incident Management Team. This support is particularly important for incidents where additional resources are required or are provided from different organizations within a single jurisdiction or outside the jurisdiction, or for complex incidents with national implications (such as an emerging infectious disease or a bioterrorism attack). When a single incident covers a large geographical area, multiple local emergency management and incident response agencies may be required.

- 10) The disappointing position that I believe we are forced to acknowledge is the lack of detailed instruments to ensure effective coordination across all agencies. I would suggest that this is the key reason which has triggered the Minister of Civil Defence into undertaking this Ministerial Review. I believe the review findings must include a recommendation to the Minister that requires the establishment of a National Integration Centre (NIC). One of the key roles for this new entity would include the development and maintenance of a comprehensive set of coordination tools. The entity should also have a regulatory role auditing the coordination delivery mechanisms and outcomes of all agencies involved in natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. The tools involved should apply to all entities once multiagency coordination is required.

#### **Shared Responsibilities**

- 11) In the international environment - shared responsibility among citizens, government agencies and local communities, is acknowledged as an area of serious concern and a risk to good outcomes. This problem is connected to a fundamental governance challenge faced by modern democratic political systems today and is not just an issue specific to the field of emergency management. The changing nature of relationships between government and citizens in the face of dynamic and complex social, economic, environmental, political and technological changes have added to the problem. Because of this, political researchers and policy makers alike increasingly argue that there is a wide scale need for “a new balancing of responsibilities between different actors and social spheres: government, industry, individual citizens, political organizations and the institutions of civil society” (Sevenhuijsen 2000). The focus on community resilience and shared responsibility in disaster policy is a particular expression of these broader and more fundamental socio-political issues. It is my view the lack of focus on this area puts NZ Disaster Responses Services at risk – as in this area – one could argue more than any other – a weak macro coordination system – costs lives and in turn leaves governments vulnerable to criticism.

- 12) One area where specific research has been undertaken in the field of sector coordination is in the bushfire environment where the New Zealand National Rural Fire Authority has worked closely with the Australian emergency management agencies as a full partner and member of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (CRC).



- 13) For the past decade in Australia many public inquiries and reviews of major wildfires have been completed. In recent times strong statements have been made in key policy documents and public inquiries about the need to focus on a principle of 'Shared Responsibility'.
- 14) The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission stated as one of its defining principles - that shared responsibilities be given even greater policy status - by firmly placing it as a central pillar of a "whole of nation" resilience-based approach to the management of disasters. However the Royal Commission did not define what sharing responsibility actually entailed
- 15) To assist in defining how this 'shared responsibility' might be expressed a programme of research was embarked on by the Bushfire CRC to help define 'sharing responsibilities'. This research, undertaken by Blythe McLennan and Dr John Handmer<sup>1</sup> from the Centre for Risk and Community Safety at RMIT University in Melbourne, has provided valuable insights into the meaning of shared responsibility. The research involved obtaining a broad range of stakeholder perspectives including interviewing those now involved in sharing responsibilities between government, and civil society. It showed that agencies and communities are interested in developing closer relationships and sharing control of key aspects of the emergency management in its widest form eg., monitoring early warning, preparedness, prevention, rapid response, suppression, restoration, etc.
- 16) The research was guided by a simple conceptual framework that encompassed six key facets of responsibility. They are causality, obligation, accountability, trustworthiness, constraint and agency/control. Each of these facets is emphasized in the literature as being particularly important for understanding the way responsibility for risk management is conceived, allocated, shared or avoided.
- 17) This research also made reference to the context of risk – emphasizing that taking responsibility is also about having control, both in decision-making and 'control in acting'. This research has drawn attention to two significant implications of putting the principle of 'Shared Responsibility' into practice - that may not be immediately evident to emergency management practitioners and other stakeholders. These are:
- a) Public sector agencies will need to allow a relatively greater degree of control of risk management processes and outcomes to rest with communities of interest; and
  - b) Agencies need to clearly and directly communicate the limits of their capacities to control risk management processes and thus make it possible to achieve risk management outcomes.

### **Risk Ownership**

- 18) When allocating risk ownership, the following has been recognized to be important:

<sup>1</sup> Shared Responsibilities in Australia Disaster Management 2014

- a) The need to understand not only *who* is allocated ownership, but *what* it is allocated for, *how* it is allocated, and *if* the allocated responsibilities can be fulfilled.
  - b) The targeted allocation of risk ownership needs to be supported by clear process structures, skilled facilitation and be given sufficient time for effective outcomes to be achieved.
  - c) Ascertaining community values requires stakeholders with diverse expertise and experiences to fully represent the different values and agendas that make up the community.
- 19) Risk ownership within the different hazard groups will vary between agencies and sector groups. Given the agencies represented on the Technical Advisory Group the focus of the Ministerial Review appears to be only on the following hazards;
- a) Earthquakes
  - b) Extreme weather
  - c) Flood
  - d) Rural fire
- 20) Many of the outcomes of this Ministerial Review will also be relevant for other hazards i.e. Animal and Plant Disease, Escape of Hazardous Materials, Human Disease and Terrorism.
- 21) Risk ownership of natural hazards has traditionally been focused in the area of effective response, administered primarily through command and control mechanisms. However, the changing nature of natural hazards and the socio-economic context in which they occur is leading to the emergence of new and different types of risks. The need for community, businesses and government to build greater resilience to these risks requires a different focus; one that goes beyond the event and builds greater capacity in all areas of our society. Strategic decision-making provides a bridge between the present and the future; one that can help us act decisively and collaboratively in the present, whilst thinking and planning ahead. It is crucial for central and local government, businesses and communities, to be efficiently and effectively connected - if we are to prepare and effectively respond to natural hazards in the future.
- 22) Effective long-term planning, preparedness and recovery require:
- a) Robust risk cultures across communities and public and private organizations.
  - b) Organizational flexibility and responsiveness and the frameworks to support this.
  - c) A willingness to work with what is unknown and to accept that there is no one perfect solution or answer. To ask 'what if' rather than state 'what is'.
  - d) An understanding of current perceptions of how success, failure and risk appetites can impede progress.
  - e) The development of values-based decision making and governance.

- f) Skills development, communication and education.

### **Public Information**

- 23) The provision of real time information to both internal and external parties in an emergency is facing huge pressure given the number of digital social mediums now available within the public environment. In disaster management public information systems must consist of the processes, procedures, and systems to communicate timely, accurate, and accessible information on the incident's cause, size, and current situation to the public, responders and additional stakeholders (both directly affected and indirectly affected). Public information must be coordinated and integrated across jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations; among National, Regional and, Local governments; and with NGOs and the private sector. Well-developed public information, education strategies, and communications plans help to ensure that lifesaving measures, evacuation routes, threat and alert systems, and other public safety information are coordinated and communicated to numerous audiences in a timely and consistent manner.
- 24) Information communications strategies and planning is essential to all aspects of public information. Plans should include processes, protocols, and procedures that require the development of draft news releases; media lists; and contact information for elected/appointed officials, community leaders, private-sector organizations, and public service organizations to facilitate the dissemination of accurate, consistent, accessible, and timely public information. Public information communications should be a critical component of training and exercises – along with the public knowing which social media outlets are to be used and relied on.
- 25) One of the major concerns with the current strategies in the management of extended emergency incidents - is the lack of preparation and training in communications for those affected at a local, regional and national level. One key recommendations in this review must include a focus on the important role of communication within and external to - the Incident Management Team structure and that adequate training and ongoing training simulations are undertaken and that it is included as one of Government's key performance indicators.

### **Coordination**

- 26) Macro coordination of the management of incident(s) is primarily concerned with the systematic acquisition and application of resources in accordance with the requirements imposed by the hazard or impact of an emergency. Usually this function is carried out by an identified lead agency.
- 27) In the event of a major disaster or in situations where there are a number of incidents all competing for critical resources, there is a need for the coordination of 'whole of government' support - at one or more levels. Such circumstances would normally require the

implementation of coordination arrangements in accordance with identified legislation, plans and procedures.

- 28) An urgent need exists for the development of a National Emergency Coordination Framework to ensure a common high-level coordination of emergency assistance and resources for major emergencies – including disasters and dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks.
- 29) This propose Framework needs to:
- a) Have a strategic coordination function. (It is not intended to operate at the level of incident operations. It is not about control nor is it intended to replace incident management systems used by individual jurisdictions or agencies.)
  - b) Facilitate cooperation between National, Regional and Local Governments by providing a commonly understood framework and standard terminologies which will simplify coordination and promote inter-operability.
  - c) Strengthens information flow between functional areas at all levels - in order to build a rapid and effective appreciation by everyone - of any given situation.

#### **Relationship to Incident Management Systems**

- 30) A Coordination *Framework* should be established to support the “Blue Book” work developed by the lead Government agencies in New Zealand in 1998 where agreement was reached to adopt the ***New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS)*** for the management of incidents. The First Edition Blue Book should not be confused with the Second Edition CIMS book released in 2014.
- 31) The CIMS 1998 Blue Book clearly define roles and responsibilities for command, control and coordination of resources at incidents and emergencies.
- 32) The 1998 CIMS blue book has four common functions, these are:
- a) Control
  - b) Operations
  - c) Planning
  - d) Logistics
- 33) The four functions form the basis of a comprehensive incident management system that incorporates command and control. A key recommendation in this submission is to rename the 1998 CIMS Blue book the NZICS Blue Book and amend the CIMS reference, wherever it appears, to New Zealand Incident Control System (NZICS)
- 34) In incident management the term ‘*operations*’ means the management of all *activities that are undertaken directly to resolve the incident and management of all resources directly assigned to the incident*. Therefore, in this coordination framework there is no operations function.

**A more detailed look at a Strategic Coordination Framework**

35) A national emergency coordination framework should be a common high level framework that supports a Government endorsed *Model Arrangements for Leadership during Emergencies of National Consequence* for the strategic coordination of assistance and resources in the event of a major emergency or catastrophic disaster. For the coordination above the Incident Management Team(s) (IMT) the following coordination structure provides support to the IMT(s) (Figure 1).




Figure 1 The Response Coordination Model

36) The strategic coordination *Framework* reflects the common functional areas;

Coordination
Planning
Logistics
Investigation
Intelligence
Public Information/Media

37) The Framework:

- a) Operates within the arrangements, structures and legislative frameworks at the national level.

- b) Is flexible and adaptable according to the scale and complexity of an event and provides a structure and process for delegation to ensure that all vital management and information functions are adequately performed.
- c) Supports the coordination of resources, information and agencies during a major event or multiple incidents.
- d) Operates at the coordination level, not in the incident management environment (Figure 2).





Figure 2

### National Coordination Incident Management System

38) The establishment of a New Zealand National Coordination Incident Management System (NZCIMS) is recommended. It should involve a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector - to work together efficiently and effectively in relation to incidents involving all threats and hazards—regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity—in order to reduce loss of life, property and harm to the environment. To manage the elements associated with NZCIMS would require the establishment of a National Integration Centre (NIC) which would be an independent body to administer NZCIMS and become the owner of the National Preparedness System. NIC could sit as a function within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

39) The NZICS would provide the essential foundation to the National Preparedness System (NPS) and provides the template for the management of incidents and operations in support of all emergency management functions. Outlined below is an overview of the suggested coordination framework.



40) The purpose of the NZNIMS is to provide a common approach for the coordination and management of incidents. The NIC would provide for a flexible but standardized set of incident management practices with emphasis on common principles, a consistent approach to operational structures and supporting mechanisms, and an integrated approach to resource management.

41) Incidents typically begin and end locally, and they are managed daily at the closest possible geographical, organizational, and jurisdictional level. There are other instances where success depends on the involvement of multiple jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and/or emergency-responder disciplines. These instances necessitate effective and efficient coordination across this broad spectrum of organizations and activities. By using NZNIMS, communities would be part of a comprehensive and predictable national approach that would improve the effectiveness outcomes of emergency management and response personnel dealing with the full spectrum of potential threats and hazards (including natural hazards and disasters caused by human error or ill intent) regardless of their size or complexity.

42) A further development of NZNIMS could include;

- a) NZNIMS Doctrine Supporting Guide & Tools: This would involve the NIC developing guides and other tools to assist different jurisdictions in their implementation of the NZ National Incident Management System (NZNIMS).

- b) Training: The NZNIMS Training Programme would develop the national NZNIMS training programme for all agencies. It would outline the NIG stakeholder responsibilities and activities and the plan for developing, maintaining and sustaining NZNIMS training.
- c) Resource Management & Mutual Aid: Effective resource management is founded on the guiding principles of the NZNIMS. National resource management efforts across all five mission areas (Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery).
- d) Implementation Guidance & Reporting: National, regional and local agencies would be required to adopt NZNIMS as a condition of receiving preparedness and response grants.
- e) NZNIMS Alerts: The NIC would establish and maintain a 'whole of Government' - natural disaster communication system that would be used by lead agencies to announce regional alert status levels and the distribution of NZNIMS Alerts. This communication system would be used by NIC for the release of new NIMS guides, tools, and other resources.
- f) Incident Management System Resources: The New Zealand Incident Control System (NZICS) is a fundamental element of incident management. The use of NZICS will provide standardization through consistent terminology and established organizational structures.

## Recommendations

- 43) The following recommendations are submitted for consideration by the Ministerial Review for 'Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies';
- a) That a New Zealand National Coordination Incident Management System (NZCIMS) is established;
  - b) Renaming the 1998 CIMS Blue book the NZICS Blue Book and amend the CIMS reference wherever it appears to New Zealand Incident Control System (NZICS).
  - c) That a National Integration Centre be established - with an independent body to administer NZCIMS and become 'the owner' of the National Preparedness System.
  - d) That a National Integration Centre be charged with;
    - 1) Developing an internal and external communication information solution which meet the needs of Government's at a national, regional and local levels along with the private sector, communities and citizens.
    - 2) Developing, publishing and auditing - National Coordination Standards.
    - 3) Providing grants to emergency management entities for the delivery of external coordination training and special communication projects.



- 4) Providing for a media/emergency digital information coordination solution for lead agency emergency alerts.
- 5) Providing preparedness and response grants to eligible entities in support on the NIC functions.
- 6) Ensuring greater involvement of communities in the risk management process through meaningful engagement and development of user-friendly tools that enable them to more fully participate in decision making.
- 7) Improving the organizational culture around the management of risk across public and private sectors through transformative and change management processes – in particular, the restructuring of organizational systems – where required to allow for better collaboration and flexibility to support this. In addition, to ensure that any organizational change proposals in agencies involved in responding are reviewed for the impact of any recommended organizational changes or any other restructuring that could negatively impact on their ability to meet the 'National Coordination Standards'.
- 8) Increasing collaboration across public/private organizations and communities.
- 9) Working towards an integrated approach to all hazards.
- 10) Through regional and local governments engaging with communities and private industry and identifying their needs (what is important to them) in relation to natural hazards.
- 11) Educating and building risk literacy, particularly with children.
- 12) Standardizing aspects of language and developing common definitions and understandings across the Emergency Management Systems.
- 13) Developing better ways to support long-term actions that are sustainable in the face of short term thinking and political cycles.
- 14) Improving understanding and use of data.
- 15) Developing of tools to support decision making.
- 16) Future Proofing - understanding the future better – to maximize opportunities and minimize threats of technology, the environment and resources - including people.
- 17) Improving resource allocation and management through better identification of existing resources, reduction of duplication, pooling of resources and coming up with strategies that support collaborative sharing of resources.
- 18) Encouraging community-led activities and improve risk awareness in this area.

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please  
visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Alan Thompson
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):  As forwarded by separate email on 29th June.  I agree to the conditions of submitting as below.  Signed  Alan Thompson Lower Hutt

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

## Ministerial Review: Better response to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

### Written Submission

**Name:**

Alan Thompson

**Wish to be Heard in Support of this Submission:**

I would have preferred to be heard in support of this submission but I am holidaying overseas during July, being the period that has been allocated for oral submissions. As I will be in remote wilderness areas in Alaska it will not even be practical for me to request a teleconference link so as to be heard.

I will however be able to access my email on a reasonably regular basis and can therefore reply to any questions that may apply to my submission.

**Contact Details:**

s9(2)(a)

[Redacted contact details]

### 1. Introduction

It may assist the Committee to have a brief overview of my background and experience as it relates to this review:

- Voluntary member of the Lower Hutt Civil Defence team over the period 1986 -2014
- Rural Firefighter (Vol) for 20 years.
- Deployed to major wildfires in the Lower North Island as a member of the IMT.
- Deployed to Wildfires in Victoria in 2006, 2007 and 2009 (Black Saturday) as the leader of the NZ firefighting contingent. I was attached to the IC at the fires acting as the Liaison Officer in what were "multi-agency" responses involving over a 300 personnel.
- Deployed to the USA as leader of the NZ Firefighting contingent sent to California in 2008. I was attached to the IC at the major fires acting as the Liaison Officer in what

were “multi-agency” responses. The largest of the fires involved over a 1000 personnel at the incident with many hundreds more at supporting coordination centres.

- Wrote the National Rural Fire Authorities (NRFA) “Green” handbook on Rural Fire Management.
- Designed and set up the NRFA’s National Incident Management Teams and acted as team leader for the first 5 years.
- Member of NZ Land Search and Rescue for 6 years.
- Deployed to ChCh in the wake of the major earthquake as a member of the SAR IMT.
- Made a submission to the Pike River Inquiry and was quoted in the final report.
- Made representations to the Ministry of CD&EM at the time they led the review of the CIMS “Blue Book”.

## 2. Terms of Reference

I would first like to comment of the terms of Reference for this review.

### Purpose

It is stated that the purpose is “to ensure that NZ’s emergency response framework is world leading”. I suggest to the Committee that you have accepted and impossible and unrealistic task:

- 2.1. You have no way to determine or indeed the criteria of what qualifies as “world leading”;
- 2.2. You have no way to make an assessment of whether (then) NZ is a “world leader”;
- 2.3. This matter should not be some sort of international competition to be the best, we need an approach of “meeting our needs” and “fit for purpose”.

I suggest that the “Purpose” is quite adequately stated in the first paragraph and the last sentence of the 2<sup>nd</sup> para.

### Context

In the footnote, a list of “events” or “emergencies” is set out. This list identifies the Port Hills fire and states that Selwyn District Council was the Lead Agency.

I believe that it is relevant for the Committee to note that the Port Hill fire was actually two fires. The first was in Early Road and Selwyn DC was the lead. There was however a second fire up on Summit Road and the Dept of Conservation was the Lead Agency for this fire. Yes, the two fires did eventually join up but they were two fires and involved two separate agencies as the Lead until sometime after that happened.

This is relevant (rather than pedantic) because it adds a further dimension (a 4<sup>th</sup> agency) to the complex issues around multi-agency incident management. Ie, the Port Hills involved management input from Selwyn DC, the NZ Fire Service and DOC with respect

to the fire fighting and liaison with other agencies.

### 3. Submission

- 3.1. I intend to only make a submission with respect to Outcome 4 as set out in the Terms of Reference. This outcome relates to chain of command and control, coordination and decision making. These are areas where I have some national and international experience of and some expertise with respect to the subject matter – the NZ Co-Ordinated Incident Management System (CIMS). CIMS sets out a framework for incident management (single and multiple) and prescribes how Command (vertical) and Control (horizontal) is implemented and managed.
- 3.2. CIMS was introduced into NZ as a joint initiative of all of the emergency services as they recognised that a common and co-ordinated response was required to incidents and in particular, where those incidents required a multi-agency response.
- 3.3. NZ CIMS Ver I was modelled on the very success California system – Incident Command System (ICS). The principles of California’s ICS had already been adopted by all of the States of the USA in their National Inter-Agency Incident Management System (NIMS). The response sections of NIMS are titled “ICS” with the rest of the NIMS manual prescribing the broader framework of emergency management and the structured layers of local, regional and national implementations.

Australia also modelled their AIIMS (Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System) on California’s ICS. Their manual focuses entirely on the local level of incident management and does not currently address management of multiple incidents at a local, regional or state level.

There is a very high degree of compatibility between CIMS Ver I, AIIMS and ICS and this has been a significant factor in the agreement signed between the parties and the exchange of rural fire incident management personnel over the last 20 years or so.

- 3.4. The National Rural Fire Authority were champions of ICS, AIIMS and NIIMS as rural fire teams deployed to the USA and Australia had been working with the model and had recognised the excellence of the system and applicability to NZ. The NRFA took a lead role in the formulation of CIMS and its adoption in NZ.
- 3.5. Whilst Rural Fire adopted and became proficient in CIMS Ver I, AIIMS and ICS from these regular deployments to major wildfire events (eg Victoria’s Black Saturday Fires) I believe that it is fair to say that other emergency services struggled to understand the incident management system. Accordingly, they failed to develop any reasonable level of proficiency in the system.

- 3.6. This was evidenced in the significant failure such incidents CTV Building collapse in the Canterbury Earthquake and Pike River. The Coroner's Inquest into the CTV collapse and the Commission of Inquiry into Pike River were both highly critical of the many failures of the emergency services with respect to the management of these incidents.

My own submission to the Pike River Commission identified failures by NZ Police at almost every level of their management of the incident in accordance with the CIMS model. Reference to my submission was included in the report of the Commission.

In an opening statement to the Coroner, the NZ Fire Service conceded to the CTV Coronial that they got it wrong and had failed to establish incident control in accordance with the CIMS model (or indeed any model).

Lives were lost at Pike River and CTV and whilst it can never be known that any were the direct consequence of the failings around incident management it was a "wake up" call with respect to the wider emergency services sector getting their act together regarding CIMS.

- 3.7. The culmination of the many incident management level failures in these major multi-agency events resulted in a number of recommendations with regard to CIMS resulting from the inquiries in o:
- The Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy;
  - The Independent Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake;
  - The Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission;
  - The Independent Review of Maritime New Zealand's Response to the MV Rena Incident on 5 October 2011; and
  - The CTV Building Coronial Inquest (22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake).

These included recommendations around the development of further plans for such events and additional training for managers. One of the key recommendations of the CTV collapse was also to review CIMS:

*"The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management give consideration to amending the CIMS model to provide for the situation where there are multiple sub-incidents, it is a role of the overall Incident Controller to ensure that incident control of a sub-incident has been determined".*

- 3.8. My submission is that the work that the Ministry of CD&EM subsequently undertook in a lead role to develop CIMS Version II:

- demonstrated that they failed to understand the principles of CIMS Ver I (ie the principles of ICS/NIMS and AIIMS);
- resulted in a seriously flawed model of CIMS being introduced and one that no longer was consistent with the international principles of ICS/NIMS in spite of it being one of the goals of the review;
- created a legacy for emergency services where confusion and uncertainty now exists with respect to inter-agency liaison and the principles around the Command and Control (Co-ordination) of major incidents; and that
- this legacy is at the root cause of the many failures at the local, regional and national level that have occurred at recent major events such as the Port Hills and Kaikoura.

3.9. In accordance with the US and Australian models, NZ CIMS (Ver 1) set out the principles of incident management for an incident. All three systems specified that there was one (and only one) Incident Controller (IC) who was responsible for Command and Control who is appointed by the Lead Agency or by agreement between Agencies. The IC is solely responsible to the Lead Agency(s) for the management of the incident and the decisions with respect to Objectives, Strategy, Planning and Operations.

3.10. CIMS (Ver 1) devoted only one page to how multiple incidents should be managed. What was prescribed was however (in accordance with ICS/NIMS) was a Response Coordination level (above the Incident level) for major, complex or multiple incidents. As in ICS/NIMS response coordination:

- a. is a co-ordination function and is led by a Response Coordinator (ie not a Controller);
- b. has all of the functions of an Incident Management Team (IMT) but had no Operations Section. Ie, Operations are only undertaken at the Incident level;
- c. as per the ICS/NIMS, CIMS Ver I set out that the response coordination level was “primarily concerned with the systematic acquisition and prioritisation of resources” and therefore had no role in incident Command/Control.

It is very important to understand this fundamental principle of CIMS Ver I and its equivalent systems - AIIMS and ICS/NIMS.

3.11 I submit that it is apparent that the failings of recent events in NZ at the “inter-agency” level is a consequence of:

- a. A general lack of understanding (outside or the rural fire sector) of the principles and implementation of a CIMS incident management model;
- b. The flaws introduced into CIMS Ver II by the Ministry of CD&EM (as Leader of the review of CIMS Ver I) and approved by ODESC in April 2014. These flaws relate to the principles of managing multiple, large or complex incidents and

directly track to issues that the Review Committee is now considering.

3.12. I will summarise as below where I believe that CIMS Version II has gone “off the rails”. This is a reasonably complex subject matter and I will attempt to keep make my points by identifying some of the key flaws in CIMS Version II. I have further set out in an appendix some more examples of CIMS Version II and where it strays from the proven and internationally accepted principles of ICS/NIMS, AIIIMS and CIMS Version I.

3.13. One and Only One Controller

ICS/NIMS, AIIIMS and CIMS Version I all specified a single “Controller”. This is the Incident Controller (IC). The IC is the person at the incident location who is responsible for the management of the response. At no other levels above the incident is there any “Controller” function or role and an incident is never remotely managed.

The significant failures of the Police management of Pike River were largely caused by levels of incident management at the Mine Entrance, at Greymouth and in Wellington. As found by the Commission of Inquiry, information, situation, planning and operations all became hopelessly paralysed by the long and convoluted “chain of command” stretching from the wilderness of the mine, to the West Coast, up to Wellington and back again.

CIMS Version II is unique internationally in prescribing that there can be multiple level of Controller who are “coordination response personnel” and this is a seriously flawed approach. Eg, on P16 of the CIMS Ver II manual it is stated that *“Likewise an Incident Controller may coordinate small teams, while a Regional or National Controller may coordinate the activities of thousands of response personnel”*.

As per the international standard, there is only one position that coordinates (manages) personnel who are engaged in a response to an incident and that is the Incident Controller. The levels above the Incident are roles of response coordination around planning and logistics. These higher levels have no role in the coordination of “thousands of response personnel” as stated in CIMS Ver II.

**Consequence:**

The concept of having multiple levels of Controllers is simply absurd and is not found in any other international system. This seriously flawed model will:

- Create confusion at every level – exactly who is in control when there are (say) three levels of control? Whose plan is each Controller working to? Are these plans consistent?



- Create serious delays in making plans and getting decisions. This was a significant failing of Police at Pike River where they had three levels of incident management including one (the highest level) in Wellington. Confusion, inaction and failure at the Mine incident site resulted from the multiple levels of decision making and the delays in the process.
- Whilst higher level of response are involving themselves in the detail of “control” activities they are not able to operate effectively and responsively to the “bigger picture” issues. This results in the sorts of failures that occurred at Port Hills around dealing with governance, information, welfare, advanced planning, etc.

### 3.14. IC Direct Reports

As the figure below shows, CIMS Version 2 adds the roles of Response Manager, Technical Expert(s), Risk, Intelligence Manager, PIM Manager and Welfare Manager to the IC’s direct reports. This same section then rather curiously goes on to say that these functions should “*arranged in a way that supports a manageable span of control, which is normally two to seven*”.



- a. The diagram indicates that the IC may have up to nine direct reports if there is only one “Technical Expert and one “Risk” person. If there were several Technical Experts and several Risk personnel the direct reports could be in the order of 8-14 persons. It is not clear how nine functional roles can be “arranged” so that the IC only has 2-7 reports. This is a serious flaw in the CIMS Ver II model.

**Consequence:** IC exceeds their span of control, become seriously overloaded and are unable to focus on the higher strategic and governance level of their role.

- b. CIMS Version I, AIIMS and ICS/NIMS all include a Deputy IC role to assist and share delegated workload with the IC. This is referred to in CIMS Ver II’s

Response Manager's role description along with other vaguely stated responsibilities. The question is, and given the stated goal for CIMS of retaining international consistency, why unnecessarily introduce a new and inconsistent term such as Response Manager?

**Consequence:** In a major incident an IC needs a Deputy that:

- can have IC responsibilities delegated to them
- can step up to be Acting IC when the IC needs a break or is otherwise absent
- act as a sounding board
- enable the IC to focus on the high level strategic stuff
- is in training to become an fully qualified IC.

- c. Assigning "Technical Experts" as a direct report to the IC is a seriously flawed approach and is not included in ICS/NIMS or AIMS. If technical experts are required they should be assigned to Planning and to Operations where their skills would be required during the planning phase and the operations shifts. They are always available to the IC as required without taking up the ICs time in the management and supervision of these people.

**Consequence:** IC exceeds their span of control, become seriously overloaded and are unable to focus on the higher strategic and governance level of their role. ICs (at major incidents) rarely attend planning or strategy sessions and the Technical Experts need to be with and report directly to the managers who are doing planning and operations. When the IC attends the IAP sign off meeting all they need to be concerned about is the question (to all managers, Liaison, Technical Experts, etc) "Do you support the Plan?".

### 3.15 Multiple Incident Control Points (ICPs).

A fundamental principle of CIMS Ver I, AIMS and ICS/NIMS is that an incident has one control point (an ICP). This is of course a fairly obvious concept, ie, you can't have multiple locations assigned to control an incident. However, the Ministry of CD&EM advised in their re-write of CIMS that:

***"Several ICPs can be established when a response is required at various or dispersed sites. In such cases each ICP has an Incident Controller. ICPs can be supported, coordinated or directed by higher level response if required".*** (Ref Page 13, CIMS Ver II Manual).

Unlike Version II which suggests that there may be several ICPs, CIMS Ver I, ICS/NIMS and AIMS are all quite clear that it is one ICP and one Incident Controller per Incident (or Incident Complex). Eg:

**"An ICP is established for each Incident or for an Incident Complex (multiple**

### incidents managed by one IC /IMT).”

Furthermore:

- Response is not “required at various and dispersed sites”. Response is required to an “Incident”. There is no definition of a “site” and this term means nothing in the context of CIMS (refer Definition of Terms) or indeed CIMS Version I, ICS/NIMS or AIIIMS. One of the key objectives of all of these three systems is to have “Common Terminology”. The Ministry has created in CIMS Version II a system that is riddled with inconsistency and vague undefined terminology such as “site”.
- It is not the “ICPs” that are “supported, coordinated or directed by higher level response” but it is the IC and the IMT who are “coordinated” by a response coordination level. Again vague and undefined terms such as “supported” and/or “directed” have no place in CIMS language. The response coordination level would never “direct” an IC/IMT, their role is always one of coordination”.

**Consequence:** The Ministry of CD&EM have created a confused and contradictory model unique to NZ that does not deliver a clearly defined framework for decision making. The language of the manual is verbose and difficult to understand.

Incident Controllers are not uniquely empowered to manage their incidents. Support by local, regional and national response coordination is confused and includes too many “Controller” layers when the higher levels of local, regional and national involvement should be “coordination”.

#### 3.16 Coordination centres

CIMS Revision II, Page 21 states:

*“A coordination centre (CC) is where the Controller and IMT manage their response from. It needs to be large enough to accommodate all the personnel, equipment, and facilities required to effectively manage the Controller’s response element. The CC may be as small as a single vehicle or desk, or as large as an entire building with dozens of personnel. There are four types of CC:*

- *Incident Control Point (ICP) is an incident level CC. There is only one ICP at an incident level response site; separate ICPs may be established at other response sites.*
- *Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs) are local level CCs*

- *Emergency Coordination Centres (ECCs) are regional level CCs, and*
  - *National Coordination Centres (NCCs) are national level CCs.”*
- a. A very confused and contradictory description of what is a simple and fundamental principle of CIMS Ver 1, AIIMS and ICS/NIMS – “An Incident is managed by the IC and the IMT from the Incident Control Point (ICP)”.
  - b. An ICP is not a coordination centre (CC), it is a Control Point as stated in the name. Ditto, EOCs are operations centres.
  - c. Again we have the use of this unknown and undefined term “response site(s)”.
  - d. “It needs to be large enough to accommodate all personnel, equipment and facilities to.....”. Unnecessary and verbose!
  - e. “...required to effectively manage the Controller’s response element”. What on earth is this statement about?

### 3.17. Incident Action Plan

The changes introduced by the Ministry with respect to the Incident Action Plan (IAP) are of particular concern. The confused and impossible scenarios that they prescribe for “multiple Action Plans” are very revealing in terms of a demonstrated lack of understanding of the proven principles of incident management as set out in CIMS Ver I, AIIMS and ICS/NIMS.

I have set out just a few quotations from CIMS Ver II as follows that show that seriously flawed concepts now built into the NZ system. Given the critical importance of the planning and the IAP I suggest it is easy to see how confusion, frustration and errors will result from the multi levels of Controller and Incident Plans. It is not surprising then that failures such as those being addressed by the review committee have occurred.

Quotations from CIMS Ver II:

***CIMS Ver II: “In more complex incidents, there are likely to be multiple Action Plans, with each response element having their own. This range of Action Plans may develop in one of two ways, bottom-up and top-down”.***

Comment: As previously advised in my introduction I have been deployed leading NZ responses to major wildfire events in Australia and the USA. These have been seriously and complex large incidents involving the response from all manner of emergency services, several thousand Fire-fighters, Police, Ambo, Military,

Welfare, Catering, Laundry, etc along with all of their equipment, vehicles, aircraft, etc. These incidents were supported by local and State level coordination centres staffed by many hundreds of additional personnel from all agencies.

Very significantly (and as prescribed in their AIIMS or ICS/NIMS) there was one and only one Incident Action Plan. It was produced twice a day, one overnight for the day shift and one during the day for the night shift. There were *not* multiple action plans and no one produced their own action plan.

***CIMS Ver II: "Ideally, the Controller verbally briefs subordinate Controllers and/or team leaders who implement the Action Plan"***

***and;***

***"Some elements of the Action Plan may be briefed by the relevant function manager (Intelligence Manager briefs on hazards, Operations Manager on tasks, Logistics Manager on Logistics), but ideally the Controller leads this brief".***

Comment: In AIIMS and ICS.NIMS the IC does not brief sub-ordinates, that is the role of the IMT managers led by the Planning Manager. The IC may attend the briefings and may say a few words to conclude the briefing but doesn't need to and shouldn't get involved in the detail of a briefing. There are many much more important matter for the IC to be focused on. The standard approach is:

1. Objectives agreed with the IC
2. Planning Manager leads the IMT in preparing to IAP for the next Operational Period. Generally the IC doesn't participate in this process.
3. A full IMT manager's meeting is held to brief the IC on the draft plan. The IC signs off the plan after polling to IMT for their "Support the Plan"
4. The plan is presented by the Planning Manager at the briefing to all personnel at the beginning of the next Operational Period. The IC (if present) will address the group. The group will disperse for detailed task briefing from the Ops Manager.

***CIMS Ver II: "Operations is responsible for amending the Action Plan and detailed task planning. Planning may need to issue an updated Action Plan (version 1.1, 1.2 etc.) where these amendments become substantial".***

Comment: Operations should not amend the Incident Action Plan other than revise tasks as the situation changes. Amendment to the plan is the responsibility of the Planning Manager in consultation with the other members of the IMT (eg, with input from the Ops Manager). The IAP is prepared and approved for a period. On larger ongoing incidents this will be for a 12 hour period and possibly a second IAP for the night if there 7X24 operations.

Plans should not be annotated Version 1.2, 1.3, etc. This is very dangerous and

risky. How would you know if you have and are working to the current plan? International best practice is a plan for a specified operational period eg “**6am – 6pm Thursday 1 June**”.

The nature of action planning is that you do not “make amendments”. The Objectives, Strategy, Taskings, Resources, etc are likely to change with every new operational period. Each plan is a complete re-write and is a new plan.

- 3.18. The CIMS Version II manual contains many more examples of confusing, contradictory and highly risky statements on emergency management. I have set out a few more examples in the appendix for those who would like to read further.
- 3.19. My submission is that these are not simply matters of minor difference or of being pedantic and resisting change. The problems that have been occurring with our response to natural disasters and other emergencies are bound up in the serious flaws that exist with our systems and specifically driven by CIMS:
- a. We have a system (CIMS Ver II) that creates a structure for failure. The lines of control are blurred, there is duplication of the powers of Control, and the planning process is confused and risky.
  - b. Higher levels of response that should be focussed on Coordination only are assigned a role/responsibility for Control. However Control belongs at the incident level and only at that level.
  - c. New Zealand CIMS has become a clumsy and confused model that defies understanding and comprehension. The verbosity, language and grammar of Version II adds to the difficulty with the new system.
  - d. Contrary to its own objectives CIMS Ver II has taken New Zealand away from what is accepted international practice, particularly with respect to Australian AIIMS and the US's ICS/NIMS.
  - e. As clearly demonstrated in the responses to disasters and emergencies over the last few years, it clearly is not working.

## Recommendations

- 3.20. The Technical Advisory Group agrees and accepts that we have lost our way with respect to our emergency management system CIMS and that this model needs to be fixed before we can address the underlying issues as evidenced by all the recent criticisms.
- 3.21. CIMS Version II is currently scheduled for a review in April 2019. In light of the significant problems with Version II, TAG should propose that this review be brought forward and undertaken as soon as possible and as a matter of urgency.
- 3.22. In leading the review of CIMS to produce Version II, the Ministry of CD&EM have created a structure that is greatly influenced by their view of the emergency services world. A review project should be led by independent practitioners who:
- Have a good understanding of emergency management and emergency management systems such as CIMS, AIIMS and ICS/NIMS.
  - Have national and international experience in emergency management of large and/or complex incidents.
  - The support of a range of Subject Matter Experts from the emergency services and other agencies. It is important however that these SMEs also understand emergency management and emergency management systems and have suitable experience.
- 3.23. The CIMS review should be tasked to return to a higher level model/framework along the lines of the Blue Book (Version I) that is generic and avoids any service or agency bias. This document can then be used by services and agencies (such as the Min of CD&EM) to write whatever system in whatever language that suits their purpose or culture – as long as it is consistent with the framework.
- 3.24. The TAG should also consider the Australian AIIMS manual and whether this can be adopted by New Zealand. AIIMS has produced a very good document and both countries should not be duplicating time, energy and effort to produce what is (or should be) the same document.
- 3.25. At the end of the day it doesn't matter much how good or bad an emergency management system is if services and agencies fail to understand it and cannot implement it quickly and effectively in the event of a disaster or emergency. The TAG should consider whether enough effort, and the right sort of effort is going into CIMS education and training.

Alan Thompson  
Lower Hutt  
29<sup>th</sup> June 2017


**Appendix A**

**Additional Examples of Issues with CIMS Version II**

From the CIMS Ver II Manual	CIMS Ver I/ICS/AIIMS	Comments
<i>“Determining the intentions of the higher levels by accessing the Governance’s objectives from a higher level Action Plan”</i>	Only one Action Plan that is prepared by the IMT and approved by the IC	The Ver II statement is difficult to understand.
<i>“Determining the required tasks. Some of these may come directly from an Action Plan, Terms of Reference or Delegation of Authority. Many will need to be deduced from the intent of Governance. Choose those that are essential to achieving the Governance intent. These essential tasks become the objectives of the response element. Some other tasks may need to be assigned to agencies in the Action Plan”</i>		The Ver II statement is difficult to understand.  The idea that you might “deduce tasks in an incident response from the intent of Governance” defies comprehension or logic.
<i>“When the response is nationally led, the lead agency NCC directs priorities, sets national objectives and manages national level coordination. Support agency NCCs maintain command of their own agency operations, ECCs maintain control of the regional level response and EOCs maintain control of the local level response (see Figure 8 on page 16), although with all levels subject to the direction of a National Controller”.</i>	The “response” is only led by an Incident Controller at the incident level.	The Ver II statement is difficult to understand.
<i>“The Action Plan is the Controller’s document, usually drafted by other personnel on the Controller’s behalf. The Controller determines intentions and sets the</i>	The only “Action Plan” is at the incident level because that is where the action takes place. It is developed, prepared and	



<p><i>objectives for the Action Plan. The Planning function supports the Controller by managing the planning process and ensuring that the Action Plan meets the Controller's intentions and objectives".</i></p>	<p>owned by the Incident Management Team and approved by the IC.</p>	
<p><i>"New Action Plans should not be developed at arbitrary periods, such as the start of a new shift. New Action Plans are only developed:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>• when the objectives in the original Action Plan are achieved</i></li> <li><i>• if the situation changes significantly and the original Action Plan objectives cannot be achieved, or</i></li> <li><i>• the objectives are changed by the Controller".</i></li> </ul>	<p>A new Incident Action Plan is usually prepared for the commencement of every new shift. This is because everything is likely to have changed over the period. New Objectives, new Tasks, different personnel and equipment, etc.</p>	<p>Completely contrary to international best practice</p>
<p><i>"From the local response level and higher, Action Plans are a team effort, with direction and oversight from the Controller".</i></p>	<p>There is only one "action plan" and this is at the incident level.</p>	
<p><i>"Determining the intentions of the higher levels by accessing the Governance's objectives from a higher level Action Plan or in a Delegation of Authority/Terms of Reference. Use these to determine what part the response element plays in the overall response".</i></p>		<p>The Ver II statement is difficult to understand.</p>

<p><i>“Intent: A formal statement that gives clear direction on a Controller’s intentions regarding a response. It is normally expressed as objectives, a concept of operations and an end state”.</i></p>	<p>No such term. The prescribed format for a planning includes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mission</li> <li>2. Objectives.</li> <li>3. Strategy (optional).</li> <li>4 Tasks.</li> <li>5. Resources available to undertake the taskings.</li> <li>6. Etc</li> </ol>	<p>A new and undesirable term introduced into Version II. There is nothing “clear” about intent and the CIMS Ver I approach is international best practice.</p>
<p><i>“When the response is nationally led, the lead agency NCC directs priorities, sets national objectives and manages national level coordination. Support agency NCCs maintain command of their own agency operations, ECCs maintain control of the regional level response and EOCs maintain control of the local level response (see Figure 8 on page 16), although with all levels subject to the direction of a National Controller”.</i></p>	<p>‘Control’ is only exercised at the incident level.</p>	<p>No response to an Incident should be nationally “led” (whatever that means).</p> <p>Coordination maybe a local, regional or national response but doesn’t include the “Control” element.</p>
<p>A Controller is required at each level of the response. Figure 16 below shows how there may be multiple Controllers within a single response.</p>  <p>Figure 16 Controllers at different levels during a response</p>	<p>The role of local and regional levels above the incident level are of “coordination” only.</p>	<p>This diagram says it all and is the main reason that CIMS Ver II is a seriously flawed model</p>

<p><i>“The Response Manager may be delegated responsibility for overseeing the detailed operation of the CC, making some decisions in the absence of the Controller, ensuring the Action Plan is implemented, and resolving internal conflicts. This frees the Controller from the details involved in operating the CC, and allows them time to think ahead. The Response Manager may represent the Controller outside of the coordination centre. Some agencies call the Response Manager a different term, such as the Chief of Staff, or Deputy Controller”.</i></p>	<p>A Deputy IC is appointed for major incidents.</p>	<p>Another level of uncertainty and confusion being quite unnecessarily introduced. A founding principle of CIMS (and AIIMS, ICS/NIMS) is “Common Terminology”. Why then introduce different terms such as “Chief of Staff” or “Response Manager” into what should be a generic document. Let any agencies own documentation or implementation of CIMS use whatever names they want (at their peril). The CIMS document should set the standard and stick to its principles.</p>
<p><i>“Technical Experts provide specialist advice on aspects of the response. Examples include scientists specialising in the hazard (such as volcanologists during a volcanic eruption), environmental experts (such as hydrologists during a flood) or industrial experts (such as mining experts during a mine incident). These experts may be assigned to Planning, Intelligence, and/or Operations, but retain a direct relationship to the Controller. They may also serve as Liaison Officers if they are members of a responding agency. In a larger response where there are is a shortage of technical experts, these experts may be centralised into an advisory group at the highest activated response level. This ensures the Controller can assign their expertise to where it will have the most effect”.</i></p>		<p>This Ver II concept completely defies any logic and cuts right across the essential “Span of Control” principle of CIMS.</p>

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Simon Fleisher (WCC Controller)
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes/No <input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
<b>C</b> s9(2)(a) [Redacted]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): I have been the Wellington City Council Primary CDEM Local Controller since November 2014. I was one of four Controllers who covered the majority of the 8-hour shifts for WCC for the 12-day EOC local activation that occurred following the Kaikoura earthquake in November 2016. On the following pages, I have documented specific feedback on items outlined in the review terms of reference. For amplification, I am also submitting a technical paper written on the WCC response.

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

①

Simon Fleisher

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

**Submission:**

① During my time as the Local Controller during the Wellington City response to the Kaikoura earthquake, whilst there were many examples of outstanding team effort and community support, there were also instances of systemic problems with many of the response efforts made, due to a combination of reasons.

② From the Scope contained within the terms of reference, there were specific issues that adversely affected the overall response operation with respect to:

- Declaration of State of Emergency, and
- Response capability and capacity

(a) Despite the severity of the incident, when we first collectively went through the MCDEM Director's Guidelines for considering a Declaration of State of Emergency, two issues arose:

- There was too much ambiguity over what did and did not merit a Declaration, and
- It was rapidly apparent that many of the people involved in the decision were adamantly opposed to a Declaration, almost as an ingrained, cultural bias.

Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand

Written Submission Form

Submission:

(b) Response Capability and Capacity  
WCC is one of the larger TAs in New Zealand and yet we struggled to populate our EOC properly throughout the 12-day activation. We did ask for support from other areas but little help was received because:

- Many other regions had already provided supplementary personnel to other affected areas in the South Island
- Again, there appeared to be a culturally-based aversion to asking for help from elsewhere - almost as if it would appear to be an admission of defeat.

As a Council, we work really hard to keep enough people trained and competent to cover all of the desks, but it is a challenge, particularly as we are all 'part-time volunteers'.

Some CIMS desk functions are relatively easy to fill as their job functions map closely to their day jobs, eg, PIM, Welfare, Ops. The desks that are difficult to fill include Controller, Logistics, Planning and Intelligence.

Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand

Written Submission Form

Submission:

③ Outcome 1

Local Government staff are dedicated and capable of providing the response necessary in the event of large natural hazards and/or other emergencies, however:

- o They are inevitably under-resourced and struggle to balance their CDEM Response roles with their day jobs.

- o The current 3-tier system does give good span of control, however, there are too many weak links, particularly at Group level. In addition, MCDEM (although very well intentioned) are very remote from local decision making and do not generally interact with local TAs.

Outcome 2

Within the Wellington region, there is a paucity of the adoption and use of appropriate protocols to enable supporting organisations to assist.

Training provision is problematic - it exists, but more training (including diversity of delivery method) is required, to bridge the gap between a small number of highly experienced CDEM professionals, and a large number of enthusiastic but part-time 'volunteers'.

Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand

Written Submission Form

Submission:

Outcome 3

My many years of military experience leads me to believe that the current system for considering a declaration of State of Emergency isn't fit for purpose in that:

- o It is far too subject to the whims and biases of the key players (in particular, Mayors and CEOs, amongst others) whose views and experience may differ wildly from that of the Controller.
- o The process needs to be more objective and less subjective. In my heart of hearts, in Wellington, we "did things right" but I'm not sure we "did the right thing" in terms of not declaring a State of Emergency.

Outcome 4

My view is that the CIMS framework works well (when used properly) but there is inconsistent buy-in and engagement with it, particularly by other agencies, when CDEM is the lead.

Lack of a common operating picture, and fragile communications (very heavily reliant on mobile telephones) are significant strategic weaknesses that have got to be addressed (and quickly).



Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand

Written Submission Form

Submission:

Outcome 5

I think CDEM is up-to-speed in this area, as the rapid and early adoption of social media and fast-changing news is already well understood and imbedded.

In summary, I am proud of WCC's CDEM capability, and am one of many people who have worked hard to improve Response capability and do the right thing for the community.

From a governance and C2 perspective, there are systemic weaknesses that need to be addressed. If not, there is a significant risk that we will all be found wanting in the event of a very large natural hazard affecting multiple regions (eg, Alpine Fault earthquake).



**A Contribution**

**How to ensure that  
New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading  
and well placed to meet future challenges.**

**Prepared for**

**Technical Advisory Group**

**Prepared by**

**John Coburn**

s9(2)(a)

**30 June 2017**

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Summary

**For New Zealand emergency response to be world leading and well placed to meet future challenges it needs to align itself with a professional operation that has vision of a future world formed from emerging technologies.**

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

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## Introduction

Recent evidence of deficiencies in New Zealand emergency response process has led to a Ministerial Review conducted by the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to advise the Minister how changes can be made to ensure New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, fit-for-purpose, and well placed to meet future challenges.

The purpose of this document is to contribute information to assist TAG in its deliberations.

In this document reference is made to the [Review of the CDEM Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake dated June 2012](#). Reference to page 200 of that review:

*"It is clear that the classical elements in emergency management of Planning Preparation Response and Recovery do need to be managed together.*

*"The structures required to manage a response should not be divorced from the other elements of emergency management."*

To best assist TAG recent response events on Waiheke Island is used as a case study.

Waiheke Island is an ideal example to study emergency response because

*"These two communities [Waiheke and Great Barrier] are potentially at highest risk from tsunami inundation in the Auckland Council jurisdiction.*

*"The Islands are also at risk from a range of other hazards including but not limited to: cyclonic storms, aircraft crashes rural or urban fire, earthquakes, loss of utility services (Waiheke), landslides and volcanic activity.*

*"The Islands have the potential to be isolated during hazard events which interrupt aviation and ferry services<sup>1</sup>*

### Case study

On 21/22 January 2016 a storm caused cancellation of ferry services stranding seventy individuals who sought shelter in Matiatia ferry building.

The storm was not a sudden unforeseen occurrence but had been forecast at least 24 hours prior to the event.

The storm caused a power outage but for unknown reasons the emergency generator in the building could not be operated thus depriving those in the building of light other than from battery driven emergency illuminated exit signs; inability to access drinking water or to flush toilets (three stalls for women; three stalls and urinals for men and one stall for those with disabilities).

In addition critical emergency medical equipment, including a defibrillator, remained inaccessible behind locked doors.

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<sup>1</sup> [GNS report dated April 2012](#)

## Examination of Response Plan preparation process

### Effective emergency warning system

July **2011** then director Auckland CDEM, Clive Manley, commissioned GNS Science to provide a feasibility study for “an effective alert system on Waiheke” (refer footnote 1)

Following a recent request for the cost of the feasibility study the background to the study was stated in [Auckland Council letter](#) 23 March 2016:

#### *“Background to project*

*Auckland Council through the Auckland Civil Defence Emergency Management Department has assessed their public alerting options for hazardous events.*

*“Previous tsunami events in the Pacific and community interest (particularly in Waiheke and Great Barrier Islands) in public alerting have highlighted the need for investment into public alerting systems in Auckland region. As a result of that Auckland Council agreed that an assessment of available alerting options was warranted.”*

Extract from a [Gulf New article](#) 18 September 2014:

*“Potential tsunami disaster areas have been mapped and although there are no warning sirens on Waiheke, the civil defence community does not think they are necessary.”* Local Board member.

The Local Board member did not suggest or deliver an alternative alerting system.

The Local Board member has no experience or training in disaster risk management.


Waiheke does not have an effective emergency warning system.

### Preparation

There is no record of an attempt to identify and reduce risk to develop a worst case scenario.

The [Waiheke Emergency Response Plan](#) remains in draft format a state it's been in since at least 9 December 2016 and for the duration of the peak holiday season.

There is no record of public education programmes; training; simulations and drill rehearsals per an example flow chart copied from an Emergency Response Procedures document of a New Zealand state-owned enterprise.



There is no record of assessment/evaluation of response planning by Council or other party.

The quality of preparations on the ground has never been independently examined.

Note the draft Plan June 2017, inter alia, fails to:

Identify Matiatia ferry building as a designated shelter;

Provide method to access critical medical equipment, including a defibrillator -  
Auckland letter 22 March 2017 (page 26 this document):

*“For many years you have expressed your concerns about preparedness for a disaster on Waiheke Island. During this time Auckland Council staff and the Mayor have assured you that the Auckland CDEM department takes planning and responding to emergencies seriously. Further to this, we are satisfied that we have investigated your concerns fully and appropriately and responded to all concerns raised. We will therefore not be looking into queries which have already been raised.”*

Medical equipment, including a defibrillator, still remain inaccessible behind locked doors

#### Relevant material

Five years earlier, December 2012, Auckland CDEM was encouraged to visit Waiheke to:

*“Familiarise Civil Defence (Shane) with the geography of Waiheke:  
Identify risk areas and identify possible shelter sites.”*

A [summary of the survey](#) was sent to Auckland CDEM 12 December 2012.

Extract page 1:

#### **Matiatia wharf [building]**

*“Water source: not known nor method of delivery i.e. by gravity feed or electric pump.  
If by pump what is the back-up?”*

*Loading ramps: raised/lowered hydraulically driven by electric motors.*

*“Power back up by generator. It is not known if generator can be used to operate ramps and terminal emergency lighting/water delivery simultaneously. This should be checked.*

*“Current Passenger evacuation plan: by vehicles to Marae; excess spread among Fullers employees” homes. Marae is 2.2 kms away. The nearest designated shelter is 1.15 kms; Mud Brick 1.6 kms; Cable Bay 2.11? The last two designed for shelter, etc. Evacuation procedures need re-thinking.”*

Note Mud Brick and Cable Bay were/are not designated shelters but the suggestion was that they should be.

Two months before the January 2016 storm Council was warned of the threat to stranded passengers but took no action. (refer page 11 this document).



## Events Waiheke Island

- Waiheke “**Fourth Best Island in the World to visit 2015**” (Traveller);
- Waiheke “**World’s Fifth Best Region to Visit 2015**” (Lonely Planet);
- Waiheke “**top 10 destinations on the rise in the South Pacific**” (Trip Advisor);
- Waiheke headland Sculpture on the Gulf “**voted 35<sup>th</sup> 100 top things to see in 2015**” (The New York Times)

### 5 December 2016

Auckland Council warned of threat to passengers stranded on Waiheke from any cause.

Warning ignored.

### 21/22 January 2017

Threat occurs: storm caused cancellation last ferry sailings Waiheke – Auckland.

70 visitors stranded overnight in ferry building.

### 29 January 2017

Hundreds of concert fans left queuing for more than an hour after failed ferry schedule.

### 2 February 2017

Council advised of events and inaccessibility of critical emergency medical equipment.

### 23 February 2017

Council advised impractical method to access critical emergency medical equipment.

### 27 February 2017

Suggested effective way to access emergency medical equipment.

### 22 March 2017

Council refuse to take action because proper channels not followed.

### June 2017

Critical medical equipment remains locked away.

Detailed correspondence covering these events included in the Appendix.

## Conclusion and Professional Input

### Failure to deliver legal requirements and professional input rejection.

The case study clearly shows Auckland CDEM has failed to deliver the Purpose of the CDEM Act 2002 and has developed a culture that rejects professional input - notably from the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) among others.

Auckland Council also fails to accept its responsibility for the safety and well-being of people in Auckland including international visitors and has no understanding of its duty to customers as a supplier of civil defence services.

Auckland confirms Waiheke is the responsibility of Auckland CDEM (page 20 this document)

### Auckland CDEM five year Group Plan 2016-2021

Not included in this document are details of an examination of Auckland CDEM Group Plan.

From the examination it is observed Auckland CDEM:

Does not understand risk or how to deal with risk and

For the next five years has no vision of taking advantage of benefits generated by developing technology e.g. the use of software driven preventative measures such as flood simulation and land-slide prediction and

Utilising the benefits of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in response and recovery.

In view of the events Waiheke January 2017 and Council comments (page 20 this document) Auckland CDEM can hardly be seen to be fit-for-purpose today.

Observation above shows Auckland CDEM is not well placed to meet future challenges.

### Professional input

In these circumstances suggest an approach should be made to the Australian and New Zealand National Council for fire, emergency services and land management (AFAC) requesting full membership.

It is understood currently Ministry CDEM is an affiliate member only while New Zealand Fire Service and Department of Conservation New Zealand are full members.

It is noted:

*“Australia’s aid programme is assisting several countries to implement the Sendai Framework including through the Philippines Disaster and Climate Risk Management Initiative, a five year programme to support integration of disaster and climate change preparedness across government systems and communities.*

*“Australia is investing some US\$30 million in climate and weather services, and in disaster and climate risk governance through UNDP’s Pacific Risk Resilience. Assistance is also being extended to Pacific island countries to tap into the Green Climate Fund. Australia also provides important donor support to UNISDR.”*

Australia is acknowledged as being one of the best disaster prepared nations in the world.

Australian state of the art warning system was demonstrated at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai City, Japan in 2015.

Dr Robert Glasser, an Australian, is head of UNISDR.

Stuart Ellis now CEO AFAC was a member of the team that authored *Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake* dated June 2012.

Stuart Ellis details are included Appendix 2 of the Review

If New Zealand Government decides to pursue a relationship with AFAC, development of a highly trained corps of volunteers is envisaged led and trained by experts in disaster risk management (somewhat along the lines of the revamped Fire and Emergency New Zealand) aware of the new world evolving from the effects of collecting/mining big data; artificial intelligence (AI); blockchain; the supercomputer; Quantum computing and more.

With exciting globally recognised brands such as the All Blacks; Emirates Team New Zealand; Weta Workshops and more, world beating creative disaster risk management promotional programmes can be visualised.

If the New Zealand Government decides to go professional with an approach to AFAC then the issues outlined in the terms of reference can be addressed.



Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**Appendix**

**Correspondence with Auckland Council**

**5 December 2016 – 7 April 2017**

John Coburn

s9(2)(a)

Please acknowledge receipt to: s9(2)(a)

5 December 2016

Mr Phil Goff  
The Mayor  
Auckland Council  
Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142 via email

Dear Mr Mayor

### Your inheritance

In my letter 1 December 2016 I identified a **“worst case risk scenario”** on Waiheke as **“when the ferries stop”**. This past weekend is best summarised by a Waiheke resident on Saturday morning, 3 December 2016:

*“What a total f... fest at Matiatia [Waiheke terminal] and Downtown [Auckland terminal] this morning. Quickcat breaks down and absolute mayhem results. From 10:30am onwards no ferries arrived as scheduled, groups due for pickup left on the wharf in Auckland. It has never been as bad as it was today. Fullers have some serious immediate issues to attend to, not sure of a solution but some 500 or 600 seat boats that don't break down would certainly help. If you want to reduce visitor numbers to this island just keep up the same old same old Fullers it's working a treat.”<sup>2</sup>*

Leaving the island Sunday 4 December 2016:



Queue for 5.00 pm ferry from Matiatia, Waiheke. Red line shows queue length. Ferry

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/groups/733295520039979/?fref=ts>

**capacity for this sailing 250 individuals. Half this queue will be unable to board.**

Reference to the Facebook page, shows residents' measure of faith in the dependability of Fuller Ferries services.

The following is an extract from "Notes" to Auckland CDEM **July 2013** (ignored):

#### **"Matiatia**

Below is an aerial shot from Matiatia Wharf to Mako Street, Oneroa.

- The car park area bounded in red becomes gridlocked at boat time in "normal" summer conditions.
- Conditions in an emergency can only be imagined
- Oceanview Road, in yellow, is 1.25 kms to Mako Street the first available turn off
- Blockage of this road from any cause would deny traffic access to/from Matiatia
- Pedestrian access to/from Matiatia by way of the south (bottom) is arduous
- Pedestrian access to/from Matiatia by way of the north is rugged and dangerous at high tide, if at all possible.
- Access either way is highly hazardous at night or in bad weather conditions.
- Difficulties of access either way accentuated for special needs individuals.



In other words visitors arriving at Matiatia but unable to leave by ferry are trapped."

In the photograph page 1, individuals in the queue are waiting patiently in good spirits.

The Mayor should not expect a similar attitude from people wanting to urgently leave Waiheke but find ferry services suspended or cancelled - from any cause.

Extract Waiheke Island Gulf News **14 February 2007**

### **Stranded passengers turn wharf into a 'war zone'**

**"It looked like something out of a war zone."**

That was how chief wharfinger Keith Anderson described the scene on the Matiatia wharf in the early hours of Sunday morning after watching security footage of the terminal where more than **100 people were stranded** after the last ferry sailed at 12.30am with a **capacity 550 passengers** aboard.

"Plumes of thick black smoke **from the bonfires** wafted across the wharf and people were running around like crazy. It was **pure chaos**," he said.

Mr Anderson's colleague Werren Stachl was the first on the scene at 6.45am Sunday morning to find the terminal "**completely trashed**".

The Prime Minister as Minister for Tourism; Ateed (Auckland Tourism, Events and Economic Development); Auckland CDEM; Waiheke Local Boards are aware of this scenario and have done nothing to address the issues.

Continually, visitors are encouraged to visit Waiheke Island when authorities at all levels know the area is not properly prepared for visitors' safety and well-being - even without the occurrence of a natural event.


Respectfully the Mayor is reminded of the impending event 27 January 2017 to 19 Feb 2017: headland (sic) Sculpture on the Gulf with a reported attendance of 55,000 individuals on the last occasion.

Anecdotal evidence indicated the majority of attendees were day tripper visitors i.e. not prepared for overnight or longer stay.

The Waiheke Response Plan 2015 does not address these issues

The Mayor will recall in 2014, an office focused Auckland CDEM, self- assessed its capability as 89.5%, that is within the highest category possible while Ministry CDEM assessed Auckland CDEM at 75.5%

Yours sincerely



**Copies:** the Prime Minister and others



21 December 2016

John Coburn

s9(2)(a)



Dear Mr Coburn,

Thank you for your recent letters to the Mayor dated 1 December, 5 December, 15 December and 20 December 2016. The Mayor has asked me to respond to these operational issues.

Auckland Council were very pleased with Dr Bonner's assessment of the former Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Group Plan 2011 – 2016. We were not advised in advance of Dr Bonner conducting his assessment so it was great to read his expert conclusions for Auckland. We have built on the plan and discussed directly with Dr Bonner areas of best practice and approach from his worldwide studies to consider over development of the new Group Plan.

Our CDEM Group committee recently adopted our new Group Plan which, as the previous one did, sets out our 5 year strategic direction. The Group Plan highlights the issues and challenges Auckland faces in building resilience to disasters. If you would like to read our new Group Plan please go to the Auckland CDEM website ([aucklandcivildefence.org.nz](http://aucklandcivildefence.org.nz)).

The Group Plan outlines how we will measure our progress in addition to the national monitoring and evaluation programme which includes the capability assessment tool. We were pleased with our national capability assessment score of 75.5% in 2014; although we are always looking to continually improve which I am confident will be acknowledged in the next assessment of Auckland's CDEM capability.

I am satisfied with the measures my Director of Civil Defence and Emergency Management has in place to monitor and evaluate the success of the Auckland CDEM work programmes and their level of professionalism and partnerships with relevant agencies and organisations.

The CDEM department are always open to receiving useful feedback that contributes to our effective CDEM activities across the Auckland region.

Some of the issues that you have raised in your letter dated 5 December, while safety related, are the responsibility of Auckland Transport. Below is their response to your concerns.

*There are three commercial ferry operations to the island from the mainland: Fullers into Matiatia; Sealink into Kennedy Point; and 360 Discovery into Orapui. Should an issue happen on the island then these three AT owned assets would be available for use (subject to condition).*

*The crowding etc. recently witnessed at Matiatia have been as a result of significant service delivery issues which operators have unfortunately experienced, plus continued demand to travel to and from the island. There have been regular daily occurrences of multiple vessels being out of service due to mechanical breakdown, including the two largest boats within the Fullers' fleet. This not only results in services being unable to be delivered, but has also resulted in smaller vessels being allocated to services which has resulted in full boats being experienced or customers being left behind at wharves.*

135 Albert Street | Private Bag 92300, Auckland 1142 | [aucklandcouncil.govt.nz](http://aucklandcouncil.govt.nz) | Ph 09 301 0101



As for plans for the future – there is a piece of work which the Local Board is delivering (I believe) called the Matiatia Plan. Apart from that, the only thing which we (AT Ferry Services) has lined up is around a slight refresh of the facility in the next 12 months which will include a review and assessment of queue management.

Also, early next year AT Metro will be looking to extend the scope of the AT Operations Centre to play a greater surveillance role over ferry assets.

Yours sincerely



Stephen Town  
Chief Executive

**Note:**

1. Dr Bonner is from a Canadian firm (whose professionalism is not questioned) specializing in risk management and public relations and media training services that had never visited New Zealand or Auckland.
2. Safety is the responsibility of Auckland Council per CDEM Act 2002
3. Other letters in December mentioned in CE's letter advise the newly elected Mayor Phil Goff the lack of tsunami response; lack of designated shelter capacity on Waiheke, etc. etc.
4. The letters were written at a time Waiheke anticipated record numbers of visitor arrivals generated by the continuing effects of unprecedented global promotion 2015/16; the headland (sic) Sculpture on the Gulf; the Easter Festival of Jazz and concerns about the reliability of ferries - JC.

John Coburn

s9(2)(a)

Please acknowledge receipt to: s9(2)(a)

2 February 2017

Mr Phil Goff  
The Mayor  
Auckland Council  
Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142 via email

Dear Mr Mayor

In previous correspondence I advised the Mayor of current real risk scenarios on Waiheke Island.

The advice was especially relevant because of an anticipated increase in visitor numbers this year attending the biennial event: the headland Sculpture on the Gulf Exhibition.<sup>3</sup>

Stephen Town, Chief Executive Auckland Council, responding in his letter 21 December 2016 negligently chose to ignore the advice.

**Storm weekend 21/22 January 2017**<sup>4</sup>

- Fuller's [ferries] was forced to cancel its last two sailings from Auckland;
- 10.15pm departure from Auckland had to turn back with 60 people on board;
- Finding accommodation for passengers trapped at both ends proved a logistical challenge;
- Hitting the phones, Matiatia terminal manager Shelly Wood and local police joined forces to find beds for about 40 people;
- About 30 more people faced a miserable night in the terminal until the Red Cross blankets arrived;
- Some of them had come from wedding parties and they weren't dressed to spend a night in a cold terminal.<sup>5</sup>

I understand, inter alia:

- a) Toilets could be used but not flushed because of the power failure
- b) Emergency lighting only was available.
- c) The medical area containing the defibrillator and other emergency medical supplies could not be opened because of restricted key access.
- d) No wharfinger on duty

<sup>3</sup> Voted 35th in The New York Times 100 top things to see in 2015

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.waihekegulfnews.co.nz/storm-strands-passengers/>

<sup>5</sup> Note Refer my letter to the Mayor 5 December 2016

## My Pretties Concert 29<sup>th</sup> January 2017.<sup>6</sup>

- Fly My Pretties concert-goers were left dismayed after a late-night [Fullers] ferry timetable mishap left them temporarily stranded on Auckland's Waiheke Island;
- Hundreds of fans were left queuing for more than an hour after a scheduled Fullers ferry failed to collect them for the trip back to Auckland at 9.45pm;
- The crowd were dropped at the dock by bus after the concert;
- One concert goer said the waiting crowd were (sic) becoming "quite an angry mob"<sup>4</sup> with many people intoxicated at the all-ages event;
- Many of the crowd waiting were dressed for a summer's day in singlets or sun dresses and really got cold<sup>4</sup>;
- She said concern was growing that not everyone would fit on the remaining ferry sailings;
- Families had been left stranded in the cold as long queues stretched from the ferry terminal;
- There were probably about 1000 people waiting for a ferry;
- It was understood that the scheduled ferry due about 9.45pm had departed early, and the next one was not due until 11.15pm;
- The woman's concert tickets included return ferry travel from Auckland to Waiheke;
- There were people with kids. It was an all-ages show.

I understand, inter alia:

- a) The medical area containing the defibrillator and other emergency medical supplies could not be opened because of restricted key access
- b) No wharfinger on duty

I understand the rate of quasi-heart/heart attacks increase during times of stress.

I understand in "normal times" queues up to 30 women can form to use Matiatia toilets.

The Mayor should note there were no reviews after the occurrences; no lesson learned from the restricted key access after the first occurrence and the problem persisted to the second.

### **Delegation of CDEM management to Waiheke Local Board**

I understand Auckland CDEM has delegated disaster risk management responsibilities to Waiheke Local Board.

The Local Board has shown no interest in disaster risk management or disaster risk reduction and there is no evidence members have experience or training in this discipline.

### **Disaster risk reduction**

In October 2016 quoting Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 I requested details of the of disaster risk reduction progress on Waiheke Island.


<sup>6</sup> <http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/88881712/fly-my-pretties-concertgoers-left-stranded-on-waiheke-island-after-ferry-timetable-mishap>

I was referred to the Auckland CDEM Hazards quick reference guide and Waiheke Local Board Hazard Report.

Upon examination it is seen these documents identify certain hazards but there is no evidence of a hazard reduction or hazard elimination programme.

Clearly ACDEM does not understand or ignores the concept of disaster risk reduction (DRR)

An example of DRR is the graphic included in the Waiheke Response Plan 2015 that identifies the tsunami hazard to Waiheke.



The response plan does not include details of tsunami DRR e.g. by developing escape trails from low-lying areas etc.

### **Planning for the worst**

A basic concept to plan for the worst is not understood or ignored by ACDEM.

The concept is outlined in "Comments on the Chief Executive's Letter" attached.\*

### **Summary**

Referring to the two minor occurrences mentioned in this letter, it is not hard to imagine a risk scenario of greater scale causing serious consequences.

The summer seasonal visitor surge continues and this matter requires urgent immediate attention.

But the Chief Executive and ACDEM believe civil defence is a bureaucratic exercise: drafting Group Plans; attending conferences; delegating responsibilities; etc.

Advice of risk scenarios will continue to be ignored.

In the circumstances, respectfully, I suggest the Mayor commissions an urgent independent specialists' review into the state of preparations on-the-ground and action required to address the issue.

Yours sincerely

\* Comments not included in this file but will forward if required.



23 February 2017

John Coburn  
s9(2)(a)

AC0594-Mayor-Letterhead-2015-image

s9(2)(a)

Dear Mr Coburn

Thank you for your letter dated 2 February about various transport and civil defence related matters on Waiheke Island. I acknowledge the concerns you have raised and have responded to the matters you raise below.

#### Operational ferry matters

The Auckland Transport Operations Centre – Central (ATOC CENTRAL) is available on 09 448 7160 to provide 24-hour response for customers at the Matiatia ferry terminal. ATOC CENTRAL operators are able to provide relevant information regarding terminal access, medical facility room access, and emergency power.

The following items will be addressed and in place by the end of this month:

1. Contact signage to be installed at entrances to the terminal and the medical facility room, providing the direct dial number to an ATOC CENTRAL operator – ATOC CENTRAL 09 448 7160
2. The medical room is accessible from both inside and outside the terminal. The door locks to this facility are to be replaced with access code pads, and the ATOC CENTRAL operator will provide the access code if requested.
3. The emergency back-up generator (for the terminal) is intended to operate as an automated response in the event of general power failure. The ATOC CENTRAL operator will provide access and operating instructions required.

In the future I would recommend that you liaise directly with Auckland Transport on operations ferry matters and any other issues. Auckland Transport's customer number for both urgent and non-urgent enquiries is 09 355 3553. Their customer relations team can also be contacted on [CustomerLiaison@at.govt.nz](mailto:CustomerLiaison@at.govt.nz)

#### Civil defence matters on Waiheke Island

I have spoken to Chief Executive, Stephen Town, and Director of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, John Dragicevich, with regards to the various matters that you raise in your most recent letter.

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OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF AUCKLAND  
Auckland Council, Level 27, 135 Albert St, Auckland 1010, New Zealand  
Private Bag 92300, Wellesley St, Auckland 1142, New Zealand  
T: +64 9 301 0101

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I can assure you that the Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) department takes planning and responding to emergencies seriously.

The Auckland CDEM Group Plan, 'Resilient Auckland', does acknowledge, though, that building resilience is a collective responsibility requiring everyone from individuals and families, government both central and local, to private business and others to work together to build a resilient Auckland.

The department reports regularly to the Auckland CDEM Group Committee on its progress and also on the activities of the many partners and stakeholders involved in building resilience from across the civil defence sector in Auckland. You may wish to read the agendas and papers from these committees or even attend one of the meetings; details can be found on the [Auckland Council website](#).

With regards to CDEM on Waiheke Island I have been informed by council officers that there has been no "delegation of CDEM management" to the Waiheke Island Local Board. The management of civil defence matters as per the CDEM Act 2002 is the responsibility of the CDEM Group which in Auckland falls to the Auckland CDEM Group Committee, department and partners.

When requested, staff from Auckland CDEM do regularly attend business meetings and workshops of the Waiheke Island Local Board. Staff are always available to offer advice and assistance to local boards on civil defence matters as they look to implement programmes and projects that may help to raise levels of resilience across the region.

You will be interested to know that with regards to tsunami risk, which you identified in your letter, that a report on public alerts is due to be considered by the CDEM Group Committee on 22 February. It is expected that this report will set out the next steps required to enhance Auckland's public alerting options and network, as well as look at other important matters such as signage and community notification and awareness during emergencies. Details of this report can be found on the Auckland Council website.

Once again I thank you for raising these matters with me. If you have any other comments or for future correspondence I would encourage you to contact Anna Bird in council's customer services team by email to [customerrelationshipsteam@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz](mailto:customerrelationshipsteam@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz). Anna will be able to direct your correspondence and ensure that any concerns you may have are properly dealt with by the appropriate council department.

AC0594-N

Yours sincerely



Phil Goff  
MAYOR OF AUCKLAND

#### Notes

1. Responding to emergencies: Though these occurrences were publicised in print media Auckland would have been unaware without my correspondence. None of the issues raised have been addressed by May 2017.
2. Does acknowledge: Refer Technical Advisory Group document page 18

John Coburn

s9(2)(a)

Please acknowledge receipt to: s9(2)(a)

27 February 2017

Mr Phil Goff  
The Mayor  
Auckland Council  
Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142 via email

Dear Mr Mayor

I thank the Mayor for his courtesy in replying to my letter, 23 February 2017.

**Access emergency medical supply room Matiatia.**


Does the Mayor consider that in the real world:

during a severe storm; in minimal lighting; with telephone connection questionable;  
individuals in state of stress and caller might have limited English

telephoning for access codes to a defibrillator is an option?

It is an emergency; not a time to be inflicted with Council's bureaucratic procedures.

In an emergency; equipment needs to be accessed fast e.g.:



**Civil defence matters on Waiheke Island**

I am attaching copy letter from Council dated 2 November 2016 responding to my request for information in accordance LGOIM Act 1987 that led me to believe civil defence responsibility was delegated to Waiheke.

Responsibility on one side, page 3 of the letter refers to "work" needed to ensure defibrillator access.

It appears “work” has not been undertaken since the matter was raised **15 December 2015** leading to the situation at Matiatia **21/22 January 2017**.

Perhaps all defibrillator locations Waiheke/Auckland should be identified and ease of accessibility examined.

### **Occurrences 21/22 and 29 January 201 - Review**

The occurrences might seem trivial to those sitting in offices but it is not hard to imagine a risk scenario of greater scale causing serious consequences.

In these circumstances, in the private sector, on 23 January a brief independent review would have been ordered to “find and fix” problems to improve process.

“Monitoring and reviewing the process” is among key areas in Purpose, CDEM Act 2002<sup>7</sup> and UNISDR Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – key areas **ignored** by Council.

The Mayor was Minister for Justice in the Helen Clark Government that passed the CDEM Act into law 2002.

Will the Mayor now ensure that, after 15 years, the Act will be implemented in Auckland?

### **Writing to the Mayor**

Respectfully, I write to Council because Council is responsible for the safety and well-being of people in Auckland.

I address correspondence to the Mayor because Auckland Council has ignored key areas of disaster risk management and, in my view, Auckland is a disaster waiting to happen.

I understand, ultimately, the Mayor is accountable.

Yours sincerely



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#### **CDEM Act 2002: Purpose**

- (i) identifying, assessing, and managing risks;
- (ii) consulting and communicating about risks;
- (iii) identifying and implementing cost-effective risk reduction;
- (iv) **monitoring and reviewing the process**; provide for planning and preparation for emergencies and for response and recovery in the event of an emergency

#### **Hyogo FA: 2005 Key areas**

- (a) Governance: organizational, legal and policy frameworks;
- (b) Risk identification, assessment, monitoring and early warning;
- (c) Knowledge management and education;
- (d) Reducing underlying risk factors;
- (e) Preparedness for effective response and recovery.





2 November 2016

LGOIMA No. 8140000551  
(Please quote this in any correspondence)

John Coburn  
s9(2)(a)

Dear Mr. Coburn

**Local Government Official Information And Meetings Act 1987**  
**Waiheke Island Documentation**

I refer to your letter, which we received on 7 October 2016, concerning a request for copies of minutes from the meetings of the Waiheke Island Community Response Group and for information on hazards and risks facing the island.

I have responded to each of your questions in turn below:

1. Please forward copy minutes of meetings August and September 2016, and
2. Copy minutes of meetings September; October; November; December 2015

Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) staff do not attend the meetings of the Waiheke Island Community Response Group (CRG).

CRGs are in operation to varying degrees in different locations across Auckland. In the past, Auckland CDEM staff have attended CRG meetings where requested to do so, including to the Waiheke Island CRG.

The last meeting of the Waiheke Island group attended by Auckland CDEM staff was in December 2015. On this occasion Auckland CDEM staff volunteered to take the minutes of this meeting, a draft of which was circulated to attendees after the meeting.

Please find attached for your information a copy of the draft minutes of the December 2015 Waiheke Island CRG as requested. Please note that the names of the attendees have been withheld pursuant to s 7(2)(a) of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, in order to protect those people's privacy.

Auckland CDEM does not hold any other meeting minutes from this group, and accordingly, your request for the meeting minutes for September – November 2015, and August and September 2016, is refused pursuant to s 17(g) of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987.

3. Please forward details of the identification and analysis of long-term risks to human life and property from natural or non-natural hazards on Waiheke; and
4. Details of which risks have been eliminated or reduced in magnitude of impact or the likelihood of them occurring on Waiheke.

Please find attached two documents relevant to your request:

1. *Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management: Hazards quick reference guide*, and
2. *Waiheke Local Board Hazard Report*.

The hazards quick reference guide was published in April 2014. Its purpose was to document the main hazards (natural and man-made) facing the Auckland region. In response to feedback from a number of local boards, Auckland CDEM published a number of more locally specific hazard reports. The Waiheke Island report was published in December 2015. Links to this and other local reports can be found on the Auckland Council website at this link: [link](#).

Since these reports have been published work has been ongoing on the Auckland Council Natural Hazard Risk Management Action Plan (NHRMAP). This document, which is due to be published in 2017, is intended to be used to inform and educate Aucklanders about the risks of natural hazards; explain how the risks of natural hazards are assessed; and identify actions to be undertaken to reduce these risks and build resilience to natural hazard events. Although the NHRMAP will take a region-wide view, the document will be of relevance to the hazards and risks facing Waiheke Island, many of which are common across the region.

You may also be interested to know that Auckland CDEM has published a range of tsunami evacuation maps; including for Waiheke Island. Copies of these maps can be downloaded from the Auckland CDEM website at this link: [link](#).

If you have any further queries please contact me on s9(2)(a) [redacted] or s9(2)(a) [redacted] quoting LGOIMA No. 8140000551.

Should you believe Auckland Council has not responded appropriately to your request, you have the right by way of complaint, under section 27(3) of the LGOIMA, to apply to the Ombudsman to seek an investigation and review of the decision.

Yours sincerely



Rosemary Judd  
Privacy & LGOIMA Business Partner  
Privacy & LGOIMA

8140000551



Name of Meeting	Waiheke Community Response Meeting
Date	18 <sup>th</sup> of December 2015
Location	Waiheke Library
Attendees	§ 7(2)(a)
Apologies	§ 7(2)(a)

MINUTES

No	Action Point	Action by
1.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>§ 7(2)(a) Attended the meeting on behalf of § 7(2)(a) who was unable to attend</li> </ul>	
2.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This Group has been formed as a true representation of the Waiheke Community and will be the Waiheke Community Response Group..</li> <li>Until recent times the Waiheke Community Response Group has been made up of the Emergency Services Group on the Island. This Group will still be in place but will be referred to as the Emergency Management Committee</li> </ul>	§ 7(2)(a)
3.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Waiheke Community Response Plan was in Draft form but had not been distributed to the Community Group. So this group will be able to respond to any Emergency on the Island and be able to open up an Evacuation Centre if required a copy of the Draft plan and contact Names and Numbers were left was left with the group.</li> <li>Any changes that are identified within the Draft by the CRP will be conveyed to § 7(2)(a) in the New Year.</li> </ul>	§ 7(2)(a)
3.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discussions were had with the Community Response Group as to their roles and responsibilities if an Evacuation Centre was required to be opened. They were directed to the plan as to what was required of them. There was also a discussion around who could declare emergencies under the Act and the implications should this occur.</li> </ul>	§ 7(2)(a)
4.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>§ 7(2)(a) are both NZQA qualified Trainers and run First Aid Training on the Island. They are also interested in getting the Schools involved in Education programmes.</li> <li>While in Wellington they were associated with WREMO and taught Unit Standard 528 in relation to CDEM. This may well be an opportunity to drive this further on Waiheke.</li> </ul>	§ 7(2)(a)
5.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The issue around where the Island Defibrillators were located was raised and it would appear as most are locked away after hours. Some work may be needed to see if these can be made more readily available.</li> </ul>	§ 7(2)(a)



22 March 2017

Mr John Coburn  
s9(2)(a)

Dear Mr Coburn

I write to address your concerns regarding civil defence matters on Waiheke Island and your most recent correspondence to Mayor Phil Goff of 27 February 2017.

On 23 February 2017 Mayor Phil Goff wrote to you addressing your most recent correspondence regarding civil defence on Waiheke Island. In this letter the Mayor requested that going forward you only contact our Customer Relationship Team. Despite this request you have written to the Mayor again.

For many years you have expressed your concerns about preparedness for a disaster on Waiheke Island. During this time Auckland Council staff, and the Mayor, have assured you that the Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) department takes planning and responding to emergencies seriously. Further to this, we are satisfied that we have investigated your concerns fully and appropriately, and responded to all concerns raised. We will therefore not be looking into queries which have already been raised.

You are advised again to direct all of your email correspondence to the following email address: [customerrelationshipteam@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz](mailto:customerrelationshipteam@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz), and you will be responded to by one of our Customer Services Relationship Managers if any new matters are raised.

If you wish to seek a review of our actions, you may contact the Ombudsman:  
<http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/make-a-complaint>

Yours sincerely

Sally Woods  
Customer Experience Manager  
s9(2)(a)

cc: Mayor Phil Goff

#### Notes

1. For many years: simply because Auckland has failed to address issues raised as in this case.
2. Responded to all concerns: the issues have not been addressed and the terminal building suitability as a shelter remains unchanged from **2007**

John Coburn

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

7 April 2017

Mr Phil Goff  
The Mayor  
Auckland Council  
Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142 via email

Dear Mr Mayor

### 2019 to be China-New Zealand Year of Tourism

The 2019 China-New Zealand Year of Tourism initiative was announced 27 March 2017 by Prime Minister Bill English as part of an official visit from Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.

"A new international agreement will focus on attracting **high-value** Chinese visitors who stay longer, spend more and travel independently.

"Our focus now is on encouraging tourists to visit outside of the peak season and to explore our regions, as well as our most iconic destinations." (Minister Paula Bennett - part of a press release 27 March 2017).



Inevitably high-value Chinese visitors travelling independently in New Zealand will become involved in national emergencies or natural disasters.

Failure to respond satisfactorily could expose New Zealand's credibility as a high-value Chinese visitor safe destination.

#### Example

Copy paragraph in a letter to Mayor 5 December 2016:

#### Stranded passengers turn wharf into a 'war zone'

"It looked like something out of a war zone."

That was how chief wharfinger Keith Anderson described the scene on the Matiatia wharf in the early hours of Sunday morning after watching security footage of the terminal where more than **100 people were stranded** after the last ferry sailed at 12.30am with a **capacity 550 passengers** aboard.

"Plumes of thick black smoke **from the bonfires** wafted across the wharf and people were running around like crazy. It was **pure chaos**," he said.

Mr Anderson's colleague Werren Stachl was the first on the scene at 6.45am Sunday morning to find the terminal "**completely trashed**".

*Gulf News 14 February 2007*

Response 21 December 2016

“I am satisfied with the measures my Director of Civil Defence and Emergency Management has in place to monitor and evaluate the success of the Auckland CDEM work programmes and their level of professionalism and partnerships with relevant agencies and organisations.” *Stephen Town, Chief Executive.*

21/22 January 2017 it is understood:

- 1 A storm caused the cancellation of last sailings Fuller Ferries from Waiheke stranding about 100 individuals on the island;
- 2 Those unable to find alternative accommodation (about 70 individuals) took shelter in Matiatia ferry terminal building;
- 3 The building was in darkness; battery powered emergency lighting illuminated only exit signs;
- 4 It is understood the backup generator operated the fire protection sprinkler system only; it did not back up emergency lighting; wharf ramp hydraulics; pump to obtain drinking water and toilet flushing;
- 5 Because of the power outage, toilets (3 stalls for women; 3 stalls and urinals for men; one stall for disabled persons) could be used but not flushed;
- 6 There was no access to food and water;
- 7 Some individuals, alcohol affected, showed signs of violence;
- 8 A concerned person rang the police who arrived and restored order;
- 9 Police then arranged for collection of blankets from Red Cross Centre 1.5 kms away;
- 10 The medical area containing a defibrillator and other emergency medical supplies could not be accessed because of restricted key availability;
- 11 No wharfinger on duty

**Note Details differ from media reports after receiving advice from someone close to the action.**

- 12 **The media account** of the occurrence and the inaccessibility of vital medical equipment was reported to the Mayor by letter 2 February 2017;

- 13 **Reply from the Mayor** 23 February 2017 (extract):

“The following items will be addressed and in place by **28 February 2017**:


1. Contact signage to be installed at entrances to the terminal and the medical facility room, providing the direct dial number to an ATOC CENTRAL operator – ATOC CENTRAL 09 448 7160
2. The medical room is accessible from both inside and outside the terminal. The door locks to this facility are to be replaced with access code pads, and the ATOC CENTRAL operator will provide the access code if requested.
3. The emergency back-up generator (for the terminal) is intended to operate as

an automated response in the event of general power failure. The ATOC CENTRAL operator will provide access and operating instructions required.”

14 **Letter** to the Mayor 27 February 2017 (extract)

“Does the Mayor consider that in the real world:  
during a severe storm; in minimal lighting; with telephone connection  
questionable;  
individuals in state of stress and when caller might have limited English  
[perhaps only Chinese]  
telephoning for access codes for a defibrillator is an option?” \*

Suggest key placed behind glass with instructions to smash glass in case of  
emergency:



15 **Council's reply** 22 March 2017 attached.

16 At date of writing **7 April 2017**:

There is **no evidence**:

- Of installation of contact signage or instructions of any kind;
- Of effort to address Matiatia conditions that have remained basically unchanged since February **2007**;
- Defibrilla or and medical equipment remain behind locked doors:



Door medical room inside  
terminal;

Note: digital lock circled;

Note: no instructions;

Note: no defibrillator sign.

**30 June 2017**

\* **Accessibility to defibrillator**<sup>8</sup>

Door medical room  
outside terminal;

Note: digital lock circled;

Note: no instructions;

Note: no First Aid or  
defibrillator sign.

**30 June 2017**



<sup>8</sup> <https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/aed/when> (page 2)

Using an Automated External Defibrillator to shock the heart within minutes of the start of sudden cardiac arrest (SCA) may restore a normal heart rhythm. Every minute counts. Each minute of SCA leads to a 10 percent reduction in survival.

### **Defibrillators elsewhere on Waiheke**

Minutes of Waiheke Community Response Meeting dated 18 September 2015 copied to ACDEM, Action Point 5:

“The issue around where the island defibrillators were located was raised and it would appear as most are locked away after hours some work may be needed to see if these can be made more readily available”.


### **Review of the occurrences outlined above**

There has been no review.

### **High-value Chinese visitors to New Zealand and China’s Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction**

China is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world. To address the issues China has vigorously promoted the United Nations sponsored Hyogo Framework For Action (HFA) since it was adopted by all UN Member States in 2005. China has worked on mitigating disasters by evaluating national conditions; perfecting the organizational system and improving the working mechanism. China efforts can be seen in five main aspects corresponding to key areas for developing a relevant framework for action <sup>9</sup> outlined in the following video:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=soAHljKjQGo>



Some scenes in the video are similar to recent occurrences in New Zealand. China’s observation: climate change will cause disasters to become more sudden; more extreme and more difficult to predict.

### **New Zealand and Hyogo Framework For Action**

New Zealand rejected HFA.

### **International tourists.**

All international visitors expect disaster preparations in New Zealand to be at least as well developed as in their home countries.

- View BBC interview with family of a visitor killed in a Fox Glacier plane crash: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18002045>
- 200 international families plead for stiffer New Zealand rules after damning inquest: [http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=10870304](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10870304)

<sup>9</sup> Hyogo Framework for Action: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters

- (a) Governance: organizational, legal and policy frameworks;
- (b) Risk identification, assessment, monitoring and early warning;
- (c) Knowledge management and education;
- (d) Reducing underlying risk factors;
- (e) Preparedness for effective response and recovery.



**Bad case scenario**

- High-value Chinese visitors travelling independently spend a day on Waiheke <sup>10</sup>;
- A storm forces Fullers Ferries to cancel return sailings to the mainland;
- Those unable to find alternative accommodation seek shelter in Matiatia ferry terminal building;
- The building is in darkness; battery powered emergency lighting illuminated only exit signs;
- Toilets can be used but not flushed
- Etc.. (Perhaps a high-value Chinese visitor has a heart condition).

**Addressing correspondence to the Mayor (see letter next page)**

I am not a part of the Auckland Council bureaucracy.

Ultimately the Mayor is accountable for the safety and well-being for people in Auckland.

The Mayor is also accountable for political situations that might develop because of Auckland Council's incompetence.

I shall continue addressing correspondence to the Mayor and the bureaucracy can deal with it as they wish.

Yours sincerely



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<sup>10</sup> Waiheke "Fourth Best Island in the World to visit 2015" (Traveller); Waiheke "World's Fifth Best Region to Visit 2015 (Lonely Planet).

This letter is in response to a situation that could be the difference between life and death:  
*"Using an Automated External Defibrillator to shock the heart within minutes of the start of sudden cardiac arrest (SCA) may restore a normal heart rhythm. Every minute counts. Each minute of SCA leads to a 10 percent reduction in survival."*

**Attachment**



22 March 2017

Mr John Coburn  
s9(2)(a)

Dear Mr Coburn

I write to address your concerns regarding civil defence matters on Waiheke Island and your most recent correspondence to Mayor Phil Goff of 27 February 2017.


On 23 February 2017 Mayor Phil Goff wrote to you addressing your most recent correspondence regarding civil defence on Waiheke Island. In this letter the Mayor requested that going forward you only contact our Customer Relationship Team. Despite this request you have written to the Mayor again.

For many years you have expressed your concerns about preparedness for a disaster on Waiheke Island. During this time Auckland Council staff, and the Mayor, have assured you that the Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) department takes planning and responding to emergencies seriously. Further to this, we are satisfied that we have investigated your concerns fully and appropriately, and responded to all concerns raised. We will therefore not be looking into queries which have already been raised.

You are advised again to direct all of your email correspondence to the following email address: [customerrelationship@ AucklandCouncil.govt.nz](mailto:customerrelationship@ AucklandCouncil.govt.nz), and you will be responded to by one of our Customer Services Relationship Managers if any new matters are raised.

If you wish to seek a review of our actions, you may contact the Ombudsman:  
<http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/make-a-complaint>

Yours sincerely

  
Sally Woods  
Customer Experience Manager  
s9(2)(a)

cc: Mayor Phil Goff

**No response; no review and Matiatia Ferry Terminal remains as it was in  
2007**

  
John Coburn  
May 2017

## Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

### Written Submission Form

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Mark Constable
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>No</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):  <p>Lead Agencies One of the biggest problems with the current national crisis management model is that there is often confusion about who is the lead agency for a given event. Even at a local incident, we may see a lead agency change as the situation evolves. This leads to confusion and communication issues, and significantly slows decision making and escalation of the response.</p> <p>For larger events where the 'CDEM Group' is defined as the lead agency, it takes significant time for a local EOC to activate, often leading to the EOC playing catch-up on the response taken up until that time. Confusion for all parties often occurs at this point as the escalation from emergency services to local EOC is ill-defined by a lack of triggers (other than statements about the need for coordination within the CDEM Act). This is further exacerbated by powers that don't exist for CDEM response outside of a state of emergency.</p> <p>Fundamentally, at the point when this "civil defence" response activates, the current model requires a transition from professional emergency services to inexperienced, council staff and volunteers; or a confusing, partial, running of two models simultaneously – without clearly defined lines of accountability. This use of Council staff also further impacts on the council's own ability to continue its operations and any response required to issues with its own infrastructure.</p> <p>To create the effectiveness of response that the review is seeking, the national crisis management model needs to assess the way that lead agencies work. Specifically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Lead agencies should be more clearly defined. Using 'CDEM Group' as lead agency is confusing, frequently the term is misused to describe the regional consortia of agencies, however within the CDEM Act, the 'CDEM Group' is a Joint Committee of elected officials, therefore suggesting a committee is leading the response to geological and meteorological hazards (see Appendix 1, National CDEM Plan Order 2015).</li><li>• If a lead agency is to be named, it needs to be a specific agency (e.g. 'local authority' rather than 'CDEM Group'). Ideally lead agencies should be the lead from start-to-finish of an event. So as an event grows in scale, the agency will move its command from incident, to local, to regional, to national; whilst garnishing support from relevant agencies at each level. To this end, CDEM Groups and MCDEM would not feature as lead agencies.</li><li>• Councils (local authorities) should not be leads for anything within the national crisis management model. They should only lead in response to issues within their own portfolios, such as responding to flooding, 3-water emergency response, local welfare, or business continuity responses for other council services. Councils would therefore act only as support agencies during larger events, liaising with nominated lead agencies.</li><li>• If lead agencies continue to be assigned by hazard, recommend that for Geological and Meteorological events, that the lead agency role is assigned to NZ Police or Fire.</li><li>• The roles currently known in the CDEM Act of "Local-" and "Group-Controller", would be better suited to sit respectively with Police Local- and District Commanders (or the FENZ equivalents).</li><li>• Better (more pragmatic) guidance as to when to declare a SOE would go a long way towards clearing up some of this confusion as to who is in charge and when, and what it means.</li></ul> <p>Terminology Whilst Jargon is a reality for any industry, the CDEM lexicon with the CDEM Act, The Plan, The Guide and other supporting plans and documents needs a lot of clarification. This will aid in peace-time and during response. For example, within the CDEM Act, 'CDEM Group' means 'joint standing committee under clause 30(1)(b) of Schedule 7 of the Local Government Act 2002'. However 'CDEM Group' is also used to describe: the consortia of agencies from across the region; the lead agency for response; the Regional ECC, and often the Group Office. In descriptions of activities across the 4Rs, this is further confused by the use of phrases such as "at the group level" as opposed to "at the local level" – when Local Authorities are those that make up the CDEM Group. It may be easy to dismiss this issue for those within the sector who understand, but it does create significant barriers to understanding and therefore progress, when dealing with those whom only encounter CDEM issues and responses occasionally.</p> <p>Capacity &amp; Capability Most local authority districts are unlikely to ever have enough capacity to respond to major events. This is true for the Country as whole given our economy &amp; geographic isolation. As result, the capability of those engaged in emergency management needs to be bolstered significantly. Regardless of any changes to the response model, it would advantageous for Central Government to sponsor and provide an emergency management training centre programme. Such a programme could focus on training and education of concepts and standards to upskill senior management (i.e. Controllers, Recovery Managers, etc.) and competency based training for those engaged in EOC operations, or field responses. There are significant opportunities for improvements in this area, by joining up training across regions and strengthening networks and connections to ensure the most effective use of resources before and during an emergency.</p>

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

## Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

### Written Submission Form

#### Submission:

##### Lead Agencies

One of the biggest problems with the current the national crisis management model is that there is often confusion about who is the lead agency for a given event. Even at a local incident, we may see a lead agency change as the situation evolves. This leads to confusion and communication issues, and significantly slows decision making and escalation of the response.

For larger events where the 'CDEM Group' is defined as the lead agency, it takes significant time for a local EOC to activate, often leading to the EOC playing catch-up on the response taken up until that time. Confusion for all parties often occurs at this point as the escalation from emergency services to local EOC is ill-defined by a lack of triggers (other than statements about the need for coordination within the CDEM Act). This is further exacerbated by powers that don't exist for CDEM response outside of a state of emergency.

Fundamentally, at the point when this "civil defence" response activates, the current model requires a transition from professional emergency services to inexperienced and often inexperienced, council staff and volunteers; or a confusing, partial, running of two models simultaneously – without clearly defined lines of accountability. This use of Council staff also further impacts on the council's own ability to continue its operations and any response required to issues with its own infrastructure.

To create the effectiveness of response that the review is seeking, the national crisis management model needs to assess the way that lead agencies work. Specifically:

- Lead agencies should be more clearly defined. Using 'CDEM Group' as lead agency is confusing, frequently the term is misused to describe the regional consortia of agencies, however within the CDEM Act, the 'CDEM Group' is a Joint Committee of elected officials, therefore suggesting a committee is leading the response to geological and meteorological hazards (see Appendix 1, National CDEM Plan Order 2015).
- If a lead agency is to be named, it needs to be a specific agency (e.g. 'local authority' rather than 'CDEM Group'). Ideally lead agencies should be the lead from start-to-finish of an event. So as an event grows in scale, the agency will move its command from incident, to local, to regional, to national; whilst garnishing support from relevant agencies at each level. To this end, CDEM Groups and MCDEM would not feature as lead agencies.
- Councils (local authorities) should not be leads for anything within the national crisis management model. They should only lead in response to issues within their own portfolios, such as responding to roading, 3-water emergency response, local welfare, or business continuity responses for other council services. Councils would therefore act only as support agencies during larger events, liaising with nominated lead agencies.
- If lead agencies continue to be assigned by hazard, recommend that for Geological and Meteorological events, that the lead agency role is assigned to NZ Police or Fire.
- The roles currently known in the CDEM Act of "Local- and "Group-Controller", would be better suited to sit respectively with Police Local- and District Commanders (or the FENZ equivalents).
- Better (more pragmatic) guidance as to when to declare a SOE would go a long way toward clearing up some of this confusion as to who is in charge and when, and what it means.

##### Terminology

Whilst Jargon is a reality for any industry, the CDEM lexicon with the CDEM Act, The Plan, The Guide and other supporting plans and documents needs a lot of clarification. This will aid in peace-time and during response. For example, within the CDEM Act, 'CDEM Group' means "joint standing committee under clause 30(1)(b) of Schedule 7 of the Local Government Act 2002". However 'CDEM Group' is also used to describe: the consortia of agencies from across the region; a lead agency for response; the Regional ECC, and often the Group Office. In descriptions of activities across the 4Rs, this is further confused by the use of phrases such as "at the group level" as opposed to "at the local level" – when Local Authorities are those that make up the CDEM Group. It may be easy to dismiss this issue for those within the sector who understand, but it does create significant barriers to understanding and therefore progress, when dealing with those whom only encounter CDEM issues and responses occasionally.

##### Capacity & Capability

Most local authority districts are unlikely to ever have enough capacity to respond to major events. This is true for the Country as whole given our economy & geographic isolation. As result, the capability of those engaged in emergency management needs to be bolstered significantly. Regardless of any changes to the response model, it would advantageous for Central Government to sponsor and provide an emergency management training centre/programme. Such a programme could focus on training and education of concepts and standards to upskill senior management (i.e. Controllers, Recovery Managers, etc.) and competency based training for those engaged in EOC operations, or field responses. There are significant opportunities for improvements in this area, by joining up training across regions and strengthening networks and connections to ensure the most effective use of resources before and during an emergency.

## Submission to the Technical Advisory Group

by Matthew Nolan, Founder and Director, Readynet

Mr. Chairman and Members, Technical Advisory Group to the Minister of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.

This Submission seeks to

1. Highlight how failings in current Emergency Management operations have caused serious harm – with the Havelock North water contamination crisis as an example.
2. Detail how the issues leading to this situation have been widely known for more than ten years
3. Outline how the resultant “gap in the system” has persisted and remains a significant vulnerability across the CDEM sector.
4. Record the efforts to establish a nationally consistent, cross border, multi agency information sharing capability for an “all hazards” approach to Emergency Management in NZ.

This Submission addresses Outcomes 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the Terms of Reference.

### **The Havelock North Water Contamination Crisis**

The Stage One Report of the Government Inquiry into Drinking Water at Havelock North and other sources identify the following;

- The Hastings District Council, Hawkes Bay Regional Council and the Hawkes Bay DHB knew that a contamination situation existed early on the afternoon of Friday 12 August 2016
- Later that afternoon the Council utilised the “standard tools’ for communicating emergency information with the community - news media releases and social media posts.
- Many hours later and well into the following day (Saturday) caregivers at a number of Rest Homes were still encouraging sick elderly and vulnerable persons to continue drinking water in an effort to remain hydrated. In effect these people continued to drink the water that had made them unwell. A similar situation occurred with a number of boarding school caregivers.
- The warnings via news media and social media failed to reach all of the vulnerable sites such as schools, day care sites, rest homes, tourist locations, food preparation sites and others.

## Commentary

It seems implausible, in this age of worldwide connectivity and immediate access to information, that Councils, District Health Boards and the Emergency Services cannot provide emergency communications such as immediate and targeted warnings and updates to vulnerable sites and groups such as:

- Schools and colleges,
- Pre school sites such as child care centres, Kohanga Reo and kindergartens,
- Rest Homes and long term care sites,
- Tourist sites including accommodation, event, experience and hospitality locations,
- Critical infrastructure sites such as doctors, pharmacies, medical laboratories,
- Special interest groups and sectors of the community such as Aged, Disabled, Special Medical Needs etc.

An emergency communications system should provide urgent, targeted warnings, alerts, information and updates regarding:

- Imminent dangers,
- Unfolding emergency situations,
- Urgent safety alerts,
- Access to essential resources such as water,
- Critical infrastructure matters including transport,
- Misinformation management.

These messages may differ from one sector of the community to another. The message to primary schools, for example, may be different to the message to secondary schools or rest homes for a range of reasons.

In addition there are important messages that should not be in the public domain for a variety of reasons.

***Perhaps the most critical aspect is that Alerts, updates etc should be interactive to provide for confirmation that messages of high importance have been received.***

## NATIONAL CONSISTENCY

It is easy to recognise the value of a nationally consistent emergency information sharing capability - a capability that is effective across multiple agencies, council borders and risk profiles.

The Havelock North event was contained within one Local Authority. If circumstances had been different and the event spilled over into another District or Region then the potential for differing and perhaps conflicting methods of warning and updating provides an unsettling scenario.

The prospects of a health, flood, bio-security or fire event affecting neighbouring Districts and Regions highlights the fact that emergency events "don't stop at the border" as evident during the major fires at Christchurch earlier this year.

## THE KEY ISSUE

Key to the distribution of emergency communications is the database of the vulnerable sites and groups.

This database provides emergency responders with critical information such as the number of residents at rest homes, size of the roll at schools and pre school sites plus the potential number of visitors at tourist locations and venues plus other data.

This database is a vital asset to every community. It provides the basis for the communications network to communicate with vulnerable sites and groups in any local, regional or national scale emergency event.

***This database cannot be hastily assembled after an event has occurred.***

## THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

An ‘elephant in the room’ situation has existed for more than ten years.

In the absence of a nationally recognised and nationally consistent, cross border and multiagency emergency information sharing capability Councils have generally used a hotchpotch of social media (Facebook and Twitter), SMS texting lists, imported phone apps and other systems on an Ad Hoc basis to send warnings and alerts.

The results have been poor and patchy. These systems have inherent failings and have the potential to cause harm as shown at Havelock North and at emergency events elsewhere.

This reflects negatively upon the Councils and the CDEM sector attempting to make use of inadequate or “make do” solution .

***Critical communications relating to water contamination or other significant emergency events such as a fast moving fire infrastructure failure, flood and other incidents have not been distributed in a manner that exhibits excellence.***

I am aware that this has been ongoing frustration within Central and Local Government for more than ten years. I understand that Councils have sought guidance from the Ministry of Civil Defence (MCDEM) and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) about this. MCDEM and DPMC have advised that they cannot provide the direction sought by Councils for legal reasons relating to appearing to endorse a private sector product – namely Readynet.

Many mayors and Council Chief Executives have asked “what does the Government want us to do?” The lack of a nationally recognised system and has inevitably led to the “wait and see” situation that was apparent in August 2016 at Havelock North and elsewhere in recent emergency events. That situation remains current in June 2017.

## THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Most government agencies, emergency services, corporate entities, large and small businesses use social media to support their communications plan and media mix.

However, the local government sector uses social media as an operational tool for alerts, updates and communications with the community including the vulnerable sectors referred to in this submission.

Both Hastings District Council and the Hawkes Bay DHB representatives have been reported as saying that communications were primarily via social media and news media.

The Hawkes Bay DHB was also reported as saying that there was a lot of misinformation in the community during the event.

The District Council was reported as saying that communications with some demographics within the community – for example the elder members of the community – were not good.

At least one school Principal was reported as saying that by the Wednesday following the outbreak they had still not heard directly from the Council. The school was reliant upon social media and news media for information. As was the community.

A factor limiting the value of social media is that many workplaces configure their computer systems to prevent staff accessing sites such as Facebook, Twitter and other sites that may divert staff from their work.

With regard to social media, Twitter highlight a warning as follows:

***“Remember, Twitter is a complementary channel to distribute critical information. It should not replace other emergency notification systems”.***

This advice appears to have been ignored by many in the CDEM sector who used Twitter as a primary Alerting system until Vodafone ceased the transmission of Twitter via text in 2015.

The demise of Twitter messages via text to Vodafone customers has caused consternation in NZ emergency management circles. The use of Twitter as an emergency notification tool is now problematic due to the high percentage of phone users connected to Vodafone.

If dentists, doctors, airlines and the local Warrant of Fitness provider use targeted texts to inform, remind and alert users to their next appointment, flight or WOF then it would seem reasonable that Councils would use readily available and proven technology when responding to life threatening emergency situations.

The Havelock North water contamination event has highlighted the consequences of this lack of capability.

#### **RED CROSS HAZARD APPLICATION AND OTHER SYSTEMS**

The adoption of the Red Cross Hazard App by numerous Councils appears to have been in response to the termination of the Twitter alerts. Like Twitter and other social media it has the attraction of being with out cost – it is free.

The Red Cross App has not been trouble free.

User reviews at both the online Apple Store and the Google Store reveal a high level of dissatisfaction with the service provided by this Application.

The Red Cross Application receives messages from the local Civil Defence organisation amongst others. However the messages are generic. There is no capability to send targeted



messages to recipients i.e. school principals, rest home duty managers etc. Effectively the Red Cross App replicates the messages on social media in terms of being a message to the general public in a “one size fits all” manner.

There are other issues with Apps – such as compatibility with differing versions of the operating systems of certain phones, for example iPhone 4 versus iPhone 6.

Configuring Apps is not always straight forward and this has led to poor performance and ultimately to frustration and loss of trust as reported by some user Reviews.

## **THE ROLE OF READYNET**

Readynet was developed in New Zealand in 2004 with the goal of creating an interactive, nationally consistent, cross border and multi-agency information sharing, alerting and updating capability.

The goal is about ensuring that the right information is available to the right people in the right place at the right time – i.e providing information about sites to emergency responders and sending targeted briefings, warnings, alerts and updates to participating sites.

Microsoft NZ awarded the inaugural “Microsoft Citizenship Award” to the Readynet IT systems developer, Information Power Ltd, for Readynet.

A key component of Readynet is the database of recipients for emergency notifications – such as the site managers / school principals / rest home managers and duty managers etc.

Readynet information is sourced from the vulnerable site or group. The information is assembled by staff at the site using the Readynet web based service. That service includes an audit function to check each six months that the information is current.

For example, a school or other vulnerable site accesses Readynet via a unique user name and password arrangement similar to internet banking. The Readynet service prompts and guides the user to assemble vital emergency information about the site including:

1. Location and access information
2. Name and 24 hr contact details for site manager, duty managers, nominated emergency manager and other contacts
3. Number of occupants / residents day and night
4. Number of persons needing special assistance in an emergency
5. Site layout / floor plans
6. and much more

This information is stored in a secure and encrypted environment and is shared with Police 111. It is available to Civil Defence and other appropriate agencies when requested – eg Fire Service, District Health Boards.

Readynet messaging provides emergency communications to any or all participating sectors of the community. An example is an urgent update to all primary schools across the District or to only specific suburbs.

A vital feature of these communications is that recipients can confirm receipt of the message if requested. This provides many obvious operational benefits for responders as well as creating an audit trail.

#### **DURING THE HAVELOCK NORTH EVENT THE USE OF READYNET WOULD HAVE PROVIDED;**

1. The capability to send emergency notifications and updates directly and immediately to schools, rest homes, local businesses, tourist venues and other locations.
2. The capability to request confirmation that the notifications had been received.
3. The capability to provide ongoing and regular updates via email every 3, 6, 12 hours or as required.
4. The capability to send specific information to targeted groups and sites. For example messages to rest homes relating specifically to older persons and different information to schools relating to younger persons.
5. Valuable information for responders such as the total number of residents at affected rest homes, schools, tourist venues etc.
6. And much more.

#### **USE OF READYNET ACROSS NZ - SUMMARY**

1. Utilised by 12 Councils covering more than 50% of NZ at its peak in 2012 – 13.
2. Used extensively following the Christchurch quake to
  - Message many different groups inside the various cordoned areas.
  - Messages included notification of cordon opening times, safety messages and more.
3. The Rena oil cleanup. Readynet provided the communications platform for managing the 8,000 beach cleanup volunteers. This involved
  - Providing tasking and start time times for different groups
  - Providing safety messages including a tsunami alert
  - Regular email updates to provide volunteers with a “big picture” view of cleanup progress.
4. During 2013 and 2014 the Councils discontinued the Readynet service citing the lack of recognition of the role and value of Readynet and cost as opposed to social media.
5. Police requested in 2015 that Readynet integrate more fully with the 111 dispatch, control and command system known as CARD. Planning for this has commenced.
6. A number of schools and other sites continue to use Readynet.
7. Readynet has proven to be robust, reliable and durable.

#### **NEW NATIONAL ALERTING TXT SYSTEM**

The proposed National Alerting System (NAS) will be a valuable tool for its stated use – Tsunami warnings plus other significant events.

The NAS cannot achieve the following

- Send targeted messages. For example, a message to schools across Auckland or to Tourist locations in Otago.
- The NAS cannot target messages to a defined area or community because of the inherent cell site coverage at any given location. Messages to Petone residents for example will also be received widely in Wellington and Hutt areas.
- There is no provision to ensure that messages have been received by vulnerable sites – no ability to confirm receipt of message by schools, rest homes etc.

It has been reported that after its establishment it may take two years or more before approximately 70% of mobile phones will be able to receive the NAS Alerts.

### **DPMC, MCDEM and other Agencies**

Readynet built relationships with DPMC and many other agencies as long ago as 2004 – earlier in some cases.

In 2005 at a meeting hosted by DPMC, Police and Fire representatives advised that in their view there should be a system with the capabilities possessed by Readynet.

The previous Director of MCDEM, John Hamilton, advised that he “understood the role of Readynet and could make an argument for its wide adoption” but that it was not possible to take any step that might look like endorsement of a private sector product.

In more recent times senior staff at DPMC, Police, Fire and other agencies have made similar comments.

Readynet was summoned to both the Christchurch earthquake EOC and the Rena ECC recognising the supply arrangements then in place between Readynet and the Christchurch City Council and Bay of Plenty Regional Council relating to system availability, privacy provisions, Help Desk, staff support and training etc.

Police have had access to Readynet data in their 111 Call Centres since 2005. Police continue to seek more data about specific types of sites to support their response to a range of scenarios and situations. Planning to more fully integrate Readynet into the Police CARD dispatch system has commenced. Police advise that they cannot be seen as endorsing a private sector product.

**ATTACHED** are copies of two documents illustrating the difficulties faced by agencies asked to recognise the role of Readynet

1. Letter from Mr A. Kibblewhite, CE, DPMC to M Nolan, Readynet.
2. Letter from the Police National Manager of Communications Centres to Police District Commanders.

### **FINDING A WAY AHEAD**

Recent emergency events across NZ including earthquake, Tsunami alerts, flooding, fires and more at Kaikoura, Christchurch, Hawkes Bay, Edgecumbe, Whanganui and elsewhere have identified that communications with vulnerable sites and sectors in the community require significant improvement.

In addition, there may be potential for liability or associated issues to arise for Councils and agencies in the CDEM sector on the basis of failing to use “all reasonable and practical means” to reduce the impact and harm caused by emergency events.

Readynet was developed to provide the capability that has been recognised as lacking at Havelock North and in other recent events.

The value of a nationally consistent, interactive, emergency information sharing system that functions across borders and agencies as outlined in this submission is becoming widely recognised.

However, formal recognition of the role and value of Readynet should not have taken more than ten years to achieve and continue to remain unresolved at this time.

Providing a resolution to this situation will be to the advantage of all New Zealand communities, the emergency service responders and to the Readynet service providers.

Should resolution not be available then the problems in the CDEM sector identified in this submission and experienced at Havelock North and elsewhere are likely to continue.

Thank you for the opportunity to make this submission. I will be happy to answer questions.

Matthew Nolan

Readynet

Wellington

28 June 2017.

**Appendix attached**

DPMC letter, 1 page.

Police memo, 3 pages.

DEPARTMENT  
of the PRIME MINISTER  
and CABINET



9 December 2014

Mr Matthew Nolan  
Nolan Associates Ltd  
Email to: s9(2)(a)

Dear Mr Nolan,

This letter responds to your correspondence of 20 October and builds on a response you have also received from Howard Broad.

I understand that your concern relates to the future of Readynet with Crown plans to create a public alerting system.

As you would have noted from the Request for Information (RFI), the Public Alerting Project aims to create a capability to quickly "push" messages to the public based on their location when there is a threat to public safety and agencies need to be able to quickly contact either small or large sections of the community. A key consideration is that there should be no cost or maintenance required from the recipient's end, while messages should be able to be delivered without a risk of delays due to network overloads. We note that Readynet did not respond to the RFI, and we conclude that is because the public alerting project objectives are different to the nature of the Readynet system.

To answer your specific enquiries:

- The role and value of systems are largely determined by the market. While we do not dispute the merits of a product such as Readynet, I understand that central and local government agencies are aware of Readynet's functionality, and we remain of the view that decisions relating to acquiring the system are best left to individual agencies and organisations;
- The way ahead for Readynet is a commercial decision for the owners of Readynet to determine.

Having discussed this issue with Howard Broad, and with Sarah Stuart-Black, the Acting Director, MCDEM, I am satisfied that the department has appropriately and sufficiently considered your concerns.

Yours sincerely

Andrew Kibblewhite  
Chief Executive

Executive Wing, Parliament Buildings, Wellington 6011, New Zealand  
☎ 64 4 817 9700 Facsimile: 64 4 472 3181 www.dpmc.govt.nz



**Communications Centres National Management Group**

Police National Headquarters, 180 Molesworth Street, PO Box 3017, Wellington  
Phone + 64 4 463 4437 Fax +64 4 4602967

19 November 2009

To: District Commanders

From: Superintendent Andy McGregor  
National Manager Communications Centres

CC: Assistant Commissioner: Operations  
District Policing Development Managers  
Operations Managers  
Area Commanders  
Centre Managers: Communications Centres

Subject: **Readynet - Emergency Management Information**

- 1 The purpose of this memo is to advise you of an emergency management information system called Readynet, currently being used in the Communications Centres.
- 2 Readynet is a third-party provider which collects information for the purposes of emergency management. The system has the ability to hold detailed information about sites (e.g. schools, rest homes, hotels/motels, businesses) and groups (e.g. Neighbourhood Support, health providers). In some cases, site and building plans for premises are included (e.g. schools).
- 3 Organisations pay to have their details on Readynet. If local councils sign up to the service, sites in their jurisdiction don't have to pay separately to have their details on the system. It is the responsibility of the organisations which join Readynet to keep the information up-to-date. The Readynet system provides automatic reminders for groups to check and update their information. The benefit of Readynet carrying out this function is that Police do not carry the risk of ensuring contact information databases are current, and potentially subject to criticism for any shortcomings.
- 4 From an emergency response perspective, the Readynet data can provide an extra layer of useful information e.g. school building plans in the event of an "active shooter"; or lockdown in a school facility; or details about the number of people likely to be on site; or who the key contacts are for the building/s. At present, more than 400 schools nationally are on the system, with another 250 other sites captured.
- 5 The CEO of Readynet, Matthew Nolan, is proactively approaching potential customers throughout New Zealand to subscribe to his service, particularly local authorities. In doing so he is often making contact with senior Police at a local level to talk about his service and request support.
- 6 While we are unable to endorse the Readynet service, I want you to be aware of it in the event you are approached by Mr Nolan. Simply put, the more customers he gets the more information we will have available to us.
- 7 The Communications Centres access the secure Readynet website for information collected on a specific site. We also receive regular updates of newly acquired sites.

*"The communications centres are an exciting and fun place where people want to work and they come to work to make a difference, making it easier for our communities to contact police and when they do we meet and sometimes exceed their expectations"*

- 8 Police can access Readynet via a website using a secure login and password.
- 9 Should you wish to look at the Readynet information or use it for operational purposes at local level, the login and password details can be made available to you. If you want staff to have this access, please contact Jill Barclay via Lotus Notes or on extn 43429.
- 10 Further general information about Readynet can be found at Appendix 1 and at the following web address: <http://www.readynetinfo.co.nz/Site/default.aspx>
- 11 If you have any further questions about Readynet, please feel free to give me a call.

Superintendent Andy McGregor  
National Manager: Communications Centres

Appendix 1




Information & Communications Technology

Service Centre, Royal New Zealand Police College, PO Box 50040, Porirua  
Phone + 64 4 238 3000 Fax +64 4 237 2809

Readynet

Readynet assembles, stores and shares emergency management information about:

- \*\* Sites e.g. schools, rest homes, hotels/motels, businesses etc
- \*\* Groups e.g. Neighbourhood Support, health providers, special interest etc



Readynet is available for use by Emergency Services.

What does Readynet provide?


Sites or groups input and update their own details. Readynet has the ability to provide the following information:

- o Emergency summary info
- o Emergency action guide
- o Brief description of the site
- o Site layout map/s
- o Staff contacts / key holders
- o Special needs people
- o Evacuation issues

Data for about 400+ schools nationwide is available.

Local Authorities sign up to the scheme. Data in 'signed-up' areas is more prevalent. Only a limited number of local authorities have signed up to Readynet at this time (as at October 09). Two major cities due to connect soon.

Emergency Summary Information	
Site Name:	Naenaa College
Site Address:	910 High Street Naenaa LOWER HUTT
People on Site - Day:	1000
People on Site - Night:	40
Intersection Name:	High Street & Fairway Drive
GPS Location:	41 11 47 S / 174 56 27 E
Key Holder 1:	Name: [REDACTED] Phone: [REDACTED] Mobile: [REDACTED]



Readynet is currently available to emergency services via a secure website, using a login and password.

Communications Centres have access via their operations intranet page.

In the future it is expected Readynet data will be pulled into the Police environment. This will make the data more readily available to all Police staff.

Further information is available from Jill Barclay, Technology Manager: GIS, extn 43429.



**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Peter Bradley, Chief Executive, St John New Zealand
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>YES</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Submission attached in separate PDF document:  St John NZ submission to CDEM Technical Advisory Group.pdf

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence



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## **For the Attention of the Technical Advisory Group**

### **‘Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand’**

Attention  
Roger Sowry: Group Chair

## **Submission from St John New Zealand:**

The following submission is provided on behalf of St John New Zealand

For further information in regard to this submission please contact:

Peter Bradley  
Chief Executive  
St John New Zealand  
2 Harrison Road  
Mt Wellington  
Auckland

T – s9(2)(a)

E mail – s9(2)(a)



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## Introduction and History

St John New Zealand provides emergency ambulance services to nearly 90% of New Zealanders in 97% of New Zealand's geographic area. We answer and respond to over 450,000 111 calls each year and have over 5,000 paid and volunteer, trained ambulance staff across the country. To provide these services we have contractual arrangements with the National Ambulance Sector Office representing the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), DHBs and St John also provides significant funding from its fund raising and commercial activities.

Our resilience is augmented by:

- Our 111 clinical hub located within our emergency control centres and staffed with intensive care paramedics and registered nurses provide advice to selected callers to ambulance via the 111 system
- Our National Air Desk coordinates medical helicopter dispatch across the country and works closely with Police, search and rescue (SAR) and the rescue coordination centre (RCCNZ).
- Our Clinical Desk also located within our emergency control centres and staffed with intensive care paramedics, provide clinical advice to patients, control centre staff and emergency responders in the field. Access is also available to our medical directors 24 hours per day.
- Our patient transfer service which augments our emergency ambulance service and provides patient transport predominately between hospitals provides additional staff and fleet resilience nationally.

In a major incident the coordination of these resources nationally is vital.

St John is playing an increasing role in meeting the broader health needs of New Zealand communities. We provide innovative healthcare services to build resilient communities and keep New Zealanders well, and support people to live independently for longer. This includes initiatives such as our Medical Alarm capability and the Caring Caller service; ensuring people have the ability to request help and are regularly contacted.

As the largest provider of emergency ambulance responses to New Zealanders we are intimately involved in the response to any major incident or disaster where life or limb is in jeopardy. In doing so, we work alongside and in partnership with our partner emergency



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response agencies the New Zealand Police, Wellington Free Ambulance Service and Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) on the front line of any incident.

St John also works with other agencies such as Coastguard for some water transport capability and has formal arrangements with Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) who support the ambulance service with co-response and some first response support. St John also has formal arrangements with 10 helicopter operators across New Zealand for the provision of air ambulance helicopters.

As well as this we work closely with the Ministry of Health and District Health Boards in responding to the health needs of victims of an incident. Our medical directors are frequently engaged in working with hospitals in ascertaining patient movements that support optimal outcomes. Consequently, it is essential that we are fully engaged in how natural disasters, pandemics and other emergencies are responded to and prepared for from a tactical, operational and strategic perspective in partnership with all other agencies having similar responsibilities.

### **Our Mission**

We step forward, when help is needed. For Better. For Life.

### **Values:**

Our Five Values guide how we do things together as One St John:

- We stand Side by Side – Whakakoha
- We are Straight Up - Whakapono
- We have Open Minds – Whakahangahanga
- We Make it Better – Whakawerohia
- We do the Right Thing – Whakaro Tika

### **Our Key Ambitions:**

- Positive people working together
- Right time, Right care



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- Patients, customers, supporters at the centre
- Connected communities
- Partner of choice

## **Submission**

The following comments summarise the St John submission regarding the review of responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. In this submission we first address the identified problem in the terms of reference, and then make comment on each of the identified outcomes.

## **The Problem**

The terms of reference identify that organisational structures, roles and decision making powers in the civil defence emergency management response system need to align with expectations for system performance. This includes the ability to share information and operational capability. The structure of New Zealand's emergency response system makes it clear from a public expectation perspective that the Ambulance Service (St John and Wellington Free Ambulance combined) are emergency services in their own right. At a tactical level this is also the experience of ambulance staff who actively and regularly respond and work alongside police and fire personnel applying the CIMS approach to incident management. Regrettably the further up the chain of coordination one goes the less the ambulance service experiences that level of cooperation, involvement and information sharing.

We also note that the problem statement identifies that information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency. While there are certainly many instances where ambulance managers are rapidly involved in Emergency Operations Centres (EOC) and are thus able to help provide information, there have also been a significant number of cases where the only way an ambulance manager became involved was when they heard of an incident through other means (often the media) and actively went and offered their services to the EOC.

On some occasions ambulance managers have been specifically excluded from an EOC because they were "not an emergency service" rather it was the DHB that was the legally designated emergency service, which technically is correct under legislation. As a consequence we have found ourselves in the position where we were not able to share



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information and expertise to the response and at the same time were excluded from gaining much needed intelligence to inform our own response.

We believe that it is a strategic risk to the emergency service response to a major incident that senior personnel from the Emergency arm of the health service are excluded and as a consequence vital information has been missed this has in fact occurred.

Recent examples of this include the Port Hills fires where ambulance managers had to specifically offer their services and these were initially declined and the Kaikoura earthquake response where an ambulance manager was specifically excluded from the EOC by a Civil Defence manager.

We appreciate that this can sometimes be put down to personalities but note that the legislation effectively enables this disconnect to occur. As is noted in the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 2014 manual:

Responsibilities of an Ambulance Service in all emergencies are:

- To save life in conjunction with other Emergency Services
- To notify and liaise with the other Emergency Services
- To initiate and maintain an Ambulance Service Command and Control structure lead by an Ambulance Service Controller
- To protect the health, safety and welfare of all ambulance staff generally, and all health workers on the scene of a mass casualty incident
- To supply sufficient ambulances and staff for the incident
- To provide a communications system between ambulance and DHBs (including hospitals)
- To provide Ambulance Liaison Officer/s
- To acquire additional ambulance resources, as necessary through the use of the Ambulance Service's national coordination mechanisms
- To forward to the receiving hospital(s) and health facilities, Medical Officer(s) of Health and DHB(s), any information acquired at the scene relating to chemical, biological or radiation (CBR) hazards and possible contamination of casualties or rescuers and advise of the potential for self-presenting patients



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- To assume responsibility for casualty decontamination, in conjunction with the Fire Service
- To provide the Fire Service with clinical advice and assistance to support on-site decontamination
- To maintain adequate emergency ambulance cover throughout the Ambulance Service's operational area for the duration of the major incident
- To progressively release activated hospital(s) and health facilities and ultimately issue a message indicating the completion of casualty evacuation

None of this is practicably possible if ambulance managers are not specifically included in the decision making processes. Because the legislative arrangements do not provide for active engagement of ambulance services at all levels of response and preparedness including strategic preparation and planning it can be difficult for the respective lead services to ensure information sharing and decision making are appropriate to the benefit of affected individuals.

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (Group) Sections 12-20 of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act (2002) provide for the establishment and functions of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups. Local authorities must establish such groups to: Respond to and manage the adverse effects of emergencies

- Carry out recovery activities
- Develop, approve, implement, and monitor a Civil Defence Emergency Management plan and regularly review it.

Such groups must establish and maintain a Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Advisory Group (CEG) consisting of representatives of local authorities, the Police, the Fire Service, health and disability services. Ambulance Service may (*but are not required to be*) be co-opted onto CEG to assist with the management of the plan. Persons able to declare states of local emergency must be appointed in each area. The Act also provides for the appointment of Local Controllers and Recovery Co-ordinators in relation to particular areas." (NZ Parliament Digest 2306 cited in, Waters 2016)

The required addition of ambulance services is fundamental as we know from the many recent Civil Defence Emergency Management events experienced in New Zealand that



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Ambulance services provide an essential and specific emergency service perspective that is significantly different to our health and hospital service colleagues. The Ambulance Service response in a Civil Defence Emergency Management event is dictated by the national

Ambulance Major Incident and Emergency Plan (AMPLANZ). This key document has ensured that there is a common understanding between ambulance services, communications centres and our emergency management partners as to how the ambulance service will respond in a time of crisis.

### **Outcome 1**

As indicated it is clear that our stakeholders, the New Zealand public have an expectation that the combined emergency services, including the ambulance service, will be enabled to work together in responding to major incidents. Indeed the clear priority of 'preventing death and injury' falls squarely with the ambulance service as identified under the CIMS principals. In order to achieve the strongest outcomes in these areas it is imperative that the ambulance service be recognised as an emergency service in its own right so that its managers can provide vital guidance and leadership in significant events without the risk of not being informed or excluded.

By way of presenting perspective on the importance that should be accorded to the involvement of Ambulance Services in preparation for major incidents, it is worth noting the general workloads of each of the primary emergency service responders. In their most recent annual reports it is noted that the NZ Police responded to 772,000 incidents, the New Zealand Fire Service responded to almost 73,000 incidents and St John and Wellington Free Ambulance responded to 500,000 incidents (450,000 and 50,000 respectively) between them. On this data alone it can be seen that the perspective of ambulance providers should be considered as the impact on New Zealanders is potentially significant.

From the sector wide perspective, the expectation of the community is for an effective, efficient and inclusive response. This can in part be achieved by ensuring that all emergency services, including the ambulance services, are represented strategically to inform other emergency management agencies.





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## **Outcome 2**

The ambulance service is the lead pre-hospital medical response capability in an emergency. The current systems support availability of skilled clinicians and managers in responding to these emergencies. There are also appropriate protocols in place between the three front line agencies to ensure front line response will occur well. However, as an incident scales up or is less clear in terms of the nature of the incident current structures do not support a completely integrated approach to response particularly of a large scale. In order for this to happen well it is imperative that all agencies involved in the tactical response are also involved at the senior operational level (EOCs) and at the strategic level both during the response but also importantly during the planning and preparation phase.

An example of where this would have mitigated problems arises from the Port Hill's fire which had no practical medical plan in place until at least day 4, due in part to the lack of value placed on the presence of ambulance representation in the earlier phases of the response.

If ambulance services are not engaged actively at the strategic level of preparation or 'readiness' then when the time comes to make decisions about response it is likely that the decision makers will not have the best information available to make informed choices.

St John is a vital part of emergency response to the community - we take the need to ensure continuity of service seriously. As such we have actively pursued good business continuity practice and are continuing to look for ways to improve these. Consequently we can provide assurance that we are supportive of a whole of sector approach to ensuring that the ambulance service will be available to respond.

## **Outcome 3**

At this point in time ambulance services are not responsible under legislation for determining the need to declare states of emergency. As part of the response process however, we hold vital information in helping determine when that state of emergency should be declared. As such while there will be few, if any, instances where we will be the lead agency at an incident we believe it is important that we be engaged early in the strategic decision making processes because it is likely that the information we can provide will assist in those decision processes. For this to happen we need to be actively engaged at that strategic level.



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It is not necessarily 'who' it is that declares that is key, it is whether they do so having been fully informed of the risks facing the community. We do not believe that this currently occurs with consistency.

#### **Outcome 4**

As an agency operating under the CIMS model we are very familiar with the concepts of command and control and have structures and processes in place that ensure that we have good command within the ambulance service and are able to provide resource to the joint incident management teams helping with the control function.

This outcome however notes the need for the system to enable decision to be made quickly by appropriately skilled people. We believe we do this well at the tactical level and decisions at ground level are generally made in a manner that takes account of our expertise. As we move from the local level to a regional level however we often find that we are not actively included in the processes and systems. As a result there are occasions where we will not be aware of the overall operating picture that helps in efficient response decisions from a front line health perspective.

#### **Outcome 5**

St John has systems and processes that help with the provision of information into the emergency response system, including access and use of systems such as Health EMIS with some of our staff also having access into CDEM EMIS. We also look to provide information required by Ministers and officials through our link into the Ministry of Health. While we can certainly access information held on those platforms and provide information in that manner, in the early phases of response we have also found that we are late to be informed of some of the more strategic information that would help inform our own response. For this to happen more quickly we believe again that there is the need for the ambulance service to be more closely engaged at the higher level in the same way that our colleagues from FENZ and the police are.

It is clear that a number of senior personnel from partner agencies would not wish to exclude our input at this level however it is equally clear that there are enough personnel at this level who have hesitation in including us in processes at higher organisational levels. It is possible that this is because St John is a non-government agency however we are currently progressing the introduction of systems such as SEEMail to ensure security of information.



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We are also aware that in Australia there are similar ambulance services which are fully engaged at the strategic level. This can be achieved through a process of ensuring appropriate mechanisms are put in place.

### **Recommendations**

The community expectation is for the emergency management sector to move quickly, be effective, engaged with our communities, well coordinated and to communicate effectively.

There are capabilities and competencies in the emergency services that can be used more effectively and improved engagement with ambulance services as one of the emergency services will further add to an effective response. To this end we make the following recommendations.

1. The ambulance service must be specifically recognised as an emergency service in its own right, so that other response agencies and more particularly those not part of the 111 response system engage us in strategic planning and decision making. By ensuring this structure is put in place it will improve the way in which responsible agencies respond to major incidents
2. "AMPLANZ must be considered [part of the] CDEM Group in all its 4 Rs' (Reduction Readiness, Response, and Recovery) activities. In reality, this input must come from an Ambulance Service representative as our health and hospital colleagues are not fully conversant with the requirements of AMPLANZ or the regional/national capability of Ambulance Services." (Waters, 2016)
3. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 be amended to enhance the role of Emergency Ambulance Services in the readiness for, response to and recovery from major incidents. This should be achieved by amending sections 4 and 20 of the Act to clearly define; what an emergency ambulance service is, that an emergency ambulance service is specifically included in the definition of emergency services and that emergency ambulance services are specifically included in Civil Defence Emergency Management Coordinating Executive Groups or their equivalent. The Act also needs to reflect the need to engage Emergency Ambulance Services at the national strategic level.



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### **Opportunity to Address the Committee**

St John requests the opportunity to address committee in person to enable clarification and/or discussion on our submission.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Alastair Barnett
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Written submission already provided directly to Emily Stevenson at DPMC

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

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## Ministerial Review:

### Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

Written Submission by Alastair Gordon Barnett

Date: 23 June 2017

**Scope:** This submission relates specifically to Civil Defence needs arising from flood hazards and navigation hazards which may develop during a tsunami.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Qualifications and Experience

1. My full name is Alastair Gordon Barnett. I have a Ph.D in Civil Engineering from the University of Canterbury, and have since gained over forty years of experience of computational studies of water flows in proposed or existing engineering projects in over twenty countries. I have set up a wide range of field monitoring programmes for model calibration and verification, and have developed the information technology for several internationally used software packages for hydraulic analysis of floods and harbour waves, including tsunamis. I was elected a fellow of IPENZ on 25 March 2002 with the citation reading in part “for his substantial and ongoing contribution to the advancement of engineering knowledge in the field of hydraulic modelling of water flows.”
2. With the New Zealand Ministry of Works and Development from 1961-86, after graduation I began as manager of the road construction breakthrough at Haast. Then followed my Ph.D and three years of post-doctoral studies in leading hydraulic institutes in The Netherlands, France and Denmark, funded by the National Research Advisory Council. On my return to New Zealand I worked with the MWD Systems Laboratory on information technology, then with Power Division verifying computational predictions of tsunami-like wave propagation at full scale in large hydropower canals. I then moved to the Water Quality Centre in Hamilton, leading computer modelling and coastal groups, as well as serving as acting Scientist in Charge in 1981-82. After the closure of the Ministry of Works and Development in 1988, public engineering research ceased, but Government eventually made a decision to retain the science-based parts of this research unit, reconstituted as a NIWA centre.
3. To ward off collapse of our hydraulic engineering research community, I set up Barnett Consultants in 1987. We undertook specialist consulting commissions for a wide range of water flow studies in a number of countries. Clients included the Governments of New Zealand (tsunami hazards at Te Papa), Australia (dam break flood hazards for the Australian Parliament in Canberra), Malaysia (several flood studies), Singapore (urban drainage) and Hong Kong (siting the main sewage outfall in Hong Kong harbour). Clients for coastal hazard studies included the World Bank (storm surges at Chittagong in the Bay of Bengal), the Asian Development Bank (reef sewage outfalls and coastal erosion in Kiribati) and the European Investment Bank (tsunami hazards in the Port of Suva, Fiji). In 2002 the consulting business was re-incorporated as a partnership, Barnett & MacMurray Ltd.
4. I am also principal of HYDRA Software Ltd, a Hamilton company set up in 1991 to support existing local, regional and central government users of specialised information technology previously supplied by the MWD for rivers, stormwater systems, drainage networks, hydropower networks, harbours and coastal tsunami prediction.
5. Until 1995 this business included the New Zealand agency for the Danish Hydraulic Institute, under which a range of Danish engineering software packages were upgraded to meet New Zealand standards and integrated with the ex-MWD technology. I was responsible for training over 200 local engineers in the use of technology developed in this joint venture, in particular for modelling tidal currents in harbours and coastal waters such as the Hauraki Gulf. There I organised the computation of tidal current predictions over the course for the successful defence of the America’s Cup by Team New Zealand in 2000.

## Performance Assessment Credentials

6. In 1980 the New Zealand Government sent me on an official inspection tour of a number of coastal research facilities, including the Pacific Tsunami Warning System centre in Honolulu, which then operated under the SSWWS (Seismic Sea Wave Warning System) of which New Zealand was a member nation. The centre was then struggling to maintain funding, because the 1970s had been a relatively quiet period with few significant Pacific tsunamis, so their relevance had come into question in some quarters.
7. We discussed the forecasting technology they used, which was still the wave-ray refraction analysis they had developed in the 1960s, based on the simple formula connecting the speed of long waves with the ocean depth. This had the advantage of being within the computing capacity of the time, but even by 1980 supercomputers were becoming available, weakening this excuse for continued simplification. When I visited the Canadian Fisheries and Marine Service a few days later, I discussed this with their tsunami specialist, Dr Murty, noting our controlled experiments on the Upper Waitaki canals had shown that such long waves travel along channels at speeds linked to the mean depth, lower than estimates based on the maximum depth. He then presented me with a copy of his newly published (1977) monograph on tsunamis, which documented that the 1964 Alaska tsunami had arrived in New Zealand an hour and a half later than the time predicted by the wave-ray method.
8. Samoa lies almost directly between Alaska and New Zealand, with the Tonga-Kermadec trench a significant wave pathway, so the 2009 Samoa tsunami arrival so much later than the official predicted times (see Appendix A) suggested that some thirty years later the Pacific centre (and our official forecasters) were still relying on the obsolete simplified wave-ray method. The most dangerous outcome was in Tutukaka, where the wave arrived just as the evacuated boats were re-entering the harbour after the all clear. On such prediction failures the Minister commented "frankly, that is not good enough," yet no discussion was reported from the subsequent Murdoch enquiry on the reasons for the errors in forecast arrival times.
9. I am familiar with the tsunami history within and near several major New Zealand harbours, having advised the relevant port authorities on management of navigation hazards associated with waves such as storm swells and surges, tides and tsunamis. These include Whangarei Harbour, where I designed the new forestry terminal, Tauranga Harbour, where I designed the crossing layout for the harbour bridge, Port Taranaki, Port Nelson and the Otago Harbour. In addition a close analysis of Wellington Harbour tsunami responses at different wave magnitudes was required for the design of Te Papa on the very edge of the harbour.
10. I am also familiar with the pressures of decision making under emergency conditions. The advance warnings available for tsunami events ranges from under an hour to a few hours, directly comparable to river flood emergencies - for example, the recent Edgecumbe flood wave would have peaked in a time scale of under an hour. I was commissioned by the Canterbury Regional Council to reconstruct the development of the tsunami-like 1993 inundation of the Kaikoura CBD, for which the advance warning was about forty minutes. In 1998 I was called in by the Waikato Regional Council to advise throughout a three day emergency, later rated as a once in 80 year Waikato flood. There flood wave speeds in response to hydro control gate operations had been verified by our computer modelling in advance, and forecast results turned out to be highly reliable in moving pressure away from the most endangered flood defences. Edgecumbe-type uncontrolled breakouts were averted.
11. On the evaluation of high technology research, the Tertiary Education Commission expressed confidence in my performance by inviting me to join the team for comparative



assessment of engineering research at New Zealand universities in both the 2006 and 2012 PBRF rounds. The assessors are themselves assessed by TEC in this process, and I was one of the minority again invited for a third round in 2018.

12. I was invited by IPENZ to deliver their 2005 Pickering lecture series "Tsunami: Coming to a Town Near You" and I was also lead speaker in an Insurance Council of New Zealand seminar in 2006, titled "Tsunami Alert – Facts, Fiction, Action." These lectures were shared with two speakers dealing with scientific features of tsunamis.
13. My research publications on computational hydraulics are internationally recognised, and I serve as reviewer for leading engineering journals and international conferences. For example, I refer to the list of papers I reviewed for the 34<sup>th</sup> Congress of the world flood engineering body (the IAHR), held in Brisbane in 2011.

Thank you for agreeing to review papers for the 34<sup>th</sup> IAHR World Congress.

The 4 papers allocated to you are in **sub-theme 2.5** are as follows:

1. **Experimental Investigation for the Effects of Tree Density Distribution in a Forest on Mitigating Tsunami**, (presenting author: Tanaka N.)
2. **Field measurement and numerical studies on the tsunami propagation into upstream of rivers** (presenting author: Tanaka H.)
3. **Numerical Simulation of Tsunami Heights along the Coastline of Sri Lanka due to Potential Tsunamigenic Earthquakes Originating in the Andaman-Sunda Subduction Zone** (presenting author: Gunawardana C.)
4. **Investigation of Tsunami Wave Runup over Vegetated Slopes** (presenting author: Chen H.)

Paper 1 investigates flows through coastal forests in Japan, Paper 2 deals with tsunami propagation up Japanese rivers, Paper 3 deals with trans-oceanic tsunami simulation in Sri Lanka and Paper 4 deals with coastal runup above the shoreline in Singapore.

14. My award-winning *AULOS* flood modelling software is currently registered for use by universities and consultants in thirty-five countries.
15. The IAHR recently responded to widespread concerns about the lack of quality assurance in the design of many commercial and government flood modelling packages by setting up a new Flood Risk Management Technical Committee, chaired by Professor Weber of the University of Iowa. The new committee then delegated to HYDRA Software the task of organising a set of accuracy benchmarks against which model users could assess the performance of their current technology. The initial prototype standard, based on a coastal river dataset from the former Auckland Regional Council, went live on the IAHR Beijing web site in October 2016.

## Tsunami Forecasting in New Zealand

16. Tsunami forecasting has developed only since World War II, and as noted above, early responsibility for New Zealand development was delegated to the international Pacific centre in Honolulu. Then the Ministry of Works and Development took an interest in the computer forecasting of flood waves in the late 1960s, developing this into managing hydropower gate controlled waves in the 1970s and extending these models to tsunami inundation in the 1980s. Pioneers in the engineering schools of the Universities of Auckland and Canterbury also made valuable advances in this time, and the New Zealand Oceanographic Institute in Wellington contributed several publications.

17. By 1989, enough experience had accumulated for tsunami design of the iconic Te Papa museum to be undertaken by ex-MWD engineers. Computer modelling was used to reconstruct the Wellington Harbour and Hutt River tsunami generated by the Magnitude 8+ 1855 West Wairarapa earthquake, and the resulting predicted asymmetrical resonance waves (flat highs alternating with deep lows recurring every 25-30 minutes) were shown to agree with eyewitness accounts of the time. These 28 year old predictions have recently been verified by actual tsunami observations taken in 2013 and 2016 by the new Geonet system.
18. After repeated requests for tsunami forecasts from a range of Regional and City Councils, I suggested that much of this work involved research into the same historical events, as for example the great South American tsunamis of 1868, 1877 and 1960 had created significant hazards along the whole east coast of New Zealand. These were not regional events so it made little sense for each Regional Council to commission their own forecasts in isolation, especially if there was no check for consistency between forecasts for neighbouring regions.
19. Accordingly the Chief Executives of the Regional Councils agreed to a joint approach to Government supporting an application for funding from Barnett Consultants. They went further (see Appendix B), undertaking to contribute a share of the project costs in view of the importance placed on the work. The then Director of the Ministry of Civil Defence, Paul Officer, strongly endorsed the proposed jointly funded venture (see Appendix C) and the perceived priority for such work.
20. Sadly, the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology were then the sole Government agency empowered to approve technical research, and support from Regional Councils and other Government Departments was not in their terms of reference as a criterion for funding approval. Nine months later a brief letter declining funding was delivered to Barnett Consultants. No reasons were given for the decision.

## The GNS Project 2005-2017

21. In the following ten years little was done about tsunami research at a national level. It seemed that Government saw all such flood hazards as purely the concern of Regional and Territorial Councils. Once this became obvious, local government set about procuring flood forecasting services from engineering and information technology consultants. Progress was very uneven, as the institutional memory of previous quality review procedures had been lost in the drastic restaffing of technical management enforced by a succession of amendments to the Local Government Act.
22. However, by 2004 most Regional and Territorial Authorities had reassembled teams with enough awareness of technical project failures to accept the importance of determining clear objectives, methodology, priorities and delivery deadlines for each project, especially where those projects relied critically on information technology.
23. At the end of 2004 Government was shocked by the Indian Ocean tsunami, especially as many holidaying New Zealanders were directly affected. This revived interest in the virtually defunct tsunami research programme, and GNS were asked by the Minister to advise urgently on the national preparedness for such events. As they were the agency receiving the request, GNS decided to recruit a team to recommence public tsunami research. They were well aware that in the interim I had been advising Territorial and Regional Councils as and when they could afford to commission consultants, so GNS elected to commission a version of my tsunami hazard study previously undertaken for Christchurch City Council.


24. In view of the urgency of the Ministerial request, I was given one week to remobilise our tsunami model of Pegasus Bay, and to report back to GNS. Our results were plotted as Model 4, the “Barnett model” in the 2005 GNS report p.58 (Extract Appendix D) and used for verification of simplified models that GNS wished to try to meet the suddenly imposed Ministerial requirement for tsunami flooding plots of all major urban areas in the country. Note the “Barnett model” actually also predicts the area of Christchurch to be red-zoned some six years later after the earthquake series, because coastal low-lying areas trapped behind sand dunes tend to be swampy as well as prone to flooding from rivers and tsunami.
25. The GNS simplified models were then used for urban centres nationwide in spite of my strongly expressed reservation that they assumed a regional “shoreline tsunami wave height” which did not allow for wave reflection, refraction, diffraction, resonance, runup or other factors which make actual wave heights far from locally uniform along urban shorelines..
26. However GNS decided that they could continue without further outside input to the project, and by 2009 their team had four years of experience on which to base their response to the Samoan earthquake and tsunami. The errors shown in Appendix A have already been discussed, and led to the setting up of the Murdoch review by the then Minister after widespread complaints. Many of these came from Regional and Local Civil Defence.
27. The Murdoch enquiry evidently achieved nothing, because the 2016 Minister has had to take exactly the same action after experiencing three further occurrences of exactly the same problem. (The 2013 tsunami resulting from the Seddon earthquake was never reported to Civil Defence, and two more 2016 events are now before this panel.) In my opinion the Murdoch enquiry failed because it did not identify the fundamental problem, which was the inability of the central tsunami monitoring system to equip Civil Defence with progressive forecasts of the tsunami arrival time and magnitude at the various regional centres. Therefore a further seven years of research had continued without the necessary drastic restructuring of the forecasting system, so the previous incompetence has persisted. So now we need another Ministerial review...
28. I believe the system is not working because of a disconnection between the needs of the forecast system users (Civil Defence) and the funding of the forecast system development. Regional and Territorial Civil Defence are now experienced users of river and urban flood forecasting technology with similar time constraints, and they see no reason why comparable systems cannot be produced for coastal flood hazards. They want information technology, while the funders pay for scientific research! When Civil Defence do not receive the information they need, they cannot complain to the funders in MBIE, because as I understand it there has never been any negotiation between them to reach agreement on the objectives, methodology, priorities or delivery deadlines of the funded project (now running for twelve years). I have documented direct evidence that a tsunami forecasting proposal unanimously endorsed by Regional (Appendix B) and National (Appendix C) civil defence managers was not funded because no funding agency had been assigned responsibility for such work. So all that is left is to complain to the Minister.
29. My experience of working within the former NWASCA (National Water and Soil Conservation Authority) system suggests an improved model. The former Ministry of Works and Development was the designated funding agency, and provided national engineering leadership and longstanding information technology expertise. However the objectives and priorities were largely set by the Authority, in which regional and local authorities had a strong voice. I suggest a National Civil Defence Authority could do a similar job.

## Conclusions

- (a) No central system is currently capable of providing Civil Defence with accurate progressive regional forecasts of tsunami arrival times and magnitudes.
- (b) It is not even clear that any central government group understands that this is a function which they have been funded to perform.
- (c) This confusion can be traced back to the Civil Defence arrangements for storm flooding, in which central government now plays little part. Yet coastal flooding and storm flooding are technically very similar hazards, usually differing only in the initial direction of flows. Even these directions are the same in a coastal storm surge.
- (d) In other countries such as Japan, Sri Lanka and Singapore, tsunami forecasts are handled by integrating three different levels of information technology: trans-ocean modelling, coastal sea modelling and coastal flood modelling.
- (e) Trans-ocean modelling involves wave refraction, reflection and diffraction, and deals with wave propagation from remote sources into New Zealand waters. The GNS model appears to consider only refraction, causing major errors in arrival time estimation. This model needs an upgrade even to reproduce the 2009 Samoa tsunami observations.
- (f) Coastal sea modelling deals with navigation hazards, and involves all of the above effects plus runup, wave breaking, resonance and bottom friction. This deals with models at a regional scale, interfacing with the trans-ocean models in deep water offshore. A suggested convenient boundary is the 1000m depth contour.
- (g) Coastal flood modelling requires the addition to the above of full perimeter friction modelling, as bottom friction alone is inadequate for modelling channels and pipes as commonly found in drainage networks. The error involved can be assessed using the IAHR Auckland accuracy benchmark. Coastal flood management requires models at a local government scale, interfacing with coastal sea models at the coastline.
- (h) This model technology hierarchy matches our current Civil Defence structure well, as Regional Authorities already manage their navigation responsibilities through a range of coastal sea models of their regions. In many cases they rely on consultants to operate their models for them.
- (i) Similarly, Local Authorities already manage their storm flood hazard responsibilities, through various combinations of in-house IT departments and consultants. To deal with coastal flooding, they only have to run existing drainage network models backwards, and many already need to do this to deal with situations such as in Edgecumbe, where the river switched from being the receiver of floodwater to the source of floodwater.
- (j) At present these three system tiers operate virtually independently, which is completely unsatisfactory when emergency coordination is vital.
- (k) Before 1990, such central-local coordination was overseen by the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority (NWASCA). That successful model is now proposed as the basis for a National Civil Defence Authority.

## Appendix A: The Samoan Tsunami of 30 September 2009.

The Figure compares the predicted wave arrival times in New Zealand with those actually measured by the GNS Geonet system (see <http://www.geonet.org.nz/tsunami/gauges/index.html> )




It is obvious that the tsunami warning downgrade issued by Civil Defence at 10.30am was based on wave arrival time predictions which assumed wave speeds roughly 70% faster than those measured. For example, the travel time to East Cape was predicted as just under 3 hours against approximately 5 hours as measured.

This is quite an error in arrival times which were issued to the nearest minute in Bulletins from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre in Hawaii. Presumably Civil Defence felt safe in downgrading the warning after waiting for something to happen at East Cape for half an hour after 9.44am, and seeing nothing.

At about the same time, the wave actually arrived at the Raoul Island recorders, leading to an unseemly scramble to reverse the warning downgrade before the waves arrived in New Zealand around noon. As a result, after hearing the warning downgrade, boat owners who had correctly put to sea to reduce risk returned to Tutukaka Harbour just in time to be caught in the harbour entrance by the real tsunami, endangering lives even in the relatively small event which actually occurred.

This serious error would not have happened if the wave prediction system had been upgraded to use engineering technology which was first developed for the Te Papa/ Museum of New Zealand design project in 1989.

## Appendix B: Letter of Financial Support from Regional Councils



**Hawke's Bay  
Regional Council**

102 VAUTIER STREET \* PRIVATE BAG 6006 \* NAPIER \* TELEPHONE: (06) 835-3164 \* FAX: (06) 835-3601 \* DX:13068

Our Ref: 12/16  
15 November 1994

Dr A G Barnett  
Barnett Consultants Ltd  
PO Box 9463  
**HAMILTON**


**BARNETT CONSULTANTS**  
18 NOV 1994  
P.O. BOX 9463  
HAMILTON

Dear Sir

A proposal for developing techniques to determine the return period of damaging tsunamis along the East Coast of New Zealand was considered by the Chief Executives of Regional Council's at their September 1994 meeting. They expressed a high level of support for this study, and believe that once the scientific methodology is proven, further more focussed studies could result considerable benefits to Regional and District Councils in understanding tsunami hazards along much of the coastline of New Zealand.

The meeting felt it was very important that the research that could ultimately lead to a greater understanding of this hazard deserves strong support from available research funding agencies. Furthermore, they have undertaken to provide financial support to future studies that will provide some direct benefit to contributing Councils, particularly along the eastern coast of New Zealand.

The Regional Council CEO's commend the proposed tsunami research to the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology, and urge them to support the important and relevant work proposed.

Yours faithfully  


Andrew Caseley  
**GENERAL MANAGER**

AC:DW:BARNETT.DOC


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**MANAGING OUR RESOURCES, PROTECTING OUR ENVIRONMENT**

FUNCTIONS INCLUDE: Civil Defence, Flood Hazard Mitigation, Harbour Activities, Land Drainage and River Management, Noxious Plants Control, Pest Destruction, Resource Management, Soil Conservation.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Appendix C: Supporting Letter from Director of Civil Defence

<b>MINISTRY OF CIVIL DEFENCE</b>		<b>Te Manatū Arai Mate Whawhati Tata</b>
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<p>Correspondence to: THE DIRECTOR Ministry of Civil Defence P.O. Box 5010, Wellington New Zealand Telephone 64-4-473 7363 Facsimile 64-4-473 7369</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"><p>BARNETT CONSULTANTS 21 NOV 1994 P.O. BOX 9463 HAMILTON</p></div>	<p>Our reference:  L53</p>
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18 November 1994

Dr A G Barnett  
Barnett Consultants Ltd  
P O Box 9463  
HAMILTON


Dear Dr Barnett


Thank you for your fax BC1/31/5 of 17 November. I am pleased to provide a letter of support for your application to the Foundation for Research Science and Technology for funding of your Pacific Tsunami Study.

As we seek to apply most effectively the resources of central and local government, it is important to have a clear perception of the comparative risks which need to be considered. Tsunamis of a dangerous size have not been numerous in New Zealand's recorded history. A well based project to enable us to estimate more accurately the likely impact of distant tsunamis, especially from Chile, would help in the allocation of resources for protective works. It would also ensure that alerts or warnings could be better framed, and avoid the possibility of crying "wolf" too often.

Having consulted Professor Terry Healy at Waikato University, who leads my advisory group on tsunami hazards, I am confirmed in my belief that the project you propose would advance the cause of tsunami estimates to a significant degree. I am therefore glad to lend my support to your application for funds.

Yours sincerely

  
P.N. Officer  
Director  
Ministry of Civil Defence



CIVIL  
DEFENCE

Ground Floor  
33 Bowen Street  
Wellington

Appendix D: Model Verification in Berryman 2005 Report p.58 (Extract)


Model 1a - Slope/roughness model



Model 1b - Slope/roughness model



Model 3 - Bath model



Model 2a - Slope/roughness model



Model 2b - Slope/roughness model



Model 4 - Barnett model



Released by the Minister of Civil Defence





4 July 2017

By email to:

bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz

## **SUBMISSION TO MINISTERIAL REVIEW: BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCIES IN NEW ZEALAND**

This submission is made on behalf of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group on the *Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand*.

This submission is made in the context of the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this review.

While the Group fully supports the review and believes it is timely, as a preliminary matter we wish to point out that the context of the review needs to be based on the facts of any specifically cited response, not unsubstantiated opinions.

For example in the TOR for this Review mention is made of criticism of the effectiveness of the civil defence emergency management sector in the response to the August 2016 Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis outbreak. In fact the Report of the Havelock North Drinking Water Inquiry: Stage 1 states:

*Ultimately the welfare support provided to the Havelock North community appears to have been helpful and generally well executed but it effectively started only on Tuesday 16 August 2016 when it could have been identified as necessary on Friday 12 August 2016, and certainly should have been by the morning of Saturday 13 August 2016.<sup>1</sup>*

While the Inquiry criticised the District Health Board and Hastings District Council (in its role as a drinking water supplier) on the timeliness of identifying the issue and possible welfare needs, it did not criticise the CDEM welfare response itself.

There was some minor criticism of the decision not to declare a state of emergency under the CDEM Act 2002 (the Act) for this event. This was a conscious decision made at the time in consultation with the Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM). Considering the fact that Health were the lead agency and there was no indication that the responding agencies could not cope, the definition of an emergency under the Act was not fulfilled. This was confirmed in part by the Government Inquiry as follows:

*The Inquiry has, however, considered whether a drinking-water emergency should have been declared under s 69ZZA of the Health Act. While the Inquiry has identified above aspects of HDC's and the DHB's*

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<sup>1</sup> Government Inquiry into Havelock North Drinking Water (2017), p. 135 [568]

*contingency planning and response that were deficient, it does not consider that the overall circumstances of the outbreak meant that a drinking-water emergency should have been declared.<sup>2</sup>*

This contrasts the decision to declare a local state of emergency for the Havelock North Fires. Whilst again CDEM was not the lead agency, the Rural Fire Authority advised it could not acquire the resources it needed to fight the fires and the definition of an emergency under the Act was fulfilled.

It is therefore important that this Review obtain the full facts on any emergency response used as an example before using this as a basis for suggesting operational or legislative changes.

This submission will address the following matters:

- The place of response in the context of comprehensive emergency management in New Zealand
- The role of Local Government in emergency management
- CDEM response capability at all levels
- Existing command and control arrangements under the CDEM Act 2002
- CDEM response structures as provided for under the CDEM Act 2002
- Situational awareness in a CDEM emergency

### **The Place of Response in the Context of Comprehensive Emergency Management in New Zealand**

The New Zealand doctrine for emergency management is based on what is termed comprehensive emergency management which is represented by the 4Rs being Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. While this Review is focused on response, it is important that any changes to legislation, structures or responsibilities consider the flow on effect across Reduction, Readiness and Recovery.

In the CDEM context, comprehensive emergency management is essentially delivered locally by the CDEM Groups which in themselves are made up of a coalition local authorities. This is logical as functionally individual local authorities are also primarily responsible for reduction, readiness and recovery across a wide range of other activities at a local level.

Reduction, readiness (community resilience) and recovery are delivered across a range of local government activities as normal business. Most CDEM Groups would have strong linkages into (or may take the lead on) the local government functions that contribute to comprehensive emergency management.

Response however, is primarily delivered by the CDEM Group in coordination with the emergency services and other government and non-government agencies.

Response is actually a very small, yet publically facing, part of comprehensive emergency management.

#### Key Points:

1. The concept of comprehensive emergency management should be maintained as the basis of how New Zealand deals with CDEM emergencies.

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<sup>2</sup> Government Inquiry into Havelock North Drinking Water (2017), p. 145 [603]

2. If this is accepted then any separation of response from CDEM is likely to weaken the delivery of comprehensive emergency management.

### **The role of Local Government in Emergency Management**

This section focuses on the role of local government in CDEM, especially beyond the CDEM Group.

Section 17 of the Act outlines the functions of the CDEM Group. These logically compliment a number of the roles and functions of local government under the Local Government Act 2002. Furthermore section 17 also outlines a number of pieces of legislation supporting the CDEM Act which are also primarily administered by local government (e.g. Resource Management and Building Acts)

Beyond CDEM, local government is largely responsible for a range of functions such as

- natural hazard research, risk analysis and reduction (Reduction);
- local economic and community development/resilience (Readiness/Recovery); and
- individual resilience (Readiness/Response/Recovery).

It is therefore understandable, that under the Act, CDEM outcomes are seen as largely being delivered by local government (often through the CDEM Group). The only significant exceptions to this are the obligations placed on Lifelines operators (of which all councils are also members) and the emergency services during the response.

Other requirements generally only fall on central government agencies during readiness and in support of the response. Central government welfare agencies would be an example of this.

MCDEM is one obvious exception to this, however the Ministry's role is more in the policy development and setting guidelines in readiness, supporting any local response and coordinating a national response.

The main issue for local government is not so much in reduction, readiness and recovery activities, but capability in the response. We believe that rather than making significant changes by removing responsibility for the response away from CDEM, clarity of those responsibilities and enhanced capability is needed to improve the overall response. This will be discussed more fully in the next sections of this submission.

#### Key Points:

1. Local government is a vital partner for central government in building individual and community resilience in making New Zealand as a whole more resilient to disasters.
2. The roles and responsibilities given to local authorities across a range of legislation (other than the CDEM Act) means local authorities are well placed to deliver CDEM outcomes to local communities.
3. Response capability is a weakness in local government, however that weakness is variable between CDEM Groups depending on resourcing and capability.

## CDEM Response Capability at all Levels

We would agree that the response capabilities of New Zealand Emergency Services within their defined areas of responsibility are generally good. Therefore the purpose of this section is to make comment specifically on the CDEM sector being MCDEM, CDEM Groups and individual local authorities.

Our view is that this discussion would be helped by using the review of the response to the Canterbury Earthquakes as context. We would encourage the TAG to particularly read the response structures and capability comments in the *Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake* (p190-195). It would appear to us that the comments made on recent responses and the resulting TOR of this review, are very similar to those issues raised as a result of the Canterbury Earthquake response review.

One of the key recommendations of that review relevant to response capability was:

1. *Enhance professionalism in emergency management: a 'cadre' of highly trained emergency managers from organisations across the country should be established to lead and control emergency responses.*

The Cabinet decided this should be investigated further, however we are not aware of any significant progress in this regard.

### MCDEM

MCDEM has had relatively very little resource increase since the Canterbury Earthquakes until very recently. An analysis of the Ministry's Annual Plans shows that at the time of the Canterbury Earthquakes MCDEM had a staff of 39 full time equivalents (FTEs) and an operating budget of \$10.7M. By comparison in 2016 MCDEM had about 40 FTEs and an operating budget of \$11.7M.

Our view is the Ministry is under resourced particularly for a response related activities including developing increased response capability across the sector. As mentioned, until the 2016 Budget announcement MCDEM budgets were at best standing still. In the last 6 years however the requirement for policy development and change has increased greatly. Our view is that this has effectively meant that MCDEM has become more focused on developing policy and the response capability has not kept pace with wider changes in the sector.

This should not be taken as criticism of MCDEM staff who are committed, work hard and have very good relationships with the CDEM Groups.

However most national CDEM response roles are tacked on to an existing role which by nature leads to difficulties in prioritising work. Furthermore the structure of the Act makes it hard for MCDEM to take a stronger role in requiring consistency in response readiness across the CDEM Groups.

Our view is that MCDEM needs additional resourcing to develop a more effective national response structure including providing support to CDEM Groups during a response. To compliment this we also believe that MCDEM's role needs to be strengthened in the Act. This will be discussed more fully in the next two sections of this submission.

## CDEM Groups

As a general observation, since the Canterbury Earthquakes the CDEM Groups have put a significant investment into their overall capability. For example, in less than 5 years the Bay of Plenty Group office has gone from 3 FTEs to 12<sup>3</sup>. The Waikato Group have increased their FTEs from 1.3 to 9. In the case of the Hawke's Bay Group, staff have increased from 1.5 to 6.5 FTEs. There has also been a corresponding increase in operational expenditure. In the case of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group increasing from \$1M in 2010 to \$2.1M in 2016.

By contrast there has generally been very little increased investment by individual territorial local authorities. This points to the fact that most individual councils believe that a cooperative approach along shared service type arrangements produces the best CDEM outcomes for their communities. This has definitely been the experience from the Hawke's Bay perspective.

A number of CDEM Groups now employ full-time professional Group Controllers who are often the CDEM Group Manager as well. This approach is not uniform however and some smaller Groups do not have significant resourcing or capability to do this.

In Hawke's Bay the additional resourcing available since 2010 has focused on:

- Hazard research and reduction
- Increasing community and individual resilience planning
- Professionalization of key response roles such as Group Controller, Group Welfare Manager and response managers
- Training and exercising of council staff who operate coordination centres
- Welfare planning and response
- Coordination centre technology and processes

The key realisation in regard to capability is that the bar is consistently rising. While the Hawke's Bay Group has developed its response capability significantly, we would still struggle to effectively respond to a sustained large-scale event. For that reason we would support the development of national teams that could be deployed to support or even manage significant events.

As mentioned previously this was a significant recommendation of the Christchurch Earthquake Response Review and Cabinet agreed this should be investigated. We would recommend this now be given some priority and resourcing. National response teams could be multiagency (including selected CDEM Group staff) and should contain experts across the full range of CIMS functions. These teams may be deployed to take control of an major emergency but more importantly they could also be deployed across the full range of events to provide advice and expertise to a Group or local coordination centre.

We note this is not a new concept with Maritime NZ and Rural Fire having a similar tiered response capability.

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<sup>3</sup> Comparisons between 2010 and 2016 and does not include local EMO numbers.

### Key Points:

1. The funding and resourcing of MCDEM has not kept pace with the investment by many of the CDEM Groups and the increasing expectation of a response. This needs to be addressed.
2. That multiagency National response teams should be developed to respond or support the response to significant civil defence emergencies.
3. Significant increases in resourcing has occurred at the CDEM Group level, however these could be better utilised and aligned through strengthening the role of MCDEM beyond a mainly policy/advisory role.

### **Existing command and control arrangements under the CDEM Act 2002**

The current Act is structured to deal with two levels of response namely national and local. In a national response the lines of command and control are relatively straight forward, however the national controller only has powers to direct the response down to a local level when a national declaration occurs. The February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake is the only time a national emergency has been declared.

In contrast the Group Controller has the ability to give direction to a local controller in any emergency whether a declaration has occurred or not. In line with our recommendation that MCDEM be better resourced to support the response to civil defence emergencies, we also recommend that the national controller also be given powers to direct group controllers in an emergency whether a national declaration has occurred or not.

### Command and Control Definitions

During a state of national emergency the Act and the National Plan Group require the Director and/or national controller to *direct and control* the overall response<sup>4</sup>. However in section 9(2)(a) the powers are changed to *coordinating* resources.

In comparison during a declared local emergency group controllers are generally given powers to *direct and coordinate* the response. In our view use of the word coordinate lacks clarity and confuses the command and control arrangements in the response.

While individual emergency services and other government departments must retain command of their organisation, if a controller has responsibility and accountability for the overall response then they need to have very clear control arrangements over the supporting agencies.

The NZDF clearly identify command and control relationships which are words that are seen as having two very different meanings. Command is seen as being the direct authority to allocate people/resources to a specific task. Control is seen as the authority to delegate and prioritise tasks. For example in a CDEM context the police area commander will retain full command over their organisation however the operational control to delegate and prioritise the police CDEM response tasks may be given to the controller.

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<sup>4</sup> Section 8(2)(h) of the Act

In our view this type of approach is clearer than “coordinating” resources, which leaves room for ambiguity during a response.

We believe that CDEM response command and control needs to be very clearly defined in the Act and in particular the National Plan.

#### Declarations

The Act provides for local elected officials to declare a state of emergency for their area. The Hawke's Bay CDEM group has clear delegations for who and where a declaration can be made. At the beginning of each triennium CDEM induction/familiarisation is conducted for councillors where the delegations, roles and responsibilities for elected officials is explained.

We are of the view that the existing provisions for declaring a state of emergency are fit for purpose. However there is often tension between the desire to have more control over an emergency response and having to place this responsibility in the hands of a single controller.

We are of the view that this clear separation between governance and management in the response needs to remain. This separation exists at central government levels where ministers do not interfere with operational matters.

The Joint Committee has the power to replace a controller during an emergency if they are not satisfied, and this is the appropriate mechanism for political input into the operational aspects of the response.

We also note that if the Minister has concerns over the handling of a local emergency, they have the power under the Act to either make a local declaration themselves or remove the relevant CDEM group from control of the response.

#### Key Points:

1. The power of a controller to direct a response in an emergency should apply whether a state of emergency has been declared or not.
2. That the national controller should be given the power to direct a group controller during an emergency.
3. That the command and control arrangements during an emergency need to be reviewed and clarified. In particular there needs to be clear definitions for these arrangements and those responsible for the response should have an appropriate level of control over supporting agencies.
4. That local government elected officials are the appropriate level for declaring a local state of emergency, however beyond the strategic input of the Joint Committee, a trained controller should retain overall management of the response.

#### **CDEM Response Structures as Provided for Under the CDEM Act 2002**

CDEM response structures under the Act envisage three levels being national, group and local. The Group must appoint a Group Controller, however it may appoint local controllers. This structure and how

associated coordination centres work together in response was reviewed as part of the Christchurch Earthquake Review.

The key recommendation from that Review was:

*The emergency management response: territorial authorities should no longer have power to control the response to emergencies, but that they still retain the power to declare them.*

The Cabinet rejected this recommendation stating:

*Rather than diminishing the role of territorial authorities, MCDEM will work with regional CDEM Groups that need strengthening.*

Our view is that this Cabinet decision was a fundamental misunderstanding of how Groups should work and therefore missed an opportunity to streamline and clarify the roles of the different levels of government in CDEM. As stated in the Review:

*The Review found that the inherent duplication of control between the regional CDEM Group and CCC (Christchurch City Council) hampered the Response to the earthquake. The division between these two entities persisted in the CRC (Canterbury Response Centre) after it was formed. It is clear that the potential for duplication across the country needs to be reduced. This would concentrate resources, training and expertise on a smaller number of incident management teams and EOCs while still ensuring that emergency management is decentralised. (p190)*

.....

*This recommendation arises directly from an assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the several EOCs that operated during the Response:*

- *Initially both CCC and the Group operated separate EOCs in the same city, initially some few hundred metres apart. This involved duplication, confusion as to roles and uncertainty with supporting agencies as to with whom they should be dealing.*
- *After the declaration of National Emergency the two EOCs were merged but within the new CRC the two groups never melded into a cohesive organisation. This was despite the efforts by individuals on both sides to make the new structure work.*
- *It is quite clear the CCC EOC on its own could never have handled an emergency of this severity satisfactorily nor would the Group EOC have been able to cope, especially without the active support of the CCC.*

*These conclusions are reinforced by the experience after the September event when three TLAs each declared a state of local emergency and appointed their own EOC. The emergency was thus managed in three separate parts, despite considerable commonality in issues faced and resources required. With that even, partner agencies like the Police, MSD, the DHB and NGOs needed to appoint representatives in three EOCs rather than in one. (p191)*

Our view is that the above situation still exists across the country today and it is reinforced by the often conflicting roles and responsibilities between the national response, CDEM Groups and individual local authorities.



As an observation it would appear criticism of the response to recent events has occurred where there has been a lack of cooperation and at times strained relationships between members of the CDEM Group.

Our view is that individual members of the CDEM Group must abide by the majority decisions of the collective. There are examples around the country where individual councils have taken an "opt out" approach to CDEM Group decisions. This should be clarified in the legislation with powers to remove the ability of a local council to control a CDEM response given to the Minister and/or the Joint Committee.

We are of the view that you cannot allow differences or personalities to interfere with a coordinated Group response in a CDEM emergency.

While at times there has been conflict between individual Hawke's Bay councils on matters other than CDEM, both the Joint Committee and the CEG work to the common good and relationships in this area are strong. This has allowed the Group to take a comprehensive look at its capability, response structures and resourcing across the 4Rs but in particular for the response.

In 2015 the Group commenced an internal review of its response structures and method of operations. The review found:

1. Individual local councils lacked the staff and resources to manage anything other than a small emergency.
2. There was a lack of inter-operability between the coordination centre staff of different councils.
3. There was variability between equipment and processes in different coordination centres.
4. There was duplication of effort between the GECC and local EOCs.
5. The emergency services and other government agencies could not provide liaison and support five separate coordination centres across the region.
6. The public's expectation of a CDEM response had increased and this combined with the rise of digital media had increased the demand for instantaneous information and focus on the needs of the individual rather than communities.

It is likely that the above conclusions would be common across most Groups.

The Group decided that a rationalisation of Hawke's Bay response structures was needed to ensure that significant staff trained to an appropriate level were available to staff coordination centres during both a local and regional emergency.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group also rationalised its controller pool from 25 to 13 and appointing local controllers to the entire Hawke's Bay Group area so they can deploy in support of different councils. This has allowed us to focus limited resources on the developing a smaller pool, to a higher level.

The new mode of operational response adopted by the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group to address the above issues is outlined as follows:

1. The Group ECC will always activate in support a local council. The level of activation will depend upon the scale of the emergency however this helps to ensure that local councils have immediate access to the expertise held at the Group office.
2. Where possible the Group Controller will take the lead in the initial response to any event. This ensures that the expertise of the full time controller is used to establish situational awareness,

liaison with the emergency services, set the initial response objectives and develop the first action plan before a shift handover.

3. The GECC is staffed by three shifts made up of the staff of Hastings, Napier and the Regional Councils. This enables local knowledge to be retained in the GECC.
4. Individual councils are only responsible for managing their lifeline activities and this response is integrated into the Group Operations function.
5. All other CIMS functions are managed and fulfilled centrally.
6. The structure allows for Wairoa and Central Hawke's Bay to run scaled down EOCs given their relative geographical isolation.

As a result the number of coordination facilities across Hawke's Bay has effectively reduced from 5 to 3.

This structure has only recently been implemented. However a number of benefits are already accruing with common training and standardisation of roles and processes across different council staff. Recent gastro outbreak and rural fire events in Hastings District have been supported by coordination centre staff from Napier City and Hawke's Bay Regional Councils.

We acknowledge the Hawke's Bay approach may not suit all Groups. In particular smaller groups who do not have the ability to provide a full-time CDEM controller resource or those with large or remote areas. There could be an argument for the Government to establish a fund for Groups that lack the ability to fund appropriate response structures for their region.

Consideration should also be given to a more effective and equitable way to fund CDEM in the future to ensure, regardless of where you live, you can expect a consistent level of service in readiness, response and recovery.

Currently there are a number of variables that determine how well funded CDEM is in each region. Some of the variability is around individual council decision-making and priorities, some is simply due to the size of the rating base. Within the Groups themselves, varying rating bases across individual local authorities often result in larger TLAs effectively subsidising smaller TLAs.

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group is moving towards a single regional targeted rate based at the property level. This will simplify the funding process, ensure budget allocation is done in the best interests of the Group and that there is equity between ratepayers who are effectively receiving the same level of service.

A consistent funding model across New Zealand would lead to a more equitable and consistent level of capability.

The funding model for CDEM is different to that of the other Emergency Services which are centrally funded and often use population to determine the capability to be provided. The funding model alone won't improve capability but a centralised funding model, alongside commitment from TLAs to provide staff and share resources with a centralised agency, could improve capability.

#### Key Points:

1. In general individual territorial authorities lack the expertise and resources to manage a significant CDEM response.

2. At a local government level the majority of CDEM expertise and experience now lies at the Group level.
3. We are of the view that at the local authority level there is no need for two layers of response as this leads to duplication and confusion.
4. While territorial authorities still need to respond in their role as Lifeline providers and support specific response functions, there is little need for them to direct or control a multiagency coordinated response at a local level.
5. The role and functions of regional CDEM Groups should be strengthened to ensure individual local authorities must actively participate and abide by the decisions of the Group.
6. A review of CDEM funding should be conducted to help ensure equitable service and capability across New Zealand.

### **Situational Awareness in a CDEM Emergency**

This is an area which is constantly evolving as technology and expectations develop. From our perspective there appears to be three issues.

Firstly the ability for senior politicians and executives to access immediate information through news blogs and social media has increased significantly over the last 5 years. The issue is that much of this information lacks the checks and balances that official information must go through. There is no easy solution to this issue, however if the right technology was available and was used across all agencies and Groups, the flow of information and therefore situational awareness would improve.

Secondly, in terms of technology there is a wide range of off the shelf products which can be easily implemented to provide for quick impact and needs analysis.

There has been some work nationally to develop an impact analysis tool which can be used on the ground by all emergency services and CDEM volunteers. These systems automatically collate the information centrally at a coordination centre. However this appears to have stalled as different agencies have tried to cater for their specific needs.

This has also occurred in the welfare needs analysis space. The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has developed a very simple tool based on free software used by NGOs. This enables individuals to be registered and their welfare needs identified. This information is collated at the GECC and cases allocated to the appropriate agency. An overall picture of the welfare situation can be easily attained.

We have yet to use this software in an event, however a recent welfare exercise had encouraging results and significantly increased our welfare capability.

All of these systems are portable and simple to use. They can use mobile or satellite data, or the data can be uploaded upon return to a civil defence facility.

The third issue is around the selection and governance of these types of systems. There needs to be a focused process for selecting systems and all agencies should be required to adopt the solution.

It would appear to us that technological solutions are available but identifying and implementing a common platform across all agencies involved in a CDEM response becomes bogged down in individual agency preferences and bias.

This needs to be addressed at a central level and individual agencies (including CDEM Groups) need to be held accountable if they do not adopt a common emergency management platform.

A good example of this is the decision by some CDEM Groups to not fully adopt EMIS. If all Groups used EMIS in the way it was intended the ability for the NCMC and other Groups to get situational awareness at a regional level would be greatly enhanced. Our view is that Groups should be required to use EMIS through the National Plan or other regulation.

Key Points:

1. Situational awareness is the key to making appropriate response decisions in a timely manner.
2. Decisions on what platforms record and deliver impact and needs information should be made at a national level by a single agency after consultation rather than agreement.
3. All agencies and CDEM Groups should be required to adopt these platforms and EMIS rather than allowing an "opt out" approach.

**Conclusions**

Despite recent commentary on responses to CDEM emergencies, the coordinated response to a civil defence emergency in New Zealand has improved over the last 5 years.

However improvements can always be made and this Review is an opportunity to reinforce and address a number of reoccurring issues identified in responses since the Canterbury Earthquakes.

It also needs to be remembered that a civil defence response is not just the responsibility of MCDEM, the CDEM Groups or individual councils. In responding to a civil defence emergency all agencies and even communities become part of Civil Defence. Any change that is just focused on one sector of the system will not make a significant difference.

Any change will need to be resourced otherwise it is likely to fail and we will be having the same conversations in another 5 years

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group would like the opportunity to be heard and questioned on this submission.

Point of contact: Ian Macdonald s9(2)(a)

*Signed on Original*

Bill Dalton  
Chairperson  
Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

**From:** [Stephen Ward](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** Personal submission to Ministerial Review from Stephen Ward  
**Date:** Wednesday, 5 July 2017 8:56:05 a.m.

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Personal submission from Stephen Ward s9(2)(a)

### **Submitter's details:**

I am a CDEM Group PIM in a large region with 11 territorial local authorities. I have been involved with PIM since 2007 and have deployed to a number of major events. I have had experience working intra-regionally and inter-regionally at boosting PIM co-operation and resourcing.

### **General commentary:**

- I am a strong believer in the need for central government and others to invest more in beefing up the professionalization and capacity of our PIM resources at a national and regional level. Otherwise there is a potential for the public and CDEM professionals to be failed by inadequate PIM services, with all the risks to public safety and agency reputation that entails.
- One of my primary concerns is that significant PIM responsibilities are being loaded on to already busy communications staff at regional and local councils who cannot necessarily give the optimum amount of time and attention to driving PIM developments within their areas of responsibility.
- There is a need to treat PIM more as an essential part of the CDEM team and resource it accordingly.

### **Specific suggestions for improving PIM nationally and regionally:**

- A significant concern is differences in capacity and skills of PIM responders and in the systems that support them.
- A nationally-provided regional BAU PIM resource, able to be deployed at short notice to assist local and regional responses, would help avoid risks associated with different capacity and skills levels.
- Nationally paid for full-time PIM resources based within MCDEM (both in Wellington and elsewhere) could be available to provide mentoring or surge capacity in large events, in readiness and recovery.
- Standardised PIM management systems (especially IT) would help make the deployment of such resources as seamless as possible.
- Any specialised national PIM support and resourcing should, as indicated, always be available before, during and after events.
- A centrally funded resource could also help drive and coordinate PIM improvements within regions or groups of regions during readiness.
- National resources could be more active in ensuring that PIM-related developments are understood and implemented within regions comprehensively.
- The establishment of inter-agency PIM forums could be incentivised and supported at a national and regional level to accelerate relationship building, identify additional existing communication networks and help provide for surge capacity/mutual support.
- There needs to be regular professional development for PIM at a regional and local level, including key stakeholders (especially iwi) and partner agencies, and nearby groups.

- A more systematic and comprehensive national approach to PIM training and upskilling needs to be given high priority.

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## SUBMISSION TO MINISTERIAL REVIEW: BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCIES IN NEW ZEALAND

Date: Wednesday, 21 June 2017

By email to: [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz) (Submissions close 7 July 2017)

From: Alison Prins, Group Welfare Manager, Hawke's Bay CDEM Group  
(*Individual submission – not on behalf of HBCDEM Group*).

Re: **The Wellbeing of Children and Young People in Emergencies**

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This submission is regarding the arrangements in place for the wellbeing<sup>1</sup> of children and young people in an emergency. This submission identifies the problem, a potential solution and benefits. For context, it summarises existing arrangements, provides some personal experience, research and references websites with further information.

### The Problem

Whilst children and young people are provided for generally in welfare response arrangements and specifically in terms of, statutory care and protection and some areas of psychosocial support there are gaps in the arrangements. **There is also a lack of coordination across all issues, which may affect children, and no clear responsible agency to lead this.**

In contrast, animal welfare is well catered for in the National Plan. The Animal Welfare sub function (under welfare) covers the breadth of welfare needs for animals, has ownership from a responsible agency and support of multiple agencies and NGOs.

Children and young people are particularly vulnerable in emergencies and do not have a vote or voice when it comes to ensuring their needs are met. Children can lack understanding of what is happening in an emergency which can increase their vulnerability. The impact of stress on babies and young children as their brains develop can have lasting effects. In addition, 'parents problems become children's pain' as there are increased risk of poor mental health of parents and caregivers, family violence and substance abuse.

The interface between education facilities, Ministry of Education and CDEM can be complex for a number of reasons but decisions around closing and reopening educational facilities can have wide-ranging implications on communities if not well managed. The Ministry of Education also currently works across multiple welfare sub functions which is not the most efficient to manage their limited resource.

Educational facilities currently are required to have health and safety plans but there are concerns about the effectiveness of planning for facilities particularly in tsunami zones.

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<sup>1</sup> Wellbeing provides a more holistic view than welfare. Welfare is often associated with child protection and statutory care and has potential negative connotations eg 'child welfare' in the Hunt for the Wilderpeople!

## Potential Solution

There is an opportunity to review arrangements for the wellbeing of children and young people in an emergency.

One possible outcome could be a specific sub function under welfare arrangements for the Wellbeing of Children and Young People in an Emergency, which has a child centred lens across emergency management. The scope of this sub function could be care and protection, psychosocial support and continuity of education. It could be the 'go to' sub function for matters relating to child wellbeing in emergencies across the 4Rs. It would have a responsible agency underneath the umbrella of the Welfare Coordination Group and have a broader range of support agencies with expertise with children eg DHB, Save the Children.

## Benefits

Reduction – trusted voice / advocacy to reduce the risk for children in educational facilities, particular tsunami zones.

Readiness – development of messaging, factsheets resources and response planning.

Response – clear leadership, subject matter expertise and coordination across issues for children and young people.

Recovery – clearer view of recovery issues for children and young people and coordination of strategies to enhance their recovery.

## Existing Arrangements

There are arrangements in place in the **Welfare Services section of the National CDEM Plan 2015** (the National Plan) as follows:

- **Clause 72** makes provision for the **care and protection services for children and young people**. The scope of this “planning the delivery and co-ordination of statutory care and protection services to those children and young people who have been identified (after registration) as being separated from their parents, legal guardians, or usual caregivers during an emergency.” The Ministry for Vulnerable Children Oranga Tamariki (formerly Child, Youth & Family) are the agency responsible for this sub function supported by the Ministry of Education, the New Zealand Police, the New Zealand Red Cross and Te Puni Kōkiri.
- **Clause 71(3)(a)** as part of the **Psychosocial Support** sub function makes provision for the Ministry of Education, to support schools and early childhood providers during the emergency or traumatic incident by working alongside the traumatic incident teams or management teams of those schools and providers to assist them in responding to an emergency or incident and implementing an emergency response plan;



In addition to this, the **Welfare Services in an Emergency Director's Guideline [DGL 11/15]** outlines the role Save the Children NZ provide (not mandated) in support the Psychosocial Sub Function. This role is to prepare for and deliver programmes in Child Friendly Spaces during and after emergencies. In addition, to provide advice and assistance to other organisations and deliver resilience programmes to children and caregivers (e.g. Journey of Hope).

### **Personal Experience**

#### Havelock North Gastro Outbreak August 2016 (Group Welfare Manager)

There were a range of issues; under 5's identified as a vulnerable group, home alone children identified as part of outreach and families under stress with schools closed and incomes impacted.

There was a range of strategies put in place to address the issues involving many organisations: Ministry of Education, schools, Red Cross, Child, Youth & Family, Well Child Tamariki Ora providers (Plunket and Te Taiwhenua o Heretaunga). This was mostly coordinated through the Welfare Manager but the Controllers and politicians also engaged directly with schools. These arrangements were not as well coordinated as they could have been; this was not helped by the complexity of the arrangements for the wellbeing of children and understanding around them.

#### Kaikoura Earthquake November 2016 (NCMC Welfare De k)

Particular issues identified with extended disruption to schooling then going into the summer holidays, children returning from boarding schools and seeing the impact for the first time, the stress on families trying to start recovery and the importance of children being involved in the recovery. It was identified that MOE, CYF and MOH should come together to discuss these issues and support local initiatives to manage them. This was an arrangement put together in response as there was no clear agency lead. I am not aware how this subsequently evolved of the success of this.

### **Research from Canterbury**

Research on the longer-term impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes shows that children and young people affected by this event are showing ongoing signs of post-traumatic stress disorder. Research done in Japan 10 years after the 1995 Kobe earthquake saw a sharp spike in teenage suicide and delinquency. Ensuring children and young people are well supported in preparing for, responding to and recovering from disasters is critical. Research into what helped children and young people cope following the Canterbury earthquakes was ensuring that children understood and were involved in preparing for ongoing shocks, having opportunities to talk about what happened, being given tasks to help with the recovery, and returning to school and a normal routine. Parents, caregivers and teachers are key delivers of support for children and young people and require information and advice on managing this. Having an agency tasked with coordinating the well-being of children in emergencies would make sense.

## References

### Information on Recovery for Children and Young People in a Disaster

- Queensland Centre for Perinatal and Infant Mental Health <https://www.childrens.health.qld.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/PDF/factsheets/qcpimh-dis-recovery-byc.pdf>
- My Health Alberta (Alberta Government and Alberta Health Services) <https://myhealth.alberta.ca/Alberta/Pages/helping-children-teens-recover-disaster-emergency.aspx>

### Brain Development

- Brainwave Trust Aotearoa [http://www.brainwave.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/BW\\_DLE\\_pamphlet\\_revfinal1.pdf](http://www.brainwave.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/BW_DLE_pamphlet_revfinal1.pdf)

### Research

- Quake stress hurting our young <http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/christchurch-earthquake-2011/9674021/Quake-stress-hurting-our-young>
- Rolling with the shakes: an insight into teenagers' perceptions of recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1177083X.2015.1068183>

## **Submission to Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand:**

From: Steve Critchlow, Managing Director, Critchlow Limited

Dated: 05 July 2107

Contact: s9(2)(a) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

### **I would like to be heard in support of this written submission.**

Critchlow Limited [www.critchlow.co.nz](http://www.critchlow.co.nz) is based in Wellington and specialises in providing location intelligence and emergency management systems. For 25 years, we've enabled people to see, share, and understand information so they make the best business and operational decisions. We provide enabling tools such as geographic information and emergency management systems and a range of unique and precise NZ map databases maintained daily.

The company employs around 30 people across Wellington, Auckland, Sydney and Perth. My professional qualifications are in surveying, mapping and computer science. I am a member of the NZ Institute of Surveyors and IT Professionals NZ. The company is a member of the NZ Technology Industry Association and the Spatial Industries Business Association.

Since 2004 Critchlow has built and provided support for WebEOC emergency management systems on a 24/7 basis for 21 Australian government agencies, plus Maritime NZ, and Fonterra for its global incident management and notifications. WebEOC is also used by Air New Zealand and Qantas, both airlines are supported directly from the USA

Critchlow responded to MCDEM's Request for Proposals for EMIS in 2003, which eventually was cancelled, and in 2009 which resulted in the selection of E-Sponder which later morphed into EMIS as its now known. Auckland Council and the Ministry of Health both used WebEOC for a few years until they adopted the national standard EMIS. Maritime NZ and regional councils, continue to use WebEOC for oil spill response following its success during the Rena grounding.

My observations and submission is based on my experience gained in deploying successful, cost-effective emergency information management systems over the last 13 years. I wrote to the Minister on 27 October and 30 November 2016 and am happy for the content to be used and referenced by the Technical Advisory Group.

### **Outcome 2 – Appropriate capability and resourcing**

1. Most NZ territorial authorities (TA) are under-resourced. It is unreasonable to expect a NZ TA to design an emergency management system and respond to emergency incidents, other than the smallest ones, without external specialist support.
2. TA and regional response systems have been stalled by lack of central government direction for at least the 13 years that I've been active in the sector. 10-13 years ago, TAs and regional councils (RCs) were enthusiastic about the proven systems we were introducing to NZ, but couldn't commit in case a central system emerged (with the exception of Auckland City that

decided its responsibility to protect its residents overrode the fear of making a mistake). Unfortunately, for all but Auckland City, the central government line never became distinct enough for TAs and RCs to make investment decisions, so they stuck to whiteboards and paper. Eventually even Auckland Council was convinced to drop its tactical emergency response system, presumably through external pressure.

3. NZ should implement a single, continuously-operating and monitored, comprehensive internet-based national emergency management system, administered by local responders for user management, information and resource sharing, as well as accessed by supporting specialists who are likely to be in different locations. There are many excellent examples of successful multi-agency deployments operated by US and Australian state governments (Western Australia is the poster child in our region).
4. The system should be a tactical operational system (like WebEOC) as well as a reporting system (like EMIS and WebEOC).
5. Business continuity preparations in large NZ organisations is worryingly immature. In 2014 Critchlow became NZ Distributor for Sungard Availability Services, and spent the last three years promoting enterprise-quality SaaS business continuity planning software to larger NZ government and commercial organisations. We expected there would be strong demand for world-leading BC software in NZ given the country's well-documented risk profile.
6. Our expensively-gained experience is that NZ business continuity specialists are well-meaning professionals making do with zero budget for new systems or approaches and limited influence within their organisations.
7. Boards and CEO's are responsible for assuring continuity of operations, but don't have the expertise or time to learn about, or spend on, detailed business continuity planning. This is a shame because the planning processes required for business continuity assurance also enable business-as-usual processes to mesh together as intended, and the process inter-dependencies could then be communicated throughout the organisation, or all-of-government for that matter.

#### **Outcome 4 – Command and control and decision-making is effective**

1. CIMS is a proven framework and should be retained as the standard for NZ.
2. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management should be a policy and funding organisation, without a response capability. Leave response to the emergency services and Defence Force who are resourced to deal with the unexpected and are used to making rapid decisions.

#### **Outcome 5 – Information flows effectively**

1. One well-resourced, seamless emergency management system, operated and administered by Police or FENZ, running 24/7/365, is all that's required to be shared by all three layers of New Zealand government, and the media. Data updates would be entered by local users, meaning that regional and national players would monitor the status of unfolding local events on their mobile devices from any location with internet access, and organise backup support as required.

2. The system's structure should mirror the CIMS framework with users allocated to Groups which would compartmentalise data access for security management reasons.
3. A professionally-managed, mapping system showing all NZ's population distribution, aerial photographs, critical infrastructure, transport links and hazards must be a component of the emergency management system. In an emergency, there is no time to think what's required, assemble the specialist resources, design a system, and debate the merits of free versus commercial data supply. This mapping system should be designed by specialists for non-specialist users.
4. Live web map services in the mapping system should be operating continuously, eg. weather conditions and forecasts, tides, tsunami forecasts, traffic conditions are just some examples.
5. Monitor professional media and social media feeds, investigate data presented in feeds and respond to the media and public as appropriate using the single government emergency management system to manage the approval and publication process.

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CRITCHLOW 

27 October 2016

Hon Gerry Brownlee  
Minister of Civil Defence  
Parliament Buildings  
Wellington

Dear Gerry

## EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (EMIS)

Critchlow Limited specialises in providing location intelligence and emergency management systems. For 25 years, we've enabled people to see, share, and understand information so they make the best business and operational decisions. We provide enabling tools such as GIS and emergency management systems and a range of advanced GIS map data for NZ.

The Australian and NZ clients using Critchlow-supported WebEOC emergency management systems are shown on the attached map.

I am writing to draw your attention to what many qualified observers consider a high-risk DIY approach that the NZ Government is continuing to take regarding the country's emergency management information systems.

Treasury has issued a Request for Proposals for Supply of an Emergency Management Information System (EMIS)) that closes on 28 October 2016. On page 8 the business problem is stated as:-

*"From its initial installation (2011) it has been a challenge for MCDEM to promote and convince the nationwide CDEM sector to fully uptake the tool (EMIS). Feedback from the regional CDEM Groups was originally not positive. EMIS 2.0 (2013) addressed some of the issues experienced but it was still a challenge to promote and improve uptake."*

We asked a question regarding the current RFP and received an answer that leaves us perplexed.

**Question:** Will you consider an alternative proposal for a global "best in class" Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) solution, WebEOC, that is not based on SharePoint; however still allows customers to rapidly self-configure for new requirements. Has built in Whispir integration, built in ArcGIS integration, free COTS mobility applications, a COTS integration application that allows seamless and secure sharing of information between other owners of the same system. Eg AHA Centre, World Health Organisation, FEMA, Maritime NZ, Fonterra, Auckland Council; and is intuitive and simple to train others in its use?

**Answer:** Thank you for your question. As noted in the RFP Summary Document, Section 3.1 Pre-conditions, "Each Proposal must meet all of the following pre-conditions. Proposals which fail to meet one or more will be eliminated from further consideration."

*Respondents who are unable to meet all pre-conditions should conclude that they will not benefit from submitting a Proposal.*

*Pre-condition 1: The solution must be built in SharePoint 2016 or be a SharePoint 2016 based product (it will need to have the ability to integrate with other products)."*

*These conditions were created with care by the project team, the business and the system users. SharePoint is the platform our users have familiarity with and have been trained in. In addition, SharePoint is a commonly used and supported platform. This would enable the Agencies to have flexible support arrangements utilising both in house capability and vendor supplied support as required. It is also a risk reduction measure as SharePoint is widely used and there is a wealth of knowledge to tap into in the event of an emergency.*

We feel that underlying this answer is a justified fear in the project team that the proposed EMIS 3.0 could fail during a big emergency activation, continuing the unfortunate record of EMIS 1.0 and EMIS 2.0, and that a contracted support vendor can't be trusted to deliver the required support when needed. We agree that this is a real risk that needs to be mitigated if New Zea and is to have an effective EMIS.

Critchlow's risk mitigation strategy, endorsed by our clients, is to deploy battle-proven, well-supported WebEOC software systems that work as designed, when needed, allowing emergency managers to focus on incident management, not fixing broken computer systems. This pragmatic approach has been rejected out of hand by the EMIS 3.0 design team.

To illustrate the substantial benefits and much lower risks of using a COTS system the attached table compares two approaches for EMIS 3.0.

#### **Option A – WebEOC from Critchlow**

WebEOC is a proven crisis information management solution with hundreds of installations worldwide. Its highly secure environment and simplicity of operation have made WebEOC the low-risk solution of choice for the largest emergency management agencies including the USA's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

WebEOC is a web enabled, user-friendly and locally-configurable disaster and emergency management system. In Australia and New Zealand, WebEOC is used by state policing authorities, major international airlines, federal, central and local government agencies and Fonterra to get an accurate view of what is happening, where and to whom, and to enable all parties to collaborate through a simple, secure interface, so that they can make the right decisions, fast.

Australian and NZ WebEOC customers are supported 24\*7\*365 from our office across the road from Treasury, DPMC, MCDEM and the Beehive. We are resilient enough to operate from anywhere with an internet connection if our office is unusable. Our local support is backed up by staff in Australia, our supplier in the USA, and the global WebEOC user community of emergency managers.



**Option B – DIY build in SharePoint 2016**

The current Request for Proposal is seeking SharePoint consultants to build and support EMIS 3.0 using a later version of the same technology that hasn't been accepted by the Regional CDEM Groups during the past 5 years. This will be a unique SharePoint solution with all development and support costs to be borne by the NZ Government. Target delivery timelines aren't specified in the RFP. This approach has the potential for a cost blow-out.

Please understand that I'm writing not only out of personal and business interest, but also because of the frustration expressed by many qualified people in the NZ civil defence and emergency management sector that a proven commercial emergency management system backed by NZ specialists could be rejected by MCDEM for a third time. We live with many very significant natural hazards here in New Zealand. Our country deserves resilient IT systems for dealing with worst-case scenarios.

Would it be possible to meet to discuss this matter in more depth before the EMIS 3.0 RFP process is finalised?

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

**CRITCHLOW LIMITED**



**STEVE CRITCHLOW**

Managing Director


s9(2)(a)



**Table 1: Comparison of options**

	<b>WebEOC</b>	<b>SharePoint</b>
<b>Emergency Management user community</b>	600+ sites, 28 countries, 23 major sites in NZ/Australia	Isolated, bespoke development for NZ
<b>24/7/365 Support from dedicated specialists</b>	Established 24/7/365 support from Wellington, Sydney, Perth & USA	Expensive if a single customer bears all support costs
<b>Reliability</b>	Proven over 18 years	Unknown
<b>Scalable to thousands of users</b>	Proven	Unknown
<b>Training &amp; user acceptance</b>	Proven simplicity	Unknown
<b>Multi-agency</b>	Proven	To be built
<b>Whispir notification integration</b>	Proven and supported	To be built
<b>ArcGIS mapping integration</b>	Proven and supported	To be built
<b>CIMS compliant</b>	Proven	To be built
<b>Real Me integration</b>	To be built	To be built
<b>Security</b>	Used by US Federal, State, Defense and nuclear facilities	Unknown
<b>Delivery Timeframe</b>	4-8 weeks for first delivery	Unspecified by MCDEM
<b>Likely cost</b>	Fixed licence and support fees + tailored configuration effort	Unknown
<b>Client-configurable</b>	Yes	Required
<b>Overall project risk</b>	Low risk	High risk

### Australian WebEOC network As at 15 September 2016



See. Share. Understand.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

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**CRITCHLOW** 

30 November 2016

Hon Gerry Brownlee  
Acting Minister of Civil Defence  
Parliament Buildings  
Wellington

Dear Gerry

**EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (EMIS)**

Thank you for your letter of 08 November 2016 explaining that it wasn't appropriate to meet while the Request for Proposals issued by Treasury was in process. Critchlow Ltd didn't respond to the Request for Proposals because we don't agree that SharePoint is an appropriate platform for EMIS 3.0.

Treasury advised that the preferred supplier for EMIS 3.0 SharePoint development would be notified on 28 November, and I presume contract negotiations would be the next stage. I'm taking this window of opportunity between the RFP evaluation and finalising of a new contract to ensure you are aware that WebEOC is not expensive.

I confirm Mr David Coetzee of MCDEM did meet with our Scott Kennedy on 02 September 2016 and explained he couldn't consider WebEOC since his annual budget for EMIS running costs was insufficient and MCDEM didn't want to become dependent on a commercial vendor. He showed little interest in exploring the benefits that modern emergency management systems can provide. It really does seem that perpetuating the SharePoint approach to EMIS is a face-saving measure for procurement decisions made by MCDEM since 2009.

The cost of a configured WebEOC system to connect MCDEM with all Civil Defence Groups and Territorial Authorities would be a small fraction of the investments made in EMIS 1 and EMIS 2 and definitely within the budget for the EMIS 3.0 upgrade that Mr Coetzee shared with us. The first production version of a WebEOC system could be delivered in 4-8 weeks, possibly sooner if you deemed it sufficiently urgent.

With NZ's recent experiences of earthquakes and tsunami will the government pause and think about taking a fresh approach to EMIS using a proven, well-supported commercial solution as described in my letter of 27 October 2016?

Assuming it is now possible for us to meet, could you please advise when you are available?

Yours sincerely  
**CRITCHLOW LIMITED**



**STEVE CRITCHLOW**  
Managing Director  
s9(2)(a)

See. Share. Understand.

## Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

### Written Submission Form

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> New Zealand Institute of Animal Management
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes/ <input checked="" type="radio"/> No
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): As per attached email,

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)



## **Submission to the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management**

In the matter of the:

**Ministerial Review on Better Responses to National Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand with regard to Animal Welfare**

Submission by

**New Zealand Institute of Animal Management**

**5 July 2017**

**Person for Contact: Andrea McMurray, National Secretary**

## 1. Context

On behalf of the New Zealand Institute of Animal Management through delegated authority from Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ), we wish to put forward a submission to the Ministerial Review on Better Responses to National Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand with regard to Animal Welfare.

## 2. Proposal

The importance of providing animal welfare services to the community in the event of a natural disaster must be acknowledged. International research shows 58% to 68% of people that own companion animals are less likely to cooperate in an evacuation if their animals aren't provided for.

International experience also shows that inattention to providing for animal's causes heighten stress and anxiety to the community, leaving Government and Local Government at risk of community mistrust.

While most agencies are prepared to provide assistance for companion animals, we need to establish procedures and account for resources in dealing with production animals.

We believe that Territorial Authorities should be the primary supporting agency to the Ministry of Primary Industries due to our established structure and resources already engaged in animal management in the community. We believe that we have strong relationships with other like-minded agencies such as the New Zealand SPCA, Federated Farmers, Vet Association and other local welfare agencies within our community.

These relationships put us in a strong position to enable our members to provide guidance and advice as proven in the recent Edgecumbe floods and the Christchurch Port Hills fire incident.

We believe that animal welfare response should be managed at a regional level so that all communities within the region benefit from shared knowledge and resources. National plans, regional plans and local plans need to be co-ordinated to avoid confusion and ensure consistency.

The Ministry of Primary Industries must review their resourcing as the lead agency responsible for animal welfare in an emergency.

It's the opinion of this organisation (NZIAM) that Local Government New Zealand through Animal Management/Services be engaged as lead support agency to assist the Ministry of Primary Industries in their role as lead agency. We believe the existing structure and resources available from the far North to Bluff including Stewart Island and Chatham Islands, will ensure a structured and consistent response to emergency incidents.

Animal Management staff have been in the forefront in recent disasters such as Edgecumbe, Wellington, and Christchurch. Our Local Government Animal Management's teams can provide expertise and local knowledge and readiness, this will in our view enhance the Ministry of Primary Industries to fulfil their responsibilities to risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery within the New Zealand Emergency framework. .

Our members are in a position to network, build and establish coordinated responses with other likeminded agencies such as Society of Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, New Zealand Veterinary Association, Federated Farmers and other local animal welfare groups.

The New Zealand Institute of Animal Management strongly believe that a defined structure of support agencies should be formulated to ensure the effective use of resources, providing support to agencies, ensuring effective and appropriate response to emergency events.

**Thank you for the opportunity to submit on the Ministerial Review on Better Responses to National Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand with regard to Animal Welfare.**



**SUBMISSION TO THE MINISTERIAL REVIEW: BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND  
OTHER EMERGENCIES IN NEW ZEALAND**

**Name:** Tane Woodley

**Contact Details:** s9(2)(a)

**I wish to be heard in support of this written submission.**

1. I am making this submission as a private citizen, albeit one who worked in MCDEM from 2007-2016, has worked in emergency management at MAF (now MPI) and the MoH, and am currently working on readiness and response activities at the NZ Customs Service. I am also currently a logistics officer in the Army Reserve.
2. There are three areas I'd like to comment on; MCDEM's responsibilities and current resourcing, the National Warning System and the linked subjects of training and doctrine.

**MCDEM RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCING**

3. The first point I would like to make is that I believe MCDEM does a good job of meeting its responsibilities, given its current level of funding. MCDEM has come in for some public criticism lately, which was justifiable in that the public's expectations were not met. However, given its level of resources, I don't think it is possible for MCDEM to meet all of the public's expectations all of the time. I believe MCDEM needs to be either resourced to a much greater level, or some of its responsibilities need to be passed onto another agency without a reduction in budget and staff.
4. MCDEM has a very wide range of responsibilities, including, but not limited to;
  - Maintaining and activating the National Warning System on a 24/7/365 basis,
  - Maintaining and activating the NCMC, both in the Beehive basement and in any alternate location,
  - Leading readiness and response activities for a wide range of geological, meteorological and lifelines-related hazards,
  - Public information management, during readiness and response, in training CDEM groups, and across all media channels,
  - Providing advice to the Minister of Civil Defence, and to ODESC,
  - Developing and maintaining the National CDEM Plan and the CDEM Act 2002,
  - Overseeing training development and provision to the CDEM sector,
  - Developing and maintaining the CDEM Emergency Management Information System (EMIS),
  - The provision of advice and guidance to CDEM Groups,
  - Leading on lifelines and welfare readiness and response activities, both to the CDEM sector and to other national agencies, and
  - Assessing national hazard risks, particularly geological, meteorological and lifelines-related.

5. This is a wide range of substantial responsibilities. MCDEM is currently expected to meet these with approximately 60 staff and a budget for 2017/18 of just over \$16 million. I think that MCDEM's responsibilities are too much for an agency with this level of resourcing to be able to fully meet the current level of expectations. This is especially noticeable during a major response when almost all other work programmes are put on hold in order to operate the NCMC.
6. MCDEM does a credible job meeting its responsibilities. However the sheer breadth of these responsibilities means that key functions are sometimes only covered by 1-2 staff, with limited redundancy and backup. To make up for this shortfall, the staff are dedicated and work hard to deliver. Internal systems and processes were adequate when I was there. I do not think major performance gains can be made by simply restructuring MCDEM within its current resource limits. If MCDEM's performance is to improve, either some of these responsibilities need to be reallocated to other agencies, or its level of resourcing needs to increase significantly.

#### NATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM

7. I was part of the team that developed the current National Warning System in 2007/8, and for a period I was responsible for maintaining it. I believe it is an adequate and workable system, but it has always had some fundamental flaws. The first is that it is reliant on staff performing duty roles in a part-time capacity. This means that they perform their duty in addition to their normal BAU work, and that they are on-duty when they go home and go to bed. This means that staff are not primarily focused on duty, as it is normally a secondary concern that can (and does) crop up at any time of day and night.
8. The second issue with the duty system is that the key decision makers (duty manager, Director/National Controller, GNS duty officer, MCDEM duty officer) are not normally in the same location. In my time at MCDEM, decisions were normally made in a series of phone calls where not all roles were present. This may have changed, but the need to dial into a teleconference means that time is lost as duty staff take stock, gather information and then communicate with each other to come to a decision. The provision of advice from the GNS duty officer in particular was an ongoing problem as they often had multiple phone calls to make in a very short period, while also analysing data.
9. The result is that the National Warning System was workable and adequate for hazards that had already occurred (e.g. earthquakes) or for those with a lead-time of more than 2 hours (e.g. regional/distant tsunami, cyclones). However, where response times were very short (e.g. local tsunami threat, as in the Kaikoura earthquake), the system was always going to struggle. The volume of communication and analysis needed was often too great for the available time.
10. There is no easy solution to the gap around high impact/interest, short notice events. Ideally MCDEM, GNS and other agency staff would be co-located in a 24/7/365 coordination centre. This will be expensive in terms of staff, allowances and equipment to support rapid decision-making. It may be possible to get a large performance improvement from the current arrangements, but I can't see how that can happen.

## TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

11. In order to improve the standard of response across all CDEM responders, there needs to be a comprehensive and effective training system in place to bring staff up to a basic level of competence. A training system needs a body of doctrine to draw from, and which serves as a repository for lessons learnt in responses. This system and body of doctrine does not exist at present. Elements of it are present, but not enough, and not joined up to form a useful system for training staff. CIMS and the National CDEM Plan are useful starting points, but lack the required detail and breadth.
12. An agency needs to be responsible for collating all of the principles, practices and procedures for emergency management, as well as lessons identified, into a coherent set of doctrine. It also needs to be responsible for developing a comprehensive set of courses and training, and preferably for delivering these also. The use of third parties to deliver courses does not seem to work that effectively. The costs are often high, it relies on agencies and local government wanting to organise the course and the quality of delivery is uneven across multiple providers. Courses that are expected to be run by local councils are dependent on the knowledge and enthusiasm of trainers.
13. Combining doctrine and training development into one body works for the Police, NZDF and FENZ. This model could work well with emergency management. MCDEM is the logical agency for this, but not at its current level of funding. Compared to the current system it is substantially more expensive, but it will be more effective, and would lead to a higher trained state and more coherent emergency management philosophy and doctrine.
14. Thank you for the opportunity to present my views.

Regards,

Tane Woodley



07 July 2017

Technical Advisory Group Secretariat  
s9(2)(a)

Dear Jeremy,

Please find attached Auckland Council's submission in response to the Minister of Civil Defence's review of civil defence in New Zealand. We would like to appear before the Technical Advisory Group and elaborate on our views during the submissions process.

If you require any clarification on any aspect of the submission please contact Stephen Town, Chief Executive on 09 890 7742, or by email at [stephen.town@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz](mailto:stephen.town@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz).

Yours sincerely

Councillor Sharon Stewart QSM  
**Chair, Auckland CDEM Group Committee**

Councillor John Watson  
**Deputy Chair, Auckland CDEM Group Committee**

Stephen Town  
**Chief Executive, Auckland Council**  
**Chair, Coordinating Executive Group**

Encl.



Submission to the

Technical Advisory Group

**BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL  
DISASTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCIES IN  
NEW ZEALAND**

07 July 2017

## Auckland Council submission to the Technical Advisory Group

1. This is Auckland Council's submission to the Technical Advisory Group on civil defence matters.
2. The address for service is: Auckland Council, Private Bag 92300, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142.
3. Please direct any queries to Stephen Town, Chief Executive. Phone 09 890 7742 or email [stephen.town@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz](mailto:stephen.town@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz)
4. Auckland Council wishes to appear before the Technical Advisory Group to discuss this submission.
5. This submission has been approved by the Chair and Deputy Chair of the Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group Committee and by the Chair of Auckland's Coordinating Executive Group.
6. The submission is set out as follows:

**Section 1:** Introduction

**Section 2:** Executive summary

**Section 3:** Auckland Council's submission to the Technical Advisory Group

**Section 4:** Concluding comments

### SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

7. The vision of 'Resilient Auckland', the Auckland 2016-2021 CDEM Group Plan, is: 'working together to build a resilient Auckland'. The plan recognises that everyone from individuals and families; business and government, both central and local, must work together to build a resilient Auckland.
8. As a small department operating in the fastest growing, most dynamic and diverse region in New Zealand, Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) is set up and operates differently to most civil defence entities across the country. Auckland CDEM places community engagement; innovation; and quality, timely and well-informed communications at the centre of everything the department does. Auckland Council acknowledges that Auckland CDEM's modern, inclusive approach to building resilience is different to the traditional view of civil defence in New Zealand.
9. Auckland CDEM has embraced the Auckland Council mantra of 'making our size work'. The department has 31 staff but accesses expertise from across Auckland Council's 11,000 employees. Auckland CDEM build upon their strengths; make use of the skills and experience of the council family and harness the strengths of key partners and stakeholders. The department

believes in learning from others, taking the best of a wide range of approaches and disciplines and applying them to their work. Auckland CDEM keeps up-to-date with best practice, global shifts and trends, and technology to deliver quality civil defence and emergency management services to 1.6 million Aucklanders.

10. A recent survey<sup>1</sup> representative of the Auckland region showed that 77% of Aucklanders know what actions to take if a disaster struck their area and 65% have a good understanding of the type of disasters that could occur in Auckland and the chances of them occurring. While these figures are high, Auckland Council acknowledges that building resilience in Auckland requires a different and more dynamic approach to that traditionally seen in New Zealand.
11. As a unitary authority, Auckland Council has a simple setup for civil defence matters. Auckland has one CDEM political chair, one CDEM director, and one Coordinating Executive Group with representatives from a range of different agencies. This structure is well understood by key partners and stakeholders and works well in planning, response and recovery phases.
12. This submission, which is structured around a small number of key themes allied to the scope identified in the Technical Advisory Group's Terms of Reference, primarily reflects on Auckland CDEM's learnings and observations of delivering CDEM services in a unitary environment.

## **SECTION 2: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

13. CDEM in Auckland operates under a unitary model. This model is fit-for-purpose for the Auckland region. Under this model lead agency responsibilities are clear, however, Auckland Council believes that whatever 'structures' of civil defence in New Zealand are recommended by the TAG that these structures need to have the appropriate level of 'local' input successfully integrated.
14. Auckland CDEM is well resourced to deliver CDEM services. Auckland Council has offered to work with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) to share these resources but these offers have been rejected. Auckland Council asks the TAG to consider recommendations which would empower MCDEM to act upon such offers of assistance. In addition, Auckland Council submits that the role of MCDEM needs to be more clearly defined.
15. Auckland Council asks the TAG to consider the 'professionalism' of CDEM in New Zealand and recommends the establishment of a professional body or similar with associated training for membership required.

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<sup>1</sup> Auckland Council, Preparedness and Resilience Monitor, 2016/17

16. Auckland CDEM asks the TAG to consider the issue of resourcing; both during the response to emergencies and during 'peace time' to ensure that resources are able to be quickly and satisfactorily placed where they are required and that MCDEM is better able to make use of the significant resource and expertise of local government.
17. Auckland Council submits that community engagement and community resilience building is critical to the success of CDEM and should be integrated into the way civil defence operates. In addition, Auckland Council asks the TAG to consider communication platforms and tools used by the CDEM sector as well as monitoring and warning systems across the country to ensure consistency and best practice.
18. Acknowledging that the focus of the TAG's review is on mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies, Auckland Council recommends a number of refinements to the CDEM Act 2002 with regards to Coordinating Executive Groups; their membership, representation and other matters.
19. Auckland Council asks the TAG to consider the 'role' of MCDEM and whether refinements could be made to ensure a whole-of-system approach to emergency management.
20. Lastly, Auckland Council states its support for the National Disaster Resilience Strategy being led by MCDEM. This strategy is a clear step forward for civil defence in New Zealand; it takes a broad, modern approach to building resilience.

### **SECTION 3: AUCKLAND COUNCIL'S SUBMISSION TO THE TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP**

#### **Civil defence 'structures' in New Zealand**

21. As stated in the introduction above, CDEM in Auckland operates under a unitary model. This model is well suited to the Auckland region, it is fit-for-purpose and there is no ambiguity over lead agency responsibilities during response. Auckland Council is aware, however, that there are significant differences in how CDEM is structured across the country with some regions operating under a unitary model and others operating under a devolved model with regional coordination of delivery by local authorities.
22. While Auckland Council accepts that having fewer 'layers' is often preferable to overly complex or hierarchical structures, council would caution against the adoption of any recommended changes to the 'structure' of civil defence in New Zealand that lack the appropriate level of local input.



23. The Auckland Council model of governance has recently been deemed to be largely successful<sup>2</sup>, however, it is recognised that ensuring appropriate levels of 'local' input to regional decision-making is critical to the successful functioning of the Auckland Council model of governance. Auckland Council submits that the same could be said for civil defence structures. Disasters inevitably affect local areas and so balancing the need for appropriate levels of regional or national control or direction with the need for local input, empowerment and guidance is of the utmost importance.
24. Despite significant differences in the 'structures', and indeed the capacity of CDEM across various civil defence groups in New Zealand there is a level of 'one size fits all' applied to CDEM groups at the national level which is not helpful and does not work for the Auckland context.
25. Auckland CDEM is a well-resourced, multi-disciplinary, technically able and innovative civil defence group. Auckland Council has offered on a number of occasions to collaborate and form partnerships at the national level in order to share this resource and expertise; including, for example, offering to the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) to use or even co-locate their Auckland-based staff in Auckland CDEM's alternative Emergency Coordination Centre at no cost. This state-of-the-art purpose-built facility has been designed to manage the response to national or otherwise significant events and with it comes access to Auckland Council's significant crisis management capability. While these offers have been rejected to date, Auckland Council wishes to state that these offers remain valid should the TAG wish to recommend to MCDEM that they consider these and other similar offers of collaboration and partnership.
26. Auckland Council submits that consideration be given to ensuring that MCDEM, which is tasked with providing leadership, guidance and national coordination, is empowered to act upon such offers of assistance and collaboration for the betterment of civil defence in New Zealand. Auckland Council believes that it is critical that the sector takes on board new ways of thinking and is able to capitalise off the successes and expertise of experts from across the country. It is critical that the sector acts with agility and flexibility and is able to take on board new ideas. Auckland Council submits that the TAG should consider recommendations that provide for the secondment of expert staff from CDEM groups and other government departments and Ministries into MCDEM and vice versa. Auckland Council believes that this simple step could help bring much needed innovation into the sector.
27. In addition, Auckland Council submits that the role of MCDEM needs to be more clearly defined. The role of MCDEM is to: provide leadership and strategic direction for CDEM; to provide coordination; to build capacity; to promote various activities to achieve the purpose of the CDEM Act 2002; and to support, coordinate and manage at the national level the response to, and

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.knowledgeauckland.org.nz/assets/publications/Governance-of-Auckland-5-years-on-May-2016.pdf>

recovery from, an emergency. During response, MCDEM also has a role in supporting and coordinating CDEM Group response and recovery activities.

28. Immediately following the November 2016 Kaikoura earthquake, MCDEM, on a number of occasions, 'directed' some CDEM groups to undertake certain actions including evacuations. Following that event, MCDEM, with advice from science advisors, developed a revised process for evacuations in response to tsunami threats under certain conditions. This process included requirements for CDEM groups to evacuate certain areas of the New Zealand coast. Auckland Council submits that if greater national control over response actions at a regional level is desired that this be made explicit in legislation and national planning documents.
29. The success or otherwise of civil defence in New Zealand is, ultimately, dependent on a range of organisations, emergency services and others, working together. This is the case both during the response to an emergency and during 'peace time'. A considerable amount of time and resource is spent by Auckland CDEM on partnership building and stakeholder management. This is important as access to information held by partner agencies, for example, is based largely on good will. Given the critical need for information sharing in times of emergency, Auckland Council submits that the CDEM Act 2002 be amended to ensure that information required for a successful common operating picture, for example, is able to be shared without the need for individual CDEM groups forming their own agreements with regional stakeholders and in particular with emergency services.

#### **'Professionalism' of civil defence sector in New Zealand**

30. Currently there is no New Zealand professional body for civil defence/emergency management along the lines of organisations such as the New Zealand Planning Institute or Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand. Likewise the training available for staff delivered at the national level is often not at the standard one would expect from a professional body.
31. Auckland Council has spent considerable time and resource developing a suite of training for the civil defence sector with the University of Auckland and other world-leading institutions. This is in direct response to the lack of adequate, modern and up-to-date training on offer for civil defence practitioners and in particular for those practitioners operating in fast moving, complex, metro regions. Auckland Council submits that the TAG should consider making recommendations to raise the professionalism within the sector by, for example, establishing a professional body with associated training and development required for membership.

## Resourcing of civil defence sector in New Zealand

32. As stated above, Auckland CDEM is arguably the most well-resourced civil defence group in the country. Despite this, Auckland Council has found on several occasions that during the response to emergencies the system used by the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) for collecting requests for resource and assistance is overly cumbersome and unnecessarily time-consuming. Auckland Council sent approximately 40 staff from a range of disciplines and professions to Kaikoura, Hurunui and to the NCMC in Wellington following the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake but could have sent many more were systems available to determine need and, importantly, the types of assistance required. Auckland Council submits that the TAG recommends that this system is prioritised for improvement.
33. Auckland Council has access to a range of professional staff from across the council family. This includes 'three' waters engineers, geotechnical and structural engineers, transport and roading specialists, building inspectors and land-use planners. Auckland CDEM has found that knowledge of the specialist skills of local government and, indeed, of the local government operating environment in general at MCDEM is limited. Auckland Council recommends that thought be given as to whether a 'local government liaison' or similar role could be established to assist MCDEM in its interactions with local government entities and in particular during the response to an emergency.
34. Exercises are one of the most important tools used in CDEM to test capability and to ensure that staff are prepared to respond to emergencies. 2016 saw the successful delivery of the national Exercise Tangaroa which tested CDEM groups and central government to their limits. Auckland Council recommends that the TAG considers the issue of exercises and recommends that MCDEM be required to deliver at least one national exercise per year on behalf of the sector. Auckland Council is able to assist MCDEM with this task if required.
35. Auckland Council submits that the recommendation to establish a 'cadre' of trained emergency managers able to respond to emergencies across New Zealand, as made by the official review of the response to the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake<sup>3</sup>, is taken forward and recommended by the TAG. Auckland Council is able to assist MCDEM with this task if required.
36. MCDEM employs a number of Regional Emergency Management Advisors (REMAs) across the country. REMAs provide advice to CDEM groups and, among other things, act as a liaison between MCDEM and CDEM groups. Auckland Council considers that the REMAs are a critical resource for MCDEM. Auckland Council submits that the TAG considers recommending that this key resource be further integrated into CDEM groups by, for example, embedding staff with CDEM groups through co-location or joint hosting.

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/Review-CDEM-Response-22-February-Christchurch-Earthquake.pdf>

## Community engagement and communications

37. As stated above, the Auckland 2016-2021 Group Plan is titled 'Resilient Auckland'. The plan is purposefully different to other group plans across the country in that it places community at the centre of its vision. Community engagement and community resilience building is critical to the success of CDEM in the Auckland context. Auckland Council recommends that the TAG considers the importance of community engagement in any proposals to modernise and improve CDEM across New Zealand. Auckland Council notes that the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017 places responsibilities for "efficient and effective local engagement" on Fire and Emergency New Zealand and submits that any recommended amendments to the CDEM Act 2002 places similar emphasis on the need for community engagement in delivering CDEM services.
38. During emergencies, Auckland CDEM is able to draw upon experienced communications staff from Auckland Council's Communications and Engagement team. As Auckland's 'local' media is more often than not also the national media, our public information team are often called upon as the 'trusted source of the truth' for all things civil defence related and especially so during emergency events. This was demonstrated in the response to the September 2016 East Cape earthquake and the November 2016 Kaikoura earthquake when media organisations found it difficult to engage with MCDEM.
39. Auckland Council has found that the public and media, quite understandably, do not understand the distinction between Auckland CDEM and the Ministry of CDEM. In times of crisis, when the media and the public are looking for information, this can be confusing. Auckland Council recommends that the TAG considers whether the development of one shared platform for disseminating CDEM related information to the public could be considered.
40. In addition, Auckland Council recommends that the TAG considers the issue of inconsistency in public communication platforms used across the country. Auckland CDEM, like many other groups, make use of the Red Cross Hazards App to push out communications to the public as well as using a variety of different channels including social media and the OurAuckland web platform. Some civil defence groups use the same platforms and others do not. Auckland Council submits that the TAG recommends that the introduction of a national standard, or similar, for CDEM communications be considered for inclusion in its recommendations.
41. As noted in the National CDEM Plan Order 2015, MCDEM is the lead agency at the national level, and CDEM groups the lead at the local or regional level, in response to meteorological hazards. Weather-related events are the most frequent hazard event in New Zealand but, unusually, the public reporting of rainfall and flood intensity is split between two agencies; the New Zealand MetService and the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) respectively. Auckland Council recommends to the TAG that consideration is given, as is the case in most other developed countries, to

combining the reporting of hydrometeorological events in one agency. This would help to ensure consistent public information for weather events.

42. Auckland Council operates under the purpose and intent of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987; council decisions and communications are, unless there is a clear legal reason to withhold, deemed to be publically available, open and transparent. Auckland Council has found that MCDEM communications are sent on a confidential basis more than, it would seem, necessary or required. Auckland Council submits that the TAG considers open and transparent communications to be critical to the successful delivery of CDEM in New Zealand. In addition, Auckland Council asks the TAG to consider whether MCDEM could be asked to report to the Minister of Civil Defence on at least a 6-monthly basis with details of those communications deemed to be confidential by the Ministry.
43. Following the Kaikoura earthquake in November 2016 there was much media and public commentary about the 'inconsistency' of public alerting systems across the country with some CDEM groups alerting the public and others not. Auckland Council was able to determine that there was no threat to Auckland from this event and communicated this to Aucklanders. That said, Auckland Council does acknowledge that not all CDEM groups have this capability. Auckland Council recommends that the TAG considers the issue of inconsistency in public alerting and warning systems across New Zealand in its recommendations. Auckland Council submits that the TAG supports the inclusion of a recommendation for a 24/7 monitoring and warning mechanism for hazard events that pose life-safety risk across New Zealand.

#### **Coordinating Executive Group representation**

44. Auckland Council has recently concluded a review of its Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) with the intention of lifting its performance. The CDEM Act 2002 notes that Coordinating Executive Groups (CEG) have three responsibilities: provide advice to the CDEM group committee; implement the decisions of the CDEM group committee; and oversee the implementation, development, monitoring and evaluation of the CDEM group plan. The Act states that the CEG is to be made up of senior officials from a number of statutory agencies. While Auckland's CEG, which is chaired by the chief executive of Auckland Council, has representation from the key statutory members and others, there is no requirement for chief-executive level or other senior staff to attend resulting in relatively junior staff with little autonomy or authority for decision-making attending. Auckland Council recommends that the TAG considers the importance of CEG representation in ensuring that the CEG is able to fulfil its statutory purpose and contribute towards readiness activities. In addition, Auckland Council submits that the TAG considers legislative change which would require a register of attendance of CEG meetings to be reported to the Minister of Civil Defence on at least an annual basis.
45. Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Amendment Act 2016 membership of the CEG is open to "a senior ambulance service officer" if co-

opted. Auckland Council submits that, given the importance of the ambulance service to CDEM response in New Zealand, that the TAG recommends membership of the ambulance service on CEG on a par with other members such as the NZ Police and Fire and Emergency New Zealand.

### Strategy and future direction

46. As outlined above, the role of MCDEM is multi-faceted. The Ministry has a leadership role, a coordination role and an operational role. It also has a policy and legislative role as the agency responsible for administering the CDEM Act 2002. Given these multiple roles and the TAG's focus on considering improvements to civil defence's performance in the response phase, Auckland Council asks the TAG to consider whether MCDEM's roles and responsibilities are appropriate. Consideration could, for example, be given to whether MCDEM's 'policy arm' could be better integrated/co-located or even merged with its counterparts from the emergency services. This would help to ensure a whole-of-system approach to emergency management policy and legislation.
47. Auckland Council is supportive of MCDEM's work on the whole-of-government, whole-of-society National Disaster Resilience Strategy. This strategy will be a step-change for civil defence in New Zealand in that it takes a broad approach to resilience building rather than a traditional view of civil defence. Auckland Council submits that the TAG considers the importance of this strategy to the future direction of civil defence noting that New Zealand has made a commitment to the international Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and that this strategy will help to move the country closer to the achievement of that framework.

### Legislative framework

48. Auckland Council submits that the CDEM Act 2002 and the CDEM Amendment Act 2016 provides a generally sound legislative framework for the delivery of CDEM in New Zealand as current. That said, this submission has identified a number of recommended amendments for consideration by the TAG. While being mindful that the focus of the TAGs review is on mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies, Auckland Council asks the TAG to consider the issue of the interaction of the CDEM Act 2002 with other legislation of relevance to natural hazards mitigation. For example, the Building Act 2014 allows for the granting of building consent on land subject to natural hazards in certain cases and the Resource Management Act 1991 allows for a risk based approach to the management of natural hazards. Auckland Council recommends that the TAG considers recommending a review of legislation of relevance to CDEM in New Zealand including the various interactions and what they mean from a risk mitigation perspective.

## SECTION 4: CONCLUDING COMMENTS

49. Auckland Council wishes to thank the TAG for providing the opportunity to submit on its work to identify where improvements in New Zealand's civil defence sector could be made.
50. Auckland Council is supportive of the outcomes sought by the TAG. Comments and recommendations have been made on a number of aspects and in particular with regards to the 'structure' of civil defence in New Zealand; the professionalism of the sector; the sharing of resources across the country; community engagement and communications; and on the strategy and future direction of civil defence in New Zealand.
51. Auckland Council, over the last two years, has set some ambitious targets for its CDEM department. The vision of the department is to be the 'leading go-to CDEM group in Australasia'. This is an appropriate vision for New Zealand's largest city. To help achieve this vision, Auckland CDEM has had to modernise its practices. It has brought in staff from a range of disciplines and professions while maintaining a core civil defence response function. Auckland Council believes that the civil defence sector overall needs to embark upon a similar transformation; modernising its work practices, embracing diversity and transferable skills and placing 'community' at the centre of its work.
52. Auckland Council has provided commentary on the devolved decision-making model of civil defence in New Zealand from the perspective of a large unitary authority. Auckland Council has however, not provided explicit commentary on issues with regards to the declaration of states of emergency. As a unitary authority it is quite clear who has authority to declare a state of emergency and under what circumstances a state of emergency should and would be declared. Council accepts, however, that this is less clear in other parts of New Zealand.
53. As stated throughout the submission, Auckland Council views community engagement and community resilience building as critical to the successful delivery of CDEM services. Auckland CDEM's approach in this regard is modern, flexible and adaptive and builds upon the skills and experiences of staff from a range of professions and disciplines. Auckland Council firmly believes that this multi-disciplinary approach is critical to the success of CDEM in New Zealand.
54. Auckland Council wishes to appear before the Technical Advisory Group to discuss this submission.

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please  
visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Keith Suddes
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a) <div style="background-color: grey; width: 100%; height: 20px;"></div>
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Please see attached document: DPMC CDEM Submission 2017.doc

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence



**Date: 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2017**

**Ministerial Review:  
Better Responses to Natural Disasters and  
Other Emergencies in New Zealand**

**Submission from  
Keith Suddes MBA, CertEd**

**Background of the Author - Keith Suddes, MBA, CertEd**

Keith has the knowledge and crisis exposure, over 30 years in UK, USA and NZ and can speak, with some authority, on operational response to emergencies.

An experienced emergency and operational manager at strategic, operational and tactical (technical) level, a rescue squad medic, a police tactical commander and counter terrorism advisor, emergency responder to natural disasters and a qualified and experienced teacher.

Recently held the position, with Auckland CDEM, of Readiness / Operations Manager (and acting Response Manager, when necessary).

Relevant expertise includes:

- Response manager during initial Kaikoura earthquake / tsunami threat response – Auckland region;
- Operations manager during Kaikoura earthquake response (based in Hurunui region);
- Response manager during the recent severe weather and flash flooding in the Hunua Ranges;
- Emergency Medical Technician – operational response during Hurricane Sandy, NJ, USA severe weather/flooding;
- Consultant and advisor to FBI and Homeland Security on Crisis management, Critical Thinking and ‘Active Shooter’ policies and procedures;
- Police search advisor (counter terrorism) during the discovery of an IRA bomb in Kent UK;
- Strategic, Operational and Tactical advisor to senior executives during hostage rescue, life threatening police operations and protection of government facilities and personnel;
- Development of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) policies involving nuclear facilities, airports, schools, hospitals and businesses.

**The following highlights my observations following 2 years with Auckland CDEM:**

**Submission:**

Issue	Observation	Comments
New Zealand’s response framework National Response Capability Resilience !	New Zealand does not currently have a national [operational] response capability.  A cadre of qualified and seasoned controllers and managers would enhance deployments and support local/regional response at operational level as and when required.	Qualified personnel with appropriate skills matrix to manage emergencies and support/enhance local efforts.  Appropriate teams stationed across NZ. Day to day dedicated to public education and CDEM staff development.
Decision Making	Critical Thinking and Crisis	CIMS and ITF are insufficient to

	<p>Management education.</p> <p>Practice what you preach – how many of the CDEM groups across NZ are resilient and have the depth in numbers to deal with a major emergency?</p> <p>Auckland would be struggling after 24 hours due to low capability and lack of qualified staff due to poor staff development and education.</p>	<p>assist decision makers with informed decision making during a crisis – especially in the initial assessment and activation.</p> <p>Declaration decisions are left to those with limited emergency management experience.</p>
<p>Information sharing</p>	<p>Intelligence management and sharing across ALL stakeholders during an emergency.</p> <p>Key networks and liaisons must be established and TRUST created.</p>	<p>This issue is ALWAYS discussed amongst emergency services and key stakeholders though it is NEVER addressed.</p>
<p>Operational Capability</p>	<p>Start at the beginning:</p> <p>Recruit the right personnel with emergency management skills who can apply their knowledge to BaU – NOT the other way around.</p> <p>Training pathways identified AND delivered.</p> <p>Succession plan for managers to provide coverage and shift changes.</p> <p>Standardised skills matrix for each function manager which is mandated nationally, this will enhance interagency assistance where needed.</p>	<p>Too many ‘good’ BaU managers are dropped into emergency management positions and they are out of their depth.</p> <p>This is not helpful to them or their team.</p> <p>Dedicated emergency managers with the right qualifications, experience and skills for each function MUST be available on-call nationally.</p>
<p>Volunteers</p>	<p>Training and resources need to be updated and made more appropriate to the needs of the organisation and the volunteers.</p>	<p>There is a heavy reliance on volunteers to support a response especially when a nationwide incident.</p> <p>The training and support for these volunteers needs a serious update</p>

		and overhaul.
Public Education	Mandatory emergency response education in schools across NZ.	DROP   COVER   HOLD program should be extended to cover other hazards AND be mandatory in schools and colleges.  Part of the curriculum!
Lead and Support Agencies	Lead is pre-determined as per the nature of the hazard and the law.	Lead is responsible for national response to those hazards.  Lead is also responsible for development of appropriate plans and procedures in liaison with key stakeholders.
Chain of Command	A national system which MUST be followed by all stakeholders and partners.	CIMS / ITF – what is the point of a national system if you can choose whether or not to follow them?  16 different CDEM Groups and 16 different interpretations of what they need to do.
Declaration	Local declaration is important though this should not impede a national declaration if warranted.	
Outcome One: Fit for Purpose	A national CDEM forum at OPERATIONAL level where there is an exchange of ideas and reflection on local, national and global events.  Better use of internet and virtual space to share good practices.  EMIS – used and accessed by ALL emergency services.	This MUST be in addition to any Strategic forum.  No point in investing in EMIS III when its not a national requirement for ALL emergency services and CDEM's to use the system.
Outcome Two: Civil Defence Emergency Management	Civil Defence <b>should become</b> Emergency Management which includes business continuity.	Any emergency that affects a community, no matter the cause, is a concern for CDEM.  Forget Civil Defence and incorporate natural disaster management into an organisation responsible for ALL

		emergency response and management.
Outcome Three: Declared Emergency	Local, Regional and National declarations should be available to appropriately authorised personnel BUT should not be exclusive.	National intervention is appropriate when required.  This would be enhanced by a national [operational] response team of controllers and managers
Outcome Four: Chain of Command and LEAD agency	By default, there should be a pre-determined LEAD as per hazard.  Communications MUST be improved between agencies.  To control an emergency the Controller MUST be appropriately qualified, be present (physically) and take FULL responsibility for their decisions.	ONLY if agreed by designated Lead and other key stakeholders should this change.  Radio systems should be able to communicate with one another.  The role of the Controller can be delegated, HOWEVER the responsibility of the Controller can NOT.
Outcome Five: Information Flow	Intelligence management across ALL key stakeholders needs to be aligned. Information sharing (where appropriate in emergencies) should be acceptable.  Public information and consistent messaging needs to be addressed nationally in line with the National Warning system.	Consistent messaging should be driven nationally and implemented locally.

I am more than happy to expand on my observations above.

Submitted for your information.

Keith Suddes MBA, CertEd

M: s9(2)(a)

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

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<b>Name:</b> Neville Hudson
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Please see attached.

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Neville Hudson  
s9(2)(a)

6<sup>th</sup> July 2017

Review into better responses to natural disasters

### **Introduction**

Earlier this year I corresponded with the Minister of Civil Defence regarding shortfalls within the Civil Defence organisation with some suggestions for improvement.

I have not had any previous success with making submissions. For nearly ten years I have been trying to show how to better improve on the Road Safety message. I've been told it is acknowledged that the Safer Journeys programme has faults but I'm told it's too late to fix it. Millions of dollars are being spent on something that will not achieve the desired result.

Road Safety continues to worsen despite the flash safer journeys programme. I am therefore concerned that this review is more an exercise in job and reputation protection rather than a genuine effort to improve Civil Defence. I have thought long and hard as to whether to bother making a submission. I am more than happy to attend in support of my submission but if it is considered desirable you will need to call me. Hence the question mark on the form.

My submission is based on many years of teaching Civil Defence operations in the RNZAF, attending joint Defence Force and Civil Defence training exercises over several years and from personal observations.

I admit to coming from a position of no faith that anything I submit will make a blind bit of difference but I remain hopeful.

### **Overview**

We are told by the experts that serious natural disasters are on the increase with an ever increasing likelihood of personal injury, property damage and a need for evacuation.

If we look at a selection of recent events such as Whakatane floods, Kaikoura and Wellington earthquakes there seems to be a stand out problem of who is in charge of what and who makes the decisions. Whilst the Civil Defence and Council organisations will say they worked quickly. This is little comfort to the general public who were directly involved. In the 70's there was a standout problem of control and management and this appears to be no better all these years on.

In New Zealand there is one organisation which attends most Civil Defence incidents and has in name at least a mandate to provide Defence of New Zealand and its resources and assets. This organisation is the New Zealand Defence Force. This is the organisation that has the people and equipment resources to make a real difference in the control and management of

incidents and disasters. At present there are too many organisations involved in the decision making process. This should be cut down to one, the New Zealand Defence Force.

About now at least half of you will be rolling your eyes and having a panic attack about the prospect of being without a job. But wait! My submission is not about people losing their jobs, it's about the control and management moving to the Defence Force. The easiest way is to make Civil Defence part of the Defence Force using existing Civil Defence staff and volunteers. My submission is that existing Civil Defence staff remain as civilians working within the Defence Force.

I acknowledge that there will be more work required but it will solve the control and management of serious incidents and disasters immediately.

### **The Future**

The introduction of the super Ministry, the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) should have shown that there are advantages to joining smaller organisations together under the control of an umbrella organisation.

However, just changing the control and management of Civil Defence will not in itself solve all the problems. There will still be several key organisations outside of the control of Civil Defence. For example the Fire Service, Ambulance Service, Rescue Helicopters and Aircraft as well as the Coast Guard will still need to be accommodated into the control and management structure. All these organisations could be included under the New Zealand Defence Force if there was a political will. This would in effect create a super Defence Force just like MSD.

How Civil Defence fits into the Council organisations could be tricky but my suggestion is that they don't. Local Civil Defence staff could work at Council but under the Defence Force umbrella. Who has authority to declare a state of emergency is another tricky situation. My suggestion is that the Civil Defence Commander declares the state of emergency on the recommendation of the local Civil Defence officer and the appropriate Council representative.

### **Staffing**

In the late 1960's the school cadet programme and compulsory military training were scrapped. Almost instantly the gangs gained control of many of the young people in this Country and this situation continues to this day. The gangs are now a force to be reckoned with because they provide a place where young people can be made to feel valued and have a purpose. Exactly what the school cadet programme and compulsory military training provided all those years ago.

More experts tell us that in New Zealand there are 90,000 young people who are not in work, not attending education or attending trade training. They are all however being paid an unemployment benefit. Here is the Civil Defence labour pool and the advantage is that they will be spread throughout New Zealand. My suggestion is that they all be made to attend Civil Defence training with the Defence Force in return for rations and quarters and their benefit. Failure to attend will result in loss of benefit.



## Conclusion

The project definition is “the purpose of the review is to ensure that New Zealand’s emergency response framework is world leading, fit-for-purpose, and well placed to meet future challenges.

New Zealand’s biggest disadvantage is the small size, small population, geographic challenges and frequent natural disasters.

Looking at the control and management of Civil Defence in isolation from all the other issues and opportunities existing will ensure that Civil Defence will never be world leading, will not be fit for purpose or will be likely to meet future challenges.

I have outlined a course of action that will meet the project definition. The added advantage is the ability to meet other social challenges as well as improve the ability to meet Civil Defence challenges.

Yours faithfully,



Neville Hudson

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## **MPI animal welfare response to “Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies” review**

6 July 2017

**Authors:** Wayne Ricketts, Hayley Carr

**Responsible Manager:** Kate Littin, Manager Animal Welfare, Animal and Animal Products

### **Background**

MPI is the lead agency for animal welfare in emergencies. Animal welfare is one of the 9 Welfare sub functions. MPI is responsible for coordinating the provision of and planning animal welfare services to all animals including companion animals, production animals (livestock), animals in research zoo and circus animals and also wildlife. MPI also maintains the Government’s advisory and reporting capability on animal welfare in an emergency.

### **General comments**

#### **Outcome 1**

- Still a failure of some agencies to recognise the importance of animals to their owners whether they be companion animals or livestock which results in people refusing to be evacuated and/or returning illegally to cordon zones to attempt to retrieve their animals. This potentially places their lives at risk and places additional obligations on the CDEM function
- Evacuation will occur immediately by local emergency services, usually before CDEM personnel gather to develop a plan and direct evacuation priorities. Guiding principles of evacuation need to be developed to ensure that animals are included in evacuation priorities using consistent messaging such as “take your pets with you if it is safe to do so”. Currently emergency services are telling people that they do not have time to gather their pets for evacuation. This activity impacts the response as many animals are left behind and this requires significant specialist trained resources (usually from outside of the region) to effect animal rescue. Many events have highlighted the tension that is felt by CDEM from the public about animals being left behind. As consequence of no action, this has the potential to negatively impact psychosocial recovery
- CDEM groups still coming to grips how they deal with animals in emergencies and have indicated that they will not always accept animals at CDC’s although past and recent events show that people will arrive at CDC’s with pets
- Animal owners will have a high expectation that the emergency response system will address the needs of their animals in an emergency
- Our current capability and resources in animal welfare would be severely tested in a prolonged emergency or an emergency impacting on a large area of New Zealand i.e. our ability to scale up our response would be very limited
- The response framework must include animals (it needs to be explicit) rather than allowing assumptions to be made that animals are included under property
- Although animals are included as a sub-function of welfare it needs to be considered throughout all components of the response framework for example (but not limited to) animal evacuation and rescue should feature in operations and intelligence for early mobilisation of resources, access to cordons and priorities for equipment. This would allow better multi-agency communication, co-ordination thus collaboration.

- Animal welfare impacts human wellbeing therefore the psychological consequences of non-action to the general public, all responders (including human service organisations) and international consumers should be considered through to recovery
- Consideration needs to be given to animal welfare response costs, eg being included in the MCDEM budget, including the procurement, construction, leasing, or renovating of emergency shelter facilities and materials that will accommodate people with pets and service animals Note: currently although AW has been included in the welfare sub-function no funding has been allocated for the inclusion of the new sub-function
- Careful consideration of the continued inclusion that a controller can order the destruction of animals that impedes/obstructs a response as this action has significant long-term consequences
- To build capacity of community responders, the inclusion of an online learning platform hosted by MCDEM that could be used to establish a credentialing system that defines minimum qualifications for response positions (including animal emergency response) would be advantageous

## Outcome 2

- General limited expertise and capability in animal welfare in emergencies in NZ
- Uncertainty of insurance liability whilst responding as most responders are volunteers impacts the ability to have surge capacity
- Heavy reliance on MPI's support agencies – SPCA, Federated Farmers, NZ Veterinary Association, NZ Companion Animal Council, Territorial authorities (through Animal Control services) World Animal Protection – who have varying capabilities, resources, time and geographic cover.
- Some agencies have virtually very little ability to assist in response e.g. World Animal Protection may be able to send one very small animal rescue team – the nearest is in Bangkok, NZCAC – also has very little resource to assist
- In particular there is a heavy reliance on the SPCA and Federated Farmers both of which have limited resources
- Heavy reliance on the rural sector to address animal welfare issues around livestock
- Support agencies are not funded either internally or externally to provide assistance in emergencies so there is a heavy reliance on their good faith and voluntary assistance
- Support agencies are expected to respond in addition to their BAU so there are potential risks that they are unable to respond
- Potential risk for support agencies to withdraw from being a support agency
- Potential risks for New Zealand's reputation if we are unable to respond well to animal welfare issues in emergencies
- MPI is considering building on the capacity of the two existing animal rescue units – SPCA and Massey University using veterinarians, veterinary nurses, animal control officers, Animal Welfare Act Inspectors and volunteers (need to consider who they will deploy as i.e MPI response team, who will pay for their deployments including insurance and how the surge capacity will be maintained)
- MPI needs to have sufficient personnel to staff emergency operation centres to deal with animal welfare issues locally rather than remotely – either from within MPI or support agencies
- Housing/sheltering capacity to allow people with pets to encourage sheltering together (this includes emergency accommodation through to recovery)

- More agencies should be included in the animal welfare sub-function including emergency services
- Liaison officers from FENZ & NZ Police (and defence if deemed appropriate) should be embedded in animal rescue operations to allow for multi-agency collaboration and transparency
- Specialist veterinary resources should be imbedded in the rescue response structure to ensure USAR dogs and police dogs have immediate veterinary support

### Outcome 3

- Lack of knowledge and awareness of animal welfare in emergencies means that appropriate interventions and escalations may not be prioritised, but we expect this to change as knowledge and awareness grows
- Early declarations should be encouraged to allow owners as much time as possible to evacuate with their animals (production and companion animals).
- The framework needs to include better/earlier integration thus activation of CDEM declarations with non CDEM emergencies (eg. Fire or MoH) to allow for mobilisation of AW resources including AW expertise to contribute to the decision making process

### Outcome 4

- Due to CDEM's still limited knowledge of the needs of animal owners and animals, appropriate and informed decision making during an emergency is still evolving but is growing with each emergency
- Recognition of MPI's lead role and its support agency roles and responsibilities still evolving, therefore animal needs may not be prioritised
- The framework needs to encourage and enhance multi-agency collaboration amongst lead agencies across functions rather than a sole agency given the responsibility of a sub-function for example as soon as someone talks about animal welfare they are told it is MPI's responsibility rather than it being a shared responsibility across agencies
- Appropriate training needs to be made available to all lead agencies (at national and regional levels) in crisis leadership and multiple agencies should be participating in this training together to allow for better networking and relationship building
- The response needs to be proactive rather than reactive therefore mobilisation of resources occurs before complete situational awareness occurs
- Positive short-term wins for decisions needs to far out way long-term negative consequences therefore AW and psychology expertise should be consulted before short-term win decisions are activated.
- Lead agencies need to be made aware of the resources available to them

### Outcome 5

- Rapid impact assessments conducted by first responders must be communicated directly to lead agencies who are co-ordinating their response i.e directly fed to MPI at the EOC or ECC to allow for the mobilisation of resources and escalation
- Innovative intelligence and communication should be instituted to ensure it keeps abreast of new technology

### General comment

The Bay of Plenty floods has highlighted the needs of both companion animals and livestock. Over 500 (Massey has said over 700, SPCA says 900) animals including cats, dogs, aviary and cage birds, poultry, aquarium fish and a small number of livestock were evacuated from Edgecumbe following the evacuation of the town's residents. The evacuation was carried out by the SPCA's National Rescue Unit and the Massey University Animal Rescue Unit – these are the only two in the country. In addition over 7000 dairy cows were evacuated which was facilitated by Federated Farmers, Fonterra and LIC. There were also animals reported as drowned.

Despite deficiencies in our emergency response system for animals, the response was viewed as being very successful and has provided learnings for dealing with similar future emergency events

Animal welfare issues that are known before an event are exacerbated during a response. Therefore, capacity building during "peace-time" should be directed to address animal welfare issues to reduce the impact during a response.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Client:** Ministry for Primary Industries

**Subject:** Recommendations arising from the review of Kaikoura Earthquake Response

*Version date:* 28 June 2017

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The following set of recommendations was derived from a de-brief workshop involving the stakeholders who were active in the response to the November 2016 Kaikoura Earthquake. Organisations represented at the meeting are listed at the back of this report.

These recommendations arose from the workshop and have not been further distilled than what was discussed at the workshop. They are intended to inform policy and strategy of all the organisations involved and do not represent commitments by those organisations at this point. The identification of “sponsors” for each recommendation is indicative and requires confirmation.

If there are any matters that do not represent an accurate record and parties would like to see changed, could they be notified by **Wednesday 5 July 2017**.

The recommendations comprise Part I and further background to the recommendations comprises Part II. Part III has the list of organisations represented.

### PART I: RECOMMENDATIONS

#### **Recommendation 1: Establish Rural Advisory Groups at a regional level across the country.**

**Description:** Drawing from the experience of Rural Support Trusts and “Team Ag” such localised groups (generically termed Rural Advisory Groups) would:

- Be recognised by CDEM and work closely with them.
- Have clear roles, responsibilities and mandate.
- Focus on immediate needs recovery needs as well as performing welfare functions.
- Would be supported by a database which they can feed into and out of.
- Be adequately resourced to provide them with “reach”.
- Be scaleable.
- Be transferable – able to move easily to various locations as required.

**Sponsor:** MPI

**Rationale:** This is important because the most effective responses were bottom up rather than the reverse. Personnel from the RAGs provided vital information and contact.

**Next steps:** MPI will set up RAGs in Canterbury and Marlborough. This will require a major feasibility process. A proposition to scope the work of the group will be drawn up by MPI in conjunction with Federated Farmers, Rural Support

Trusts, DairyNZ, Beef and Lamb and other interested parties. The next meeting is planned for July in Canterbury.

**Considerations:** The question of where the funding for this initiative comes from would need to be resolved.

### **Recommendation 2: Develop a schedule of regular rural agency meetings.**

**Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:

- Link CDEM to other agencies.
- Link all agencies together.

**Sponsor:** MPI and Rural Support Trusts

**Rationale:** Not only strengthens the response but quickens the pace of the response.

**Next steps:** MPI could develop a short proposal and canvass it with the rural agencies to ascertain the level of interest in the proposition.

**Considerations:** This recommendation is closely related to Recommendation 1 and been placed after it for that reason.

### **Recommendation 3: A single, centrally-run database.**

**Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:

- Centrally run.
- Ease of access within clear rules about its use.
- Analytic capability.
- Covering a wide range of subjects: people welfare, animal welfare, psychological support, shelter, financial assistance and so on.
- Designed to minimise duplication and focus action.
- Usable for all parties.
- Intuitive and accessible.
- Capability of operating with App technology or GIS mapping.

**Sponsor:** Civil Defence and Emergency Management (refer to proposals outlined at the meeting from Leonie Waayer)

**Rationale:** This would focus action, record completions and reduce churn.

**Next steps:** Bring together all affected parties for an initial scoping of the dimensions and purposes of the database(s), leading to a well-worked proposal. It is recognised that there are a large number of databases designed for different purposes that could be included in such an initiative.

**Considerations:** This recommendation is of particular relevance to CDEM, local councils and RAGs.

### **Recommendation 4: Make all communities a civil defence sector.**

**Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:

- To encourage the view that “we are all civil defence”.
- To encourage even greater local responsibility.
- Ease the civil defence job and strengthen the local interface.

- Similar to a “Neighbourhood Watch” approach.

**Sponsor:** Civil Defence and Emergency Management  
**Rationale:** Speed of local response; importance of and reliance on local knowledge; demonstrable effectiveness of local response.  
**Next steps:** CDEM could consider this recommendation and form a view. If there is a prima facie case for the recommendation, scope and undertake a proposal on how it might work and what would be involved.

### **Recommendation 5: Make the CEO of district councils the local Civil Defence controller.**

**Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:

- Strengthen existing capability.
- “We are all civil defence”.

**Sponsor:** Local councils, Civil Defence and Emergency Management  
**Rationale:** This would strengthen the local response and help connect up the local response. It would also help with the national/local interface. Local councils have developed capability and access to equipment and resources.  
**Next steps:** CDEM could consider this recommendation and form a view. If there is a prima facie case for the recommendation, scope and undertake a proposal on how it might work and what would be involved.  
**Considerations:** This is a matter for consultation between local councils and CDEM

### **Recommendation 6: Develop a rural emergency information filter system for needs assessment.**

**Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:

- Currently urban-centric and fragmented.
- Too focused on the ‘now’.
- Needs one set of standard questions to satisfy all agencies, so that data is comparable.
- Filter system needs to provide a feedback loop on action taken.

**Sponsor:** Civil Defence and Emergency Management  
**Rationale:** This is a tool that ideally works for everyone and everyone can draw on it.  
**Next steps:** Consider this recommendation with recommendation 2 on databases and treat the two together by preparing a proposal for an all-parties discussion.

### **Recommendation 7: Make one entity responsible for telecommunications infrastructure.**

**Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:

- Ensure adequate contingency planning.
- Establish “in-advance” service level agreements.

**Sponsor:** Civil Defence and Emergency Management



- Rationale:** Someone needs to “own” the challenges and address them quickly.
- Next steps:** Consider this recommendation and form a view. If there is a prima facie case for the recommendation, scope and undertake a proposal on how it might work and what would be involved.
- Considerations:** This recommendation relates specifically to telecommunications because this piece of infrastructure was a strong focus of discussion. Similar concerns exist for other infrastructure such as roads where responsibilities changed during the event in Kaikoura.

### **Recommendation 8: Nationwide training in CDEM and CIMS.**

- Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:
- Everyone understands their roles, and those of others, well enough to operate under pressure.
- Sponsor:** Civil Defence and Emergency Management
- Rationale:** The greatest gain will come from coordinated effort and training will assist in achieving better coordination.
- Next steps:** CDEM could consider this recommendation and form a view. If there is a prima facie case for the recommendation, scope and undertake a proposal on how it might work and what would be involved.

### **Recommendation 9: Review the Privacy Act regarding such events.**

- Description:** Key characteristics and purposes:
- Identify where emergency response conflicts with privacy requirements
  - Review the question of personal liability
  - Identify precedents and impacts of flexibility around privacy considerations
  - Formulate a benefits evaluation of it.
- Sponsor:** Civil Defence and Emergency Management
- Rationale:** It is generally agreed that better access to information would enhance response, but there are regulatory limitations which may have to be removed or diminished at times of emergency.
- Next steps:** Scope the particular situations in which privacy is a problem and discuss with major stakeholders including the Privacy Commission.

### **Recommendation 10: Commitment of all organisations to adequate resourcing.**

- Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:
- Lack of resources inhibited aspects of the response
  - Consideration of resourcing issues are required for two aspects:
    - For pre-planning.
    - For rapid response, itself.
- Sponsor:** Everyone
- Rationale:** There were shortages of resources at critical times and in critical places. This was a co-ordination, as well as an availability problem.

**Next steps:** Prepare funding and authorisation guidelines with all-parties to ensure a joined up approach.

**Considerations:** This recommendation is a point to be noted. It was recognised that resourcing decisions are those of the individual organisations involved.

### **Recommendation 11: A national travelling rural sector team.**

**Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:

- Able to deploy anywhere in New Zealand
- Designed to enable local groups and communities.
- To build capacity.
- To raise skill levels and operational capability.

**Sponsor:** Rural Advisory Groups, nationally; MPI; Team Ag

**Rationale:** To ensure that coordination is vertical as well as horizontal.

**Next steps:** Matter referred to RAGs for their review.

### **Recommendation 12: Formal de-brief and review process.**

**Description:** Key characteristics and purpose:

- Translate findings into actions
- Introduce changes with a bottom-up perspective

**Sponsor:** CDEM and MPI

**Rationale:** A great deal is learnt from de-brief. De-briefs from previous events helped the response on this occasion

**Next steps:** Create a de-brief file accessible to all-parties; generate a simple debrief process so that comparisons can be drawn between events.

## **PART II: PRESSURE POINTS**

This section provides background to the recommendations and a flavour of the discussions that took place. It identifies pressure points that were highlighted at the workshop as requiring thought and action.

### **• Communications**

- Lack of communications to provide infrastructure, particularly on the inland road.
- Poor cellphone reception and landlines down (this prevailed at the Marlborough end for four weeks).
- Need for a joined up response from the cellphone companies; even perhaps a telecommunications “champion” to achieve a coordinated response.
- Difficulty of communicating through the cordon.
- Communication issues created a sense of isolation for many.
- Communications like websites are not enough – too passive.
- The 0800 number wasn’t widely used, probably the result of loss of telephone connection. Social media is taking the place of the telephone.

- **Understanding gap**
  - There was a noticeable gap in understanding between perceptions in Wellington and the reality on the ground.
  - At first it was thought that rural areas were OK and the problems were in the towns.
  - There was a lack of urgency and immediacy in Wellington.
  - There was lack of appreciation of the scale of the disaster and the response required e.g. temporary housing.
  - There was a lack of understanding that when farmers ask for something it really means it's urgent, otherwise they cope themselves.
  - Generally there was a lack of understanding that rural needs and responses are different from urban.
  
- **Response v Recovery**
  - There was early confusion between these two roles.
  - There was a lack of appreciation of the continuing need for response, especially early on, before recovery kicks in.
  - There was a language issue of people not fully understanding each other.
  - There was a lack of urgency at times where authorities saw what was required as business-as-usual rather than requiring an emergency response.
  
- **Red tape**
  - This is a complicated area.
  - Clearly there is a need for procedures that protect privacy, health and safety, certification and registration. These are covered in legislation and limit response in some areas.
  - There may need to be consideration of legislative impediments to action.
  - There is a need for flexibility at a practical and common sense level.
  - Protections e.g. the cordon, had unintended consequences (resulted in secret road response).
  - There was a need to get helicopters out earlier but slow decision-making prevented it in some instances.
  
- **Lack of shared database(s)**
  - Databases were not sufficiently connected.
  - There was no name/property database and maps that could be easily accessed to ensure that all people were being checked. This problem possibly requires door knocking to establish an accurate database.
  - Relied on local knowledge as a result.
  
- **People speaking without knowledge**
  - There were a number of statements that displayed a lack of knowledge of the impact on farmers and farms.
  - Impacts such as lack of access of beekeepers to hives and harvesting machinery to crops, transporting of semen were hidden impacts.

- There was a lack of understanding of the seasonal cycle of rural life evidenced in comments, instanced by the lack of recognition that the earthquake struck at the peak dairy season and tanker access was vital.
- **Information processing**
  - The speed at which information came in was at times overwhelming.
  - There needs to be a strong triaging function that sorts out urgent from very urgent. This was not always working effectively.
  - The ability to track requests and action them was not sufficiently responsive. Some requests got lost.
  - This resulted in duplication with multiple requests for the same action resulting in un-necessary churn.
- **Project management and disciplined decision-making**
  - It was not always clear who “owned” a particular issue
  - There is a need for an overall strategy and person responsible to coordinate agencies’ decisions and responses.
  - Besides overlaps in some areas, there were also “underlaps” where actions did not sufficiently join up.
  - There was an undershooting of the need for urgency.
- **Interface of Civil Defence and “Team Ag”**
  - This relationship requires assessment.
  - CDEM needs to absorb the local situation analysis and get into local knowledge networks.
  - Feedback loops need to be stronger.
- **CDEM roles**
  - Lack of continuity when CDEM has shift changes.
  - High turnover of people on the ground resulting in loss of knowledge and continuity.
  - A tighter link between CDEM and local people (especially Rural Support Trusts) is required.
- **Too much reliance on volunteers**
  - Volunteers are vital but their capability is limited.
  - There was over-reliance on them in some key areas.
  - There was pressure on volunteers who were themselves earthquake affected.

## KEY PROBLEMS

While the previous section has dealt with the range of pressure points and short-comings, there were three which were identified as being the key priorities needing a solution. They are listed in priority order from most important to be resolved to least, as rated by the workshop participants.

### i. **Communication**

This was rated far and away the most serious short-coming.

The most serious short-comings under this heading were:

- Insufficient **listening** to those in the field by those controlling resources. Assumptions were made. The degree of urgency wasn't understood.
- **Duplication** of effort due to poor management of priorities resulting in unnecessary churn.
- **Prompt and adequate responses** were not consistently made, adding to the churn.
- The **technical problems of communication** – lack of databases, usable information, cellphone connection, etc. were significant factors.
- **Focus on specifics** – some communication was too general and required more specific references.
- Inadequate **common picture** as a result of inadequate communication.

ii. **Leadership**

This is the leadership and decision-making referred to earlier. Leadership didn't deal adequately with:

- **Information overload** – sorting the priorities.
- **Role overlaps and underlaps.**
- **Common view** of the situation.
- Lack of a **local point of contact** for decision making and information.
- **Silo problem** between organisations.
- Lack of **match fitness** at the start – got better as time went on.

iii. **Red Tape**

The workshop was ambivalent on this issue. Everyone recognises the need for process and regulation, but is also aware of when and how these factors got in the way of an adequate response.

- Red tape should not close off **local knowledge and expert knowledge** and that happened at times.
- **Legislation and rules** need to be reviewed to see where they are unhelpful.

## PART III: ORGANISATIONS REPRESENTED AT THE WORKSHOP

A total of 40 people were present from the following organisations:

- Civil Defence (national, regional, district)
- Local government and Environment Canterbury
- Federated Farmers
- Beef and Lamb New Zealand
- Dairy New Zealand
- Fonterra
- Canterbury District Health Board
- New Zealand Transport Agency
- Rural Support Trusts (top of the South, North Canterbury)
- Ministry for Primary Industries (national, South Island, Christchurch).

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on the Ministerial Review on Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand.

Selwyn District Council submits that the current CDEM system in New Zealand is not capable of meeting the needs of government and the New Zealand public in 2017.

## Act Locally, Coordinate Regionally, Support Nationally

This is an admirable, but dated concept that no longer meets the expectations of central government or the New Zealand public. Information takes too long to reach central government agencies through a chain of different organisations that have different priorities, different policies and a different understanding of the particular emergency.

The public, via the news media, naturally look to central government for leadership in moderate to large scale emergencies. When central government can't provide timely updates or make informed comment on response issues, then public confidence in both response agencies and government is eroded.

Removing a layer of this structure would speed up the information flow. A nationally led response, using local resources (and national where necessary) would achieve this.

## Council Capability to Manage Emergencies

Emergency Management is not a function that sits comfortably with local councils. While council staff have the knowledge and expertise to manage council-provided lifeline utilities, such as drinking water and other services such as rubbish collection; managing professional emergency service personnel and making decisions around preservation of life are not areas in which council staff are experienced or comfortable.

As a general rule council staff lack the experience to manage large emergencies. Although obviously there are some very experienced and competent people within councils, most are involved in emergency management on a very part time basis, as an add-on to their business as usual role.

Training council staff to operate in an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) is challenging, in terms of getting staff released from normal duties to attend training and in providing sufficient training to reach an adequate level of capability. This is complicated by a general lack of operations, which means council personnel don't get many opportunities to put their limited training into practice. Obviously the best training is the real thing and it is difficult for these personnel to put their training into any context with limited opportunities to perform in an operational environment.

With council staff doing just a few days of training a year and not experiencing many operations it is unrealistic to expect a high level of competence in these roles.

The type of decision making required in an emergency is different from what council staff are comfortable with. Council staff naturally look to consult on decision making for their community, but there is generally no time for consultation in an emergency, or the opportunity to attempt to form a consensus. Often the only choice is attempting to pick the least worst option. This definition of an EOC is illuminating in terms of how council staff feel about the role - *“Where uncomfortable officials meet in unaccustomed surroundings to play unfamiliar roles, making unpopular decisions based on inadequate information and insufficient time.”*

The numbers of staff needing to be trained to work in the EOC and the burden this places on councils is unrealistic. Selwyn District needs to have 60 trained staff in order to run two 12 hours shifts in the EOC. 90 trained staff are required if those staff are to have a day off at some stage during an emergency. This is on top of personnel managing other essential services like three waters, roading, emergency welfare services, rubbish collection, cemeteries etc. One calculation suggested that councils across Canterbury require a minimum of 400 trained staff to be able to operate an EOC at each council on a 24/7 basis.

Each council currently sees the need to run its own EOC to ensure a locally coordinated response, however this means there are 9 EOCs and a regional Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) running in Canterbury during an event affecting the whole region. An objective, non-partisan review may reconsider that arrangement and the level of resourcing required.

## Readiness and Response

Readiness and response are functions that should sit within a small, professional national disaster management agency.

A small group of professional emergency managers and controllers with delegated authority to run emergencies throughout the country would provide a more professional and consistent service to the public than a large number of council personnel performing this role on a part time basis.

This agency could be based in cities throughout New Zealand and would be able to rationalise the number of EOCs that are required throughout the country and reduce the number of staff that need to be trained.

In a disaster, even a local disaster, the agency would supply controllers, response managers and functional leaders for the Intelligence, Planning, Operations, Logistics and Public Information functions. The rest of the EOC staffing could be made up from councils and other government agencies (NZDF, MBIE, DOC, IRD etc). These additional staff would need minimal training, because they would be being led by professional, competent, emergency managers, however they would still need to train.

Currently emergency welfare services are the responsibility of local authorities (emergency accommodation, household goods and needs assessment). Very few councils are resourced to meet these needs. Central government hold the databases and funding that is necessary to support the community in a time of emergency welfare need. Councils are well placed to make emergency welfare facilities and their volunteers available, but lack the “all of government” approach that makes a real difference in these events to individuals and families in the community who are suffering hardship.

The obvious concern around a national approach to emergency management relates to loss of local control and involvement in the response. However that doesn’t have to be the case. There are a number of ways in which local involvement can be retained and enhanced:

- Empower individual communities to undertake their own actions in a response. This is how we operate in Selwyn under the *Selwyn Gets Ready* model. Volunteer Community Response Teams are given a framework under which they can act in an emergency. There is no attempt to direct them, rather they are encouraged to help their own communities using their own community resources and report their results and any outstanding needs to our EOC.
- Recognise that even when national agencies are involved, the personnel on the ground are often locals. For example firefighters belong to a national agency, but live, work and volunteer in their communities.
- Create other opportunities for local involvement. A liaison officer from a local council could provide local knowledge and connect emergency managers with key community leaders and issues. A liaison officer from a particularly community could sit alongside a management team during the response to reflect local concerns or issues.
- Recovery begins at the same time as a response and is the perfect vehicle for community involvement. Recovery must be locally led and unique to each affected community.

A national agency would require national funding. This is unavoidable, but the expenditure is necessary to improve communication and levels of service to the public. The agency would require staff based throughout New Zealand, however it would not need a large number of personnel. Staff numbers could also be supplemented through the use of secondments from the emergency services, defence and other agencies with a role in disaster management. This would strengthen relationships and understanding between organisations, which would have a positive effect on disaster response.

A national agency would have better visibility over the needs of communities right across the country and could ensure consistency of service delivery and resource allocation. It could also better address the professional development needs of emergency managers.

Another advantage would be that the agency would be exclusively focused on emergency management. Just that simple fact would improve that standard of emergency



management in New Zealand. In contrast, councils have many important parts to their business. Emergency Management is generally a low cost and low profile part of that business until an event happens, which means readiness doesn't get the priority it deserves.

## Reduction and Recovery

These are functions that do naturally sit with local councils. Reduction is primarily a planning function. It's important for emergency managers to have input into reduction, but it should be owned at a local level, by local and regional councils and take account of particular local issues and concerns.

Recovery is something that must occur primarily at a local level and in its own unique way for each community. It needs to be regionally and nationally supported for major incidents, but should be locally led. Councils, with their strong community connections, are perfectly positioned to facilitate this. Recovery starts at the same time as the response phase, and this is the perfect space for local input and local customisation to suit community needs.

## Role of MCDEM

The Ministry is currently trying to fulfil a dual role, both as a policy organisation, providing advice to the Minister and guidelines to the CDEM sector, and also as an operational organisation, running the National Crisis Management Centre and leading the response to a national emergency. Even at this level of the current structure, there doesn't appear to be enough of a focus on readiness and response. MCDEM should be a policy organisation that sits above a national response agency.

A key weakness for MCDEM is that they lack the ability to lead the sector, as they don't fund it. While they make the policy, there is almost no obligation on local authorities to follow it, as they have a large degree of autonomy and are funding emergency management from rates. This leads to a lack of consistency around training of CDEM personnel, public education, services provided to ratepayers and the importance placed on CDEM within councils. CDEM service delivery can be different from one side of the street to the other, if that's where the local authority boundary is.

An example of this is the Integrated Training Framework for training personnel in emergency management. MCDEM sponsored the development of the framework, but lacked the resources to do the work itself. Some civil defence groups have adopted it, others haven't and are delivering different training. It's the same situation with EMIS – the Emergency Management Information System. Some groups use it, some use parts of it, some don't touch it.

It is little wonder there is no consistency in the management of emergencies when there is no consistency within the sector in peacetime.

## Emergency Declarations

A national response agency could have clear policy around emergency declarations. This would lead to more consistency around when declarations are and are not made, and provide more transparency and clarity for the public. The Minister should retain the power to declare an emergency. Mayors should retain the power to declare for their district as a safeguard where they perceive their district is being overlooked nationally. However they should be required to take advice from the national disaster management agency prior to declaring.

## Public Information in an Emergency

It is not possible for the current layered structure of CDEM in New Zealand to provide timely, accurate public information. Particularly when in addition to the layered structure, there are also cross-organisational issues that slow down information sharing due to different structures, different policies and often a general lack of understanding of other organisations role in an emergency.

## Keeping Government Informed

For the same reasons it is not possible to provide timely and accurate information to central government.

## Other Emergency Organisations

Most other emergency organisations are organised on a national basis and with some form of command and control structure. They struggle to understand the organisation and structure of CDEM in New Zealand. The requirement for emergency services to provide liaison officers to both regional CDEM coordination centres and then also to each local council operations centre is unrealistic and not usually achieved.

Emergency services professional leaders find it strange that they come under the control of inexperienced, non-professional emergency managers during large declared emergencies.

## Management of Volunteers

The national agency should manage CDEM volunteers to ensure that teams are located throughout the country based on likely need, they are trained and equipped to a consistent standard and are supported and recognised for their service. There are opportunities to learn from the new Fire and Emergency New Zealand organisation as it looks to make volunteer engagement a priority. Other organisations such as Land Search and Rescue and Coastguard may also provide good examples of organisations with strong, nationwide volunteer engagement. These organisations have specific skills which can be applied to specific emergencies and could potentially provide another response capability to any new organisation.

Management by a national agency would also ensure that teams could be quickly deployed from throughout the country to assist in disaster affected areas, without the need to make requests from multiple agencies and deal with the requirements imposed by those agencies around their particular resource (eg deployment length, capabilities, equipment, number of personnel etc).

Volunteer engagement is critical to an effective civil defence response across the country.

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> RNZSPCA
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / <input checked="" type="radio"/> No
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): See attached submission and appendix.

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

# SUBMISSION

BY THE

**Royal New Zealand Society for the  
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc.**

ON

The Ministerial Review: Better responses to  
natural disasters and other emergencies in  
New Zealand

July 2017

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## **Introduction**

The following submission is made on behalf of The Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RNZSPCA).

The SPCA is the preeminent animal welfare and advocacy organisation in New Zealand. We have been in existence for over 140 years with a supporter base representing many tens of thousands of New Zealanders across the nation. The organisation includes 45 SPCA Centres across New Zealand and over 80 inspectors appointed under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (AWA 1999)

The RNZSPCA welcomes the opportunity to make a submission and provide feedback on The Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. This submission is supplementary to the submission written by Steve Glassey of Wellington SPCA (attached for reference as Appendix 1) of which we are supportive. We have outlined below additional points for consideration.

### **RNZSPCA role within CDEM**

The Directors Guidelines to Welfare Services in an Emergency outlines the roles and responsibilities of organisations in an emergency. Under these arrangements the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) is the lead agency responsible for the Animal Welfare Service Sub-Function (under the Welfare Function of the CDEM Framework) during an emergency. The RNZSPCA is a support agency as part of that sub-function. The RNZSPCA, along with several other organisations, works with and supports MPI with its responsibilities under the sub-function.

The RNZSPCA is the only organisation outside of government that is approved under the AWA 1999; this Act provides for the appointment of Animal Welfare Inspectors who carry their own powers, which are unaffected by the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002. SPCA operations during an emergency (including rescue) generally have a SPCA Animal Welfare Inspector involved to ensure alternative powers through the AWA 1999 are available during a disaster.

### **SPCA resources, capacity and capability**

The SPCA, which is a charity reliant almost entirely on public donations, has 45 SPCA Centres throughout New Zealand. Each SPCA Centre's funding, skills, capabilities and resources vary widely. The SPCA's centres range from small centres with one or two staff/volunteers with limited capacity

and capability, to centres that have more extensive capacity, capability and resources. Many of the 45 Centres are on the smaller end of that scale. Therefore, as a whole, the SPCA has limited resources, capacity and capabilities throughout the country. These limited resources become particularly stretched and under pressure if disasters are ongoing or occur in close succession, such as what occurred earlier this year with the cyclones and bad weather patterns across the country.

The SPCA Centres are heavily reliant on volunteers and often lack resources, training, equipment and staff. In addition, they have limited capacity in terms of how many animals can be held within each Centre. These limited resources include items much needed in emergencies such as food, cages, blankets/towels and first aid/medicines. Many of the SPCA Centres are almost always at near maximum capacity and with limited resources during normal day-to-day business. Consequently, the Centres can struggle to cope in the event of an emergency when increased amounts of animals come into the centre and an increase in public queries and calls for assistance. With a greater influx of animals to the Centre disease control during an emergency is also a concern. In addition, the SPCA Centres still need to operate their day-to-day business despite the emergency, albeit in a limited capacity. The drain of staff and volunteer resources to assist during an emergency negatively affects the centres' ability to operate.

The New Zealand Animal Companion Animal Council report, *Companion Animals in New Zealand 2016* (NZCAC 2016), states that there are well over 4.6 million companion animals in New Zealand, 64% of New Zealand households are home to at least one companion animal, more than almost anywhere else in the world. Lessons learnt from the SPCA response during the Edgecumbe flooding proved that there are a vast range of species (cats, dogs, birds, turtles, guinea pigs, cows, pigs and such) kept by New Zealand households, and all these species have different housing, feeding and medical needs. The potentially large number of diverse animals needing care in an emergency can stretch and overwhelm the SPCA's ability to cope and provide assistance.

The SPCA is one of the pre-eminent animal welfare organisations in NZ and, as such, the public expectation is that the SPCA will be a key player in any emergency involving animals. In addition, the SPCA will be one of the organisations to which the public look to for advice and assistance.

MPI is the lead agency responsible for planning and coordinating animal welfare in emergencies but also has limited resources and capacity. Therefore, MPI is heavily reliant on support agencies such as the SPCA, particularly to undertake the response effort on the ground. The situation that would



result if a support agency on which MPI is so heavily reliant, such as the SPCA, is unable to cope or incapacitated by the emergency is of great concern. More focus, support and funding needs to be provided to MPI and the support agencies within the Animal Welfare Sub-Function to assist in the planning, coordination and response during an emergency.

### **SPCA National Rescue Unit and Emergency Reserve Programme**

The SPCA operates the National Rescue Unit (NRU); a specialist team of volunteers who are trained in urban search and rescue, technical rope rescue, confined space rescue, swift water/flood rescue and large animal rescue. This specialist animal rescue unit is the only one of its kind in New Zealand. Although based in Wellington, this team is available to be deployed anywhere in New Zealand to provide support during an emergency. However, deployment of the NRU from Wellington can create a potential time delay and involves significant expense to relocate the team and equipment to the area of the need. The NRU requires ongoing funding and maintenance in terms of training, staffing and equipment to ensure the expertise and skills required stay up to date and the unit is able to respond effectively to emergencies.

The SPCA is also starting to establish a volunteer Emergency Reserve programme that can provide additional response personnel during an emergency. These personnel are specifically trained for establishing Pet Friendly Evacuation Centres and supporting evacuation efforts. They also have some limited rescue capability to provide initial response or support the NRU.

These programmes are heavily reliant on volunteers and existing SPCA Inspectors. Deployment of these units creates a shortage of personnel in SPCA centres and the inspectorate. This affects the SPCA's ability to continue its day-to-day operations.

### **CDEM Planning**

The inclusion of animal welfare as a welfare sub-function within the CDEM Framework is a great step forward. However, with SPCA's involvement in the recent emergencies, it has become apparent that even though animal welfare is included within the framework, it has still not been factored into planning for the majority of CDEM groups.

There is a large body of evidence demonstrating that the rescue of animals is an integral component of ensuring the safety of humans during an evacuation. In an emergency, saving animals saves human lives. During previous disasters both in New Zealand and abroad, it has been found that

people are more likely to evacuate if they are able to take their pets; indeed human lives have been lost as pet owners have returned home prematurely to rescue their pets (World Society for the Protection of Animals 2014; Barlow & Shadwell 2016; McBride 2016). Refusal to allow companion animals to be evacuated with their owners can lead to non-compliance with evacuation and evacuation failure, leading to greater risk to human lives (Irving 2009; Heath 2001; Glassey 2010; Fritz Institute 2006).

Pets are considered important members of the family (Irvine 2009; Glassey 2010). Therefore, there are significant negative psychological effects on the owner if a pet is left behind and/or killed during an emergency (Edmonds & Cutter 2008; Gerwolls & Labott 1994; Hunt et al. 2008; Leonard & Scammon 2007). Pets can also play a positive psychosocial role in helping people cope during an emergency (Hunt et al. 2008; Heath 1999; Glassey 2010).

Recent events demonstrated that basic but vital actions, such as coordination of evacuation of animals, housing for evacuated animals and the tracking of these animals (such as the creation of an animal database for lost/found animals), were not included or actioned in emergency plans. These actions are essential to enable the support agencies to function effectively. For example in Edgumbe, it was necessary for the SPCA to create a database to track the animals rescued/displaced during the flooding. Once the SPCA had created the database and was able to collect the necessary data, this important information was then able to be passed on to the EOC. If the database had been created prior to the emergency this process would have been quicker and more streamlined, improving communication and response time. In addition, valuable resources from the SPCA that had to be redirected to creating the database could have been used for the on ground response. Therefore, more consistent planning and guidance from CDEM needs to be provided to facilitate the effective functioning of the support agencies.

There is a lack of focus on inclusion of animal welfare into emergency planning from CDEM at both the regional and local CDEM groups. This was highlighted during the recent MCDEM conference, where there were few references to animal welfare and the inclusion of animal welfare in planning and preparedness. There is also a lack of general emergency preparedness of the public, and even more so for preparedness for people with pets. Messaging from CDEM should be stronger and include preparedness for people with pets. Preparedness of the public with pets (i.e. having their own cages, food, having their animals microchipped etc.) will help ensure a more efficient

emergency response and enable quicker easier reunification of animals with their displaced owners post emergency.

### **Communications**

Communication between agencies is key to ensure an effective coordinated response during an emergency and to inspire public trust. Again, recent events highlighted this as an issue that needs to be addressed.

The flow of information from support agencies to MCDEM and back seems to be insufficient or delayed. During recent emergencies the support agencies had to rely on media reports and social media to get updates about the unfolding situation and had to base their response on this information rather than information received through official channels.

Lack of communication and guidance from the agency overall responsible for the event can lead to public ill-trust, incorrect information being provided (both to public and support agencies), lack of coordinated response effort and confusion about what response the support agencies can/should provide. During the Christchurch fires, the SPCA was given conflicting advice at cordon areas as to whether the SPCA response was needed and what it should entail. In addition, the confusion was heightened further as the cordon covered two council boundaries and the two councils provided different advice as to who could enter the cordoned area. In some areas members of the public were allowed to enter the cordon to collect animals but the SPCA was prevented from doing so. Members of the public being allowed into the cordon to collect their pets was covered by the media; however as the SPCA was prevented from doing so and therefore could not respond to calls of assistance from the public; this undermined public trust in the emergency response. Additionally, the state of emergency for this disaster was not declared for some days; this hampered the support agencies' response and events occurred that could have been avoided or mitigated. For example, members of the public as well as emergency services cut fences to allow stock to escape the fire. This later created problems with animals congregating in large packs/herds making identification and recovery of the animals difficult, moving and or rescuing these animals when the fire shifted into what was once safe areas, as well as the fact that the fences had to be repaired before recaptured animals could be returned to their homes and safely contained. If the support agencies had been involved earlier, this could have been handled differently and some of the issues that arose could have been avoided.

There is also a lack of consistency of messaging from CDEM group to CDEM group as well as at ground level operations such as at welfare centres. During the Christchurch fires the Animal Welfare Sub-Function had prepared a list of animal friendly accommodations and had detailed the assistance the support agencies could play in housing animals; this information was provided to the CDEM group. Despite this, members of the public were left sleeping in cars with their animals after being told that they could not take their animals into the welfare centres, with no other advice provided. This situation need not have occurred if there had been better communication. This would also have avoided the adverse coverage in the media on this situation.

Communication between support agencies, lead agencies and CDEM is vital to ensure a consistent, effective and positive response to an emergency. During the recent Edgecumbe emergency it was fortunate that the SPCA NRU was loaned a command trailer that was able to be used as a communication hub. This allowed information gathered throughout the day to be collated and fed back to the EOC and then into the greater response effort. This was a good example of how adequate resourcing could help to facilitate a more effective emergency response.

The inclusion of animals and animal welfare in planning and coordination is fundamental to effective emergency management. There is also a significant public relations risk if animals are not included in emergency management and something goes wrong. A recent example of this is the negative international attention that was received over the three cows that were stranded during the Kaikoura earthquakes.

### **Conclusion**

In an emergency, the inclusion of animals and animal welfare in planning, response and rescue is important to ensure human safety. Therefore, it is vital that animal welfare planning should be built into any consideration for amendments to emergency management related legislation, planning, coordination and response.

Currently animal welfare in emergencies is severely under resourced and this means that responses are limited and inconsistent. Lessons can be learnt from previous emergencies and addressing these issues can help to achieve improved evacuation compliance and to enable a more efficient, effective and coordinated response which adequately addresses the safety and welfare of animals.

With relevant changes to the legislation, greater focus on clarity of roles and leadership, clearer and timelier communication and increased support and resourcing the SPCA believes that a more effective, efficient and positive response to an emergency can be achieved.

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## Appendix

Appendix 1 – Attached is Steve Glassey and Wellington SPCA’s submission to the Ministerial Review:  
Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand.



## Wellington SPCA submission to the Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand

*“Pet ownership is the single most common factor associated with human evacuation failure that can be positively affected when the threat of disaster is imminent”*

(Heath & Linnabary 2015)

### Introduction

The current animal disaster legal framework in New Zealand is based primarily upon the Animal Welfare Act 1999 and Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. Both of these were written prior to Hurricane Katrina (2005) which was the genesis for modern animal disaster law with legislation being swiftly passed due to lessons learned, such as the Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act 2006. According to the Fritz Institute (2006) 44% of those who chose not to evacuate during this catastrophic event did so in part because they were unable to take their pets, as the federal policy was to leave pets behind at that time. Now in the USA, the PETS Act 2006 requires federal, state and local plans to include animal rescue, evacuation, sheltering and care. Closer to home, following the 2009 *Black Saturday* bushfires in Victoria the Royal Commission into this disaster found that human lives were lost as a direct result of animals not being able to be evacuated and pet owners returning prematurely to their properties to save their animals (World Society for the Protection of Animals 2014). By contrast, New Zealand’s efforts to improve animal disaster laws has been sub-optimal with no changes to legislation to enhance animal welfare during emergencies and therefore provide better protection for animals and their human counter-parts. The recent Kaikoura earthquake provides an opportunity to reflect on whether our current framework for animal disaster law is effective and if not, how we can strengthen arrangements for future events.

### Observations

#### Coordination and Planning

The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 yielded a robust and forward thinking piece of legislation that has served the country well for most parts. A new National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, issued in 2003, included animal welfare, with local authorities in most cases being charged with this function for companion animals. However, 14 years on there still is no national animal emergency management plan and only a small handful of group level animal emergency management plans. The state of animal emergency management is under-focused, under-resourced and inconsistent. The NCDEM Plan Order 2015, is vague and places responsibility also for MPI to also regionally “coordinate” animal welfare for civil defence. Although the lead agency is compelled to have an emergency management plan for its responsibilities and take all necessary steps to ensure those functions are provided (s. 59, CDEM Act 2002), at a regional level they only need to “coordinate the plan”. In effect, no one person or organisation is directly responsible or accountable to develop the regional animal welfare emergency management plan – this is a major flaw in the framework. In contrast, the Victorian Government following the Royal Commission into the Black Saturday bushfires,

required the Department of Primary Industries to lead the preparation of a stand-alone animal welfare emergency management plan (White 2012) which was published in 2011, only two years after the disaster and recently relaunched. Six years after the Canterbury 2011 earthquake which experienced animal welfare related issues (Glassey & Wilson 2011; Potts & Gadenne 2014) and was the country's first declared state of national emergency, we have no such plan, still little progress, and the lessons learned are more lessons lost. Lessons lost being those learnings that have been identified but never acted upon (Glassey 2011).

### Legal complexities of animal evacuation and disposal

It is important to first of all acknowledge that pursuant to section 6 of CDEM Act 2002, the Act does not affect the powers, duties or functions imposed on others. That is the powers of an Inspector under the Animal Welfare Act 2002 remain unaffected even during a declared state of emergency under the CDEM Act 2002, however common sense should always prevail. In the context of animal evacuation, the CDEM Act 2002 allows for persons during a declared state of emergency to be directed by a Constable or Controller to enter premises (s.87) including a dwelling (home) or Marae (sacred tribal meeting place registered with the government) using force if required; and to seize or destroy an animal (s.92) or other property.

Once an animal comes into the possession of the SPCA as an approved organisation under the Animal Welfare Act 1999, the SPCA can rehome the animal or otherwise dispose of it after 7 days pursuant to section 141(1A) if the owner does not claim the animal. The National CDEM Plan Order 2015, however places the local authority as the organisation responsible for accommodation of companion animals, yet they (and all other animal related organisations in New Zealand other than the SPCA) do not have the legal authority to rehome unclaimed animals other than dogs (as local authority powers for disposal only extend to stray dogs found at large under the Dog Control Act 1990) and they have no powers for holding or disposal of displaced companion animals such as cats, rabbits and birds. There is no provision in the CDEM Act 2002 that provides for the disposal of seized items except for destruction, which would have to be done while a state of emergency is still in effect. This leaves only the provisions of disposal under section 141(1A) to give effect to rehoming (or otherwise) of unclaimed animals and this power only extends currently to the SPCA which is not responsible for accommodation of disaster displaced animals.

Microchipping is a critical tool in the reunification of animals during and following an emergency (American Microchip Advisory Council for Animals 2007; Glassey & Wilson 2011) and could be interpreted that the CDEM Act 2002 allows for the "marking" of animals such as microchipping under section 91, under the direction of a constable or controller during a declared state of emergency. However, this assumption could be challenged and it is important during a mass evacuation of animals that microchipping can be applied without owner consent to ensure reunification.

Whether a declaration of emergency is in effect or not, the SPCA Animal Welfare Inspector also has the power to take animals into possession that are at risk of imminent harm under section 127(5)(a); and in doing so a notice of entry must be left at the property under (s. 129) which is not practical for mass evacuations across multiple properties; and dwellings cannot be entered unless a search warrant has been issued (s.131), again not practical in a disaster response context. The Animal Welfare Act 1999 also provides an Inspector the power to mitigate suffering and prevent likely harm from occurring to an animal under section 130(1)(a).

Where animals are taken in by the SPCA (as an Approved Organisation), the requirements under section 141(1A) of the Animal Welfare Act 1999 state the animal must be kept for seven days and has prescribed expectations around attempting to locate the owners and/or giving them notice of disposal



if the animal is not claimed. From overseas experiences including Hurricane Katrina, the American Bar Association created a model act for states to adopt to address the ownership, temporary holding, transferring and disposal of animals during and following a disaster. Their recommendation was that during a declared disaster, that the holding period was set at 30 days to allow for displaced owners to claim their animals; and that animals could not be transferred out of state without approval of the State Veterinarian (American Bar Association 2010). Thousands of animals were evacuated and transported across the United States following Hurricane Katrina, never to be reunited with their original families again and this prompted legal reforms (McNabb 2007). The model act also ensured that animals that were unable to be reunited could be legally rehomed with ownership being transferred. The SPCA as an approved organisation can legally rehome such unclaimed disaster affected; however other organisations do not have this authority and post-disaster rehoming through other organisations may lead to animal custody disputes as experienced after Hurricane Katrina.

### Mass Destruction of Animals

The CDEM Act 2002 does provide the power for the controller or a constable to destroy animals (s.91). Understanding the intrinsic value that animals have to people (World Society for the Protection of Animals 2014) and their importance as being seen as members of the family (Irvine 2009; Glassey 2010) and a psychosocial coping mechanism (Hunt et al. 2008; Heath 1999; Glassey 2010), not to mention the negative psychological impacts following the loss of a pet (Edmonds & Cutter 2008; Gerwolls & Labott 1994; Hunt et al. 2008; Leonard & Scammon 2007); though legal, it would be immoral, socially unacceptable and potentially career and politically limiting to destroy companion animals in an emergency. The availability of such unbridled power may give the impression that mass animal destruction is an acceptable emergency management practice, where that is far from the truth.

According to Irvine (2009), during Hurricane Katrina, Sherriff's Deputies were managing evacuees with their pets at the P. G. T. Beauregard Middle School. The Deputies assured the families they would take their pets to an animal shelter while families moved to the local high school. Some thirty-three dogs and cats were shot, execution style. A later forensic investigation found the animals had not been killed humanely and been left to bleed to death. To mitigate this lesson from repeating itself, it would be prudent to provide a safeguard that any destruction of animals only be undertaken after consultation with an Inspector appointed under the Animal Welfare Act 1999, not being a constable.

### Rescue Powers

#### **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

#### **85. Emergency powers of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups**

- (1) While a state of emergency is in force in its area, a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group may—
- (b) provide for the rescue of endangered persons and their removal to areas of safety:

The rescue of animals is important to human safety. The academic consensus that in an emergency, saving animals in effect saves human lives is a fundamental philosophy to contemporary emergency management doctrine. The inclusion of animals in section 85(1)(b) would help strengthen animal welfare emergency management arrangements to ensuring not just Animal Welfare Inspectors and Constables, had the emergency power to conduct rescues in a declared state of emergency. Even recently in New Zealand, there have been frequent examples of people losing their lives in an attempt to rescue their companion animals (Barlow & Shadwell 2016; Mcbride 2016).

## Evacuation Powers

### **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

#### **86. Evacuation of premises and places**

If a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or any constable, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human life, that person or a person authorised by him or her may require, within the area or district in which the emergency is in force,—

- (a) the evacuation of any premises or place, including any public place; or
- (b) the exclusion of persons or vehicles from any premises or place, including any public place.

The inconsistent use of life and human life within the CDEM Act 2002 creates challenges as the interpretation of “life” may extend to animals, whereas “human life” is very specific. Requisitioning powers (section 90) under the CDEM Act 2002 is specific to “human life”, whereas evacuation provisions (section 89) uses “life” creating greater flexibility in interpretation. These discrepancies were raised as issues to government in 2010 and despite recent amendments to the CDEM Act in 2016, these and other animal emergency management issues continue to be ignored.

The refusal of public safety officials to allow companion animals to be evacuated alongside their human families is a leading cause of evacuation failure (Irvine 2009; Heath 2001; Glassey 2010; Fritz Institute 2006). The omission of animals in this section may also imply that animals cannot be excluded from a premise or place. This section should be for the preservation of human and animal life and that animals, persons or vehicles can be excluded from any premises or place.

## Entry Powers

### **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

#### **87. Entry onto premises**

If a state of emergency is in force in any area, a Controller or a constable, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller or constable, may enter on, and if necessary break into, any premises or place within the area or district in respect of which the state of emergency is in force if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the action is necessary for—

- (a) saving life, preventing injury, or rescuing and removing injured or endangered persons; or
- (b) permitting or facilitating the carrying out of any urgent measure for the relief of suffering or distress.

The current section that provides access onto properties and premises, including that of dwellings, refers to “life”, “persons” and “suffering or distress”. Without these terms being defined in the Act’s interpretation (section 2), and without case law, the act is silent in regards to its application to animals. To avoid ambiguity and to ensure the needs of animal welfare are assured, animals should be specified with animals being defined in the Act’s interpretation as the same as in the Animal Welfare Act 1999.

## Requisition Powers

### **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

#### **90. Requisitioning powers**

- (1) This section applies if a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or a constable, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human life.

Though empirical evidence would suggest that the preservation of animal life during an emergency will positively influence the preservation of human life as earlier discussed, to avoid ambiguity the section should be amended to reflect a contemporary approach to emergency management law. During a declared state of emergency, this provides flexibility to the Controller and any constable, to effect requisitions to protect animals. For mass animal rescues during disasters such as those from intensive farming facilities and laboratories, specialist equipment and heavy machinery may be needed. The inability for public safety officials to be able to carry out specialist or logistically complex animal rescue operations may force animal activists through to pet owners to defy official advice and put themselves at harm's way as seen in numerous events such as the Buckeye Farm disaster in 2000 (Irvine 2009, p.48). It is in the interest of disaster response officials and politicians to mitigate this significant risk by ensuring animal disaster response is enabled with the same powers as those given for human disaster response.

As with the other emergency powers within the CDEM Act 2002, any constable may exercise such powers (except for those contained in section 85 which are exclusively conferred upon the Controller). SPCA and MPI Inspectors appointed under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 are already provided with the same powers as a constable under the act, except for the power of arrest or stopping a vehicle. The government already entrusts these officers with significant legal powers and it makes sense that during a time when police are going to be overwhelmed, the same powers are conferred upon them for animal welfare matters during a state of declared emergency.

## Codes of Welfare

The Animal Welfare Act 1999 makes provisions for Codes of Welfare to be established for species, industries or activities to ensure minimum animal welfare standards are set. Under the Act, they can be used as evidence of non-compliance with the Act, and they can also be used by the defence to prove they met minimum requirements and therefore were not in breach. Certain offences under the Act have a strict liability, meaning the prosecution needs only to prove the act of the offence (*actus reus*), not the guilty knowledge or intent (*mens rea*). Codes of Welfare often support the enforcement of strict liability offences, however they have also a defence caveat to applying these in circumstances of emergency, namely:

### **Animal Welfare Act 1999**

#### **13. Strict liability**

- 2 (c) that the act or omission constituting the offence took place in circumstances of stress or emergency, and was necessary for the preservation, protection, or maintenance of human life;

What countless examples of recent disasters have proven, is that the saving of animals, in particular companion animals strongly correlates to increased evacuation compliance and subsequent increase in the protection of human life. The relationship between saving people and companion animals in an

emergency is intrinsically linked, and therefore the omission to save such animals indirectly places the human population in particular their owners and public safety responders at risk. The old attitude of “human lives before pets” is draconian and reflects a lack of understanding between the evidence that saving pets will actually save more human lives. Therefore, any omission to save companion animals in an emergency, is empirically contrary to the preservation, protection, or maintenance of human life. The defence clause under section 13(2)(c), should not be seen as an excuse for public safety officials, especially when emergency management purports to take an evidence based approach to its activities. Further effort is required to enhance animal emergency management within Codes of Welfare.

### Zoological vulnerability

Companion animals are the ones that are given the most attention in emergency management, given their strong bond to their human guardians and the paternalistic protective behaviours displayed by their guardians also. But companion animals are generally the least zoologically vulnerable when compared to intensively farmed animals reliant on automated feeding and environmental systems (Irvine 2009). There numbers may be so large that their rescue during emergencies may be logistically impossible, or it may simply be more cost effective for the producer to discard them as waste, rather considering these animals as sentient beings. It is important that legislative frameworks afford protection to these animals across the spectrum of comprehensive emergency management.

Following the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake, GNS Scientist Kevin Berryman observed the seabed was vertically displaced some 6 metres along the coastline, rendering crabs, fish and Paua trapped unable to return to the water (Clayton 2016). Other media reports corroborated these observations with crayfish and lobster also being observed stranded by the uplift and despite public officials warnings not to, community members returned to relocate the sea life back into water (Lewis 2016). There was significant backlash by the public to the government direction to stop the sea life rescue attempts with even a Ministry for Primary Industries fisheries officer threatening to arrest the Paua rescue volunteers (Gates 2016). With hundreds if not thousands of crabs, lobsters, fish and crayfish stranded and dying, no government agency took responsibility for the welfare of these animals, despite them being afforded the same protections under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 as companion animals (acknowledging that Paua however are not classified as animals and therefore not protected under the Animal Welfare Act 1999). Simplistically, the government sets the maximum number of fish that can be legally taken from the sea through a quota system or *allowable catch*. The efforts by the public to rescue the fish were treated as breaches of fishing quota by officials, whereas they in many cases were acting in the interests of animal welfare. It is unclear whether the provisions of section 16 (emergency measures) would be effective in enabling rescue of fish, those protected under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 or otherwise. In effect, there is no agency or body responsible for the welfare of these animals during an emergency and this gap needs to be addressed.

Research undertaken by Potts and Gadenne (2014) also noted that other animal groups such as hedgehogs, sea birds and turtles were negatively affected as a result of the Christchurch earthquakes and current animal emergency planning efforts struggle to cater for companion animals let alone other animal groups such as wildlife. Further research is needed around non-companion animal vulnerability to disasters in New Zealand and how these animals can be better protected in the future.

## Recommendations

To strengthen the existing animal disaster legislative framework in New Zealand, there are several improvements that could be made including:

1. Mandating the development and maintenance of animal welfare emergency management plans, both at the national and regional level
2. Amending the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 to ensure animal protection measures are included in rescue, entry, evacuation, requisitioning and other relevant sections
3. That microchipping of animals is specifically added as a power during an emergency or recovery transition period
4. Limiting the power of animal destruction in recognition of international experiences
5. Educating public safety agencies (including government departments and military) around the importance of taking an inclusive approach to animals in emergency planning and evacuations
6. Revising and developing Codes of Welfare to incorporate animal welfare emergency management principles and developing a new *Code of Welfare for Animals in Emergencies*
7. Defining emergency welfare responsibility for unowned sentient animals (whether protected under the Animal Welfare Act 1999 or not), in particular those who are highly vulnerable to natural hazards.

For the purposes of consolidation, consideration should be given to a specific regulation made under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 or Animal Welfare Act 1999, like that of the Pet Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act 2006 seen in the United States. For further information, the following websites are provided:

<https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Reference/disaster/Pages/PETS-Act-FAQ.aspx>

[http://www.wagnpetsafety.com/pdf/Pet\\_Parents\\_and\\_PETS\\_ACT\\_of\\_2006.pdf](http://www.wagnpetsafety.com/pdf/Pet_Parents_and_PETS_ACT_of_2006.pdf)

## Conclusion

There is considerable evidence that substantiates the protective nature of humans towards animals, in particular companion animals. Well respected disaster management scholar Erik Auf der Heide (1989) stated that emergency planning should be based on “normal behaviour” not “correct behaviour”, in effect we should plan on the basis on how humans will likely react, not how we want them to react. On this basis, emergency managers need to place greater focus on ensuring that animals, companion animals are acknowledged as intrinsically linked to people. To achieve improved evacuation compliance and public confidence in response coordination, the welfare of animals during emergencies needs to be a core function and a priority of the response. To enable this change and designate accountability, New Zealand needs to heed the lessons of Hurricane Katrina and the Black Saturday Victorian bush fires and give urgency to strengthening the animal emergency management laws with amendments to the relevant acts or the passage of specific regulations to reflect international best practice and meet the expectations of its citizens.



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**Chief Executive Officer**

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Annex A: Model Amendments to Legislation

1. That the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 be amended as follows:

### 2. Interpretation

**Auxiliary Officer** means an auxiliary officer within the meaning of the Animal Welfare Act 1999

**Director-General** means the Director-General within the meaning of the Animal Welfare Act 1999

**Inspector** means an inspector within the meaning of the Animal Welfare Act 1999.

### 85. Emergency powers of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups

(1) While a state of emergency is in force in its area, a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group may—

(b) provide for the rescue of endangered persons or animals and their removal to areas of safety:

### 86. Evacuation of premises and places

If a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or any constable, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human or animal life, that person or a person authorised by him or her may require, within the area or district in which the emergency is in force,—

(c) the evacuation of any premises or place, including any public place; or

(d) the exclusion of persons, animals or vehicles from any premises or place, including any public place.

### 87. Entry onto premises

If a state of emergency is in force in any area, a Controller, constable or an inspector, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller, constable or inspector, may enter on, and if necessary break into, any premises or place within the area or district in respect of which the state of emergency is in force if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the action is necessary for—

(a) saving animal or human life, preventing injury, or rescuing and removing injured or endangered persons or animals; or

### 90. Requisitioning powers

(2) This section applies if a state of emergency is in force and, in the opinion of a Controller or a constable, the action authorised by this section is necessary for the preservation of human or animal life.



### **91. Power to give directions**

While a state of emergency is in force, a Controller, constable or an inspector, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller or constable, may—

- (a) direct any person to stop any activity that may cause or substantially contribute to an emergency;
- (b) request any person, either verbally or in writing, to take any action to prevent or limit the extent of the emergency.

### **92. Power to carry out inspections, etc**

1. While a state of emergency is in force-

- (a) A Controller, constable or an inspector, or any person acting under the authority of a Controller or constable, may examine, mark, seize, sample, secure, disinfect, or destroy any property, animal, or any other thing in order to prevent or limit the extent of the emergency.
- (b) An inspector, auxiliary officer or any person acting under the authority of an inspector or auxiliary officer, may microchip or otherwise mark any animal.
- (c) A Controller or any constable destroying any animal must consult with an inspector from an approved organisation before such destruction is undertaken, and only in such circumstances where it is reasonable to do so.

2. That the Animal Welfare Act 1999 be amended as follows:

#### **2. Interpretation**

**State of emergency** has the same meaning as in section 2 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

#### **141. Duties of Approved Organisations**

(7) While a state of emergency is in force, the Director-General may instruct approved organisations to extend the 7 day period under subsections (2) and (3) up to 30 days.

3. That the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 be amended as follows:

#### **75. Animal welfare**

(1) All animal owners, or persons in charge of animals, should develop their own plans to care for their animals during emergencies.

(2) At the national and CDEM Group levels, the Ministry for Primary Industries is the agency responsible for—

- (a) co ordinating the provision of the animal welfare services sub-function (including animal rescue, animal shelter, food, water, husbandry, reunification, and veterinary care and other essentials) for all animals, including companion animals, production animals, animals in research, testing, and teaching facilities, zoo and circus animals, wildlife, and any other animal as defined in section 2 of the Animal Welfare Act 1999; and
- (b) developing and maintaining the national animal welfare emergency plan; and
- (bb) developing and maintaining a regional animal welfare emergency plan for each CDEM Group; and
- (c) maintaining the Government's reporting and advisory capability on animal welfare in an emergency.

## **162. Government financial support to local authorities during response**

Government financial support for response activities focuses on costs incurred by local authorities to—

- (a) care for directly affected people and companion animals, including the costs of accommodating, transporting, feeding, and clothing people and companion animals as a result of an emergency; and
- (b) take the necessary precautions or preventive actions (whether by construction, demolition, or any other means) to reduce the immediate danger to human or animal life, where those precautions or actions were begun during the response period; and
- (c) take precautions or preventive actions aimed at reducing the potential consequences of an emergency where those precautions or actions were begun in the period immediately before the emergency.

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# TE KAAHUI O RAURU

NGAA RAURU KIITAHU IWI  
14 FOOKES STREET  
PO BOX 18, WAVERLEY 4544  
PHONE: (06) 346 5707



BY EMAIL TO: [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

7<sup>th</sup> July 2017

Submission: Civil Defense response

Te Kaahui o Rauru is the PSGE of Ngaa Rauru Iwi of South Taranaki who borders Ngaati Ruanui in the North and Whanganui Iwi to the South. The Ngaa Rauru rohe was severely flooded in 2014 via the Waitotara river and the Waitotara valley, along with the Whanganui River and the Rangitikei river in Ngaa Wairiki Ngaati Apa. A civil defence emergency was declared

In 2016 the Whanganui River burst its banks and the 3 Iwi again were involved in CD emergency and the same again at the beginning of 2017 with the Whanganui River which thankfully did not break its banks

It is our view that the 2014 event, the CD response was poorly coordinated with the virtual exclusion of Iwi in the response. We met with CD after the event to debrief and suggest improvements such as including Iwi in the emergency plans and identifying marae as gathering place for and during the emergency, but there has been no CD response to this

With the 2 later events Iwi were more organised and was able to clip into the CD system eventually. We have the same criticism with CD as previous; non-involvement in the planning and initial execution of the CD plan. Decision-making appears slow and made on a financial basis rather than an emergency basis. CD resources are centralised and it takes time to get them deployed into the "field" whereas rural storage (in a lockable container or similar) is an option that must be considered

In our view Iwi want to be involved in CD but there appears to be no will or inclination from CD, for that to occur. It also appears to us that CD is severely under-resourced.

We think that Iwi will continue to be overlooked in the CD space and its our opinion that the CD legislation must be amended to write IWI into the legislation to ensure that Iwi is consulted on the design and execution of CD plans, communications and gathering areas for example.

I would like to appear to talk submission if required

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Naku noa na



Te Pahunga Martin William Davis  
Tumu Whakarae

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**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> David Waters
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a) [Redacted]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Attached

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

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## Ambulance New Zealand Submission:

### Technical Advisory Group

### **‘Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand’**

Attention

Roger Sowry: Group Chair

The following submission is provided on behalf of the Trustees and Members of Ambulance New Zealand

For further information in regard to this submission please contact:

David Waters  
Chief Executive  
Ambulance New Zealand  
208 Ohariu Valley Road  
Wellington 3067

s9(2)(a)



## Ambulance New Zealand

### Our Vision

That New Zealanders are supplied with a safe, reliable, efficient and economic ambulance service.

### Our Purpose

Is to represent the collective interests and advocate on behalf of the ambulance sector for the provision of safe, reliable and efficient ambulance services.

### Our Membership

- St John
- Wellington Free Ambulance Service
- Life Flight Trust
- Philips Search and Rescue Trust
  
- Auckland Rescue Helicopter Trust
- Garden City Helicopters
- Helicopters Otago
- Air Gisborne
- Air Manawatu
- Air New Plymouth
- Air Wanganui
- Eastland Helicopter Rescue Trust
- Hawkes Bay Helicopter Rescue Trust
- Lakes District Air Rescue Trust
- Northland Emergency Services Trust
- Skyline Aviation
- Taranaki Rescue Helicopter Trust
- MedicAlert Foundation NZ Inc
- Medical Rescue +

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Summary

The following high level comments summarise the feedback received by Ambulance New Zealand in regard to the review of responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand:

As we know from the many recent Civil Defence Emergency Management events experienced in New Zealand that Ambulance services provide an essential and specific emergency service – significantly different to our health and hospital service colleagues and other emergency services. The Ambulance Service response in a Civil Defence Emergency Management event is dictated by the national ambulance major incident and emergency plan – AMPLANZ (explained in detail under the rationale that follows). This key document has ensured that there is a common understanding between ambulance services, communications centres and our emergency management partners as to how an ambulance will respond in a time of crisis.

The New Zealand integrated approach to emergency management can be described by the four areas of activity, known as the '4Rs'. These are:

Reduction  
Readiness  
Response  
Recovery

AMPLANZ must be considered by the CDEM Group in all its 4 Rs' activities. This input must come from an Ambulance Service representative as our health and hospital, and other emergency service colleagues are not fully conversant with the requirements of AMPLANZ nor the regional/national capability of Ambulance Services.

The terms of reference for this review identify that organisational structures, roles and decision making powers in the civil defence emergency management response system need to align with expectations for system performance. This includes the ability to share information and operational capability.

The structure of New Zealand's emergency response system makes it clear from a public expectation perspective that the Ambulance Service (St John and Wellington Free Ambulance combined) are emergency services in their own right. At a tactical level this is also the experience of ambulance staff who actively and regularly respond and work alongside police and fire personnel applying the CIMS approach to incident management. Regrettably the further up the chain of coordination one goes the less the ambulance service experiences that level of cooperation, involvement and information sharing.

The review problem statement identifies that information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency. While there are certainly many instances where ambulance managers are rapidly involved in Emergency Operations Centres (EOC) and are thus able to help provide information, in some occasions ambulance managers have been specifically excluded from an EOC because they were "not an emergency service" rather it was the DHB that was the legally designated emergency service which technically is correct under legislation. This draconian approach introduces significant risk and should be discontinued.

As is noted in the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 2014 manual:

- Responsibilities of an Ambulance Service in all emergencies are:
- To save life in conjunction with other Emergency Services
- To notify and liaise with the other Emergency Services



- To initiate and maintain an Ambulance Service Command and Control structure lead by an Ambulance Service Controller
- To protect the health, safety and welfare of all ambulance staff generally, and all health workers on the scene of a mass casualty incident
- To supply sufficient ambulances and staff for the incident
- To provide a communications system between ambulance and DHBs (including hospitals)
- To provide Ambulance Liaison Officer/s
- To acquire additional ambulance resources, as necessary through the use of the Ambulance Service's national coordination mechanisms
- To forward to the receiving hospital(s) and health facilities, Medical Officer(s) of Health and
- DHB(s), any information acquired at the scene relating to chemical, biological or radiation (CBR) hazards and possible contamination of casualties or rescuers and advise of the potential for self-presenting patients
- To assume responsibility for casualty decontamination, in conjunction with the Fire Service
- To provide the Fire Service with clinical advice and assistance to support on-site decontamination
- To maintain adequate emergency ambulance cover throughout the Ambulance Service's operational area for the duration of the major incident
- To progressively release activated hospital(s) and health facilities and ultimately issue a message indicating the completion of casualty evacuation.

None of this is practicably possible if ambulance managers are not specifically included in the decision making processes. Because the legislative arrangements do not provide for active engagement of ambulance services at all levels of response and preparedness including strategic preparation and planning it can be difficult for the respective lead services to ensure information sharing and decision making are appropriate to the benefit of affected individuals.

it is clear that the New Zealand public have an expectation that the combined emergency services including the ambulance service will be enabled to work together in responding to major incidents. Indeed the clear priority of 'preventing death and injury' falls squarely with the ambulance service as identified under the CIMS principals. In order to achieve the strongest outcomes in these areas **it is imperative that the ambulance service be recognised as an emergency service in its own right** so that its managers can provide vital guidance and leadership in significant events without the risk of not being informed or excluded.

The ambulance service is the lead medical response capability in an emergency. The current systems support availability of skilled clinicians and managers in responding to these emergencies. There are also appropriate protocols in place between the three front line agencies to ensure front line response will occur well. However as an incident scales up or is less clear in terms of the nature of the incident current structures do not support a completely integrated approach to response particularly of a large scale. In order for this to happen well **it is imperative that all agencies involved in the tactical response are also involved at the senior operational level (EOC's)**

At this point in time ambulance services are not responsible under legislation for determining the need to declare states of emergency. As part of the response process however ambulance hold vital information in helping determine when that state of emergency should be declared. As such while there will be few if any instances where ambulance will be the lead agency at an incident, However, it is important that ambulance be engaged early in the strategic decision making processes because it is likely that the information ambulance can provide will assist in those decision processes. **it is imperative that the ambulance service be actively engaged at that strategic level both during the response but also importantly during the planning and preparation phase.**

As an agency operating under the CIMS model ambulance is very familiar with the concepts of command and control and have structures and processes in place that ensure that we have good command within the ambulance service. As ambulance move from the local level to a regional level they are not actively included in the processes and systems. As a result, there are occasions where ambulance will not be aware of the overall operating picture that helps in efficient response decisions from a front line health perspective. **it is imperative that the ambulance service be actively engaged at all operational levels during the response.**

Ambulance has systems and processes that help with the provision of information into the emergency response system including access and use of systems such as Health EMIS and CDEM EMIS. While ambulance can certainly access information held on those platforms and provide information in that manner; in the early phases of response ambulance are often late to be informed of some of the more strategic information that would help inform their own response. For this to happen more quickly we believe again that there is the need for the ambulance service to be more closely engaged at the higher level in the same way that our colleagues from FENZ and the police are. **it is imperative that the ambulance service be a trusted emergency service partner and have access to all relevant information during a response.**

#### **Conclusion and Submission**

Ambulance service must be recognised as an emergency service in their own right so that other response agencies and more particularly those not part of the 111 response system engage ambulance in strategic planning and decision making. By ensuring this structure is put in place it will improve the way in which responsible agencies respond to major incidents.

**Specifically - it is imperative that the:**

- 1. ambulance service be recognised as an emergency service in its own right.**
- 2. that all agencies involved in the tactical response are also involved at the senior operational level (EOC's).**
- 3. ambulance service be actively engaged at that strategic level both during the response but also importantly during the planning and preparation phase.**
- 4. ambulance service be actively engaged at all operational levels during the response.**
- 5. ambulance service be a trusted emergency service partner and have access to all relevant information during a response.**

## Rationale

New Zealand has for a number of years had a national ambulance major incident and emergency plan

– AMPLANZ. This has ensured that there is a common understanding between ambulance services, communications centres and our emergency management partners as to how an ambulance will respond in a time of crisis.

Today however this new plan has had to take into account a number of emerging aspects in the emergency management environment. These include, for example: a number of high profile and catastrophic events in the last 5-10 years that has seen a greater focus on emergency management internationally; the redevelopment of the New Zealand Ambulance Standard (NZ8156) and the increased requirement to align with national emergency plans across the sector.

There is a continuing requirement on Ambulance Services to develop their own Major Incident and Emergency Plans based in the detailed operational framework that is AMPLANZ. AMPLANZ now provides clearer guidelines and tools to assist services at the local, service and national levels. AMPLANZ is noted within NZS8156 and therefore an Ambulance Service's Major Incident and Emergency Plan should be audited regularly.

Finally, given the recent emergencies in New Zealand particularly in Canterbury and on the West Coast, it is now clear that major emergencies do indeed occur in New Zealand. Therefore, there is a requirement that AMPLANZ and the Ambulance Service's own Major Incident and Emergency Plans continue to be 'living documents' that remain relevant and practical in order to meet the needs of their community and the service.

### What is AMPLANZ?

AMPLANZ is a detailed operational framework for the New Zealand ambulance sector to provide clear

guidance for all Ambulance Services in all parts of the emergency management cycle. It provides standard terminology, structures, and roles. It also provides tools to assist an Ambulance Service in its readiness and reduction, response and recovery, for example, task cards, planning templates, debriefing templates etc.

Specific Ambulance Service Major Incident and Emergency Plans must be developed Ambulance Services based on this framework.

AMPLANZ cannot be arbitrarily changed. There is a review process through the Ambulance New Zealand Standards and Accreditation Committee outlined as part of AMPLANZ.

In line with health sector and the emergency management sectors as a whole, there are a large number of specialist terms and abbreviations.

### The Aim of AMPLANZ

The aim of AMPLANZ is to:

- Ensure the effective and consistent management of major incidents at local, service and national levels for the benefit of patients
- Minimise the impact of a major incident or multiple major incidents on normal operations
- Adopt and encourage a whole-sector approach to major incident management
- Adopt and encourage a whole-of-organisation approach within services to major incident management.

## **Mandate of AMPLANZ**

AMPLANZ applies to all Ambulance Services in New Zealand and it is noted in Section 3.2.7 of the Ambulance Standard (NZS 8156:2008) that an Ambulance Service “shall be aware of, and where appropriate, contribute to, regional and/or national large scale contingency planning and be able to operate in accordance with such plans including... AMPLANZ”.

Ambulance New Zealand has approved policy to clarify: “...the mandate of AMPLANZ and to ensure that Ambulance NZ and Ambulance Services understand their roles and responsibilities with regards to the development, maintenance, and operationalisation of AMPLANZ”.

AMPLANZ is mandated to provide:

“all Ambulance Services with the nationally standardised framework to command, control and coordinate ambulance resources locally, regionally and nationally, for the greatest good of the greatest number of casualties during major incidents”.

## **Format of AMPLANZ**

The format of AMPLANZ includes two documents. These are The Overview and The Plan. The Plan is made up of four parts as noted below.

- The Overview: This provides a summary for all Ambulance Services and partner agencies of the concepts and approach of the ambulance sector in the management of major incidents.
- Part 1: Introduction to AMPLANZ and Emergency Management for the Ambulance Sector: This part summarises what AMPLANZ is, the sector, and key ambulance and emergency management concepts.
- Part 2: Consistent Operations at the Scene: This Part focuses on the activities to be undertaken by responding crews, the duty management and those operational officers directly involved at the scene in coordination with other responding agencies.
- Part 3: Ambulance Service Approach: This Part focuses on the activities to be undertaken by Ambulance Service Management in all parts of the emergency management cycle. It is designed to guide ambulance managers who are required to support the response at the scene, as well as play a role in preparing for or recovering from a major incident.
- Part 4: National Crisis Coordination Centre: This Part provides a framework for the development and management of National Crisis Coordination Centre to ensure that the ambulance sector is able to respond to a significant regional or national emergency.

## **The Responsibilities of Ambulance Services in a Major Incident**

The role of the ambulance sector in response to a major incident is to deliver and maintain appropriate pre-hospital clinical care. In a mass casualty incident, ambulance will lead the operational health response to the incident at the scene/s and manage the triage, treatment and transport of patients to appropriate receiving hospitals or health facilities. In all emergencies impacting the health of the communities, Ambulance Services will manage and coordinate their response with the DHBs and other emergency services to manage demands on the healthcare system.

The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), 2nd edition. 2014. Safer communities through integrated emergency management. Pages 4–6 state:

### **The key responsibilities of Ambulance Services in a major incident.**

Responsibilities of an Ambulance Service in all emergencies:

- To save life in conjunction with other Emergency Services

- To notify and liaise with the other Emergency Services
- To initiate and maintain an Ambulance Service Command and Control structure lead by an Ambulance Service Controller
- To protect the health, safety and welfare of all ambulance staff generally, and all health workers on the scene of a mass casualty incident
- To supply sufficient ambulances and staff for the incident
- To provide a communications system between ambulance and DHBs (including hospitals)
- To provide Ambulance Liaison Officer/s
- To acquire additional ambulance resources, as necessary through the use of the Ambulance Service's national coordination mechanisms
- To forward to the receiving hospital(s) and health facilities, Medical Officer(s) of Health and DHB(s), any information acquired at the scene relating to chemical, biological or radiation (CBR) hazards and possible contamination of casualties or rescuers and advise of the potential for self-presenting patients
- To assume responsibility for casualty decontamination, in conjunction with the Fire Service
- To provide the Fire Service with clinical advice and assistance to support on-site decontamination
- To maintain adequate emergency ambulance cover throughout the Ambulance Service's operational area for the duration of the major incident
- To progressively release activated hospital(s) and health facilities and ultimately issue a message indicating the completion of casualty evacuation.

#### **A structured and consistent approach**

To reduce to a minimum, the disruption of the normal work of the Service by implementing Business Continuity Plans, as appropriate, ensuring the restoration of normality at the earliest opportunity.

Responsibilities of an Ambulance Service for Mass Casualty Incidents in particular:

- To provide a structure to support the triage, treatment and transport of casualties from the scene by establishing an Ambulance Control Point, Casualty Clearing Point and Ambulance Loading Point
- To provide a Senior Ambulance Officer at the scene to act as Ambulance Commander (AC)
- To be part of the Scene Incident Management Team (IMT) to ensure a coordinated response to the incident
- To identify, notify and communicate with appropriate receiving hospital(s), health facilities and DHBs
- of the prevailing situation and the categories and estimated times of arrival of casualties
- To triage all patients prior to evacuation from the scene
- To manage all medical resources deployed to the scene for the treatment and care of casualties
- To determine the priorities for the evacuation of casualties, ensuring even and simultaneous dispatch to the receiving hospital(s) and health facilities
- To organise transportation for casualties to the receiving hospital(s) and health facilities, and any necessary secondary transfers between hospital

AMPLANZ is aligned with CIMS, important New Zealand emergency management concepts and with key national emergency plans.

AMPLANZ also notes that to effectively manage large and complex incidents, the processes and procedures used by ambulance services need to be established and understood within the services and also by partner agencies.

Major incidents, such as mass casualty events, are infrequent and consequently any procedures required to manage such incidents shall follow the same basic processes as for smaller and less

complex incidents. Therefore, essential processes, such as assigning initial response roles and responsibilities, incident escalation, notifications, situation reports, triage etc are the same no matter what the size or complexity of the incident.

### **Whole of Organisation and Sector**

AMPLANZ is designed to ensure that all parts of the ambulance sector and the individual services are involved in the response, recovery and development of readiness of the sector. This will then contribute to the resilience of the health sector.

Within an Ambulance Service there are roles and responsibilities of first-responding crews, for ambulance service management and also for key support staff in non- operational or core support positions.

Across the sector, guidance is given to further integrate the individual service's response and planning at the tactical and operational levels and also in the coordination of all ambulance services with national agencies, such as MoH.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence



Ministerial Review Team  
Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand  
By email: [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Attention: Jeremy Corban

6 July 2017

Dear Jeremy,

This letter provides a consolidated Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) submission to the Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand. Our submission draws extensively from our experiences in the Kaikoura earthquakes of November 2016, the Edgcumbe flooding event in April 2017, and to a lesser extent, the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011.

#### **MBIE's roles in natural disasters and other emergency events**

MBIE's role in natural disasters and other emergency events stems from our core policy and administrative functions in the portfolio areas set out below, together with the specific responsibilities set out in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015:

- Communications;
- Energy and Resources, including Crown Entity monitoring functions for the Electricity Authority, Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority and the Gas Industry Company;
- Building and Construction;
- Commerce and Consumer Affairs, including Crown Entity monitoring functions for the Commerce Commission; and
- Science and Innovation, including the Crown Entity monitoring functions for GNS Science.

#### **MBIE's experiences and suggestions to aid better responses**

Set out below is a summary of our experiences in recent events for each of the sectors in which we play a significant role. We have also included suggestions to aid better responses to future natural disasters and other emergency events.

##### **1. Communications**

Telecommunications services in New Zealand are predominantly provided by private sector operators, although the State Owned Enterprises Kordia and Transpower also operate telecommunications networks to support their core business interests. Chorus Ltd provides regulated wholesale services under the oversight of the Commerce Commission given the



natural monopoly and essential service characteristics of parts of its fixed line networks. MBIE's role is to provide policy advice and to administer government investment in some telecommunications services e.g. ultra-fast broadband (UFB) and the rural broadband initiative (RBI).

Our experience in the Kaikoura emergency event is that telecommunications operators worked cooperatively to restore fixed line and mobile telecommunications services as soon as possible. However, the restoration process could have been made easier through improved coordination and information sharing with CDEM. A key issue was access to sites for both personnel and equipment (including large cable drums). Telecommunications restoration did not appear to have been prioritised as a life-line service. Examples include:

- limited access to Defence assets for transport into the area - operators commissioned private helicopters when capacity existed on Air Force planes that would have led to more timely access to the area;
- restrictions on airspace and road use (e.g. the inland Kaikoura road) were implemented without clear exceptions or access rights for core infrastructure providers to assess damage and commence repair operations; and
- telecommunications operators not knowing who to contact, e.g. they did not know who to escalate the risk of naval boat anchors dragging the Vodafone submarine telco cable and damaging it off the coast of Kaikoura.

Requests by telecommunications operators to Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) coordinators to resolve these issues were not responded to consistently or in timely manner. We also experienced situations where information provided to the local CDEM coordinator:

- became distorted as it passed through different parties at the local and regional levels before reaching national coordinators; and/or
- was sourced from industry people or life-line representatives who did not have the appropriate information.

Telecommunications is an inherently complex area with fixed and mobile services, multiple players and multiple critical dependencies (e.g. electricity and fuel supplies). Our view is that strengthening the connection with telecommunications operators and knowledge of telecommunications within MCDEM will greatly aid future emergency responses and enable more accurate and timely status reporting to be provided. In particular, our view is that:

- the government should continue to encourage telecommunications sector operators to coordinate locally as our experience has been that their response and recovery efforts are efficient and effective;
- the existing telecommunications sector emergency response committee should be formally recognised by CDEM as an authoritative source of information on the state of telecommunications services, and as the primary point of contact for the coordination of repair and restoration work; and
- identified technical personnel from the major telecommunications operators should be invited into the bunker during emergency events to advise directly, if necessary.

MBIE is happy to assist MCDEM with establishing such arrangements. We also believe earlier access to telecommunications service may be able to be established by identifying schools





with operational internet connections as almost all have high speed broadband connections that could be utilised to provide community Wi-Fi services. In many cases, this will require greater coordination with electricity network operators given the dependence of most telecommunications services on electricity, even if the supply source is a standby generator.

## 2. Energy services

Energy services include the supply of electricity, liquid fuels, and natural gas in urban areas of the North Island. In New Zealand, electricity is supplied to consumers via Transpower's transmission network and 29 electricity distribution networks. The North Island is served by First Gas' transmission pipelines and four distribution networks. The supply of electricity and natural gas services is regulated by the Electricity Authority and Gas Industry Company respectively, with the Commerce Commission being responsible for the regulation of the natural monopoly characteristics of most electricity and gas networks. Liquid fuels are supplied under competitive conditions by a range of suppliers. MBIE's role is to provide policy advice and to administer the regulatory instruments supporting a government response to a significant fuel supply shortfall that could result from a global event (e.g. regional conflict or trade embargo) or a domestic event (e.g. major refinery outage).

Following the Kaikoura earthquakes, MBIE was drawn into providing daily information updates from energy service providers to Ministers and the cross-agency Kaikoura policy response group. For electricity services, our information was sourced from the two affected electricity distributors (Mainpower and Marlborough lines) and largely duplicated the standing arrangements where Transpower acts as the Sector Coordinating Entity for electricity. On one occasion, MBIE was directly asked by one electricity distributor to intervene in CDEM crisis management decision making, to ensure that all (rather than part) of the required network supplies were shipped to Kaikoura. The request was made by the distributor having, in its view, exhausted existing channels. MBIE raised the request with DPMC and understands that the prioritisation of the supplies in question was subsequently upgraded.

Within the week following the Kaikoura earthquake, MBIE on its own initiative commenced a rapid review of energy service issues in the Wellington region, in light of GNS advice there was an elevated risk of an aftershock affecting the upper South Island and lower North Island. The review sought to identify any measures that could be taken in the short term – within seven days, within one month, and within three months of an event – that might improve Wellington's resilience to a major aftershock. Before commencing this review, MBIE contacted the Wellington Regional Lifelines Group chair and project manager to advise them what it was doing. Contact was made to help manage the potential for any duplication of effort and to ensure information was shared. MBIE's work subsequently fed into the DPMC led Watch Group on Wellington's preparedness, which in turn informed advice to the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination.

Under the standing CDEM arrangements, the Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office (WREMO) and/or the regional lifelines group might be expected to undertake the type of review undertaken by MBIE. WREMO did coordinate a similar exercise across the broader set of lifeline utilities including roads, ports, water and health services. It is likely that some





modest duplication occurred - some energy suppliers gave feedback that they were asked for the same information by multiple parties including local authorities in the region.

### 3. Building and Construction

MBIE's building regulatory system includes powers for managing buildings after an emergency event. Since the Canterbury earthquakes, MBIE has been the steward of the building emergency management system. The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 sets out MBIE's responsibility for developing and coordinating this system. The system relies heavily on volunteer rapid building assessors, mainly engineers and building control officials.

Because MBIE had established a pool of trained and registered rapid building assessors who used standardised processes, building emergency management activities in Kaikoura and Edgecumbe were more organised and consistent compared to Christchurch in 2011. MBIE introduced a new operating framework in 2014 that has improved New Zealand's ability to carry out rapid building assessment operations. The decision to bring the Civil Defence Amendment Act 2016 into force early provided CDEM officials with new powers that enabled them to manage buildings outside of a state of emergency. These powers were not available following the Canterbury earthquakes. The Building Act 2004 is currently being amended to allow damaged buildings to be remediated after civil defence powers end.

We believe the Kaikoura earthquakes highlighted the need for better cross-agency coordination during an event. Currently, there is no agreed approach on who should respond to requests from local officials, or how to forward requests to the right agency. MBIE developed internal systems to coordinate the number of requests it received and liaise with the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC). Sometimes, information flows through civil defence channels could be slow. For example, the NCMC took a week to formally request rapid building assessors from MBIE for Kaikoura despite rapid building assessors having been on the ground in Kaikoura for several days by then.

Roles and responsibilities were unclear during the response to the Kaikoura earthquake. A key issue is which agency is responsible for managing damaged land with existing use rights. This legislative gap was highlighted when managing properties in Goose Bay at risk from a dam caused by a landslide. The planned new building emergency management legislation will not fully address this gap, as it will not provide powers to remediate the land. We consider this is a role for the Ministry for the Environment, not MBIE. We have begun work to better define its roles and responsibilities, to respond more effectively in an event. We plan to clarify with MCDEM if expert staff are needed at NCMC, and if so, what roles they should take. At a wider level, MBIE is working to ensure the new building emergency management and existing civil defence legislation work together in practice. We think this should extend to exploring how building emergency management planning can be better integrated into local civil defence planning.

Our experience has been that the capacity and capability of regional civil defence emergency management groups varies across the country. MBIE found Edgecumbe CDEM coordinators better prepared to do a rapid building assessment operation than Kaikoura because they had





attended MBIE training. We believe that better training and guidance could significantly improve local capability for building emergency management and other civil defence activities. Capacity and capability can also be an issue for MCDEM because it is a small agency. MCDEM struggled to find resource to complete guidance on transition periods when its legislation came into force early. MBIE created guidance at MCDEM's request. However, this was not used, in part because it did not reflect MCDEM's guidance model. This resulted in CDEM groups deciding how to interpret the legislation in isolation. MCDEM subsequently developed guidance, but MBIE continued to receive questions from councils about how to interpret the new legislation even though MCDEM guidance was available.

#### 4. Temporary Shelter and Accommodation

Under the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015, MBIE is responsible for the provision of temporary accommodation with a focus on recovery from an emergency event. This coordination function is distinct from short-term response focussed 'shelter and emergency accommodation' which is coordinated at the national level by MCDEM and regionally by CDEM groups. Local government has a role in assisting with the identification and facilitation of temporary accommodation, while the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) assesses eligibility for temporary accommodation for displaced citizens.

The experience gained in the Canterbury earthquakes and the role clarity provided by the National CDEM Plan Order of 2015 meant that the relevant agencies were starting from a solid base for the provision of emergency accommodation following Kaikoura earthquakes and Edgecumbe flooding events. However, from a customer perspective, the distribution of responsibilities between MBIE, MCDEM and MSD can be confusing. Customer confusion was most effectively dealt with when agencies took a flexible, client focussed approach. Ideally, this would involve a single agency interface with the client, although this is not always easy in the wake of significant emergency events. The absence of fit for purpose income support tools beyond the response phase is an issue that is likely to cause ongoing issues, and would be worthy of further policy work by the relevant agencies.

A factor that has a major impact on the supply of temporary accommodation is the ability of New Zealand's territorial and regional authorities to respond to emergency events. Our experience is that this varies significantly across territorial authorities, reflecting their underlying scale and resources. We believe that better responses to emergency events could be achieved if relevant response and recovery agencies developed a suite of approaches that can be deployed depending on the circumstances of the emergency event and the capacity and capabilities of the relevant territorial authorities. These different approaches to structuring functions and operations should be included in relevant CDEM plans and tested during preparedness exercises. For its part, MBIE has initiated a project to operationalise temporary accommodation capability, including redesigning our BAU and event-specific structures and processes. We anticipate this work will be completed in 2017 and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this project with other recovery and response agencies.

The legislative framework underpinning the supply of temporary accommodation is ambiguous and has the potential to delay an effective response to emergency events. Officials from MBIE, the Department of Conservation, the Ministry for the Environment, the Department of Internal



Affairs, and MCDEM are working to develop an approach, including possible legislative changes, to enable the delivery of temporary accommodation in the aftermath of civil defence emergencies [CAB-17-MIN-0235 refers]. This work would ideally be supported by clarifying and formalising the distribution of decision-making responsibilities between the Minister for Civil Defence, Minister for Building and Construction, and the other Ministers who have taken responsibility for response and recovery activities. It is also worth noting that different events may require different lead agency arrangements depending on the circumstances/impact of the event.

#### 5. GNS Science

GNS Science is a Crown Research Institute monitored by MBIE. Under the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015, GNS Science is responsible for:

- managing the GeoNet system for the detection of earthquakes, land movement, volcanic activity, and the potential for local-source tsunamis;
- assessing the threat of tsunamis with the support of a multi-agency tsunami experts panel;
- providing advice to the MCDEM on the issuing of national advisories and warnings about geological hazards;
- providing scientific advice to the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC), agencies, and CDEM Groups as needed; and
- contributing to the management of public information on geological hazards and associated emergencies.

The Kaikoura earthquakes revealed a number of pressure points for GNS Science post a significant natural disaster. As a relatively small organisation, the demand for ongoing and more definitive information about the Kaikoura quakes and the likelihood for further tremors resulted in the diversion of significant technical expertise from scientific analysis to communications related activities. There was a tendency for Ministers and the media to seek information direct from GNS Science rather than through established CDEM channels. To try and mitigate the diversion of scientific expertise, MBIE seconded two people to assist GNS Science to provide timely and appropriate advice to Ministers. While MBIE's Labour Science and Enterprise Group is undertaking some work to determine how we can better support GNS Science to manage multiple demands for advice post natural disasters, the Kaikoura earthquake experience suggests that there are broader issues with the way information flows through CDEM channels that should be addressed.

With MBIE's support, the Government announced in December 2016 that MBIE and MCDEM would develop plans with GNS Science and GeoNet to work towards a staffed 24/7 hazards monitoring system to improve the analysis and flows of information following a natural disaster event. This could include reconsidering how the Earthquake Commission (EQC) and Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) contracts that provide the majority of funding for GeoNet are structured, in consultation with EQC and LINZ. MBIE has also funded GNS Science to make some immediate enhancements to GeoNet's natural hazards monitoring capability and response service.





Another obvious area for improvement is the provision of advice on Tsunami risks, and communication of this advice to the public. Currently, GeoNet provides earthquake information to a panel of experts convened by MCDEM. These experts then consult and agree on the risk of a Tsunami and provide a stream of advice to MCDEM who then decide whether or not to issue a public warning. This process can result in significant delays. In some cases, the delay in official advice caused regional CDEM controllers to make their own decisions on the risks of a Tsunami, which ultimately resulted in different warnings being issued to different regions. A non-trivial section of the public also extrapolate the potential for Tsunami's in an inconsistent way based on the information provided on the GeoNet website. Achieving more timely and regionally consistent Tsunami warnings would make a significant improvement to the quality of responses to natural disaster events.

We would encourage the Ministerial Review Team to discuss the issues we have highlighted directly with GNS Science.

#### **Concluding remarks**

In making this submission, MBIE recognises that the issues we have identified and our suggestions for improvement have been made with 20/20 hindsight. We are also very cognisant that decision making in emergency situations is incredibly difficult given the often significant information gaps, high risks/impacts of decisions, and limited time to assess options. The Kaikoura earthquakes were particularly difficult to respond to given the inherent complexity of an earthquake event involving ruptures to multiple fault-lines. It is also important to acknowledge that while lessons can be learned from previous events, not two emergency events are the same.

Nonetheless, we believe there are improvements that could be made to provide New Zealanders with better responses to natural disasters and other emergency events. These broadly fall into the categories of improving role coverage and clarity, key contact points, information flows, and the capability and capacity of CDEM actors, with the ultimate aim of improving public and Ministerial confidence in the response to natural disasters and other emergency events. The duplication of information flows is likely to be symptomatic of wider system issues including:

- a lack of role clarity across CDEM players;
- a lack of confidence within the CDEM system about the capability and capacity of core players to effectively plan and execute response and recovery actions, including the sharing of information in an accurate and timely manner; and
- a diversion of scarce resources in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster or emergency event that may be having a detrimental impacts on overall recovery and response outcomes.

In thinking about these issues, our guiding principle is that the parties who are best placed to provide advice and effect response and recovery actions should be empowered through CDEM plans. In most cases, this will mean giving local/regional actors and key service providers a greater say in how response and recovery activities are coordinated. Once the relevant CDEM plans have been updated, we see regular exercises as the most effective way of ensuring





agencies are aware of their respective roles and are able to coordinate effectively with other organisations that have a role in natural disaster and other emergency events.

I hope this submission assists the Ministerial review, and I am very happy to make MBIE staff available to discuss the issues and themes identified in this submission if that would be of use to the review team.

Yours sincerely,

**Chris Bunny**  
Deputy Chief Executive – Building, Resources and Markets

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence





## Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand

Submission by:

Marlborough Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group



Mark Wheeler

Chief Executive and CEG chair

Marlborough District Council

[mark.wheeler@marlborough.govt.nz](mailto:mark.wheeler@marlborough.govt.nz)

DDI: s9(2)(a)



## 1. Introduction

Marlborough Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Group operate within a **unitary council**, which is Marlborough District Council. The Marlborough CDEM Group was established in 2003 in accordance with s 12 of the CDEM Act 2002. While the Group is a committee of the Marlborough District Council, it has autonomous decision making responsibilities and powers.

## 2. Unitary structure

Marlborough's unitary status ensures there is **simplicity** in its CDEM Group structure, with clear lines of accountability and reporting. Staff employed by Marlborough CDEM report to a single manager, who reports to the Coordinating Executive Group (CEG), currently chaired by the council's Chief Executive. The CEG has complete control over the annual CDEM work programme, and the work of CDEM staff focuses on the CEG's priorities.

## 3. Role of Marlborough-Kaikoura Fire and Emergency New Zealand

Marlborough-Kaikoura Fire and Emergency New Zealand (MKFENZ) rural fire staff are housed in the Group's Emergency Operations Centre, alongside CDEM staff. FENZ Region 4's Regional Manager Rural is the Group Controller and the Chief Executive of Marlborough District Council and CDEM Group Manager are Alternate Controllers. The MKFENZ Deputy Principal Rural Fire Officer is also an alternate controller and physically located with the CDEM staff. The **cohesion of these day-to-day working relationships** has helped build a solid, shared response and readiness capability.

## 4. Recent event experience

The Marlborough CDEM Group has responded to a number of events in recent years, which has given its Group **significant operational experience and learnings**, and has allowed strong relationships to be built. The region has experienced large fires, storms and two major seismic events – the 2013 Seddon earthquakes and the 14 November 2016 Kaikoura earthquake.

The scale of Marlborough's fire incident responses has required evacuations, the provision of welfare support and a multi-agency approach, with an Incident Management Team and key services on the ground. With Marlborough's dry climate, rural fire is much more relevant than other types of emergency. The response team for rural fire therefore gets hands-on experience regularly, providing benefit to the CDEM response.

## 5. Marlborough Roads

Marlborough District Council contracts out its local roads management to Marlborough Roads, which is a part of NZTA. Hence the CDEM Group works closely with roading managers and personnel who manage both the state highway network and also the region's local roads. This relationship provides a level of **asset management integration** and response capability that is often not found in other regions' CDEM structure.

## 6. Coordination with other agencies

Marlborough CDEM Group is fortunate to have the **resources of the New Zealand Defence Force** at Woodbourne close at hand (mainly Air Force), an excellent Police service, a capable lines transmission company in Marlborough Lines, a commercial airport at Blenheim that is wholly owned by the council, as is the port at Picton. There is a local Red Cross office and capability. There are also significant private aviation and aircraft resources in Marlborough that can be accessed by the CDEM Group for response – for example helicopters. The Group also works with central Government agencies' on the ground staff here, such as DOC, MSD and Te Puni Kokiri.

All these agencies and their staff are used to working together as one group in emergency responses, from the Group's Emergency Operations Centre. Marlborough CDEM Group was also able to directly assist neighbouring residents in the Kaikoura District Council area during the recent earthquake response and recovery.

In summary, **the simplicity of a unitary structure** appears to be lacking in other CDEM Groups. We believe it helps considerably to manage our response professionally and to a consistent standard, without the distraction and difficulty of having to work with second parties who may not be willing to come under a single command structure. It also assists with our readiness and recovery planning, and its delivery.

## 7. Readiness

Marlborough CDEM's Readiness and Response Committee includes the Coastguard, Te Puni Kokiri, health protection officers from the council, the Rural Support Trust, NZDF, Marlborough Roads, Marlborough Lines and DOC, as well as the usual responding agencies. The council's tourism promotion agency Destination Marlborough (DM) is also part of the committee. Notably, DM played a very important and specialised role in assisting tourists to evacuate in the days following the Kaikoura earthquake.

The strength of the Marlborough CDEM Group lies in its **established relationships**, which ensure that responses are coordinated, key staff know each other and each agency understands their role, and the roles of others. Rural Fire (now FENZ) and Civil Defence have combined their incident management teams (IMTs) into one cohesive group, who train on a monthly basis. This group includes Council staff, volunteers, welfare and responding agency members. This ensures that all hazards can be responded to by this team and as a result it is well practised.

## 8. Response



*Installing a new water supply system Ward, December 2016*

Marlborough has not felt the need to declare an emergency during the last five years, despite two major earthquakes and some of the largest fires ever seen in New Zealand. It has instead chosen to operate under a unified command structure when managed locally, or has invited a national IMT to assume control during larger fires, with other agencies in support operating a CIMS model.

We consider that the local model works very well, and allows agencies to work to their strengths. Unified command is an authority structure in which the role of Incident Controller is shared by two or more individuals, each already having authority in a different responding agency. Unified command is one way to carry out command in which responding agencies and/or jurisdictions with responsibility for the incident share the incident management.

Unified command allows agencies with different legal, geographic and functional authorities and responsibilities to work together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, responsibility or accountability. Under a unified command, a single, coordinated Incident Action Plan directs all activities. This model is embedded in the United States and could be considered as a way forward for NZ.



*First earthquake recovery meeting, Ward community hall, 23 November 2016*

The ability to also call on a national IMT for fire events is something that should be considered for Civil Defence events. New Zealand is too small, and the skills are too few, to have two separate incident management models. It is also crucial that we retain the ability to employ the Volunteer Fire Forces (Marlborough has 14, most in small rural communities) under FENZ during Civil Defence events, as these are crucial in providing local initial responses. As noted above, Marlborough CDEM has appointed its controller and one alternate from the fire ranks, and it sees opportunities for other response agencies to be so appointed in the future.

#### **9. Marlborough CDEM Group responses to the outcomes in the Ministerial Review Terms of Reference**

**Outcome 1:** *The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies.*

**We believe Marlborough CDEM Group emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations.**

*Emergency management* achieved the highest group performance rating (8.2 out of 10) in Marlborough District Council's annual customer satisfaction survey 2016. Overall performance satisfaction percentages were 89.9% (similar to 87.5% in 2015) for *Civil defence* and 92.3% (94.0% in 2015) for *Rural firefighting*.

<https://www.marlborough.govt.nz/your-council/long-term-and-annual-plans-policies-and-reports/resident-satisfaction-survey>

**Outcome 2:** *New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.*

- *The system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of the location and scale of the emergency.*
- *Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action.*
- *Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, aerial surveillance and interpretation) are knitted into the fabric of a response.*
- *Business continuity across the whole of government supports an effective response and prompt recovery.*

**We believe Marlborough CDEM Group has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses, with appropriate resources and protocols. We work with various specialist agencies and central government to achieve this.**

To date New Zealand's individual local councils and agencies have developed their own information systems. It is now time for a nationally consistent information sharing platform to be developed, with all key agencies having access to and an ability to input and interrogate the data. EMIS is not providing that.

**Outcome 3:** *Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency.*

- *A single lead role across any geographical area affected by natural disaster*
- *The purpose and consequences of declarations of states of emergency are clear*
- *Appropriate interventions and escalations are available.*

**We believe it is clearly defined in Marlborough who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency. The Marlborough CDEM Group provides the single lead role in this region. Appropriate interventions and escalations are available.**

**Outcome 4:** *The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.*

- *There is a clear operating model and chain of command and control and coordination during response, including the recognition of lead and support agencies.*
- *The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.*
- *All participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response or as the event unfolds.*

**We believe the chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate. Decisions can be taken quickly**

**and the majority of participants understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities.**

**Outcome 5:** *Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies.*

- *Recognition of the modern news cycle – immediacy of social media and power of factual decisive information delivered as speedily as possible*
- *Stakeholder needs are understood (what information is required; where and how to gather the information, providing it at the right time and in the right format).*
- *Official information maintains pace with media dialogue and social media activity.*

**We believe that, based on evaluation of recent event experiences, Marlborough CDEM Group has provided timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies.**

During a response and in recovery, the Group uses a variety of traditional and social media channels, as well as its long-established community networks. The blend of communications channels used is aligned to the preferences of residents during emergencies, contained in a public survey carried out in February 2017 (a copy of which can be made available to the TAG on request).

In the event of a prolonged emergency response, it is likely Marlborough CDEM Group would need to call in communication and engagement professionals to support or relieve the local communications staff. Marlborough District Council supports the PIM recommendations made by the Emergency Media and Public Affairs NZ (EMPA) submission to this review.

## 10. Recommendations

- a) That consideration is given to the development of coordinated incident management teams based on regional CDEM Group skills and readiness.
- b) That several national IMTs be trained (similar to the national Rural Fire Authority incident management teams) to support larger events.
- c) That FENZ and/or the NZ Police be considered as lead agencies working under MCDEM and CDEM policies and guidelines, and be given responsibility for the resourcing, training and development of these incident response teams.
- d) That a nationally consistent information sharing platform to be developed, with all key agencies having access to and an ability to input and interrogate the data
- e) That consideration to given to a protocol that facilitates a greater level of mobile capability from central government agencies' communications and engagement professional staff, to support or relieve regional communications staff. This also requires investment in training and managing a national rostering system. See the EMPA NZ submission's recommendations.

7 July 2017

Email: [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

## Submission on better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand

1. NZ Airports is the industry association for New Zealand's airports and related businesses. Our members operate 37 airports<sup>1</sup> across the country including the international gateways to New Zealand and the key regional airports. This infrastructure network is essential to a well-functioning economy and enables critical transport and freight links between each region of New Zealand and between New Zealand and the world.
2. The objective of the Ministerial Review is to provide advice to the Minister of Civil Defence on the "most appropriate operational and legislative mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand". The purpose is to ensure that New Zealand's emergency response framework is "world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges" (particularly in light of recent events such as the August 2016 Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis outbreak, the September 2016 East Cape earthquake and tsunami, the November 2016 Kaikoura earthquake and tsunami, and the February 2017 Port Hills fires).
3. As the industry association for New Zealand airports, many of which perform a critical Lifeline Utility role in natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand, NZ Airports endorses the Terms of Reference and welcomes the Ministerial Review as an opportune time to have a wide look at how the civil defence and emergency management (CDEM) system performs in those events and whether improvements or changes in settings are necessary.
4. The key areas that our response is broken into are:
  - 4.1. Emergency response system – is it fit for purpose, including first responder capability/capacity?
  - 4.2. Stakeholder relationships – are they clearly defined? Which authority should make decisions to declare a State of Emergency?

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<sup>1</sup> Our member airports are Ardmore Airport, Auckland Airport, Chatham Island Airport, Christchurch Airport, Dunedin Airport, Gisborne Airport, Hamilton Airport, Hawke's Bay Airport, Hokitika Airport, Invercargill Airport, Kapiti Coast Airport, Ka kohe Airport, Kaitia Airport, Kerikeri Airport, Marlborough Airport, Masterton Airport, Matamata Airport, Motueka Airport, Nelson Airport, New Plymouth Airport, Palmerston North Airport, Queenstown Airport, Rangiora Airport, Timaru Airport, Rotorua Airport, Takaka Airport, Taupo Airport, Tauranga Airport, Wairoa Airport, Wanaka Airport, Whanganui Airport, Wellington Airport, Westport Airport, Whakatane Airport, and Whangarei Airport.

- 4.3. Chain of command and control, coordination and decision making – how well does it work?  
Is there adequate strategic/back up planning? Do we get enough advice?
- 4.4. Communication flows between Minister, agencies, officials and other stakeholders – are they adequate? Can they improve?
- 4.5. Legislative change – is it required?

NZ Airports offers the following brief commentary on each of these areas.

5. **Emergency response system and response capability/capacity:** Our general impression is that the current system has demonstrated it can respond to the significant events of the type set out in the Terms of Reference but there will always be room for continual improvement. While capability and capacity appear to largely be adequate, there is an ongoing issue of personnel turnover in the Civil Defence environment and the need for regular multi-agency exercises for all participants across the board to remain up-to-date and demonstrate an understanding of their preparedness to respond to natural disasters and emergencies.
6. **Stakeholder relationships:** Relationships between stakeholders are generally well-understood by participants. In relation to the declaration of States of Emergency our understanding is that currently these can be declared by a range of organisations, e.g. Rural Fire in the case of the February 2017 Port Hills fire. We would encourage the Review to consider the manner in which the State of Emergency function can be exercised and communicated, and whether this is an area that would benefit from greater clarity. We consider that the function should be used sparingly. While there appears to be a move toward national control of States of Emergency, there is a risk that without strong local and regional input it could be too disconnected from what's happening at the emergency scene.
7. **Chain of command and control, coordination and decision making:**
  - 7.1. Overall the chain of command appears to function adequately though there are inevitably some gaps on the day around having experienced people in place. It is important to keep undertaking multi-agency exercises on a regular basis e.g. Exercise Tangaroa, in order to ensure responders and planners are familiar with the many different issues that will arise in a range of disaster scenarios. As indicated above, personnel turnover can result in a loss of accumulated knowledge and lack of understanding of these issues and may result in systems failing or under-performing on the day.



- 7.2. One area that would benefit from consideration is the development of a national air transport logistics plan. At present there appears to be a significant gap in air transport logistics planning at a government/national level. This is particularly evident in the case of a distant-source tsunami event which might affect a number of New Zealand's (often coastal) airports at the same time.
- 7.3. While airports and others in the aviation sector can and do make input into such planning it needs to be trialled and given a national 'home' which would trigger its operation in a disaster/emergency situation. There is currently no formal air recovery plan in place for dealing with such tsunami events nor, as we understand matters, has an exercise focusing on the response of the aviation and airport sector to this type of event been undertaken. While individual airports (particularly the major airports) can decide quickly whether their airport is operationally safe immediately after an earthquake and take appropriate action, the declaration of a significant tsunami event is a different matter as it may affect several airports at the same time.
- 7.4. Such an air logistics plan would inform the actions of various aviation parties (airlines, airports, Airways NZ). These parties may need to decide what to do with aircraft already in the air at the time, and those on the ground may have the opportunity to re-locate. Any impact on the main trunk airports could also have a significant impact on regional airports eg there is a space limit on how many aircraft can land at a regional airport, and published limits on the size of aircraft each airport can serve. Ground-based air navigation aids may also be affected.
- 7.5. Also, organisations that are impacted by an emergency need more support as to what a declared State of Emergency means for them and what support is available. This might include for an airport, for example, the impact on fuel and wider utility providers. An air logistics/recovery plan would need to include contingency arrangements for supply chain issues eg an interruption to the fuel pipeline.
8. **Communication flows:** The perception of NZ Airports members is that while outward information flows (from airports) appear to be timely and effective, inward communication flows (from control centres) can on occasions be intermittent and disjointed. This is improving and we have high expectations that the new alerting platform will provide a more efficient information flow. Social media has changed the landscape of emergency and disaster response over recent years and it is timely for the review to ensure that procedures around information flows reflect that changing environment.

9. **Legislative change:** Subject to any changes around which authority/ies should make decisions to declare a State of Emergency the Review should also consider whether there is a need for consequential legislative change. While the Review TORs don't specifically mention the role of Lifeline Utilities, we consider it is timely to review whether a wide enough range of aviation organisations and airports are on the list to ensure appropriate coverage (e.g. most airports are listed, but some are not).



Kevin Ward  
Chief Executive

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence



## Southland CDEM Group

### Submission to the ministerial review of Civil Defence

#### Executive Summary

The Southland CDEM Group;

1. supports the need for a review of the national arrangements for civil defence in New Zealand
2. emphasises the need for strong community engagement and notes its omission from the terms of reference
3. provides some background information on the shared service arrangements in Southland and suggests that this successful model should be considered by the Technical Advisory Group

#### Introduction

In 2010, Southland Regional (Environment Southland), Invercargill City, Gore and Southland District councils adopted a shared service approach to Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) and formed Emergency Management Southland (EMS). Since that time EMS has fulfilled all the requirements for CDEM in Southland, operating from a purpose-built Emergency Coordination Centre co-located with Environment Southland.

Under this model, all CDEM staff come under one manager who also fulfils the role of Group Controller during response. This allows for clear direction in the work programme and clear responsibility and command and control during an emergency.

#### Purpose of CDEM

The overwhelming priority for CDEM is to look after people.

Emergencies are dealt with on a daily basis by the emergency services and to be relevant in any response CDEM must add some value to their response. We can offer the following services;

- Coordination of large scale events
- Coordination and provision of council resources
- Public alerting
- Public information management
- Coordination of Welfare support for affected people
- Care of evacuated people
- Public Education
- Community Engagement, planning and preparedness training
- Use of Controller's powers during declaration



## The problem

I would like to give a Southland approach for the six 'problems' listed in the terms of reference;

- 1. The underlying principle of "act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally" may not be suitable in all circumstances.**

It is concerning that 'community' is not mentioned at all in the terms of reference. In large scale natural disasters communities are often the first responders and start helping themselves days before the official CDEM response becomes effective. In this regard, the premise that **"act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally"** is not always the best approach seems ill conceived, as the local community will always need to act, they will be first affected, and will always be part of both the first response and ultimately the recovery of the community affected. CDEM should not be conceptualised as merely a technical and logistical exercise falling to experts, but rather a systems approach involving affected communities. The people and community structures within a locality are the central elements in providing community resilience, not the technical or national support systems used to aid local communities.

Although the current CDEM organisational model has flaws it does recognise the importance of community and, at a local level, is firmly based on local representation and engagement with local communities.

Our work programme for the next 5 years emphasises community engagement and once this decision is made all our other work streams fit into supporting communities. Without prioritising this at a national level, we have a serious disconnect between any national direction and the work of local CDEM staff.

There has been a move to shared service CDEM models across the country, however these can be different from one region to another. Some of the larger Groups have a shared service in business as usual and then return to a local regional, national model in response. The leadership that is present with a professional Group Manager / Group Controller, such as in Southland, is then lost when local controllers, who are part time at best, suddenly are put in an emergency response leadership role. There is confusion between what is CDEM role and what is a council incident management team role.

- 2. Decisions are not necessarily made by adequately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the appropriate level of government, and supported by the best information possible in the circumstances.**

Recognising that we should respond to the needs of our local communities does suggest there will be differences in the organisation and work programmes of the 16 CDEM Groups. We understand that a system of CDEM that is currently effectively resourced locally, with only national funding at critical points, has led to an inconsistency in capability across the regions. This is not a failure of the model but



rather a failure of co-ordinated national investment to support the formation and maintenance of local institutional capabilities. This is true across information gathering, analytics and dissemination.

CDEM sector is made up from an eclectic mix of ex-emergency service staff, council employees and a few people who have studied emergency management as a career. There is no professional framework applied to create a professional structure and no qualifications applied to ensure competence. Indeed, there is little agreement between different Groups about what makes up a suitable CDEM staff member.

It is unsurprising that a system that relies on local resourcing to build and maintain local institutional structures produces a variety of CDEM models and capabilities. It is however incorrect to ascribe this to a failure of the model of “act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally”. Rather it is the consistent lack of national support and co-ordination in the development of CDEM local institutions and programmes that result in different capacities. The role of the national government is best as a provider of resources to help support more consistent capacity and capability across the CDEM sector, not to replace the model.

This diversity and confusion is not helped in the way MCDEM and the Groups interact, having separate meetings with Group Managers, Group Controllers, Local Controllers, CEG chairs, Joint Committee Chairs with no distinction between the information discussed or recognition that the Group Managers are responsible for advising their governance and implementing work programmes. There are often limited or no meeting minutes and decisions made are not circulated effectively. There needs to be clear distinction between governance and operational matters.

Most emergencies are competently dealt with by the emergency services, until they get large enough to require significant coordination and then council staff, who often have limited experience in response, suddenly take a lead role. Then when this response becomes even larger, central government staff, who are even further removed from day to day emergency response take the lead. If a change to a more top down command and control structure is put in place, then this will require significant operational expertise to be available at the MCDEM level.

There is considerable confusion about the meaning of activation and declaration. Our work is to coordinate response, provide situational awareness, information management and most importantly look after the welfare of our people. We are doing this at all times, with 24/7 duty cover and close working relationships with our emergency service colleagues. Whether the coordination centre is ‘activated’ or there is a state of local emergency ‘declared’ is immaterial. A declaration simply provides the controller with extra powers and can provide public reassurance.

Decisions about declarations are correctly made by elected politicians, with the advice of all emergency responders, as the powers given under a declaration could have significant impact on the usual rights and permissible actions of the local community.



### **3. Volunteers may not be adequately supported by a professional emergency management force**

In Southland we currently have 4 types of volunteers;

- Council staff to work in the ECC during response
- Community Response Groups (members of local communities)
- Spontaneous Volunteer Coordinators (from businesses)
- Spontaneous Volunteers (unspecified)

We have excellent support from the four councils in both numbers of staff and availability for training. We have around 100 trained ECC staff including the Group Welfare Managers, Public Information Manager, Recovery Manager and alternate Group Controllers.

Our community engagement approach recognises that local communities may have to be self-reliant for a number of days before any official response can provide substantial assistance. Empowerment of these communities to make decisions which will be supported by CDEM after the fact is essential. Providing ongoing training, support and engagement for the many communities in Southland is resource intensive but has to be done.

We do not have any Response Teams and would rely on the Red Cross or emergency services to fill that role in an emergency.

### **4. Information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency, to determine the capacity and capabilities required for the response effort**

Situational awareness is always difficult and is essential to an effective response. More use of new technology, social media crowd sourcing is the only way this will be improved. In Southland we are trying to improve this in the following ways;

- Updated website with a publicly available, real-time situation map, common alerting protocol (CAP) compliant alerting, crowd sourcing incident reporting and the ability to link to online survey tools using our Office 365 suite of programs
- Standardisation of data collection methodology across all stakeholders to ensure we reduce data handling time and can see real-time maps as information is reported
- Use of 'bring your own devices' so that data collection can be done by any agency or community
- Linking rapid impact assessment with registration and needs assessment so that one tool can satisfy all these requirements
- Maintaining levels of redundancy in communications (phone, satellite, VHF, HF radio etc)



We recognise that in a disaster situation, decisions will have to be made with the best available information at hand and the Group Controller has the necessary delegated authority and support to make those decisions.

**5. There is a need for timely, consistent and accurate communication to the public.**

In Southland, we recognise the importance of timely, accurate information being provided to the public, local decision makers and central government. We have a large pool of communications staff from the four councils and good relationships with local and national media outlets. We make full use of social media and have our own text alerting system with over 8,000 subscribers.

Our new website is one attempt to keep people informed recognising the immediacy of the current social media environment that we operate in.

However, we note that Information management is done differently in every Group, there is little commonality between IT systems of the various councils and we are slow to change practices that have not worked over repeated responses. The different communication needs at local, regional and national levels are not widely understood across the sector.

**6. Response capabilities are not necessarily deployed as promptly and seamlessly as possible, taking advantage of economies of scale and the experience of senior responders.**

In Southland, we have an excellent working relationship with our emergency service colleagues and great commitment from them to be part of the Civil Defence Group. The collective resources from all our stakeholders are always volunteered and used as required.

In recent national responses, there has been a need for staff and resources to be 'pushed' into areas, rather than waiting for detailed requests to come from already under pressure coordination centres. We would support the development of a cadre of suitably qualified individuals to be kept as a national reserve.

It is important to have clear thresholds of when emergency services will escalate a response to the local CDEM Group. Engagement at a national level to clarify these expectations and the services CDEM can offer would be helpful.

**Conclusion**

Southland CDEM Group support the need for a Civil Defence review and believes our current shared service structure is a good model for the rest of New Zealand to consider.



Angus McKay  
Manager / Group Controller  
Emergency Management Southland  
Southland Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence



7 July 2017

To [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

From Te Runanga o Ngati Awa, PO Box 76, Whakatane 3158

This is the submission of Te Runanga o Ngati Awa. Te Runanga o Ngati Awa wishes to be heard.

## **Submission to Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand**

### **Introduction**

Te Runanga o Ngati Awa is an iwi authority in the eastern Bay of Plenty's Whakatane district.

The Whakatane district experienced extensive flooding during Cyclones Debbie and Cooke in April 2017. A breach of flood protection infrastructure at Edgecumbe contributed to the civil defence emergency management event that involved the evacuation of all people from Edgecumbe town. Other towns in the district were also similarly affected.

Te Runanga o Ngati Awa (TRONA), Ngati Awa Social and Health (NASH), the hurriedly established Ngati Awa Volunteer Army (NAVA), our affiliated private Maori Land Trusts, members of the Ngati Awa community and Ngati Awa marae, responded to the event by providing food, clothing, furniture, monetary donations, places at which people could gather and stay, and voluntary clean up exercises at homes affected by flooding. One of our marae also engaged in establishing emergency housing for Edgecumbe evacuees on its papakainga land and this activity is progressing. This experience contributes to Ngati Awa submissions

Our submissions are also relevant to other natural hazards present in our area including earthquake faultlines, volcanic eruption (including the offshore volcano Whakaari (White Island), the Okataina Volcanic Plateau and tsunami and considers the potential effects of these natural hazards in the context of the purpose of the CDEM review and the five outcomes identified in the Terms of Reference for the review

### **Unofficial Attachments Relating to our Experience at Edgecumbe**

Three attachments form part and support our submissions on the Edgecumbe experience> Each attachment includes unofficial comment from private individuals whose privacy we wish to preserve. Please confirm the attachments will be withheld from public scrutiny and unavailable for viewing under the Official Information Act 1982 based on the preservation of individuals privacy. Please also confirm the contents of the attachments will inform the Ministerial review.

These documents identify key themes to our submissions on each of the five outcomes relevant to the scope of the Ministerial Review, particularly whether 'the operational and legislative settings within the system may not be performing optimally to meet current and future needs, and the role that New Zealanders need it to play'.

### **Outcome 1**

*The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies.*

***Fit for Purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations***

As a stakeholder, the Ngati Awa community expects the emergency management system to be:

- aware of vulnerable areas in the district that would be subject to the effects of an emergency event
- aware of areas within the community where access and evacuation routes, telecommunication infrastructure and water and electricity are more likely to remain secure and available in each form of emergency management event
- aware of the location of vulnerable people including the infirm, elderly and people with special needs and disabilities and responsive to their needs in an evacuation scenario
- aware and communicative with schools, hospitals and other institutions where people are located for periods of time during the day
- aware of the amenities and capabilities of marae and their community's effectiveness in an emergency event including receiving evacuees, providing a haven, feeding, sleeping and providing for their hygiene and personal needs; and that such provisions should not depend on the generosity of that community in an emergency event, but should be recoverable from the CDEM system. Where marae are used for evacuees and as staging places for the deployment of CDEM services, those marae should be deemed part of the CDEM response and all costs covered
- aware and considerate of the desire of marae communities to be ready, equipped and supported in their preparedness for responding to an emergency event at their marae
- able to make decisions quickly and to err on the side of caution.

Our community expects to be involved because it knows the locality and people in it. It also expects that CDEM will already know that the resources it has available to it are not available in our communities, so those resources need to be supplied.

Our community is fully aware that prioritisation of preventing death, injury and property damage and supports that priority.

**Outcome 2**

*New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.*

- *The system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of the location and scale of the emergency*
- *Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action*
- *Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, aerial surveillance and interpretation) are knitted into the fabric of the response*

Recognising and providing for the Ngati Awa community and its marae as supporting agencies with specialist capabilities and marae amenities is necessary. This aspect of responsiveness is not currently knitted into the fabric of the response, and can be, via protocols and memoranda of understanding. District Councils would be appropriate parties to develop protocols with marae and iwi authorities and their affiliated organisations.

Investment in training exercises with our community and marae would assist localised responsiveness because a greater level of certainty would be present to underpin the confidence with which our community and CDEM staff can respond. Protocols can assist by confirming the state of readiness at marae to engage with CDEM, its officials, staff and volunteers – including those that are unknown to us and who come from our side our district.

The recently promulgated national 'CDEM Marae Preparedness Toolkit' goes only part of the way to addressing marae preparedness. It is focused on preparing CDEM staff for engagement with Maori people at their marae, rather than preparing people at the marae with training, equipment and a support status as to their ability for provide for responsiveness in a civil defence emergency event

### **Outcome 3**

*Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a State of Emergency*

- *A single lead role across any geographical area affected by natural disaster*

Where a Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management is located out of the area subject to an emergency, there is a need for the Director to be 100% confident that the intelligence received from CDEM officials in the emergency area is accurate, reliable and precautionary, particularly where the priority is on the prevention of death, injury and property damage.

Ngati Awa requests the Ministerial Review carefully considers the effectiveness of this communications process. Delays can cost lives, livelihoods and property. The current system relies on a hierarchical system of communications involving central government, regional councils and district councils and that interaction can become fraught with delays where individual's egos, or stress or a lack of clarity as to definitions and criteria for making a call on declarations of states of emergency is in play.

Ngati Awa supports a single lead role across any geographical area affected by natural disaster and requests the Ministerial review ensure that those responsible for making such calls be deployed to the emergency area where the call can be made as to whether to declare a state of emergency.

### **Outcome 4**

*The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision-making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.*

- *The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.*

This objective reads well, but unless there is clarity about the positions to be played in an event (rather than the individuals in them), delays and unnecessary confusion can ensue. Ensuring the right attributes are with people in positions of responsibility will help. To that end it is suggested the Ministerial review considers requiring people in key positions within the CDEM arena undertake psychometric surveys and other training to ensure capability under pressure.

Teams are built. A chain of command practiced. Control, coordination and decision-making abilities are key traits that can be invested well, with mediocrity or not at all.

Ngati Awa expects that those making decisions that prioritise life, limb and property will be equipped to make sound, informed decisions with confidence and alacrity.

#### **Outcome 5**

*Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency responses system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communications to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with interests; and to the public during emergencies.*

- *Stakeholders needs are understood (what information is required; where and how to gather information, providing it at the right time and in the right format).*

Ngati Awa agrees there is a need for stakeholders needs to be understood and considers this is best achieved when CDEM decisions are made locally.

In explanation, we repeat our submissions points under Outcome 1 to inform this part.

As a stakeholder, the Ngati Awa community expects the emergency management system to be:

- aware of vulnerable areas in the district that would be subject to the effects of an emergency event
- aware of areas within the community where access and evacuation routes, telecommunication infrastructure and water and electricity are more likely to remain secure and available in each form of emergency management event
- aware of the location of vulnerable people including the infirm, elderly and people with special needs and disabilities and responsive to their needs in an evacuation scenario
- aware and communicative with schools, hospitals and other institutions where people are located for periods of time during the day
- aware of the amenities and capabilities of marae and their community's effectiveness in an emergency event including receiving evacuees, providing a haven, feeding, sleeping and providing for their hygiene and personal needs; and that such provisions should not depend on the generosity of that community in an emergency event, but should be recoverable from the CDEM system. Where marae are used for evacuees and as staging places for the deployment of CDEM services, those marae should be deemed part of the CDEM response and all costs covered
- aware and considerate of the desire of marae communities to be ready, equipped and supported in their preparedness for responding to an emergency event at their marae
- able to make decisions quickly and to err on the side of caution.

In summary, the Ngati Awa community expects to be involved at multiple levels throughout a Civil Defence Response because we know the locality and people in it.

For any enquiries about the contents of this submission please refer to:

Ms Beverley Hughes Manager Policy & Strategy Te Runanga o Ngati Awa  
PO Box 76, Whakatane 3158 , Phone s9(2)(a)

Naaku noa,

Leonie Simpson  
**CHIEF EXECUTIVE**

Our Ref: A2644787

4 July 2017

Roger Sowry  
Chair, Technical Advisory Group  
Ministerial Review  
Via email  
[bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Dear Roger

### Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand

This submission has been prepared by the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group to inform the national Technical Advisory Group (TAG) looking at better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. It has been developed through a consultative process involving focus groups and email feedback from members of the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group. Submitters often referenced learnings and experiences from previous events including the Edgecumbe earthquake, several medium scale flooding events, the Matatā debris flow, Canterbury earthquakes, Kaikoura earthquakes, PSA and the most recent Whakatāne floods of April 2017.

The Bay of Plenty CDEM Group has formed its submission by looking at what it believes is required to achieve the five outcomes set by the TAG. There are commonalities of improvement to support best practice in the response phase of an event.

**Outcome 1: The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking into account the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies.**

Several key factors for improvement have been identified to achieve this outcome.

The development of the skill base of the staff working in a response needs to be increased. The current model allows for inexperienced but local people to be in critical roles, potentially delaying the speed of the response. Put the right people in the right roles to remove conflicts of interest, politics, and enable professionalism in a response. Acknowledging that political interests are an important aspect that needs to be addressed in a response, but they should not overly influence critical decision making.

Recognise the competing and conflicting demands for Local Government operating business as usual in addition to civil defence requirements in peace time. The increased demands of business continuity coupled with the new 'business as usual' as a result of an emergency.

Recent events continue to highlight that the acknowledgment and inclusion of Iwi and other key stakeholders in the response is an important aspect that needs development. Iwi in particular have shown that they will stand up and respond for their community and the structure needs to be able to support this.



Locally led responses are important aspect to retain. Local knowledge and perspective is essential in ensuring the best response outcomes are met. In the majority of emergency events the first response will often be from the local communities, local government and local agencies staff. This is especially applicable in the smaller remote areas. The local capability is key to any event.

Legislation is currently guiding rather than directive. There is a need to build in legislative instruments that require Local Government and partner agencies to ensure a higher level of commitment to response capability and capacity development. Add in stronger accountability to ensure the obligations are met.

Greater empowerment of staff identified as having critical business continuity and emergency management roles to develop their capability is required. Ensuring they have the capability and capacity within their roles to develop the business in the readiness phase.

In order to achieve consistency across the country a national response and capability standard (or some equivalent) is seen as necessary to set a benchmark that all Local Authorities must meet and maintain to ensure a response capability. This would help to ensure the appropriate people are employed into the relevant CDEM roles within Council and those systems, processes, and resources needed by CDEM roles during response are consistent and fit for purpose.

The CDEM Act imposes a structure on Local Government that does not fit neatly with the existing structure of Local Government. Rather than allocating specific responsibilities to Territorial and Regional Authorities it appoints them to CDEM Groups. Much time and effort is spent on identifying responsibilities amongst the different members of the Group. Amendments to the current legislation could provide greater clarity around responsibilities for each Local Authority.

The Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group all agreed that a skilled professional response is needed. How we get there was an area of significant debate and there was no single clear view. On balance the majority favoured retaining the current structure where CDEM is delivered and led by Local Government and focusing improvements to this model as outlined above. Improvements need to focus on professionalising controllers and the response team. Ensuring key staff in the response are trained and experienced at a high level. Establishing a system where experienced professionals can support the Controllers as technical advisors such as senior members of the Police or Fire service.

The alternate view was to assign the response component of CDEM to a national agency responsible for the overall coordination of the response (Emergency Management New Zealand). Or designate the response function to another agency that is familiar with responding to emergencies on a daily basis such as Fire and Emergency New Zealand or New Zealand Police. This would not remove the requirement for Local Authorities to provide a level of response capability. It would essentially assign the lead agency to another authority and require local government play a key supporting role.

The current financial arrangements in place to pay for the costs of a response operation as outlined in Section 33 of the Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan have been in place since the 1983 Act with no significant change. The arrangements that cover the costs of responding to an emergency need to be reviewed and updated to reflect and suit the context of New Zealand in today's environment.

**Outcome 2: New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for CDEM responses.**

- **The system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of the location and scale of the emergency.**
- **Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action.**
- **Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, aerial surveillance and interpretation) are knitted into the fabric of a response.**
- **Business continuity across the whole of government supports an effective response and prompt recovery.**

The growth of emergency management has been rapid over the past 10 years. The current model struggles with the reality that the response phase is resourced by staff who are not emergency management responders. For most it is a “tack on” to their day job. Often staff working in the response structure have limited training and many have never experienced the pressures of responding to a real event. The business as usual role is prioritised over the part time nature of civil defence emergency management.

Capability and capacity needs to be consistent across the country. It is important to recognise the scale and nature of response required for different local authorities. The ability to respond to a major, widespread and or multiple events across the region is limited. Smaller councils are reliant on the support of the Group (other Local Councils) if events surpass their capacity to respond. For some councils, nearly all their staff would be needed to staff the EOC, limiting their ability to continue to operate core council functions. Regional/Group level commitment to support wider action – including the development of protocols so smaller councils are able to function during an emergency (surge capacity). In large events response becomes the core function for councils.

Development of national training standards and capability requirements are seen as essential to supporting a consistent level of appropriately trained and skilled people across the country. Currently training is developed ad-hoc across the country this needs to be mandated and directed nationally.

There needs to be stronger compulsion or legislative requirement for council to allow staff to step into these roles, removing the current situation that involvement is optional. There is a strong call for an increased commitment from local government to incorporate civil defence duties as core business. Local Government is continuously under pressure to do more while keeping rates at a minimum. CDEM is competing amongst a large number of activities to be seen as a priority for resourcing and time. While many councils across the country have increased the CDEM budgets and dedicated emergency management staff, events demonstrate that a whole of council response is required.

One of the recommendations from the Canterbury Earthquakes was the development of a national team of responders who are able to be deployed to support a response. These responders would be trained to a high level and have the ability to drop in and support any locally led response across the country. Creating a culture where emergency management is seen as a profession, with multi-disciplinary teams that have recognised qualifications, supported by legislated training requirements including:

- Cross-training exercises to develop their capacity and capability to respond to emergencies
- The development of national training standards that:
  - are recognised nationally
  - accredited
  - have measurable competencies and

June 2017

4

- have renewal requirements
- link regional capability to national capability

This would require resource and commitment to deliver, but is seen as a valuable resource which would support outcome 2. The Maritime New Zealand National Response Team (oil spill) would be a good example to base this model on. It would utilise agencies whose core business it is to respond to emergencies (police, fire, military) as well as those that have a high level of experience and expertise in field.

Define and legislate which agencies are responsible for particular functions in a response, affording them accountability for these, creating specialised training that is implemented, monitored and enforced.

Develop directive legislation for all Government agencies to include the requirements of CDEM into their business models. The current legislative model is enabling rather than directive, consequently there is little motivation for agencies to support or contribute during peace time. There is no doubt that everyone will stand up and help when something happens but the most gains can be made when all agencies are working together in the readiness phase.

Define the role and contribution of lifelines in a response and how they integrate into the response model. More can be done to capitalise on Lifelines agencies during the response. Currently they are required to maintain a level of operational capacity during an event. There is much greater scope for Lifelines agencies to contribute to New Zealand's response, if this can be more clearly defined and required through legislation.

Volunteers, Iwi and the community have demonstrated that they have the capacity to mobilise quickly and take action to save lives and protect property in a response. The New Zealand CDEM model places significant responsibility on our community to look after themselves and others in an event. Further work can be done to provide clarity around how volunteers are engaged, supported and enabled to enhance New Zealand's response capability.

**Outcome 3: Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency.**

- **A single lead role across any geographical area affected by natural disaster**
- **The purpose and consequences of declarations of states of emergency are clear**
- **Appropriate interventions and escalations are available**

Defining the responsibilities of key roles in the response phase is essential, as is defining the roles of local politicians and chief executives. Clarity around these roles and responsibilities will enable a sound response structure where the leaders in a response can support each other.

The current declaration process needs to be changed so the responsibility and leadership of the response is clear when a declaration is made. It should be abundantly clear who is the lead agency in an event like the Port Hills fire once a declaration is made under the CDEM Act.

The community expects the Mayor to front up and speak in a response. Retain the existing process of the Mayor declaring a state of emergency is recommended. The Mayor should be supported in the process by the



controller and other response staff. The rationale for this is to ensure the connection to the community is clear, with strong leadership at a local level. This enables locally led responses to be declared by the duly elected local officials in the community. This would need to be supported by giving elected members appropriate training and support to upskill them and clarify their role in response.

**Outcome 4: The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.**

- **There is a clear operating model and chain of command and control and coordination during response, including the recognition of lead and support agencies.**
- **The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.**
- **All participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response or as the event unfolds.**

The preference is for the continued use of a command and control mode. This is based on the leaders in a response understanding their roles, having the right training, experience and support to do so. There is a need to provide direction and training for senior managers and politicians (CEOs and mayors) in local government, defining roles and responsibilities, this includes clarification of the role of Joint Committee and CEG during a response.

Key factors include:

- One person is in command (Controller) and this is constant over the course of the response (only one controller for the event setting the objectives and direction) supported by deputy controllers when they are on rest. Reflecting the military model of operation.
- Appointing a person to a command/control role needs to be accompanied with a level of freedom to act.
- Reinforce having only one structure with legislation requiring integration across agencies to participate and support.
- Consistency in how the model is implemented across the country.
- Requirements of staff to be trained and involved across all agencies.
- Provide clear guidance at a national level including statutory direction for key areas including: capability / capacity / alerting. This could be in the form of a national standard or something similar
- Clear understanding of the cost of associated decisions and who pays.
- Understanding around the escalation of events as it increases in scale before declaration. Clarifying who is responsible at the various stages of escalation.

**Outcome 5: Information flows into, across and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communications to Ministers; agencies, officials, stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies.**

- **Recognition of the modern news cycle – immediacy of social media and power of factual decisive information delivered as speedily as possible**

- **Stakeholder needs are understood (what information is required; where and how to gather the information, providing it at the right time and in the right format).**
- **Official information maintains pace with media dialogue and social media activity.**

Accuracy and credibility of information is critical during a response. How information is shared is a constantly evolving space where people want the right information quickly. To support this outcome it is recommended that national driven initiatives are developed that include:

- One – ‘all of Government’ communication system for all agencies and Groups that is mandated to be used during an event.
- A nationally managed suite of alerting tools for all of New Zealand.
- Define information needs up front, understand who needs what information in readiness rather than waiting until the event is unfolding.
- A single source of truth for the community to find accurate and reliable information. Communicating this out across a range of media.

Monitoring and alerting for emergencies is a significant weakness in our current capability. This needs to be resourced to allow for 24/7 capability across New Zealand, alerting direct to the community and not through a series of third parties.

Dedicated Public Information Managers that are resourced, have specialised skill sets and use evidence based information to guide messaging. This needs to be supported by existing communication staff in various agencies.

Undertake mapping of information flows, defining who is responsible for informing different audiences.

We understand the dynamic nature of communication in the modern world. CDEM should endeavour to ensure the balance between speed and accuracy is maintained. This can be supported by recognising the lead agency as the single source of truth and supporting agency communications echoing this messaging.



Garry Poote

**Chair Bay of Plenty Coordinating Executive Group  
Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group**

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

### Written Submission Form

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Robert Philip Barlin
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>YES</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Dear Sir/ Mdm, This is a submission in regards the Ministerial Review on Better Responses to Natural Disasters in New Zealand. I have worked in many disaster areas throughout the world. The most successful operations had clear Governmental control / coordination through one organisation that kept things simple. The only such organisation in NZ that achieves this is the Ministry of Civil Defence and everyone else becomes a support element with their strengths being fully used by the coordinating body. Paragraph 3 identifies problems. Firstly principles should always be a guide. Otherwise ingenuity suffers. In alliance with this is the concern that decisions are not necessarily made by adequately skilled and experienced people AND information is not always readily available. The above problems are normal in an emergency. The people at the scene of the emergency see the immediate view. They do not necessarily see what is happening in the areas outside their immediate concerns they are totally submersed in their humanitarian activities (and rightly so) and assume that what is obvious to them must be obvious to others. The way to resolve this is to have more highly trained people from different departments who actually know all participants through constant exercises and working together. These highly trained people could be labeled "Emergency Support Teams" these teams would be at Regional and Government level. Their role is to step back and gather information from the "local face" then pass this information up the line in the fastest possible time so that an appropriate level declaring a state of emergency can be made and implemented. Their role is to report "UP" and coordinate delivery of support elements forward as required by the first responders to allow them to get on with their work. These teams must be fully self sufficient and have their own communications equipment. Keeping the public informed is fundamental and is at two levels. The public immediately affected by the emergency and those outside the area and not involved. In a major disaster it is unlikely that electronic means of communication will be operating, alternatives need to be ready for use. Please note my other submission on declaration of a state of emergency and on international support. Another disaster of a large scale of that which affected Christchurch means these must be addressed. SUMMARY There is a lot more to what I have said. The Civil Defence Act needs to clearly state that it is the prime document. It must be fully descriptive. Above all it must be simple. Easily read and not overly legalised. It should also make sense. Example, we have districts, local authorities, regions, unitary authorities. One definition states "district means the district of a local authority, and includes a region." I submit that this could do with some review. I look forward to meeting with the Advisory Group. Kind Regards Robert Philip Barlin, MNZM.

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

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The way to resolve this is to have more highly trained people from different departments who actually know all participants through constant exercises and working together. These highly trained people could be labeled "Emergency Support Teams" these teams would be at Regional and Government level. Their role is to step back and gather information from the "coal face" then pass this information up the line in the fastest possible time so that an appropriate level declaring a state of emergency can be made and implemented. Their role is to report "UP" and coordinate delivery of support elements forward as required by the first responders to allow them to get on with their work. These teams must be fully self sufficient and have their own communications equipment.

Keeping the public informed is fundamental and is at two levels. The public immediately affected by the emergency and those outside the area and not involved. In a major disaster it is unlikely that electronic means of communication will be operating, alternatives need to be ready for use.

Please note my other submission on declaration of a state of emergency and on international support. Another disaster on a larger scale of that which affected Christchurch means these must be addressed.

**SUMMARY**

There is a lot more to what I have said. The Civil Defence Act needs to clearly state that it is the prime document. It must be fully descriptive.

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Example, we have districts, local authorities, regions, unitary authorities. One definition states " district means the district of a local authority, and includes a region." I submit that this could do with some review.

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Kind Regards  
Robert Philip Barlin, MNZM

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**A SUBMISSION IN REGARDS TO THE INQUIRY INTO PARLIAMENTS LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO  
FUTURE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES**

Reference A: Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002

Reference B: National Civil Defence Management Plan Order 2005

Reference C: The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2006  
revised 2009

Reference D: Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015, 18-22 January 2005

Reference E: Final MCDEM Briefing Incoming Minister 2014 (BIM)

This submission will suggest improvements in the operational response to emergencies in New Zealand. It will also try and demonstrate how New Zealand can become a world leader in disaster response in accordance with the provisions of Ref D. It should be noted that none of the references above except Ref E mention the Hyogo Framework and yet with New Zealand now a member of the Security Council there is a wide scope to improve world response to natural disasters and to enhance the humanitarian leadership role that New Zealand can instigate. Perhaps we need to consider setting up a disaster response school with international links.

Declaration of a National State of Emergency

Under current legislation the Minister of Civil Defence can so declare a State of National Emergency. But if the disaster is in Wellington and the Minister is not in a position to declare this Emergency who does? (Ref A, Sect 4, page 44, para 66) It is suggested that a succession plan be clearly identified and could include the Mayor of the neighbouring region or perhaps in the event of a cataclysmic event the Ambassador to Australia.

In addition, if a serious event occurs and CD HQ is completely inoperable and not reachable what is the alternative?

Clusters

References B and C contain information about Clusters. This could be better described in both references. For example. Clusters should be clearly identified and the Chair of each cluster clearly appointed. There could be some confusion in a large scale event when the references state “clusters organise themselves” “determine their own membership” (Ref B, page 36, para 36).

There is mention in the references of SCE’s (Sector Coordinating Entities) are these in any form Cluster heads?

### International Assistance

This section could be enhanced. If in the event of a major disaster it requires Government to approve request for international assistance (and that could take several days). What happens if indeed the cataclysmic event is based on Wellington and Government has been completely devastated? This is an area where in accordance with the Hyogo framework pre approvals for specific international assistance could have already been granted. In the event of this large disaster, response teams and materials could be automatically activated and sent to NZ to commence work. In the event of a large earthquake, immediate response saves lives if delays are imposed then people die. (Ref C, page 4, Section III A, 13 b.), and (Ref C, page 5, Section III A, 13 h).

“Urban Search and Rescue personnel were deployed as soon as they were available. Local teams from Christchurch were entering buildings less than an hour after the quake occurred. Auckland and Palmerston North teams arrived in the city within hours. International teams were on the ground in the first few days.

The Christchurch 2011 earthquake response involved teams from New Zealand, Australia, China, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, UK and USA.”

<http://www.fire.org.nz/About-Us/Our-Organisation/Pages/UrbanSearchandRescue.html>

In conversation with a Head of another countries Search and Rescue organization he had teams ready to move within hours of the earthquake, but approval to deploy did not arrive until two days after the event. We need to speed this up hence the pre approval.

It is submitted that New Zealand needs to arrange, in advance, approvals for skilled and trained teams to be immediately dispatched in the event of a large scale disaster. We will be a world leader.

### International Coordination

This field can also be done in advance. A website can be clearly developed which gives full details to incoming International and private Non- Governmental Organisations (NGO's). In my experience (more than 10 years in various roles and positions internationally) they must sign a memorandum of understanding before commencing operations. The Government under MCDEM would control these organisations at the highest levels in regular meetings. Countries that have done this have had few problems and have achieved success. The more of this that can be done in advance, will be lifesaving.

I am prepared to brief the committee directly to clarify the points made above and to provide specific examples.

Kind Regards

Robert Philip Barlin, MMZM



## *Otago CDEM Group Submission to the Ministerial Review*

### *Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand*

#### Introduction

This submission is made to the Ministerial Review as detailed above and addresses the Terms of Reference (TOR) as provided to the CDEM Sector.

#### Purpose of the Review

As stated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), the key purpose of the review is to provide advice to the Minister with “the most appropriate operational and legislative mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand.”

The aspiration is defined as “to ensure that New Zealand’s emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges”, however, what “world leading” means is unclear and from the outset we wish to record our concern that the focus of the review appears to be “Wellington Centric” as reflected by the membership of the Technical Advisory Group (TAG). We clarify that we mean no disrespect for the members of the TAG, merely that because civil defence is almost invariably delivered locally and the makeup, in our view, should have included a higher level of representation from both operational local government (i.e. a Mayor experienced in responding to a local event), a representative from the CDEM Special Interest Group (i.e. a CEG Chair), and an experienced CDEM Regional Manager.

That said, the Otago Group fully supports the review process as both timely and necessary and thanks the Ministers involved for commencing, and progressing, this review.

## The Challenges

it is acknowledged that there are significant challenges across the country with how CDEM is structured, resourced, perceived by the public, and delivered to the community, as it is neither uniform or consistent. Some of the challenges include;

- CDEM is not seen as being a nationally professional organisation with a consistent identity, region to region, despite a high degree of cooperation and mutual support between regional groups.
- Resourcing (which includes funding and allocation of Local Authority staff training time) varies greatly region to region, depending on the priority given to it, which affects CDEM capability significantly. In Otago, this is most clearly shown by past decisions to only fund a .5 position in Queenstown Lakes and a .5 in Central Otago, both of which are at significant risk from multiple and complex natural hazards. This has changed under the current leadership of the Otago CEG and Joint Committee.
- The Ministry do not “lead” CDEM in NZ as they are, in effect, a policy driven entity who advise and encourage, but do not direct activity, with the exception being during a national declaration when they are required to activate and lead the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC). Transitioning from business as usual to leading an effective NCMC during a national emergency is an extremely difficult step under any circumstances. National resources are stretched thin, as they have been in every recent major event, many staff lack extensive role-specific training, and the relationships between NCMC and Groups are tenuous which makes delivering high quality leadership to the sector almost impossible. This situation is, in many cases, replicated within local and regional CDEM Groups with the same challenges around consistency, quality and regularity of training. Unless the issues of training and resourcing are addressed through this review, we will always get what we've got before, because we will continue to do what we have always done.
- Organisational silos remain a significant barrier to an effective response as significant skills, which could be employed to lead components of a response, are often overlooked, or are not fully exploited. As an example, the Kaikoura earthquake response showed the effectiveness of having the logistics function supported by trained and experienced NZDF personnel embedded in the EOC, as opposed to an under-resourced and inconsistently trained section at Group level.



- There are also significant philosophical divisions around the decision to declare a state of emergency, and although there is a published guideline (DGL13/12), which details when and how a state of emergency may be declared, it fails to note the importance of public confidence in the process. This was highlighted in Otago on November 14th, 2016, when Dunedin City declared for a short period following the tsunami warnings (specifically for reasons of public confidence) the declaration elicited significant concerns from MCDEM. Conversely in the recent earthquakes and fires in Canterbury, concern was expressed by the Minister when the authorities involved either did not declare, or were slow to do so.

## Outcomes

The following details the specified outcomes sought by the review with Otago Groups recommendations following each outcome.

### Outcome 1: The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations.

Outcome 1 focuses on the “Emergency Response System”. CDEM in New Zealand is mandated to address four specific priorities, these being; Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery. It is our view that the review should first and foremost review and recommend what should be the primary focus of CDEM activity as this has a significant bearing on the outcomes of the review process.

There are significant differences between the manner in which Groups structure their delivery of CDEM to their region. Over the past 18 months the Otago Group has undergone a major reorganisation with the creation of a fully regionalised delivery model but with locally domiciled and dedicated staff. These staff are supported by a Regional Office providing carefully considered specialist skill (see figure: 1) to support the local staff. Each local authority is a full partner in the delivery of regional services, however the bulk of the funding for the Group’s activities is provided through a targeted regional rate.



Figure: 1 Otago Group Regional Support Structure

We believe that we now have the appropriate structure in place to address the areas we are tasked with, accompanied by a realistic funding base. However, the current system still relies heavily on each TLA willingly contributing significant time and effort to achieve effectiveness. The current legislation is “enabling” rather than “directive”, thereby allowing local authorities to choose their level of preparedness and resources which are often at a low level as “core business” does not always include a focus on CDEM. This drastically effects operational performance in terms of capability and capacity.

## Outcome 1: Recommendations

- Consideration needs to be given to which of the 4 R’s stays with CDEM. Should the current priorities continue, or should the main focus be on Readiness and Response with Reduction and Recovery sitting primarily with Local Authorities (with CDEM providing support)?
- The current legislation needs to change to become more directive to require TLA’s to meet an acceptable minimum standard. This should also apply to MCDEM across all its activities. Effective monitoring and reporting of capability should be undertaken on a bi-annual basis
- Under (Section 17(d) of the Act, Groups are obligated to “respond to and manage the adverse effects of emergencies”, however the legislation does not provide effectively for the coordinating role of a controller in non-declared emergencies, neither does it provide any protection from liability

- The level of professionalisation of the CDEM Sector needs to be improved to better define CDEM as a nationally consistent and effective organisation. This would require nationally consistent branding, leadership processes, public communications, and greater public recognition of the role CDEM undertakes.

## Outcome 2: New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.

The current system relies on local authorities providing most of the trained personnel to staff emergency operations centres during an event. Nationally, training provision is inconsistent both in content and quality. The introduction of the Integrated Training Framework (ITF), supported by most CDEM Groups and led by the Waikato Group, provides the basis for improvement however, this is still in its early stages of development and delivery. There is no requirement for EOC staff in functional management roles to be fully trained to a national standard, qualified or experienced.

Consistent and readily accessible training is critical to the development of an effective CDEM capacity. Insufficient priority has been placed on this over preceding years and this needs to be significantly increased with both the development of remainder of the ITF and much-strengthened requirements for local authorities to prioritise training of their personnel.

Professional development (including experience gained supporting actual responses) of full time CDEM staff is critical. The introduction of a Training Institute would enable the development and delivery of greater capability and capacity across the country. This Institute could, and should, be partnered with other international training programmes (i.e. the [ASEAN ACE Programme](#) led by the AHA Centre in Jakarta).

One of the recommendations from the Christchurch earthquake review was the establishment of a cadre of well trained and certified professional emergency management staff (from both CDEM and Partner Agencies) able to deploy in support of a response. This recommendation has not been implemented but should be revisited. A rapid response unit of this kind would significantly improve our ability to mount a well-resourced, effective response to sudden onset events. Maritime New Zealand's national response team provides a model of how this could be done, drawing on trained staff from local government, through longstanding MOUs, to provide a ready response team able to deploy within hours to a major oil spill anywhere in the country. Applying a similar approach to CDEM would overcome the resourcing challenges experienced by many smaller local authorities confronted with a sudden onset emergency. This cadre, bringing with them a much higher level of training and experience, would make a major impact in the effectiveness and timeliness of response activities. In the absence of a nationally mandated cadre, the Otago Group is focusing on developing strong

relationships with our local authorities, key agencies, stakeholders, and bordering CDEM Groups. However, our ability to develop stronger links within an Emergency Operations Centre environment with partner agencies is heavily influenced by the national policy of the agency, more than it is through local relationships, with a consequent element of uncertainty over each agency's ability to commit.

EMIS, the MCDEM mandated information management system, has never been nationally adopted and its functionality has been widely criticised. The lack of a universal, fit-for-purpose and easy to use platform for sharing information within and between groups, and with NCMC, is a critical hindrance to gaining a common operating picture and situational awareness.

## Outcome 2: Recommendations

- All CDEM staff, both professional and TLA-based responders, must be trained to nationally consistent standards and exercised regularly.
- A national cadre of deployable key staff needs to be developed and appropriately trained to a very high standard. These should include;
  - Controllers
  - Response Managers
  - PIM
  - Welfare

This group of people would provide a significant increase in capacity and capability across the Country, and could also be used to support emergency responses in other countries where New Zealand has a strategic relationship (which would also provide valuable operational experience among the cadre).

- The creation and operation of an Emergency Management Institute, resourced appropriately and staffed by qualified and experienced personnel (both operational and academic) should be a priority. The [FEMA Emergency Management Institute](#) in Emmetsburg, Maryland provides a relevant example.

**Note:** If an Institute is contemplated, the opportunity of linking with Australia to create an “Australasian” Institute should be considered. This would also support a greater collaboration between Australian State Emergency Services and New Zealand CDEM operational personnel.

- The role of Controllers needs to be better specified, and supported. The aim must be to ensure that each local authority, and CDEM Group, can deploy fully qualified and competent Controllers who are familiar with the local communities and their Hazardscape. Where this is not practical due to the size or resources available to a local authority, arrangements with neighbouring authorities to deploy trained Controllers from elsewhere should be mandatory, and an active programme of relationship development ensured. The role of Partner Agencies (specifically Police, Fire, & NZDF) needs to be re-specified and Legislation changed to require emergency services (including CDEM) to collaborate within a newly specified emergency operating structure. This would allow the integration of high level skills into an EOC such as;
  - o Fire Service – Operations
  - o Police - Planning & Intelligence
  - o NZDF – Logistics & Air Operations
- An urgent change needs to be made to the way public alerting occurs. The current practice of a MCDEM staff member, and a GNS scientist, being woken by an event alert, trying to decipher its magnitude (from their bedroom), and then providing what has proven in the past to be confusing advice to CDEM staff around the Country, who then also need to wake up, try to decipher the consequences for their potentially affected communities (also from their bedroom), and only then start to get the message out is untenable. A 24/7/365 “awake” process needs to be created and resourced with the ability to make rapid assessments and decisions, followed by an immediate national alert sent through the new Cell Broadcasting system, thereby considerably speeding up both the timeliness and effectiveness of an alert to the public.
- A nationally standardised approach to the delivery of CDEM, including branding, region to region needs to be developed and mandated. This would support a more professional approach in the eyes of the public, and in providing a more effective support network across the country.
- A stronger relationship with IWI needs to be developed to both leverage off and provide greater support for the skills and abilities both groups bring to the response “table”.

- Scrap and replace EMIS with an internationally proven, integrated and effective cloud based information sharing system. This needs to be intuitive and simple to use because in a response, many of the personnel brought in to staff an EOC or ECC won't be familiar with it. The system needs to be capable of supporting BAU functions to ensure it is used in "peacetime", which will encourage its adoption.
- Develop and resource much greater use of GIS Systems to support more effective decision making and rapid sharing of information locally, regionally, and nationally.
- Change CDEM legislation to provide much greater protection for all those undertaking CDEM activities, both in declared and non-declared events.

### Outcome 3: Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director CDEM can step in to declare.

It is a truism that all emergencies are local. To maintain public trust and confidence, it is important that emergencies continue to be managed by local authorities who are best placed to understand the needs and expectations, challenges, strengths, and weaknesses, of their communities. In New Zealand, the only "Cavalry" we have to ride to the rescue is contained within our communities and across the 4 Rs, work is undertaken regularly to prepare them for an event. This should not change. Decision making around preparedness response and recovery must also be made at a local level.

CDEM Groups should continue to provide leadership and support and as noted, the Otago Group is comfortable that our current model will deliver on our community's needs and expectations. Local and Regional Controllers need to have a high level of training, skills, and aptitude and able to gain and maintain the confidence of their communities, local elected members, and senior TA management. They need to be supported by fully trained functional managers (i.e. PIM, Welfare, Operations, Planning & Intelligence, Logistics).

This also affects the decision to declare a state of emergency. The Otago CDEM Group strongly supports the decision to declare remaining in the hands of local elected members as per the current process. Local declarations are, and should be, made by people who understand their communities, are well informed by good situational awareness, are respected, and are the "face" of their community. This current process of a declaration being made by a local Mayor, in consultation with the Controller, and with local emergency services, is the most appropriate. A change to legislation to introduce a formal Regional Declaration (currently still defined as a local declaration) should be considered and this would sit with regional authority elected Chair. National declarations should

remain as they are currently made by the Minister, and we note that the MCDEM Director does not have the power under the current act to perform this function.

### Outcome 3: Recommendations

- Continue the current process of declaring an emergency but strengthen the relationship between the Ministry and Regional CDEM to ensure a better understanding of the reasons for a declaration. This includes a better understanding of the need for public confidence as a key reason to declare, and not simply an activation of additional powers.
- Acknowledge the differences between a local, regional, or national declaration which reflects the scale of an event. Clearer understanding and agreement on trigger points between different levels of authority and states of emergency should be well embedded across the Country.
- Legal protection for Controllers during declared and non-declared events must be addressed nationally.

### Outcome 4: The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.

Responding to a major natural disaster is akin to fighting a war and no defence force would approach an impending battle with the structure, resources, and level of training CDEM currently operates with.

Effective command, coordination, and control, comes from the activities of well trained, experienced, well-resourced, and demonstrably effective personnel who are recognised as capable of operating in a crisis environment. **This requires a much stronger national commitment (and requirement) towards ensuring consistent standards and levels of resources exist across the country.**

Consistent processes and procedures under CIMS are essential to ensure inter-operability between agencies involved in the response.

All staff filling leadership positions in an EOC or ECC must be well trained and experienced, and fully understand the operating and command structure, including the respective functions and responsibilities of NCMC, Group and local CDEM.

## Outcome 4: Recommendations

- Within the establishment of dedicated national multi-agency response teams, ensure a cadre of trained Controllers are included.
- Change the legislation to ensure that trained and certified controllers can operate in any location across the Country and are not constrained by not having been “approved” by local authorities.
- Change Legislation to require a standardised approach and operating model across all agencies involved in emergency response. In NZ, CIMS is the standard model but acceptance and use varies greatly, **most notably in emergency services.**
- Legislate the requirement for consistent and standardised training and education of all key leadership roles within the EOC. At a minimum, there should be an internationally recognised certification for Controllers and ideally the certification would be extended to the managers of Public Information Management, Welfare, Operations, Planning & Intelligence and Logistics.
- Provide for greater involvement and collaboration between all CDEM stakeholders by ensuring legislation requires each agency to align and support the development of effective response capability.

## Outcome 5: Information flows, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers, agencies, stakeholders and to the public

The effectiveness of every emergency response since the Canterbury earthquakes, if not before, has been measured largely by the public's perception of how well it was managed. The quality of communication with impacted communities and stakeholders, with and between partner agencies, and to the Government has been a critical element in influencing how each of these audiences has assessed the success or failure of the response, and how much - or little - trust and confidence there has been in CDEM.

As such, the Public Information Management (PIM) function is a critical part of the CDEM response structure at every level - local, group and national. While the imperative for PIMs in NCMC may be to keep the Minister informed, followed by agencies and stakeholders, with the public at the bottom of the list (as set out in Outcome 5), the reality for Controllers, Mayors and their PIMs at local and group



level is that the needs of their community and stakeholders will always be the top priority, with the Minister and agency partners a close second.

Underpinning Outcome 5 is acknowledgement of the immediacy of "news" via social media, digital and broadcast media; the universal expectation that information, corroboration and comment will be available from CDEM - even before a response is fully underway - and the impact of citizen journalism.

All of these elements make it impossible to "manage" the media or control the messaging in the traditional sense, but they also provide new opportunities for CDEM to inform, communicate and engage directly with our communities and target audiences, and to retain their trust and confidence as an authoritative source. To do this, the PIM team must be fully staffed by well trained personnel who can activate immediately - operating remotely if necessary - to provide authenticated information swiftly and update it often in an evolving situation.

In the Otago Group, we have acknowledged this by creating a new role within our CDEM Group for a permanent full-time Public Information Manager to develop the capability of the Group PIM team as well as those in our local EOCs. The other key element of this role is improving community awareness of Otago's complex Hazardscape, increasing preparedness, and creating resilience.

As noted previously, consistent training and the recruitment of qualified, experience staff are key to the successful delivery of all functions in a response - this applies particularly to Public Information. In most cases, PIM team members at local and group level are drawn from local authority communications staff, supplemented by other council or contract staff. At NCMC, MCDEM's communications team supplies the core capability, augmented by other government communications staff. At present, there is no requirement for any of these staff, at any level, to be trained, qualified or experienced in the skills required to deliver public information effectively in the fast-paced environment of an emergency response. In smaller councils without dedicated communications resources in-house, PIMs range from librarians and receptionists to planners. Their skill levels and experience vary and even those with a communications background do not necessarily have the skillset or the temperament to operate successfully under pressure.

There is currently no national PIM training programme and while it was previously recommended that PIMs attended a course, this was not a requirement either for PIM managers or for team members. The previous training regime was withdrawn pending the development of a new PIM course within the Integrated Training Framework, which is not yet complete. There is no consistent exercise programme for PIMs either, it being left to each Group and local CDEM organisation to decide whether and how to exercise its PIM function.

Although there are generally accepted functions that exist within PIM (set out in MCDEM's PIM handbook), there is no consistent PIM structure in use across the sector. This makes it more difficult for staff brought in from other councils or agencies to assist in a local response to assimilate quickly.

Most local EOCs use their home council's IT systems, email, filing and document management systems, and their BAU access rules also make it very difficult for incoming team members to become operational quickly. Given the immediacy of the PIM function, these delays are a barrier to effective, timely communication.

With the arguable exception of Auckland Council, no local authority or CDEM Group in the country can deploy a full public information management team for a sustained response lasting more than a couple of days without outside assistance. In the 2011 Christchurch earthquake response, the PIM structure required 48 people to be fully staffed on a 24-hour basis across three shifts - even allowing that some positions did not have to be filled overnight. While that is at the extreme end of the scale, the PIM team in Kaikoura was drastically under-resourced with just four-five people for the first week (initially there was only one). The reality is that every significant emergency response will require outside resources to be brought in to supplement local staff. This needs to be acknowledged, planned for, and welcomed.

There are two aspects to address:

1. the need for a national roster of highly qualified and experienced Public Information Managers and PIM team members, drawn from councils, CDEM Groups, around the country, and from government agencies, who can be deployed at short notice to support or lead PIM teams, or fill key roles in any location.
2. The need for all local authorities to accept, welcome and assimilate outside assistance in their CDEM activation without parochialism, resentment or deliberately obstructive behaviour.

For this to occur, there needs to be a universally accepted trigger for requesting outside assistance, and consistent protocols for receiving and assimilating those staff. This is not exclusive to the PIM function.

## Outcome 5: Recommendations

For the CDEM sector to meet the high public and political expectations of sustained, effective, and timely communications, the following will be required:

- Mandatory extensive training to a nationally set standard for all PIM managers, including compulsory participation in a regular exercise programme
- A comprehensive and nationally consistent training programme for PIM team members, augmented by exercises to test systems, procedures and skills, as well as PIM's integration with other core EOC / ECC / NCMC functions
- A nationally consistent basic PIM structure for all EOCs and ECCs including social media, media liaison, community relations and stakeholder engagement functions as a minimum, to enable inter-operability when staff from outside an impacted area are brought in to assist. This does not preclude local variations but ensure a consistent foundation.
- The relationship between the PIM, the All of Government Communications Manager, and the Controller, when an AOG Communications Manager is deployed into the field, needs to be clearly defined.
- Identify a pool of trained, experienced, and fully equipped PIMs and other PIM team members from around the country who can be deployed at short notice to an EOC, ECC, and the NCMC. Their ability and experience to operate in an EOC, ECC or NCMC should be certified in advance.
- Establish national protocols for triggering outside assistance in a response and incorporating those resources into EOCs, ECC and NCMC.
- Develop a National Public Information Strategy
- Establish and support a national reference group and forum for Public Information Management to strengthen networks, develop best practice and advise on training and development for PIM.
- Invest more resources in an ongoing CDEM public education programme, led nationally and supported by Group and local delivery

## Conclusion

The greatest challenge in the Civil Defence Emergency Management environment is that for many years New Zealand dodged a series of bullets. We now clearly understand that “What never happens ... happens” but to date we seem to be stuck in the cycle of doing the same thing yet expecting a different outcome. Were this not the case then CDEM would not be under scrutiny for failing to meet the expectations of our community, our stakeholders, and Government. CDEM nationally is charged with the protection of life and property and in many instances, activation and responses are required without notice requiring instant decision making under extreme pressure, and in potentially life threatening circumstances.

When levels of training, resourcing, consistency, and “national trust”, have not been established and embedded in advance, it is unreasonable to expect that a fully professional and effective response will occur in all cases, and is it unacceptable that when those failures occur, criticism is levelled at the people who were simply doing their best under very trying circumstances.

The development of mutual trust and respect across all sectors of CDEM, starting with National Government, needs to be a primary focus of the outcomes of this review. During crisis events, we must be “**Team New Zealand**” and not siloed, organisationally focused, and blinkered.

In order to provide the high quality, professional and effective response that our communities rightly expect, changes are required at every level. The experiences of 2010 & 2011, the last eight months in Kaikoura, Hurunui and Wellington, and the Port Hills fire, show us that whether our smallest local authorities or our large metropolitan areas are involved, CDEM is not yet adequately resourced, trained or prepared, and that past lessons have still not been learned despite being punched in the face repeatedly.

To ensure this does not continue, enabling changes in legislation are required, a significant improvement in training and experience is needed, and changes to the CDEM Sector are required to produce a professional and effective CDEM Team.

This does not, and should not, remove the responsibility of Local Government to continue to lead and deliver CDEM services to their communities, but would rather provide a significant improvement in the support for, and leadership of, a nationally supported and effective CDEM organisation, delivered locally and regionally, coordinated by a new and effective “National Emergency Management Agency”.

The Otago Group wishes to support these changes actively and collaboratively and we welcome the opportunity for both scrutiny of our operational structure, and for the opportunity to support implementation of the review and future development of CDEM capability in New Zealand.

Submission presented by;

Otago Civil Defence & Emergency Management Group Joint Committee

Stephen Woodhead  
Chair  
Chairman – Otago Regional Council

Tim Cadogan  
Mayor  
Central Otago District Council

Gary Kircher  
Mayor  
Waitaki District Council

Jim Boulton  
Mayor  
Queenstown Lakes District Council

Dave Cull  
Mayor  
Dunedin City

Brian Cadogan  
Mayor  
Clutha District Council

Emergency Management Otago

Peter Bodeker  
Chair - Otago Coordinating Executive Group  
Chair - National CDEM Special Interest Group  
Chief Executive – Otago Regional Council

Chris Hawker  
Regional Manager / Group Controller

Michele Poole  
Public Information Manager

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**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Gisborne District Council
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) Lisa Osler, Senior Advisor
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Please refer to attached pages.

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Ministerial Review: Better Responses to  
Natural Disasters and Other  
Emergencies in  
New Zealand

Gisborne District Council  
Written Submission  
(7 JULY 2017)

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## 1. Introduction


Thank you for this opportunity to submit on the Ministerial Review – Terms of Reference for Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. This submission has been prepared on behalf of Gisborne District Council - a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group.

Tairāwhiti Civil Defence Emergency Management sits under the Gisborne District Council Group (a unitary authority).

Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Office there is a community link structure with the areas identified in the adjacent map – Te Araroa, Waiapu, Uawa, Waikohu, Gisborne City and Gisborne Rural.

These communities activate in response to emergency events in their areas and work alongside the team in the Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC).

It should be noted that these communities recently received a Gold Award for outstanding contribution to Civil Defence and Emergency Management in NZ, in particular for their readiness and response.



## 2. Terms of Reference – Problem Statement

While we agree in principle with the problem statement, we would like it noted that many of these problems do not occur in the Tairāwhiti area.

We acknowledge that the principle of act local, coordinate regionally and support nationally may not be suitable for all emergency events. However, the importance of local knowledge in events should not be disregarded. Trust between key emergency partners and the community is built up over time and is an integral part of a response.

Building and maintaining local community resilience is a vital part of emergency management across Tairāwhiti. While we recognise the benefit of receiving national support following significant events, we also recognise the need to operate independently for our area.

As an experienced Incident Management Team, we believe that community resilience has been a significant contributing factor to our success as a region in managing emergencies.

In many emergency events key information may not always be available regionally or nationally and local decisions are made based on what we already know and have had verified locally. This is where local knowledge is crucial and where our community link and Incident Management Team (Police, NZFS, DHB, Response Manager and Lifelines Coordinator) (IMT) are involved.

Public information needs to be timely, consistent and accurate and in Tairāwhiti we try to use all the different tools - website, Facebook, email, media releases and interviews. It is not always possible to update the Gisborne District Council (GDC) Senior Management team and GDC elected members before information goes out to the public. These groups have always been understanding of the need to get the information out and the possibility that they may hear or read this information at the same time as the public. Councillors have demonstrated trust in their



Civil Defence Emergency Management Team and allow them to proceed with their tasks. Where possible, elected members and the GDC Senior Management Team are notified of any major risks/concerns or decisions prior to any public notification.

Having the support of the Regional Emergency Management Adviser, who acts as the intermediary between the Minister/Ministry and the Group during an emergency event, is an important role and takes the political (national) pressure off the IMT.

### 3. Terms of Reference - Outcomes

Similar to our position on the problem statement, we agree with and support the outcomes within this Terms of Reference. However we feel it is important to qualify our support by discussing how each outcome relates to our experience in Tairāwhiti.

**Outcome 1: *"The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies."***

We agree with the statement however in our experience stakeholders (communities) have an unrealistic expectation of the emergency response system. Many people believe that they will be able to access immediate help from the authorities during emergency situations.

We are educating our communities on how they need to provide for themselves and their whānau for at least 2-3 days and not be reliant on outside agencies.

**Outcome 2: *"New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses."***

The Gisborne District Council believes this statement and expands on its position below.

#### Appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing

In terms of capability and capacity, we feel that New Zealand does have experienced and qualified people as well as experienced and qualified specialist agencies. However there is no single agency that keeps a national register of these people/companies and their contact details and qualifications/experience.

This register needs to be held by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management and they will be able to direct the appropriate skilled people to where they are required.

Maritime New Zealand has developed a National Response Team (NRT) that is made up of suitably qualified and experienced people that they can call upon when required. These team members already have a signed agreement with their employers to deploy (if able). The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management could investigate having have a similar NRT for initial response.

The team will be dependent upon needs and people's ability to deploy. Having identified key roles and people able to fill these roles prior to an event is important for initial response.

#### Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action

Protocols that are widely disseminated and understood are critical. Here in Tairāwhiti we have protocols for our key players. For example, if there is an emergency event and no phone system then we meet at the CDEM office in half an hour from the time of the event.

**Outcome 3: "Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency."**

The Gisborne District Council and Tairāwhiti CDEM IMT agree with this statement in regards to the understanding by members of the public and this is discussed below.

A single lead role across any geographical area

The Gisborne District Council/Tairāwhiti CDEM Office are a unitary authority and therefore we are in the fortunate position to be the single lead across this area working alongside our community link teams. The roles have been established and there is a mutual trust between our communities and the staff at the ECC.

The purpose and consequences of declarations of states of emergency are clear

The Civil Defence Emergency Act 2002 states who deems a declaration is necessary, who has the authority to declare as well as what powers are given to the Controller. Our communities tend to perceive declarations more simply as a sign of an event's seriousness. This has sometimes led to confusion when the public perceives a significant event but no declaration is required.

In the 2007 Gisborne earthquake a declaration was made to keep people out of the CBD while inspections of the buildings were made. This was lifted once the state of all the buildings has been decided.

During the lengthy power outage in December 2016 none of the powers under the Act were required so a declaration, although discussed, was not believed necessary. However, the outage was perceived as a prominent event and consequently, a number of people questioned why there was no declaration.

During all emergency events the need to declare is canvassed regularly with the IMT.

There may be an issue with locating an elected official to sign the declaration and there could be an added step in the process that allows the declaration to be signed by two members of the IMT and confirmed by the Mayor or Deputy as this avoids any delay in using the power that the declaration is made for.

Appropriate interventions and escalations are available

The Gisborne area has had a number of emergency responses where interventions and escalation was required. Having the register of suitably qualified and experienced people will be a great asset for get these underway in a timely manner.

**Outcome 4: "The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate."**

The Gisborne District Council agrees with this statement however within each Council there are only a small number of staff where civil defence emergency management is their core role. During an emergency a team relies on other members of staff to help out – some of these have had training/experience while others may have limited knowledge but they are all willing to help.

There is also the risk that these people may not be available as emergency events are not planned and people may be required to step up out of their usual roles.

There is a clear operating model and chain of command, control and coordination.

Here in Tairāwhiti we have built relationships and trust with our emergency partners and stakeholders in peace time. This is an important part of the process and builds up the trust that is required when we work together in emergency responses.

In December 2016 Tairāwhiti suffered a significant power outage following the tragic collision of a top dressing plane with Eastland Networks 110kv high tension powerlines. This line feeds all of the Gisborne / East Coast area.

Eastland Network supplied one of their General Managers to work in the CDEM incident Management Team (IMT) and the Team played a key role in working with stakeholders and the wider public to ensure as much as possible the city and wider district continued to function reassuring the public through coordinated communications. While no state of emergency was declared CDEM effectively allowed Eastland Network to concentrate its efforts on repairing the line and restoring power to the region.

Eastland Network and Tairāwhiti CDEM Team worked together to ensure a timely outcome for this area. The public were very supportive of this approach and commended the Council (Tairāwhiti CDEM) and Eastland Network for working together for their community.

**Outcome 5: "Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies."**

The Gisborne District Council agrees with this statement - information during emergencies is dynamic and always changing and it is not always possible to update the GDC Senior Management Team and elected members before information is released to the public.

Council has faith and trust in their Civil Defence Emergency Management Team and allows its members to proceed with their tasks.

If possible Councillors and the GDC Senior Management Team are notified of any major risks/concerns or decisions prior to any public notification.

Stakeholder needs are understood and official information maintains pace with media dialogue and social media activity.

Maintaining clear, robust and resilient lines of communication is absolutely critical for our region – especially for our communities spread along the East Coast, widely known for its tsunami risk. We depend on the quick reception of information and effective planning for alternative forms of communication as a backup to existing mobile coverage.

There have been issues with the information received from the official departments such as GNS. Early notification of earthquakes is received through their website and phone APPS however once this has been examined it may change (magnitude lower or higher, location or shaking). Updated information is not re-notified to inform people on the changes and actions that may be required are missed unless these changes are noticed.

- The Kaikoura earthquake was notified initially as a 6.5 but upgraded 3 days later to a 7.8.
- The Te Araroa earthquake in September 2016 was originally notified on land and a magnitude of 6.8 before being upgraded to 7.1 and moved off shore.
- March 2017 an earthquake was notified at 12.03am as 3.1 but in the paper the next day the Tairāwhiti Civil Defence Emergency Manager saw that the earthquake had been upgraded to 5.0 and strong and fielded a number of concerned calls about the lack of communication with the community.

The concern with re-notification is that the public may perceive this as another earthquake however not re-notifying means that the CDEM team may not be aware of the change and therefore the added risk this may pose.

There are also other Groups who run their own computer programmes on tsunami risk. While this information can be provided quite quickly and appears to be reliable it cannot be used as it is not the verified official version. Making decisions off the verified official data can take time after calling the panel together and looking at information.

## Conclusion

The Gisborne District Council agrees with the five outcomes however believes that:

- Local responses to emergency events must be maintained. This is especially important in Tairāwhiti where effective emergency responses rely on strong relationships across geographically isolated communities.
- The public needs to be informed of their responsibilities in the readiness and response phases as well as the definition and reasoning behind the need for declarations.
- A national register of qualified and experienced people is maintained by the Ministry.
- Personnel requests for additional staff during events is coordinated by the Ministry.
- Notifications of earthquakes and tsunamis are made in a timely manner and if there is a noticeable change to the location, magnitude and depth then this should be re-notified.
- While information is received from recognised sources, CDEM Group's unofficial sources should not be discounted and used during major events.
- Where possible Ministers, elected members and GDC's Senior Management Team should be notified of information prior to the public but these groups should also understand that information during events is dynamic and where death, injury or property damage may occur this may not always be possible.
- The Terms of Reference also take into account the importance of new technology, including mobile technology developments, in order to support the outcomes of this document.

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
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<b>Name:</b> Waikato CDEM Group
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)  s9(2)(a)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):  Please refer attached submission

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**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

**Submission:**

Please refer attached submission

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## **Waikato CDEM Group Submission to the Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand**

### **Executive Summary**

Waikato Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group has been involved in responding to a series of emergency events throughout New Zealand. While CDEM has not been the lead agency in each event, the effectiveness of the response has been called into question. It is this that has given rise to this review of the CDEM sector.

The Waikato CDEM Group commends Parliament for initiating this Ministerial Review. We put forward the following top 10 recommendations that we believe will enhance CDEM activities:

1. Develop directive legislation that provides clarity of roles and responsibilities for all agencies to deliver effective multiagency collaboration activities.
2. Create a National structure of integrated agencies to undertake planning, response and support activities.
3. Legislate an integrated competency based training framework (which includes refresher training and regular exercising) for controllers, elected members, CDEM staff and other relevant stakeholders e.g Emergency service partners.
4. Standardise processes and management models (such as CIMS), ensuring consistency through mandatory nationwide multi agency implementation.
5. Legislated protection for all those undertaking CDEM activities who act in good faith and within their skillset/experience levels.
6. Implement a single nationally integrated cloud based IT system that allows all agencies to collate data, obtain situational awareness and report one truth.
7. Establish multiagency National Incident Coordination Teams (NICT) who are trained, exercised and able to undertake rapid deployments into affected locations to support or lead a local response.
8. Establish an interim mechanism for non-declared CDEM events with clear trigger points for transcending into a declared event.
9. Establish a consistent national approach to PIM, with adequate resourcing and mentoring for PIM teams to communicate effectively and accurately at speed, across all available channels and stakeholder groups.
10. Invest in a national social media strategy that is supported through capability and capacity of experienced and trained PIM staff. This is required before, during and after an event.

## Introduction

The Waikato CDEM Group oversees the CDEM activities across one of the largest regions in New Zealand. It covers, approximately 25,000km<sup>2</sup> of the North Island - stretching from the West coast north of Port Waikato and Coromandel Peninsula in the north, to the King Country and Central Plateau in the south.

While the Waikato CDEM Group does not believe CDEM is 'broken', there are many improvements that will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the work we undertake. Based on our knowledge of our local communities, this submission will focus on what we consider to be the most beneficial facets for improving and enhancing CDEM activities.

### **Outcome 1: The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations.**

Under the current model, the delivery of CDEM is based on a devolved accountability approach. From a governance standpoint, the Waikato Group believes that CDEM has the correct structures in place. However, the current system falls short at the leadership level which is supported by enabling rather than directive legislation. There is also a short fall with operational levels, in terms of capability and capacity.

#### Waikato CDEM Group recommendations for outcome 1:

- Rewrite the current 'enabling' legislation to be directive. This is applicable across all areas of the CDEM spectrum, including the National Plan and the Director's Guidelines.
- Provide greater certainty for the role of a controller in non-declared emergencies. The majority of incidents coordinated by Controllers do not involve declarations. However, other than Group's obligations to "...respond to and manage the adverse effects of emergencies..." (Section 17(d)), there is nothing in legislation that acknowledges the coordinating role of a controller in non-declared emergencies nor the need for protection from liability in such cases (e.g. a controller will often be the decision maker for activating a wide area coastal evacuation for tsunamis with significant economic and social implications).
- Legislate for all participants involved in CDEM (including elected members and controllers) to undertake nationally standardised training.
- Legislate to require directing emergency services (including CDEM) to collaborate in such things as integrated planning and exercising.
- Strengthen branding about who CDEM is and what CDEM does to include consideration of rebranding to something that better defines its function. An 0800 phone number would be beneficial in assisting the community to know who to call.
- Review effective international models.
- Consider the existing CDEM becoming a combined resource entity for responding agencies and councils rather than a standalone branch of government under the umbrella of councils (see diagram 1). As part of its readiness role, the entity would be responsible for facilitation, promotion and support of integrated response and pre-event planning across all agencies, combining the general skills of the core staff and the technical skills of seconded staff (e.g. fire/police/health).



As part of its response role the entity would ensure that coordination centres are activated, trained coordination teams made up of staff from a broad spectrum of agencies and stakeholders<sup>1</sup> (rather than just council) are mobilised and that an appropriately qualified controller (3 deep from each agency) is appointed.

This entity would still be responsible for coordination and facilitation of reduction and recovery, but delivery would firmly be the responsibility of local councils where it is best placed.

We believe this structure would create a point of focus for response integration with collective buy-in from all partners rather than CDEM being seen as a separate entity that operates in a silo, only engaging (with varying degrees of effectiveness) when it is seen as the 'big one'.

### **Outcome 2: New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.**

The current system relies heavily on Local Government to supply trained staff to lead and assist with the response phase. Use of the Integrated Training Framework (ITF) has demonstrated the most effective improvements within the Waikato CDEM Group. The ITF Framework is based on the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS). It was developed to meet coordination centre training and development requirements throughout the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) sector. Established by a consortium of regional CDEM Groups, the ITF is supported by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, to promote and support standardised professional development. Since utilising this framework, CDEM professionals in the Waikato have noted improvements in common knowledge amongst agencies/stakeholders and clearly defined processes. While there is still work required in this area, the Waikato has demonstrated a more focussed level of response efficiency in recent activations.

As a small country, we have a limited number of people to respond to a large scale event, particularly when it comes to our emergency services. Without stakeholder assistance, emergency response would struggle. Waikato CDEM places significant emphasis on the development of relationships with key agencies and stakeholders. Many of these relationships have been formalised through incorporation in local strategies and plans. We also have more formal arrangements through our CEG Advisory Groups. This gives the Waikato CDEM Group the ability to call on, and work effectively with local community leaders to assist with local arrangements and decisions.

#### Waikato CDEM Group recommendations for outcome 2:

- Understand the diversity that exists amongst the regions under the current model. This is essential if we are to achieve standardisation and progress within the sector.
- Standardise CDEM activities in terms of branding, chain of command, training, policies, processes and so on, is fundamental to effective operations.
- Establish dedicated national and regional multiagency response teams chosen for their individual skills, team working ability and leadership; to train, exercise and undertake rapid deployments into affected locations to lead or support a local response (refer to diagram 1).

<sup>1</sup> An example of a significant local partner might be an oil/gas refinery or port facility.

- Require multiagency collaboration across the four Rs (readiness, response, recovery and reduction). This includes integrated response and succession planning. Legislative clarification of roles and responsibilities, would also be beneficial, particularly for multiagency events.
- Implement a single nationally integrated cloud based IT systems would allow all agencies to obtain situational awareness, monitor and report one truth.
- Establish a national pool of qualified and experienced Controllers who can respond to larger regional or national emergencies. On-going training must be provided to this pool of Controllers.
- Legislate for the protection for all those undertaking CDEM activities, both in declared and non-declared events, who act in good faith and within their skillset/experience levels.
- Give serious consideration to international legislation, best practice and the most effective systems demonstrated by other emergency management agencies throughout the world.

**Outcome 3: Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director CDEM can step in to declare.**

Local emergencies are best managed locally with decision making around preparedness, response and recovery also made at a local level. Group support, advice and where necessary resource assistance that is utilised under the current model works well. The Controller needs to have the skill and personality to come into a situation and quickly gain the confidence of the local elected members and senior management.

Waikato CDEM Group believe the current process for who determines and actually declares is appropriate. Local declarations are, and should be, made by the Mayor on the recommendation of the Group and/or Local Controller. The local mayor is the appropriate person to declare as they represent the local communities. It should be noted that Mayors have an incredibly important role throughout the recovery phase as communities adjust to their 'new state of normal'.

Waikato CDEM Group recommendations for outcome 3:

- Recognise the importance of 'local' vs 'regional' vs 'national' when it comes to the scale of an event. Clearer definitions for trigger points between different levels of authority and states of emergency would be advantageous.
- Establishment of a nationally consistent coordination and clarity of chain of command is required to enhance effective response.
- Recognise the role and responsibilities of controllers in legislation for non-declared CDEM events.
- Clearer direction on the requirement of agencies to communicate and work collaboratively under national CDEM guidelines. This includes clarification of the lead agency and how all other agencies are to inter-relate. The Waikato CDEM Group are currently creating a policy to support this direction at a regional level.
- Legal protection for controllers during declared and non-declared events is essential.

**Outcome 4: The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.**

The Waikato CDEM Group believe that a strong legislated command and control model is required. During the response phase, the Controller will gather all the intelligence they require from the various CIMS functions to make an informed decision. There is no time for robust debate during response. Decisions are usually life critical and need to be made immediately without hesitation. Response is not a consultative process.

Waikato CDEM Group recommendations for outcome 4:

- Establish a multiagency National Incident Coordination Team (NICT) who are trained, exercised and able to undertake rapid deployments into affected locations to lead or support a local response (Refer to diagram 1 for further detail).
- Legislate nationally across all agencies involved in emergency response, the use of a standardised management model (such as CIMS) to ensure adherence and greater levels of efficiency.
- Legislate a single competency based training framework which includes refresher training and exercising.
- Strengthen legislation to ensure collaboration and alignment between all CDEM stakeholders.
- Establish a single nationally integrated cloud based IT systems that would allow all agencies to monitor, obtain situational awareness and report one truth.

**Outcome 5: Information flows, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers, agencies, stakeholders and to the public**

As CDEM professionals, as leaders, as a sector and as a national brand, we are judged on the efficiency of response, how we communicated, managed our volunteers and provided for the welfare of people.

CDEM has begun implementing integrated response tools at a National level. For example, EMIS offers a central repository for data management and information sharing. However, this current system fails to work with other systems. It is also unable to provide situational awareness – an essential component for effective response. CDEM Groups are investing in their own systems to fill this gap.

From a Public Information Management (PIM) perspective, we cannot underestimate the number of PIM staff required to effectively manage communications. The Waikato CDEM Group are fortunate to have a PIM team who regularly demonstrate effective collaboration. Working together to establish plans and strategies, key messages as well as supporting each other during activations. This has resulted in successful social media campaigns both locally and regionally. It is an area that is anticipated to grow exponentially.

From a community perspective, much of their knowledge during an emergency event comes from media reporting. As demonstrated in recent events, the media sometimes fail to recognise their role and responsibilities in the face of an emergency – to provide factual information, clear instructions and encourage calm and appropriate behaviour from our communities. Not only does this failure add stress to our communities but it puts undue pressure on CDEM professionals and emergency responders.

Waikato CDEM Group recommendations for outcome 5:


- Implement a system that is 'fit for purpose' and presents 'one source of truth'. A centralised and integrated approach to data/information management and situational awareness that is trusted by all stakeholders, agencies and officials is essential.
- Establish a consistent national approach to PIM. For example, regional resourcing of specialist CDEM communications staff during business as usual (currently the Waikato is only region who has a dedicated person in this role).
- Ensure PIM teams are adequately resourced and mentored to be able to communicate effectively and accurately at speed, across all available channels and stakeholder groups.
- Invest in a social media strategy that is supported through capability and capacity of experienced and trained PIM staff. This is required before, during and after an event.
- Develop inter-agency PIM forums to accelerate relationship building, identify additional existing communication networks and help provide for surge capacity. This includes creating professional development opportunities with key stakeholders (especially iwi) and partner agencies, including PIM from neighbour boundaries.
- Develop a National approach to overcome communication barriers such as limitations in cell phone reception.
- Create a specialised National multiagency PIM team to support Groups before, during and after an event.
- Establish an educational programme for media to explain their role and responsibilities during emergency events.

**Conclusion**

Civil Defence Emergency Management operates at the extreme end of the public safety spectrum. CDEM Groups are charged with the protection of life and property. Decisions during the response phase are frequently made under life threatening circumstances.

The Waikato CDEM Group do not believe that the current system is broken. However, there are a number of improvements and/or enhancements that would benefit current practice. In the Waikato, we are strong believers in working collaboratively. While there remain areas for further improvement, we have demonstrated that our integrated stakeholder approach is gaining successes in achieving efficiencies in both capability and capacity.


We invite the Review Committee (and its writers) to the Waikato region to allow us to demonstrate some of the best practice we undertake. We also extend the invitation to demonstrate the challenges we face and further discuss our perspective.




Hugh Vercoe  
Chair of the Joint Committee  
Waikato Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group

Diagram 1: Suggested New Emergency Management Model

# EMERGENCY COORDINATION AGENCY [BUSINESS AS USUAL]



# EMERGENCY COORDINATION CENTRE [RESPONSE]





7<sup>th</sup> July 2017

The Chair  
Technical Advisory Group

## **Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand**

The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) Oceania Council welcomes the opportunity to provide input to the *Ministerial Review on Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand*.

### **Background:**

The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), which has more than 6,000 members worldwide, is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to promoting the "Principles of Emergency Management" and representing those professionals whose goals are saving lives and protecting property and the environment during emergencies and disasters.

<http://www.iaem.com/home.cfm?c=Global>

### **Our Vision**

That the International Association of Emergency Managers be recognized globally as the premier organization for emergency management.

### **Our Mission**

The mission of IAEM is to advance the profession by promoting the principles of emergency management; to serve its members by providing information, networking and professional development opportunities; and to advance the emergency management profession.

IAEM was founded in 1952 as the U.S. Civil Defense Council, becoming the National Coordinating Council of Emergency Managers (NCCEM) in 1985, and the International Association of Emergency Managers in 1997.

The IAEM-Oceania Council represents IAEM members located in Australia, New Zealand, and all Pacific islands and nations (excluding U.S. Territories).

The IAEM-Oceania Council, which became an IAEM Region in 2004, was the third Region outside the United States to join IAEM under the previous organizational structure. When IAEM took on an international structure in 2007, IAEM-Oceania became one of seven Councils within IAEM-Global.  
<http://www.iaem.com/home.cfm?c=Oceania>

Currently there are 40 New Zealand members.

#### **Principles of Emergency Management:**

IAEM promotes the principles of emergency management as outlined;

1. Comprehensive - emergency managers consider and take into account all hazards, all phases, all stakeholders and all impacts relevant to disasters.
2. Progressive - emergency managers anticipate future disasters and take preventive and preparatory measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities.
3. Risk-Driven - emergency managers use sound risk management principles (hazard identification, risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning priorities and resources.
4. Integrated - emergency managers ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all elements of a community.
5. Collaborative - emergency managers create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication.
6. Coordinated - emergency managers synchronize the activities of all relevant stakeholders to achieve a common purpose.
7. Flexible - emergency managers use creative and innovative approaches in solving disaster challenges.
8. Professional - emergency managers value a science and knowledge-based approach based on education, training, experience, ethical practice, public stewardship and continuous improvement.

#### **Professionalism of Emergency Management:**

There is currently no recognition in New Zealand that emergency management is a professional occupation in its own right. Statistics New Zealand classification code finder fails to recognise emergency management or the role of an emergency manager as a profession. It does reference defence force members, fire fighters and police as outlined below;

*Occupation – ANZSCO V1.2 (6 digit level)*

*Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations*

#### *Definition*

*DEFENCE FORCE MEMBERS, FIRE FIGHTERS AND POLICE protect and preserve property, public order and safety through the provision of specialised military services to the defence forces, the enforcement of laws, attendance at emergencies, and control and extinguishment of fires.*

Given that the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 interprets civil defence emergency management to mean -

*(a) the application of knowledge, measures, and practices that—*

*(i) are necessary or desirable for the safety of the public or property; and*

*(ii) are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, recover from, or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with any emergency; and*

*(b) includes, without limitation, the planning, organisation, co-ordination, and implementation of those measures, knowledge, and practices*

there is an implication that skill specialisation is required by those tasked under the Act. There are also Specialisation titles provided in the Act. This meets the ANZSCO definition of an occupation (recognised by Statistics New Zealand) and should thus be included.

**Recommendation:**

It is submitted that the professionalization of emergency management would be greatly enhanced through the acknowledgement and recognition of emergency management as a profession within New Zealand.

**National Training Standards:**

An effective and efficient response capability relies on the key foundation of staff and volunteers who are trained and exercised to a nationally consistent standard. It is noted that in New Zealand there is currently no clear national consistency for training courses or for the delivery of training across the field of emergency management. While individual disciplines are focused on the training standards and delivery applicable to their specific fields there is no national consistency across disciplines.

Equally it is not sufficient to promote nationally consistent standards which are optional as opposed to mandated. The practise of setting national consistent standards through guidelines means that there is the option for agencies / organisations to opt out and not ensure they are training to the standards required.

Nationally consistent training standards which are prescribed must be supported by nationally consistent training delivery, evaluation and assessment criteria. The training must also be accessible to all emergency management practitioners across all disciplines.

It is noted that in the United States of America, training capability at a national level is led and supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the Emergency Management Institute which offers both courses presented via face to face instruction and through the Independent Study Programme online that enables practitioners to achieve emergency management professional program (EMPP) recognition. Other government agencies also provide agency specific emergency management training. <https://training.fema.gov/competencies/>



**Recommendation:**

It is submitted that the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM) as the national lead agency of emergency management in New Zealand should be responsible to set minimum national training standards which are prescribed. In addition MCDEM should facilitate a centralised national training capability such as that provided for by FEMA.

**Certification:**

As with other professions such as engineers, the profession of emergency management should be subject to a certification process.

IAEM created the Certified Emergency Manager® and Associate Emergency Manager® Programs in 1993 to raise and maintain professional standards. It is an internationally recognized program that certifies achievements within the emergency management profession. CEM® and AEM® certification is a peer review process administered through the International Association of Emergency Managers. <http://www.iaem.com/page.cfm?p=certification/history-of-cem>

- Candidates do not have to be an IAEM member to be certified, although IAEM membership does offer a number of benefits that can assist applicants through the certification process. Certification is maintained in five-year cycles.
- The CEM® and AEM® Programs are served by a CEM Commission, which is composed of emergency management professionals, including representatives from allied fields, education, military and private industry.
- Development of the CEM® and AEM® Programs was supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), and a host of allied organizations.

Currently there are 6 Certified Emergency Manager's® in New Zealand. It is clear that current CEM® holders are in key positions within emergency management across various disciplines. The challenge is that there is currently no official support or endorsement of this programme in New Zealand.

- Charles Blanch CEM® Director - Emergency Management, New Zealand Ministry of Health
- Clinton Naude CEM® Director Emergency Management Bay of Plenty
- Kristin Hoskin CEM® Director, Red Iguana Ltd
- Lee Hazelwood CEM® CDEM Group Manager/Controller, Waikato CDEM Group
- Sarah Holland CEM® Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet
- Steve Glassey CEM® Chief Executive Officer, Wellington SPCA

The register of Certified Emergency Managers is publicly accessible and places no burden on any agency to maintain their own competency register. For this reason agencies in the USA, such as FEMA, require CEM for various positions in order to minimise the burden of verifying competencies of potential and current staff.

As an example those completing the Controllers development programme with Massey University may well be eligible for certification as an Associate Emergency Manager®.

**Recommendation:**

It is submitted that the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM) as the national lead agency of emergency management in New Zealand should consider a formal relationship with IAEM to strengthen the professionalization of the emergency management sector, to enhance professional development opportunities and to support the Certified Emergency Manager® and Associate Emergency Manager® Programs within New Zealand. The advantages of this would be that it would better enable New Zealand gained credentials to be recognised against those of other countries, and to comparably draw on established experience and knowledge based criteria for demonstrating competency.

**Conclusion:**

We wish to thank the Review Committee for consideration of our submission and commit to our mission to advance the profession by promoting the principles of emergency management; to serve our members by providing information, networking and professional development opportunities; and to advance the emergency management profession.

We extend an invitation to the Review Committee to meet with us to better understand the role that IAEM might play to build the professionalisation of emergency management within New Zealand.

Respectfully



---

Kristin Hoskin CEM®  
IAEM Vice-President Oceania



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Clinton Naude CEM®  
IAEM National Representative New Zealand

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Vanessa McDonald
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No Only if you wish to speak to me
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):  Please refer attached submission

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

**Submission:**

Please refer attached submission

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence



# Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand

A personal submission to the Ministerial Review of  
Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM)

V. McDonald, CDEM Professional

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

"We cannot underestimate the importance of emergency planning in our region.

If an earthquake or terrorist attack occurs, we won't necessarily have advance warnings or opportunities to double or triple check our plans."

Ellen O'Kane Tauscher  
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control  
and International Security Affairs

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

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## Executive Summary

There have been a number of emergency events throughout New Zealand in which Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) has been involved. While not the lead agency in each event, the public frequently assume CDEM is in charge.

The current emergency management structure in New Zealand is complex, confusing and not the most efficient. Each emergency response agency falls under a different Minister and most have differing legislation to guide their activities. While CDEM has the responsibility of providing coordination during a response, they can only do so when the lead agency requests that level of escalation – meaning the event either exceeds or is about to exceed their ability to resource the response.

This submission is my personal view on the effectiveness of the CDEM sector. It does not reflect the views of my current workplace. My views may also differ from others in the emergency management industry. It is based on my industry training, experience and the frustrations I have seen within the NZ context.

Key recommendations I wish to put forward include:

### **Outcome 1: The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations**

- Redesign the entire structure to reflect a modern multiagency emergency management model that is fit for purpose at an international standard. This includes strengthening the branding so that our communities understand who and what emergency management is.

### **Outcome 2: New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.**

- Establish dedicated regional and national response teams to lead a response.
- Acknowledge and legislatively define the role, responsibilities and importance of volunteers in the emergency management sector.
- Legislate integrated training with simulated response pressures for **all** stakeholders operating at the extreme end of the public safety spectrum.
- Legislate protection for **all** who operate in good faith and within their training/ experience when undertaking CDEM activities, particularly during response.
- Establish an internal support mechanism to deliver mentoring and to ensure the physical and mental wellbeing of **all** staff and volunteers in the industry.
- Develop integrated processes and legislate strict fatigue management protocols.

### **Outcome 3: Declarations and the role of the Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management**

- Ensure local knowledge informs every decision making process.
- Legislate protective measures for decision-makers (ie Controllers) acting in good faith and within their skillset/experience during response.

### **Outcome 4: Effective and appropriate Chain of command, response coordination and decision making.**

- Recognise that response is not a consultative process.
- Legislate standardised training that meets the NZQA framework and enforces participation of those involved in CDEM activities.



- Consolidate trainers to ensure standardised training delivery throughout NZ.
- Create more multiagency training and exercising opportunities.
- Implement standardised National IT systems, processes and policies.
- Stop reinventing the wheel.

**Outcome 5: Effective information flows and accurate communication to stakeholders.**

- Enhance the National PIM capability, in particular social media.
- Recognise that there are more trained reporters than trained PIM staff.
- Establish a standardised PIM training and mentoring programme.
- Implement effective national cloud based communication systems and tools.
- Legislate mandatory training for all media who report on emergency events.
- Improve and standardise all operational policies and processes across CDEM activities nationwide.
- Create a single multiagency organisation with a distinct and focussed brand to provide one truth.
- Address negative social statistics and develop creative methods to assist communities in lower socio-economic locations to prepare for an emergency.

*Note: All images used in this submission were taken by myself or have been taken from public websites or social media.*

## Who am I?

I am a Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) professional and a volunteer member of LandSAR. I am a 'tall poppy'. Through the course of my daily work, I regularly face the 'poppy slashers' we have come to know and love in this country.

Growing up in New Zealand, emergency management was a strong component of life. My grandfather was a Fire Chief. My father was a police officer. My mother was the personal assistant to a Mayor, regularly dealing with the political aspects of readiness, response, recovery and reduction. As a result my brothers have either been, or currently are, volunteer fire fighters; while my focus went into emergency response and risk management.

I have worked for both the public and the private sector throughout Australasia. When I began in the workforce for NZ local government at age 15, I had CDEM tasks 'tacked onto my Council positions. Back then I was given time to fulfil these requirements. It was viewed by the Councils I worked for as an essential part of doing business.

Since then, I have been lucky enough to have had the opportunity to travel and study overseas. After the Christchurch earthquakes, I returned home several times during the response phase to support family and friends. I have experienced what it is like to work in a condemned building during an earthquake. During the recovery phase I went to work for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), gaining contracts in the Communications Team, the Social and Cultural Recovery Team and the Rebuild Team.

I have undertaken various projects in risk management, business continuity (and succession planning), emergency capacity and capability as well as strategic planning during the course of my career. More recently, I have written submissions to Australian State and Federal Governments on all manner of topics. These have included the development of remote locations, investing in critical infrastructure, the mental health of Fly In Fly Out (FIFO) workers and a review of emergency legislation. I have completed projects specifically for Australian State/Territory emergency service departments reviewing capacity and capability.

In addition to my paid roles, I have held voluntary roles with the Australian State Emergency Services, Marine Rescue, Coastguard and currently LandSAR in NZ. With a strong focus on operational response, I have been part of local, regional and State response teams. I have been lucky enough to have been given extensive emergency response training. This has included USAR<sup>1</sup>, CareFlight, Road Crash Rescue, SAR<sup>2</sup> and paramedic level first aid/injury management. I have attended incidents ranging from search and rescue of individuals through to assisting communities to recover from emergency events such as cyclones, floods and earthquakes.

As part of my volunteer roles, I have held positions on local management committees and fulfilled specific roles with personal protective equipment and memberships. I have supported management in the development of processes, job descriptions and written submissions to legislative reviews. I have won awards for my work in this industry.

No matter where I have worked or the number of "tall poppy slashers" I have come across, I remain passionate and enthusiastic about the work I do. I am a proud CDEM professional who would like to accept your offer to submit to this Ministerial Review of CDEM.

---

<sup>1</sup> USAR – Urban Search and Rescue

<sup>2</sup> SAR – Search and Rescue

## 1. Introduction

“Readiness, response, recovery, reduction and retribution”. These are the five Rs I was taught upon returning to the New Zealand CDEM sector. I had never heard of the fifth R until then. It is said jokingly but having worked in an Australian mining town, jokes such as this, are usually made to warn people of the ‘unwritten policies’. It made me immediately wonder how healthy the emergency management sector was in my homeland.

It’s hard for me to say what the joke is about. Is it lack of legislative protection for those working in the industry? Is it indicative of a bullying culture? Or is it merely just a reminder of how serious the CDEM role is during response?

Emergency management staff are renowned throughout the world for their ‘black sense of humour’. Those of us who have worked on the front line, understand the need to alleviate the stress. We understand the need for clear boundaries and effective leadership through a strong chain of command during response. At the extreme end of public safety we see things that people shouldn’t see. We may even experience loss of our own in the course of doing our duty. And more often than not, we invest personal time, money and energy going beyond the call to duty.

While this submission will discuss many of the significant issues within the emergency management industry, it is important to remember why we do what we do.

***He aha te mea nui o te ao***  
*What is the most important thing in the world?*

***He tangata, he tangata, he tangata***  
*It is the people, it is the people, it is the people*

‘Serious concerns’ about emergency management in New Zealand is not a new concept. Specific industry concerns are well known. They are documented repeatedly in activation debriefs. I read about these concerns in a multitude of reports. However, I am yet to read a report around the successful implementation of a recommendation. I am told lack of resources, unnecessary red tape, unclear chains of command and lack of integrated preparedness across New Zealand are what is hampering the implementation of key learnings. But I would suggest the problem goes further than this.

John Norton, Director of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management in 2002, stated:

*“When we allow communities to be established on flood-prone land, or when an organisation plans its emergency response in isolation, our communities are exposed to unnecessary risk. **A coordinated and structured approach is fundamental** to managing hazards and reducing the potential impacts of disasters.”*

There is no argument that there is a lot of work required for NZ to catch up to the international emergency management industry. We are far from being world class at this point. CDEM professionals can only achieve what we are allowed to achieve with the resources we are given. There are many improvements that will greatly enhance our ability to do our job.

I commend Parliament for initiating this review.

## 2. Civil Defence Emergency Management

Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) cannot operate in a silo. It is dependent on its communities, other organisations and government working together to 'get ready and get through'.

Starting with a clear brand identity, there needs to be a shared understanding as to who and what CDEM is. The CDEM logo itself is easily identified, but unlike a firefighter who puts 'wet stuff on hot stuff' or a police officer who protects the community from crime and poor driving behaviour, I am yet to find someone who can define a CDEM professional.

So what exactly do CDEM professionals do?

During 'peacetime', we prepare and empower our communities and stakeholders to become self-sufficient in the face of an emergency event. We provide education. We run community events and workshops. We give presentations and provide information. And we encourage a two way engagement directly with our communities through social media. CDEM professionals work closely with other Council/Government departments and industry to encourage risk reduction. We develop plans and strategies that assist us in responding to and recovering from an emergency event.

Once activated, CDEM professionals strategically coordinate all of the agencies involved in the response. Basically this means we establish a goal. We put together the strategy to achieve this goal. Then communicate to each stakeholder how we will address the situation in an integrated manner. We ensure responders have everything they require to do the job. We identify where agencies can collaborate in order to get the job done faster. We regularly check that things are going to plan and alter that plan as the emergency event dictates. Most importantly we ensure that all people are safe (both physically and mentally), including the emergency responders.



Source: Waikato CDEM Group Plan

### 3. CDEM Structure

While most regions follow a similar governance structure, some, such as Auckland, utilise a different model. Where I currently live, the Waikato Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (WCDEMG) oversees the delivery of emergency management services to the region.

The Waikato CDEM group is made up of:

- Local authorities (11 Councils in total)
- Emergency services (police, fire and health)
- Lifeline utilities organisations (broadcasting, fuel, gas telecommunications, three waters, transport and electricity).
- Welfare organisations (such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army and SPCA),
- Government departments (such as Ministry of Primary Industries)
- and non-government organisations (including the local business sector)

There are three layers of quarterly reporting that occur:

Management and Governance Subgroup (M&G)	This is a subgroup of the CEG who provide oversight of budgets and internal management issues.
Coordinating Executive Group (CEG)	Made up of the 11 Council CEOs (or their delegate) plus a senior executive of each emergency services and health. They set the strategic direction for the Group and take legal responsibility for CDEM activities.
Waikato CDEM Joint Committee (JC)	Made up of the 11 Mayors (or their delegate) of each Council. They endorse strategic direction and take legal accountability for CDEM activities.

In addition, there are ten Advisory Groups made up of subject matter experts who provide advice and information to the CEG/JC as required.

The Group Emergency Management Office (GEMO) and Local CDEM Professionals undertake the day to day strategic and operational activities. There is frequent collaboration and support between all CDEM staff in my region with regular monthly team meetings.

Unlike most council departments, the GEMO do not report directly to the Regional Council. They are accountable to the entire WCDEMG. However, the Regional Council supports CDEM with administrative services such as accounting, legal, human resources, IT and the minute taking of the Joint Committee meetings.

#### 3.1 CDEM Volunteers

Some regions have CDEM volunteers such as Nelson and Christchurch. This helps spread effective key messages and aids in the breakdown of myths. Volunteers increase a region's capability and capacity levels. In return volunteers receive training and transferable skills. Let's face it, not everyone wants to work at the extreme end of public safety.

Where I currently live, there are no CDEM trained volunteers from the community. However, staff from Council departments, other agencies and government departments 'volunteer' to assist if required. Most undergo training to work in an Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) or a Civil Defence Centre (CDC). For some of these staff it is not truly 'volunteering' as supporting CDEM forms part of their employment contract.

### 3.2 Emergency Response Teams

NZRT6 is the only professionally trained response team in my region. It is owned by the Taupo District Council and has service agreements with a number of District Councils throughout the Waikato.



*Taupo Civil Defence Emergency Response Team - NZRT6*

## 4. What are our communities saying?

During the course of my work (paid and volunteer), I get the opportunity to engage with our local communities. If we are to review CDEM effectively, we must first gain some understanding from our communities. What is their understanding of CDEM? Do they know their local hazards? What level of risk are they prepared to accept? What are the barriers to preparedness? What information does the community actually require and why? Where are they obtaining their information? What are the gaps in their knowledge and how do we address these?

The MCDEM survey goes some way to identifying key issues. However, the methodology utilised is questionable.

On a recent outreach at the Mystery Creek Fielddays, I took time out to speak to my community about their views of CDEM. The following are a selection of the comments made to me on the topic of this review:

### 4.1 What works well?

#### **Satisfaction levels:**

- Approximately 40% of respondents felt CDEM did a great job overall with the resources they had. Most had suggestions for improvements and/or questions about CDEM's role and responsibilities.
- "Feel safe with CDEM."
- "CDEM does a good job as far as they are allowed to."
- "CDEM and coastguard are really good."
- "Thames CDEM do a fantastic job – during the recent floods CDEM rang the school to see if they needed support – really happy with the work they do."
- "Online resources are good – have used a few of the posters."

#### **Preparation:**

- Approximately 50% of respondents felt they were prepared with generators, water, fuel etc.
- "People are happy to look for information."
- "Most farmers are prepared especially if in remote areas."

- “We all know who the farmers are that aren’t prepared and we make sure they are OK through our phone tree.”
- “We don’t have a community response plan but we have a good phone tree in place to help each other out.”
- “People need reminders and motivation to be prepared - the TV ads are really good.”

## 4.2 What doesn’t work?

### Inadequate branding:

- Approximately 60% had no idea who CDEM was or what they did.
- “Branding is not strong – don’t know unless involved in an emergency event.”
- “Not enough information about how CDEM works.”
- “Don’t know what CDEM does or what resources they have.”
- “What does Civil Defence do?”
- “Never heard of Civil Defence.”

### Unprepared or inadequately prepared:

- Approximately 50% of participants had no understanding as to why they would need to prepare for an emergency. “Never thought about it” or “don’t need to” being the most common answers.
- “Don’t know till a crisis happens and then it’s too late ”
- “Not prepared – we don’t need to.”
- “Not really thought about it.”
- “Yep I’m prepared - I always keep alcohol in reserve.”

### Failure to debrief the community:

- “During Kaikōura earthquake, Wellington had to evacuate their building. How are we supposed to feel safe when they can’t get into their building to do their job? What happens when this happens?”

*[This was a reference to the bunker being flooded and staff evacuated. Several respondents believed CDEM to be run centrally from Wellington, an overwhelming number of respondents had no idea Councils were involved in CDEM].*

- “In the Kaikōura Earthquake, Wellington was very slow to evacuate seaside residents.”
- “Why didn’t all the tsunami sirens work during the Kaikōura Earthquake? Why did CDEM not turn them all on?”

### Alerts and communication issues:

- “Need better warning alerts and more frequent alerts on radio and TV – not everyone has access to internet or to social media (especially farmers and people over 70 years old).”
- “Communications – often don’t know until after the event happens.
- “Not enough communication with community.”
- “No never heard of the Red Cross Hazards app - Why haven’t we heard about it?”
- “Why do we have to come to the Waikato to find out about the Red Cross Hazards app? Why haven’t our CDEM told us about this?”
- “More information needs to be on the CDEM website – like does CDEM come and visit worksites to teach people how to be prepared?”
- “Communication on social media is bad for rural communities (not able to access cos too remote).”

### **Funding:**

- “Central Government is the problem – they are always cutting the funding to the essential services then gloat that they have a surplus. That surplus should be going straight into health so there are shorter waiting lists.”

### 4.3 What could be improved and how?

#### **Branding:**

- “Thought CDEM was part of central government, had no idea Councils were involved.”
- “Never thought of going to the Council for CDEM information.”

#### **Community engagement:**

- “Need to get engaged with communities like cubs and scouts to teach the kids what to do.”
- “Need to involve people and get them doing stuff (especially kids)”
- “Need clear boundaries and people need motivation to be prepared”

#### **Improved coordination between agencies**

- “Need better coordination with other emergency services and government agencies.”

#### **Alerts and communication:**

- “A lot of the communication being used is too high tech – still needs to be door knocking, radio and TV especially for the older people who have no interest in the internet or social media.”
- “Tsunami warnings are essential – people forget the Gisbourne tsunami in 1947 where the waves were over 12m high.”
- “Warnings need to be along all coastal areas.”
- “What sort of ability will we have to use technology in an emergency? Eg Kaikōura Earthquake – the tsunami occurred at midnight but didn’t receive the text until 3am after the evacuation had occurred – it’s a bit late then!!”
- “Roads are blocked off and there is no information (particularly for local roads). Need to know exactly which parts are blocked and where the alternative routes are. Eg the bomb scare in Rototiti (near Rotorua) – had no idea where we could get through or if we could get home.”

#### **Media:**

- “Media are too harsh – its either CDEM are doing too much or too little, they are always biased just looking for a story.”



*Fieldays 2017, Mystery Creek Hamilton. Source:ruralconnect.org.nz*



## 5. Regional Profile

CDEM is split into 16 regions. Many of our stakeholders use different regional boundaries. This can and does create issues when trying to coordinate readiness, response, recovery and reduction. Every region has a different set of demographics. This influences the way emergency management is delivered. It also impacts on how key messages are received and understood by the community.

The following is some critical points for consideration taken from the Waikato CDEM Group Plan about the region I currently live in - the Waikato, one of the largest CDEM regions in New Zealand:

*Covering a significant part of the North Island, the Waikato CDEM region is approximately 25,000km<sup>2</sup>. Stretching from the West Coast north of Port Waikato and Coromandel Peninsula in the north, to the King Country and Central Plateau in the south.*

*The environment varies from built-up urban areas to remote and small isolated communities. Hazards within this jurisdiction are equally diverse. These include: active faults in the southeast and Hauraki Plains; higher tsunami risks on the east coast; volcanic risks in the southern and northern areas; adverse weather events and flooding risks across the region becoming more severe with climate change. In addition, the Waikato region borders 5 other CDEM Groups that have hazards that may indirectly impact the Waikato CDEM Group.*

### Map of the Waikato CDEM Group's Jurisdiction



Note: The Waikato CDEM Group jurisdiction differs to that of the Waikato Regional Council.

## 5.1 Regional Hazards

The seventeen most prevalent hazards in the Waikato Region include:

- earthquakes;
- volcanoes;
- landslides;
- tsunamis;
- coastal hazards;
- floods;
- severe wind;
- snow;
- droughts;
- wildfires;
- animal diseases;
- plant diseases;
- infectious human disease pandemics;
- infrastructure failures;
- major transport accidents;
- terrorism; and
- food safety

## 5.2 Social Environment

The Waikato community is briefly described as follows<sup>3</sup>:

- A usually resident population of around 400,000;
- A median age of 36 years;
- 73% of residents class themselves as European;
- 21% of residents identify themselves as Māori;
- The average median income for people aged 15 years and over was \$27,280.

There are significant differences in economic and social circumstances between communities across the Group and therefore varying ability to provide for everyday needs and prepare for emergencies. Some areas are recognised as having “above average deprivation”, including some urban communities within Hamilton City and Waikato, Hauraki, South Waikato and Waitomo Districts, and some rural communities. There are also a number of rest homes and retirement villages that host communities that may be more vulnerable to hazards.

## 5.3 Natural Environment

The Waikato CDEM Group jurisdiction covers an area that has a rich array of natural assets and resources, including:

- 100 lakes, 20 rivers and 1,420 streams;
- 1,150 kilometres of coastline, including iconic west coast and Coromandel beaches;
- 80% of New Zealand’s geothermal systems;
- 3 out of 6 of the country’s internationally important wetlands (recognised under the Ramsar Convention);
- Important mineral producing areas providing coal, aggregate, iron sand, gold, silver and limestone.

The area covered by the Group is all within 80 km from the coast, which means temperatures are quite regulated. Sheltered and elevated inland places experience extremes of hot and cold. The north central Waikato region tends to have warm, humid summers and mild winters. The average annual rainfall is 1,250 mm; generally enough for agriculture but with potential for drought during summer. The three areas with the highest annual rainfall figures are the Coromandel Peninsula, Waitomo/Kawhia and Tongariro National Park.

The topography of this area is varied and includes flat floodplains, rolling hills, mountain ranges and steep volcanoes. The Group area can be divided into four distinct topographical

<sup>3</sup> Statistics New Zealand 2013 Census

areas, characterised by different landscapes – the Taupō Volcanic Zone, the Waikato Lowlands and Hauraki Plains, the Western and Central Hill Country and the Eastern Ranges. The topography has a significant influence on land use, hazards and risks within each area.

#### 5.4 Built Environment

The largest population centre in the Group area is Hamilton City. In addition to the main population centres, there are numerous small communities within the Group area. Some communities are isolated, including those in the northern Coromandel Peninsula and those on the west coast such as Raglan and Kawhia. A key consideration of the built environment for the Group is the spread of relatively remote population centres over a large geographic area. Also of note is the spill over of communities from the Auckland Council area, placing additional pressures on the built environment in the northern part of Waikato District.

The area of the Waikato CDEM Group has complex networks of infrastructural assets including 1,700km of state highways and 8,500km of local roads. The region is a major road transport corridor that links Auckland and Tauranga to the rest of the North Island and also a major corridor for the supply of essential services such as electricity generation and distribution, telecommunications networks, rail and gas distribution.

Industry across the Group area produces and processes heavy bulk goods, which are transported to the two busiest ports in the country, along with other freight that passes through the region. Therefore, there are strong links between local GDP and the role of the Group as a major transport corridor. The Waikato region is experiencing strong population growth and ever-increasing freight transport requirements.

#### 5.5 Economic Environment

The Waikato region produced an estimated gross domestic product of \$18.2 billion, or 9% of the New Zealand total. With a significant proportion NZ' export facing industries, some of the largest contributors to the region's economic growth can be seen in Table 1.

**Table 1: Largest Waikato Contributors to NZ's GDP (Source: Waikato Regional Council)**

• Dairy	Highest milk production and largest dairy processor in NZ.
• Meat	Largest processing region in NZ for cattle meat exports.
• Forestry	Largest proportion of plantation forests and a significant number of major wood processors.
• Aquaculture and agri-business	Second only to Marlborough for number of aquaculture farms and farmed areas.
• Tourism	Nationally significant attractions including Waitomo Caves, Cathedral Cove and Lake Taupo.
• Education	University of Waikato and Wintec both attract international students and offer degree-conferring joint programmes with partner institutes in China.
• Energy	Largest generator of electricity with multiple energy sources including hydro (Waikato River), geothermal, biofuels and coal.
• Mining/quarrying	Largest producer of bituminous coal in NZ and a long history of mining of gold, silver, aggregate, sand and limestone.

*Electricity generation and distribution is an important industry at both the regional and national levels. The power generating base of the North Island is located within the Waikato region, with nine hydroelectric stations on the Waikato River, geothermal power stations including Wairakei, Ohaaki, Nga Awa Puria, Ngatamariki, Rotokawa and Mokai, and the Huntly thermal power station. The backbone of the nation's electricity system is located within the Waikato CDEM Group area, with almost 40 per cent of the nation's electricity generation capacity, and it is capable of generating up to 50 per cent of New Zealand's electricity when required<sup>4</sup>.*

*While not currently in the top ten industries from an economic perspective, it is acknowledged that tourism is very important for the Waikato CDEM Group area.*

*Economic growth has been uneven across territorial authorities in the region. On key economic indicators and measures of prosperity, Hamilton, Waipa and Waikato often perform better than other areas, due in part to industrial structure and population growth. In contrast, Hauraki, Thames-Coromandel and South Waikato have not performed as well.*

## 5.6 Emergency Management Challenges for the Waikato

This demographic profile, presents the following challenges for CDEM in the Waikato. The Waikato CDEM Group Plan draws attention to the following areas:

- *A large number of organisations engaged in the management of the same risks, including several instances where multiple jurisdictions need to be considered within the one organisation.*
- *A large geographic area with widespread small population centres with areas of particularly vulnerable communities subject to a wide range of hazards.*
- *An increasing population and development pressure on land that is at risk from a number of hazards, including significant spill over from the Auckland Council area.*
- *A strong local economy that produces a significant proportion of New Zealand's GDP.*
- *Companies that have significance to National industries [such as Liberty Genetics and Livestock Improvement Corporation (LIC)]*
- *Important national lifeline utilities infrastructure, power generation and transport corridors with relatively widespread resources.*
- *Potential large numbers of people away from their normal homes (holiday houses, tourists) that need a higher level of support.*
- *A changing population with increasing numbers of new migrants and a large Māori population that has a special relationship with the Waikato region.*
- *"Above average deprivation".*

With this profile in mind, the following sections are my suggestions for improving the current emergency management model in New Zealand.

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<sup>4</sup> Waikato Regional Energy Strategy

## Outcome 1

**The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies.**

When the *CDEM Act 2002* was being written, many reports on CDEM<sup>5</sup> concluded 'unrealistically high expectations' from various stakeholders. Issues raised included the inability to provide government assistance, varying acceptance of local risk, and a fragmented national capability that was untested and barely adequate. Since then we have seen our current model tested on numerous occasions. So it is timely to review and implement improvements.

### 'Fit for Purpose' Response

As we have seen, many emergency events involve a multiagency response. From the public perspective, our communities feel safe seeing all of the different uniforms working together. It looks professional and there is trust that each uniform is adequately trained and has the appropriate experience to undertake their tasks. From the outside looking in, the response services and agencies work well together.

However, comments from emergency services throughout the country and in my own experience on the front line, it is often unclear who is in charge during an event or at an incident. I have witnessed agencies battling over who is in command, while other times, the issue is simply ignored. Having worked in very strictly managed responses in Australia, I struggle to comprehend how this can be effective?

Despite having management structures in place (such as CIMS) which clearly define roles and responsibilities, many individuals and/or agencies do not utilise or follow this framework in the manner to which it is designed. Each service appears to operate under different processes, procedures and management structures. Each provides a different level of training to responders. And most of the emergency services operate under completely different regional boundaries. What is common to all is that none of them fully understand what skills each other has, or how these can benefit a response if collaboration was to occur.

There are situations where multiple agencies have the same responsibilities yet fail to be able to work together. There are examples where differing pieces of equipment prevent effective collaboration. For example, each emergency service utilising different radio platforms and/or frequencies at the same event without any way of getting messages to each other.

Add to this amount of infighting that occurs. I regularly hear of Canterbury being held up as the shining example of effective emergency management. Yet every time I am in the region I am subjected to an appalling display of agencies/councils who cannot stand to be in the same room as each other. This attitude extends to anyone presenting a perspective from outside the region. I have worked with many international people when I was in Christchurch, all who had amazing skills. Yet they were frequently overlooked because they weren't a born and bred Cantabrian, just as Central Government ignored local perspectives. This arrogance was certainly not representative of the Canterbury communities I have lived amongst and it has proceeded to worsen over time.

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<sup>5</sup> MCDEM (2002). Working together: The formation of CDEM groups. Director's Guidelines for Local Authorities and Emergency Services [DGL 1/02]

Despite what many think, Canterbury are not the only region to experience the 'battle of the ego' or the impact of unaddressed trauma. Similar scenarios have repeated in recent events. This level of infighting is unhealthy for all involved. It prevents effective collaboration and should not be allowed to continue!

### Stakeholder Expectations

As a stakeholder in CDEM, the most significant failure of the current CDEM model in meeting my expectations, are the debates over finances. These frequently occur during a response. They appear to take precedence over the preservation of life and critical infrastructure. This is something I never experienced in Australia. The emergency management model places human life at the forefront of all activities. Response is immediate from all stakeholders. The significance of the event is well understood. Finances are either predetermined or sorted out once the response phase has been completed.

From a process perspective, myself and fellow colleagues have been let down substantially by the National Coordination Management Centre (NCMC) during responses more than once. I strongly recommend a review of the processes and procedures that are utilised by NCMC before such failures cost lives.

As it currently stands, I do not feel that we have an organisational structure that works effectively or that aligns with stakeholder expectations.

### Recommendations for Outcome 1 include:

- **Develop stronger branding.** Be clear about who and what CDEM is. How do the community contact us? And in what circumstances?
- **Create a nationally centralised and integrated multiagency organisation.** Bring all emergency services under the one umbrella (similar to the NZ Defence model) to develop a similar model to those utilised in Australia.
- **Create career paths.** Under the current model there is no real career path for volunteers and/or staff to follow. Standardising integrated training and pathway clarity under a centralised emergency management model will enable mentoring opportunities to be developed.
- **Provide for succession planning.** Secondments into roles or multiagency projects will assist in developing knowledge, skills and experience within the industry.
- **Implement mandatory trauma counselling.** If issues such as infighting are deemed to be negatively impacting of effective collaboration, then the Director of CDEM or Controller should have the power to enforce mandatory trauma counselling for all staff and volunteers following major emergency events.
- **Develop an audited process for activation learnings.** This includes the identification and implementation of learnings.
- **Review NCMC processes and provide training opportunities.** To be effective, staff working at a National level must have the opportunity to experience response delivery at the regional and local levels. They need to understand the difference between BAU and the escalation of speed/efficiencies required during response.

- **Develop strategies and plans to manage stakeholder expectations.** This applies to our communities, elected members and other stakeholders.
- **Provide legislative clarity around financial obligations.**

## Outcome 2

### **New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.**

Since I have arrived back into NZ, I have heard other CDEM professionals state that our communities perceive CDEM as “Dad’s Army”. This is not a perception that I have managed to verify when I speak to community members. People I have spoken to believe that there is an army of people – this is true. They believe these people to be highly trained and capable of saving lives during an emergency event. These opinions align with the many TV shows depicting emergency services. There is always surprise when I admit there are around 20 CDEM professionals in the region I live, servicing a population of over 400,000 people.

Having undertaken extensive work in the area of capability and capacity in Australia, I personally find the levels in NZ somewhat unsettling.

The current model assumes that anyone can work in emergency management and emergency response - Council staff being the first ones to be brought in to assist during an emergency event. Yet CDEM exercising, training and planning is often viewed as a burden or unimportant by many Councils. I know from personal experience with new members to the industry, that unless they are given adequate training, exercising and mentored experience, the end result is stress and trauma for that individual.

Lack of fatigue management protocols should be of serious concern. I have regularly seen staff work 16+ hours a day during a response. This is unacceptable and can create long term issues for that individual’s wellbeing – physically and mentally (Pietrantonio & Prati, 2008). Whatever emergency structure results from this review, this particular issue must be addressed.

There is a strong belief that ‘she’ll be right’. Yet our emergency services would not be able to cope with their current numbers. Most of our emergency services have realised this already. They have added a significant volunteer component to their service offering. For example, fire volunteers deal with fires in rural or remote locations. LandSAR volunteers assist the police with search and rescue. St John volunteers support health.

The Australian emergency management model has a strong recognisable volunteer component. Members of the community volunteer to undertake emergency response in their location. The more remote, the more significant their role. These individuals are passionate about what they do. After passing the initial screening process, they attend regular weekly training and exercising. They learn standardised processes and receive recognised qualifications (Australia is currently working towards National recognition of these skills).

As the volunteers come from various organisations, each has different arrangements. Some of the State/Territory governments reimburse a percentage of the volunteer’s wage if they are activated during work hours. However, many companies do not claim this benefit as they see their support of emergency services as their contribution to community wellbeing (as well as possibly being a tax write off).

The latest figures from Volunteering New Zealand indicate that volunteers alone contribute \$3.5 billion dollars to the Nation's GDP. However, unlike Australia, I have not been able to locate a sector specific breakdown of these figures). These figures also do not include the 'in-kind' contributions made by volunteers. Nor is the cost of volunteering in New Zealand recognised. For example, despite LandSAR operating for the Police, there is very little funding that goes into supporting this organisation. Currently my unit does not have a dedicated facility to hold our meetings. We rely on our private vehicles to get to a search location.

From my experience, I have had to purchase all my uniforms and all my equipment. This includes covering the costs of all maintenance of that equipment. The total cost is well into the thousands. For many residents, this cost would exclude them from participating. In addition, I am expected to maintain my skills in my own time (outside of meetings), as well as fundraise for finances to support the running of our unit.

Recommendations for Outcome 2 include:

- **Establish dedicated response teams.** These need to be at a regional and national level that can be rapidly deployed to lead a response.
- **Establish role clarity for CDEM volunteers.** Roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined in the legislation and implemented consistently throughout the country. This will assist with community expectations. There may even be opportunity to merge LandSAR with CDEM volunteers to create an integrated recognisable response team similar to the Australia State Emergency Service who undertake a range of tasks.
- **Protect and invest in volunteers.** This includes legislation protecting volunteers who act in good faith and within their training and experience. It includes the provision of adequate training and financial support to volunteer units.
- **Enforce the integrated training framework** - through legislation for all those involved in CDEM activities.
- **Training for inter-regional support.** Train all participants on how to enter an emergency event when it is not in their territory. The ability to come in and support alongside locals is an art. It is very easy to just come in, take over and exclude them particularly if national processes and systems are not enforced. This includes training on dealing with staff suffering from trauma and stress.
- **Establish a trained psychosocial support unit.** These people must work within the industry and understand the pressures of working in emergency response. While there are workplace agencies such as EAP, unless the support people have experienced the pressure and conditions placed on those at the extreme end of public safety, it is likely to be difficult to relate.
- **Identify and address the gaps in capacity and capability.** For example, what is our current capability? How do we know this is accurate? What is the maximum capacity we can supply? Who can provide temporary storm damage repairs? Who is responsible for sandbags? Who undertakes door knocking during an evacuation? In



many of these examples, emergency response stakeholders have undertaken the tasks when required, but often without structured training.

- **Invest in capability and capacity.** Acknowledging that NZ is a small country with a limited number of people, we need to be smarter and more strategic in how we do things. The Australian emergency management sector recognises that the addition of trained volunteers is the only way to achieve effective levels of capability when money is tight. Capitalising on people's skills and enthusiasm at a local level to deliver peace of mind to their communities.
- Develop integrated processes and legislate strict fatigue management protocols.

### Sandbag Capacity and Capability Example

Most community members I speak to in NZ think building a sandbag wall is easy. Grab a few sandbags and throw them together. However, the force of flood water or storm surge will collapse this structure (above).



In Australia, integrated multiagency training enables a larger capability to be enacted when it is needed the most. Below are State Emergency Service (SES) volunteers and Fire volunteers working together as they learn the science behind making a sandbag wall that actually does the job. Integration such as this occurs across many response activities.



## Outcome 3

### Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency.

If the decision making stays at a local/regional level, then the local elected members, executive Council management and the Controller must have an effective and respectful relationship. Both the local elected member and the Controller must undertake training, exercising and create operational policies that clearly define their roles. Each Controller (at any level) must have the skill and knowledge to know when escalation is required. The local elected member must heed the advice given by the Controller or be prepared to accept responsibility if they choose to ignore that advice.

From my experience, I personally do not have faith in the current model. I have seen it fall short on multiple occasions throughout New Zealand.

If the decision making goes to the Director of CDEM, then local knowledge of the situation must be taken into account. Both the local Controller and the local elected member must be involved in this process as they will be the ones fronting the impacted communities (and most probably the media). This process is similar to that used in Australia with the Commissioners. While it can be extremely effective and emphasise a strong chain of command, it does have its limitations. The Director must have effective relationships with the Controller. Local knowledge must be sought and respected in the decision making process.

From my experience, this scenario does not yet exist. For example, in Australia, the Commissioners make a huge effort to meet every single person (paid and volunteer) working in their organisations. It is never a token gesture. The Commissioners take the time to talk and socialise with crews. They really listen to issues raised with them and implement positive change as a result. Many of the senior management do likewise. The only time I have experienced this in New Zealand was working under Minister Gerry Brownlee and Roger Sutton at CERA.

No matter which scenario is elected, the decision maker requires knowledge of the options available and the consequences of such decisions. For example, awareness of the impact a declaration can have on insurance policies and payouts.

One of the most significant issues is the lack of clarity around the Controller's role during a non-declared CDEM event. The community expect a CDEM Controller to respond yet under the current legislation there is no authorisation for a Controller to act in this role.

Legislative protection is required for Controllers charged with decision-making during response. The 'trial by media' that occurred recently against a West Coast Controller was simply appalling. It is very easy in emergency events when emotions are running high to blame an individual rather than to address the real issues. Process failures, inadequate training and substandard fatigue management protocols along with a lack of support or protection from MCDEM and the legislation, will result in people not willing to take on the Controller role. Or we will be left with Controllers who are too afraid to make a decision for fear of repercussions.

Recommendations for Outcome 3 include:

- **Legislate chain of command.** The chain of command and decision-making processes must be clearly articulated so there is no confusion. This must be applicable and integrated across all stakeholders involved in emergency response. It must also be enforced nationally.

## Outcome 4

### The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.

We have two sayings where I work. The first is to **'leave your ego at the door'**. The second is that **'Response is not a consultative process!'**

#### Command and Control

Many people do not fully understand the true meaning of the term 'command and control'. In emergency management it translates as clarity of process, roles and responsibilities. It requires the Controller to be aware of the 'big picture' and the possible implications or added risk that may occur. The Controller is responsible for gathering all of the intelligence available from each of the CIMS functions. The Controller may seek additional information or advice from other experienced practitioners.

At the end of the day, the Controller is legally responsible for making the best possible decision under the immediate circumstances they are faced with. There is no time for robust debate during response. Decisions are usually life critical and need to be made without hesitation. Only a foolish Controller would make a decision without reviewing the evidence and scientific data at hand.

The current process creates confusion around the chain of command. There are three levels of emergency, of which not all are recognised by the current legislation.

1. The first is a business as usual (BAU) situation. These incidents are managed by the response agency. For example, local councils respond to water/sewage incidents, regional councils respond to oil spills, fire services respond to house fires and so on. While CDEM professionals may provide support, they do so as a member of Council staff.
2. However, then comes the next level of event – a non-declared CDEM emergency. This usually involves multiple people and the skills of CDEM professionals to assist. By its very nature, it requires a CDEM Controller to manage the response. However, it may remain solely in the purview of the local council or it may require regional support. At this stage though, it does not require the Controller powers gained under a declaration.
3. The final level of event is as we know it under the current legislation – a declared CDEM emergency which provides extra powers.

The problem with recognising a Controller's role during a non-declared emergency event has already been discussed in Outcome 3. However, there is an additional issue with chain of command when multiple agencies are involved. The processes that response agencies operate under are not necessarily aligned with each other. This can create issues out in the field and can result in all agencies looking incompetent to the public.

#### Reinventing the Wheel

Under-resourcing of CDEM and unrealistic expectations can create unnecessary pressure on CDEM professionals. This is likely to have a detrimental impact on response and decision-making. There are many opportunities to collaborate with our international colleagues, particularly those in Australia where we regularly provide international support (and vice versa). So why do we reject proven methods and international best practice? Why do we waste the little money we have, along with our precious time inventing our own 'unique' version? For example CIMS versus AIIMS.

We should be learning from events (both our own and others overseas). We should be implementing international best practice and standards across the entire industry.

#### Decision making

When decision making goes wrong in emergency management – it can unfortunately be fairly spectacular. In my experience, bad decision making comes down to three fundamental issues – substandard training, inadequate processes and poor fatigue management.

#### Training and exercising

For training to be successful it must be standardised and integrated across all agencies. Emergency management in NZ had a great training system that aligned with NZQA. It was recognised across the country. I am still struggling to understand why this was disestablished? As a result many of the experienced trainers have left the industry altogether.

Since then, we have since tried to create an integrated training framework. However when I look at the Takatu website, already diluted by allowing regions to do their own thing. This makes it a completely ineffective solution, a decision that has demonstrated a significant impact in recent activations.

We struggle to find qualified and experienced trainers to deliver training. The only solution to this is to consolidate trainers at a national level. Standardisation of the training delivery is essential. LandSAR provides a good example of an effective training regime. Senior subject matter experts from around the country deliver standardised training to all units throughout NZ through regional courses. Volunteers frequently travel inter-region to gain specific knowledge and qualifications.

Response can be high stress and is definitely high pressure. Any decent training programme will include regular exercising and refreshing of knowledge. Yet these exercises rarely occur in NZ. For staff to perform under the pressure of an event, then they need to practice through regular exercising in simulated conditions to an actual event. It will not be 'alright on the day' if staff do not understand roles, responsibilities and processes. It will not be 'alright on the day' if staff are put into roles that they do not feel adequately trained to do.

As many staff working in the CDEM industry do not come from an operational background, regular exercising is even more essential. All CDEM staff need to gain experience out in the field. They need to understand the ramifications of decisions. They need to know that strategies, plans, policies and processes are actually realistic. Then expectations can be managed accordingly.

#### Processes and systems

From a process perspective, the most significant issue is the lack of integrated cloud based national software. This would allow each level of CDEM (local, regional and national) to be more collaborative. When EMIS was implemented, the understanding was that it was to be a national system. However, the reality is that it is merely a records management system utilised predominately during response. It fails to deliver what is actually required by the industry to aid decision making, speed operational response and deliver effective communication. There is no ability to gain real-time situational awareness or ability to credential staff. To supply fast and efficient intelligence to elected members and decision-makers at any level, we need a fully integrated tool that not only collates all the information but enables us to use data analytics or big data methodologies to provide immediate real time situational awareness and intelligence. The technology is out there, so why aren't we using it?

At a local/regional level, many Councils are now utilising Promapp in the readiness phase as a solution for capturing operational processes. However, processes still differ between councils and between regions. We need an integrated tool for the other aspects of preparedness, response or recovery.

We should be able to consolidate costs by implementing a national system to capture all of our business as usual documentation, activation documentation and the flow into recovery activities. This will also aid in the reduction of duplication and 'reinventing the wheel'.

Fatigue management protocols need to be established formally, along with clear policies and processes to ensure staff are not working excessive hours.

Recommendations for Outcome 4 include:

- **Response is not a consultative process.** Establish a clear and legislated chain of command that goes across all agencies and stakeholders.
- **Stop reinventing the wheel.** Utilise industry best practice and international standards for emergency management and response.
- **Legislate standardised training that meets the NZQA framework.** Ensure that it is mandatory that all who undertake CDEM activities are appropriately trained, including decision makers and key stakeholders.
- **Legislate training participation** - Local councils used to see CDEM as a fundamental part of BAU. However, as Council responsibilities have increased, CDEM training is not seen as a priority or included into local work programmes.
- **Consolidate Trainers at a national level.** Recognise the shortage in the industry and implement a strategy to ensure standardised training is delivered consistently across New Zealand and by subject matter experts.
- **Create more multiagency training and exercising opportunities.** Use technology to create simulated training environments (like we see with fire response and their burning house training).
- **Implement National IT systems.** This will allow greater collaboration across the country. It will also ensure standardisation, access and legislative compliance.
- **Standardise processes and policies at a National level.** While there may be some slight variations at a local level, the fundamentals should be the same across all regions.

## Outcome 5

**Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public**

### Public Information

We know public expectations are increasing. With the advent of social media it has increased the accessibility to information. So much so that it has become a competition as to who can get the story first. From an intelligence perspective, most people will accurately describe what is happening for them at their location. However there is another group of people who will post simply for the attention.

Research undertaken as part of my qualifications in information management, indicated that very few people can identify factual or credible sources for information. What results is myths and false information being spread throughout our communities. For example, the 'triangle of life' myth for surviving an earthquake that appears on social media every time a major shake occurs.

False information is misleading, dangerous and cause significant harm to a community's wellbeing. For example, during the recent flood events through the Coromandel, residents ignorant of how their flood scheme operates posted on Facebook about stop banks 'breaching' when in fact they were overtopping. This is exactly what they are designed to do. Others posted photos depicting designated pooling areas accompanied by dramatic emotive statements. And then there is a constant media barrage during a cyclone or earthquake event about dams breaking. This is usually attached to footage of a man-made dam doing exactly what the dam is designed to do.

A large number of people gain their knowledge from our media. It is disappointing when those media do not educate themselves on the hazards in their area, the mitigation schemes in place to prevent loss of life, or their role/responsibilities during an emergency event. Many opt instead for scaremongering and false reporting for dramatic effect. The impact of this results in increased levels of post traumatic stress for many of our community members.

It is essential to have an adequately resourced and skilled Public Information Management (PIM) team to manage media relationships. PIM teams also need to engage and respond to communities in such a style that suits people and their preferred method of communication. Community, media and elected member expectations for information must be managed to a realistic level. Information needs to be provided in a controlled and timely manner from one source of truth. This will involve new innovative methods of educating and informing.

### Operational Information

From an operational perspective, all of the issues can be resolved through the standardisation of processes and training. For example, everyone using the same template for a situation report (sitrep) and all sitrep writers understanding what needs to be covered in the report.

Privacy is a major issue for CDEM. We are often criticised for not releasing enough information. However, put a police officer in a similar position and the community expect the officer will remain 'closed lipped' on information that could cause further harm or raise unnecessary alarm.

Overseas, all who work in emergency services (whether paid or volunteer) sign a contract to abide by Privacy laws. Confidentiality is seen as a critical component to working in the

industry. Only those allocated and trained as Public Information Managers (PIM) are permitted to discuss an event outside of the Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC).

### Branding

Civil Defence is seen as one National entity by our communities, even though it is delivered locally. When something goes wrong at a local level, the entire CDEM brand is impacted. Emergency events therefore frequently highlight the inconsistencies between local councils. It becomes obvious which staff have received training, who has a clear understanding of CDEM processes, whether the Council has access to adequate resources or effective community relationships. Any internal issues a Council may have during normal BAU suddenly come to the forefront for all to see.

**The reputational risk for CDEM as a National brand is significant!**

### Community Limitations

As seen in the demographic profile for the Waikato Region, I live in an area with substantially high levels of poverty. This is a significant challenge for government and needs to be taken seriously. How do we ensure our communities are prepared when they struggle to cope in normal daily life?

Our CDEM key message from Central Government is to have enough supplies to survive for 3-7 days or be able to grab items in a hurry. Many in our community cannot afford day to day living expenses, let alone have items that can make up an emergency kit. I have spoken to residents who cannot even afford to purchase a torch.

We are seeing similar levels of household overcrowding as Auckland due to increasing rental prices. We have high levels of illiteracy. We have high drug and alcohol abuse issues. We have domestic violence and suicide. We have high unemployment.

Is it any wonder our community switches off to CDEM messaging?

The Waikato shares a similar demographic profile to New Orleans. Unless these negative social statistics are seriously and effectively addressed, we can safely predict a similar situation to that seen in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.

Recommendations for Outcome 5 include:

- **Enhance the National PIM capability.** There is currently one dedicated person in New Zealand at a regional/local level undertaking PIM activities as part of their normal BAU role. Compare this with the number of trained reporters.
- **Expand the social media capability.** During an event social media use surges as people search for information and advice.
- **Establish a standardised PIM training and mentoring programme.** Ensure that all who are involved in CDEM PIM activities go through this programme. Allocate senior experienced PIM to mentor new PIM to the industry.
- **Implement effective national cloud based communication systems and tools.** These need to provide fast situational awareness, monitor social media and enable speedy PIM communications during a response. Systems also need to deliver standardised key messages for public education or public advice during an event.

- **Legislate mandatory media training.** This needs to be mandatory for all those reporting on an emergency event as well as all those communicating to media during an event.
- **Improve and standardise all operational policies and processes across CDEM activities nationwide.**
- **Create a single multiagency organisation with a distinct and focussed brand to provide one truth.**
- **Address negative social statistics and develop creative methods to assist communities in lower socio-economic locations to prepare for an emergency.**

## Conclusion

I have read many of the reports written by or for MCDEM or Central Government. Each has identified fundamental issues that could be easily resolved with some simple planning and clear strategies. I am at a loss as to why it is unclear to Central Government for CDEM professionals to be struggling to meet expectations?

This submission has put forward constructive criticism of the CDEM industry in order to help identify the issues and gaps we face on a daily basis. I ask for an open and honest discussion on these issues without retribution. I do this because I am, like many CDEM professionals, passionate about what I do.

Having experienced many different emergency management structures, I consider the Australian emergency management models to be effective, in particular the Western Australian model. I strongly believe that a similar model can be replicated successfully in New Zealand. Having one centralised national multiagency organisation will provide clarity of roles and responsibilities. It will enable standardisation of training, processes, public messaging and strategies/plans. However, local and regional differences must be acknowledged and incorporated for a successful outcome.

Appropriate and adequate resourcing needs to be allocated to response. This includes adequate staffing, clear functions for volunteers, and appropriate equipment to undertake the job. An emphasis on integrated cloud based software and systems that are 'fit for purpose' is essential. Most importantly, a strong chain of command is required - **“Response is not a consultative process”**.

We must start delivering on international best practice. We must learn from others and put petty squabbles aside. There is no room for complacency or game playing when we are talking about the extreme end of public safety. We need to be honest and open to significant change. Most of all, we need strong enforceable legislation and a clear direction driven from the top.

We have an opportunity to advance our industry in some of the most innovative ways possible – adding economic value to GDP by capitalising on the uprising trend in emergency research and emergency response technologies. When we truly achieve integrated collaboration, it is then and only then, that hazard awareness, improved public safety, community resilience and risk reduction will begin to shine.



**WIDE AWAKE – Audioslave**

*You can look a hurricane right in the eye,  
1,200 people dead or left to die.  
Follow the leaders, were it an eye for an eye,  
We'd all be blind, deaf or murdered  
This I'm sure in these uncertain times.  
Come pull the sheet over my eyes,  
So I can sleep tonight, despite what I've seen today  
I've found you guilty of the crime of sleeping at a time,  
When you should have been wide awake.*

*Down on the road the world is floating by,  
The poor and undefended left behind  
While you're somewhere trading lives for oil,  
As if the whole world were blind.  
Come pull the sheet over my eyes,  
So I can sleep tonight despite what I've seen today  
I've found you guilty of the crime of sleeping at a time  
When you should have been wide awake,  
I've found you guilty of the crime, oh this I know.*

*Come pull the sheet over my eyes,  
So I can sleep tonight despite what I've seen today  
Cos I've found you guilty of the crime, of sleeping at a time  
When you should have been wide awake.*

*Wide awake!*

*Wide awake!*

*Wide awake!*

*Wide awake!*

**From:** [Judy Hedwig & Richard Scales](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMCI\]](#)  
**Cc:** [Cathy Ellis](#); [Dennis Berdinger](#); [Donna Cross](#); [Helen Borrett](#); [Isabel Boyes](#); [Jane Baxter](#); [Marten Young](#); [Meg Whitlow](#); [Midge Murray](#); [Mike Yule BBMPPA Chair](#); [Sue Melville](#)  
**Subject:** Breaker Bay Wellington (6022) Community Submission  
**Date:** Friday, 7 July 2017 1:49:08 p.m.

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Attn: Emily Stevenson  
Secretariat to Technical Advisory Group on Organisation of Civil Defence Responses  
s9(2)(a)

Dear Ms Stevenson,

Some 40 residents and guests (WREMO and E Ward Councillors) attended the AGM of the BBMPPA Association on 28th June 2017.

It was recognised that Breaker Bay is an extremely vulnerable location:

- beneath steep hills
- low-lying beside the sea
- limited road access to north (steep-sided cutting ie The Pass of Branda)
- distant access to up-hill roads (to the north and the south)
- poor radio reception
- mobile phone coverage sketchy or non-existent (and our tower vulnerable to quake damage)

Moa Point has similar vulnerabilities.

We write to express our collective concern at the long delay in warning residents of a tsunami following the Kaikura quake and the even longer delay in advising that the hazard was over.

We understand lessons will have been learned and steps taken to improve communications. **But we urge you to take serious note of our particular vulnerability and to take special and robust measures to ensure that Breaker Bay and Moa Point residents receive full and speedy warnings in future.**

Yours sincerely,

*Richard Scales*

Secretary Breaker Bay and Moa Point Progressive Association  
s9(2)(a)

Mema Pāremata mō Waiariki  
Member of Parliament for Waiariki  
Te Minita Whanaketanga Māori  
Minister for Māori Development


Te Minita Whānau Ora  
Minister for Whānau Ora

Te Minita Tuarua Whanaketanga Ohaoaha  
Associate Minister for Economic Development



29 JUN 2017

Hon Nathan Guy  
Minister for Civil Defence  
Parliament Buildings  
WELLINGTON



Tēnā koe Nathan

Tēnā rā koe i ngā mihi ki ō tātou mate tūturu nui e hinga ake nei. Tēnei rātou kua riro ki te kāpunipunitanga o ngā wairua, ki tua o te pae o maumahara, ā, e waiho ake ana i a tātou ki konei haku ai, taute ai ki a rātou. Ko te whakatau noa ake, ko rātou ki a rātou, ko tātou ki a tātou i roto i te wā nei. Nō reira, tēnā anō rā koe.

*Greetings, upon our acknowledgments to our deceased. They have departed to the gathering place of the spirits, beyond the veil of memory, and they have left us here lamenting and grieving for them. To settle this, we leave them to each other, and we acknowledge ourselves at this time. On this basis, greetings.*

I am pleased to provide you a copy of my submission 'Improving working relationships and collaboration between iwi/Māori and Civil Defence Emergency Management'. This will be submitted to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Technical Advisory Group for the review currently being undertaken.

The submission highlights the experiences of Māori in Civil Defence emergencies and outlines the observations and issues for iwi/Māori in the management of various Civil Defence emergencies. These experiences support the recommendations proposed in the report.

I look forward to seeing the outcome of the Technical Advisory Group review. Ngā mihi nui ki a koe.

Nāku noa, nā

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Honore'.

Hōnore Te Ururoa Flavell  
Te Minita Whanaketanga Māori




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## Improving working relationships and collaboration between iwi/Māori and Civil Defence Emergency Management

A submission to the CDEM Technical Advisory Group, Minister for Māori Development

Te Kāwanatanga o Aotearoa



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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## PURPOSE AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES

The purpose of this submission is to:

- Highlight the experiences of Māori in Civil Defence emergencies since the Canterbury earthquakes
- Outline the observations and issues for iwi/Māori in the management of various Civil Defence emergencies
- Define the outcomes sought and priorities for improving iwi/Māori engagement in Civil Defence emergencies, and
- Propose recommendations for facilitating improved collaboration between iwi/Māori and the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) sector.

The expected outcomes of this submission are:

- Improved understanding of the experiences of iwi/Māori in Civil Defence emergencies and issues faced in the management of emergencies
- The development of a stronger foundation for practical improvements to the future collaboration of iwi/Māori and the CDEM sector, in readiness, response and recovery.

## BACKGROUND

### CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCIES CONSIDERED

This submission considers the emergency management experiences of iwi/Māori communities and their interaction with the CDEM sector across the following events:

- Canterbury earthquakes of September 2010 (Darfield) and February 2011 (Christchurch), which impacted Christchurch City, Seddon and Waimakariri Districts
- Taranaki/Manawatū-Whanganui flood event of June 2015, which impacted South Taranaki, Whanganui, Rangitikei and Manawatū Districts
- Kaikōura earthquake of November 2016, which impacted Hurunui, Kaikōura and Marlborough Districts, and Wellington City
- Bay of Plenty floods of April 2017, which impacted Edgecumbe and many rural communities in the Whakatāne District.

Experience gained from the above events are a combination of personal interaction with Te Puni Kōkiri staff, research and direct engagement between communities and the Minister for Māori Development. While not considered in depth for this report, other incidents such as the Rena, Port Hills fires and East Coast Tsunami warning demonstrate similar features.

### CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCIES AND IWII/ MĀORI

#### Impacts of civil defence emergencies on iwi/Māori

The impacts of emergencies on iwi/Māori and Māori communities generally follow the same pattern as broader impacts to communities across the social, built, economic and natural environments.

Despite this, the impacts of emergencies on iwi/Māori tend to be more acute in the following respects:



- **Role of marae:** almost without exception, marae rapidly activate to support all affected people during emergencies. This is regardless of the number of people and level of resources present at the time, or the level of connection with CDEM operations either before or during the event.
- **Vulnerability of marae:** marae are often situated in rural areas that are particularly vulnerable to damage, such as during the 2015 Taranaki/Manawatū-Whangai floods, where seven marae sustained flood damage. The vulnerability of marae is often exacerbated by a lack of insurance coverage for specific damage.
- **Socio-economic vulnerability of Māori communities:** impacts of emergency events are often exacerbated due to the low socio-economic status of Māori, particularly in rural areas. The impacts of emergency events are often compounded further by low levels of insurance coverage and isolation from services.
- **Role of Māori Wardens:** Each response process varies as to how a Māori Warden group assists in the event of a civil defence emergency. Māori Wardens are provided with training that will assist them to respond in any event. Their services vary from whānau advocacy to general rescue awareness. However, there is still a lack of understanding on the role of the Māori Wardens in emergency events by CDEM and other volunteer groups e.g. Red Cross.
- **Temporary accommodation:** there are often delays and at times a lack of coordination of temporary accommodation provision, and this is often exacerbated by an under-supply of housing. In addition, there is often a lack of resources for cleaning and restoration of uninsured houses, and a lack of support from Enhanced Task Force Green.
- **Psychosocial impacts:** these are similar to the general population, but exacerbated by the points above, particularly where there is an absence of culturally appropriate supports, or where cultural competency is lacking.

### Iwi/Māori response to civil defence emergencies

The response of Iwi/Māori to civil defence emergencies is similar to the wider population, in that it is instant and locally driven. In the case of Iwi/Māori, there is generally instant activation of marae, Māori Wardens, and Māori networks to every extent possible given the emergency.

In the longer term, Māori networks are often formed and/or formalised to provide specific assistance to Māori communities. Iwi organisations and others such as Te Puni Kōkiri and Māori providers, play key roles in facilitating the formation of networks such as the provision of ongoing services for example Whānau Ora navigators

Māori response is underpinned by cultural values that seek to acknowledge the needs of all people. These values are demonstrated in the creation of the initial mission statement of the Māori Recovery Network in Christchurch following the September 2010 earthquake:

*'Aroha nui ki te tangata' (love to all people).<sup>1</sup>*

The values underpinning Māori response can be summed up per Kenney et al (2015)<sup>2</sup>:

*The Māori Community-led response to the Christchurch earthquakes exemplifies the ways in which traditional Māori knowledge values and practices are inter-related and actioned as cultural technologies to facilitate disaster risk reduction and community resilience. Research participants have identified various cultural values including kōtahitanga (unity); whānau*

<sup>1</sup> Kenney et al (2015). Community-led disaster risk management: A Māori response to Ōtautahi (Christchurch) earthquakes. Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, Volume 19, Number 1. p. 14

<sup>2</sup> p. 14.

*(family); whakapapa (genealogy); whakawhanaungatanga (building/maintaining relationships); marae (community centres); manaakitanga (respect/support/hospitality), and kaitiakitanga (guardianship) as key actants in shaping responders' actions.*

The Ngāti Awa Volunteer Army took on the role of coordinating volunteers to assist with the clean-up effort in Edgecumbe. In collaboration with Bay of Plenty Regional Council and Whakatāne District Council, Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa created the Ngāti Awa Volunteer Army. Volunteers worked on flood-damaged properties, assisting residents and contractors in removing the worst affected belongings and removing silt from public areas. Their focus was manaakitanga for those who need it most.

Other aspects of iwi response may be focused directly on their beneficiaries and marae. Ngā Rauru Kitahi, Whanganui and Waiariki-Ngāti Apa established a Pūtea Aroha and co-ordinated their efforts through Te Oranganui, an iwi led health and social services provider. Activity subsequently extended to the establishment of additional Enhanced Taskforce Green teams to focus on damaged marae and community infrastructure.

Ngāi Tahu also mobilised to get food supplies in to Takahanga Marae, who fed thousands affected by the Kaikōura earthquake. They also flew in three chefs to help out with cooking duties at the marae.

## ROLE OF TE PUNI KŌKIRI IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Te Puni Kōkiri is an emergency welfare services agency under the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan. The role of Te Puni Kōkiri in emergencies is:

1. Engaging with Māori communities to support meeting their needs during and following an emergency (including short, medium and long term recovery)
2. Working with Government agencies and Civil Defence Emergency Management groups to facilitate and coordinate support for Māori requiring assistance.

Te Puni Kōkiri has obligations under the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan to prepare for and deliver welfare services as a support agency for four welfare sub-functions - needs assessment, care and protection services for children and young people, psychosocial support and shelter and accommodation.

At the national level, Te Puni Kōkiri participates on the National Welfare Coordination Group prior to emergencies as required to help ensure a coordinated and integrated all-of-Government welfare response. During response and recovery, Te Puni Kōkiri may participate on the National Welfare Coordination Group to support gaining a collective understanding of impacts and providing regional support.

At the regional level, Te Puni Kōkiri supports collaborative planning and relationship building prior to emergencies, and may support development of local welfare arrangements via participation on regional Welfare Coordination Groups. Examples of readiness include relationship building with local iwi/marae, and support for emergency marae and whānau preparedness via provision of toolkits. During response and recovery, Te Puni Kōkiri may attend Welfare Coordination Group meetings to report on welfare service delivery progress, gain an understanding of what other welfare agencies are doing and understand broader response and recovery issues and objectives.

In practical terms, the role of Te Puni Kōkiri in emergency response and recovery at the regional level is to:

- Inform whānau about where to go for assistance





- Facilitate engagement with Māori communities
- Assist agencies to identify, engage and interact with impacted Māori communities
- Anticipate and monitor any emerging issues
- Help facilitate compensation for marae utilised as recovery centres
- Identify the need for funded positions to assist in the recovery process.

It is important to note that Te Puni Kōkiri is not responsible for 'managing all emergency responses that affect Māori', and does not have large numbers of staff available for deployment during emergencies.

Despite the limitations of these roles, Te Puni Kōkiri extends beyond a pure welfare function to maintain personnel on the ground, rotate staff from across its regional network for response and recovery efforts, including EOC management, advice and assistance with communications, and direct community engagement. For example, following the Bay of Plenty flooding in April 2017, Kokohinau marae in Te Teko was supported by Te Puni Kōkiri to establish housing solutions for affiliated whānau who were displaced as a result of having their houses 'red-stickered'. Kokohinau marae has since allocated 5 hectares of marae land for the construction of a papakāinga. The papakāinga will initially support whānau impacted by the floods to receive temporary housing relief, then in the longer-term, provide a sustainable housing solution at the papakāinga to meet the growing need for emergency housing in the eastern Bay of Plenty.

## OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES ARISING FROM CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCIES

### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES FOR IWI/MĀORI

The following observations and issues have been compiled from the experiences of Māori communities over the four civil defence emergencies considered. The observations and issues are as reported by Te Puni Kōkiri staff, and are widely reported as being common issues and observations across all four emergencies.

The most common observations and issues are:

#### **Iwi/Māori and CDEM sector interaction:**

*'Local and Central government isn't set up well to respond to Māori and we aren't in there at the governance level. We want to be at the decision making table, embedded and not just a welfare group or a recovery group' – Iwi Chief Executive.*

- Challenges for iwi/Māori in being seen as critical partners in CDEM, both before and during emergencies. In addition, there is a lack of recognition in some parts of the CDEM sector of the importance and value added by rapid activation of Māori networks and entities, especially marae and Māori Wardens.
- Apparent lack of understanding of Iwi-Treaty partner role and expectations including under settlement legislation and Accords. Ngāi Tūhoe for example has a relationship agreement with the Bay of Plenty Regional Council outlined in their Deed of Settlement and the Ministry of Social Development is the lead agency for the Accord. They experienced some initial difficulties in accessing data and engagement with the wider response during the Bay of Plenty flooding in April 2017.

- There is a perception by iwi/ Māori that there is no place for iwi unless by invitation.
- A lack of cultural knowledge and understanding within CDEM operations and systems e.g. CDEM not observing and taking account of marae protocol. In addition, there is a lack of culturally appropriate support from agencies, such as a focus on paperwork and systems rather than people.
- Emergency welfare support arrangements are complex during emergencies, and there is often a lack of coordination and fragmentation of service among agencies. In addition, accessing support can be difficult for isolated communities.
- In some emergencies, a lack of skilled staff and resourcing for Emergency Operations Centres and/or Recovery Assistance Centres, which leads to a lack of capacity to identify people in need and facilitate the provision of services.
- There is a need for much better coordination between agencies that are responsible for impact and needs assessment, in terms of:
  - Planning and coordinating the collection of emergency data, including utilising Māori networks and local knowledge
  - Prioritisation and delivery of immediate needs
  - Coordination in the collation and sharing of information among response agencies to inform decision-making.
- A need to improve coordination of emergency housing needs and temporary accommodation.
- Poor coordination of support for rural communities when they are dislocated from services, such as limited interaction with Rural Support Trusts, who only focus on the farming community.
- Difficulties in estimating how many Māori live in affected areas, and particularly those who are already struggling prior to the emergency. Having up-to-date data for Māori, instead of basic census data, would improve tracking of CDEM efforts in coordination with other agencies for the benefit of Māori.

### Whānau experience

- 'Whānau look for the Māori person...' quote from Whakatāne whānau. The Rapaki resilience study<sup>3</sup> which was part of Te Pūtahitanga o Te Waipounamu, Rū Whenua Review noted that: '*ancestral connection to place; a central hub such as a marae; and whānau participation in Te Ao Māori; are important indicators of whānau resilience*'. Culturally appropriate support and a need to take a more whānau centred approach is therefore a significant factor when assisting Māori communities through response and recovery phases.
- The process of the Whānau Ora navigators is supporting people through the end-to-end process and to organise support around needs and issues for whānau as they present. This role is critical to the whānau experience and is only effective if key messaging from response and recovery lead agencies is received in a timely manner.

<sup>3</sup> Te Pūtahitanga o Te Waipounamu, Rū Whenua Review June 2016 – Ancestral connection pg.4



## Iwi/Māori capability, capacity and communication during emergencies

- There is variable understanding among Māori about their role in emergencies at iwi and hapū levels, and also about where to seek assistance and support at the whānau and individual levels. Alongside this lack of understanding is the recognition that:
  - Māori have a role to play in preparedness as well as in response and recovery
  - There is a need for better role definition, recognition and resourcing for Māori Wardens during readiness, response and recovery.
- Better preparation in relationship development, and capability and capacity building with Māori communities is required prior to events, especially within communities that are high on the deprivation index and in vulnerable localities.
- There is a need for consistent, targeted public information management for iwi/Māori communities, and there are opportunities to better utilise existing iwi/Māori networks and communications channels, such as iwi radio stations.
- Effective use of social media to provide information – iwi utilise Facebook and other social media to extend their reach
- Te reo speaking capability for community meetings, and provision of resources in te reo Māori – Te Puni Kōkiri engaged an additional te reo speaker to assist with door knocking in rural communities, and had resources translated for Edgumbe.

## ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR TE PUNI KŌKIRI

In summary, the key issues for Te Puni Kōkiri arising out of previous civil defence emergencies are:

- A discrepancy between the role of the organisation as a welfare support agency as stated within the National CDEM Plan, and the actual role and involvement during emergency response and recovery
- A lack of consistent understanding and recognition of the role of Te Puni Kōkiri in emergencies across the CDEM sector at both the national and regional levels.

The result of this for whānau is that assistance may not be culturally appropriate, and consequently whānau cannot easily access services during response or recovery in an appropriate manner.

Both key issues are discussed below.

### Discrepancy between Te Puni Kōkiri stated role and actual role

A recent Te Puni Kōkiri internal review of the response to the Kaikōura earthquake<sup>4</sup> highlighted the following points about the actual role and involvement of the organisation during emergencies:

- The extensive use of existing **local knowledge, relationships, networks and partnerships** with iwi and marae to facilitate improved response
- **Building and brokering relationships** between iwi/marae and local CDEM staff and decision-makers at a time of high stress
- **Taking a leadership role** in the management of emergency response centres/recovery assistance centres when there was an absence of leadership from other agencies and an urgent need

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<sup>4</sup> Initial draft report.

- The **speed of deployment**, creation of deployment plans and the ability of staff to rapidly gain local intelligence and understanding of Māori community needs.

It is noted that the role of Te Puni Kōkiri is dependent upon the event and the specific needs of communities at the time. In Marlborough and Kaikōura for example, the focus was on relationship building and welfare management, while the focus in Hurunui was more on advocacy. By contrast, the focus of the Canterbury earthquake events was triage initially, while the focus of the 2015 Whanganui flood was needs assessment and delivery of supplies.

In addition to near-unanimous internal feedback about the huge value added by regional staff in support of emergency response in the affected regions, staff noted the widespread positive feedback from other agencies about the role and involvement of Te Puni Kōkiri staff, including their:

- Invaluable experience from previous events
- Significant logistical expertise
- Presence on the ground
- Courage in difficult situations.

### **Awareness and understanding of the emergency role and capability of Te Puni Kōkiri**

An insight into staff views of awareness and understanding of Te Puni Kōkiri role is provided within the draft internal review of the response to the Kaikōura earthquake. Our response to emergencies is challenging for the organisation in terms of capacity and capability. The review will assist us to understand the impacts on individual staff and the capacity challenges:

*'The need to facilitate a greater awareness and understanding of the role and capability of Te Puni Kōkiri in emergency management was frequently mentioned, especially among agencies with emergency welfare responsibilities. There is a broad perception among staff that there is very limited understanding across the Civil Defence sector of Te Puni Kōkiri emergency welfare and capabilities – 'you manage Māori response in emergencies, don't you?'*

*Of particular importance is a lack of recognition or understanding of Te Puni Kōkiri abilities to broker relationships in emergency situations, and the potential for increased understanding to improve relationships between Te Puni Kōkiri and other agencies with emergency welfare responsibilities....*

*...Feedback also emphasised a need to facilitate greater awareness of emergency management among Māori, and greater involvement of iwi in Civil Defence governance within CDEM Groups.'*

### **MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT**

Engagement with the Minister for Māori Development has consistently raised the following issues, many of which echo the issues above:

- There was a lack of co-ordinated Civil Defence planning in each region that includes iwi, marae, iwi and Māori service providers, Māori wardens, Māori communities, and Te Puni Kōkiri. This results in poor communication and co-ordination, and lack of Civil Defence knowledge of available resources and points of particular risk or vulnerability.
- Preparation is required to support high needs whānau and communities (including rural areas) so they are able to self-sustain during an emergency period.
- Cultural knowledge and capability should be built into Civil Defence operations at a systems level as well as for individuals (including volunteers) who are part of response and recovery.



This would ensure appropriate engagement with iwi, whānau, and marae. It would make it easier for whānau and communities to access support.

- Access to information would be improved through better utilisation of Māori media including iwi radio, and social media networks of iwi, and of iwi and Māori providers.
- Building an understanding of Civil Defence stages and processes with iwi, marae and Māori communities, and their capability to participate in planning, response and recovery is needed. This would support them, particularly marae, to make informed choices about their participation, and ensure they are positioned to access resources as appropriate.
- Addressing fragmentation – support currently appears to be built around government agency and local government infrastructure rather than around whānau and communities. This may result in multiple contacts being made with whānau without any actual assistance being provided, and whānau having to engage with multiple groups and agencies.
- The role of Māori Wardens in emergencies needs to be better understood, and co-ordination issues need to be addressed.

The Minister has observed and commented that a whānau centred approach recognises the strength of whānau and communities and that there should be active leadership and visibility of Māori involved in the local response and recovery planning and delivery.

## DISCUSSION AND OUTCOMES SOUGHT

### DISCUSSION

As members of the wider community, the importance of iwi/Māori involvement in response to and recovery from emergencies is undeniable. Iwi/Māori involvement occurs within a framework of traditional knowledge, values and practices. Iwi/Māori involvement is often indispensable to effective response, whether by the actions of whānau/hapū, Māori Wardens, iwi organisations or Te Puni Kōkiri.

Despite the importance of effective iwi/Māori involvement in Civil Defence emergencies, there is an apparent lack of recognition and involvement of iwi/Māori at both national and local levels.

At the national level, there is a lack of strong recognition of partnership between the CDEM sector and iwi/Māori. There is scant recognition of the importance of a partnership in the National CDEM Act 2002, the National CDEM Strategy and the National CDEM Plan.

At the regional level, there is inconsistent recognition and mana from the CDEM sector towards the involvement of iwi/Māori as key partners, either prior to, during or following emergencies, but a reliance on iwi/Māori and Te Puni Kōkiri to '*stand up and be counted*' during emergencies. For example, there is often an implicit expectation by the CDEM sector that marae will activate to provide community support, but in some cases, little prior engagement or support provided by the CDEM sector.

The role of Te Puni Kōkiri invariably goes well beyond the support role outlined in the National CDEM Plan, and feedback from emergency welfare agencies is that the organisation often 'punches above its weight' in response.

## OUTCOMES SOUGHT

The following outcomes are sought:

- Improved partnerships between iwi/Māori and CDEM, based on mutual respect and shared values
- Improved recognition of the capability and capacity of iwi/Māori and marae to support CDEM response and recovery
- Improved collaboration between iwi/Māori and CDEM both prior to and during emergencies
- Improved regional CDEM understanding of marae protocols, and adaptation of CDEM processes to complement the protocols
- Clear financial arrangements for response and recovery support for marae that activate during emergencies
- More consistent preparedness and collaboration efforts across the 16 CDEM groups
- Improved recognition and understanding of the role of Te Puni Kōkiri, and what Te Puni Kōkiri can bring to the table both prior to and during emergencies
- Greater involvement of Te Puni Kōkiri and iwi/Māori in coordination of needs assessment and information sharing across the CDEM sector.

## RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE COLLABORATION BETWEEN IWI/MĀORI AND THE CDEM SECTOR

The following recommendations are made to improve collaboration between iwi/Māori and the CDEM sector at both national and local levels:

### National level

- That the provisions for partnership and collaboration between iwi/Māori and the CDEM sector at both national and local levels are strengthened via the National CDEM Strategy<sup>5</sup> and National CDEM Plan. Amendments to the National CDEM Strategy and National CDEM Plan must recognise the important status and capability of iwi/Māori as core CDEM partners, and facilitate collaboration across the 4Rs.
- That the provisions for partnership and collaboration between iwi/Māori and the CDEM sector at the local level be strengthened in the first instance by inclusion as a requirement within CDEM Group Plans, via the CDEM Group Planning Director's Guideline. At present, there is no explicit requirement on CDEM groups to engage with iwi/Māori at the local level.
- That the following aspects of interaction between marae and the CDEM sector be clarified and/or approved:
  - Clarify the role of marae in emergencies, especially in relation to the operation of CDEM Civil Defence Centres
  - Financial arrangements for the support of marae during emergencies

<sup>5</sup> Soon to be 'National Disaster Resilience Strategy'.



- Adoption of the 'marae toolkit' as a national standard.

### Local level

That consideration be given by CDEM groups to the following actions to improve local level collaboration between iwi/Māori and the CDEM sector:

- Facilitating iwi/Māori engagement at the CDEM governance level, via participation on Coordinating Executive Groups in the first instance, and across all levels of CDEM activity at the local level as required
- Greater interaction with Te Puni Kōkiri regional offices to facilitate increased collaboration during readiness, response and recovery
- Requirements for work on better understanding iwi/Māori capability, capacity and vulnerability prior to events at the local level
- Improving the emphasis on readiness activities for CDEM personnel such as professional development and training on the local role, capability and capacity of iwi/Māori in emergencies
- Improving systems and processes for coordinated needs assessment information collection, collaboration and sharing
- Improving the recognition and utilisation of iwi/Māori communications networks, such as social media and iwi radio stations
- Increasing CDEM support for improving the awareness and engagement of iwi/Māori in emergency management
- Improving rural area planning, connections and delivery between iwi/Māori and emergency welfare agencies such as Rural Support Trusts.

**From:** [John Meeuwsen \(Waiheke Local Board\)](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in NZ - Submission  
**Date:** Thursday, 20 July 2017 1:17:01 p.m.

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Thank you so much for following thru on this Emily. I would like to be heard during the conference next week if the logistics allow – if you can find me a slot I will ensure that I turn up for it. I will await advice.

Meanwhile I mentioned that I missed some words in my submission – see highlight below for the missing words.

Cheers, John Meeuwsen (Waiheke Local Board)

### **Submission**

I wrote to the Minister responsible for what is now FENZ suggesting that the Bill to establish FENZ should include an explicit requirement that FENZ is expected to collaborate with all other agencies with a role in emergency and disaster management, particularly during an event. Without such a clause, I noted, accountability on that specific responsibility would be limited and circumspect.

The response from the Minister's office, which ironically came just before the "Better responses" review was announced, was that there was no need for such a clause. I have experienced, latterly in my role as an elected member of the Waiheke Local Board and in the late 1990's as a second tier manager in the Wellington City Council, that the individual agencies – Police, Fire, Ambulance, Coastguard – are wont to put their own responsibilities ahead of a coordinated approach. Gaining their full commitment to planning and exercises as preparation for emergencies is difficult to achieve. Full integration of communications is literally impossible with the Police maintaining limits from Privacy Act and other constraints on sharing comms while each of the key agencies developing comms systems in isolation from each other and entirely based on their own perceived needs. Council and MCDEM will confirm they have difficulties in establishing genuine collaboration with / between the key EM agencies while having no formal power to do anything about it. It is unlikely that any legislation to give them power to demand specific action by Police, FENZ etc would be supported so the best leverage that is likely to be to make explicit the accountability of key EM agencies to use their best efforts to collaborate – particularly in the event that a lead agency is declared.

On Waiheke, in response to efforts to establish a command and control centre for emergency management given our potential isolation, I have had the senior local officer of both the Police and the Fire Service say in effect "we'll be too busy carrying out our own jobs to be worried about meeting to coordinate or communicate with others". Without an expectation that it is, in essence, a part of the job, key emergency agencies now rarely attend the quarterly meetings of the Waiheke Emergency Management Committee.

In respect of the declaration of an emergency and the need for a single lead role to take overall charge during an emergency, Waiheke as an island which may be isolated for some days is a useful prism thru which to view the best response. While the initial declaration of a state of emergency may still be best left to a person in a regional position with sufficient overview of events, that person should have the ability to delegate to the local head of a lead agency in discrete / relatively isolated areas, who would then become the controller – with all the legal powers provided for under the CDEM Act. If deemed appropriate that delegation could be for a defined duration.

I have attached the developing Waiheke Emergency Response Plan which highlights how a central



EMC is complemented by "Community Response Groups" for our 7 villages - see pp6-8. It should quickly be clear that in the event of isolation from the mainland, particularly when the isthmus is also subject to the same emergency or disaster, it would be very helpful if Waiheke had its own controller empowered by law.

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**From:** Emily Stevenson [DPMC] s9(2)(a) **On Behalf Of** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, 19 July 2017 9:45 AM  
**To:** John Meeuwsen (Waiheke Local Board) s9(2)(a)  
**Subject:** RE: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in NZ - Submission

Good morning John

If you would like to be heard I can make a time with you, otherwise your submission will be taken as read.

The TAG is attending the LGNZ Conference in Auckland next week and it may be possible for you to be heard then.

Kind regards  
Emily

Emily Stevenson  
**Secretariat to Technical Advisory Group on Organisation of Civil  
Defence Responses**

s9(2)(a)  
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet



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**From:** John Meeuwsen (Waiheke Local Board) s9(2)(a)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, 18 July 2017 8:27 p.m.  
**To:** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]  
<bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz>  
**Subject:** RE: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in NZ - Submission

Apologies Emily. I have been laid low since we spoke last week and never got to the reply we discussed.

If time permits I will send a further email.

Cheers John Meeuwsen 0212424925

Sent from my Windows Phone

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**From:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Sent:** 13/07/2017 11:18 a.m.  
**To:** [John Meeuwsen \(Waiheke Local Board\)](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in NZ - Submission

[IN-CONFIDENCE]

Good morning John

I have noted you wish to be heard in support of your submission. Would you like to make a time to be heard?

We are currently scheduling hearings for next week in Wellington, and have 1/2 hour slots available on Monday at 9am, or in the afternoon from 3:30-5, and on Wednesday afternoon from 4 – 5.

Let me know what suits you and I will schedule you in. Do feel free to give me a call if you wish to discuss.

Emily Stevenson

**Secretariat to Technical Advisory Group on Organisation of Civil  
Defence Responses**

s9(2)(a)

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

DEPARTMENT  
of the PRIME MINISTER  
and CABINET



**From:** John Meeuwsen (Waiheke Local Board) s9(2)(a)

**Sent:** Friday, 7 July 2017 2:26 p.m.

**To:** Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies [DPMC]  
<[bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)>

**Subject:** Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in NZ - Submission

From John Meeuwsen, member Waiheke Local Board with the civil defence portfolio.

I wish to be heard in respect of this submission

### Submission

I wrote to the Minister responsible for what is now FENZ suggesting that the Bill to establish FENZ should include an explicit requirement that FENZ is expected to collaborate with all other agencies with a role in emergency and disaster management, particularly during an event. Without such a clause, I noted, accountability on that specific responsibility would be limited and circumspect.

The response from the Minister's office, which ironically came just before the "Better responses" review was announced, was that there was no need for such a clause. I have experienced, latterly in my role as an elected member of the Waiheke Local Board and in the late 1990's as a second tier manager in the Wellington City Council, that the individual agencies – Police, Fire, Ambulance, Coastguard – are wont to put their own responsibilities ahead of a coordinated approach. Gaining their full commitment to planning and exercises as preparation for emergencies is difficult to achieve. Full integration of communications is literally impossible with the Police maintaining limits from Privacy Act and other constraints on sharing comms while each of the key agencies developing comms systems in isolation from each other and entirely based on their own perceived needs. Council and MCDEM will confirm they have difficulties in establishing genuine collaboration while having no

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meeting to coordinate or communicate with others". Without an expectation that it is, in essence, a part of the job, key emergency agencies now rarely attend the quarterly meetings of the Waiheke Emergency Management Committee.

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I have attached the developing Waiheke Emergency Response Plan which highlights how a central EMC is complemented by "Community Response Groups" for our 7 villages - see pp6-8. It should quickly be clear that in the event of isolation from the mainland, particularly when the isthmus is also subject to the same emergency or disaster, it would be very helpful if Waiheke had its own controller empowered by law.

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5 July 2017. - A submission to the Technical Advisory Group by the Public Media Project to lift the effectiveness and accessibility of Crown funded public communication and to stimulate civic engagement in decision-making on matters of public importance – particularly on Civil Defence and Emergency management and risk minimisation, and the activities of Parliament, Regional Government, and Local Authorities - by the creation of a new, interactive digital multi-media public communications system, iMEDIA.

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## 1 Introduction

- 1.1 The terms of reference (TOR) for the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) suggest that a succession of recent events – ranging from the Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis outbreak through the East Cape earthquake and tsunami, the Kaikoura earthquake and tsunami, and the Port Hills fire - have called into question the effectiveness of the civil defence emergency management structure, “resulting in a loss of stakeholder, public and Ministerial confidence in the response system.” This is an alarming situation, if it is correct and confirmed by the TAG review.
- 1.2 The Public Media Project has been tracking the news media coverage of responses to the civil defence emergency management issues – risk minimisation, event response, and recovery - from the day of the first Canterbury Earthquake in 2010 to 2 June 2017 when the TAG review was announced. We can confirm that there has been substantial scrutiny and criticism of emergency management from elements of the news media, the elected politicians in Parliament and Local Government, and the public over that period. In our view, the analysis that there has been a loss of stakeholder, public and Ministerial confidence is correct and justified. But we also note that there has been no lack of will or effort by Ministers and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management to address the issues, and many issues have related to the activities of agencies which are only within the MCDEM emergency management control during the periods in which a State of National Emergency is declared to exist.
- 1.3 PMP notes that **Outcome 5** of the terms of reference for the review is to ensure:
- “Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies.
  - Recognition of the modern news cycle – immediacy of social media and power of factual decisive information delivered as speedily as possible
  - Stakeholder needs are understood (what information is required; where and how to gather the information, providing it at the right time and in the right format).
  - Official information maintains pace with media dialogue and social media activity.
- 1.4 The Public Media Project has been formed by a small group of experienced news media, advertising, and information technology industry professionals and academics with a particular interest in media studies. The PMP’s iMEDIA proposal is designed to assist the delivery of Outcome 5 in particular by lifting the effectiveness and accessibility of public communication, particularly on matters of civil defence emergency management and risk minimisation - and to stimulate civic engagement in policy-making on matters of public importance by the creation of a universally-accessible, interactive digital multi-media public communications hub platform with regional spokes.
- 1.5 For 7 years, PMP’s convenor also served as an executive member of Air New Zealand’s crisis management team and of its senior executive safety audit committee (*see Appendix 1*) with particular responsibility for the management of public and government communications through a wide range of emergency incidents, including volcanic eruptions, aircraft mechanical and systems failures, extreme weather disruptions, airport fires, biosecurity

incursions, a fatal aircraft crash, and a riot and fire that endangered Air NZ passengers and an aircraft at Tahiti's international airport.

- 1.5 PMP submits that iMEDIA hub can be created rapidly, at minimal cost, and the proposal identifies the potential for significant public communication improvements and for Government cost-savings on Parliamentary and Crown-funded public audio-visual communications through structural changes in regulatory and funding arrangements.
- 1.6 The iMEDIA proposal recognises the need to maintain the rigorous separation and protection of security-sensitive internal government communications from public communications – but argues that public confidence in emergency management will be enhanced by the establishment of a single, universally accessible, interactive public communications platform. This platform would need to be supported by integrated broadcast and telecommunications technologies and mandated by the Government and Parliament to providing instantaneous, two-way public communication of audio-visual and text content relating to emergency risk minimisation, emergency management and recovery operations would improve civic and private sector engagement in policy decision-making by Parliament and operational decisions by emergency management and lifeline service providers.
- 1.7 Implementing the iMEDIA proposal would enable immediate action to be taken to improve the cost-effectiveness of Crown-funded public communication at a time when digital disruption is occurring in the advertising market that requires complex, time-consuming major structural changes in the business models and operations of New Zealand's established and predominantly advertising-funded mass-media enterprises.
- 1.8 Further benefits in the form of an increase in the quantity and diversity New Zealand-made audio-visual public communications content, and expanded, interactive regional public communications accessibility could be achieved from the involvement of:
  - regional and local authorities;
  - corporate entities in the tourism, transport, telecommunications, and energy sectors;
  - international hazard and aid management agencies;
  - domestic health, environment and social development agencies;
  - educational institutions; and
  - other philanthropic non-government organisations and individuals.

Sensible steps to rationalise and coordinate the activities of Crown Agencies that currently produce and archive public communications content could actually reduce the total amount funded by taxpayers and other Government sources for public communications purposes.

- 1.9 PMP estimates the iMEDIA hub set-up cost to be in the order of \$5 million, with set-up completed in 9 months, and that it would require approximately \$15 million per annum from the sources mentioned above (1.8) to meet initial operating costs. We estimate the initial stakeholder consultation and business case development and feasibility study by a competent team of media professionals should take no more than six weeks and cost no more than \$500,000. The convenor of PMP has offered his services free-of-charge to assist the stakeholder consultation and the conduct of a professional business feasibility study,

however other specialist advisers would need to be hired to complete an adequate business feasibility study. This proposal needs to be tested as rapidly as possible.

## 2 Background

2.1 The Technical Advisory Group's review of the effectiveness of the current emergency management follows a number of other reviews of Government policy, beginning with:

- Consultations with industry stakeholders on **the transition of broadcast television services from analogue to digital transmission**, following the issue of transitional licences to enable dual digital and analogue transmissions by Television New Zealand (TVNZ), MediaWorks, and BCL/Kordia, a state-owned enterprise providing broadcast transmission services. Other television broadcasters – including analogue non-commercial regional television broadcast licence holders - were expected to negotiate transitional digital spectrum access contracts with Kordia at the general commercial rates **until the completion of the Digital Switch Over in December 2013**; followed by
- Consultation with industry stakeholders and interested parties by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) on **the allocation and purchase of long-term digital spectrum leases** for broadcast purposes; followed by
- Consultations with industry stakeholders and interested parties in a cross-government policy and regulatory review (led by the Ministries of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) and the Ministry of Culture and Heritage (MCH) of the **impact of media globalisation and the convergence of digital information management technologies** used for broadcast radio-communications and telecommunications services in New Zealand;
- Followed by Consultations with industry stakeholders and interested parties by the **Office of the Clerk (OoC)** on the provision of **television production services to support live broadcasts of the proceedings of the House of Representatives** via a Notice of Intention. The live television broadcasts of these proceedings occupies about 8 percent of the annual hours which could be supported by the technical infrastructure required to meet the needs of Parliament TV. The OoC says this review is to support its objective is "improving value for money from our investment in broadcasting infrastructure and funding for services". A request for proposals from interested parties was scheduled to be issued and closed in the period between May and September. The RFP was issued via the GETs (Government Electronic Tendering Service) on 12 June 2017 (*See RFP – sent as separate document*).

2.2 The Public Media Project has participated in all these consultations as an industry stakeholder.

2.3 At this point, PMP is concerned at the apparent lack of coordination between the three reviews that are currently in train. This week, PMP has appealed to the Probitry Auditor at AuditNZ to suspend the Request for Proposals process implemented by the Office of the Clerk, because the OoC failed to advise PMP that the RFP had been published on the Government Electronic Text service on 12 June 2017 until 2 days after the process to select a preferred supplier had commenced. The Probitry Auditor has just rejected my complaint. PMP's proposal is not eligible for consideration under the terms of the OoC Request for

Proposals. (See Appendix 2 – Complaint to Probity Auditor, the Probity Auditor’s response, and previous e-mail correspondence between PMP and the OoC).

- 2.4 PMP wishes to draw TAG’s particular attention to the following advice, it has received from the Office of the Clerk:

*“We are available to discuss with the Technical Advisory Group, our future plans with regard to the production of the broadcast feed and broadcasting the Parliament TV programme, if that is of interest to them. I am not aware that they have sought any consultation with the Office. We had previously asked CDEM if they had any content that might be broadcast on the Parliament TV channel. They didn’t, as they (understandably) prefer to use the mainstream channels that command a greater audience share, both for their preparedness content and also for emergency communications as required.”<sup>1</sup>*

- 2.5 Since 2009, PMP has been in frequent contact with the Ministry for Business, Innovation & Employment, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, NZ On Air, and Radio New Zealand, and submitted proposals to the Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency Management and the Office of the Clerk on Parliament TV in June last year. In general terms, they are all aware of the substance of this submission. PMP will send a copy of this submission to them, and to their Ministers, the Leaders of all political parties currently represented in Parliament, and the Speaker of the House as soon as possible.
- 2.6 PMP is conscious of the fact that the dissolution of Parliament occurs on 22 August 2017, the general election is on 23 September 2017 and that the official results for the election will be announced on 7 October 2017. After that new government will be formed and a new Speaker will be selected. Before this process is completed, the Office of the Clerk’s current schedule is to have its preferred supplier to provide **television production services to support live broadcasts of the proceedings of the House of Representatives selected by the end of September**, while Parliament is dissolved and there is no Speaker.

#### **Recommendation 1**

**That TAG immediately advises the OoC of its potential interest in the unutilised capacity of Parliament TV for both State of Emergency, emergency risk minimisation, and emergency recovery public communications, if it considers this would assist in the delivery of Outcome 5 of its own Terms of Reference.**

#### **Recommendation 2:**

**That the Target Advisory Group Immediately express its concern to its Minister at the lack of coordination between its efforts and the other current reviews of aspects of public communications effectiveness by delaying further work on the cross-government media globalisation and digital review and the implementation of the Office of the Clerk’s Request for proposal until after the General Election; and seeks an assurance that there will be co-ordination between the TAG and the Office of the Clerk when consideration of the OoC RFP resumes, desirably after the election, the formation of a new Government, appointment of a new Ministry and new Speaker for the House of Representatives.**

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<sup>1</sup> Email , 30 June 2017, Sandy Brimblecombe, Contractor, House Services / Education and Public Engagement, Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives – See Appendix 2, part 2.



- 2.7 The following diagram identifies the initial stakeholders who would need to be consulted on the development of the iMEDIA proposal, or any other emergency communications proposal in response to the OoC's RFP, into a fully-detailed business case for further consideration. Appropriate confidentiality agreements would need to be developed to conduct these consultations. Other organisations could be added to this list if the Government, or decides to approve funding of a business case to test the feasibility of the iMEDIA proposal or any other public communications proposal TAG wishes to pursue.



**Recommendation 3:**

that the Technical Advisory Group examines the iMEDIA proposal with urgency with a view to recommending an immediate commitment of up to \$500,000 from the Government to enable the TAG to fund the development a business case to test its feasibility, if TAG determines this would be useful.

- 2.8 PMP also notes that the **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002** requires the **Minister of Civil Defence to complete** a National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy and to report to Cabinet on progress, **as part of a process to review the Strategy prior to its mandate expiring at the end of 2017**. This process would incorporate the TAG review recommendations. Adopting the iMEDIA proposal would assist the Government in fulfilling this requirement of the Act.
- 2.9 PMP also notes that New Zealand is committed to implementation of the **2015 United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction**. To meet the objective of the Framework, nations adopting it must act between 2015 and 2030 to: *“Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental,*

*technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience.*" The iMEDIA proposal supports the main objective of the Sendai Framework (*See the full text of the Framework which we are also sending to you separately*).


- 2.10 Finally, we note that New Zealand has been committed to pursue the principles of the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948. Article 19 of the Declaration of Human Rights states: *"Every person has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this right includes freedom to hold opinion without interference, and to seek, receive, **and impart information through any media** regardless of frontiers."* (See Appendix 3 - Human Rights Commitments).
- 2.11 Despite the laudable formation of Te Mangai Paho and the establishment of the Maori Television Service and iwi radio stations to honour Treaty of Waitangi obligations to safeguard the taonga of Te Reo, New Zealand's capacity to meet its broader Article 19 obligations has diminished steadily since 2006, when the Government signed a Crown Agreement in 2006 to supply digital spectrum to New Zealand's two main television broadcasters (TVNZ and Mediaworks) and the major supplier of free-to-air broadcast transmission services (BCL/Kordia) during the transition to the Digital Switch Over which was completed in December 2013.
- 2.12 PMP also notes that the **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 requires the Minister of Civil Defence to complete** a National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy and to report to Cabinet on progress, **as part of a process to review the Strategy prior to its mandate expiring at the end of 2017**. Adopting the iMEDIA proposal would assist the Government in fulfilling this requirement of the Act.

### **3 The iMEDIA Hub & Spoke Concept**

- 3.1 The iMEDIA proposal is to develop a non-commercial, interactive, digital, multi-media communications system, starting with the establishment of a hub operation based around the television broadcasting capacity of Parliament TV, with spoke operations across the regions of New Zealand.

The following diagram illustrates the iMEDIA Public Communications Hub concept.

## Digital Multi-Media Public Communications Hub - iMEDIA



3.2 The hub operation could be constructed within the parameters of the current radio-communications systems used to broadcast audio-visual broadcast content via satellite and terrestrial transmission systems and the telecommunications technologies used for audio-visual content communication via the internet. The hub would have the capacity to

- Receive audio visual content from any digital communications device,
- Transmit communications to any digital communications receiving appliance, and
- Operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

## Government has the Resources to Create the iMedia Hub



3.5 Parliament Buildings currently house:

- The National Crisis Management Centre;


- Parliament TV (capable of broadcasting 24hours, 7 days a week but currently using less than 8% of this capacity per annum for live coverage of the proceedings of the House of Representatives) ;
- Radio New Zealand facilities for broadcasting live coverage of the proceedings of Parliament;
- Hansard (with its rapid print production system);
- The on-line [www.parliament.govt.nz](http://www.parliament.govt.nz) facility;
- The Press Gallery and media conference facilities;
- Public event and hospitality services

- 3.6 This paper proposes an exploration of the feasibility of integrating the **public** communications operations via Parliament TV and of public communications operations by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management remotely via an operational and production iMEDIA hub in Auckland - with a small maintenance and content supply team on-site at Parliament and all other operational and production processes undertaken at a suitable site in Auckland. *(See Section 7 - iMEDIA Auckland Hub)*
- 3.7 The iMEDIA system would require a small presentation studio at Parliament and close to the NCDEM centre in the Parliamentary precinct, with the capacity to conduct small interviews and discussions and to store small mobile video recording equipment used to cover parliamentary events outside the hours the House is sitting and in areas of Parliament where media conferences and interviews currently take place
- 3.8 The iMEDIA platform hub communications technology infrastructure would be separated from the Parliament's internal communications systems carrying confidential audio-visual and text content being exchanged between the Office of the Clerk, the Speaker, Ministers, Members of Parliament and between MPs and their constituents and between MPs others wishing to have confidential communications with individual MPs. It would also have its own Governance body *(See Section 5 – iMEDIA Governance)* and legislated or regulatory Mission specifying the outcomes it is required to deliver *(See Section 4 - iMEDIA Mission Statement)*.
- 3.9 Another advantage to be derived from locating the iMedia hub operation in Auckland is that Auckland is already identified as alternative location for the operations of Parliament and the National Civil Defence and Emergency Management centre in the event of a disaster in Wellington renders one or other of them being incapable of sustained operation from their existing location in the Parliamentary precinct and also provides a point of coordination for other Regional CDEM operations. *(See Section 8 - iMEDIA Regional Operations)*.

## 4 iMEDIA Mission Statement

- 4.1 This section of the proposal identifies key elements of a Mission Statement for the proposed interactive digital public media hub system. This draft has been designed to future-proof the the potential for the iMEDIA system to develop Regional spoke operations across New Zealand.

- 4.2 The following key points are suggested to initiate discussion on an appropriate iMEDIA mission statement. PMP suggests iMEDIA’s specific responsibilities could be to:
- A Provide universal public access to live audio-visual coverage of the proceedings of the House of Representatives and communications relating to Civil Defence & Emergency Management;
  - B Facilitate civic engagement in consultations and discussion with central and local government decision makers and with other organisations contracted to provide public and community services;
  - C Deliver the fastest possible, universal access to civil defence and emergency management communications audio-visual content via a combination of free-to-air broadcast and continuous universal public access to emergency risk minimisation audio-visual content on-demand and free-of-charge;
  - D Support Freedom of Expression in keeping with New Zealand’s commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human rights by enhancing the ability of regions, communities and individuals to generate and exchange ideas via all forms of mass and personal communications media appliances available to New Zealanders; and
  - E Promote universal access to all-of-life education and capacity building opportunities and cultural, social, regional and community development services.
- 3.3 This distinctive citizen-focused mandate would ensure the non-commercial, advertising-free iMEDIA system performs an informational and educational role that would complement rather than compete with the more heavily entertainment and consumer-focused content provided by commercial, advertising funded broadcasters.
- 4.4 Meeting the obligations of such a Mission Statement would ensure that the iMEDIA system would increase the diversity of New Zealand-produced Free-To-Air (FTA) TV content, and provide a new, more stable, multi-media public emergency communications platform across the widening range of media appliances now used by many New Zealanders.
- 4.5 However, despite the rapid growth in audiences for new on-line and mobile interactive digital media services, for the next 5 year it is likely that the majority of New Zealanders will still employ Free-to-Air linear broadcast television and radio platforms for instantaneous and universal access to public communication by audio-visual digital content, as indicated by the most recent survey conducted by NZ On Air in April 2016.



- 4.6 The fully integrated iMEDIA multi-media broadcast and telecommunications platform providing universal access to linear broadcast television and radio and access for 85% of New Zealanders to fibre broadband by 2024 is preferable to the fragmented and evolving media systems currently in place.

## 5 iMEDIA Governance

- 5.1 The governance structure of iMEDIA would need to preserve the current controls over live Parliament TV coverage of House proceedings by the Speaker of the House, and protect the security and integrity of internal Parliamentary and Civil Defence & Emergency management communications. The Office of the Clerk is currently seeking suppliers “able to supply and support a robust technical solution to connect remotely with the New Zealand Parliament to obtain the camera and sound feeds, and have existing infrastructure and equipment to produce the live broadcast feed.”
- 5.2 This proposal is for the establishment of a Public Media Foundation, constituted as a not-for-profit, public-private partnership, which would be contracted to meet the public communications requirements specified by the Ministry for Civil Defence & Emergency Management and the Office of the Clerk, and utilise the Parliament TV transmission infrastructure services contracted by OoC outside the sitting hours of the House of Representatives.
- 5.3 These services are provided by Digital Satellite services (DTH) provided by Kordia (free-to-air TV) and Sky Network Television (pay-to-view TV) which are accessible in 99% of New Zealand households) and Terrestrial Transmission systems operated by Kordia (sole supplier of DTT access to 75% of New Zealand households) and other DTT service providers offering access to a further 11% of New Zealand households. It should be noted that DTT is the only transmission capable of being regionalised and is available to a total of about 87% of households. To achieve 99% coverage of New Zealand households, it is necessary to have access to both Kordia and Sky TV DTH satellite transmission services. Currently, there is a lack of clarity about Kordia and Sky’s responsibilities in the emergency management process (*See Section 6 – Enhancing Emergency Management Communications, paras 6.7 to 6.13*).
- 5.4 The PMF would have the capacity to raise funds for iMEDIA content and operational purposes from non-government organisations, private commercial businesses, philanthropic institutions and individuals, and members of the public who join voluntarily by payment of a low membership fee. It could also compete with other suppliers for Crown-funding under the proposed contract to produce the broadcast feed of Parliament TV and join the contest for NZ On Air for other digital content Crown-funding to produce other iMEDIA public information content.
- 5.5 For discussion purposes, the Public Media Project (PMP) proposes the following structure for a Public Media Foundation. It should be noted that the PMF proposal for Parliament TV would involve a technical solution to operate its sound and camera service remotely from Auckland, with a small system maintenance crew on site in Wellington. (*See Section 7 – iMEDIA Hub*).

## PUBLIC MEDIA FOUNDATION COVERNANCE - DRAFT



- 5.6 This structure assumes that exploratory approaches made to the Ministry for Arts, Culture and Heritage Radio New Zealand, NZ On Air, the Auckland Council and Auckland University of Technology can be developed into working partnerships to support the iMEDIA platform.
- 5.7 Public membership in the PMF would involve an annual payment of a very low fee – and rights to elect 50% of the not-for-profit Foundation’s Board of Governance, and its ordinary members would be encouraged to make further donations via fund-raising events and crowd funding processes.
- 5.8 Major Private and Public Sector Crown-funded partners would also have the right to nominate and elect 50% of the Board.
- 5.9 The Board chair (and the casting vote) would be held by an independent chair with particular experience in editorial and media standards management – nominated and elected jointly by the private and public partners, and the public members’ Foundation Trustees.

## 6 Enhancing Emergency Management Communications

- 6.1 The iMEDIA proposal is designed to create a Lifeline TV broadcaster with a specific responsibility to provide public communication on emergency risk minimisation, management, and recovery on a constant basis, beyond the periods when a State of Emergency is declared to exist.
- 6.2 The current Civil Defence & Emergency Management Strategy is based on a Risk Assessment that pre-dates the rapid development of Media Globalisation and the Digital Information & Communications technology convergence in New Zealand.



\* New issues, not included in this MCDEM risk assessment analysis.

- 6.3 The current National Civil Defence and Emergency Management strategy is under review and it is timely to consider public emergency communications as part of that process, given the new capabilities created by broadcasting, telecommunications, and information technology convergence.
- 6.4 The Government’s commitment to the United Nations sponsored *Sendai Framework* suggests new strategy needs to be developed, requiring action across four priority areas:
- A Understanding disaster risk;
  - B Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk;
  - C Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and
  - D Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
- 6.5 Success in delivering the outcomes sought in the *Sendai Framework* looks likely to require a significant increase in public communication activity to stimulate community engagement in risk reduction, disaster preparedness, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction outside periods when a State of Emergency has been declared. This could be addressed by conducting a review of Lifeline Utility responsibilities under the terms of the Civil Defence Act 2002 at the same time as the business case for the iMEDIA proposal is developed.
- 6.6 A preliminary review of Lifeline Utilities designation and responsibilities by PMP suggests it is necessary to address a potential threat to effective public emergency communications that has already arisen from New Zealand’s Broadcasting Digital Switch Over (DSO).





- 6.7 This threat is evident in the diagram (above) taken from the current MCDEM Strategic plan. Under the terms of the Civil Defence and Emergency Act, Radio NZ, TVNZ, and Telecommunications Companies are designated as Lifeline Utilities. Radio NZ and TVNZ are the only broadcasters specifically designated as Lifeline Utilities in the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act.
- 6.8 TVNZ and RNZ are both audience leaders in their respective fields of broadcasting, but neither of the two designated Lifeline broadcasters can provide comprehensive public communications across New Zealand without the support of DTH direct to home satellite and DTT digital terrestrial transmission services provided by the Crown-owned enterprise Kordia, and DTH capacity provided by Sky Network Television.
- 6.9 New Zealand's other major Free-to-Air radio and television broadcaster Mediaworks has signed a memorandum of understanding to act as lifeline broadcaster. It is in the same situation as the Crown-owned broadcasters and Parliament TV— dependent on transmission infrastructure services provided by Kordia and Sky Network Television.
- 6.10 Sky Network Television is not a designated lifeline utility. It provides satellite television broadcast transmission services and reception equipment to about 830,000 New Zealand subscribers and about 50% of New Zealand households. Its service also carries the Free-to-Air broadcast content originated by TVNZ and Radio NZ.
- 6.11 PMP has asked Kordia if it is classified as a lifeline utility under the terms of the Civil Defence Act. Kordia's general counsel Michael Jamieson has advised PMP that Kordia cannot give legal advice as to the interpretation of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (Act). He states: "However, Kordia Limited considers itself to be a lifeline utility under Clause 5 of Part B of Schedule 1 to the Act: 'An entity that provides a telecommunications network (within the meaning of the [Telecommunications Act 1987](#)).'" It appears from this response that Kordia does not necessarily see its role in the distribution of TV and radio broadcast content as a Lifeline Utility responsibility.
- 6.12 The Ministry for Business, Innovation and Enterprise consultation paper on the recent review of the Telecommunications Act stated: "broadcasting networks and services are

*specifically excluded from the Telecommunications Act.”* On 16.02.16, Osmond Borthwick - Manager of Communications Policy, Infrastructure and Resource Markets, MBIE – recommended to the Minister of Communications that *“broadcasting infrastructure should not be subject to industry-specific regulation under the Telecommunications Act”*.<sup>2</sup>

- 6.13 Lack of clarity about the Lifeline Utility status and responsibilities of Kordia and Sky as broadcast radio-communications transmission infrastructure providers could threaten the essential role that the designated Lifeline Free-to-Air radio and TV broadcast originators play in the vital process of public emergency communication, and particularly emergency risk minimisation when a State of local or national Emergency has not been declared. It could impede the development of the iMEDIA as an originator and receiver of public digital communication content on emergency risk minimisation and disaster preparedness on a constant basis, within and outside periods in which a State of Emergency has been declared.

#### **Recommendation 4**

**That TAG request the Minister Government to review legislation and regulation relating to Lifeline Utilities to ensure that all Free-to-Air TV broadcasters and broadcast transmission services providers – and particularly Kordia and Sky TV – are lifeline utilities and that all lifeline utilities are required to carry NCDEM Lifeline Utilities public communications audio-visual content on emergency risk minimisation and recovery programmes so that they are universally accessible throughout New Zealand.**

- 6.14 Public reaction to the increasing number of earthquakes, Tsunami alerts, Extreme Weather Events, Water and Air pollution health risks, and Hazardous Materials, Biosecurity and Cybersecurity Threats in New Zealand indicate there is an urgent need for improved public communication on risk minimisation and disaster preparedness. A Government commitment to designate iMEDIA as a Lifeline Utility television broadcaster, with specific emergency communications responsibilities in its Mission Statement would be also be perceived as a positive response to public concern.
- 6.15 The essential, sensitive and specialised nature of the public communications task in emergency management and risk minimisation, and digital disruption in the advertising market suggests that it would not be sensible to be totally reliant on advertising-dependent media businesses (including TVNZ) that are in the process of making substantial structural changes to meet the challenges of media globalisation and digital communications technology convergence (*See Section 10 of this proposal*).
- 6.16 The iMEDIA proposal could offer a non-commercial, advertising-free Television broadcast option that would provide additional resilience to the Civil Defence Emergency Management public communications process. The specific inclusion of emergency communications in its Mission Statement (*see Section 4 above*) would require it to substantiate its commitment to do so by developing a special capability in this field.
- 6.17 Effective crisis communication requires specialist skills that do not exist in New Zealand’s established news media. The development of these skills involves specialist education and training, and constant practice, testing and modification. PMP’s certainty on this point flows

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<sup>2</sup> MBIE *Brief to Hon Amy Adams, obtained under Official Information Act.*

from its convenor's seven years of experience as a member of Air New Zealand's crisis management team and its executive safety audit committee.

- 6.18 From start-up, the proposed iMEDIA nationwide, interactive multi-media hub would be equipped to exchange audio-visual communications with regional civil defence organisations across New Zealand via Skype, on-line and mobile computers, 4G smart phones and tablets.

### iMEDIA Hub - Skype links to Regional CDEM Network



- 6.19 The iMEDIA Hub would also be able to extend its reach to the travelling public and international visitors via FTA broadcasts and interactive SKYPE links to visitor information centres, via the Tourism and Transport sectors, and frontline emergency response services.

### Extending iMEDIA Reach to Travellers via Tourism, Transport Sectors



- 6.20 The iMEDIA Hub could support the exchange of audio-visual content between NCDEM and the complex framework of organisations that are involved in the provision of emergency services. Skype wireless. Mobile, and UFB internet links can easily be developed between the Hub and NCDEM’s network of first respondent emergency service agencies to enhance their nationwide public communications activities.

**iMEDIA Skype links to First Respondents**



- 6.21 The iMEDIA Hub could also exchange on line and wireless mobile content with international agencies responding to international emergencies, including international Early Warning Advisers and relief and risk minimisation agencies.

**Potential Global iMedia Content Contributors**



### Potential Global iMedia Content Contributors



[QuakeZones - Current and Historical Earthquakes](#)

News

[View In iTunes](#)

[ubAlert - Disaster Alert Network](#)

News

[View In iTunes](#)

[PBS NEWSHOUR - Official](#)

News

[View In iTunes](#)

[QuakeWatch - Latest Earthquakes](#)

Info

News

[View In iTunes](#)

[Algo: Real-time news](#)


News

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


6.22 iMEDIA could also cooperate with other NCDEM Early Warning Advisors within New Zealand.

### NZ Early Warning Contributors




## NZ Early Warning Contributors



6.23 Key Crown-funded road, air, and sea transport organisations – NZTA, KiwiRail, Airways and Maritime Services – operate systems tracking transport services that are vital to emergency management of the supply chain. Transpower monitors the nationwide electricity network and the Ministry of Energy could provide tracking data on the operation of the natural gas supply pipeline in the North Island.

## NZ Early Warning Contributors



6.24 iMEDIA could then combine the data gathered from these separate organisations into a single New Zealand electronic mapping and tracking system for use in emergency management and risk-minimisation communications, and for use in a wide range of growth promoting applications of both public and private interest.

- 6.25 PMP is able to draw on experience with the introduction of the Future Air Navigation system and the development of commercial road transport fleet tracking IT systems in New Zealand to produce a comprehensive iMEDIA electronic mapping and tracking system to visualise status changes across New Zealand’s entire meteorological, environmental, energy and transport supply chain systems in near real time. This would be a world first in civil defence and emergency management and in public broadcast communication.
- 6.26 The creation and universal accessibility of this mapping and tracking system could also make a significant contribution to the productivity and competitiveness of New Zealand-based industry, and facilitate more effective commercial investment and operational decision making in international trade, tourism, and financial sectors.
- 6.27 Other Crown-funded agencies are involved developing relevant broadcast and on-line audio—visual content that could also be utilised by the iMEDIA system to support its role in public communications on hazard identification and risk minimisation and its responsibility to promote civic engagement.

**Potential Crown Funding/Content Contributors**



- 6.28 These (and other) Crown funded agencies could be approached in the development of the iMEDIA business plan to determine their willingness to contribute programme content and/or audio-visual production funding for iMEDIA broadcast and on-line, mobile wireless and UFB internet distribution. Most of them are engaged in their own direct public communications programmes, and there would be opportunities for them to make cost savings by utilising the iMEDIA multi-media service.
- 6.29 A similar approach could be made to the private sector companies who are designated Lifeline Utilities and have a strong interest enhancing public communication on hazard identification, risk minimisation, and emergency management, rehabilitation and recovery.

Potential Telecom lifeline utility funding/content contributors



- 6.30 These telecommunications companies are members of the New Zealand Telecommunications Forum. Their interest in making a voluntary contribution to the development and operation of the iMEDIA system – in the form of content, content funding, and/or production equipment and free-of-charge use of their distribution technology – would be assessed during the development of the iMEDIA business case. At the same time, a similar approach would be made to the multinational interactive digital media organisations entering the New Zealand market via their systems.
- 6.31 The Government’s backstop position - in the event voluntary contribution is not forthcoming - could be the introduction of a “must carry-must offer free-of-cost” requirement on telecommunications and broadcasting transmission infrastructure operators. This would enable the Government to remove the statutory obligation on TVNZ to be a lifeline utility under the provisions of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act (by transferring them to PMF/iMEDIA), and enable the Government to adopt a more neutral digital media policy stance towards broadcast and telecommunications network transmission service operators.
- 6.32 “Must carry – must offer” requirements are not a novel concept. A so-called “must carry” provision was purported to be included in NZ Crown contracts awarding digital broadcasting spectrum licences to TVNZ, Mediaworks, and Kordia during the transition from analogue to digital broadcast transmission – but never implemented. In the United States, regional cable operators were obliged to provide capacity to significant television broadcasters. They also entered into a voluntary agreement to fund the operations of the C-Span network, performing a similar function to Parliament TV. The potential for “must carry-must offer” application in New Zealand should not be ignored when it comes to the provision of a “public good” in the form of emergency-related communications.



Potential NGO Sector Funding/Content Contributors



6.33 These Non-Government Organisation entities – and others – could also be approached during the development of the iMedia business case to establish their interest in content provision, and/or operational funding. Private sector businesses in these sectors benefit from effective CDEM risk minimisation and recovery management efforts and should be willing to make contributions towards iMEDIA’s effectiveness to improve their own public communications reach and community relationships.

7 The iMEDIA Hub in Auckland

7.1 The Office of the Clerk has advised that its decision to outsource production of the broadcast feed for Parliament mean that the Parliamentary Service will no longer own any control room equipment. Respondents to its Request for Proposals are expected to provide their own control room, and associated studio, graphic generation and play-out facilities somewhere else. The logical location for these activities is Auckland as it will add to the resilience of the system and has better links with the suppliers of broadcast transmission systems for Parliament TV. This location also has advantages in terms of the management of emergency risk minimisation, relief operations, and recovery activities.

Govt Must Build Resilience with an Auckland iMEDIA Hub

Civil Defence & Emergency Management, Auckland Council & CCOs, NGOs, Lifeline Utilities



Auckland will need to be prepared to host Parliament & NCDEM HQ in the event of a disaster in Wellington. It is well-resourced for the task.



Auckland is already NZ’s main media, communications and transportation hub. RNZ currently has AKL premises but may need to relocate HQ operations here too.



PARTNERS	STAKEHOLDERS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Auckland Council</li> <li>NZ Police</li> <li>NZ Fire Service</li> <li>32 Police</li> <li>District Health Boards</li> <li>Auckland Regional Public Health Service</li> <li>Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management</li> <li>Rural Fire Authority</li> <li>Red Cross</li> <li>Safetion Army</li> <li>Ministry of Social Development (including its constituent members)</li> <li>Amateur Radio Emergency Corp</li> <li>Ministry of Health</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New Zealand Defence Force</li> <li>Earthquake Commission</li> <li>NZ Insurance Council</li> <li>Māori Whenua Group</li> <li>Housing NZ</li> <li>Ministry of Education</li> <li>Inland Revenue</li> <li>Auckland Chamber of Commerce</li> <li>Employers and Manufacturers Association</li> <li>Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry</li> <li>Maritime Safety Authority</li> <li>Land Transport Safety Authority</li> <li>Civil Aviation Authority</li> <li>NZ Customs</li> </ul>
<p><b>LIFELINE UTILITIES</b></p> <p>For the purposes of section 62 of the CDEM Act 2002 this list names Auckland’s Lifeline Utilities:</p> <p>a) Specific Entities (Per A. Schedule 1, CDEM Act 2002)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Radio NZ Ltd</li> <li>Television NZ Ltd</li> <li>Auckland Airport Ltd</li> <li>Ports of Auckland Ltd</li> </ul> <p>b) Entities carrying on specific business (Per B. Schedule 1, CDEM Act 2002)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Producer, supplier or distributor of manufactured or natural gas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vector Ltd</li> </ul> </li> <li>Provider of a road network: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Auckland Transport Agency</li> <li>New Zealand Transport Agency</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Department of Corrections</li> <li>Accident Compensation Corporation</li> <li>Ministry of Transport</li> <li>Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief</li> <li>Geological and Nuclear Sciences</li> <li>National Institute for Water and Atmospheric Research</li> <li>Met Service</li> <li>Society for Earthquake Engineering</li> <li>Building Research Association of NZ</li> <li>Institute of Professional Engineers</li> <li>Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals</li> <li>Department of Labour</li> <li>Ministry for the Environment</li> <li>Coastguard</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Generator or distributor of electricity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transpower Ltd</li> <li>Vector Ltd</li> <li>Coastal Power Ltd</li> <li>Genesis Power Ltd</li> <li>Mighty River Power Ltd</li> <li>Contact Energy Ltd</li> </ul> </li> <li>Supplier or distributor of water: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Watercare Ltd</li> </ul> </li> <li>Provider of telecommunications network: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Telecom NZ Ltd</li> <li> Vodafone NZ Ltd</li> <li> Tiptoe Clean Ltd</li> <li> Zidgreen Ltd</li> <li> Wooloh</li> <li> Vector Ltd</li> <li> Kordia Ltd</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Producer, Processor or Distributor of Petroleum Products: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NZ Refining Co Ltd</li> <li>Wai Oil Services Ltd</li> <li>BP Oil Ltd</li> <li>Indust Oil Ltd</li> <li>Greenline Energy Ltd</li> <li>Caltex NZ Ltd</li> <li>Call Petroleum Ltd</li> <li>Joint User Refinery Insulation</li> <li>Shell Wipacard What</li> </ul> </li> <li>Provider of a Rail Network or Service: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kiwi Rail Ltd</li> <li>Auckland Transport Agency</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

- 7.2 The Kaikoura Quake and its impact on Wellington has highlighted the need to develop the capacity for Parliament and the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) to operate in Auckland in the event a major disaster causes widespread destruction outside the Parliamentary executive wing that impairs the operation of Parliament and the management of NCDEM State of Emergency operations and recovery operations in the Capital.
- 7.2 An alternative site providing for the continuing operation of Parliament and the NCDEM centre has been identified at the Devonport Naval Base in Auckland. It is clear that Parliament and the Centre will both require effective public communications infrastructure in the event it is necessary to relocate to this site. However, the effectiveness of the Devonport option has still to be put to the test. The Devonport base is located at sea level and the shortest route to it from Auckland City and the Auckland International Airport is across the Auckland Harbour Bridge. Its seaside location may render it vulnerable to a tsunami generated by a major earthquake in other North Island locations, and the provision of a second harbour crossing to reduce serious congestion on the Harbour Bridge is still a matter to be negotiated between Central Government and the Auckland Council. This matter should be explored in the TAG review and in the development of the iMEDIA Business Case.

#### **Recommendation 5**

**That TAG examines the feasibility of utilising Devonport Naval Base as the alternative location for Parliament and NCDEM operations during a State of Emergency, and the potential for other alternative locations in Auckland that are less exposed to tsunami and traffic congestion risks.**

- 7.3 The Auckland iMEDIA hub could be designed to operate Parliament TV remotely and to broadcast nationwide on satellite, and on the Kordia digital terrestrial transmission as well as to provide support for the public communications operations of regional Civil Defence and Emergency Management activity in Auckland to address regional risk minimisation, emergency management and recovery audio-visual digital content needs in Auckland. The iMEDIA regional capability of the facility should be contributed, at least, in substantial part, by the Auckland Council, in association with its council-controlled organisations, and business and other community-based stakeholders in the Auckland region. The sheer scale of Auckland Council operations means it also has substantial public communications needs that could be delivered more efficiently in conjunction with the development of the proposed iMEDIA Hub. The Council also owns and operates a number of venues that might be used for Parliament, Executive Government and NCDEM operations instead of the Devonport Naval Base.
- 7.4 In the development of any business case for an iMEDIA-style multimedia platform, it is recommended that the Auckland University of Technology should be consulted regarding the use of its sophisticated television production facility in the Auckland CBD to originate and produce iMEDIA Hub services and to reduce its capital and operating expenditure requirements, and that the AUT and the Auckland Museum be approached to establish their ability and willingness to provide for sittings of Parliament and the continued operation of Parliament TV and the iMedia hub during any relocation to Auckland.

## Recommendation 6

**That TAG consults with the Office of the Clerk, the Office of the Speaker, the Minister of CDEM, Auckland Council, Auckland University of Technology, and Auckland Museum Trust Board on the provision of suitable alternative venues for the operations of Parliament, Parliament TV and Radio broadcasts, and the NCDEM, and a multi-media iMEDIA-style platform to meet Parliamentary and Emergency Management public communications needs.**

- 7.5 The scale of Auckland Council's operations demands extensive and expensive Auckland ratepayer support, but localised disaster in either Auckland or Wellington would have serious repercussions for the other regions of New Zealand. The feasibility of developing a non-commercial regional channel in Auckland with specific Lifeline responsibilities merits careful consideration. It also raises the question of how demand for similar operations in other major regions of New Zealand could be managed.
- 7.6 The proposed Auckland iMEDIA Hub development could also provide a prototype for the development of a hub and spoke system to provide localised broadcast and telecommunications public communications platforms in other regions across the country.

## 8 iMEDIA Regional Operations



- 8.1 What is possible in Auckland may not be practical in other regions of New Zealand, but the potential for non-commercial **regional** Lifeline broadcast channels should not be ignored as there would need to be a significant regional consultation in further development of the iMEDIA business case in any event.
- 8.2 The development of regional broadcast capacity could require a revival of the non-commercial regional television broadcasting licence. The need for this form of licence was eliminated during the Digital Switch Over when many regional channels terminated operations due to lengthy negotiations on Crown-funding in the transition to DSO and the explosion of transmission costs associated with the transition process. It should be noted that the Government's Regional and Community Broadcasting Policy framework (2006 and endorsed by the National-led coalition Government in 2008) contains the following content requirement:

*"Where possible, the broadcaster should have established and maintained working relationships with significant groups within the community, such as territorial and regional government, **emergency management**, iwi and rununga, educational institutions, youth and community groups, and organisations for the disabled. The broadcaster is expected to facilitate the provision of relevant content from these types of groups."*

The non-commercial television licence was the only regulatory mechanism providing access to TV broadcasting facilities for local authorities and civil defence and emergency management organisations. The licensing system was terminated, without stakeholder consultation, at the Digital Switch Over.

- 8.3 It is worth reviewing how regional broadcasting might be organised on a more effective and sustainable scale as the number and range of localised emergencies increases across the country, as the number of regional and local television broadcasting operations reduces, and

regional public communication content provided advertising-funded broadcasting networks and newspaper chains reduces. The creation of a new form of non-commercial regional Lifeline television and community radio broadcasting licence and the reduction in regional news content by the integrating commercial print and broadcast media would make regional public communications hub and spoke channels with a responsibility to support regional emergency management and civic engagement a more feasible proposition. Here are concept diagrams showing how the hub&spoke operation might function and evolve over time – the first stage being hub&spokes linked by SKYPE, the second stage including regional TV broadcasting operations.



8.4 Regional CDEM/iMEDIA governance structures would include representation of regional CDEM, regional, city, and district local authorities and tertiary education providers (with media studies curricula) and tourism interests.

- 8.5 Regional mini-hubs would be integrated with, and promoted by the nationwide iMEDIA digital communications network, in a third phase of development. The potential for achieving cost benefits through joint bulk purchasing arrangements could be another benefit from coordinating the development of regional and nationwide iMEDIA-style systems.
- 8.6 iMEDIA nationwide and regional broadcasting operations could engage in human and technical resource sharing, audio-visual programme content exchanges and cross promotion.
- 8.7 An iMEDIA regional development could also create a new, more stable foundation for the development of regional, district, community and individual public access to TV broadcasting and digital telecommunications technology at a time when commercial FTA TV and the two newspaper chains producing the bulk of the regional newspapers are in a fragile position.
- 8.8 The full repercussions of digital technology convergence on regional news media and local government public communications under current policy settings are far from clear. This issue is outlined in more detail in the next section of this proposal.

#### **Recommendation 7**

**That TAG recommends that the Government considers the creation of a new Regional Life non-commercial Lifeline broadcasting licence, embracing television and radio broadcasting activities and on-line live streaming of digital audio visual content, on demand and mobile access to content via telecommunications systems to facilitate emergency management public communications.**

### **9 Enhancing Parliament's Public Communications**

- 9.1 Existing arrangements for Parliament-funded coverage of House proceedings and related content by Radio NZ were revised recently. The Public Media Project (PMP) understands that, currently, Radio NZ does not see provision of a Free-to-Air Parliament TV broadcast channel as a high priority, and these negotiations are not progressing. The iMEDIA proposal is designed to provide an option that would enable changes to be made to operate Parliament TV as quickly as possible, without compromising Radio NZ's development priorities. However, PMP envisages forming a content-sharing partnership with Radio NZ and has explored this prospect with RNZ.
- 9.2 The Office of the Clerk has stated that the successful trial of live streaming of some Select Committee proceedings will end because the funding set aside for them has been exhausted.
- 9.3 PMP also understand the Office of the Clerk (OOC) and RNZ have negotiated new terms for the provision of radio broadcast content to replace *Today in Parliament* and *The Week in Parliament* radio broadcasts in 2017 and some other web-based initiatives using in-house Radio NZ services.
- 9.4 In the development of an iMEDIA business case, PMP seeks the opportunity to explore the potential for:
  - A Utilising a common master control, server and playout suite for both live Parliamentary TV coverage of the proceedings of the House, live coverage of Select Committee proceedings via on-line streaming and via on-demand, interactive on-line and mobile telecommunications platforms, and the production and play-out of iMEDIA content

outside the sitting hours of the House; and to meet the public communications needs of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency management, including the new risk minimisation services it may be required to provide as a result of the current Ministerial Review;

- B Providing audio-visual content to enable the proceedings of House and Select Committees for on-line and mobile video streaming and for on-demand public viewing via the Parliamentary website [www.parliament.govt.nz](http://www.parliament.govt.nz) ;
- C Using the existing inventory of Parliamentary audio-visual content in programmes broadcast on iMEDIA, including content generated for the *Virtual House* programme;
- E Scheduling within iMedia's own content, Parliament 'infomercials' for broadcast at times when the House is not sitting. The 'infomercials' could promote public awareness of the wide range of Parliamentary information, educational material developed for public on-line / on demand access, (including new reports available, calls for submissions, public consultation schedules, and notices of special events), the systems for social media engagement, and on-site services and exhibitions available to the visiting public in the Parliamentary complex.
- F Providing live cover of media conferences by the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, Ministers, and leaders of other parties represented in Parliament. This could be made available to other news media organisations under an open access pooling arrangement


9.5 Other iMEDIA TV programme content relating to the NZ Parliament could include:

- A Live coverage of significant Parliamentary ceremonies and events;
- B Interviews and discussions with VIP guests, deputations making official visits to Parliament, and submitters to Select Committee hearings;
- C '*Nationwide*' – daily bulletins of major news and other emergency-related and significant public consultation activity in the regions of New Zealand (produced through co-operative arrangements with Radio NZ);
- D '*Worldwide*' – daily bulletins of international news from regions of the world of particular significance to New Zealand – including special feature coverage of political, diplomatic, trade, tourism, cultural relations with, and official New Zealand missions and deployments to, other nations;
- E '*Capital Call*' – a daily morning forum for the nation's public policy makers, journalists, authors and historians to discuss key issues of the day, world events, and key legislation in Parliament, fact-checking about issues under debate, and providing a 'call-in' segment enabling viewers to talk directly to the guests and to engage in on-air;
- F '*At The House*' - longer form feature programmes on New Zealand's Parliamentary history, its art and gift collections and recorded coverage of social, cultural, performing arts, sports celebrations, ceremonials and commercial events staged in the Parliamentary precinct;

- G *'Citizen's Guide to .....*' – feature programmes tracking how significant law changes have been made by following the process from issue identification through policy development, ministerial and official analysis, consultation, parliamentary debates, submissions and/or petitions, select committee hearings, party caucus considerations, voting, to final Assent and similar processes undertaken by local authorities; and
- H *'The Innovators'* – feature programmes on contemporary and historical New Zealand Crown and commercially-funded science and technology, health, education, housing and social development breakthroughs of international significance.
- I *Travellers' Guide* – a regularly updated daily service providing domestic travellers and international tourists with information on **regional** weather, risk minimisation advice, events, business developments and local hospitality opportunities, significant events and other attractions of interest.
- J *Elections & By Elections* – iMEDIA could provide more extensive coverage of New Zealand general elections and by-elections, by offering free-time for allocation by the Electoral Commission to qualifying parties to broadcast Leader's opening and closing addresses, and party infomercials during the campaign period. It could also consult with the Commission in the development of voter-education content to promote public participation in the electoral processes of central government and local authorities.
- J *International Political Coverage* - It is technically straightforward to include, at zero cost, international material from C-SPAN, the House of Commons, the Canadian House of Commons, the German Bundestag, the Israeli Knesset, and the Russian Duma, the World Bank and IMF, various EC institutions and other representative bodies. Such content, as well as other international public affairs forums and events, political party conventions and conferences, elections, newscasts, and interviews with foreign government officials would be selected and edited in a manner which was relevant to NZ's interests and supportive of public participation in our political processes. PMP is aware that New Zealand parliamentary privilege would not extend to the international coverage that is obtained from foreign sources.
- 9.6 The iMEDIA proposal would not include any change to the role, content, or nature of Parliament TV's live coverage of the proceedings of the House of Representatives. It would continue to be delivered in accordance with guidelines produced by Office of the Speaker and the Office of the Clerk. The repeat screening of *Question Time* during the evening meal recesses would continue.
- 9.7 However, the late night repeat of *Question Time* could be replaced by an updated iMEDIA news bulletin containing a summary of the business of the day in Parliament along with live discussions and interviews on Parliamentary issues of public importance in periods when the House of Representatives is in session. This would be a matter to be negotiated with the Office of the Clerk.

## 10 Digital Disruption of NZ Media

- 10.1 The major New Zealand-based free-to-air commercial broadcasting and newspaper businesses (including TVNZ) are all currently adversely affected by digital disruption in the advertising market. This disruption has been caused by the rapid advances of media globalisation and the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications, and audio-visual, text, data, and other information technologies. Significant adjustments need to be made by established New Zealand media organisations to meet this challenge. This adjustment is likely to be a slow and complex process.
- 10.2 The Government has a major stake in the structural changes that are occurring – both as a regulator and a media owner. It will be particularly sensitive to the need to maintain its neutrality as a policy maker, legislator and regulator, by ensuring any alliance between Crown-owned broadcast services and content providers with one or some of the merging and restructuring commercial media groups. The following graphic demonstrates the potential for this risk.



- 10.3 It should be noted that Crown-owned entities – commercially-focused TVNZ and non-commercial Radio NZ – were both aligned with the two newspaper companies - NZME and Fairfax Media - that were seeking to merge their New Zealand operations.
- 10.4 In March, the Sky TV – Vodafone merger was rejected by the Commerce Commission. The Commission states:

*“The proposed merger would have created a strong vertically integrated payTV and full service telecommunications provider in New Zealand owning all premium sports content... Around half of all households in New Zealand have Sky TV and a large number of those are Sky sports customers... Given the merged entity’s ability to leverage its premium live sports content, we cannot rule out the real chance that demand for its offers would attract a large number of non-Vodafone customers... The evidence before us suggests that the potential popularity of the merged entity’s offers could result in competitors losing or failing to achieve scale to the point that they would reduce investment or innovation in broadband and mobile markets in the future... In particular, we have concerns that this could impact the competitiveness of key third players in these markets such as 2degrees and Vocus.”*




This ruling creates a quandary for Sky TV in terms of finding any other telecommunications partner with significant capacity for on-line distribution of its content against fast-growing new on-line rivals such as the US-based multi-national Netflix. In February, Sky announced its first half profit at December 2016 had declined 32 percent to \$59.3 million due to programme cost increases and falls in revenues and subscribers. Sky also operates the Prime Free-To-Air Television network which will be suffering from the FTA-TV sector's loss of advertising revenue. Sky and Vodafone are not appealing against the Commission's decision, but have agreed to pursue other partnership arrangements.

- 10.5 This month, the Commerce Commission formally rejected the NZME-Fairfax NZ merger. In a cross-submission prior to the announcement, NZME and Fairfax indicated redundancies were an economic reality facing both businesses if the merger was rejected. Job losses would be at a faster pace and may be focused in the regions. The companies said "NZME and Fairfax reiterate that in the absence of the merger, the relevant counterfactual is that both businesses will be unable to maintain their current quality and production levels and remain financially viable. Therefore there is likely to be material reduction in frontline journalism and the production of print publications." (Source: NZ Herald, 13.12.2016) The chief executive of Fairfax NZ, Simon Tong, resigned before the Commission announced its final decision. In February, NZME reported that its trading revenue declined 6 percent to \$407 million in the challenging advertising market during calendar year 2016.
- 10.6 The latest TVNZ financial report for the six months ended December 2016 states:  
*"The New Zealand television advertising revenue market decreased 8.4% for the half year, however TVNZ was able to partially offset this through increased market share and growth in online revenues to achieve advertising revenues for the period of \$159.4 million (down 5.1% from \$168.1 million for the six months to 31 December 2015)."*  
On 15 March, TVNZ's CEO Kevin Kenrick announced a major restructuring, including staff losses, would be needed to adjust the organisation to a shrinking television advertising market.
- 10.7 The second largest free-to-air commercial television operator MediaWorks is in fragile financial condition and faces an uncertain future. Its current owners, US-based Oaktree Capital are engaged in downsizing and restructuring existing operations. Its adjustments include the replacement of its own channel *Four* with the joint venture *Bravo* channel, part-owned by US-based NBCUniversal. Since MediaWorks is privately-owned, no detailed financial performance data is available
- 10.8 The Auckland-based company posted a net loss of \$14.8 million in calendar 2016, due in part to \$6.4 million of impairment charges on the TV business which left the value of that unit's goodwill and broadcasting licences at nil. In a presentation by chief executive Michael Anderson and chief financial officer Ciara McGuigan to provide like-for-like, revenue fell 5.7 percent to \$298 million, driven by an 11 percent decline in TV ad sales to \$130 million. Part of the decline in TV advertising was due to the closure of the TV4 channel and introduction of Bravo, which the accounts show required a \$4.5 million investment from Mediaworks. Oaktree continued to support MediaWorks with equity injections last year and pumped a further \$8 million after the Dec. 31 balance date, having funded new capital projects over the past two years, however, Anderson said there weren't any plans for new investments. Oaktree Capital is the company's biggest lender, with a \$72.9 million loan, while Westpac New Zealand provides a \$20 million working capital facility. MediaWorks was in breach of interest cover and leverage ratio covenants, which required it to seek a waiver from


Westpac, and chief financial officer Ciara McGuigan said she expected the company to be back within the undertakings by September.

- 10.9 The resolution of complex commercial and legal issues arising from the media merger refusals by the Commerce Commission and the rapid increase in competition from off-shore multinational digital media for audiences, advertisers, and programme content with international appeal is likely to be a litigious, time-consuming process.
- 10.10 The scale of digital disruption in the New Zealand advertising market that supports the provision of New Zealand content by New Zealand-based commercial media is evident in data released by the Advertising Standards Authority up until 2015, and subsequently by individual media operators and the New Zealand Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB).




- 10.11 The Advertising Standards Authority recently released advertising turnover data by media for 2016. This data also confirmed the small proportion of the interactive digital media market that has been gained by the new digital media developments of broadcast TV and Radio operators.

- 10.12 New Zealand has one of the most advertising-dependent Free-To-Air television broadcasting in the developed world, according to a survey conducted by Canadian researchers Nordciti in 2011 (*Available, if required*). In 2015, TVNZ derived 94 percent of its revenue from advertising and commercial sponsorship, according to its last annual report.
- 10.13 In the United States, under similar pressure from new, interactive digital media, major television broadcasters have reduced their advertising revenue dependence from 100% to around 50%. They have diversified their revenue streams by introducing subscription and pay-to-view services, licencing programme-related goods and services, and foreign programme sales, according to the respected television analyst Michael Wolf, the author of *“Television is the New Television”* (published: Penguin Random House, 2015).
- 10.14 No adjustments of a similar scale have yet been made by New Zealand’s major free-to-air commercial television broadcasters or newspaper publishers, but main TV networks have increased their investment on on-line services, and appear to be seeing little benefit for it yet. However, viewers are noticing a difference in local content on-screen. There is less original local content, more emphasis on advertising-friendly genre such as light news and current affairs, virtual reality contests, and light entertainment travel and comedy programmes, more repeated content, and more long periods of commercial “infomercials”
- 10.15 The Crown-funding agency NZ On Air has recorded a steady decline in original (first-run) New Zealand content being screened on the major Free-to-Air TV networks since 2008. It states that its funding now supports just 14% of the hours of first-run New Zealand content screened by the major FTA channels. The bulk of FTA-TV local content is funded by advertising revenue.



10.16 Data provided by IAB demonstrates that the bulk of the IADM sector's growth in advertising revenue is being gained by new global media and communications technology businesses. This is illustrated vividly in the IAB's presentation of sector results for 2016.

### Multinational Operators Dominating Contest for NZ Media Advertising



10.17 Search & Directories (Google and Yahoo) dominate the interactive digital advertising market. The second smallest share of the interactive digital media market is the on-line video sector, the sector where television broadcasters have made significant investments to preserve their audience reach and attractiveness to advertisers. The very small share of the on-line video sector captured by New Zealand television broadcasters is indicated clearly in the ASA pie chart at 10.11 (above).

10.18 In the 4th quarter of 2016, on-line video had the second fastest growth rate, as global media operators such as Netflix and AmazonVideo stepped up their presence in New Zealand.



- 10.19 PMP notes that in the United States in 2015 “as much as 70 percent of Internet-distributed data was video, 50% of it from Netflix and You Tube,” according to the respected media analyst Michael Woolf, author of *“Television Is the New Television”*. Similar dominance of internet data traffic in this country is most likely to occur – and, on current Government policy settings, it is likely to be at the expense of New Zealand-based media and New Zealand broadcast television local content production.
- 10.20 The Government is well aware that the multinational media companies make a minimal contribution to its tax revenue – while they are major beneficiaries from its heavy investments in the provision of ultra-fast broadband and the development of Rural Broadband Initiatives.
- 10.21 PMP submits that the multinational interactive digital media companies entering the New Zealand market have, at least, a strong moral obligation to support New Zealand consumers and taxpayers who funded the provision and support the operation of the mobile, UFB, RBI, and telecommunications cable lifeline utilities that sustain their operations here.
- 10.22 Moral obligations are difficult to enforce. Nevertheless the will of the multinational operators to provide support to the maintenance and development of a new, non-commercial iMEDIA emergency communications and risk minimisation system should be tested, particularly given the impact their operations are already having on the ability of the New Zealand-based FTA TV channels and New Zealand newspaper publishers to support the production of New Zealand content to meet the information needs of New Zealanders as citizens, as well as consumers of entertainment.
- 10.23 The multi-national interactive digital media entry to the New Zealand market is also likely to erode the value of the Crown’s wide range of free-to-air media and communications carrying assets.
- 10.24 The development of a stand-alone non-commercial iMedia FTA-TV system would enhance the Crown’s options for reducing its exposure to reductions in FTA-TV advertising expenditure and its ability to secure constant, almost universal and instant public access to emergency-related mass communications.

## 11 Government Cost Savings through Structural Changes

- 11.1 The final section of this proposal canvasses the potential for Government cost-saving through changes to reduce overheads and duplication of effort between a range of Crown-funded agencies affected by the convergence of Global and New Zealand-based media and the digital information technologies they employ.
- 11.2 The Government indicates that it wishes to reduce its costs, and to stimulate and support economic growth, where this is possible without harm to the public interest. This requires difficult choices to be made in areas where rapid changes are occurring, as they are in the print media, radio and television broadcast media, and telecommunications media sectors.
- 11.3 Sound information is required as the basis for Crown-funding decisions, but it is not readily available via public sources to other parties. However, the Public Media Project has attempted to identify some area where cost-savings may be achieved as the iMEDIA system is developed and implemented. Areas for consideration are identified in the following diagram.



- 11.4 The first grouping relates to Emergency Sector agencies. It may be possible to achieve cost-savings through an integration of public communications effort across the Fire & Emergency Service, St John Ambulance, Police Motorway Support, Road Patrol and Maritime services and Regional search and rescue and coastguard services. Cost savings could be achieved by bulk purchasing commonly-used major items such as helicopters, observation drones, coastal patrol vessels, and associated training and maintenance services. These savings could be enhanced by co-location of fleet and despatch centres, and communications technology.
- 11.5 The second grouping relates to Crown-funded audio-visual digital content collection, archiving, curation, and on-demand, on-line servicing of requests for access and use of content in the public domain. This would involve a coordination of Crown-funded activities administered by the Ministry of Culture & Heritage and the Department of Internal Affairs,

via NZ On Air, the Film Commission, National Archives, the National Library's DigitalNZ service

- 11.6 The third grouping relates to the management of media content standards and content complaints by agencies such as the Office of Film & Literature Standards, On-line Film and Games classification, and on-line and on-demand video content standards. In terms of programme and advertising standards regulation, the development of new digital advertising forms – such as “native advertising” (editorial lookalike advertisements) and commercial product placement (paid for presence of products within broadcast local programme content) indicates that convergence of digital media content regulatory and complaints agencies' activities may be required to address these issues.
- 11.7 The fourth grouping relates to Crown-funded audio-visual digital content management and regulatory activities administered by the Department of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Education, and involves the public communications services provided by agencies and organisations such as the Open Polytechnic, eTV, Universities, Polytechnics, and schools involved in media literacy and studies programmes. PMP sees opportunities for cost-savings by exchanging content with the educational agencies where it has broadcast or educational potential, and to build public awareness of new services being offered by educational and social development agencies in iMEDIA news and information programmes.
- 11.8 The fifth grouping involves eliminating overlap in functions performed by NIWA, Geonet, and the Met Service relating to weather, water and air quality, and earthquake studies
- 11.9 The sixth grouping embraces the operations of the Electoral Commission and the Justice Sector who have independent public communications needs which could be met via the iMEDIA platform. The Electoral Commission PMP understands that the Ministry of Justice and the Judiciary may be considering the matter of providing audio-visual coverage of court proceedings. The most cost-effective manner of serving this demand would be by a providing pooled coverage arrangement similar to the one being proposed for Parliament TV, a single operator providing production services, under separate codes of practice approved by the Judiciary and the Electoral Commission, to make public communications audio-visual content available on a free-to-use pool basis by all news media. This would save the need to provide additional media gallery space in Courts and eliminate the cost of operating ad hoc systems to manage a multitude of individual media requests.
- 11.10 These proposals could all be examined in more detail if the Government decides that the PMP's iMEDIA platform development merits further consideration.

**Recommendation 8:**

**That TAG consider, endorse or modify recommendations for restructuring Crown-funded Organisation public communications content and service operations identified in Section 12 of this proposal to achieve savings that would recover the cost of creating and operating an iMEDIA-style platform.**

## **12 Conclusion & Recommendations**

- 12.1 Priority should be given to the essential tasks of improving immediate and continuing emergency management communications services and the public communications

processes of Parliament on a continuous and nationwide basis, as rapidly as possible and in the most cost-efficient manner. The iMEDIA proposal is designed to achieve this objective.

- 12.2 Finally, I repeat my offer of continuing assistance in developing and implementing this proposal voluntarily and seek no reward beyond the recovery of authorised expenses incurred in performing any duties that might be required of me.

**Recommendation 1:**

**That TAG immediately advise the OoC of its potential interest in the unutilised capacity of Parliament TV for both State of Emergency, emergency risk minimisation, and emergency recovery public communications, if it considers this would assist in the delivery of Outcome 5 of its own Terms of Reference.**

**Recommendation 2:**

**That TAG immediately express its concern to its Minister at the lack of coordination between its efforts and the other current reviews of aspects of public communications effectiveness by delaying further work on the cross-government media globalisation and digital review and the implementation of the Office of the Clerk's Request for proposal until after the General Election; and seeks an assurance that there will be co-ordination between the TAG and the Office of the Clerk when consideration of the OoC RFP resumes, desirably after the election, the formation of a new Government, appointment of a new Ministry and new Speaker for the House of Representatives.**

**Recommendation 3:**

**That the Technical Advisory Group examines the iMEDIA proposal with urgency with a view to recommending an immediate commitment of \$1 million from the Government to enable the TAG to fund the development a business case to test its feasibility, if TAG determines this would be useful**

**Recommendation 4:**

**That TAG request the Minister Government to review legislation and regulation relating to Lifeline Utilities to ensure that all Free-to-Air TV broadcasters and broadcast transmission services providers – and particularly Kordia and Sky TV – are lifeline utilities and that all lifeline utilities are required to carry NCDEM Lifeline Utilities public communications audio-visual content on emergency risk minimisation and recovery programmes so that they are universally accessible throughout New Zealand.**

**Recommendation 5:**

**That TAG consults with the Office of the Clerk, the Office of the Speaker, the Minister of CDEM, Auckland Council, Auckland University of Technology, and Auckland Museum Trust Board on the provision of suitable alternative venues for the operations of Parliament, Parliament TV and Radio broadcasts, and the NCDEM, and a multi-media iMEDIA-style platform to meet Parliamentary and Emergency Management public communications needs.**

**Recommendation 6:**

**That TAG consults with the Office of the Clerk, the Office of the Speaker, the Minister of CDEM, Auckland Council, Auckland University of Technology, and Auckland Museum Trust**



**Board on the provision of suitable alternative venues in Auckland for the operations of Parliament, Parliament TV and Radio broadcasts, the NCDEM, and a multi-media iMEDIA-style platform to meet Parliamentary and Emergency Management public communications needs.**

**Recommendation 7:**

**That TAG recommends that the Government considers the creation of a new Regional Life non-commercial Lifeline broadcasting licence, embracing television and radio broadcasting activities and on-line live streaming of digital audio-visual content, on demand and mobile access to content via telecommunications systems to facilitate emergency management public communications.**

**Recommendation 8:**

**That TAG consider, endorse or modify recommendations for restructuring Crown-funded Organisation public communications content and service operations identified in Section 12 of this proposal to achieve savings that would recover the cost of creating and operating an iMEDIA-style platform.**

David Beatson – convenor – Public Media Project.

**ENDS**

For further information, contact: David Beatson, Convenor – Public Media Project, PO Box 47718  
Ponsonby AUCKLAND 1011. s9(2)(a) .

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## **APPENDIX 1 – About the Author**

David Beatson's 50 year career has encompassed radio and television journalism, senior executive and board positions across the television and radio broadcasting sector, print publishing, tourism and aviation, and information communications technology sectors and involvement in the development of media policies, legislation, regulations, and codes of practice.

### **Broadcasting**

Presenter, interviewer and producer of radio and television news and current affairs programmes at both network and regional levels. (Town & Around (Dunedin host), Compass, Gallery, Foreign Affairs, Eyewitness News);

A founding member and chair of the Current Affairs Broadcasting Society and of the Radio & Television Journalists Society; founding member NZ Television Producers & Directors Association);

Co-author – New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation News & Current Affairs Manual;

Editor of News at Six and News at Ten, South Pacific Television (TV2);

Executive producer of Current Affairs, South Pacific Television;

A member of the Executive Committee (Excom) of the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand.

A founding director of Endeavour Television, which later evolved into South Pacific Pictures;

A founding director of Radio Pacific Limited, New Zealand's first news-talk radio station;

Ad hoc member of the Electoral Commission, implementing Election Broadcasting policy;

Chair – NZ on Air.

### **Print**

Reporter, feature writer, illustrations editor, Otago Daily Times;

Author – The New Zealand Weather Book;

Editor and Managing Editor – New Zealand Listener, pioneering digital editorial processes;

Chair of the Magazine Publishers Association;

Chair of Advertising Practices Committee, overseeing the formation of the Advertising Standards Authority.

### **Communications**

Chief press secretary to Opposition leader and Prime Minister Jim Bolger;

Communications management consultancy projects for: Toll New Zealand Limited – New Zealand's largest multi-modal supply chain operators; Tranzrail – restructuring and sale; Civil Aviation Authority; Speirs Group – financial services, fresh food products and omega 3 processing; Tenon Limited – transition from Fletcher Forests ownership; and the Regional Television Broadcasters Association on transition arrangements for the Digital Switch Over.

### **Tourism, Aviation, and Events**

New Zealand Tourism Board – Deputy Chief Executive. Organiser of the New Zealand Tourism Awards

Air New Zealand - Vice president – Government, International & Public Affairs

Member of the Board of Airline Representatives New Zealand (BARNZ)

Chairman - Towards 2000 Taskforce, a Government-appointed taskforce organising nationwide Millennium Celebrations programme.

### **Digital Technology**

Former Chair of Directors, Ivistra Ltd. (now *Vis Fleet*), specialists in fleet tracking and management visualisation;

Convenor, Public Media Project, developing concepts for interactive digital multi-media systems.

## APPENDIX 2 – PMP Appeal to Probity Auditor on Office of the Clerk's RFP

**From:** David Beatson [mailto:s9(2)(a)]

**Sent:** Sunday, 2 July 2017 1:02 p.m.

**To:** Peter Davies s9(2)(a)

**Subject:** Request for Proposals - Office of the Clerk - Expression of Concer

s9(2)(a)

Dear Mr Davies

I am writing to you in your capacity as the Probity Auditor in respect of the Request for Proposals to provide television production services to the Office of the Clerk for broadcasting the proceedings of the House of Representatives. I am advised by the OoC that "respondents with concerns about the RFP process are invited to contact our probity auditor directly.

As convener of the Public Media Project I have been in communication with the Office of the Clerk on this matter since June last year. I have attached a time-lined copy of email communications with the Office, and excerpts from a letter sent to me by the Manager Business Continuity and Chamber Operations/Serjeant-at-Arms Steve Streefkerk on 18 April 2017 as evidence of this communication.

The manner in which the Office of the Clerk has handled my requests and the terms of the Request for Proposals have effectively disqualified me from participating as an interested party in the RFP process because:

- I have made repeated attempts to register under the RealMe process to obtain access to the GETs service since last October and none of them has been successful. The registration process simply sends me round in a never-ending circle. I have sent an email complaint to the postmaster of the RealMe service asking him to rectify the problem so I can register. I have, as yet, received no response from the postmaster.
- I have already missed the first requirement of the RFP because I was not made aware that it had been published on the GETs service until the date for interested parties to attend the **Mandatory** Site Visit on 28 June had passed. Consequently, I also missed your briefing on the role of the Probity Auditor. This happened because I only received confirmation from the OoC that the RFP process had been published on 12 June 2017 together with a copy of the RFP on the 30th of June, two days after the Mandatory Site Visit date had passed despite the fact that my inquiry about it was lodged on the 25th of June.
- I am unable to ask further questions relating to the RFP and the deadline for questions is 14 July, because all questions must be lodged by the GETs service and I am still unable to access that service.
- I am unable to negotiate with third parties to meet the requirements of the RFP because my proposal involves negotiations with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management and a Ministerial Inquiry into the effectiveness of the emergency management response was initiated by a special Technical Advisory Group on 12 June which is required to complete its work before the end of September. This Group's terms of reference are extensive and include both internal and public communications. The TOR document is attached for your information. It will be straining to meet its deadline.
- Finally, my proposal to the Office of the Clerk and the Ministry of Civil Defence will require extensive consultations with other Ministers, Ministries, leaders of all parties represented in Parliament, other State-owned enterprises and agencies, and Local Authorities to create the

partnerships needed to support a more effective national and local emergency risk minimisation, disaster management and recovery operations public communications system.

As matters stand, and given the vulnerable state of advertising-funded news media – television, radio, and newspapers - at national and regional level, it seems likely that Kordia will be the only organisation capable of fulfilling the requirements of the RFP. Kordia's broadcast transmission services include both satellite free-to-air television and terrestrial television broadcasters and mobile on demand and on-line services that are essential to the provision of universally accessible, and instantaneous interactive mass public communications in New Zealand. However, while Kordia's telecommunication services are classified as an emergency lifeline utility, its broadcast transmission services are not. This anomaly needs to be addressed by an amendment to the Broadcasting Act. Furthermore, Kordia was not established to, or mandated, to provide television broadcast production services.

I believe the RFP process being followed by the Office of the Clerk is fatally flawed. With the Speaker retiring when the House of Representatives rises for the general election campaign by the end of August, its timing for the selection of a television production service provider before the composition of the new Parliament and new government is formed could not be worse.

I seek your intervention as Probity Auditor to postpone the start of the RFP process until the end of September, as it cannot produce a result that is in the public interest under the process that has been initiated by the Office of the Clerk.

I will also be drawing this issue to the attention of leaders of all parties represented in the current Parliament, as they are also members of the Parliamentary Services Commission which is chaired by the Speaker of the House.

Please do not hesitate to contact me for further information. I am deeply concerned by what is happening.

Yours sincerely,

David Beatson – convenor – Public Media Project.

**RE: Request for Proposals - Office of the Clerk - Expression of Concern**

3/7/2017 13:49

**Peter Davies**

To David Beatson

David, I would like to acknowledge receipt of your e mail.

Can you please advise whether you are happy for me to identify in discussions with the Office of the Clerk the name of the person who has raised this matter. I suspect they will know anyway but I can endeavour to maintain some anonymity if you would prefer that.

I will look into the matter you have raised but I have no ability to stop the process. Any decisions on the conduct of the process are rightfully the prerogative of the Office of the Clerk.

I also note that several of the matters that you have raised fall outside the responsibilities of the Office of the Clerk. An example of this is the difficulty you have had in registering on GETS. The GETS system is managed by Government Procurement as a branch of MBIE.

I would appreciate your early response to my question above.

Regards

Peter Davies  
Director, Audit New Zealand

**RE: Request for Proposals - Office of the Clerk - Expression of Concern**  
3/7/2017 16:03

**David Beatson**

To Peter Davies

I have no objection to you revealing my identity to the Office of the Clerk, As I know they have guessed it would be me. I have tried to explain that I fully realise that my proposal goes beyond the Clerk's Mandate. I understand the Mandate could be changed by the Parliament Service Commission, chaired by the Speaker and has a membership comprising leaders of Political Parties represented in Parliament or their nominated representatives. If you could confirm that I would be grateful.

db

**Request for Proposals - Office of the Clerk - Expression of Concern**  
5/7/2017 13:32

**Peter Davies**

To David Beatson

David, you advised me on 2 July of some concerns that you hold about a tender process that is presently being conducted by the Office of the Clerk (the Office). You referred to potential probity issues and you asked me as Probity Auditor to investigate your concerns.

Further to my brief acknowledgement to you yesterday of receipt of your complaint I have now met with the Office of the Clerk (the Office) and discussed the matters you raised. I have also had an opportunity to review the documentation that you provided.

To summarise the outcome of my review of this matter and my discussions with the Office I advise that the tender process for broadcasting services commenced with the release of the RFP document on 12 June. The Office has confirmed to me its intention to continue with the tender process as planned. I acknowledge that this will not be the news you will be hoping for. I have set out below an explanation of my role with this process and I have provided a response to some of the matters that you raised.

Firstly, to explain my role – Audit New Zealand has been engaged as Probity Auditor for this tender process. I am providing those services. We undertake a considerable amount of this work for public sector entities throughout New Zealand. Our role is an audit role - to confirm that an appropriate process is being or has been followed for the tendering of the services. As Auditor we do not have a

decision making role. Nor do we design the tender process. We take an independent position and report on the process as we find it. Our focus is on the process, on adherence to good practice and the planning for the process and on fairness to the tenderers who are legitimately involved in the process. We do not review the business case for the procurement and nor do we make or endorse any decision on the award of the contract – those decisions are rightfully the domain of the purchasing authority.

In response to some of the matters you have raised I comment as follows:

- The responsibility for registering with GETS and obtaining a RealMe registration lies entirely with you. GETS is a widely used system for the advertising and processing of tenders for goods and services. It is a system that is managed by Government Procurement which is a branch of MBIE. If you have had difficulties with your registration with RealMe or GETS then you need to take that up with the relevant agencies. This is not a matter for the Office of the Clerk and nor for my role or my Office. I am not aware of any purchasing agency that takes responsibility for ensuring that prospective tenderers are registered on GETS.
- You should have been aware that the process for this procurement was imminent because you received advice from the Office about this in mid May. If you had been registered on GETS you could have set yourself up to automatically receive advice of the tender opportunity – as many other suppliers and providers do. I note that on 30 June you were provided with a copy of the RFP for information purposes.
- Several of the matters that you have raised such as the timing of the mandatory site visit and deadlines for questions are matters that are only relevant to parties that intend to tender for the services set out in the RFP – the production of TV broadcasts. It is difficult to understand how you can be seen as a prospective and legitimate tenderer in this process. The Office is not aware that you have the capability to provide broadcasting services. The information you have provided to the Office at an earlier time and to me recently does not suggest that you could present a tender that properly addresses the scope of the RFP. All tenders are considered for compliance with the scope and requirements described in the RFP before they are considered for evaluation. If they are not compliant then usually they are not evaluated. That aside, it is your decision as to whether you are capable of presenting a compliant tender.
- I don't agree with your view that the RFP process is "fatally flawed". The current tender process is based on the current requirements for broadcasting services. If the requirements for the services change at some future point then the broadcasting contract may need to be reviewed.
- You suggest that the selection of a broadcasting provider is somehow influenced by the Government of the day. I don't accept that. It is the Office of the Clerk's responsibility to select a provider. The Government's interest will be in the mandate that the Office holds and possibly in the scope and costs of the services.
- You clearly have a vision for the opportunities that Parliament TV may present. However, this vision is well outside the scope of this particular procurement. Your proposal is also outside the mandate that the Office of the Clerk has for Parliamentary TV. Your advice below also makes reference to the need for legislative change. Consequently the Office cannot progress any proposal through this tender process that requires legislative change. However, the Office's e mail to you on 30 June referenced some possible options ahead for your proposal.
- You may wish to continue to explore your proposal with other agencies. If you are successful then this may result in some change in the future.

- The current contract for TV production services concludes at the end of next year. To ensure that a new service can be implemented and tested including the establishment of new production facilities it is important that this tender process proceeds now. Should the Office not find a suitable provider taking into account both the qualitative and cost aspects of the services then the Office will need time to look at alternative options. The Office also needs to identify a budget for the services by later this year. The Office is not prepared to compromise its ability to deliver TV services on a continuing basis. These considerations all lead to needing to progress this tender now. The Office has confirmed its intention to continue with the tender process.

If you wish to clarify any of the comments above then please let me know. However, I do not expect that I can add anything further to the position set out above.

Regards

Peter Davies  
Director, Audit New Zealand.

## **Fwd: FW: Parliament TV production services RFP dox**

15:06

### **David Beatson**

To s9(2)(a)

Dear Mr Davies

I am copying you in on this message, sent today, to the RFP contact person at the Office of the Clerk. Please regard this is an appeal against your determination and act accordingly. I am also taking this matter up with members of the Parliament Services Commission, chaired by the Speaker, and comprised of members representing all the political parties in the House of Representatives. I draw your particular attention to the provision in the RFP for variations to the RFP, as mentioned to Ms Brimblecombe below. I hope to hear your response to my appeal, as soon as possible. The matter requires urgent consideration before Parliament is dissolved for the General Election.

Yours sincerely,

David Beatson s9(2)(a)

----- Original Message -----

From: David Beatson s9(2)(a)

To: Sandy Brimblecombe s9(2)(a)

Date: 07 July 2017 at 14:57

Subject: Re: FW: Parliament TV production services RFP dox

Good afternoon. I am, as of yesterday, a registered RealMe person with access to the GETs site. This process required a three hour non-stop phone call to the RealMe Help Desk. The first three-quarters of an hour was spent waiting for a response from the RealMe Help Desk team member, and the remaining two-and-a-quarter hours were spent in a series of unsuccessful attempts to gain acceptance of my registration. That ended at the point when the RealMe Help Desk member attempted to transfer me to the GETs site Help Desk and the call and the transfer process end when someone (not me) terminated my call. I then called the GETs Help Desk directly and finally completed the registration, as I had been a GETs user prior to the introduction of the RealMe system, but up until yesterday, all my previous attempts to make contact with RealMe to register had failed - because I had given up waiting for the RealMe Help Desk well before three-quarters of an hour elapsed..

I do not accept the Probity Auditors verdict that OoC has no responsibility for the functions of the RealMe and GETs systems. That was a deliberate choice by OoC, and OoC was aware of my status as an interested party as a result of my response to the RFI which was prompted by a PMP team member with access to GETs. The OoC response to those who registered as interested parties (18 April 2017 - by NZpost delivered letter) did not specify the date on which the RFP would be published on GETs. From then until yesterday, all my previous efforts to register personally with RealMe for access to GETs had failed. Hardly surprising, really. You should try registering for GETs Access with RealMe yourself!

Be that as it may, OoC was always well aware of my continuing interest, and you also knew who had gained access to the RFP, and had my email and postal mail contacts before the termination date for RFP responses occurred. I asked you on 25 January, and it would have been in seen by you on Monday 26 January - however you did not respond to my request for the GETs publication date until 30 January when you emailed me a copy of the RFP.

I note that your response was sent to me after the deadline for responses to the RFP had expired and two days after respondents were required to attend a mandatory site visit. The date set for that visit was 28 February. Perhaps, I could have met the deadline for the mandatory site visit if I had been able to see the details of the RFP in the two working days between my 25 Jan inquiry and the date set for the mandatory visit. I think you will understand why I am not impressed and will be using all the means at my disposal to gain recognition for PMP as an interested party that should have been able to qualify under the terms of the RFP, which I note are subject to variation. Perhaps, you should advise your "higher authorities" of my intent to pursue this matter by all means at my disposal.

Cheers & Aroha  
David B

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David Beatson s9(2)(a)

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Cheers & Aroha  
David B

On 07 July 2017 at 12:05 Sandy Brimblecombe <s9(2)(a)> wrote:

Good morning

I see from my prospective tenderers report (which GETs makes available to me) that you are yet to subscribe to the opportunity on GETs

Please let me know if you need any further assistance with the subscription process.

Sandy

From: Sandy Brimblecombe  
Sent: Wednesday, 5 July 2017 4:12 p.m.

## **2 EMAIL TRAIL AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH OFFICE OF THE CLERK**

From: David Beatson s9(2)(a) ]  
Sent: Monday, 20 June 2016 3:40 p.m.

To: Sandy Brimblecombe  
Subject: PMP Response to RFI - part 2 - Appendix B

And here is appendix B. It is a powerpoint presentation and should be printed in the notes page format so that both the graphic and the explanatory text can be seen.

Thank you for your consideration

David Beatson.

RE: PMP Response to RFI - part 2 - Appendix B

20/6/2016 17:58

**Sandy Brimblecombe**

To David Beatson

Thank you for responding to our RFI. We have received both parts A & B.

We will consider the information set out in your response and be in touch if we wish to explore it further.

Sandy Brimblecombe

From: David Beatson s9(2)(a) ]  
Sent: Tuesday, 21 June 2016 9:02 a.m.  
To: Sandy Brimblecombe  
Subject: Re: PMP Response to RFI - part 2 - Appendix B

Dear Sandy

Thank you very much for the prompt acknowledgement. Could you please also let me know if it's OK to send a copy of my response on to the Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency Management? I did advise them I was sending my submission to them on to you with the Response to your request for information.

Best wishes

David B

On 21/6/2016 at 10:59 Sandy Brimblecombe wrote:

**Sandy Brimblecombe**

To David Beatson

Yes, that is fine with us.

Sandy

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On Monday, 17 October 2016 3:24 PM, Sandy Brimblecombe  
s9(2)(a) > wrote:

Hi David

Catriona Scrannel from the Ministry of Culture and Heritage has been in touch just wanting to be sure we are all on the same page / have the same information regarding your proposal to use Parliament TV to broadcast civil defence messages. I would like to share your response to our RFI with Catriona. Are you happy for me to do that?

Sandy

**From:** David Beatson [mailto:s9(2)(a)]  
**Sent:** Monday, 17 October 2016 4:53 PM  
**To:** Sandy Brimblecombe s9(2)(a)  
**Subject:** Re: Your response to our RFI

Hi Sandy,  
I'm very happy for you to send my material - the response to the OoC RFI and the MCDEM submission - on to Catriona. I'd like MCH to be aware of my proposals. Hope all's well with you.  
Cheers  
David B

On Tuesday, 18 October 2016 7:45 AM, Sandy Brimblecombe s9(2)(a) > wrote:

Many thanks - I thought as much but wanted to be sure. Also, I have attached the most recent Colmar Brunton research we have.  
Sandy

On Tuesday, 18 October 2016 9:56 AM, David Beatson s9(2)(a) > wrote:  
And many thanks to you too,  
db

**18 April 2017**

Letter sent to PMP by Steve Streefkerk, manager Business Opportunity & Chamber Operations / Serjeant-at-Arms – “Notice of opportunity to supply live television production services for broadcasts of the proceedings of the House of Representatives”. It states that suppliers must be able to “supply and support a robust technical solution This letter advised:

“The Office’s indicative timelines for identifying and implementing a services solution are:

- May-September 2017 Issue RFP and identify shortlisted/preferred supplier
- October – December 2017 Undertake due diligence and negotiate contract

- January-June 2018 Consult successful supplier on House camera refresh programme
- July 2018 Commence solution implementation and testing
- December 2018 Commence broadcasting the overnight roll
- February 2019 Commence live programme production services

"The Office expects to release the RFP in mid to late May 2017. The RFP process will include a mandatory site visit to the parliamentary precinct in Wellington to be held on a sitting day in late May or early June. The date for that site visit will be advised in the RFP.

"If you have any queries in relation to this notice please direct them to Sandy Brimblecome at s9(2)(a) ."

From: David Beatson [mailto:s9(2)(a)]  
Sent: Thursday, 4 May 2017 12:49 p.m.  
To: Sandy Brimblecombe  
Subject: Notice of Opportunity

Dear Sandy - hope you are well - and I see you're named in despatches again....

I have received a letter from Steve Streefkerk at OoC giving notice of the opportunity to supply live production services for broadcasts of the proceedings of the House of Representatives. Could you please send me an electronic copy?

Also can you advise me what is meant in terms of "supply and support of a robust technical solution to connect remotely with the New Zealand Parliament to obtain the camera and sound feeds"? Does this mean supply new cameras and microphone systems for placement in the Debating Chamber?

Also, what is meant in the "indicative timelines" section by "broadcasting the overnight roll" What exactly is the "overnight roll"?

Many thanks

David Beatson

Convenor - Public Media Project s9(2)(a)

RE: Notice of Opportunity

12/5/2017 14:01

**Sandy Brimblecombe**

To David Beatson

Hi David

Yes, we are going to the market to source the production of Parliament TV. The notice simply alerts the market that we are about to issue the RFP. There is no further documentation available at this stage. If you wish to obtain a copy of the RFP document once it is published you will need to register on GETS.

Obtaining the camera feeds does not mean supplying new cameras or any equipment or infrastructure on the parliamentary precinct. Although we will be replacing the cameras in the chamber as a separate project next year.

The overnight roll is the information that is broadcast when the House is not sitting.

I trust these responses answer your queries.

Sandy

From: David Beatson [mailto:s9(2)(a)]  
Sent: Sunday, 25 June 2017 4:16 p.m.  
To: Sandy Brimblecombe  
Subject: RFP - Suppliers of live TV production services - corrected version

Corrected version

Dear Sandy,

I hope you are well. I am writing to inquire if the Request for Proposals has been published on GETs yet. I have tried unsuccessfully to register to gain access to GETs several times, and am unable to get the registration process to work.

My reason for asking is that the Minister of Civil Defence & Emergency Management recently initiated a review to ensure that New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges. The terms of reference for the review were endorsed by a "cross-parliamentary group" of party representatives. The TOR states that recent events (the Hawke's Bay gastroenteritis outbreak, the East Cape and Kaikoura earthquakes and tsunami scares, and the Port Hills fire) have called the effectiveness of the current emergency management situation into question, "resulting in a loss of stakeholder, public and Ministerial confidence in the response system".

The review is to be undertaken by a special Technical Advisory Group within a period of three months, and the Minister states that its work will be supported by the "Cross-Parliamentary Group". The TOR requires the group to consider both internal and external emergency communications processes and to complete its work within three months.

As you know, the proposal I have outlined to the Office for the provision of television production services to support live broadcasts of the proceedings of the House of Representatives envisages the use of technical infrastructure supporting the operations of Parliament TV for other purposes outside the hours that Parliament is sitting - principally for the broadcast of content designed to enhance public access to content relating to emergency

risk minimisation, emergency management and emergency recovery, and to support public engagement in the decision-making processes of Parliament, Government Ministers, their officials, state agencies, and with Regional and district government and their operating agencies.

The OoC has advised me of its need to ensure that its activities on behalf of the Speaker are not to be compromised by any proposal to employ Parliament TV infrastructure for other purposes. However, I believe satisfactory ways and means of ensuring that does not happen can be devised and the public can be provided with more value for the funds that are invested in securing the Parliament TV broadcast infrastructure without compromising its political independence.

I am currently preparing a submission to the Technical Advisory Group conducting the review of the effectiveness of the current emergency management system, because of TOR includes a specific outcome in regard to its internal and public communications and to alert it to the fact that the OoC is also engaged in a process of exploring the feasibility of new arrangements for the production of the broadcast of live proceedings of the House. I will be expressing concern that the Technical Advisory Group and its supporting cross-parliamentary group liaise closely with the Speaker over the utilisation of Parliament TV infrastructure to deliver the desired improvements in public communications on emergency management matters.

That is why I asking about the timing of the issuing of the OoC RFP, which is currently scheduled for between May and September 2016. Given that an Election will take place in September, it appears that time will very short for any coordination of a response to you and and to the Technical Advisory Group conducting the review of the emergency management system.

Can you assist me?

David Beatson.

RE: RFP - Suppliers of live TV production services - corrected version

30/6/2017 15:44

**Sandy Brimblecombe**

To David Beatson

Good afternoon. David

Yes, the RFP was released on GETS on 12 June. Sorry to hear you are having trouble with GETS registration (it is a two-stage process requiring a RealME logon). To save you the trouble, I have attached a copy of the RFP, for your information.

The Office's decision to outsource production of the broadcast feed will not affect the availability of our unused broadcast time. We remain interested in options for other broadcasters to buy that time from Kordia and arrange for their programmes to be broadcast when Parliament is not sitting. As you know from our previous discussions, we cannot be the broadcaster of other agencies' content. Our decision to outsource production of the broadcast feed does however mean that the Parliamentary Service will no longer own any control room equipment. Note that the current

Parliament TV Control Room does not include the facility to make or playout other programmes. It was designed and built for the limited purpose of filming the proceedings and providing the switched output to the media and to broadcasters.

We are available to discuss with the Technical Advisory Group, our future plans with regard to the production of the broadcast feed and broadcasting the Parliament TV programme, if that is of interest to them. I am not aware that they have sought any consultation with the Office. We had previously asked CDEM if they had any content that might be broadcast on the Parliament TV channel. They didn't, as they (understandably) prefer to use the mainstream channels that command a greater audience share, both for their preparedness content and also for emergency communications as required.

If you have any further questions, please don't hesitate to email or phone to discuss.

Sandy

**RE: RFP - Suppliers of live TV production services - corrected version**

3/7/2017 14:40

**Sandy Brimblecombe**

To David Beatson

Good afternoon, David

Thank you for your email. I was about to ring you to discuss your request, when Peter Davies advised me there has been a formal complaint lodged regarding the process – Peter has not disclosed to me who the complainant is, but as I am aware of your concerns, I'm guessing it may be you. I been advised not to reply on the substance of your request at this stage until the matter is resolved with Peter. But I did want to acknowledge that I had received your email sent on Friday evening.

The documents you are after are all available on GETS which is the public platform used for Government tenders. Here's the link for information on how to register with GETS <https://www.gets.govt.nz/RegisterUser.htm>

GETS requires a RealME logon as well. If you need assistance to complete that process, guidance can be found here <https://www.realme.govt.nz/help/> .

I trust this is helpful in the meantime.

Sandy

From: David Beatson [mailto:s9(2)(a) ]  
Sent: Monday, 3 July 2017 3:57 p.m.  
To: Sandy Brimblecombe  
Subject: RE: RFP - Suppliers of live TV production services - corrected version

Thank you Sandi

I am still unable to get RealMe to register me so I can access GETs, and have yet to receive a response from the RealMe postmaster to my complaint about that. So I am still locked out of the RFP process.

Hence, my complaint to the Probity Auditor.

Best wishes and please be assured its nothing personal. I have a feeling some higher authority is dictating your conduct. And I would not wish to compromise you by asking you confirm or deny my suspicion.

Best wishes

David B

RE: RFP - Suppliers of live TV production services - corrected version  
3/7/2017 17:14

**Sandy Brimblecombe**

To David Beatson

No worries from this end. You might like to try the real me helpdesk 0800 664 774. I doubt you'll have much luck with a postmaster address.

Have you heard back from the CDEM Tech Advisory Group re your proposal?

Sandy

RE: RFP - Suppliers of live TV production services - corrected version  
3/7/2017 20:49

**David Beatson**

To Sandy Brimblecombe

well, i do worry. thanks for the realme advice. And I haven't yet heard from the technical advisory group, but am reasonably confident i will

cheers db.

To: 'David Beatson'

Subject: RE: Parliament TV production services RFP dox

Here's the link

<https://www.gets.govt.nz/OOC/ExternalTenderDetails.htm?id=18742440>

Sandy



**RELATED COMMUNICATION WITH MINISTER OF CIVIL DEFENCE**

**OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT REQUEST - CIVIL DEFENCE &  
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE REVIEW**

12/6/2017 15:17

**David Beatson**

To nathan.guy@parliament.govt.nz

Dear Minister

Under the terms of the Official Information Act, I write to request a copy of reports you hold on the recommendation for and formation of the cross-parliamentary reference group that approved the terms of reference for the Technical Advisory Group conducting the Ministerial Review to ensure that New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, fit-for-purpose, and well placed to meet future challenges.

In particular, I seek the report recording the proceedings of the cross-parliamentary reference group at which it considered and approved the terms of reference for the Technical Advisory Group conducting the Review.

Since the beginning of this year, I have been in consultation with the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, the Ministry of Culture and Heritage media policy unit, NZ On Air, and the Office of the Clerk regarding the use of unused TV broadcast capacity on Parliament TV and the development of a private-public partnership, non commercial multi-media platform to improve the quality and effectiveness of emergency communications and risk minimisation communications.

I believe I have material that could be of assistance to the Technical Advisory Group - particularly in its consideration of Outcome 5 of its terms of reference. I have to confess that my consultations so far have been a complex and frustrating experience. However, I also believe that, given the current fragility of the established New Zealand news media, and the rapid changes it must make to develop new business models capable of sustaining its operations in a period of rapid media globalisation and digital technology convergence, it is a matter of vital importance to the lives, security and welfare of all New Zealanders and requires urgent attention.

While most of my experience has been in senior executive roles in broadcasting, print publications, and the development of new digital media and information technology applications, I was also, for a period of 7 years, a member of the crisis management group and senior executive safety audit committee at Air New Zealand.

It would be appreciated if I could receive a rapid response to this request, as I know that the Technical Advisory Group will be working under extreme pressure to produce a worthwhile report for you in a period of three months.

Yours sincerely,

David Beatson - convener of the Public Media Project. Contacts: PO Box 47718, Ponsonby, Auckland - phone s9(2)(a) - email s9(2)(a)

...On 12 June 2017 at 15:20 Millie Carr s9(2)(a) wrote:

Good afternoon, On behalf of Hon Nathan Guy, thank you for your email. The Minister is considering your request in accordance with the Official Information Act and will reply to you in due course. Kind regards, Millie Carr...

...On 12 June 2017 at 15:24 David Beatson wrote to Millie Carr

Thank you for your very prompt response.  
David Beatson.

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## APPENDIX 3 – HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

- 1.1 **Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights** (adopted by the UN General Assembly, 10 December 1948) states:

*“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and express; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.”*

- 1.2 **ECOSOC 2000 Ministerial Declaration: Development and international cooperation in the twenty-first century: the role of information technology in the context of a knowledge based global economy** (adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council in its July-August year 2000 session) states:

**“17.** We call upon the international community, including the relevant international organizations, funds and programmes, and specialized agencies of the United Nations system, to urgently:

- a. Promote programmes to intensify cooperation, especially South-South cooperation, in ICT for development projects, including ideas and projects for enhancing direct connectivity among developing countries
- b. Actively explore new, creative financing initiatives for ICT through appropriate arrangements involving all relevant stakeholders, including the private sector;
- c. Devise measures to substantially reduce the average cost of access to the Internet within developing countries;
- d. Promote measures to increase the number of computers and other Internet access devices in developing countries;
- e. Explore measures to facilitate access to ICT training;
- f. Explore and find ways to promote and facilitate investment in the research and development of technologies, products and services that would contribute to raising the literacy and skill levels in developing countries;
- g. Facilitate the transfer of information and communication technologies, in particular to developing countries, and support efforts towards capacity-building and production of content;
- h. Encourage research and development on technology and applications adapted to specific requirements in developing countries, including distance learning, community-based training, digital alphabetization, tele-medicine, interoperability of networks, and natural disaster prevention and mitigation;
- i. Explore and define ways and means to strengthen the use of ICT in small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries and countries with economies in transition as these enterprises constitute a major source of employment, and also to enhance their competitiveness in the emerging global economy.

18. Partnerships, involving national Governments, bilateral and multilateral development actors, the private sectors, and other relevant stakeholders, should play a key role.”

**1.3 The United Nations Millennium Declaration** (adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 September 2000) states:

*“20. We also resolve ... to ensure that the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technologies, in conformity with recommendations contained in the ECOSOC 2000 Ministerial Declaration are available to all.”*

**1.4 The International Telecommunications Union Declaration** (adopted by the ITU, a UN agency at its World Summit on 12 December 2003) states:

*“We, the representatives of the peoples of the world, assembled in Geneva from 10-12 December 2003 for the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, declare our common desire and commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and people to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life, premised on the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”*

**1.5 The International Telecommunications Tunis Commitment** (adopted by the ITU, a UN agency, at its second World Summit on 12 December 2005) states:

*“10. We recognise that access to information and sharing and creation of knowledge contributes significantly to strengthening economic, social and cultural development... This process can be enhanced by removing barriers to universal, ubiquitous and affordable access to information. We underline the importance of removing barriers to bridging the digital divide, particularly those that hinder the full achievement of the economic, social and cultural development of countries, and the welfare of their people, in particular, in developing countries.”*

**1.6 The United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction at Sendai, Japan** adopted the Sendai Framework on 18 March 2015, which states:

*“7. There has to be a broader and a more people-centred preventive approach to disaster risk. Disaster risk reduction practices need to be multi-hazard and multisectoral, inclusive and accessible in order to be efficient and effective. While recognizing their leading, regulatory and coordination role, Governments should engage with relevant stakeholders, including women, children and youth, persons with disabilities, poor people, migrants, indigenous peoples, volunteers, the community of practitioners and older persons in the design and implementation of policies, plans and standards. There is a need for the public and private sectors and civil society organizations, as well as academia and scientific and research institutions, to work more closely together and to create opportunities for collaboration, and for businesses to integrate disaster risk into their management practices.”*

**1.7 Conclusion: New Zealand has committed its support to these UN Declarations and Statements, and it is necessary to create a universally-accessible, ubiquitous, and affordable system for managing public emergency management audio-visual content via a coordinated, nationwide, multi-media/information technology platform capable of both**

**instant mass communication and inter-active, live and on-demand personal communication via New Zealand's existing broadcast and telecommunications networks.**

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# Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 - 2030



United Nations

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Sendai Framework  
for Disaster Risk Reduction  
**2015-2030**

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

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## Foreword

*The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030* was adopted at the Third UN World Conference in Sendai, Japan, on March 18, 2015. It is the outcome of stakeholder consultations initiated in March 2012 and inter-governmental negotiations from July 2014 to March 2015, supported by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction at the request of the UN General Assembly.

The Sendai Framework is the successor instrument to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. The HFA was conceived to give further impetus to the global work under the International Framework for Action for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction of 1989, and the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation and its Plan of Action, adopted in 1994 and the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction of 1999.

The Sendai Framework is built on elements which ensure continuity with the work done by States and other stakeholders under the HFA and introduces a number of innovations as called for during the consultations and negotiations. Many commentators have identified the most significant shifts as a strong emphasis on disaster risk management as opposed to disaster management, the definition of seven global targets, the reduction of disaster risk as an expected outcome, a goal focused on preventing new risk, reducing existing risk and strengthening resilience, as well as a set of guiding principles, including primary responsibility of states to prevent and reduce disaster risk, all-of-society and all-of-State institutions engagement. In addition, the scope of disaster risk reduction has been broadened significantly to focus on both natural and man-made hazards and related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks. Health resilience is strongly promoted throughout.

The Sendai Framework also articulates the following: the need for improved understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions of exposure, vulnerability and hazard characteristics; the strengthening of disaster risk governance, including national platforms; accountability for disaster risk management; preparedness to "Build Back Better"; recognition of stakeholders and their roles; mobilization of risk-sensitive investment to avoid the creation of new risk; resilience of health infrastructure, cultural heritage and work-places; strengthening of international cooperation and global partnership, and risk-informed donor policies and programs, including financial support and loans from international financial institutions. There is also clear recognition of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction and the regional platforms for disaster risk reduction as mechanisms for coherence across agendas, monitoring and periodic reviews in support of UN Governance bodies.

UNISDR has been tasked to support the implementation, follow-up and review of the Sendai Framework.



**Margareta Wahlström,**  
United Nations Special Representative of  
the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

# Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

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## I. Preamble

1. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 was adopted at the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, held from 14 to 18 March 2015 in Sendai, Miyagi, Japan, which represented a unique opportunity for countries:

- (a) To adopt a concise, focused, forward-looking and action-oriented post 2015 framework for disaster risk reduction;
- (b) To complete the assessment and review of the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters<sup>1</sup>
- (c) To consider the experience gained through the regional and national strategies/institutions and plans for disaster risk reduction and their recommendations, as well as relevant regional agreements for the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action;
- (d) To identify modalities of cooperation based on commitments to implement a post 2015 framework for disaster risk reduction;
- (e) To determine modalities for the periodic review of the implementation of a post 2015 framework for disaster risk reduction.

2. During the World Conference, States also reiterated their commitment to address disaster risk reduction and the building of resilience<sup>2</sup> to disasters with a renewed sense of urgency within the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and to integrate, as appropriate, both disaster risk reduction and the building of resilience into policies, plans, programmes and budgets at all levels and to consider both within relevant frameworks.

### Hyogo Framework for Action: lessons learned, gaps identified and future challenges

3. Since the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005, as documented in national and regional progress reports on its implementation as well as in other global reports, progress has been achieved in reducing disaster risk at local, national, regional and global levels by countries and other relevant stakeholders, leading to a decrease in mortality in the case of some hazards.<sup>3</sup> Reducing disaster risk is a cost-effective investment in preventing future losses. Effective disaster risk management contributes to sustainable development. Countries have enhanced their capacities in disaster risk management. International mechanisms for strategic advice, coordination and partnership development for disaster risk reduction, such as the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction and the regional platforms for disaster risk reduction, as well as other relevant international and regional forums for cooperation, have been instrumental in the development of policies and strategies and the advancement of knowledge and mutual learning. Overall, the Hyogo Framework for Action has been an important instrument for raising public and institutional awareness, generating political commitment and focusing and catalysing actions by a wide range of stakeholders at all levels.

1. A/CONF.206/6 and Corr.1, chap. I, resolution 2.

2. Resilience is defined as: "The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions", United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), "2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction", Geneva, May 2009 (<http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology>).

3. Hazard is defined in the Hyogo Framework for Action as: "A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hazards can include latent conditions that may represent future threats and can have different origins: natural (geological, hydrometeorological and biological) or induced by human processes (environmental degradation and technological hazards).

4. Over the same 10 year time frame, however, disasters have continued to exact a heavy toll and, as a result, the well-being and safety of persons, communities and countries as a whole have been affected. Over 700 thousand people have lost their lives, over 1.4 million have been injured and approximately 23 million have been made homeless as a result of disasters. Overall, more than 1.5 billion people have been affected by disasters in various ways, with women, children and people in vulnerable situations disproportionately affected. The total economic loss was more than \$1.3 trillion. In addition, between 2008 and 2012, 144 million people were displaced by disasters. Disasters, many of which are exacerbated by climate change and which are increasing in frequency and intensity, significantly impede progress towards sustainable development. Evidence indicates that exposure of persons and assets in all countries has increased faster than vulnerability<sup>4</sup> has decreased, thus generating new risks and a steady rise in disaster-related losses, with a significant economic, social, health, cultural and environmental impact in the short, medium and long term, especially at the local and community levels. Recurring small-scale disasters and slow-onset disasters particularly affect communities, households and small and medium-sized enterprises, constituting a high percentage of all losses. All countries – especially developing countries, where the mortality and economic losses from disasters are disproportionately higher – are faced with increasing levels of possible hidden costs and challenges in order to meet financial and other obligations.

5. It is urgent and critical to anticipate, plan for and reduce disaster risk in order to more effectively protect persons, communities and countries, their livelihoods, health, cultural heritage, socioeconomic assets and ecosystems, and thus strengthen their resilience.

6. Enhanced work to reduce exposure and vulnerability, thus preventing the creation of new disaster risks, and accountability for disaster risk creation are needed at all levels. More dedicated action needs to be focused on tackling underlying disaster risk drivers, such as the consequences of poverty and inequality, climate change and variability, unplanned and rapid urbanization, poor land management and compounding factors such as demographic change, weak institutional arrangements, non-risk-informed policies, lack of regulation and incentives for private disaster risk reduction investment, complex supply chains, limited availability of technology, unsustainable uses of natural resources, declining ecosystems, pandemics and epidemics. Moreover, it is necessary to continue strengthening good governance in disaster risk reduction strategies at the national, regional and global levels and improving preparedness and national coordination for disaster response, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and to use post-disaster recovery and reconstruction to “Build Back Better”, supported by strengthened modalities of international cooperation.

7. There has to be a broader and a more people-centred preventive approach to disaster risk. Disaster risk reduction practices need to be multi-hazard and multisectoral, inclusive and accessible in order to be efficient and effective. While recognizing their leading, regulatory and coordination role, Governments should engage with relevant stakeholders, including women, children and youth, persons with disabilities, poor people, migrants, indigenous peoples, volunteers, the community of practitioners and older persons in the design and implementation of policies, plans and standards. There is a need for the public and private sectors and civil society organizations, as well as academia and scientific and research institutions, to work more closely together and to create opportunities for collaboration, and for businesses to integrate disaster risk into their management practices.

8. International, regional, subregional and transboundary cooperation remains pivotal in supporting the efforts of States, their national and local authorities, as well as communities and businesses, to reduce disaster risk. Existing mechanisms may require strengthening in order to provide effective support and achieve better implementation. Developing countries, in particular the least developed countries, small island developing States, landlocked developing countries and African countries, as well as middle-income countries facing specific challenges, need special attention and support to augment domestic resources and capabilities through bilateral and multilateral channels in order to ensure adequate, sustainable, and timely means of implementation in capacity-building, financial and technical assistance and technology transfer, in accordance with international commitments.

4. Vulnerability is defined in the Hyogo Framework for Action as: “The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards”.

**9.** Overall, the Hyogo Framework for Action has provided critical guidance in efforts to reduce disaster risk and has contributed to the progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Its implementation has, however, highlighted a number of gaps in addressing the underlying disaster risk factors, in the formulation of goals and priorities for action,<sup>5</sup> in the need to foster disaster resilience at all levels and in ensuring adequate means of implementation. The gaps indicate a need to develop an action-oriented framework that Governments and relevant stakeholders can implement in a supportive and complementary manner, and which helps to identify disaster risks to be managed and guides investment to improve resilience.

**10.** Ten years after the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action, disasters continue to undermine efforts to achieve sustainable development.

**11.** The intergovernmental negotiations on the post 2015 development agenda, financing for development, climate change and disaster risk reduction provide the international community with a unique opportunity to enhance coherence across policies, institutions, goals, indicators and measurement systems for implementation, while respecting the respective mandates. Ensuring credible links, as appropriate, between these processes will contribute to building resilience and achieving the global goal of eradicating poverty.

**12.** It is recalled that the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in 2012, entitled "The future we want",<sup>6</sup> called for disaster risk reduction and the building of resilience to disasters to be addressed with a renewed sense of urgency in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication and, as appropriate, to be integrated at all levels. The Conference also reaffirmed all the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.<sup>7</sup>

**13.** Addressing climate change as one of the drivers of disaster risk, while respecting the mandate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,<sup>8</sup> represents an opportunity to reduce disaster risk in a meaningful and coherent manner throughout the interrelated intergovernmental processes.

**14.** Against this background, and in order to reduce disaster risk, there is a need to address existing challenges and prepare for future ones by focusing on monitoring, assessing and understanding disaster risk and sharing such information and on how it is created; strengthening disaster risk governance and coordination across relevant institutions and sectors and the full and meaningful participation of relevant stakeholders at appropriate levels; investing in the economic, social, health, cultural and educational resilience of persons, communities and countries and the environment, as well as through technology and research; and enhancing multi-hazard early warning systems, preparedness, response, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. To complement national action and capacity, there is a need to enhance international cooperation between developed and developing countries and between States and international organizations.

**15.** The present Framework will apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters caused by natural or man-made hazards, as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks. It aims to guide the multi-hazard management of disaster risk in development at all levels as well as within and across all sectors.

5. The Hyogo Framework priorities for action 2005-2015 are: (1) ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; (2) identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning; (3) use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels; (4) reduce the underlying risk factors; and (5) strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels

6. A/RES/66/288, annex.

7. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, vol. I, Resolutions Adopted by the Conference (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.I.8 and corrigendum), resolution 1, annex I.

8. The climate change issues mentioned in this Framework remain within the mandate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change under the competences of the Parties to the Convention.

## II. Expected outcome and goal

**16.** While some progress in building resilience and reducing losses and damages has been achieved, a substantial reduction of disaster risk requires perseverance and persistence, with a more explicit focus on people and their health and livelihoods, and regular follow-up. Building on the Hyogo Framework for Action, the present Framework aims to achieve the following outcome over the next 15 years:

The substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.

The realization of this outcome requires the strong commitment and involvement of political leadership in every country at all levels in the implementation and follow-up of the present Framework and in the creation of the necessary conducive and enabling environment.

**17.** To attain the expected outcome, the following goal must be pursued:

Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience.

The pursuance of this goal requires the enhancement of the implementation capacity and capability of developing countries, in particular the least developed countries, small island developing States, landlocked developing countries and African countries, as well as middle-income countries facing specific challenges, including the mobilization of support through international cooperation for the provision of means of implementation in accordance with their national priorities.

**18.** To support the assessment of global progress in achieving the outcome and goal of the present Framework, seven global targets have been agreed. These targets will be measured at the global level and will be complemented by work to develop appropriate indicators. National targets and indicators will contribute to the achievement of the outcome and goal of the present Framework. The seven global targets are:

- (a) Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower the average per 100,000 global mortality rate in the decade 2020–2030 compared to the period 2005–2015;
- (b) Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower the average global figure per 100,000 in the decade 2020–2030 compared to the period 2005–2015;<sup>9</sup>
- (c) Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030;
- (d) Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030;
- (e) Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020;
- (f) Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of the present Framework by 2030;
- (g) Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to people by 2030.

<sup>9</sup> Categories of affected people will be elaborated in the process for post-Sendai work decided by the Conference.



### III. Guiding principles

19. Drawing from the principles contained in the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation and its Plan of Action<sup>10</sup> and the Hyogo Framework for Action, the implementation of the present Framework will be guided by the following principles, while taking into account national circumstances, and consistent with domestic laws as well as international obligations and commitments:

- (a) Each State has the primary responsibility to prevent and reduce disaster risk, including through international, regional, subregional, transboundary and bilateral cooperation. The reduction of disaster risk is a common concern for all States and the extent to which developing countries are able to effectively enhance and implement national disaster risk reduction policies and measures in the context of their respective circumstances and capabilities can be further enhanced through the provision of sustainable international cooperation;
- (b) Disaster risk reduction requires that responsibilities be shared by central Governments and relevant national authorities, sectors and stakeholders, as appropriate to their national circumstances and systems of governance;
- (c) Managing the risk of disasters is aimed at protecting persons and their property, health, livelihoods and productive assets, as well as cultural and environmental assets, while promoting and protecting all human rights, including the right to development;
- (d) Disaster risk reduction requires an all-of-society engagement and partnership. It also requires empowerment and inclusive, accessible and non discriminatory participation, paying special attention to people disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the poorest. A gender, age, disability and cultural perspective should be integrated in all policies and practices, and women and youth leadership should be promoted. In this context, special attention should be paid to the improvement of organized voluntary work of citizens;
- (e) Disaster risk reduction and management depends on coordination mechanisms within and across sectors and with relevant stakeholders at all levels, and it requires the full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels and a clear articulation of responsibilities across public and private stakeholders, including business and academia, to ensure mutual outreach, partnership, complementarity in roles and accountability and follow-up;
- (f) While the enabling, guiding and coordinating role of national and federal State Governments remain essential, it is necessary to empower local authorities and local communities to reduce disaster risk, including through resources, incentives and decision-making responsibilities, as appropriate;
- (g) Disaster risk reduction requires a multi-hazard approach and inclusive risk-informed decision-making based on the open exchange and dissemination of disaggregated data, including by sex, age and disability, as well as on easily accessible, up-to-date, comprehensible, science-based, non-sensitive risk information, complemented by traditional knowledge;
- (h) The development, strengthening and implementation of relevant policies, plans, practices and mechanisms need to aim at coherence, as appropriate, across sustainable development and growth, food security, health and safety, climate change and variability, environmental management and disaster risk reduction agendas. Disaster risk reduction is essential to achieve sustainable development;
- (i) While the drivers of disaster risk may be local, national, regional or global in scope, disaster risks have local and specific characteristics that must be understood for the determination of measures to reduce disaster risk;
- (j) Addressing underlying disaster risk factors through disaster risk-informed public and private investments is more cost-effective than primary reliance on post-disaster response and recovery, and contributes to sustainable development;

<sup>10</sup>. A/CONF.172/9, chap. I, resolution 1, annex I.

- (k) In the post-disaster recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, it is critical to prevent the creation of and to reduce disaster risk by "Building Back Better" and increasing public education and awareness of disaster risk;
- (l) An effective and meaningful global partnership and the further strengthening of international cooperation, including the fulfilment of respective commitments of official development assistance by developed countries, are essential for effective disaster risk management;
- (m) Developing countries, in particular the least developed countries, small island developing States, landlocked developing countries and African countries, as well as middle-income and other countries facing specific disaster risk challenges, need adequate, sustainable and timely provision of support, including through finance, technology transfer and capacity-building from developed countries and partners tailored to their needs and priorities as identified by them.

#### IV. Priorities for action

20. Taking into account the experience gained through the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, and in pursuance of the expected outcome and goal, there is a need for focused action within and across sectors by States at local, national, regional and global levels in the following four priority areas:

**Priority 1:** Understanding disaster risk.

**Priority 2:** Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk.

**Priority 3:** Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience.

**Priority 4:** Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

21. In their approach to disaster risk reduction, States, regional and international organizations and other relevant stakeholders should take into consideration the key activities listed under each of these four priorities and should implement them, as appropriate, taking into consideration respective capacities and capabilities, in line with national laws and regulations.

22. In the context of increasing global interdependence, concerted international cooperation, an enabling international environment and means of implementation are needed to stimulate and contribute to developing the knowledge, capacities and motivation for disaster risk reduction at all levels, in particular for developing countries.

##### **Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk**

23. Policies and practices for disaster risk management should be based on an understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, hazard characteristics and the environment. Such knowledge can be leveraged for the purpose of pre-disaster risk assessment, for prevention and mitigation and for the development and implementation of appropriate preparedness and effective response to disasters.

##### **National and local levels**

24. To achieve this, it is important:

- (a) To promote the collection, analysis, management and use of relevant data and practical information and ensure its dissemination, taking into account the needs of different categories of users, as appropriate;
- (b) To encourage the use of and strengthening of baselines and periodically assess disaster risks, vulnerability, capacity, exposure, hazard characteristics and their possible sequential effects at the relevant social and spatial scale on ecosystems, in line with national circumstances;

- (c) To develop, periodically update and disseminate, as appropriate, location-based disaster risk information, including risk maps, to decision makers, the general public and communities at risk of exposure to disaster in an appropriate format by using, as applicable, geospatial information technology;
- (d) To systematically evaluate, record, share and publicly account for disaster losses and understand the economic, social, health, education, environmental and cultural heritage impacts, as appropriate, in the context of event-specific hazard-exposure and vulnerability information;
- (e) To make non-sensitive hazard-exposure, vulnerability, risk, disaster and loss-disaggregated information freely available and accessible, as appropriate;
- (f) To promote real time access to reliable data, make use of space and in situ information including geographic information systems (GIS), and use information and communications technology innovations to enhance measurement tools and the collection, analysis and dissemination of data;
- (g) To build the knowledge of government officials at all levels, civil society, communities and volunteers, as well as the private sector, through sharing experiences, lessons learned, good practices and training and education on disaster risk reduction, including the use of existing training and education mechanisms and peer learning;
- (h) To promote and improve dialogue and cooperation among scientific and technological communities, other relevant stakeholders and policymakers in order to facilitate a science-policy interface for effective decision-making in disaster risk management;
- (i) To ensure the use of traditional, indigenous and local knowledge and practices, as appropriate, to complement scientific knowledge in disaster risk assessment and the development and implementation of policies, strategies, plans and programmes of specific sectors, with a cross-sectoral approach, which should be tailored to localities and to the context;
- (j) To strengthen technical and scientific capacity to capitalize on and consolidate existing knowledge and to develop and apply methodologies and models to assess disaster risks, vulnerabilities and exposure to all hazards;
- (k) To promote investments in innovation and technology development in long-term, multi-hazard and solution-driven research in disaster risk management to address gaps, obstacles, interdependencies and social, economic, educational and environmental challenges and disaster risks;
- (l) To promote the incorporation of disaster risk knowledge, including disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery and rehabilitation, in formal and non-formal education, as well as in civic education at all levels, as well as in professional education and training;
- (m) To promote national strategies to strengthen public education and awareness in disaster risk reduction, including disaster risk information and knowledge, through campaigns, social media and community mobilization, taking into account specific audiences and their needs;
- (n) To apply risk information in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity and exposure of persons, communities, countries and assets, as well as hazard characteristics, to develop and implement disaster risk reduction policies;
- (o) To enhance collaboration among people at the local level to disseminate disaster risk information through the involvement of community-based organizations and non-governmental organizations.

## Global and regional levels

25. To achieve this, it is important:

- (a) To enhance the development and dissemination of science-based methodologies and tools to record and share disaster losses and relevant disaggregated data and statistics, as well as to strengthen disaster risk modelling, assessment, mapping, monitoring and multi-hazard early warning systems;
- (b) To promote the conduct of comprehensive surveys on multi-hazard disaster risks and the development of regional disaster risk assessments and maps, including climate change scenarios;
- (c) To promote and enhance, through international cooperation, including technology transfer, access to and the sharing and use of non-sensitive data and information, as appropriate communications and geospatial and space-based technologies and related services; maintain and strengthen in situ and remotely-sensed earth and climate observations; and strengthen the utilization of media, including social media, traditional media, big data and mobile phone networks, to support national measures for successful disaster risk communication, as appropriate and in accordance with national laws;
- (d) To promote common efforts in partnership with the scientific and technological community, academia and the private sector to establish, disseminate and share good practices internationally;
- (e) To support the development of local, national, regional and global user-friendly systems and services for the exchange of information on good practices, cost-effective and easy-to-use disaster risk reduction technologies and lessons learned on policies, plans and measures for disaster risk reduction;
- (f) To develop effective global and regional campaigns as instruments for public awareness and education, building on the existing ones (for example, the "One million safe schools and hospitals" initiative; the "Making Cities Resilient: My city is getting ready" campaign; the United Nations Sasakawa Award for Disaster Risk Reduction; and the annual United Nations International Day for Disaster Reduction), to promote a culture of disaster prevention, resilience and responsible citizenship, generate understanding of disaster risk, support mutual learning and share experiences; and encourage public and private stakeholders to actively engage in such initiatives and to develop new ones at the local, national, regional and global levels;
- (g) To enhance the scientific and technical work on disaster risk reduction and its mobilization through the coordination of existing networks and scientific research institutions at all levels and in all regions, with the support of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Scientific and Technical Advisory Group, in order to strengthen the evidence-base, in support of the implementation of the present Framework; promote scientific research on disaster risk patterns, causes and effects; disseminate risk information with the best use of geospatial information technology; provide guidance on methodologies and standards for risk assessments, disaster risk modelling and the use of data; identify research and technology gaps and set recommendations for research priority areas in disaster risk reduction; promote and support the availability and application of science and technology to decision-making; contribute to the update of the publication entitled "2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction"; use post-disaster reviews as opportunities to enhance learning and public policy; and disseminate studies;
- (h) To encourage the availability of copyrighted and patented materials, including through negotiated concessions, as appropriate;
- (i) To enhance access to and support for innovation and technology, as well as in long-term, multi-hazard and solution-driven research and development in the field of disaster risk management.

## Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk

26. Disaster risk governance at the national, regional and global levels is of great importance for an effective and efficient management of disaster risk. Clear vision, plans, competence, guidance and coordination within and across sectors, as well as participation of relevant stakeholders, are needed. Strengthening disaster risk governance for prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery and rehabilitation is therefore necessary and fosters collaboration and partnership across mechanisms and institutions for the implementation of instruments relevant to disaster risk reduction and sustainable development.

### National and local levels

27. To achieve this, it is important:

- (a) To mainstream and integrate disaster risk reduction within and across all sectors and review and promote the coherence and further development, as appropriate, of national and local frameworks of laws, regulations and public policies, which, by defining roles and responsibilities, guide the public and private sectors in: (i) addressing disaster risk in publicly owned, managed or regulated services and infrastructures; (ii) promoting and providing incentives, as relevant, for actions by persons, households, communities and businesses; (iii) enhancing relevant mechanisms and initiatives for disaster risk transparency, which may include financial incentives, public awareness-raising and training initiatives, reporting requirements and legal and administrative measures; and (iv) putting in place coordination and organizational structures;
- (b) To adopt and implement national and local disaster risk reduction strategies and plans, across different timescales, with targets, indicators and time frames, aimed at preventing the creation of risk, the reduction of existing risk and the strengthening of economic, social, health and environmental resilience;
- (c) To carry out an assessment of the technical, financial and administrative disaster risk management capacity to deal with the identified risks at the local and national levels;
- (d) To encourage the establishment of necessary mechanisms and incentives to ensure high levels of compliance with the existing safety-enhancing provisions of sectoral laws and regulations, including those addressing land use and urban planning, building codes, environmental and resource management and health and safety standards, and update them, where needed, to ensure an adequate focus on disaster risk management;
- (e) To develop and strengthen, as appropriate, mechanisms to follow up, periodically assess and publicly report on progress on national and local plans; and promote public scrutiny and encourage institutional debates, including by parliamentarians and other relevant officials, on progress reports of local and national plans for disaster risk reduction;
- (f) To assign, as appropriate, clear roles and tasks to community representatives within disaster risk management institutions and processes and decision-making through relevant legal frameworks, and undertake comprehensive public and community consultations during the development of such laws and regulations to support their implementation;
- (g) To establish and strengthen government coordination forums composed of relevant stakeholders at the national and local levels, such as national and local platforms for disaster risk reduction, and a designated national focal point for implementing the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. It is necessary for such mechanisms to have a strong foundation in national institutional frameworks with clearly assigned responsibilities and authority to, inter alia, identify sectoral and multisectoral disaster risk, build awareness and knowledge of disaster risk through sharing and dissemination of non-sensitive disaster risk information and data, contribute to and coordinate reports on local and national disaster risk, coordinate public awareness campaigns on disaster risk, facilitate and support local multisectoral cooperation (e.g. among local governments) and contribute to the determination of and reporting on national and local disaster risk management plans and all policies relevant for disaster risk management. These responsibilities should be established through laws, regulations, standards and procedures;

- (h) To empower local authorities, as appropriate, through regulatory and financial means to work and coordinate with civil society, communities and indigenous peoples and migrants in disaster risk management at the local level;
- (i) To encourage parliamentarians to support the implementation of disaster risk reduction by developing new or amending relevant legislation and setting budget allocations;
- (j) To promote the development of quality standards, such as certifications and awards for disaster risk management, with the participation of the private sector, civil society, professional associations, scientific organizations and the United Nations;
- (k) To formulate public policies, where applicable, aimed at addressing the issues of prevention or relocation, where possible, of human settlements in disaster risk-prone zones, subject to national law and legal systems.

### **Global and regional levels**

**28.** To achieve this, it is important:

- (a) To guide action at the regional level through agreed regional and subregional strategies and mechanisms for cooperation for disaster risk reduction, as appropriate, in the light of the present Framework, in order to foster more efficient planning, create common information systems and exchange good practices and programmes for cooperation and capacity development, in particular to address common and transboundary disaster risks;
- (b) To foster collaboration across global and regional mechanisms and institutions for the implementation and coherence of instruments and tools relevant to disaster risk reduction, such as for climate change, biodiversity, sustainable development, poverty eradication, environment, agriculture, health, food and nutrition and others, as appropriate;
- (c) To actively engage in the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, the regional and subregional platforms for disaster risk reduction and the thematic platforms in order to forge partnerships, periodically assess progress on implementation and share practice and knowledge on disaster risk-informed policies, programmes and investments, including on development and climate issues, as appropriate, as well as to promote the integration of disaster risk management in other relevant sectors. Regional intergovernmental organizations should play an important role in the regional platforms for disaster risk reduction;
- (d) To promote transboundary cooperation to enable policy and planning for the implementation of ecosystem based approaches with regard to shared resources, such as within river basins and along coastlines, to build resilience and reduce disaster risk, including epidemic and displacement risk;
- (e) To promote mutual learning and exchange of good practices and information through, inter alia, voluntary and self-initiated peer reviews among interested States;
- (f) To promote the strengthening of, as appropriate, international voluntary mechanisms for monitoring and assessment of disaster risks, including relevant data and information, benefiting from the experience of the Hyogo Framework for Action Monitor. Such mechanisms may promote the exchange of non-sensitive information on disaster risks to the relevant national Government bodies and stakeholders in the interest of sustainable social and economic development.

### **Priority 3: Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience**

**29.** Public and private investment in disaster risk prevention and reduction through structural and non-structural measures are essential to enhance the economic, social, health and cultural resilience of persons, communities, countries and their assets, as well as the environment. These can be drivers of innovation, growth and job creation. Such measures are cost-effective and instrumental to save lives, prevent and reduce losses and ensure effective recovery and rehabilitation.

### National and local levels

30. To achieve this, it is important:

- (a) To allocate the necessary resources, including finance and logistics, as appropriate, at all levels of administration for the development and the implementation of disaster risk reduction strategies, policies, plans, laws and regulations in all relevant sectors;
- (b) To promote mechanisms for disaster risk transfer and insurance, risk-sharing and retention and financial protection, as appropriate, for both public and private investment in order to reduce the financial impact of disasters on Governments and societies, in urban and rural areas;
- (c) To strengthen, as appropriate, disaster-resilient public and private investments, particularly through structural, non-structural and functional disaster risk prevention and reduction measures in critical facilities, in particular schools and hospitals and physical infrastructures; building better from the start to withstand hazards through proper design and construction, including the use of the principles of universal design and the standardization of building materials; retrofitting and rebuilding; nurturing a culture of maintenance; and taking into account economic, social, structural, technological and environmental impact assessments;
- (d) To protect or support the protection of cultural and collecting institutions and other sites of historical, cultural heritage and religious interest;
- (e) To promote the disaster risk resilience of workplaces through structural and non-structural measures;
- (f) To promote the mainstreaming of disaster risk assessments into land-use policy development and implementation, including urban planning, land degradation assessments and informal and non-permanent housing, and the use of guidelines and follow-up tools informed by anticipated demographic and environmental changes;
- (g) To promote the mainstreaming of disaster risk assessment, mapping and management into rural development planning and management of, inter alia, mountains, rivers, coastal flood plain areas, drylands, wetlands and all other areas prone to droughts and flooding, including through the identification of areas that are safe for human settlement, and at the same time preserving ecosystem functions that help to reduce risks;
- (h) To encourage the revision of existing or the development of new building codes and standards and rehabilitation and reconstruction practices at the national or local levels, as appropriate, with the aim of making them more applicable within the local context, particularly in informal and marginal human settlements, and reinforce the capacity to implement, survey and enforce such codes through an appropriate approach, with a view to fostering disaster-resistant structures;
- (i) To enhance the resilience of national health systems, including by integrating disaster risk management into primary, secondary and tertiary health care, especially at the local level; developing the capacity of health workers in understanding disaster risk and applying and implementing disaster risk reduction approaches in health work; promoting and enhancing the training capacities in the field of disaster medicine; and supporting and training community health groups in disaster risk reduction approaches in health programmes, in collaboration with other sectors, as well as in the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) of the World Health Organization;
- (j) To strengthen the design and implementation of inclusive policies and social safety-net mechanisms, including through community involvement, integrated with livelihood enhancement programmes, and access to basic health-care services, including maternal, newborn and child health, sexual and reproductive health, food security and nutrition, housing and education, towards the eradication of poverty, to find durable solutions in the post-disaster phase and to empower and assist people disproportionately affected by disasters;

- (k) People with life-threatening and chronic disease, due to their particular needs, should be included in the design of policies and plans to manage their risks before, during and after disasters, including having access to life-saving services;
- (l) To encourage the adoption of policies and programmes addressing disaster-induced human mobility to strengthen the resilience of affected people and that of host communities, in accordance with national laws and circumstances;
- (m) To promote, as appropriate, the integration of disaster risk reduction considerations and measures in financial and fiscal instruments;
- (n) To strengthen the sustainable use and management of ecosystems and implement integrated environmental and natural resource management approaches that incorporate disaster risk reduction;
- (o) To increase business resilience and protection of livelihoods and productive assets throughout the supply chains, ensure continuity of services and integrate disaster risk management into business models and practices;
- (p) To strengthen the protection of livelihoods and productive assets, including livestock, working animals, tools and seeds;
- (q) To promote and integrate disaster risk management approaches throughout the tourism industry, given the often heavy reliance on tourism as a key economic driver.

#### **Global and regional levels**

**31.** To achieve this, it is important:

- (a) To promote coherence across systems, sectors and organizations related to sustainable development and to disaster risk reduction in their policies, plans, programmes and processes;
- (b) To promote the development and strengthening of disaster risk transfer and sharing mechanisms and instruments in close cooperation with partners in the international community, business, international financial institutions and other relevant stakeholders;
- (c) To promote cooperation between academic, scientific and research entities and networks and the private sector to develop new products and services to help to reduce disaster risk, in particular those that would assist developing countries and their specific challenges;
- (d) To encourage the coordination between global and regional financial institutions with a view to assessing and anticipating the potential economic and social impacts of disasters;
- (e) To enhance cooperation between health authorities and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen country capacity for disaster risk management for health, the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) and the building of resilient health systems;
- (f) To strengthen and promote collaboration and capacity-building for the protection of productive assets, including livestock, working animals, tools and seeds;
- (g) To promote and support the development of social safety nets as disaster risk reduction measures linked to and integrated with livelihood enhancement programmes in order to ensure resilience to shocks at the household and community levels;
- (h) To strengthen and broaden international efforts aimed at eradicating hunger and poverty through disaster risk reduction;
- (i) To promote and support collaboration among relevant public and private stakeholders to enhance the resilience of business to disasters.



**Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction**

32. The steady growth of disaster risk, including the increase of people and assets exposure, combined with the lessons learned from past disasters, indicates the need to further strengthen disaster preparedness for response, take action in anticipation of events, integrate disaster risk reduction in response preparedness and ensure that capacities are in place for effective response and recovery at all levels. Empowering women and persons with disabilities to publicly lead and promote gender equitable and universally accessible response, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction approaches is key. Disasters have demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of a disaster, is a critical opportunity to “Build Back Better”, including through integrating disaster risk reduction into development measures, making nations and communities resilient to disasters.

**National and local levels**

33. To achieve this, it is important:

- (a) To prepare or review and periodically update disaster preparedness and contingency policies, plans and programmes with the involvement of the relevant institutions, considering climate change scenarios and their impact on disaster risk, and facilitating, as appropriate, the participation of all sectors and relevant stakeholders;
- (b) To invest in, develop, maintain and strengthen people-centred multi-hazard, multisectoral forecasting and early warning systems, disaster risk and emergency communications mechanisms, social technologies and hazard-monitoring telecommunications systems; develop such systems through a participatory process; tailor them to the needs of users, including social and cultural requirements, in particular gender; promote the application of simple and low-cost early warning equipment and facilities; and broaden release channels for natural disaster early warning information;
- (c) To promote the resilience of new and existing critical infrastructure, including water, transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, educational facilities, hospitals and other health facilities, to ensure that they remain safe, effective and operational during and after disasters in order to provide life-saving and essential services;
- (d) To establish community centres for the promotion of public awareness and the stockpiling of necessary materials to implement rescue and relief activities;
- (e) To adopt public policies and actions that support the role of public service workers to establish or strengthen coordination and funding mechanisms and procedures for relief assistance and plan and prepare for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction;
- (f) To train the existing workforce and voluntary workers in disaster response and strengthen technical and logistical capacities to ensure better response in emergencies;
- (g) To ensure the continuity of operations and planning, including social and economic recovery, and the provision of basic services in the post-disaster phase;
- (h) To promote regular disaster preparedness, response and recovery exercises, including evacuation drills, training and the establishment of area-based support systems, with a view to ensuring rapid and effective response to disasters and related displacement, including access to safe shelter, essential food and non-food relief supplies, as appropriate to local needs;
- (i) To promote the cooperation of diverse institutions, multiple authorities and related stakeholders at all levels, including affected communities and business, in view of the complex and costly nature of post-disaster reconstruction, under the coordination of national authorities;
- (j) To promote the incorporation of disaster risk management into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes, facilitate the link between relief, rehabilitation and development, use opportunities during the recovery phase to develop capacities that reduce disaster risk in the short, medium and long term, including through the development of measures

such as land-use planning, structural standards improvement and the sharing of expertise, knowledge, post-disaster reviews and lessons learned and integrate post-disaster reconstruction into the economic and social sustainable development of affected areas. This should also apply to temporary settlements for persons displaced by disasters;

- (k) To develop guidance for preparedness for disaster reconstruction, such as on land-use planning and structural standards improvement, including by learning from the recovery and reconstruction programmes over the decade since the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action, and exchanging experiences, knowledge and lessons learned;
- (l) To consider the relocation of public facilities and infrastructures to areas outside the risk range, wherever possible, in the post-disaster reconstruction process, in consultation with the people concerned, as appropriate;
- (m) To strengthen the capacity of local authorities to evacuate persons living in disaster-prone areas;
- (n) To establish a mechanism of case registry and a database of mortality caused by disaster in order to improve the prevention of morbidity and mortality;
- (o) To enhance recovery schemes to provide psychosocial support and mental health services for all people in need;
- (p) To review and strengthen, as appropriate, national laws and procedures on international cooperation, based on the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance.

#### **Global and regional levels**

**34.** To achieve this, it is important:

- (a) To develop and strengthen, as appropriate, coordinated regional approaches and operational mechanisms to prepare for and ensure rapid and effective disaster response in situations that exceed national coping capacities;
- (b) To promote the further development and dissemination of instruments, such as standards, codes, operational guides and other guidance instruments, to support coordinated action in disaster preparedness and response and facilitate information sharing on lessons learned and best practices for policy practice and post-disaster reconstruction programmes;
- (c) To promote the further development of and investment in effective, nationally compatible, regional multi-hazard early warning mechanisms, where relevant, in line with the Global Framework for Climate Services, and facilitate the sharing and exchange of information across all countries;
- (d) To enhance international mechanisms, such as the International Recovery Platform, for the sharing of experience and learning among countries and all relevant stakeholders;
- (e) To support, as appropriate, the efforts of relevant United Nations entities to strengthen and implement global mechanisms on hydrometeorological issues in order to raise awareness and improve understanding of water-related disaster risks and their impact on society, and advance strategies for disaster risk reduction upon the request of States;
- (f) To support regional cooperation to deal with disaster preparedness, including through common exercises and drills;
- (g) To promote regional protocols to facilitate the sharing of response capacities and resources during and after disasters;
- (h) To train the existing workforce and volunteers in disaster response.

## V. Role of stakeholders

**35.** While States have the overall responsibility for reducing disaster risk, it is a shared responsibility between Governments and relevant stakeholders. In particular, non-State stakeholders play an important role as enablers in providing support to States, in accordance with national policies, laws and regulations, in the implementation of the present Framework at local, national, regional and global levels. Their commitment, goodwill, knowledge, experience and resources will be required.

**36.** When determining specific roles and responsibilities for stakeholders, and at the same time building on existing relevant international instruments, States should encourage the following actions on the part of all public and private stakeholders:

- (a) Civil society, volunteers, organized voluntary work organizations and community-based organizations to participate, in collaboration with public institutions, to, inter alia, provide specific knowledge and pragmatic guidance in the context of the development and implementation of normative frameworks, standards and plans for disaster risk reduction; engage in the implementation of local, national, regional and global plans and strategies; contribute to and support public awareness, a culture of prevention and education on disaster risk; and advocate for resilient communities and an inclusive and all-of-society disaster risk management that strengthen synergies across groups, as appropriate. On this point, it should be noted that:
  - (i) Women and their participation are critical to effectively managing disaster risk and designing, resourcing and implementing gender-sensitive disaster risk reduction policies, plans and programmes; and adequate capacity building measures need to be taken to empower women for preparedness as well as to build their capacity to secure alternate means of livelihood in post-disaster situations;
  - (ii) Children and youth are agents of change and should be given the space and modalities to contribute to disaster risk reduction, in accordance with legislation, national practice and educational curricula;
  - (iii) Persons with disabilities and their organizations are critical in the assessment of disaster risk and in designing and implementing plans tailored to specific requirements, taking into consideration, inter alia, the principles of universal design;
  - (iv) Older persons have years of knowledge, skills and wisdom, which are invaluable assets to reduce disaster risk, and they should be included in the design of policies, plans and mechanisms, including for early warning;
  - (v) Indigenous peoples, through their experience and traditional knowledge, provide an important contribution to the development and implementation of plans and mechanisms, including for early warning;
  - (vi) Migrants contribute to the resilience of communities and societies, and their knowledge, skills and capacities can be useful in the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction;
- (b) Academia, scientific and research entities and networks to focus on the disaster risk factors and scenarios, including emerging disaster risks, in the medium and long term; increase research for regional, national and local application; support action by local communities and authorities; and support the interface between policy and science for decision-making;
- (c) Business, professional associations and private sector financial institutions, including financial regulators and accounting bodies, as well as philanthropic foundations, to integrate disaster risk management, including business continuity, into business models and practices through disaster-risk-informed investments, especially in micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; engage in awareness-raising and training for their employees and customers; engage in and support research and innovation, as well as technological development for disaster risk management; share and disseminate knowledge, practices and non sensitive data; and actively participate, as appropriate and under the guidance of the public sector, in the development of normative frameworks and technical standards that incorporate disaster risk management;

- (d) Media to take an active and inclusive role at the local, national, regional and global levels in contributing to the raising of public awareness and understanding and disseminate accurate and non-sensitive disaster risk, hazard and disaster information, including on small-scale disasters, in a simple, transparent, easy-to-understand and accessible manner, in close cooperation with national authorities; adopt specific disaster risk reduction communications policies; support, as appropriate, early warning systems and life-saving protective measures; and stimulate a culture of prevention and strong community involvement in sustained public education campaigns and public consultations at all levels of society, in accordance with national practices.

**37.** With reference to General Assembly resolution 68/211 of 20 December 2013, commitments by relevant stakeholders are important in order to identify modalities of cooperation and to implement the present Framework. Those commitments should be specific and time-bound in order to support the development of partnerships at local, national, regional and global levels and the implementation of local and national disaster risk reduction strategies and plans. All stakeholders are encouraged to publicize their commitments and their fulfilment in support of the implementation of the present Framework, or of the national and local disaster risk management plans, through the website of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.

## **VI. International cooperation and global partnership**

### **General considerations**

**38.** Given their different capacities, as well as the linkage between the level of support provided to them and the extent to which they will be able to implement the present Framework, developing countries require an enhanced provision of means of implementation, including adequate, sustainable and timely resources, through international cooperation and global partnerships for development, and continued international support, so as to strengthen their efforts to reduce disaster risk.

**39.** International cooperation for disaster risk reduction includes a variety of sources and is a critical element in supporting the efforts of developing countries to reduce disaster risk.

**40.** In addressing economic disparity and disparity in technological innovation and research capacity among countries, it is crucial to enhance technology transfer, involving a process of enabling and facilitating flows of skill, knowledge, ideas, know-how and technology from developed to developing countries in the implementation of the present Framework.

**41.** Disaster-prone developing countries, in particular the least developed countries, small island developing States, landlocked developing countries and African countries, as well as middle-income countries facing specific challenges, warrant particular attention in view of their higher vulnerability and risk levels, which often greatly exceed their capacity to respond to and recover from disasters. Such vulnerability requires the urgent strengthening of international cooperation and ensuring genuine and durable partnerships at the regional and international levels in order to support developing countries to implement the present Framework, in accordance with their national priorities and needs. Similar attention and appropriate assistance should also be extended to other disaster-prone countries with specific characteristics, such as archipelagic countries, as well as countries with extensive coastlines.

**42.** Disasters can disproportionately affect small island developing States, owing to their unique and particular vulnerabilities. The effects of disasters, some of which have increased in intensity and have been exacerbated by climate change, impede their progress towards sustainable development. Given the special case of small island developing States, there is a critical need to build resilience and to provide particular support through the implementation of the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway<sup>11</sup> in the area of disaster risk reduction.

**43.** African countries continue to face challenges related to disasters and increasing risks, including those related to enhancing resilience of infrastructure, health and livelihoods. These challenges require increased international cooperation and the provision of adequate support to African countries to allow for the implementation of the present Framework.

<sup>11</sup> General Assembly resolution 69/15, annex.

44. North-South cooperation, complemented by South-South and triangular cooperation, has proven to be key to reducing disaster risk and there is a need to further strengthen cooperation in both areas. Partnerships play an additional important role by harnessing the full potential of countries and supporting their national capacities in disaster risk management and in improving the social, health and economic well-being of individuals, communities and countries.

45. Efforts by developing countries offering South-South and triangular cooperation should not reduce North-South cooperation from developed countries as they complement North-South cooperation.

46. Financing from a variety of international sources, public and private transfer of reliable, affordable, appropriate and modern environmentally sound technology, on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed, capacity-building assistance for developing countries and enabling institutional and policy environments at all levels are critically important means of reducing disaster risk.

#### **Means of implementation**

47. To achieve this, it is necessary:

- (a) To reaffirm that developing countries need enhanced provision of coordinated, sustained and adequate international support for disaster risk reduction, in particular for the least developed countries, small island developing States, landlocked developing countries and African countries, as well as middle-income countries facing specific challenges, through bilateral and multilateral channels, including through enhanced technical and financial support and technology transfer on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed, for the development and strengthening of their capacities;
- (b) To enhance access of States, in particular developing countries, to finance, environmentally sound technology, science and inclusive innovation, as well as knowledge and information-sharing through existing mechanisms, namely bilateral, regional and multilateral collaborative arrangements, including the United Nations and other relevant bodies;
- (c) To promote the use and expansion of thematic platforms of cooperation, such as global technology pools and global systems to share know-how, innovation and research and ensure access to technology and information on disaster risk reduction;
- (d) To incorporate disaster risk reduction measures into multilateral and bilateral development assistance programmes within and across all sectors, as appropriate, related to poverty reduction, sustainable development, natural resource management, the environment, urban development and adaptation to climate change.

#### **Support from international organizations**

48. To support the implementation of the present Framework, the following is necessary:

- (a) The United Nations and other international and regional organizations, international and regional financial institutions and donor agencies engaged in disaster risk reduction are requested, as appropriate, to enhance the coordination of their strategies in this regard;
- (b) The entities of the United Nations system, including the funds and programmes and the specialized agencies, through the United Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience, United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks and country programmes, to promote the optimum use of resources and to support developing countries, at their request, in the implementation of the present Framework, in coordination with other relevant frameworks, such as the International Health Regulations (2005), including through the development and the strengthening of capacities and clear and focused programmes that support the priorities of States in a balanced, well-coordinated and sustainable manner, within their respective mandates;
- (c) The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, in particular, to support the implementation, follow-up and review of the present Framework by: preparing periodic reviews on progress, in particular for the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, and, as appropriate, in a timely manner, along with the follow-up process at the United Nations,

supporting the development of coherent global and regional follow-up and indicators, and in coordination, as appropriate, with other relevant mechanisms for sustainable development and climate change, and updating the existing web-based Hyogo Framework for Action Monitor accordingly; participating actively in the work of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators; generating evidence-based and practical guidance for implementation in close collaboration with States and through the mobilization of experts; reinforcing a culture of prevention among relevant stakeholders through supporting development of standards by experts and technical organizations, advocacy initiatives and dissemination of disaster risk information, policies and practices, as well as by providing education and training on disaster risk reduction through affiliated organizations; supporting countries, including through national platforms or their equivalent, in their development of national plans and monitoring trends and patterns in disaster risk, loss and impacts; convening the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction and supporting the organization of regional platforms for disaster risk reduction in cooperation with regional organizations; leading the revision of the United Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience; facilitating the enhancement of, and continuing to service, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Scientific and Technical Advisory Group in mobilizing science and technical work on disaster risk reduction; leading, in close coordination with States, the update of the publication entitled "2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction", in line with the terminology agreed upon by States; and maintaining the stakeholders' commitment registry;

- (d) International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and regional development banks, to consider the priorities of the present Framework for providing financial support and loans for integrated disaster risk reduction to developing countries;
- (e) Other international organizations and treaty bodies, including the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, international financial institutions at the global and regional levels and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to support developing countries, at their request, in the implementation of the present Framework, in coordination with other relevant frameworks;
- (f) The United Nations Global Compact, as the main United Nations initiative for engagement with the private sector and business, to further engage with and promote the critical importance of disaster risk reduction for sustainable development and resilience;
- (g) The overall capacity of the United Nations system to assist developing countries in disaster risk reduction should be strengthened by providing adequate resources through various funding mechanisms, including increased, timely, stable and predictable contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction and by enhancing the role of the Trust Fund in relation to the implementation of the present Framework;
- (h) The Inter Parliamentary Union and other relevant regional bodies and mechanisms for parliamentarians, as appropriate, to continue supporting and advocating disaster risk reduction and the strengthening of national legal frameworks;
- (i) The United Cities and Local Government organization and other relevant bodies of local governments to continue supporting cooperation and mutual learning among local governments for disaster risk reduction and the implementation of the present Framework.

#### **Follow-up actions**

**49.** The Conference invites the General Assembly, at its seventieth session, to consider the possibility of including the review of the global progress in the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 as part of its integrated and coordinated follow-up processes to United Nations conferences and summits, aligned with the Economic and Social Council, the High-level Political Forum for Sustainable Development and the quadrennial comprehensive policy review cycles, as appropriate, taking into account the contributions of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction and regional platforms for disaster risk reduction and the Hyogo Framework for Action Monitor system.

**50.** The Conference recommends to the General Assembly the establishment, at its sixty-ninth session, of an open-ended intergovernmental working group, comprising experts nominated by Member States, and supported by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, with involvement of relevant stakeholders, for the development of a set of possible indicators to measure global progress in the implementation of the present Framework in conjunction with the work of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group On Sustainable Development Goal Indicators. The Conference also recommends that the working group consider the recommendations of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Scientific and Technical Advisory Group on the update of the publication entitled "2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction" by December 2016, and that the outcome of its work be submitted to the Assembly for its consideration and adoption.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

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# Chart of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

## Scope and purpose

The present framework will apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters, caused by natural or manmade hazards as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks.

It aims to guide the multi-hazard management of disaster risk in development at all levels as well as within and across all sectors

## Expected outcome

The substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries

## Goal

Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience

## Targets

Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 100,000 global mortality between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015

Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower the average global figure per 100,000 between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015

Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030

Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030

Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020

Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of this framework by 2030

Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to people by 2030

## Priorities for Action

There is a need for focused action within and across sectors by States at local, national, regional and global levels in the following four priority areas.

### Priority 1

Understanding disaster risk

Disaster risk management needs to be based on an understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, hazard characteristics and the environment

### Priority 2

Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk

Disaster risk governance at the national, regional and global levels is vital to the management of disaster risk reduction in all sectors and ensuring the coherence of national and local frameworks of laws, regulations and public policies that, by defining roles and responsibilities, guide, encourage and incentivize the public and private sectors to take action and address disaster risk

### Priority 3

Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience

Public and private investment in disaster risk prevention and reduction through structural and non-structural measures are essential to enhance the economic, social, health and cultural resilience of persons, communities, countries and their assets, as well as the environment. These can be drivers of innovation, growth and job creation. Such measures are cost-effective and instrumental to save lives, prevent and reduce losses and ensure effective recovery and rehabilitation

### Priority 4

Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to «Build Back Better» in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction

Experience indicates that disaster preparedness needs to be strengthened for more effective response and ensure capacities are in place for effective recovery. Disasters have also demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of the disaster, is an opportunity to «Build Back Better» through integrating disaster risk reduction measures. Women and persons with disabilities should publicly lead and promote gender-equitable and universally accessible approaches during the response and reconstruction phases

## Guiding Principles

Primary responsibility of States to prevent and reduce disaster risk, including through cooperation

Shared responsibility between central Government and national authorities, sectors and stakeholders as appropriate to national circumstances

Protection of persons and their assets while promoting and protecting all human rights including the right to development

Engagement from all of society

Full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels

Empowerment of local authorities and communities through resources, incentives and decision-making responsibilities as appropriate

Decision-making to be inclusive and risk-informed while using a multi-hazard approach

Coherence of disaster risk reduction and sustainable development policies, plans, practices and mechanisms, across different sectors

Accounting of local and specific characteristics of disaster risks when determining measures to reduce risk

Addressing underlying risk factors cost-effectively through investment versus relying primarily on post-disaster response and recovery

«Build Back Better» for preventing the creation of, and reducing existing, disaster risk

The quality of global partnership and international cooperation to be effective, meaningful and strong

Support from developed countries and partners to developing countries to be tailored according to needs and priorities as identified by them



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## Ministerial Review Terms of Reference

### Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand

#### 1. Purpose

This review will provide advice to the Minister of Civil Defence on the most appropriate operational and legislative mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand.

The purpose is to ensure that New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges. In light of recent events it is appropriate to see how we can further enhance and strengthen the current system.

#### 2. Context

A series of recent hazard events and emergencies in New Zealand have resulted in wide spread reflection on whether the current operational and legislative settings for responding to natural disasters and other emergencies are fit for purpose.

Responsibility for the management of these events lay with three different agencies<sup>1</sup>. The civil defence emergency management sector was however involved in all three responses as either lead or support agency. In all three cases the effectiveness of the civil defence emergency management sector was called into question resulting in a loss of stakeholder, public and Ministerial confidence in the response system.

The National Security System, of which civil defence emergency management is a part, has a range of lead agencies that operate under different legislative mandates, depending on the hazard type. The complexity of the system is well understood by those agencies that operate within its framework but are not widely publicised or understood by the public<sup>2</sup>.

Many lessons from the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 and other events have been successfully embedded into the operation of the current civil defence emergency management system. However there has been no significant review of the organisational structures, roles and decision-making powers, within which responses are orchestrated. It is timely to take a wide look at how the sum of those parts work together. In particular, to consider whether any changes to settings could optimise the civil defence emergency management system's performance in the response phase.

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<sup>1</sup> August 2016 Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis outbreak (lead agency Health); 2 September 2016 East Cape earthquake and tsunami (lead agency Civil Defence Emergency Management); 14 November 2016 Kaikoura earthquake and tsunami (lead agency Civil Defence Emergency Management); and 13 February 2017 Port Hills fire (lead agency Selwyn Rural Fire Authority).

<sup>2</sup> November 2016, Controller and Auditor General report Governance of the National Security System.

### 3. Project Definition

**The problem** The purpose of the review is to ensure that New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, fit-for-purpose, and well placed to meet future challenges.

The current organisational structures, roles and decision-making powers in the civil defence emergency management response system need to align with the expectations for system performance.

Recent events tested New Zealand's response framework, and its effectiveness in supporting decision making, information sharing and operational capability. In particular it has been noted that:

- The underlying principle of "act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally" may not be suitable in all circumstances.
- Decisions are not necessarily made by adequately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the appropriate level of government, and supported by the best information possible in the circumstances.
- Volunteers may not be adequately supported by a professional emergency management force.
- Information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency, to determine the capacity and capabilities required for the response effort.
- There is a need for timely consistent and accurate communication to the public.
- Response capabilities are not necessarily deployed as promptly and seamlessly as possible, taking advantage of economies of scale and the experience of senior responders.

In summary, the operational and legislative settings within the system may not be performing optimally to meet current and future needs, and the role that New Zealanders need it to play.

**Scope** The work will examine:

- The current devolved decision-making model from central to local government, and framework of lead and support agencies to manage response to emergencies arising from specific hazards.
- Decision making and chain of command, including:
  - who has the power to declare a State of Emergency, and
  - whether there is a need for an interim mechanism to manage a localised event with significant consequences or that could evolve into a state of local emergency or a state of national emergency.
- Response capability and capacity.

- Whether legislative changes are required to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (and other legislation related to emergency response).

**Outcome 1:** The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies.

**Outcome 2:** New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.

- The system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of the location and scale of the emergency.
- Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action.
- Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, aerial surveillance and interpretation) are knitted into the fabric of a response.
- Business continuity across the whole of government supports an effective response and prompt recovery.

**Outcome 3:** Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency.

- A single lead role across any geographical area affected by natural disaster
- The purpose and consequences of declarations of states of emergency are clear
- Appropriate interventions and escalations are available.

**Outcome 4:** The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.

- There is a clear operating model and chain of command and control and coordination during response, including the recognition of lead and support agencies.
- The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.
- All participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response or as the event unfolds.

**Outcome 5:** Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies.

- Recognition of the modern news cycle – immediacy of social media and power of factual decisive information delivered as speedily as possible
- Stakeholder needs are understood (what information is required; where and how to gather the information, providing it at the right time and in the right format).
- Official information maintains pace with media dialogue and social media activity.

The work will not examine the current legislative framework for hazard risk assessment and management set out in other legislation, for example the Resource Management Act 1991, but may make reference to any further work or consideration that may be necessary to better fit other Acts to enable resilience and preparedness.

**Consultation and Engagement**

The chair of the Technical Advisory Group is expected to agree with the Minister of Civil Defence the overall process, including matters of consultation and engagement. There is significant benefit in direct engagement with key stakeholders, as their contribution will add value to the Technical Advisory Group's advice. This should include providing for engagement with local government, emergency services, relevant government departments, and iwi and Māori. The means of consultation and engagement will need to reflect the time available and it is recognised that engagement will commonly be through the chair and the secretariat.

**Key Deliverable**

A review document examining the current operational and legislative settings for responding to emergencies and the recommended options for change.

The document will be provided to the Minister of Civil Defence no later than three months from the date of the agreement to these Terms of Reference.

1 June 2017

Ministerial Review: Terms of Reference

## 4. Governance

**Sponsor** Minister of Civil Defence

**Technical Advisory Group** A Technical Advisory Group made up of:

- Roger Sowry, as Chair;
- Benesia Smith MNZM, independent consultant;
- Malcolm Alexander, Chief Executive, Local Government New Zealand;
- Assistant Commissioner Mike Rusbatch, New Zealand Police;
- Deputy National Commander Kerry Gregory, New Zealand Fire Service;
- Major General Tim Gall, New Zealand Defence Force;
- Sarah Stuart-Black, Director, Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.

**Project Team and Secretariat** The project team and secretariat is headed by Jeremy Corban.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

# Supplementary Submission from the Transport Sector to the Technical Advisory Group:

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*Submission of the Civil Aviation Authority, Maritime New Zealand, and the New Zealand Transport Agency following the oral hearing on submissions*





## Introduction

This is a supplementary submission to the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) appointed by the Minister of Civil Defence to carry out the ministerial review “better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand”.

The submission is made by the New Zealand Transport Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority, and Maritime New Zealand, in response to questions raised by the Technical Advisory Group during the oral hearing of the transport sector submission on 19 July 2017.

With respect to emergency powers, in addition to commenting on the powers of transport entities, we have noted the emergency powers of civil defence controllers, the New Zealand Police, and Fire and Emergency New Zealand. However, we have not commented on the exact nature of the powers of the civil defence controllers, New Zealand Police and Fire and Emergency New Zealand, or the legislation from which they are derived; and are of the opinion that representatives from those agencies are in a better position to comment on their powers. We understand those agencies are represented on the TAG.

## Submission by the Civil Aviation Authority in response to questions raised regarding restricted airspace.

Questions were raised by the TAG on how restricted airspace was instituted and managed after the Kaikōura Earthquake and Tsunami, and the general procedure regarding restricted airspace after an emergency event.

The following submission has been provided by the Deputy Director Aviation Infrastructure and Personnel of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA):

*A restricted area was declared by CAA around Kaikōura for the purposes of supporting the conduct of aviation operations in response to the emergency, and ensuring these operations were conducted in a safe manner. Such areas can be initiated by the CAA under Civil Aviation Rule Part 71.153 upon request of a third party (which does not have to be an aviation entity) or as a result of CAA independently assessing the need for such action in the interests of safety, in essence being proactive and not just waiting for a request to be made. In the case of Kaikōura the latter occurred; i.e. CAA was monitoring the situation and in engagement with the NCMC at the time identified the need for a restricted area to be initiated in the interests of safety and to ensure effective and efficient aviation operations in support of the emergency response. Factors that informed decision making in this particular case included the presence of intensive levels of activity by civilian aircraft (helicopters in particular) and both New Zealand and foreign military aircraft, including those operating to and from ships off-shore. In addition the area in question, which is uncontrolled airspace, lay across the main north-south route for itinerant aircraft flying at low levels between the North and South Islands. These factors collectively created a heightened risk if aircraft operations were not subject to an appropriate level of coordinated management at a local level. After consultation with aviation stakeholders and the NCMC a Restricted Area was declared and Airways were assigned the administering authority in this particular case. It then deployed staff to Kaikōura to fulfil this function. From that point onwards operational management of the airspace rested with the administering authority, i.e. Airways.*

Note that it is not compulsory that Airways, or indeed any aviation entity, becomes the administering authority in all cases. CAA is required under law to assign an administering authority as per Civil Aviation Rule Part 71.153. A non-aviation entity may be assigned this "gate-keeper" role by CAA which will then allow that entity to manage access to, and operations within, the restricted area. This occurs on a regular basis in respect of firefighting operations whereby the entity in charge of the firefighting operation is assigned the administering authority role. In the case of Kaikōura and taking into account the factors I have outlined above, including the high level of New Zealand and foreign military aircraft operations, Airways was the only entity with the capacity and capability to fulfil the required function in question in that particular scenario; this included experience in situations involving New Zealand and foreign military aircraft operations.

CAA is ambivalent as to who may be an administering authority. As I have noted above it does not have to be an aviation entity. As long as an entity can demonstrate it has the capability and capacity to fulfil the function required of the administering authority under Civil Aviation Rule 71.153 in individual cases that is suffice; we are not wedded to a particular entity being assigned. If CDEM controllers are making plans to develop the capacity and capability to manage airspace in a manner that they can be assigned the "gatekeeper" administering authority role in individual cases we would have no objection to this and would indeed applaud it as a sign of proactive capability development on the part of the CDEM sector. We would also welcome the opportunity to provide educational support to CDEM controllers should this be necessary.

Any entity, be it Airways, CDEM or another cannot declare a restricted area as per Rule 71.153. This is a function of the Director of Civil Aviation and it is carried out by CAA staff with legal delegations allowing them to do so. The CAA maintains a 24/7 capability to fulfil this function which includes relevant staff having satellite phone connectivity. As alluded to above, be it in response to a request or via proactive action on the part of the CAA, once an piece of airspace is declared as restricted the administering authority assigned to it takes on the "gatekeeping" role associated with it. Note that the administering authority can be changed as circumstances change. If entity A is assigned as the administering authority when a restricted area is initiated this does not prevent the CAA amending it to entity B at a later date if developing circumstances require this. A NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) is issued for restricted areas as a means of promulgating the fact a restricted area has been or is about to be established. Any such NOTAM will include the contact details of the administering authority in question.

CAA does not charge for activity involved in establishing restricted areas so I am unsure what the reference to non-payment is alluding to.

In brief summary a restricted area is established in response to a request to the CAA or the CAA determining such action is necessary in specific cases. The administering authority assigned to the restricted area by the CAA, which does not have to be an aviation entry, then assumes the "gatekeeper" role in managing that area.

A document available on the CAA website at [http://www.caa.govt.nz/assets/legacy/airspace/Guidelines\\_Temp\\_Restr\\_Airspace.pdf](http://www.caa.govt.nz/assets/legacy/airspace/Guidelines_Temp_Restr_Airspace.pdf) provides some further detail. It speaks to issues broader than just civil defence emergencies noting that there are multiple drivers for us to establish restricted airspace.

## Submission of Maritime New Zealand in response to questions raised regarding emergency powers

Questions were raised by the TAG on emergency powers. The following submission has been provided Maritime New Zealand (MNZ):

*Following the ministerial review, technical advisory group meeting with MOT on Wednesday, 19 July 2017, MNZ was asked:*

*"If Maritime New Zealand was the lead agency and had a national controller appointed, could the national controller direct another agency to do something, for example you wanted defence to do something and they said No."*

*The context provided was where another agency could do what was requested but advise they would not. The panels question was "could the National controller from another agency legally direct another agency to do something."*

*You have asked for MNZ's view. Our comments are as follows:*

- As a general and overarching comment, it is important to be clear on the legal framework for any response to an event. It is that legal framework that informs the scope of the statutory powers that may be exercised. For example, the term "national controller" may be used in an informal sense in a response under the MTA, or it may refer to the person appointed under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. MNZ can speak to relevant statutory powers under the MTA. Advice on the scope of powers held by other agencies or under other legislation would be better directed to those departments or the Crown Law Office.*
- Maritime New Zealand, is a Crown Entity constituted under the Maritime Transport Act 1994 ("MTA"). In the event of a shipping casualty or pollution incident, such as Rena, the MTA has specific provisions that guide the powers of the Director and any response to an oil spill. These powers are based on International Maritime Conventions and respectively give the Director powers of intervention to take certain measures in respect of ships that are discharging or threatening to discharge oil (equivalent powers exist in relation to structures) and establishes a framework for planning and responding to clean up oil spills and prevent any further pollution damage, under the control of a National-On-Scene-Commander.*
- In both cases the MTA provides specific statutory powers to either the Director (for example section 248/249 MTA) or to the National-On-Scene-Commander (for example section 305 MTA). These include powers to give certain directions and require certain actions to be taken. This can include authorising others to exercise powers. However, neither the powers of the Director under sections 248 or 249 of the MTA or the powers given to National-On-Scene-Commanders under the MTA empower the Director or NOSC to give directions to other government departments to take action or to assist in the event of an oil spill or a pollution incident and/or require those departments to comply with such directions. For example, while there are provisions for directions to be given to ships, this would exclude ships of the NZDF. Likewise the ability of the NOSC to place land or property under his control and direction for the purposes of an oil spill response expressly excludes land or property belonging to NZDF.*

*For completeness, we note that during Rena, consideration was given to whether the powers under the MTA would be sufficient or if others emergency legislation should be triggered, namely civil defence provisions. In that case the specific powers of the MTA were considered appropriate.*

*If a regional or national emergency was declared under Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM) MNZ could be involved. However, this would be part of a broader government response under the CIMS model. It would not be a MNZ response or an exercise of power under the MTA. Any powers would be those given to the Director of Civil Defence under that legislation (CDEM). The extent and scope of powers under CDEM is not for MNZ to advise on. By way of general comment only, our understanding is those powers are very broad and extend to giving directions to co-ordinate the use of in relation to the resources of other departments that have been made available.*

*The exercise of any powers should be clearly based in law. The lawful exercise of those powers will be relevant to questions such as whether civil or criminal liability might flow from any decisions or action that are taken in accordance with that direction. For example, protections from civil and criminal liability are expressly provided for under the MTA when the NOSC or Director takes action and extend to protect those who act in accordance with any direction or authorisation.*

### **Submission of the New Zealand Transport Agency in response to questions raised regarding road cordons**

Questions were raised by the TAG on how road cordons were instituted and managed after the Kaikōura Earthquake and Tsunami (particularly with respect to Route 70), and the general procedure regarding road cordons.

The following submission has been provided by the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZ Transport Agency):

*After the Kaikōura Earthquake and Tsunami, the NZ Transport Agency assumed control of Route 70 and started managing as part of the State Highway network. This was done in accordance with an agreement between the NZ Transport Agency, Hurunui District Council, and the Kaikōura District Council. The road remains a local road, however.*

*The NZ Transport Agency took over and operated/controlled Council established closure/checkpoints very early on. This was done under the authority and direction of the Civil Defence Controller acting under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.*

*More generally, the NZ Transport Agency as the road controlling authority for the State Highway network has the ability to institute and control road cordons on State Highways, under the Government Roding Powers Act 1989. Additionally local authorities have the ability to institute and control road cordons on local roads under the Local Government Act 1974. The New Zealand Police and Fire Service also have the ability to institute and control road cordons in certain circumstances; however, the extent of these powers is not for the NZ Transport Agency to advise on.*

*The relevant Civil Defence Controller(s) may control road cordons after a local state of emergency has been declared (or the National Controller if a national state of emergency has been declared).*

*The NZ Transport Agency is not in a position to advise whether the powers of the CDEM Controller/National Controller take precedence over the powers of the NZ Transport Agency when a state of emergency has been declared.*

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# Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand:

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*Joint Submission of the Ministry of Transport, the transport Crown Entities and  
the transport State-Owned Enterprises*



Ministry of **Transport**  
TE MANATU WAKA



**NZ TRANSPORT**  
**AGENCY**  
WAKA KOTAHI



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## Introduction

This is a joint submission to the Technical Advisory Group appointed by the Minister of Civil Defence to carry out the ministerial review “better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand”.

The submission is made by the Ministry of Transport, the transport Crown Entities (the New Zealand Transport Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority, Maritime New Zealand, and the Transport Accident Investigation Commission), and the transport State-Owned Enterprises (Kiwirail and Airways New Zealand).

## The role of the transport sector in an emergency

### Major transport incidents

The transport sector takes the lead in response to most major transport incidents. A major transport incident is a significant air, sea or land incident involving one or more vehicles, ships or aircraft, with impacts exceeding normal business-as-usual for emergency service providers. In some cases (such as a response to a terrorist attack involving transport vehicles) the New Zealand Police would be the lead agency.

According to the National Security System Handbook (published August 2016) the Ministry of Transport is the lead response agency at the national level after a major transport accident, while the New Zealand Police has the operational lead. This however is not completely correct, e.g. Maritime New Zealand would have the operational lead (pursuant to a clear statutory framework that is consistent with international best practice) at the national level in response to a maritime accident, whereas the Ministry of Transport would likely have the strategic lead. Work is currently being undertaken by the transport sector to clarify the sector’s response arrangements for major transport incidents.

Exercises are conducted on a regular basis for major transport incidents, with:

- Maritime NZ leading exercises for the maritime mode
- Airways NZ conducting exercises with respect to air navigation
- Kiwirail conducting exercises for the rail mode
- individual airports conducting emergency exercises pursuant to the Civil Aviation Act and civil aviation rule 139.109 (2).

### Other emergencies (including natural disasters)

The transport sector is listed as a lifeline utility sector in the Guide to the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan 2015. The transport sector has an important role in natural disasters including:

- providing intelligence and advice to the National Crisis Management Centre regarding evacuation and supply routes
- restoring transport connections as soon as possible (including by using alternative means of transport) to ensure that rescue teams and supplies can be brought into the affected area, and people can be evacuated as required
- ensuring the response is safe from a transport perspective (e.g. placing temporary restrictions on the use of airspace).

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The Transport Response Team (TRT) is the Sector Co-ordinating Entity for the transport sector during an emergency response. The objectives of the TRT are to:

- facilitate the flow of information throughout the transport sector
- facilitate the timely and accurate transfer of information between the transport sector and the Government, providing a 'whole of transport' picture
- provide strategic advice and recommendations to the lead agency, the secretary of transport, and Government on transport related issues.

The TRT is activated and coordinated by the Ministry of Transport and consists of representatives from the NZ Transport Agency, KiwiRail, Civil Aviation Authority, Maritime NZ and Airways New Zealand as required.

The TRT has been activated twice for events in the last 12 months; firstly in response to the Kaikoura Earthquake and Tsunami, and secondly in response to Ex Tropical Cyclones Debbie and Cook. Additionally, in the past 12 months the TRT was also activated for Exercises Whakautu II and Tangaroa. Historically the TRT has been activated for other notable events such as the Christchurch Earthquakes and the RENA response.

The transport sector also has important roles in the response to other emergencies such as: pandemics (e.g. controlling the spread of the pandemic, via transport vectors, in accordance with orders of the Director of Health); fires (e.g. restricting airspace to allow for an effective aviation fire-fighting response); cyber-attacks (e.g. ensuring the safety of transport users is not compromised by a cyber-attack that attempts to affect the transport system); terrorist attacks (i.e. responding effectively to a terrorist attack involving transport assets) etc.

## Submission

### Comments and recommendations regarding lifeline utility arrangements

#### About the lifeline utility arrangements

Section 60(a) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the Act) requires a lifeline utility to "ensure that it is able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency". The entities, which are designated lifeline utilities, are listed in Schedule 1 of the Act. For the transport sector these include: operators of some airports (but not all airports), operators of some ports (but not all ports), providers of road networks (mainly the NZ Transport Agency for State-highways, and local councils for local roads), providers of a rail network or service (Kiwirail with respect to the rail network and some services, and various operators with respect to other services particularly metro services). The other entities listed as lifeline utilities include entities from the energy sector, water sector and communications sector.

#### Comments

It is our view that the current legislative arrangements for lifeline utilities do not:

- include all the relevant entities (such as those that provide air navigation services) and sectors (such as the fast moving consumer goods sector)

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- account for the trade-offs between transport modes (i.e. the ability of one transport mode<sup>1</sup> to act as a redundancy for another transport mode)
- account for the interdependencies between lifeline utility sectors (for example having sufficient requirements of the fast-moving consumer goods sector to store vital food and water, within a community, reduces the pressure to use the transport network to deliver mass care in the immediate aftermath of a disaster)
- properly specify the requirements for lifeline utilities, and as a result they are open to interpretation and may not achieve the objectives of the legislation
- take into account the commercial reality of operating a lifeline utility (in particular the difficulty for achieving resilience, for civil defence purposes, for some classes of entities that have a limited ability to pass on costs (e.g. ports; entities providing the use of aviation navigation aids) without Government funding.

### Recommendations

We recommend the Technical Advisory Group considers **advising** the Minister of Civil Defence to:

1. **add** entities (both from existing lifeline sectors and from other sectors) to Schedule 1 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (for example entities which provide air navigation services and entities in the fast moving consumer goods sector)
2. **amend** section 60 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2015 so that:
  - a. the duties of lifeline utilities are clear, and
  - b. there is sufficient allowance for trade-offs to be made between entities within a lifeline utility sector and between lifeline utility sectors to ensure civil defence resilience objectives can be achieved for the lowest overall cost and from the appropriate funding source.
3. **create** a civil defence and emergency management lifeline utility resilience fund<sup>2</sup>, funded by the Crown:
  - a. which would be a contestable fund managed by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management where lifeline utilities could submit projects (including large-scale infrastructure projects) for funding, provided that:
    - i. the project is not otherwise commercially viable, and
    - ii. the project is likely to assist the Crown in preserving human life following a disaster, and
    - iii. the project addresses a known disaster risk.

### Comments and recommendations regarding the civil defence structure and recent civil defence operations

#### Comments

The transport sector has observed that:

- there is room for improvement on how the planning function, under New Zealand's Co-ordinated Incident Management (CIMS) model, is operated during a civil defence

<sup>1</sup> The transport modes being air, sea, rail, and road.

<sup>2</sup> This would be similar to the current CDEM Resilience Fund but be specifically for lifeline utilities to conduct projects (including infrastructure project).

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response, we consider that the issues regarding the planning function largely arise from:

- a lack of resources available to dedicate to the planning function (consequently the planning function can get overlooked in favour of the operations, intelligence, and logistics functions which are required to provide an urgent response)
- a lack of planning training that is easily available for agencies to access.
- communication between the National Crisis Management Centre (NCCMC) and local/regional civil defence groups is not always working effectively
- local (and perhaps regional) CDEM groups are insufficiently resourced
- local (and perhaps regional) CDEM groups activate relatively infrequently and consequently building up experience in those groups is challenging
- some national agencies are insufficiently resourced (particularly where they are the lead agency responding to a large scale event for a significant period)
- there is a lack of centralised training that agencies and private sector stakeholders can 'tap into' which is particularly problematic for agencies which are not mainly operational agencies and which do not have the resources to develop their own training
- significant lessons learnt from civil defence led exercises/events are not being properly implemented due to a lack of resources
- there is a low level of participation from civil defence in some of the exercises regarding critical transport infrastructure (this is most likely a resourcing issue)

### Recommendations

We recommend the Technical Advisory Group:

1. **investigate** the how the planning function has been conducted during recent civil defence exercises and events
2. **explore** whether the recommendation contained in the Exercise Tangaroa post-exercise report to "leverage the existing experience of the New Zealand Defence Force to lead operational planning (and training for operational planning) in response on behalf of All-of-Government" should be implemented
3. **investigate** the communication between local/regional CDEM groups and the NCCMC, during recent exercises and events, and make any recommendations it considers necessary, regarding Civil Defence operations, to the Minister of Civil Defence.
4. **note** under the current model the local Civil Defence groups have insufficient resources and experience to appropriately lead civil defence responses.
5. **explore** whether:
  - a. the central Government should increase resourcing to the local Civil Defence groups (noting this will not address the experience issue);or
  - b. decrease the threshold for Civil Defence responses being nationally led (with appropriate local involvement) – with national teams being deployed as required
6. **explore** how regional centres (such as the NZTA Transport Operations Centres) could be better used to support a civil defence response at the regional level
7. **recommend** to the Minister of Civil Defence that robust training should be available for civil defence matters so that:

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- a. all central government agencies, regional government agencies, and key private sector stakeholders can appropriately manage their own responses,
  - b. and central and regional government agencies can also provide staff to supplement the lead agency if the lead agency has a staff shortfall.
8. **investigate** the how lessons learnt have been implemented and whether major themes keep reoccurring in post-event/post-exercise reports; and if this is the case what resources/frameworks are need to prevent this from re-occurring.
  9. **investigate** how critical infrastructure exercises can be better integrated with civil defence.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

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7 July 2017

Office of the Chief Executive  
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet  
Office of the Chief Executive  
Level 8 Executive Wing  
Parliament Buildings  
Wellington  
Attention Jeremy Corban – Secretariat

Dear Mr Corban

**Subject – Ministerial Review – Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand**

In response to the invitation from the Technical Advisory Group on the Ministerial Review “Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand”, attached is a submission from the Engineering Leadership Forum.

In preparing this submission we have consulted with a wide range of engineering practitioners who have had wide experience in emergency management.

We hope that our submission is able to make a significant contribution to the review. The Engineering Leadership Forum would appreciate the opportunity to present the submission in person.

If the Technical Advisory Group requires further information, please do not hesitate to contact us. Our first point of contact is John Pfahlert – CEO Water NZ at .39 The Terrace, PO Box 1316, Wellington, 6140, Phone 04 495 0896.

Yours sincerely

Susan Freeman-Greene  
Chief Executive  
IPENZ

Kieran Shaw  
Chief Executive  
ACENZ

John Pfahlert  
Chief Executive  
Water New Zealand

Peter Silcock  
Chief Executive  
Civil Contractors NZ

Peter Berry  
Chief Executive  
EEA

Peter Higgs  
Chief Executive  
IPWEA

Rob Gaimster  
Chief Executive  
CCANZ

\* The Engineering Leadership Forum comprises the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand, Association of Consulting Engineers New Zealand, Water New Zealand, Civil Contractors NZ, Electricity Engineers' Association, IPWEA (Institute of Public Works Engineering Australasia – NZ Division), and the Cement & Concrete Association of New Zealand.

# Ministerial Review - Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

## Submission by the Engineering Leadership Forum

7 July 2017

### Introduction

1. Thank you for the opportunity to provide comment to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Review (the Review).
2. This submission is from the Engineering Leadership Forum (the Forum). The Forum comprises the CEOs of New Zealand's professional engineering associations, including the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand, the Association of Consulting Engineers New Zealand, Water New Zealand, Civil Contractors New Zealand, the Institute of Public Works Engineering Australasia (New Zealand Division), the Electricity Engineers' Association and the Cement and Concrete Association of New Zealand. These organisations represent well over 30,000 professional engineers.
3. The Forum supports the need to ensure that emergency responses operate with clear authority and chains of command, good information and communications, and the right capability. Engineering professionals are central to the reduction, response to, and recovery from natural disasters and other emergencies. The professional engineering and associated communities always rally in response to natural disasters and have made significant contributions. In our view, it is therefore critical that the skills of experienced engineering professionals are utilised at key stages of any emergency management process, and that their voice is heard with regards to any proposed changes.
4. This submission is informed by discussions with professional engineers experienced in dealing with civil emergencies, and from the collective experiences of the Engineering Leadership Forum member organisations. We encourage the Review Panel to engage with engineers over the course of its review, and to give consideration to the importance of the engineering role and contribution to effective emergency response management, from reduction to recovery. We would be happy to connect the Review Panel with engineers with specific expertise in this area if that would assist with the Review.
5. Overall, our view is that notwithstanding the wide range of potential emergencies and hazards facing New Zealand communities, the Act provides a good framework for the CDEM system, and that the problems that are emerging as evident in recent events can be quickly resolved by a more consistent implementation of the Act, improvements in governance and training, and a greater focus on risk reduction. These are discussed further below.
6. We note the Review seeks to improve the civil defence and emergency management (CDEM) system and is especially focused on securing 'better responses'. In our view, getting 'better responses' is inextricably linked to improving emergency preparedness and increased focus on risk reduction investments. Risk reduction may be outside of the scope of the Terms of Reference (ToR) and the ToR commentary, but it is, in our view, a critically important component of the CDEM system. We include commentary on this.

### Surge Capability

7. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the Act) requires central Government agencies, TAs, emergency management groups and utilities to 'ensure ... they can continue to function, albeit at a reduced level, during and after an emergency ... and to plan for this'.
8. In our view, effective response to a civil emergency is a consequence of deliberate and prior preparation over extended periods.
9. Natural disasters are fortunately infrequent. The main participants in the CDEM system, the Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (the MCDEM), the territorial authorities (the TAs), and the regional emergency management groups, may spend long periods in a 'business as usual' mode before a disaster occurs that they perhaps have not anticipated and are not well prepared for. Recent experience indicates that in a disaster, particularly major disasters, even our largest cities and lifeline utilities quickly become overwhelmed. The challenge for the CDEM system is to maintain the necessary professional expertise during periods of low activity and to ensure the ongoing preparations required for coping with a disaster.
10. In our view, one solution is to organise the CDEM system to ensure that emergency controllers, TAs and utilities impacted are immediately supported by experienced professional engineers and civil defence specialists in a pre-organised and formal response process.
11. CDEM practitioners call this 'surge capability', which is the rapid deployment into an afflicted area of pre-formed and trained specialist groups. These groups could include a wide range of skills and capabilities depending on the type of emergency. In most significant situations, TAs need experienced professional engineering support, utilities need support at senior executive level and in operations management, and the regional controller needs to be supported (and possibly replaced by) an experienced CD practitioner. The deployment of surge capability recognises that senior engineering staff employed by the TA will be mobilising the resources of the council and local contractors in repairing critical council infrastructure – including roading and water services.
12. There are many examples of surge capability support processes in current operation. In the utilities sector there is already widespread outsourcing of operations to national companies. Examples include North Power, who operates widely across the electricity lines companies, and City Care who work with the three water utilities. These organisations have a track record of mobilising out of region support quickly and efficiently in emergencies. In the Manawatu floods, for example, there was extensive overnight deployment of civil engineering and construction support from the private sector. However, there appears to be much less pre-planning around senior executive capability backup in TAs, utilities and in the CDEM system. It is relevant to this discussion that in the Kaikoura earthquake, an experienced controller was brought in immediately.
13. Surge capability supports, but does not replace, local leadership and capability, especially in the TAs. Each situation has its own dynamic, and there may be exceptions to this in extreme cases, but it is very clear to those who have experienced management of a declared emergency that prior local contacts and local knowledge is essential to an optimal response – engineers and CD practitioners need local knowledge and local contacts to operate effectively. How people connect before events, and the extent to which they share a common sense of duty, and an operating awareness, will set the scene for any response.

### **CDEM Training**

14. A feature of the current CDEM system is the lack of a centralised national training system. This is in contrast to the training undertaken by the Police or the Fire Service, for example. Training, and retraining, is a central part of these organisations culture and operation. We advocate the development, under the MCDEM, of a comprehensive and nationally consistent training system for both the CDEM professionals and volunteers. This is not a criticism of the current university programmes, but a reflection that training needs to be seen as a core MCDEM activity and under its direct control.
15. In particular, the advice we have received is that surge capacity needs leadership training for dealing with situations which are overwhelming. The courses that were provided by the MCDEM Civil Defence School in the past have been referred to as practical and applicable, but we understand that, since its disestablishment, MCDEM courses have been more theoretical. In our view, there needs to be a training programme for controllers and senior emergency office personnel that focuses on judgement and decision making in disaster, on learning from the good and bad from prior emergencies and on learning from experienced CD practitioners and controllers.
16. A new national CDEM training programme would require significant new investments in learning and development. The programme could be delivered in part through an education provider, but it would need MCDEM oversight and active involvement of its senior managers. The objective would be to develop a centralised national CDEM force, trained, qualified and accredited through a national system (with national standards and competency frameworks for standard operations), funded by MCDEM, with careers managed by the Director. The new CDEM capability developed would be deployed on a regional basis and monitored and supported by the TAs.
17. A national training system would provide the basis for the creation of the teams of specialists envisaged in providing surge capability (as discussed above), and the building of networks among CDEM professionals and regional controllers, to allow a seamless transition from business as usual to disaster response.
18. The CDEM system is dependent on the mobilisation of significant numbers of preferably trained volunteers. The current variable training of volunteers should also be replaced with a national system, designed and funded by MCDEM, and delivered and supported on a day to day basis by the regional emergency offices.

### **Governance and Organisation Design**

19. While policy is important, for the CDEM system to be truly effective, its leaders (most specifically the MCDEM) need to be operationally focused – active, engaged, and enabling. An example of this would be MCDEM becoming involved in national training programmes, as discussed above. Effective communication between CDEM organisations and practitioners is also key – for example, closer day to day relationships between MCDEM and the Regional Emergency Management office managers.
20. TA professional engineers have commented that in an emergency it is not always easy for the TA's Chief Engineer to carry out the TA controller function given the other demands on them. An alternative approach is to shape the controller's role so it can be undertaken by a specialist, such as another TA staff member who is a trained and experienced manager, with sound

organisational and interpersonal skills, and potentially risk and crisis management skills. Further, there is an emerging view within the engineering community that regional emergency controllers should report to the declaring TA, which invariably bears the brunt of the cost of the response. Clarity around reporting should not affect the ability of MCDEM to assign command and control powers to the controller.

21. In regard to the regional emergency management offices, there is also an emerging view in the engineering community that they would best be managed by experienced business managers rather than a person with regional controller skills. The basis for this view is that the skill set for establishing emergency preparedness and to assist in risk identification activities may best lie with experienced programme and business managers. In this model, in disaster, the regional controller position would be quickly taken over by an experienced practitioner from the surge capability group, but supported by staff with local knowledge.
22. The Act is silent on audit, but it was debated during its drafting. We consider that experience shows that audit is now needed. The audit of emergency preparedness is well established in the defence forces and in many organisations, particularly in industry, and could be extended into the lifeline utility sector as an extension of current health and safety audit processes. The lack of audit and consistent implementation of the Act is probably at heart the main reason for this review. MCDEM could be funded and resourced to undertake this, though they may contract these to an existing organisation such as the forces' Inspector General Unit or Audit New Zealand.
23. An alternative, less intrusive (though arguably less effective) approach to audit would be to require disclosure of compliance in annual reporting processes. For example, a disclosure obligation for a lifeline utility (in their Annual Report) on the utility's plan for functioning during and after an emergency would be a very strong incentive to encourage compliance with Section 60 of the Act.

#### **Risk Reduction**

24. The CDEM system is wholly focused on the improvement of emergency preparedness and response. In our view, risk reduction initiatives can substantially reduce the impact of natural events on communities and should be an important and mandated part of CDEM processes.
25. The Act implies a responsibility on MCDEM in some aspects of risk reduction, for example the implementation and operation of a proper warning system for locally sourced tsunamis, and an earthquake warning system that gives communities warning of the arrival of strong earthquake shaking.<sup>1</sup> However, some important risk reduction strategies fall outside the activities of the CDEM system as it currently operates. Consistent interpretation and application of the RMA by TAs and a coherent nationwide approach to hazard risk reduction is crucial. For example, more focus on land use planning and community resilience is needed – we should be restricting building on flood plains, beaches and fore-dunes. A further example is the lack of incentives for the construction of buildings with energy absorbing systems which reduces damage in earthquake to the minimum and allows buildings to be immediately repopulated.
26. The Act requires utilities to be resilient, but there is no systematic assessment of utility resilience nor of the resilience of utility systems (this is where audit might come into play, as discussed above). Furthermore, one of the most serious deficiencies in the current CDEM system is the

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<sup>1</sup> Both of these can be implemented through the push broadcasting capability currently being implemented, and modelled on similar schemes elsewhere especially the Japanese systems.

lack of incentives and process to enable lifeline utilities to be more resilient and to improve the resilience of their networks. Utilities should be encouraged to deal with these issues as building resilient systems can involve quite different programmes than building more capacity or the replacement of aging assets, and interdependency issues between utilities can significantly threaten emergency responses. The establishment of agreed service targets after disaster would provide a basis for planning the improvements required.

### **Other Issues Mentioned in the ToR**

27. It appears from the ToR that consideration is being given to the effective timing of declarations. The view of the experts we have interviewed is that the TAs remain well aware of the consequences of declarations of emergency and are best placed to call them.
28. Although the ToR asserts that we have learnt the lessons from the Canterbury earthquakes, we note there has never been a public and independent review of, for example, the operation of the state of emergency declared, the impact of the lengthy red zoning, how CERA operated and the process adopted for the rebuild. The objective of the audit is to learn and not to blame.
29. Industry undertakes exhaustive reviews of incidents and near misses as a matter of course to comply with the Health and Safety at Work Act, and this culture needs to be embedded into the CDEM process through MCDEM.

### **Summary**

To conclude our overall comments are summarised under the ToR Outcomes as follows:

30. *Outcome 1: Is the emergency response system fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies?*

As noted above, notwithstanding the wide range of potential emergencies and hazards facing New Zealand communities, we assess that the Act provides a good framework for the CDEM system, and that the problems that are emerging as evident in recent events can be quickly resolved by a more consistent implementation of the Act, improvements in governance and training and a greater focus on risk reduction.

31. *Outcome 2: Does New Zealand have the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses?*

See our recommendations for surge capability and training.

32. *Outcome 3: Is a clearer definition needed of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency?*

The Act is quite clear that the intention is to place this responsibility on TAs. If TAs are well supported then there is no need to give the Director power in this regard.

33. *Outcome 4: Is the chain of command and control, coordination and decision making during an emergency effective and appropriate?*



We recommend that, in a regionally declared emergency, controllers be accountable to the declaring authority. MCDEM is better placed to be focused on organisational capability building and system training.

34. *Outcome 5: Are information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effective, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies?*

The deployment of nationally trained surge capability, as we recommend, would improve the oversight of emergencies and communications. There needs to be a focus on providing proactive and accurate information to the public (and media) during emergencies.

### **Conclusion**

35. The Act provides a good framework for the CDEM system, but there are areas where the system, as it currently operates, could be strengthened. We think it is important that the Review consider how to ensure the Act is more consistently implemented, personnel involved in CDEM receive appropriate training and support, governance is strengthened, and risk reduction is prioritised.

36. In these areas, our key points are as follows:

- a. In disaster, TAs need support that integrates into existing business processes, operational frameworks and organisational culture without causing disruption and dysfunctionality. We recommend the creation of properly trained teams of experts to be deployed by MCDEM to assist TAs, lifeline utilities, and to take over regional controller roles in significant emergency.
- b. The MCDEM should be tasked and funded to deliver a national CDEM training programme for both CDEM professionals and prospective volunteers.
- c. CDEM leaders, specifically MCDEM, need to be operationally focused, and engaged in training and capability building, establishing minimal requirements on TAs and utilities for compliance with the Act, and implementing compliance audits.
- d. The engineering profession would like to see a rational and measured approach to the defence of communities from natural disaster and other emergencies and detailed consideration of a wider range of risk reduction programmes.

37. Thank you for the opportunity to comment. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions about this submission.

John Pfahlert  
Chief Executive  
Water New Zealand  
7 July 2017

For and on behalf of the Engineering Leadership Forum.

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Mike Grant _ CEO Wellington Free Ambulance
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>NO</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): For the attention of the Technical Advisory group "Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand" Attention: Roger Sowry, Group Chair <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Wellington Free Ambulance recognizes that in an emergency response there needs to be a consistent approach to responding to emergencies, these needs to include a wide group of responders beyond that of the legislated emergency response agencies. The responders need to have consistent experience and training within the CIMS model.</li><li>Wellington Free Ambulance supports the development of a professionally trained emergency management workforce which can competently lead and or contribute to the New Zealand Comprehensive emergency management framework. Emergency responders should be recruited from a range of agencies and should support a single lead agency operating a unified control response model.</li><li>A unified control model would recognize the need to be able to draw on resources across New Zealand and other international ambulance providers. It would clearly identify the lead agency and use these resources to provide support to response and recovery. Special note should be made of rural communities which will be found to be isolated within a major emergency, unified control is imperative in this environment as is recognizing the lead agency and resources from the local community.</li><li>There is a need to ensure Ambulance services (St John and Wellington Free Ambulance) are recognized as emergency services and as such are included in a legislative change to reflect this.</li><li>There is a need to formalize a framework nationally, regionally and locally to provide a consistent approach to EOC deployment and management so that the ambulance sector is formally represented in this.</li><li>Civil Defence Emergency management coordinating groups are mandated to have Ambulance service membership; currently there is no mandate to include ambulance services.</li><li>"Preventing death and injury" during or post a civil defence emergency is the responsibility and expectation that the public has that the emergency ambulance service will provide for the community to prevent death and injury. The ambulance service is seen as an integral partner of the emergency services group across New Zealand. Ambulance Service is also a recognized provider of health services in the wider health community across New Zealand.</li><li>EMIS is a nationally deployed digital emergency management system. Wellington Free Ambulance supports the mandating of an all of government approach to using this system during national, regional and local emergencies.</li></ul> <b>Key Summary</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>The ambulance service (Wellington Free Ambulance and St John) needs to be recognised as an emergency service in its own right and legislated this effect.</li><li>The ambulance service needs to be involved in strategic and tactical planning and response activity.</li></ol>

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

**Submission:**

For the attention of the Technical Advisory group

“Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand”

Attention: Roger Sowry, Group Chair

- Wellington Free Ambulance recognizes that in an emergency response there needs to be a consistent approach to responding to emergencies, these needs to include a wide group of responders beyond that of the legislated emergency response agencies. The responders need to have consistent experience and training within the CIMS model.
- Wellington Free Ambulance supports the development of a professionally trained emergency management workforce which can competently lead and or contribute to the New Zealand Comprehensive emergency management framework. Emergency responders should be recruited from a range of agencies and should support a single lead agency operating a unified control response model.
- A unified control model would recognize the need to be able to draw on resources across New Zealand and other international ambulance providers. It would clearly identify the lead agency and use these resources to provide support to response and recovery. Special note should be made of rural communities which will be found to be isolated within a major emergency, unified control is imperative in this environment as is recognizing the lead agency and resources from the local community.
- There is a need to ensure Ambulance services (St John and Wellington Free Ambulance) are recognized as emergency services and as such are included in a legislative change to reflect this.
- There is a need to formalize a framework nationally, regionally and locally to provide a consistent approach to EOC deployment and management so that the ambulance sector is formally represented in this.
- Civil Defence Emergency management coordinating groups are mandated to have Ambulance service membership; currently there is no mandate to include ambulance services.
- “Preventing death and injury” during or post a civil defence emergency is the responsibility and expectation that the public has that the emergency ambulance service will provide for the community to prevent death and injury. The ambulance service is seen as an integral partner of the emergency services group across New Zealand. Ambulance Service is also a recognized provider of health services in the wider health community across New Zealand.
- EMIS is a nationally deployed digital emergency management system. Wellington Free Ambulance supports the mandating of an all of government approach to using this system during national, regional and local emergencies.

**Key Summary**

1. The ambulance service (Wellington Free Ambulance and St John) needs to be recognised as an emergency service in its own right and legislated this effect.
2. The ambulance service needs to be involved in strategic and tactical planning and response activity.



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**To:** TAG Secretariat

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**From:** Sarah Stuart-Black, Director MCDEM

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**Date:** 28 July 2017

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**Subject:** MCDEM Submission to the TAG

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This document provides the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM) input into the Technical Advisory Group review of responses to emergencies in New Zealand, as part of the public submission process.

The document has three main parts:

Part 1: provides context of New Zealand's hazardscape, the CDEM sector and response framework and its origins, and progress since 2002.

Part 2: discusses three possible operating models.

Part 3: considers issues to be addressed in any model.

This paper does not represent a policy approach or proposal nor does it try to portray the full picture or represent views of those outside MCDEM. Notwithstanding this we have outlined some proposals, noting that any changes to operating models would need to be fully analysed and costed through a formal policy process before any decisions were made. This would include: an evidence-based problem definition; an options analysis that takes account of context, confronts trade-offs and identifies risks of unintended consequences and how to mitigate them; and a regulatory impact analysis to ensure the solution is cost effective.

I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the tremendous work I have seen by people who work tirelessly and with great passion and commitment at a local, regional and national level to support our communities in times of real need, and for their contributions towards building greater nationwide resilience.

Our submission is deliberately focused on response to emergencies to fit with the main purpose of the TAG and its terms of reference. We acknowledge that the long-term strategic goal of MCDEM is to work towards nationwide resilience so there are fewer emergencies to respond to.

We welcome this review and the opportunity to comment.

Sarah Stuart-Black  
Director CDEM

# MCDEM Submission to TAG

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## 1 Context

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1. We acknowledge that TAG members are already well informed of the current legislative and operational framework for response. However, as context for this submission we briefly summarise New Zealand's hazardscape and its existing civil defence emergency management system.

### 1.1 Our Hazardscape

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2. New Zealand's dynamic physical environment and level of technological development means that we are exposed to a wide variety of hazards. Flooding is the natural hazard that most often leads to a community-wide emergency, the most under-estimated is volcanic eruption and potentially the most dangerous are earthquakes and tsunami.
3. One of the more significant hazard scenarios is a major earthquake on either the South Island Alpine or Wellington faults. Other significant natural hazards include snow, wind, landslide and severe storms. Coastal erosion, storm surge and tsunami pose significant risks to many coastal areas of the country.<sup>1</sup> Such risks are expected to increase due to climate change. New Zealand's increasing exposure to risks from natural hazards is consistent with international trends. During the past four decades, global economic losses from natural disasters have increased ten-fold.
4. New Zealand's vulnerability to hazards is influenced by the structure of its economy and society. The economy depends heavily on agriculture, tourism and international trade - all of which could be severely affected by an inadequate response to a disaster in New Zealand.
5. The nature of our lifestyles, settlement patterns and resource-use affects the way hazards could impact on New Zealand. If present patterns of development continue, such as a growing number of people living in coastal and urban areas, more and more of the population will be concentrated in areas of relatively high risk. Scientific research into the New Zealand hazardscape continues to identify new hazards and often points to a more compelling risk from our known hazards than was previously understood. For example, the understanding of the likelihood of an Alpine Fault earthquake event has increased dramatically over the past five years, as has the severity of the volcanic and tsunami hazards.

### 1.2 Origins of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002

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6. A primary responsibility of government is ensuring the security, safety and welfare of its citizens and communities. In New Zealand, prior to 2002, this was often construed to mean that government would assume responsibility in the event of major emergencies. There was a view that disasters were "acts of God" which could not be mitigated. Emergency and disaster planning did not occupy a high priority for many decision makers. At that time, New Zealand had been relatively free of major disasters since the Napier earthquake in 1931.
7. The majority of emergencies are small-medium in scale and have effects that are localised to regions or districts. Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) has therefore evolved so that responsibility for CDEM is largely devolved from central government to local government.
8. This arrangement dates back to changes to legislative and structural change as far back as 1979. Up to this time the co-ordination of civil defence had been the responsibility of the Ministry of Civil Defence, operationalised through three regional divisions. This mechanism was seen increasingly as inefficient, as it was detached from local government. Local government re-organisation in that year 'led to a re-appraisal of every aspect of civil defence to assess its capability to deal with major disasters'.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management from 'Response' to 'Resilience': Emergency Management Reform in New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, Wellington (1999).

<sup>2</sup> Civil Defence in New Zealand – A Short History, June 1990, Ministry of Civil Defence publication, available at <http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/resources/publications/>

9. In 1979 a Civil Defence Amendment Act made each regional unit of local government a Civil Defence region. The new regions were charged with the responsibility for reviewing and approving local civil defence plans prepared by local authorities (previously undertaken by the Ministry of Civil Defence). It was hoped that this would strengthen civil defence by giving 'a more practical means of coordinating...resources' and thus reinforcing the ideal of community self-help. The Civil Defence Act 1983, more clearly defined the tasks of the new regional and united councils in relation to civil defence, including planning and preparation before an emergency, and the powers and functions required to deal with an emergency situation.<sup>3</sup>

### 1.3 The Civil Defence Emergency Management sector and response framework

10. Through the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act), central government established a comprehensive, risk-based approach to the management of all hazards, with a primary goal being to support communities to be resilient and self-reliant.
11. The CDEM Act in 2002, established structures at the local, regional and national level to support the management of hazardous disasters at the local level. Communities, through their local authorities and other agencies, should aim to reduce the likely impact from and prepare for emergency events, and be able to effectively respond to and recover from them. Regional and national co-operation and co-ordination is one of the cornerstones of the approach.
12. An emergency is any situation arising from a wide range of hazards (natural or otherwise) that endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand, and which cannot be dealt with by emergency services on their own<sup>4</sup>. Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups (made up of local authorities within each region or each unitary authority) undertake planning and activities across the 4Rs of emergency management – reduction, readiness, response and recovery.
13. CDEM Groups and local authorities manage response to and recovery from regional/local scale emergencies, with assistance from central government agencies and lifeline utilities in the affected area, as needed. The role of MCDEM is to support CDEM Groups to undertake reduction, readiness, response and recovery work, as well as to coordinate central government assistance. MCDEM has no significant standard/performance setting or regulatory compliance role over CDEM Groups. This framework is often summarised as "act locally, coordinate regionally, and support nationally". See **Appendix 1** for functions and powers of the Director CDEM under the CDEM Act.
14. The Minister of Civil Defence may declare a state of national emergency when the resources required to manage the response are beyond the resources of CDEM groups and local authorities in affected areas. MCDEM supports three statutory positions - the Director, a National Controller and a National Recovery Manager - who have (or may be delegated) powers to control and direct local authorities, other agencies and individuals in a state of national emergency.
15. Under New Zealand's National Security System, of which civil defence emergency management is a part, MCDEM is responsible for coordinating central government support for locally led responses and leading responses during a state of national emergency arising from geological hazards (earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, tsunami), meteorological hazards (floods, severe winds, snow) and infrastructure failure. In these instances, MCDEM is also responsible for oversight and coordination of recovery at the national level. Other central government agencies lead reduction, readiness, response and recovery for risks and emergencies arising from other hazards.<sup>5</sup> When it is not the lead agency, the MCDEM's role is to support the other lead agencies.

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<sup>3</sup> Civil Defence in New Zealand – A Short History, June 1990, Ministry of Civil Defence publication, available at <http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/resources/publications/>

<sup>4</sup> Under the CDEM Act 'emergency' encompasses any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an emergency service or a lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act.

<sup>5</sup> The Ministry of Health for infectious human diseases and radiation incidents; Ministry of Primary Industries for drought, animal and plant pests and diseases, and food safety; Fire and Emergency New Zealand for fire and hazardous substance related emergencies, New Zealand Police for terrorism and major transport accidents; and Maritime New Zealand for a marine oil spill.



16. In line with this devolved framework, local government funds provision of most reduction and readiness activity and the operational costs of response and recovery activity. However, under current arrangements, central government pays a large share of the goods and services required for response (for immediate welfare needs of people), and capital expenditure required for recovery (for repair of essential infrastructure such as roading, three waters assets, and flood control systems).

#### 1.4 Progress in Civil Defence Emergency Management since 2002

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17. The TAG's role is to reflect on issues with the current system and look to how they can be addressed. It is also important to acknowledge the significant challenge issued to Ministers and the CDEM sector by the new 2002 Act to build a new system based on a new paradigm. There has been considerable work undertaken by successive governments and the CDEM sector and much has been achieved over the past 15 years (see **Appendix 2**). Below is only a brief summary of the investment and progress made.
18. The National Crisis Management Centre was established in 2003 to support coordinated responses across government agencies at the national level.
19. Research to understand hazard risk is progressing with agencies and science providers working collaboratively under programmes such as Resilience to Nature's Challenges. We now have a better understanding of national hazards risk and developed a common methodology to assess them.
20. MCDEM has established and maintains a tsunami risk management programme that has delivered:
- A tsunami hazard risk assessment in 2005 and updated in 2013.
  - *Tsunami Evacuation Zones Director's Guideline for CDEM* [DGL 08/16] (2016).
  - *Mass Evacuation Planning Director's Guideline for CDEM Groups* [DGL 07/08] (2008).
  - Development of a national tsunami advisory and warning plan in 2008, updated regularly, most recently in 2017 [SP 01/17].
  - Continuous enhancements of tsunami warning message content.
21. Two National CDEM Plans have been made, with each one incorporating a more robust, complete and well-understood set of arrangements for CDEM across the 4Rs. There is also a greater commitment by agencies to deliver on their roles and responsibilities.
22. All agreed recommendations of the independent Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake (2012) have been addressed and, where needed, incorporated into the National Civil Defence Emergency Plan 2015 or business as usual practices. This resulted in significant improvements in CDEM capability development, practice and processes across many agencies, including
- Changes to the Coordinated Incident Management System.
  - Guidelines covering managing cordons, co-ordinating volunteers, welfare services, how to do rapid impact assessments and organise logistics.
  - Improved training for Controllers, engineers and inspectors and joint Police and Fire Service training activity.
  - The Christchurch Justice and Emergency Services Precinct.
23. Changes to welfare services, including the elevation of existing arrangements to the National CDEM Plan, have integrated and clarified roles and responsibilities for registration; needs assessment; inquiry; care and protection services for children and young people; psychosocial support; provision of household goods and services; shelter and accommodation; financial assistance; and animal welfare.
24. The Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) has been implemented at both national and local levels to provide a coordinated and consistent system to request and track resources, assign tasks, and monitor and report on progress.
25. Reviews of the Wellington Earthquake National Initial Response Plan and the National CDEM Fuel Plan are well advanced, and an Alpine Fault Earthquake Initial Response Plan is in development.

26. MCDEM will soon conclude two significant projects to enhance the ability to monitor and warn about hazards. This is to implement a new National Warning System and establishing a multi-million dollar Cell Broadcast Public Alerting system based on mobile phone technology.
27. Several nationwide public education campaigns have been run since 2008:
  - The *Get Ready Get Thru* social marketing campaign has been running since June 2006. This includes the *Happens* campaign launched in July 2016, aimed at improving household preparedness, particularly for groups with low rates of preparedness.
  - The *Shakeout* exercise for earthquake preparedness in 2012 (in which 1.3 million people participated) and in 2015.
  - The Earthquake Commission's *Quake Safe Your Home*; and *Fix, Fasten and Don't Forget*.
  - *What's the Plan Stan?* Curriculum material aimed at school children.
  - The *Turtle Safe* DVD aimed at pre-school children.
  - Earthquake Commission and GNS Science GEONET public education programmes.
  - Use of new media/outreach programmes, such as Twitter alerts and a programme for the hard of hearing/seeing.
  - Tsunami video and hazard event scenario narratives made for television
  - *Long or Strong, Get Gone* campaign for what to do if there is a risk of tsunami from a felt earthquake.
28. A Memorandum of Understanding between MCDEM and national radio and television broadcasters has been in place since 2006 and has recently been renewed and strengthened. The Memorandum is activated during significant and fast moving emergencies in which an immediate risk to personal safety exists that requires urgent information or advice to be relayed to the public. When activated, MCDEM issues a 'request for broadcast' involving a statement which is broadcast verbatim at regular intervals until a cancellation is issued. The new agreement provides for captioning or news tickers on television.
29. In 2014, MCDEM rebuilt their website to allow CDEM Groups to flag a regional emergency status for automatic publication on the MCDEM website. This makes it easier for people to find the Group's information and for the Group to get its information to the public.
30. Significant progress in professional development in CDEM has been achieved through several initiatives. An Integrated Training Framework has been established. This is a joint CDEM Group and MCDEM initiative to enhance the competency of all staff working in an Emergency Coordination Centre environment. Over 4,500 participants have completed courses. The Framework has on-going development.
31. A CDEM Learning Management System was launched in July 2016 to automate the management, tracking and reporting of training programmes and provide a platform for content delivery, training materials and evaluation tools. MCDEM has established a CDEM Controllers Development Programme to develop the capability of controllers at local, regional and national levels. This is offered jointly by Massey University and Auckland University of Technology. Since it was first offered in 2014 more than 150 participants have enrolled.
32. MCDEM facilitates the National CDEM Exercise Programme - a ten year programme of regular exercises and exercise planning. Since 2006, the following national level exercises have been conducted:
  - Exercise Ruamoko (an Auckland volcanic field scenario) in 2008.
  - Exercise Tangaroa (a distant source tsunami scenario) in 2010.
  - New Zealand ShakeOut (an earthquake drill) in 2012 and in 2015.
  - Exercise Tangaroa (a regional source tsunami scenario) in 2016.
33. The CDEM Competency Framework introduced by MCDEM in 2009 provides a comprehensive suite of technical competencies across specified CDEM roles. MCDEM has worked closely with the CDEM sector to develop related tools and to support its use.
34. MCDEM has developed and implemented a capability assessment programme, including a capability assessment tool to assess CDEM capability across the 4Rs. The tool is used to monitor and evaluate CDEM Groups' capability, as required under the CDEM Act. Capability assessments were reported in 2012 and 2015 (including regional reports).

35. Considerable progress has been made in response capability and systems. CDEM Groups have made strong improvements in their capability to manage emergencies and increase community participation. There has also been a notable improvement in risk reduction. The capability assessment process has motivated most Groups to implement changes to increase professionalism, improve structures and planning, improve community engagement and local government leadership, and use new technologies such as social media.
36. Numerous national guidance documents (e.g. Director's Guidelines) have been produced and revised to assist CDEM Groups. Some recent examples are:
- *Response Planning in CDEM Director's Guideline for CDEM Groups* [DGL19/15] (2015)
  - *Welfare Services in an Emergency: Director's Guideline for CDEM Groups and agencies with responsibilities for welfare services in an emergency* [DGL 11/15] (2015)
  - *Emergency Movement Control (cordon management)* [DGL 18/15] (2015)
  - *Logistics in CDEM Director's Guideline for CDEM Groups* [DGL 17/15] (2015)
  - *Rapid Impact Assessment: Information for the CDEM Sector* [IS 14/13] (2014)
  - *Lifeline Utilities and CDEM: Director's Guidelines* [DGL 16/14] (2014)
  - *Volunteer Coordination in CDEM: Director's Guideline for CDEM Groups* [DGL 15/13] (2013)
  - *Public Information Management: Director's Guideline for CDEM Groups* [DGL14/13] (2013)
  - *Including people with disabilities: Information for the CDEM Sector* [IS 13/13] (2013)
  - *Including culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities: Information for the CDEM Sector* [IS 12/13] (2013)
37. Changes to the CDEM Act in 2016 provide for better recovery from emergencies by providing a mandate for roles and responsibilities of recovery managers during recovery, establishing local and national transition periods so that appropriate powers are available, and requiring CDEM Groups to undertake strategic recovery planning. MCDEM is developing a recovery framework, incorporating guidance, capability development and the establishment of a professional forum for Recovery Managers.

## 2 Operating models for responding to civil emergencies

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### 2.1 Accountability for levels of service and responsibility for delivery

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38. A clear, understood and accepted framework of accountability for levels of service and responsibility for delivery of response to civil emergencies is essential.
39. Our submission assumes that response to a large-scale event with significant nationwide implications will continue to be managed at the central government level in whatever model is preferred.
40. For small-medium scale emergencies (by far our most frequent emergencies) a fundamental decision is whether accountability and responsibility for response should also sit at the national level or be devolved to local government. This then leads the policy maker down different structural, operational and funding pathways, related to who should make decisions about response activities (including what level of service is provided in response), who should pay, and who is accountable if service is not up to standard. Where local government is made responsible, central government can provide various forms of support.

41. The question of whether to devolve accountability and responsibility or not for any public service is obviously not a new one for governments. Governmental and academic institutions have developed and reworked many principles and decision-making frameworks for analysing the benefits/costs and trade-offs, the subsidiarity principle being the most pervasive.<sup>6</sup> There are some common themes which essentially boil down to aligning communities of interest with where the benefits and costs lie. This includes weighing up the benefits and costs of such attributes as national consistency and economies of scale over local variability and access to local knowledge.
42. We do not attempt to suggest a definitive framework or undertake a comprehensive analysis of where accountability and responsibility for response should lie in this submission.
43. We discuss below three models for small-medium scale emergencies that could be analysed further (noting our assumption that response to national scale event emergencies would continue to be managed at the central government level):
- Model 1: A centralised response agency with a regional presence - Central government accountable for levels of service and responsible for delivery.
  - Model 2: National standards for emergency response, delivered by local government - Central government is accountable for setting and regulating levels of service, with local government responsible as the primary agent of delivery.
  - Model 3 (status quo): Localised response agencies with central support - Local government accountable for levels of service (within broad national parameters) and responsible for delivery.
44. For completeness, there is a fourth possible model along this continuum of central-local government accountability: Local authorities decide to provide for response (or not) and to deliver response on their own or collectively as they see fit and to a level of service determined by their communities (i.e. a 'general power of competence' concept). This model seems untenable and we do not explore this further.
45. The TAG and policy makers will need to consider how any model would support effective integration and implementation across all 4Rs – risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery. All four may not need to be managed by the same organisation but the system would need to support their interdependencies and seamless, clear and efficient transitions, in particular from response into recovery.

## 2.2 Desired outcomes in any model

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46. We consider the following outcomes are desirable in any preferred model.

### 2.2.1 Strong leadership and consistent application

- Direct legislation setting out what is expected.
- Leaders work together to minimise duplication of effort.
- Standardisation across regions where sensible.

### 2.2.2 Clarity of roles and responsibilities

- Clear expectations of roles and organisations, and lead agencies.
- Clear accountability for performance.
- Strong requirements for key roles (e.g. Controllers and Recovery Managers).
- Strategic work managed and undertaken separately from response work.

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<sup>6</sup> For example, the Department of Internal Affairs has guidelines related to allocating regulatory functions to local government, and the same concepts therein could be applied to response to civil emergencies. The Productivity Commission (Towards Better Local Regulation, May 2013) also developed a framework to guide allocation of regulatory roles, for example considering where the costs and benefits are likely to fall; how those responsible are held to account for decisions; acceptability of variability in outcomes across regions; cost efficiencies; the location of the knowledge; capability to implement; and suitable funding mechanisms. Treasury working papers, for example, Devolution and the New Zealand Resource Management Act 1998, Kerr S, Claridge M & Millich D.

- Effective integration and implementation of all 4Rs – risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery.

### 2.2.3 The right people with the right skills in the right roles

- Investment in capability and capacity.
- Full-time, dedicated roles where needed in both response and recovery.
- Nationally-consistent, professional and high-quality training.
- Highly experienced Controllers and Recovery Managers with the necessary skills and mana for the role.
- Recognition of emergency management as a profession.

### 2.2.4 Speed and early effectiveness in response

- 24/7 monitoring, alerting and warning.
- Rapid information assimilation capability.
- Ability to 'get on top of' issues early, and form and maintain a common operating picture.
- Information sharing capability.
- Streamlined communications.

### 2.2.5 A forward-focussed, learning culture driven by the needs of the community

- Forward thinking (rather than doing more of the same)
- A focus on long-term strategic policy across the 4Rs.
- Agility and flexibility and the ability to learn quickly.
- Less risk adverse.
- Able to keep up with technology.
- Free of capture by individuals or personalities.
- A strong community/local focus.
- A model that allows – or drives – community consultation, engagement, and participation.
- Meaningful engagement with iwi.

## 2.3 Model 1: A centralised response agency with regional presence

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47. A centralised response agency would see all response activity centralised into one agency. The agency would be responsible for the coordination and control of any response to an emergency that required a significant multi-agency response, from local to national level.
48. Small local incidents and crises that can be managed by a single local authority (e.g. localised flooding etc.) would be exempt. These events are too one-dimensional and frequent for people outside of the district to manage. This means local authorities would still need to retain the capability and capacity to manage emergencies affecting their own assets and services. The response would focus on business continuity management not for the coordination and control of more widespread emergencies significantly impacting communities.
49. The centralised agency would co-ordinate across functions and agencies but would not necessarily do all the response functions. Other organisations may increase their roles to better leverage off expertise and capabilities (for example NZ Defence providing the logistics function).
50. There would need to be a partner unit, directorate or other home (potentially a separate agency) for risk reduction and recovery to build resilience. This would recognise the different skills, knowledge, and capabilities required and ensure each gets the focus it requires. This could require:
  - Multi-agency regional resilience 'forums' or 'platforms'.
  - A dedicated national risk/resilience agency or unit and

- A dedicated national recovery agency/unit,
- A separate business continuity management unit.

51. Key features of a successful centralised model are:

- Full-time readiness and response, including a 24/7 awake monitoring operation to issue public alerts and warnings.
- A strong regional presence, nationally employed, directed, and funded, including Regional Controllers.
- Regional Controllers would support other lead agencies in their response and would have authority to direct partner agencies in a state of emergency. Regional Controllers would also be responsible for regional readiness, including regional planning, response/recovery cadres (see **Appendix 3**), and facilitating any emergency management structures/committees.
- A national capability development facility/service to deliver training and other learning consistently and measurably to cadres and all response agencies (e.g. Emergency Management, Police, Fire, Health).
- Local government would remain close partners, with a regional multi-agency collaboration/coordination forum or platform.
- New/strengthened legislation including stronger directive powers
- Other readiness activities would include: operational planning, exercising, multi-agency collaboration and coordination, public education and public information management.
- The Minister of Civil Defence or the Director of the national agency would declare states of emergency on their own, or on the request or advice of the regional controller and local authorities.
- Increased national capacity, with a singular focus on readiness and response, recognised as a full-time endeavour, requiring specialist skills, attributes, knowledge, and attention. Partner agencies could second staff into the agency.

52. The benefits of this would be:

- Accountability and responsibility assumed by central government (can also be seen as a trade-off).
- Central government provides leadership and centralised command and control of response.
- There is better line of sight and directive from national to local level during response.
- National standardisation and consistency of approach (strategy, planning, training, procedures).
- A dedicated and more transparent funding stream linked to a specified and consistent level of service.
- Less confusion for the public, politicians, and other organisations; holding more weight and parity with other organisations.
- Full-time, dedicated capability and capacity for all key roles, with control of competency levels, and full control of (re)deployment.

53. The main trade-offs of this approach are:

- Accountability assumed by central government, noting that central government faces the same political prioritisation decisions and resourcing constraints as local government.
- Cost to central government of funding nationwide capacity.
- Loss of autonomy, ownership and control by local government.
- Local government are a key source of local knowledge, and the holders of most information/data about the community.
- Less direct linkage with other local government activities and services that have synergies with response.

54. A loss of local ownership includes a risk that there is less incentive for local government to invest in reducing hazard risk and building resilience, for example making infrastructure more able to cope under stress, if local government does not have to deal with the consequences. This is an underlying issue driving the review of the 60/40 cost sharing arrangement for reimbursing local authorities 60% of the cost of their infrastructure repair damaged in an emergency. This highlights the difficulty of considering response in isolation from the rest of the 4Rs and resilience.

## 2.4 Model 2: National standards for emergency response, delivered locally

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55. This model would make central government accountable for setting and assessing levels of services and capability, with local government responsible for delivery as an agent of the Crown. Local authorities would be funded by central government to deliver.
56. Currently, under the CDEM Act, the Director, National Controller and MCDEM has little ability to direct work, resources, or actions across the CDEM sector (from national to regional to local) except in a national emergency (of which there has only been one).<sup>7</sup> MCDEM also has little oversight of local capability and capacity and does not assess the capability of individuals, including Controllers or Recovery Managers. MCDEM monitors the performance of CDEM Groups, for compliance with the CDEM Act, National CDEM Strategy, and the National CDEM Plan and organisation-wide capability. However, MCDEM has no ability to enforce or penalise CDEM Groups for non-compliance. Further, there are few prescriptive standards to base enforcement or penalties for non-compliance on.
57. Under this model central government would have leadership and control over the delivery of response. More directive legislation would be needed to allow standards to be set with stronger mechanisms to enforce a consistent level of performance, while also providing flexibility where needed. Getting this balance of prescriptiveness vs flexibility right would be a core issue. This model would require significant resources to set and maintain the required levels of service that make sense taking into account the variability of hazard risk over New Zealand.
58. The Director could also have more powers to direct in peacetime and in declared and non-declared emergencies. There could be national level approval of emergency management plans (noting that this did occur under the Civil Defence Act 1983) and the selection of Controllers and Recovery Managers.
59. Prescription in this model may not just relate to local authority levels of service. The definition of, role and requirements on lifeline utilities could also be prescribed, and their performance enforced. For example, the types of lifelines could also include the Fast Moving Consumer Goods sector, banking/finance sector, and health sector. The Act could also define, specify, or require expected levels of service, in particular to identified critical customers.
60. In this model, local authorities would be funded by central government to deliver the service. Local government is very critical of what it calls 'unfunded mandates' – where central government imposes prescribed activities and outcomes and associated costs on local authorities, which takes away their autonomy to lead those decisions on behalf of the community (i.e. what they were elected to do). We note that under current arrangements central government does already pay a large share of response and recovery costs (subject to low thresholds). Reimbursement of local authority recovery costs (usually the lion's share of costs after an event) is currently under review.
61. Main benefits of this model would be:
- National control to ensure what is deemed to be adequate basic levels of service across New Zealand.
  - Control over the level of national consistency versus degree of local flexibility.
  - Capitalise on local knowledge and synergies with other local services in delivery.
  - Mitigate the central government-local government 'unfunded mandate' issue.
62. The main trade-offs of this approach are:
- Potential for loss of local variation and tailoring of CDEM to local needs.

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<sup>7</sup> CDEM Groups or local authorities must take into account Director's Guidelines and Technical Standards but after doing so may choose not to follow them.

- Providing the required level of direct oversight of, and accountability for, local capability, capacity and performance could be difficult and costly.
- Risk of costly and reputationally damaging litigation between central and local government.
- Implications for delivery of 4Rs/resilience if resources are focussed on response.

## 2.5 Model 3 (status quo): Localised response agencies with central support

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63. Model 3 would essentially leave the status quo in place whereby local government is responsible for determining levels of service (within broad national parameters), and are responsible for its delivery. As a consequence the services are funded by local communities and the local authorities are accountable to them for any actual or perceived failure in providing the desired levels of service. Currently CDEM is coordinated at the regional level through CDEM Groups.
64. The key benefits of the approach are:
- Local control, ownership and accountability.
  - Decision makers are closest to communities of interest – subsidiarity principle.
  - Access to local knowledge and synergies with other local government activities and services.
  - Incentivises local government to invest in resilience.
65. The main trade-offs of this approach are:
- Lack of ability to provide central government leadership.
  - Lack of ability to control national consistency and ensure basic levels of service.
  - Does not address lack of clarity of accountability for decision making.
  - Weaknesses in monitoring, warnings, information flows and delivery of 4Rs/resilience.

## 3 Issues that require attention in any model

### 3.1 Political and public understanding and acceptance of where accountability lies

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66. Under the current framework, local government is responsible for decisions about the level of preparation for, and response to, most civil defence emergencies. MCDEM has little ability to lead CDEM except in a its role to support CDEM Groups to undertake reduction, readiness, response and recovery work, and to coordinate central government assistance. MCDEM has no significant standard/performance setting or regulatory compliance role over CDEM Groups. However, the distinction between the roles of MCDEM, CDEM Groups and local authorities (particularly in responding to emergencies) and how CDEM works, is not well understood and sometimes not accepted.
67. The media and public are often surprised to find out 'Civil Defence' is not one, large organisation – they assume that it is akin to Fire Service, Police, or Defence. In an emergency, affected communities often do not understand, or more importantly care, that 'Civil Defence' in most cases is not undertaken by MCDEM. 'Civil Defence' is viewed by the public as one organisation with central government accountable at the top of the structure. They often look to MCDEM for information that falls within the remit of the CDEM Group/local authority, or other agencies. This can cause confusion in events.
68. This gap between public, media and political perception/expectation and current accountability is a significant problem for MCDEM and CDEM Groups. When it is perceived that a decision (or lack of) made by a CDEM Group/local authority is 'wrong', or performance is lacking, Ministers/MCDEM are sometimes criticised in the mistaken belief that they made that decision, or that they lack oversight over the CDEM Group/local authority. For example, MCDEM may issue a national warning but the CDEM Group is responsible for the decision to evacuate communities. Neighbouring CDEM Groups may take different decisions about which communities to evacuate. Conversely, if MCDEM's decisions are in question, CDEM Groups may be criticised.
69. This could be mitigated by:
- The centralised model.



- Clearer and firmer roles and accountabilities, supported by legislation/funding.
- Public education that shows how CDEM works, and who does what.
- Training for elected officials (national and local) and other spokespeople on roles and responsibilities.
- Considering more targeted branding for the agency that is responsible for key decisions.

## 3.2 Capacity of the Civil Defence Emergency Management sector

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### 3.2.1 Current capacity across the CDEM sector

70. MCDEM currently has 53 FTE. There are a further 172 FTE in emergency management around the country (employed by local and regional councils), another 201 persons who act in a part-time capacity as Controllers. Anecdotally there are another few hundred (mostly in local authorities, social agencies, and emergency services) who act in other part-time capacities and fulfil other key response roles (for example welfare managers, lifelines coordinators, recovery managers, public information managers, planning/intelligence managers, logistics managers, etc.). In response, most emergency operations and welfare centres (civil defence centres) are staffed by additional people sourced from across local authorities.

### 3.2.2 The part-time nature of readiness and response

71. MCDEM acts as strategic planning and policy unit to research, set, review, maintain, and guide the CDEM framework, including for the NCMC, and all the actors that have roles within it. CDEM Groups and local authorities similarly have corresponding strategic planning roles that cover the 4Rs.
72. While acknowledged as CDEM 'professionals', many will have been selected for competencies other than meeting operational response needs. This situation reflects the wide brief of the "4Rs/resilience" approach requiring a broad range of 'business as usual' competencies. Fulfilling an emergency response role is a secondary job requirement to that of a primary role, and therefore requires significant ongoing on-the-job training.
73. 'Response' (including supporting local response) may seem like the most crucial aspect of the CDEM sector's responsibilities. However other roles are crucially important to reduce the impacts of an emergency to respond to in the first place. These include understanding hazards and risks and best emergency management practice; investing in better risk assessment; building organisational infrastructure; building community resilience; educating and informing the public; improved building standards and land-use planning (to name but a few). CDEM projects often require highly specialist knowledge and capability, and significant time to develop and maintain processes and assets, often with the need to maintain multi-stakeholder relationships.
74. At the same time, at both the national and local level, the same staff are expected to fulfil an on-call duty role and an emergency response role. Response functions like control, information management, intelligence gathering and analysis, logistics, and operations are disciplines in their own right, and need full-time, peace-time attention in order to be effective in times of emergency. Further these roles require different knowledge, expertise and behaviours than strategic policy setting and planning.
75. This dichotomy of role means that staff feel stretched between three or more jobs and can naturally feel sub-optimal at all of them. On a part-time basis, projects often do not receive the focus needed to progress in a timely and efficient way.
76. Having strategic and operational staff working together has many benefits and can usually be managed in the same agency where there is capacity to separate the roles. We note that, at the national level, expecting those dual roles to be undertaken by the same people seems unusual in government. There is often a separation of strategic planning and policy usually located within a government department, from an operational unit which is often a crown owned entity. For example, the Ministry for the Environment and the Environmental Protection Authority; the Ministry of Transport and the NZ Transport Authority; the Ministry of Culture and Heritage and Heritage NZ.

### 3.2.3 The growing scope of CDEM and expectations

77. The increased frequency of emergencies over the past few years has led to a heightened public awareness of the risks posed by natural hazards. Accordingly, the public have greater expectations of the capabilities of the civil defence emergency management sector particularly of its ability to prepare for and respond to emergencies.
78. At one level, this increased scrutiny helps to keep the sector responsive to the needs of the communities it serves. However, the civil defence emergency management sector is also perceived to have more resources than it possesses, leading to unrealistic expectations of its ability to respond to emergencies.
79. The number of functions that are considered crucial to 'civil defence emergency management' has grown steadily since the CDEM Act in 2002. In part this is because we now know a lot more about what constitutes good 'disaster risk management' than we did in 2002, due to a combination of:
- increased information-sharing domestically and internationally enabled by the rapid growth of the internet
  - growth in emergency/disaster risk management as a field of academic research, resulting in a steady stream of recommendations for improved practice
  - the number and significance of the local activations that have occurred since 2002
  - The step-wise nature of the emergency management learning curve – emergencies provide regular, high profile opportunities to learn a raft of significant lessons, which then have to be rapidly incorporated into standard practice.
80. For example Hurricane Katrina (2004) became a seminal event for emergency management practice worldwide when it illustrated to the world five main things:
- i. how risk reduction (maintenance of the levees and stopbanks) could have reduced or prevented some significant consequences, and millions or billion of dollars of damage
  - ii. the importance of 'social capital' to community resilience and recovery (versus an emphasis on preparedness, for example)
  - iii. the complete unacceptability of getting 'emergency welfare provision' wrong
  - iv. how emergencies exacerbate existing social vulnerabilities, and can rapidly become disasters as a result, and
  - v. how it is important to plan for catastrophic events, even if they are extremely unlikely.
81. The first of these was already an expectation of the CDEM Act, but the second, third, fourth, and fifth – while not completely 'new', changed the way we did things significantly. This increased the scope of what was considered CDEM and, for example, it resulting in CDEM being responsible for welfare coordination, and for the investment in specific event contingency plans, like the Wellington Earthquake National Initial Response Plan
82. Being able to capitalise on that knowledge to meet expectations requires a corresponding level of resource. We note that the lessons learnt from the Christchurch earthquake resulted in significant changes to the scope of operations of CDEM but did not result in corresponding funding.
83. The baseline budget for MCDEM sits at \$11 million. As part of Budget 2016, MCDEM received an additional \$6.1 million of operating funding over four years and \$63,000 of new capital funding. This additional funding has partly alleviated some immediate capacity issues, but MCDEM continues to face resourcing and capacity issues and fulfilling its statutory obligations is challenging.
84. MCDEM currently has 53 FTEs to deliver on its responsibilities (see **Appendix 4**). In some key areas there are only a few dedicated staff, for example:
- i. 1.5 FTE dedicated to welfare coordination and capability.
  - ii. 1.5 FTE dedicated to lifelines coordination and capability.
  - iii. 2 FTE dedicated to operational, contingency, and statutory planning.
  - iv. 2 FTE dedicated to recovery planning and capability.
  - v. 5 FTE dedicated to hazard knowledge and risk management.

- vi. 4 FTE dedicated to MCDEM and sector capability development.
  - vii. 1 FTE dedicated to public education.
  - viii. 4 FTE dedicated to communications.
85. MCDEM has no dedicated resources for business continuity planning, community resilience (other than preparedness messaging) or liaising with the private sector.

### 3.2.4 Local government leadership and funding

86. The premise of the devolved accountability model is that local communities 'choose', through their elected representatives, what level of service they are willing to pay for, prioritised with other services they also pay for. MCDEM cannot require local authorities to spend in a certain way or to a certain amount. **Appendix 5** below shows that a number of CDEM Groups have few full-time employees dedicated to civil defence emergency management.
87. Local authority leadership at the political level can be variable. The CDEM Act envisaged that Joint Committees (elected officials) and Coordinating Executive Groups (senior executives of local authorities and emergency services) had an active leadership role. Instead some appear to operate in a perfunctory way.<sup>8</sup> Where CDEM Groups lack active leadership they are not sufficiently committed, funded, or driven to succeed.
88. Many CDEM Groups and their constituent local authority members struggle to meet basic levels of CDEM service, seemingly due to the small population sizes and low funding base. The low prioritisation of CDEM against other needs and expectations of the community is also likely a factor. There is considerable variation between how CDEM Groups and local authorities are resourced and operate. The CDEM National Capability Assessment Report in 2015 found that while CDEM Group response arrangements had improved in recent years, there were still problems with logistics, critical resource management, and capability to recover from emergencies.
89. We acknowledge that this is not an issue particular to CDEM. There is ongoing discussion on the economies of scale necessary for local authorities to fulfil 'acceptable' levels of service across other areas.
90. Local CDEM is very reliant on volunteers to fulfil response roles. While volunteerism has many tangible and intangible benefits, this is a risk due to:
- volunteerism declining in New Zealand
  - increasing barriers to utilising volunteers – privacy, and health and safety legislation in particular, and
  - difficulties in offering people incentives to volunteer, and to maintain their interest and capabilities in the long term.

### 3.2.5 Capacity to respond to a large-scale national or multi-region event

91. Currently MCDEM struggles to adequately staff a response to a large-scale nationwide event or a large multi-region event for a sustained period of time. MCDEM can, on average, resource two 12 hour shifts, for a maximum of 4-5 days. There is a lack of capability in key CIMS response positions (function managers and controllers). Most key positions have 2-3 options, maximum. This necessitates staff working long hours (>12 hours) for multiple days. Attempts to resolve this through arrangements with other agencies have been made but are difficult to maintain and result in minimally-trained personnel. Prolonged or repeated deployments of MCDEM Regional Emergency Management Advisors (REMAAs) and Wellington-based subject matter experts to regions is hard to sustain, and significantly impacts on the ability to fully staff the NCMC.
92. Responding to an event can often take all MCDEM staff away from other work. In a year such as 2016-2017 where there are several events, MCDEM's wider work programme is significantly impacted making it difficult to keep ahead of critical improvements, for example the national warning system. Managers are monitoring response fatigue, particularly the cumulative effect of multiple emergencies in quick succession, and its effects on health, wellbeing, and home life, which is a concern.

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<sup>8</sup> See 2009, 2015 National CDEM Capability Assessment reports.

93. MCDEM suggests the development of a national multi-agency response team (cadre), or other deployable capacity to mitigate this capacity issue. See **Appendix 2** for more details of what this might look like.

### 3.2.6 24/7 monitoring capacity

94. CDEM has statutory responsibility for warnings and public alerting. However, there is currently no awake 24/7 capacity at both the national and local level to monitor hazards and issue warnings.<sup>9</sup> This function and capacity may not need to sit within the national response agency.

## 3.3 Capability

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### 3.3.1 Capability development across CDEM

95. Appropriate, good quality and consistent training is required at all levels. MCDEM suggests a 'Centre of Excellence' approach which would manage training and capability building across the sector, developing shared tools and best practice, and setting clear expectations and enforceable performance measures. See **Appendix 6** for more detail on what this could look like.

## 3.4 Information and communications

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### 3.4.1 Fit for purpose and up to date technology

96. The technology, systems, capability and capacity of CDEM staff need to be adequate to deliver dynamic, real-time information. This is in order to provide for a single 'source of truth' for situational awareness and a common operating picture, and to provide clear, timely public information, and intelligence analysis. Systems need to be robust, scalable and holistic.
97. The NCMC requires ongoing reassessment and investment in adequate technology to meet this goal. Aside from investment in some key systems (for example the Emergency Management Information System and the National Warning System) the NCMC has had small-to-moderate investment in it over the years. MCDEM has been unable to keep pace with technology or 'best practice' emergency operations centre capability. Other government agencies, and some CDEM Groups, have considerably more modern operations centres. In particular, the NCMC and MCDEM lacks internal GIS capability. Most local authorities have GIS capability, but it is not often used for emergency management purposes (although this is starting to change, and some use it in very effective ways).
98. The NCMC also requires more base data (in particular 'social' or community data) and other analytical capability to evaluate the strategic or critical 'so-what' of impact information. The intelligence function needs the capacity and tools to do more than just receive, store and show data. It needs to be able to generate useful robust, accurate and verified information to guide response and recovery decisions.
99. EMIS is often wrongly viewed as the tool to enhance information flows across agencies, hence establishing a common operation picture. EMIS does not have this capacity. Instead it is a workflow system to manage tasks and resources, and collate/file datasets such as action plans and situation reports. Appropriate and effective information sharing across agencies to establish a common operating picture is yet to be resolved.

### 3.4.2 Agency-to-agency communications – horizontally and vertically

100. The multi-layered structure of CDEM slows down information flow. Information is slow to progress through the layers (horizontally and/or vertically) and up to the Minister or out to the public. It is difficult to verify every bit of information that comes through the pipeline; to do so would be very time-consuming and slow down the flow of communications to ministers and the public even further.

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<sup>9</sup> Recently investigated – see initial scoping paper.

### 3.4.3 Expectations on the ability to keep up with social media

101. Social media is an increasing source of information, but keeping up with it is very difficult, if not impossible. MCDEM must verify any information from social media rather than simply relying on it or else risk perpetuating myths or misleading information being provided to the public, Ministers and media.
102. Expectations about the speed at which information can be verified need to be clear and realistic. For example, that we will never keep ahead of or even at pace with the social media, but that we will, of course, look to work alongside it and use it as a source of intelligence and to leverage public information and public safety messages.

### 3.4.4 Dedicated strategic communications and policy advice to support political needs

103. As the public look for leadership in an emergency, it is important to resource support of the Prime Minister, Ministers, and the Director CDEM to provide consistent and accurate messaging and policy advice. This requires engagement across press secretaries and the media. This could involve incorporating a 'Ministerial/Political servicing' role in the CIMS structure.

### 3.4.5 Public information management recognised in the CDEM response system

104. PIM has very low numbers of dedicated staff/budget in most regions. PIM requires specific expertise, however, in many councils there is no dedicated PIM role. In an event PIM may therefore be staffed without the necessary expertise, for example, librarians, and administrative staff. This places the function at risk and the individuals in an invidious position, despite their best endeavours. This leads to a wide variance in performance during emergencies. PIM is often seen as a 'part time' role resulting in insufficient development during peace time. Consistent training is critical to be able to deploy PIMs across districts and regions, and to the NCMC, in a surge capacity.
105. PIM is not recognised as a profession in CDEM, and there is no clear career pathway compared to, for example, the NZ Police. This makes it hard to attract and retain the right calibre of people, or to create a demand for people to seek relevant expertise in tertiary education. This results in a lack of specialised skills/capability across the sector.

### 3.4.6 Public education recognised as important for risk reduction and readiness

106. The purpose of public education and public information management is to keep people safe. Response is an important ambulance at the bottom of the cliff but investment in public education reduces the social and economic impact of events.
107. Recent research undertaken by MCDEM shows the public believe public education is the most important thing we can do to ensure our communities withstand and recover from a disaster. This is followed by 'preparation at the community level' and 'household preparedness' (both of which are key focuses of MCDEM's public education programme). This reflects public sentiment that public education is a vital piece of the puzzle.
108. Currently, public education funding does not reflect its perceived importance. MCDEM has about \$800k annually to fund public education (about 20c per New Zealander).<sup>10</sup> This is not commensurate with the risk to the public posed by natural hazards and not comparable to Fire Service or road safety funding for public education. The Long or Strong, Get Gone/Drop, Cover and Hold advertising campaign was run as a one-off campaign from an additional injection of funding from within DPMC. This campaign has been highly effective to educate the public to know the right action to take in a large earthquake or tsunami. There is an opportunity to continue the campaign to ensure greater retention of its messages.
109. There is inconsistency in the way public education is carried out across the country. CDEM groups tailor messaging to their regions, but many are under resourced to deliver public education with most having no FTE for the role.

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<sup>10</sup> Excluding a one-off reallocation from DPMC of \$1.25m for 'Long or Strong campaign'.

110. MCDEM's emergency preparedness education in schools programme *What's the Plan, Stan?* is now strongly linked to the New Zealand Curriculum and we promote its use. However, there is no onus on schools to teach emergency preparedness. Teaching preparedness as part of the curriculum would ensure all primary school children have a basic understanding of risk and the need to prepare, and can act as agents for change in their families and communities.

## Appendix 1 Functions and powers of the Director CDEM under the CDEM Act

### 8 Appointment and functions of Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management

(1) The chief executive of the responsible department may appoint under the State Sector Act 1988 a suitably qualified and experienced person as the Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management.

(2) The functions of the Director are to—

- (a) provide advice to the Minister on matters relating to civil defence emergency management:
- (b) identify hazards and risks that the Director considers are of national significance:
- (c) monitor and evaluate the national civil defence emergency management strategy:
- (d) develop, monitor, and evaluate the national civil defence emergency management plan:
- (e) develop, in consultation with the relevant persons and organisations that have responsibilities under this Act, any guidelines, codes, or technical standards that may be required for the purposes of this Act:
- (f) monitor the performance of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups and persons who have responsibilities under this Act:
- (g) promote civil defence emergency management that is consistent with the purpose of this Act:
- (h) during a state of national emergency or a national transition period, direct and control for the purposes of this Act the resources available for civil defence emergency management.

### 9 Powers of Director

(1) The Director has all the powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to enable the Director to perform his or her functions.

(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the Director may—

- (a) co-ordinate the use of and, during a state of national emergency or a national transition period, use, for the purposes of this Act, the personnel, material, information, services, and any other resources made available by departments, Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups, emergency services, New Zealand Defence Force (as provided in the Defence Act 1990), and other persons and in particular, without limitation, for—
  - (i) the provision of transport:
  - (ii) the removal of endangered persons and casualties from any area affected by the emergency to areas of safety or to hospitals:
  - (iii) medical care and attention to casualties:
  - (iv) the relief of distress and suffering:
  - (v) the accommodation, feeding, care, and protection of persons:
  - (vi) the provision of other services necessary to restore community services and provide for the welfare of the public:
- (b) during a state of national emergency, control the performance of the functions and duties and the exercise of the powers of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups and Group Controllers:
- (be) during a national transition period, control the performance of the functions and duties and the exercise of the powers of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups and Recovery Managers:
- (c) enter into arrangements, including employment arrangements, with any person for the purpose of carrying out civil defence emergency management as may be agreed:
- (d) devise, promote, and carry out, or cause to be carried out, research and investigations into matters relating to civil defence emergency management:
- (e) issue or cause to be issued warnings of hazards:

- (f) disseminate information and advice on matters relating to civil defence emergency management:
- (g) promote and carry out, or cause to be carried out, the training of personnel for civil defence emergency management purposes:
- (h) co-ordinate the planning of civil defence emergency management between Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups:

- (i) advise in relation to, and assist in the planning, preparation, co-ordination, and carrying out of, civil defence emergency management.

(3) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the Director may issue guidelines, codes, or technical standards to any person or organisation with responsibilities under this Act, including guidelines, codes, or technical standards for—

- (a) the establishment and operation of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups and Co-ordinating Executive Groups:

- (b) the development of Civil Defence Emergency Management Group plans and operational plans for the response to, and recovery from, specific emergencies:

- (be) the development of strategic recovery planning for emergencies:

- (c) the development of Civil Defence Emergency Management plans by the Crown, local government agencies, emergency services, and lifeline utilities:

- (d) the operational role of controllers, Recovery Managers, and other persons with responsibilities under this Act:

- (e) any other matters that—

- (i) the Director considers necessary; and

- (ii) are consistent with the purposes of this Act.

N.B. civil defence emergency management—

- (a) means the application of knowledge, measures, and practices that—

- (i) are necessary or desirable for the safety of the public or property; and

- (ii) are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, recover from, or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with any emergency; and

- (b) includes, without limitation, the planning, organisation, co-ordination, and implementation of those measures, knowledge, and practices



## Appendix 2 National Response Team (aka flying squad, cadre, NIMT)


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1. See separate 'Cadre' paper.<sup>11</sup>
2. There is need for a rapidly deployable cadre to supplement, or in the short term, establish local level response and recovery.
3. The team should include capability across all key CIMS positions, particularly control, operations, planning, intelligence, logistics, PIM, welfare, and lifelines. The team could include national-level emergency service personnel, including Police, Fire, and Defence.
4. The purpose would be to ensure effective response in the early phase of an emergency, by rapidly assessing local capability and capacity, supporting or establishing good structures and processes and to ensure an effective and appropriate flow of supplementary capacity (via liaison with the NCMC). They are, in effect, 'eyes and ears' on the ground, able to advise and support, and step-in if needed. They could also support the establishment of recovery arrangements and processes, and strengthen local capability.
5. It would ensure best practice is implemented, significant issues are elevated, and enables local people to focus on local issues, and tie in with local communities.
6. The team would be led by MCDEM (or another central government agency if the hazard at hand suggested it, e.g. health, fire, etc.), but sourced from appropriately qualified and trained personnel from a range of agencies, pre-identified by MCDEM and pre-approved by employers.
7. Consistent capability development becomes even more important - across the country, but for pre-identified people in particular.
8. Some legal barriers need to be removed, e.g. Controllers are appointed for their district/region only, the requirement for Joint Committees to meet to appoint Controllers/Recovery Managers.
9. Requires a selection and vetting process (look at Rural Fire and Maritime/Marine oil spill models).
10. Team members would ideally be full-time emergency management professionals – local or national.
11. Deployment commitment would be for a minimum of 5-7 days.

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
<sup>11</sup> Previously provided to the TAG secretariat; note, this paper was developed in 2012 and would need to be refreshed in light of recent experiences and discussion in the development of this submission.

## Appendix 3 New Zealand's Civil Defence Emergency Management Journey





## Appendix 4 Current MCDEM resourcing

N.B. numbers in the following graph varies slightly compared to in section **Error! Reference source not found.** because the graph incorporates management staff and a new position not yet filled.



## Appendix 5 Current CDEM resourcing nationwide





## Appendix 6 Emergency Management Centre of Excellence

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What could an Emergency Management Centre of Excellence look like:

1. A standalone academy/institute/school) that conducts all emergency management-related training and exercising nationwide that has a full-time training centre/facility with adequate resourcing to run a full-time programme.
2. Manages the Integrated Training Framework (ITF) and cover all NZ emergency management-related capability needs, across the 4Rs, from any agency or organisation, e.g. Controllers, Recovery Managers, all emergency operations centre positions and functions, public information management, risk communications, lifelines, CIMS, business continuity management, hazards/risks, risk management, planning, exercises, evaluation (etc.); and from public sector, private sector, civil society, or more
3. Has its own facility (including emergency operations centre), but also delivers training locally/regionally.
4. Units focused on: research, developing training, delivering training, assessment, evaluation, and moderation, learner management/managing nationwide capability/capacity, doctrine development, continuous improvement (lessons learnt), and an exercising.
5. Develops learning/development pathways, rolemaps, competencies, development needs analysis and other core capability development mechanisms.
6. Could include seconded staff, and guest lecturers/trainers.
7. Complements (doesn't replace) other emergency services learning and development programmes, but could become the centralised hub for some training, e.g. CIMS.
8. Ongoing management of individual learning and development (especially for 'full time' emergency management staff), including individual development plans and facilitating the full range of learning opportunities (noting formal training is only a small part of capability development).
9. Tracking of national wide capability.
10. Would require standards (and credentialing? accreditation?) and/or other mechanism(s) for testing, evaluation, and assurance of competence.
11. Manages a national response team resource (Cadre/NRT/NIMT).
12. Leads National Exercise Programme, including exercise development and delivery across all agencies.
13. Could incorporate a Business Continuity Management centre of excellence.
14. Could investigate sharing/outsourcing arrangements with other/private providers if they're willing to come under the umbrella of the centre.
15. Could accommodate a 24/7 awake monitoring, alerting and warning centre.

Benefits of centralised capability development:

16. Significantly increased national response capability.
17. Significantly increased national response consistency.
18. Would enable a strong career pathway for emergency management staff nationwide.
19. Centralise (most) capability development for local authorities, CDEM Groups, and MCDEM, meaning significant freeing up of resources locally.
20. Enables more sharing of resources, more deployable personnel.
21. Nationwide capability management incl. surge capacity, cadre/NIMT.
22. New FTE = additional national capacity/frontline NCMC staff.
23. A dedicated facility (with EOC classroom) can be an alternative EOC/NCMC.
24. Would better support a decentralised system by providing a stronger centralised resource, and quality control/assurance.

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Angharad George on behalf of Stats NZ
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>No</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Stats NZ notes that the purpose of the review is to provide advice on the most appropriate operational and legislative responses to natural disasters and other emergencies. In support of this we would request that consideration be given to the way in which government agencies (central and local) undertake business continuity planning in order to respond to Outcome 2 of the Terms of Reference. Given planning is central to the quality of response we believe there is room for coordinated cross government activity in this area. A centre of excellence would be one way of achieving this.  Coordinated business continuity planning, allowing for organisational differences, would help ensure that government agencies were appropriately and equally positioned to respond should the need arise. Coordination would develop a collective understanding of business continuity to support effective response and prompt recovery and that dependencies between departments are well understood and managed. Coordination would also ensure that support skills and networks can be mobilised in addition to specialist capabilities.  In addition to a coordinated response to business continuity planning, we would encourage the review to consider how government data protection and recovery is planned for, given the vulnerability of government operations and recovery if significant data loss is experienced or if data is illegally accessed during a period of disruption. Stats NZ would welcome the opportunity to support this aspect of government DR or BC activities.  We are aware that the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) are developing a new Information Strategy for the National Crisis Management Centre to enable more rapid responses to events. Open data has been identified as essential to preparedness and rapid response. With important data about infrastructure and facilities, maps and models can be developed in advance of an event and be ready to deploy. Stats NZ and MCDEM are exploring how we collaborate in working with departments and local government to release the necessary data.

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

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Released by the Ministry of Civil Defence



# Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

## Written Submission Form

1. This is a private submission to the Technical Advisory Group on the Ministerial Review: Better responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand.
2. Please direct any queries to Hamish Keith, Address: s9(2)(a) [REDACTED].
3. Hamish supports the Auckland Council submission but wishes to provide additional information to the Technical Advisory Group for their consideration.
4. Hamish has over 10 years' experience in civil defence and emergency management working across all levels both within local and regional structures in Canterbury, Otago, Auckland, Wellington and Marlborough.
5. Hamish would like the submission to be seriously considered and is happy to answer any questions should the Technical Advisory Group want clarity, but does not need to appear before the Technical Advisory Group to discuss the submission.
6. The submission is structured in alignment with the scope as set out in the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review.
7. The submission is set out as follows:
  - Section 1:** Executive Summary
  - Section 2:** Decision-making Model
  - Section 3:** Declarations
  - Section 4:** Response Capability and Capacity
8. Hamish wishes to thank the Technical Advisory Group for providing the opportunity for key sector staff to provide input into the review and for opening submissions to the public. Hamish looks forward to the outcomes of the review.

**Hamish Keith**  
MSc (Hazard and Disaster Management)

## Executive Summary

The operational and legislative settings for Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) in New Zealand are not fundamentally flawed. However the way in which these are interpreted and implemented means that delivery is inconsistent and not performing optimally. Greater statutory guidance and clarity is needed to make organisations and agencies understand the role of CDEM and their own responsibilities in being part of this group/association.

The underlying principle of “act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally” may not be suitable in all circumstances. This submission proposes a simplified structure of a single coordinating entity which is resourced nationally and governed locally. The structure involves all stakeholders and ensures a manageable span of control. The necessary legislative changes to implement such a structure would not be significant.

Decisions are not being made by adequately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the appropriate level of government or supported by the best information possible in the circumstances. Response capabilities are also not necessarily deployed as promptly or as seamlessly as possible. Nor do they take advantage of economies of scale and the experience of senior responders. This submission seeks to “professionalise” emergency management and ensure that training is consistent across the country. This can be achieved by removing some of the barriers that exist in the deployment of staff to other regions.

Information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency, to determine the capacity and capabilities required for the response effort. There is a need for timely, consistent and accurate communication to the public but this requires greater funding, resourcing and collaboration from partner agencies and a significant investment in technology.

### Decision-making Model

1. The relationship between CDEM and partner agencies is not well understood. CDEM is not an agency in itself but is a coordinating entity. CDEM encompasses all organisations and agencies ‘like an umbrella’ including local, regional and unitary authorities, emergency services, lifeline utilities, welfare agencies and government departments. To provide clarity over the role of CDEM maybe it should be seen more as an ‘association’ rather than an ‘agency’ or a ‘department’.
2. CDEM needs greater separation from the local authority in that it should be managed by a board of directors (CEG) and governed by elected members (Joint Committee) without the necessity of internal council reporting lines. This will reduce duplication of reporting, raise the levels at which CEG operates, improve collaboration across partner agencies, increase productivity and accountability. By no means does this imply that Council is without responsibility; in fact Auckland Council prides itself on “making its size work” – being able to tap into the resources of the local authority is essential, but this should be the same as with any organisation that is part of CDEM.
3. In acknowledgement of the fact that ‘local’ input to regional decision-making is critical to the successful functioning of CDEM, it is recommended that the Joint Committee be comprised of fair representation from across a region such as the councillors or local board chairs. The variation between unitary authorities and local authorities will need to be taken into consideration. The Coordinating Executive Group is made up of key partner agencies.

National agencies will need to have local representation to eliminate the confusion that exists between national direction and regional direction. This is discussed in more detail below.

4. CDEM needs to involve all stakeholders in a mutually supportive structure with a manageable span of control. Please refer to the example CDEM structure that was created for Auckland. (Note: This structure has not been adopted) Each CEG Sub-committee has its own dedicated multi-agency work plan that spans across the four R's which encompasses the Recovery Task Groups, Emergency Response Groups, Welfare Coordinating Groups and Technical Advisory Groups. The combination of these work plans will provide a holistic 'resilience' plan for the region that can be adequately monitored and evaluated. The work plan identifies issues at all levels (regional issues and agency issues), objectives, actions and takes into consideration interdependencies. More information can be provided on this concept if necessary.
5. CDEM should be centrally coordinated (with the mandate to ensure consistency) but locally led (with the flexibility to apply local initiatives). This means that CDEM staff are employed by the CDEM Group rather than the local authority or central ministry. CDEM staff will be required to follow national doctrine but will have the flexibility to apply it locally, subject to the approval of the Coordinating Executive Group (CEG).
6. Improved legislation is required to mandate organisations and agencies including emergency services, lifeline utilities, welfare agencies and government departments to contribute to CDEM activities and CEG. Currently this is voluntary and there is an undeniable reluctance for organisations and agencies to take upon additional work at which they consider outside 'Business as Usual'.
7. To promote this sense of CDEM being an association rather than an agency and to assist in the separation between CDEM and the local authority, the responsibility of welfare services in an emergency should be that of the local authority and not the CDEM Group, as welfare services (such as registration and household goods and services) are a key deliverable, whereas CDEM is only responsible for the coordination of these services.
8. Recent emergencies such as the earthquakes in Canterbury, flooding in Edgecumbe and fires in Christchurch have demonstrated that the local, regional and national structure, does not work. This can be supported by the efficiency at which Auckland, a unitary authority – without this three tiered structure, responded to and recovered from the severe weather events that occurred in March and April. The suggestion should be made to remove the 'local' and 'national' levels of response and to just coordinate all activities through a regional Emergency Coordination Centre. The boundaries of the "region" are to be determined and may be different in different areas depending on the local needs, although this should be consistent wherever possible.
9. This structure will also eliminate the issues that exist when national agencies are being directed at a national level without consultation with the local response. For example during the Kaikoura earthquake a national infrastructure agency that was being given direction from the national coordination centre undertook actions in contradiction to the direction that was being given at the local level. This situation is causing confusion, miscommunication and has the potential to cost lives. The recommendation is that national agencies setup their structure to be consistent with a regional response (e.g. similar to the role of Regional Emergency Management Advisors for the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management). This supports the position of the response being locally-led.
10. Publically funded agencies with similar responsibilities should be amalgamated as the contradiction between the two agencies is causing confusion. Tax payers should also not be paying twice for the same information. For example during the recent severe weather events both the New Zealand Met Service and the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric


Research (NIWA) reported respectively to the public on the rainfall. While neither of the two agencies were incorrect as they were each using their own datasets, the difference in reporting is causing public confusion. The recommendation is that the two agencies should be amalgamated or mandated to share data/work together to make it easier to provide a single source of truth.

## Declarations

11. Similarly to the governance structure there is too much interpretation when it comes to declaring states of emergency. We waste too much time deciding on whether we should declare a state of emergency or not, without significant advantages or disadvantages either way. Greater statutory guidance is required on whether to declare a state of emergency such as an automatic declaration on the CDEM Controllers involvement or activation
12. Consideration could be given to having a single declaration of state of emergency rather than the conflicting national vs. local declarations. Declarations could be made by the national level politicians (e.g. ODESC) to avoid any conflicts of interest. The group Controller should still have an ability to request that a declaration be made, given certain circumstances.

## Response capability and capacity

13. More emphasis needs to be placed on national deployment and logistics processes. Removal of these additional levels of response should help but legislation and training also needs to be updated to enable this. For example: Controllers can only be appointed on approval from the local Joint Committee which makes utilising Controllers from outside of the region challenging. Further consideration should be given to a national register of CDEM personnel or 'cadre' of staff that can be shared with CDEM groups to use during emergencies.
14. Recovery needs to be further embedded into local authority structures. Response is the responsibility of the CDEM Group however recovery should become the responsibility of the local authority. This will allow a clearer delineation in the transition from response to recovery; from the CDEM group to the local authority.
15. Professionalism in CDEM needs to be increased perhaps through the establishment of a national professional body similar to IPENZ for engineers or IAEM but at a national level. Bring back the old Civil Defence School to ensure consistency of training and capability across CDEM Groups and the country.
16. Organisation and agency boundaries need to be consistent and mutually supportive. These should be based on existing regional territorial authority boundaries. Councils, NZ Police, DHBs, FENZ, Rural Support Trusts all have different statutory boundaries which makes it difficult to apply command and control principles and to share information across agencies.
17. Greater funding and improved legislation is required to invest into more innovative and technological solutions for emergency management. Emergency management is about 20 years behind the times when it comes to technology and innovative solutions now exist to utilise 'business as usual systems' to help collect data and communicate information to partner agencies and the public directly. A proposal for a "situational awareness" system has been developed and can be made available to the Technical Advisory Group on request.
18. Given the critical need for information sharing in times of emergency, the CDEM Act 2002 should be amended to ensure that information required for a successful common operating picture can be obtained before an event.



- Top 10 Benefits of proposed structure:
- Aligns with statutory requirements, CEO's vision, University of Auckland's approach and the draft national resilience strategy.
  - Avoids duplication and reduces the number of groups/meetings stakeholders attend, thereby making them more meaningful.
  - More holistic approach to emergency management – Resilience focused rather than response focused.
  - Establishment of the sub-committees will make CEG more strategic than operational with a higher level of reporting.
  - Wider and equal representation from CDEM stakeholders from both private and public sectors.
  - Recognises the critical role of all stakeholders but provides a fair structure with a manageable span of control.
  - Integrated recovery planning and less effort required to establish and maintain smaller (task) groups.
  - Less resource intensive and more cost effective.
  - Improves coordination across the region by removing organisational boundaries – making Auckland's size work.
  - Sub-committees to have individual work-programmes and a dedicated webpage (i.e. virtual resilience hub) for knowledge sharing.

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**  
Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please  
visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Science New Zealand Inc
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>YES</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) Anthony Scott, Chief Executive, Science New Zealand. <a href="mailto:ce@sciencenewzealand.org">ce@sciencenewzealand.org</a> ; Tel: s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):  Submission attached

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Submission to the Technical Advisory Group

### Public document

Science New Zealand acknowledges that all submissions may be made publicly available. There is nothing in this submission that Science New Zealand prefers is withheld.

### To be heard in person by TAG

Science New Zealand asks to be heard in person.

## SUBMISSION FROM SCIENCE NEW ZEALAND Inc

### Science New Zealand Inc

Science New Zealand is the peak body for its members, the seven Crown Research Institutes. Callaghan Innovation, a Crown agency, is an associate member.

This submission is made on behalf of the Crown Research Institutes, which are wholly-Crowned owned companies.

### The CRIs

#### Trading name

AgResearch

ESR

GNS Science

Landcare Research

NIWA

Plant & Food Research

Scion

#### Official name

AgResearch Limited

Institute of Environmental and Science Research Limited

Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited

Landcare Research New Zealand Limited

National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Limited

The New Zealand Institute for Plant & Food Research Limited

New Zealand Forest Research Institute Limited

### Summary of submission

CRIs have a lengthy history of assisting New Zealand (and indeed other countries, particularly in the Pacific) to prepare for and respond to disasters and emergencies, and to manage for long term recovery and resilience.

The range of disasters and emergencies includes natural events (tsunami, earthquakes, volcanoes, flood and weather events etc.); and other events (such as fire, food safety and security events, and events or threats relating to human health and wellbeing, or biosecurity). The latter events can involve international as well as national actors or agencies in their commissioning or solution.

Almost all crises and emergencies require timely, authoritative, well-presented and actionable science-based information and expertise to manage and resolve. CRIs have a history of deploying, at speed and scale, the requisite people and delivering the requisite information and advice in a timely manner.

Recent events have prompted the CRIs to consider how we, as crown agencies and as a major part of the national science capability, may enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the national effort across all elements of the CIMS framework: Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and Communications.

This submission highlights three areas in which greater knowledge sharing and engagement between CRIs and lead agencies can build capability, enable greater effectiveness and efficiency of delivery and outcomes, improve management in the aftermath, and contribute to continuous improvement of process and readiness:

**1. The technical expertise provided by each CRI;**

While this is generally well understood, it is important to have continuous refreshing of such information and access points. Lead agencies need to understand what expertise is available, and from whom. All parties (lead and support) need to share insights on what expertise may be required in the future. Lists of expertise are not static, nor are the sources. The current New Zealand response framework is very distributed, and so the list and access points to expertise must fit into widely varying operational environments.

The objective is to ensure there is clarity of process, and knowledge of what is available, how to access it, and how technical information advice and interpretation is coordinated, managed and presented in times of crisis. This will assist the lead agencies and the support partners, such as CRIs, deliver optimum outcomes.

- **We recommend** ongoing processes for identifying technical expertise and access points, refreshing such information and making it visible to all parties.

**2. The availability and suitability of CRI office and communications facilities;**

This relates to physical resources, including sites, equipment and communications networks. The CRIs are in 50 locations around New Zealand, with offices, power and internet communications which may be of assistance in an event. The latter are particularly robust, more so than commercial networks, as most offices are connected via the REANZ network.

- **We recommend** identification and mapping of physical resources available from Crown entities, such as CRIs, be part of the planning processes in civil defence.

**3. The soft skills and knowledge arising from CRIs experiences in multiple events, sectors and locales, embedded in CRI people and processes.**

New Zealand's emergency response framework may be enhanced by greater, more structured sharing of the 'soft skills' and knowledge held by CRIs and the lead agencies. This is separate from a CRI's technical expertise or physical capability. It recognises that CRIs, as support partners, have been critical to the response in multiple events, in multiple sectors and locales over many decades; the resulting methodology is now embedded in people and processes to address times beyond 'BAU'.

New Zealand's lead agencies are the responsible centres of expertise in disaster preparedness and response and are the decisionmakers with legal authority. CRIs are support partners, providing technical expertise and advice based on the science as one input to the decisionmakers. This is an important distinction of roles and responsibilities which needs to be maintained. The sharing of soft skills and knowledge between all parties is likely to improve the seamless national responsiveness and will enhance clarity of roles and responsibilities.

- **We recommend** that lead agencies and support partners (in particular, CRIs) develop means by which to better share soft skills and knowledge.



## Submission

### The Ministerial Review: Technical Advisory Group

This submission from Science New Zealand responds to the terms of reference for the Ministerial Review:

*To ensure that New Zealand emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges. In light of recent events it is appropriate to see how we can further enhance and strengthen the current system.*

### Overview

CRIs are part of the Crown resource. While some parts of that resource are well understood, CRIs can contribute greater value than is currently recognised within the national framework for preparedness for disasters and emergencies, and in post event management.

At present, the role of CRIs is primarily seen as providing technical expertise. This is our principal role given the nature of our science knowledge and capability, and our ability to deploy at scale and speed to an event.

In addition, we can and do provide access to physical facilities, such as offices and communication networks.

CRIs suggest, however, that there is a third element which can add value to local, regional and national emergency and disaster response framework. That is, by recognising, developing and sharing the soft skills and knowledge held by all parties (lead agencies and support partners). While some of this occurs in some situations, it is not consistent and the value of this mutual sharing should be better recognised and included in the framework.

### Submission points

#### 1. Technical expertise

This submission does not set out the technical expertise available from CRIs. TAG members will be broadly familiar with expertise associated with various CRIs. We understand that there is a mandated list of capabilities associated with each CRI, developed and held by MCDEM and/or DPMC.

Expertise is constantly evolving. CRIs also liaise with each other and with other sources of expertise relevant to their areas. Given the distributed nature of New Zealand's emergency response framework and very different operational environments, it is important to ensure that lists are up to date and accessible.

It would be beneficial for disaster and emergency management leadership and other personnel to develop regular, structured engagements with CRIs to ensure:

- i) operational collaboration is tested and refined;
- ii) that the mandated list of expertise is regularly updated;
- iii) that knowledge is shared around developing technologies or expertise (from the insights of lead agencies or of the CRI) which may be useful to pursue.

## 2. **Physical and networking facilities in sites around the country.**

The CRIs have 3400 FTEs in 50 locations around New Zealand, of which some 20 are shared with other CRIs or institutions (e.g. some are located on or adjacent to university sites). Sites range from Kerikeri in Northland to Invermay in Southland, plus research vessels such as the RV Tangaroa. In addition, CRI staff are in "the field", which ranges from mainland New Zealand, to offshore islands and Antarctica.

The CRIs are connected via commercial fibre and the national, high-speed advanced network operated by REANNZ (Research, Education and Advanced Network for New Zealand) which provides services and technology not commercially available. The REANNZ network can be more robust than commercial providers.

Disaster and emergency management personnel have been able to use CRI sites as home base, utilising proximity and availability / suitability of office space, and power. The national system should ensure up to date knowledge of sites and facilities / services as part of national resource mapping.

## 3. **Recognising, developing and sharing soft skills and knowledge arising from CRIs experiences in multiple events, sectors and locales, embedded in CRI people and processes. This should be mutually beneficial; CRIs can integrate knowledge from the lead agencies into their processes.**

Each emergency and disaster event has its own attributes, dimensions and response and recovery protocols. The established civil defence and other emergency response organisations have invaluable experience and expertise.

CRIs have some insights and experience to offer, arising from their extensive experience in multiple types of emergency, in multiple sectors and locales.

This has built internal response procedures, in terms of linking with external parties at time of the identification of the emergency or disaster event; managing the issue identification, optioning and solution finding process; and linking with the lead agencies (such as MCDEM, MPI, DPMC or local authorities and private sector entities) in managing communications to stakeholders requiring different levels of detail.

These are 'soft skills' which are mediated by protocols developed from experience, and also by the science (including social science) research culture focussed on benefit to NZ Inc.

The CRIs are working to codify these processes (approach, framework, methodology) and to create a community of practice that actively works to have continuous practice improvement arising from their diverse experiences.

This will enable:

- a. each CRI to enhance its individual practice; and
- b. the CRIs collectively to enhance their response when two or more are needed in the process. Good collaboration processes enable any one CRI to take a lead, as appropriate, and lead integration or insertion of others into an event or aftermath response as needed.

## Current practice

### Clarity of role and responsibility

Within CIMS framework, there is a lead agency. Whichever that is has the legal authority and the responsibility to make decisions. CRIs are support partners providing technical expertise and advice based on the science as one input to the decisionmakers. This is an important distinction of roles and responsibilities which needs to be maintained.

The evolving framework should look to have a version of CIMS which works across all parties in the emergency and disaster environment. It provides a workable guide and also enables structural alignment of parties. Clarity of roles and responsibilities, such as the lead agency being the body with legal authority and responsibility to take decisions, guards against support parties (such as a CRI) being asked de facto to make such calls.

The clarity also flows into communication responsibilities. In an event, multiple parties require information, and decisions are made on prioritising recipients, and also depth or density of information that is conveyed.

CRIs can and do provide information and interpretation to enable decisionmakers to make decisions on actions, including communications. While CRIs are often important advisers to that decision, the decision-maker may need to take into account other elements before making a final decision.

CRIs have everyday experience in communicating risk, and this experience may be of value to lead and partner agencies. Science information is often complex and best interpreted as giving levels of probability rather than the certainty which is often demanded by public or the media. Many CRIs have extensive social science-based expertise and experience in framing and delivering these messages. Practice by all parties in maximising use of this expertise would be a useful training element.

In brief, there is continuing need to pay attention to the fundamentals: consistency and clarity of engagement at all points of engagement: before (mitigation and readiness), during (right people, at right place, right time) and after (what was learned from this experience; how might we improve?).

### CRIs role:

- provision of technical expertise and science-based advice;
- coordination of science-based advice from a range of science entities.

Given that in some cases a lead agency may not have the science capability to access let alone evaluate science reports or expertise, a CRI can play a valuable role in coordinating input from multiple sources (other CRIs, tertiary institutes and the like, from New Zealand and abroad).

Some lead agencies (such as DoC, MPI) have science capability, and thus the CRI role will be of a different or more limited nature (although may still have a role in accessing and evaluating offshore knowledge).

As an example of a structured relationship, GNS Science has an MoU with MCDEM. It was initiated in 2006, signed in 2009 and revised in 2015 following lessons learnt from the Canterbury quakes. It is, to some extent, a service level agreement indicating expectations during 'business as usual' and expectations at crisis mode. GNS Science reports that the MoU is a very useful statement in guiding and clarifying the relationship and requirements.

The lead and support parties may find it useful to consider developing a schedule of which agencies have a lead role in certain types of event. This may appear fairly simple; however, in practice, events may have considerable crossover of expertise (see Havelock North water event; Kaikoura earthquakes; pest and disease incidents).

CRIs are Crown entities with a statutory mandate to provide and disseminate research for the benefit of New Zealand, and are the largest holders of science capability in their fields. CRIs are the logical agencies to be mandated to undertake the advisory and coordination role in regard to science-based input.

- On occasion, CRIs have played facilitating roles in debrief sessions processes and procedures, across multiple agencies involved in an event.

## Background on CRIs

### Origin of CRIs

The Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) were created in July 1992 from Crown-owned entities such as the DSIR (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research), FRI (Forest Research Institute), and MAFTech (the research arm of the then Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries). Since then, other entities have been brought into CRIs, including the Meat Industry Research Institute of New Zealand (MIRINZ) and the former Wool Research Organisation of New Zealand (WRONZ).

### Role of CRIs

The CRI Act 1992 requires that CRIs must undertake research for the benefit of New Zealand, pursue excellence, be socially responsible and comply with ethical standards. The Act also requires CRIs to promote and disseminate their research. In brief, the CRIs must undertake and help apply science research of benefit to New Zealand.

In doing so, a CRI must be “financially viable” to ensure that it makes sufficient surplus so that it can reinvest in its people and facilities.

The Government’s CRI Taskforce of 2010, under Sir Neville Jordan, reinforced that objective, stating *“the measure of a CRI’s success should be the positive impact it has on New Zealand – be that economic, social or environmental – not the commercial return a CRI has been able to achieve.”*

In preparing for and responding to disasters and emergencies, CRIs are driven by the responsibility as Crown entities and by the CRI Act. CRIs are not driven by profit seeking or desire to ‘do research’. The CRI expertise is put to work in identifying issues, options and solutions.

CRIs are not funded for disaster and emergency work. Such work is of uncertain occurrence and duration and intensely demanding upon the CRI people and physical resources. It affects their ability to undertake other parts of the business as usual (including bidding for work). The CRIs are thankful that governments have tended to reimburse, to a considerable extent, post-event – but that this is an ad hoc funding process. It is notable that Japan, which has similar natural risks, has a formal process for funding science-based responses to such disasters and emergencies.

### National capability platforms

The Government has confirmed a \$1.2bn investment (over 7 years) into platforms of national capability held by CRIs. The investment is via the Strategic Science Investment Funding mechanism. In the announcement (4 July 2017) Minister of Science & Innovation, Hon Paul Goldsmith said of CRIs:

“Their work covers many aspects that affect New Zealanders including resilience of communities and sectors to natural hazards, environmental protection and climate change, as well as high value manufacturing and development of new opportunities.”

### **CRI focus**

Each CRI works with a specific sector which may be primarily economic, environmental or social in nature. There is natural overlap - e.g. environmental research on flora, fauna, water or human health has considerable social and economic contribution.

Cabinet has mandated to each CRI a specific responsibility to lead in its area of science research and application, and to contribute in other defined areas. This level of clarity ensures close collegiality across the CRIs in terms of developing human and physical resources and in knowing who does what in responding to events. Boards and management are accountable for ensuring practice matches policy.

### **Examples of expertise and coordination on an emergency**

#### ***Havelock North Drinking Water event – 2016***

CRIs deployed at speed and scale to respond to the developing event. Some 200 people from several CRIs (e.g. GNS Science, ESR, NIWA, AgResearch, Landcare Research) were involved, each CRI dealing with some aspect specific to its expertise, and each ensuring appropriate coordination of effort.

#### **Taking ESR as an example:**

- provided on-going epidemiological, microbiological and clinical expertise to support local agencies and the Ministry of Health in the investigation of the outbreak amongst the local population;
- conducted the initial testing of the drinking water which confirmed the presence of campylobacter;
- conducted an epidemiological analysis and performed faecal source tracking to identify the source of the outbreak;
- assisted the agencies directly involved by providing critical information on the nature and extent of the outbreak, attending the various outbreak meetings and advising the District Council staff on the requirements for campylobacter testing in the water;
- provided expert witness testimony at the subsequent Government Inquiry

#### ***Pest and disease incursions***

CRIs work closely with MPI and DOC in numerous pest and disease incursion responses. CRIs have contributed to MPI's responses to myrtle rust across a range of native, ornamental and productive species, spiked awl snail, pea bruchid and velvet leaf, Psa in kiwifruit crops, Tomato Potato Psyllid and potato in tamarillo crops, Queensland fruit fly in fruit and vegetables, and Kauri dieback.

#### **Taking AgResearch as an example**

- skills in risk analysis, population modelling, statistically based surveillance design and pest control have underpinned successful eradications of invading moths, fruit flies, mosquitoes, ants and sundry other pests.
- modelling has influenced surveillance systems for fruit flies and forestry pests, and provided proof of freedom for demonstrating eradication of Queensland fruit fly, great white butterfly and painted apple moth.
- provide training to MPI staff, and CRI skills have been utilised from pre-border risk analysis to long term pest management.

An essential element in biosecurity and bioprotection is readiness, including developing mitigation strategies and tools. This includes developing novel methods for detection and monitoring of pests and diseases; decision support and risk assessment tools; and novel biological control and disinfestation methods.

#### **Taking Plant & Food Research as an example:**

- engages with key Government regulators and funders (e.g. MPI, ERMA and regional authorities) as well as with relevant sector representative bodies and growers to scope current knowledge on the pathogen or pest, identify knowledge gaps, agree on research priorities and discuss resourcing;
- input ranges from undertaking long term research programmes to diverting current sector-aligned research to focus on the crisis, active monitoring and surveillance through to the development of tools and technologies to either support eradication or develop control and management responses.
- These in turn can be long term (such as breeding resistant or tolerant cultivars) to more immediate solutions (such as sticky traps, lures or sterile insect technologies).
- Involvement can range from weeks to months and years. Breeding for tolerance to Psa for example is now a long term target in Plant & Food Research's kiwifruit breeding programme and is safeguarding \$1 B pa of revenue from kiwifruit exports.

#### ***Health and public welfare***

##### **ESR and threat to contaminate infant formula with 1080 poison**

Anonymous letters were sent to Fonterra and Federated Farmers that threatened to contaminate infant formula with 1080 unless New Zealand stopped using 1080 for pest control.

ESR undertook DNA testing on a retraction letter that was sent to NZ Police following the initial threats. The DNA testing used a Low Copy Number (LCN) testing technique – a method used when only small traces of DNA are found. This testing established that one individual could not be excluded as being a contributor of DNA to the sample. Accompanying the letters were small packages of milk powder which tested positive for 1080.

ESR undertook testing to help Police identify the source of the 1080. ESR scientists produced a chemical profile of the 1080 samples which was compared against reference 1080 samples – five of which could have been the source of the 1080 sent with the letters. Information gathered from ESR testing, along with other evidence gathered by NZ Police led to the confession of the offender.

##### ***Scion and Rural fire operational support***

Scion's rural fire research team support wildfire responses, such as three significant forest fires in Marlborough in 2015/16, and major wildfires in Hawkes Bay and the Port Hills over 2016/17 season.

Scion supports the Incident Management Teams coordinating and managing the wildfires, by providing fire behaviour predictions to support operational decision making regarding firefighting resource requirements and control strategies and tactics. This can include decisions regarding where it is safe and effective to deploy firefighters, and whether nearby properties and communities are at risk and require evacuating.

In the 2017 Port Hills wildfires, Scion also modelled the on-going fire break out potential using the Prometheus fire growth tool and provided smoke model forecasts. This assisted decision making around the lifting of evacuation cordons and recreational access restrictions and to help define public health advice by health and welfare agencies. Scion staff spent 180 hrs over two weeks supporting the immediate fire response.

Post-fire recovery activities include helping to identify the cause of the fires; inputting to the debrief meetings and technical advice to the independent Operational Review of the fires; presenting on fire progression, behaviour and wildfire risk mitigation opportunities to recovery staff and affected residents at community recovery meetings; and a public workshop on post-fire ecological recovery.





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7/07/2017

The Chairperson,  
Technical Advisory Group,  
Ministerial Review – CDEM Response,  
Wellington

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Dear Mr Sowry

### MINISTERIAL REVIEW

Please find attached a submission prepared by the Northland Coordinating Executive Group on the Ministerial Review – Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand.

Due to the restricted timeframes, our submission is on behalf of the Northland CEG, since we have not had the opportunity to meet with our CDEM Group members.

If there are matters in the submission that you may wish to discuss further, please contact me directly.

Yours Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Tony Phipps', written over a white background.

Tony Phipps  
Chairman  
Northland Coordinating Executive Group

Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management Group "Resilient Communities Together"



## **Submission from the Northland Coordinating Executive Group on the Ministerial Review - Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand.**

### **Introduction**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to make this submission. The submission is made on behalf of the Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management Group.
2. The Northland CDEM Group supports the purpose of the review; ensuring that New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, fit-for-purpose, and well placed to meet future challenges.
3. We understand that recent operational responses may not have been effective as they could have been; however, we submit that those responses are not indicative of operational response capability in all regions.
4. The Northland CDEM Group has established a high level of capability, capacity and stakeholder engagement across the Northland region since the introduction of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. Through an active and engaged joint committee and Coordinating Executive Group, we have focused upon ensuring that all stakeholder's clearly understand their roles and responsibilities under the CDEM Act.
5. Through strong leadership and relationship management the Group has ensured the development of functional and informed Lifelines Utility Group and Welfare Coordination Group.
6. The Northland CDEM Group and its stakeholders have experience in operational responses to medium scale emergencies within its region and deployment of personnel to assist in other regions for larger scale events. Northland has demonstrated that it has the capacity and capability to deliver an operational response that is fit for purpose.
7. The Northland CDEM Group supports the enhancement of readiness and response arrangements nationally to ensure that there is capability and capacity to deliver an effective operational response across all regions in New Zealand.
8. Civil Defence Emergency Management readiness and response takes into consideration the wide variation of circumstances that exist in New Zealand, from the Auckland metropolitan context to the small rural local authority.
9. We have considered each of the outcomes from the terms of reference.

### **Fit for Purpose Response**

10. Outcome 1 : The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations.
11. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, National Plan, guide to the National Plan and supporting Coordinated Incident Management Systems doctrine provide a solid platform to support fit for purpose readiness and response arrangements.

12. Amendments to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act are not required.
13. Some regions, including Northland have in place robust and effective readiness and response arrangements that have been actively developed and implemented since the inception of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.
14. Appropriate levels of readiness and response vary considerably across a variety of key stakeholders and agencies. That some agencies and members lack an understanding of the responsibilities outlined in the Act, National Plan or the guide.
15. MCDEM Monitoring and Evaluation reports and other reviews have clearly highlighted that there are Groups that have areas to work on to improve and enhance readiness and response capability.
16. Arrangements and understanding of the capability and capacity of some agencies with specialist expertise is in our view not integrated at a level that is operationally effective. Often the Defence Forces in New Zealand are available to assist in responding to emergencies however planning, training, and exercising with the defence forces has been limited.
17. The Territorial Local Authority model that applies to CDEM is a suitable arrangement. Some CDEM groups have invested in Community Response Planning, which is proven to enhance community resilience. The TLA model also provides the ability to scale up in terms of staff resource during response.
18. It is not the framework which is at fault, but more the application of the act and its requirements in a consistent manner across the country.

### **Recommendations**

19. Implement a nationally led strategy to strengthen stakeholder engagement, enhance relationships, collaboration and understanding of agency responsibilities outlined in the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, the National Plan and the guide to the plan
20. Act to ensure that the functions of Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (S.17, CDEM Act) are clearly understood and are acted upon by the responsible agencies.
21. Implement a national plan to ensure that adequate consistent standards of readiness and response arrangements exists across the sixteen Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups and that the standards are supported nationally.
22. Reinforce that the current legislation provides a robust platform for Civil Defence Emergency Management readiness and response.

## Response Capability and Capacity

23. Outcome 2: New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.
24. New Zealand does not have the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses nationally.
25. Current response arrangements, or lack of them, vary considerably and allow each group to provide for their own arrangements. Recent emergencies have highlighted deficiencies.
26. There are qualified experienced personnel to deploy nationally, however deployment arrangements are poorly coordinated or planned for, and emergency response arrangements are often confused and muddled, or poorly understood and implemented.
27. Our key concern is that there are a lack of national standards or models that have been implemented to facilitate medium scale event response, let alone a large-scale event.
28. An example of a proven model is the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) systems which has a history of successful deployments to sudden onset disasters internationally. Assessment, coordination and information management are UNDAC's core mandates in an emergency response mission.
29. The UNDAC system comprises four components:
  - Staff: Experienced emergency managers made available for UNDAC missions by their respective governments or organizations. UNDAC members are specially trained and equipped for their task.
  - Methodology: Pre-defined methods for establishing coordination structures, and for organizing and facilitating assessments and information management during the first phase of a sudden-onset disaster or emergency.
  - Procedures: Proven systems to mobilize and deploy an UNDAC team to arrive at the disaster or emergency site within 12-48 hours of the request.
  - Equipment: Personal and mission equipment for UNDAC teams to be self-sufficient in the field when deployed for disasters/emergencies.
30. The UNDAC model could be applied to the New Zealand context to provide a national response capability and capacity.
31. Those government agencies with responsibilities should also be members of any national support arrangements capable of being deployed to a region, including Welfare, Police, MPI, FENZ and other key agencies.

## Recommendations

32. Urgently develop a national level capability to support response in the regions or at the national level.

33. Consider the international best practise models that exist and how best to implement those models into the New Zealand context.
34. Develop and implement a standardised national template for emergency readiness and response arrangements, including deployment, assessment, information management, command and control, that includes representation from all the key agencies
35. Develop minimum standards for regional readiness and response capability and capacity across CDEM Groups including Welfare arrangements and Lifelines Utility capability.
36. Any national support system must be a living arrangement, supported by professional development, human resources policy, memorandums of understanding and resources

### **Declarations**

37. Outcome 3: Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency.
38. The model and the legislation that supports emergency response, particularly declarations, the appointment of local and group controllers, and their roles and functions is workable and satisfactory in an operational setting provided the appropriate preparedness arrangements are in place.
39. The current devolved decision-making model from central to local government, and framework of lead and support agencies to manage response is a model that is appropriate for emergency management in the New Zealand context.
40. Recently we have seen the thresholds for declarations alter, whereby there has been a shift from the long held rational of declaring an emergency was to have the Controllers powers in the CDEM Act. Through other pressures, we have recently seen declarations made for reasons other than to use the powers of the Act. We do not support the approach of declaring emergencies for reasons other than to access the powers.
41. We do not support any interim arrangements and believe that the current declaration processes and appointments of persons authorised to make declarations, if applied, are both timely and rigorous.

### **Recommendations**

42. Reinforce that the current arrangements for declarations are robust and there is no requirement to change or alter the current legislative mandates.
43. Consideration be given to clarifying, in an updated guideline, the reasons for declaring an emergency i.e. powers v public interest.

## Command and Control

44. Outcome 4: The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.
45. Whether command and control is appropriate in any event will depend upon those in the leadership roles and the level of expertise to carry out the appropriate functions
46. We submit that there is a need for consistent levels or benchmarks nationally for each of the sixteen groups to achieve in terms of capacity and capability. There is currently considerable variation in the levels of readiness, including capacity of Welfare arrangements, Lifelines arrangements and more significantly in the training and experience of those personnel who will be required to respond.
47. Gaps in training, professional development and consistency in applying response arrangements have been identified nationally. The lessons learnt and gaps identified from the Christchurch earthquake response were the subject of a detailed report and “corrective action plan,” and it seems that these corrective actions may not have transferred into the operational response arrangements.
48. These include such things as – inability to identify and efficiently deploy in a timely manner appropriately qualified and skilled personnel; inability to appropriately manage and share information across an emergency event (including to the public); confusion around organisational roles and responsibilities, and inability to manage and coordinate a response, including the capability to carry out coordinated needs assessments.
49. Our submission is that central government, particularly MCDEM, should take ownership of ensuring that there are consistent and well understood arrangements in place for responding to an emergency, and that the arrangements are integrated across the sixteen groups.
50. The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System was introduced in 1998, and revised in April 2014. CIMS establishes a framework of consistent principles, structures, functions, processes and terminology that agencies can apply in emergency response.
51. In the forward to the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of CIMS Andrew Kibblewhite noted that “CIMS will not guarantee effective response arrangements by itself. Successful and effective response rests in the understanding and application of the CIMS concepts by the agencies. The responsibility is therefore upon agencies to note and apply CIMS appropriately.”
52. Implementation of CIMS has been inconsistent and to be effective CIMS must be the baseline operating procedures agreed and used by all responding agencies.
53. The development of the Integrated Training Framework is a step forward in professional development, however, to date the outcomes from the programme have been mixed. It is unclear if there is a strategy for the delivery of the Integrated Training Framework and what MCDEM’s expectations are in regards to it. ITF should be part of a wider Capability Strategy.

## Recommendations

54. Implement a standardised national programme of professional development for response personnel including Coordinated Incident Management Systems.
55. Reinforce the requirement that Coordinated Incident Management Systems is the standard operating procedure for multi-agency response and ensure that the concept of lead agency is understood and adhered too.

## Information Management

56. Outcome 5: Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies
57. Since the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004 the Northland CDEM Group has progressively grown and enhanced regional level warning and alerting arrangements to ensure that communities receive timely notifications. Northland has developed an extensive region wide Tsunami siren network which was installed in 2012. MCDEM developed a guideline in 2015 for tsunami sirens and alerting. Each region's alerting mechanisms are different and are out of step with each other.
58. The tsunami warning issued immediately after the Kaikoura earthquake is an example of the inconsistent approaches adopted to emergency response in New Zealand. Despite notification, the urgency and the assessment, there was inconsistency and variation in how groups responded. This event highlighted the desperate need for a consistent all of nation single warning system whereby information is disseminated from a single point of contact at national level across all platforms, including social media to the community and responders.
59. The current system causes confusion and in-consistency since information is provided to sixteen CDEM groups, who in turn "interpret and analyse" then send out variations of the original message. A single authoritative direction is required.
60. In the months before the Kaikoura earthquake CDEM Groups nationally were made aware of, and offered the use of the "Red Cross Hazard app," an alerting platform capable of being used to disseminate alerting and warning information to the public. Several groups, including the Northland CDEM Group took up the offer to utilise this technology. MCDEM were offered the use of the app, which would act to strengthen the national warning system, however they declined the offer.
61. MCDEM have devolved the responsibility for warning and alerting communities to CDEM Groups and have made little progress in recent years in implementing any form of smart technology to speed up or enhance distribution of information through social media channels or other media channels, instead they have maintained an email, and text based system. The recent review and change in the NWS has neglected the interface with social media.
62. The national Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) has a role to play in managing and sharing information across a broad range of stakeholders during any emergency event, however EMIS has been poorly implemented, it's use is highly variable and in our view, it's value is not being optimised. Nothing explicit

concerning the way groups shall use EMIS exists and there are no guidelines for groups about the agreed standards or levels of use. EMIS also lacks a nationwide programme for implementation, which was left to groups.

63. Needs assessment is fundamental to all emergency response, yet in New Zealand there is no standard practices, agreed protocols, nor agreed technology to gather and analyse information. Internationally there are protocols, standard practices and processes, including a freely available and operative collection data base. International best practise could be easily transferred into the New Zealand emergency management context.

### **Recommendations**

64. Urgently review and incorporate where practical international best practice technology and processes into readiness and response, particularly impact and needs assessment.
65. Review, consider and implement technology that provides interface with alerting systems, and information management and analysis.
66. Develop at a national level specialist personnel who are information management specialist capable of sourcing, analysing and reporting on information in a timely and efficient manner.



**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

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visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Drew Mehrtens
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Separate document is attached.

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

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## **Personal submission to the Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand**

I have served as a Public Information Manager (PIM) in numerous responses over the last decade and prior to that, reported on them as part of the media. In some cases I was lead PIM and in other cases I have been part of a wider Group PIM team as either manager or team member.

This submission reflects my personal views and not those of any organisation for which I have served as PIM.

I perceive a massive risk in the way significant PIM responsibilities are merely added onto already busy communications staff in local and regional councils. Already, this has resulted in their not being able to give the time and attention to the standard of PIM development needed ahead of a major event. Individuals who do well are usually working with a higher pace and frequency of emergency level or news-room situations, but this is rare across the country.

I put forward the following recommendations and points of view from a PIM perspective that I believe will enhance CDEM activities:

1. Create a National structure of integrated agencies to undertake planning, response and support activities.
  - Currently, meaningful and useful multi-agency PIM relationships need to be built in advance of response and recovery.
  - This takes time and resource not often available during business as usual, with a consistent approach for the role across councils and agencies. This is not happening well under the current structure.
2. Legislate an integrated competency based training framework (which includes refresher training and regular exercising) for PIM, including liaison staff from other relevant stake holders e.g. emergency service partners.
3. Implement a single nationally integrated cloud based IT system that allows all agencies to collate data, obtain situational awareness and report one truth. A centralised and integrated approach to data/information management and situational awareness that is trusted by all stakeholders, agencies and officials is essential.
  - Standardised PIM management systems (especially IT) would help make the deployment of such resources as seamless as possible.
4. Create a specialised National multiagency PIM team to support Groups before, during and after an event.
  - Leadership in this field would best be provided under a national structure, with legislative teeth to allow for national or regional PIM to be more directive.

5. A nationally-provided regional BAU PIM resource, able to be deployed at short notice to assist local and regional responses, would help avoid risks associated with different capacity and skills levels.
  - National full-time PIM resources based within MCDEM (both in Wellington and elsewhere) would provide mentoring or surge capacity in large events, in readiness and recovery.
  - The establishment of inter-agency PIM forums could be incentivised and supported at a national and regional level to accelerate relationship building, identify additional existing communication networks and help provide for surge capacity/mutual support. This includes creating professional development opportunities with key stakeholders (especially iwi) and partner agencies, including PIM from neighbour boundaries.
  - Ensure PIM teams are adequately resourced and mentored to be able to communicate effectively and accurately at speed, across all available channels and stakeholder groups.
  - Invest in a social media strategy that is supported through capability and capacity of experienced and trained PIM staff. This is required before, during and after an event.
6. Establish multiagency National Incident Coordination Teams (NICT) who are trained, exercised and able to undertake rapid deployments into affected locations to support or lead a local response.
  - These teams can be chosen for their individual skills, team working ability and leadership. These will train and mentor others.
  - Mentoring will also allow [NICT] teams to focus on each team member's strengths. Thus, as in national defence, we will have high performance teams ready to deploy with the ability to bring in local knowledge and work with local PIM but without the response, community or sector being hamstrung by less skilled volunteers blocking high-risk communication from within the PIM role.
7. Establish an educational programme for media to explain their role and responsibilities during emergency events.
8. Develop a national approach to overcome communication barriers such as limitations in cell phone reception.

One of the greatest difficulties with PIM, and one that causes political and reputational problems for more than just the lead agency, is when you have local people thrust into the role of PIM who are not able to perform the task well but who resist allowing others to do the job at the level required by an emergency response.

An NICT that is expected to manage this task in conjunction with locals providing local knowledge would provide a consistently higher standard. Over time, this would also develop a higher standard across the pool of local PIM used in these roles.

An argument is often brought up to say that because local knowledge is important, local PIM should always lead or manage the function. However, this fails to consider the implications of a person who is not able to perform the task being handed the keys to the function at a critical time. Imagine a Minister rushing to a car on their way to a response and discovering that the person climbing into the driver's seat is drunk.

Would the Minister allow the drunk driver to take the wheel simply because of local knowledge? Or should a sober driver be given the key instead, with a sober local providing navigation support? In an emergency, local trauma causes people to grip white-knuckled to control, even if their emotional state or general skill level is the equivalent of a drunk driver in this scenario.

Local PIM who are regularly activated in response are rare. It is worth noting that some who have been appointed as PIM by local councils do not work in a communications function. Others, even in communications roles, are in locations where the business as usual standard allows for a lower standard of skill across PIM functions to remain hidden. This lower level of skill often includes (1) the inability to cope with lots of information at one time, (2) the inability to work at high speed and (3) an emotional attachment to being viewed as important. This last point can also cause someone to be unable to delegate. Those with these issues fail repeatedly in response because they can't cope with information, speed or the need to delegate or take instruction.

Trained and exercised teams built on team member's strengths will deliver better results. This has been seen when experienced PIM who are used to working together are called together from around the country. Unfortunately, this is often after the first week or so, when hard-to-repair damage has been done.

Other PIM are not able to operate across the broad skillset required, whether it be to make sure media is given access to accurate, clear and timely information, or to make sure that ministerial and Mayoral activity is coordinated with press secretaries and other agency staff. A consistent approach to PIM will help with this problem.

A consistent approach to PIM is also important, because without it, the sector or any future agency model will be vulnerable to a wide discrepancy of standards of communication with citizens and other stakeholders.

Little or no distinction is ever made in public between the Ministry, sector, emergency services, individual agencies and local EOCs when communication fails or is inconsistent in a response. Whether the model changes after this review or remains the same, bad communication tars all with the same brush. It would be seen as petty – even if true – if a Minister told media that the problem wasn't the agency's issue, but was a problem with a local person or team who did not have the appropriate skill to be in the driver's seat.

### **Conclusion**

Civil Defence Emergency Management operates at the extreme end of the public safety spectrum. CDEM Groups are charged with the protection of life and property. Decisions during the response phase are frequently made under life threatening circumstances.

A more systematic and comprehensive national approach to PIM training and upskilling needs to be given high priority.

Drew Mehrrens

Public Information Manager

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

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<b>Name:</b> Ministry of Health New Zealand
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)  §9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): Please see attached files.  We have provided a signed scanned copy and a pdf copy for ease of access.  END

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

# Ministry of Health submission to the Emergency Management Technical Advisory Group



The Ministry of Health welcomes the opportunity to provide input to the *Ministerial Review on Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand* and has identified a number of thematic issues and recommendations on possible mechanisms to enhance future responses.

These issues have been informed by our significant engagement with the Civil Defence Emergency Management sector and a complex range of incidents within the National Security System. Health has operated as both lead and support agency in a range of recent events at national and local level. As society becomes more complex and connected, we anticipate future response challenges as a result of concurrent hazards with local, regional or national implications.

Officials from the Ministry of Health are available to provide further advice if requested.

SEE SCANNED VERSION

Dr Stewart Jessamine  
Director Protection, Regulation & Assurance  
Friday 7 July 2017

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Summary

The Ministry of Health (the Ministry) has identified three core thematic issues which are covered within Section A of this submission:

### 1. Development of a professional, trained emergency management workforce

The Ministry of Health supports the development of a professional trained emergency management workforce able to respond at local, regional and national levels of coordination. However, we consider that this workforce needs to operate, coordinate and lead inter-agency and intersectoral activity across all four R's (Reduction, Readiness, Response & Recovery) of New Zealand's comprehensive all-hazards emergency management framework.

In a response, this emergency management workforce needs to be able to draw on a broader pool of appropriately skilled and exercised responders. These responders should have received quality assured, nationally consistent functional training across CIMS roles, in order to establish effective Incident Management Teams at all levels. This includes specialist courses for key roles (such as Controllers and Public Information Management), as well as the interface between an emergency management response and the National Security System.

### 2. Implementation of Unified Control

The emergency management workforce could be drawn in a response from a range of agencies, and should support a single lead agency, operating under a centralised Emergency Management agency model. The Ministry consider this model would be best structured around appropriately resourced and supported regional offices aligned with current CDEM groups.

Under this lead agency model, an effective Unified Control response should be able to operate utilising the hazard and consequence specific technical knowledge of a range of support agencies. This change would ensure that New Zealand is able to effectively manage the range of concurrent and various duration hazards that we face (for example, an acute regional weather event during a prolonged pandemic).

### 3. Leadership of emergency management

The Ministry of Health consider that the lead agency under a lead agency model (as outlined above), would be most appropriately named and branded as Emergency Management (or similar), moving away from the 'Civil Defence' branding. We recognise this has been debated considerably, but view that the legacy of the term 'Civil Defence' contributes to a stakeholder perception that there is a standing army of resources available to respond, rather than coordinated response between existing agencies and the community.

Whilst greater mandate is recommended for a single coordinating lead agency at national and regional level, it is important that the obligations on other agencies within the CDEM Act and Plan remain. All agencies should be expected to lead and coordinate the work to mitigate, manage and recover from the hazards or consequences that they are best placed to do so. However this could take a more integrated approach with the lead Emergency Management agency.

The concept of a consistent lead agency at local, regional and national levels does not prevent or lessen the requirement for support agencies to establish and maintain their own coordination centres at local, regional or national level. This requirement should be determined by agencies, based on factors such as their need to resource and ensure plans for adequate control of their finite resources.



At the National level, the Ministry consider that this Emergency Management lead agency would be most effective remaining within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It could provide a centralised response coordination capability, with an expanded response capacity which includes key functional staff from other agencies. This response capability would be aligned with current reviews of the NCMC and 24/7 Watch functions, and would be capable of managing multiple concurrent events across both classified and unclassified areas<sup>1</sup>.

Assurance and oversight of these new arrangements could be provided by establishing an independent monitoring mechanism. For example, a number of Australian jurisdictions have established Inspector-General for Emergency Management<sup>23</sup> who work across a range of agencies with Emergency Management roles. Such a model in New Zealand would strengthen the current oversight provided by agency Chief Executives via the Hazard Risk Board. An Inspector-General office (or similar) could provide quality assurance processes, play an instrumental role in supporting lessons identified processes, event and exercise debriefing and developing competency and training frameworks.

### Specific topics

This submission also covers:

- a range of other specific points of feedback (Section B).
- an overview of the Health and Disability Sector related to Emergencies (Annex 1).
- illustrative examples of responses where Health was a lead or support agency (Annex 2).

### Definitions

For clarity, in this submission the following terms have been used:

<b>Civil Defence</b>	used specifically to denote either local or regionally structured entities, along current lines, undertaking these emergency management functions (not withstanding possible changes to resourcing)
<b>Emergency Management</b>	used to denote a management function consisting of 'comprehensive all-hazards emergency management across all phases (the four R's)' and can be undertaken by any agency
<b>Emergency Manager</b>	refers to a professional with the majority of their role focussed on Emergency Management
<b>Incident Management Team</b>	refers to trained responders who undertake command and control functions based on CIMS principals during Response and Recovery phases. May or may not be an emergency manager
<b>Responders</b>	refers to any personnel, including volunteers and community responders who are operating during an event. Many will be performing their normal functions, but some will be performing unique roles

<sup>1</sup> Emergency Management Australia, within the Attorney-General's department operates the Australian national crisis centre which is charged with being able to manage and coordinate three concurrent national events.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.igem.qld.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.igem.vic.gov.au/home/our+work/>

<b>Psychosocial</b>	refers to the inter-relationship between individual psychological and social factors. The psychosocial approach considers individuals in the context of the combined influence that psychological factors and the surrounding social environment have on their physical and mental wellness and their ability to function
<b>Psychosocial support</b>	Psychosocial support during an emergency (irrespective of the duration) is about easing the psychological, social and physical difficulties for individuals, families/whānau and communities. It is also about enhancing wellbeing and helping people to recover and adapt after their lives have been disrupted

## Section A: Core Thematic Issues

### 1. Development of a professional, trained emergency management workforce

The Ministry supports the use of trained professional staff for emergency management in New Zealand. We see there is a need to provide a comprehensive role-specific competency and training framework to support Incident Management Teams and note the following:

- Response activity is part of a continuum across the four R's. Training therefore needs to provide a context and link to these other activities.
- A lead agency may undertake coordination of response activity but cannot control or command other agencies resources or personnel (notwithstanding emergency powers under a declaration).
- We understand there is no NZQA training or unit standards (beyond CIMS 2 and CIMS 4) three years on from the publication of the CIMS 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Whilst the MCDEM Integrated Training Framework (ITF) has made progress in the last couple of months, we consider this is essential to delivering response focussed courses at Emergency Operations Centre, Emergency Coordination Centre and National Coordination Centre level.
- The CDEM Controllers Course has been a noticeable success, with over 120 controllers having completed 6 weeks on-line learning, a 5 day residential and (an optional)12 month personal development programme. We suggest this is extended and could provide the core content of a Controllers course for all hazards. The Ministry considers all Controllers, regardless of agency, should be seen as a common professional trained workforce pool.
- The National Security System (NSS) courses delivered by DPMC / Victoria University are a useful adjunct into the ODESC environment. Those officials who undertake a CIMS National Controllers / Coordinators role should be expected to have completed a CDEM Controllers Course. Similarly, the development of a version of the NSS course for local and regional officials (which we understand is currently underway) is essential in ensuring they understand the wider national environment and the demands from stakeholders.
- Experience in a uniformed service provides command experience and training, however does not necessarily provide the knowledge or experience to manage complex events in a comprehensive and

integrated emergency management setting. This should be considered as part of training and competency frameworks.

- The breadth of positions and depth of response that an Incident Management Team needs to provide means that all organisations will be reliant on staff whose core function is not day to day Emergency Management. This needs to be recognised and supported.
- There will be a necessary separation between those leading Emergency Management activity across the 4Rs and those with essential skills, knowledge and experience who support a response.
- The recommendation from the McLean review of the Canterbury Earthquake response relating to the development of specialist Emergency Management Assistance Teams (EMATs) has not been implemented, i.e. “that a cadre of highly trained emergency managers from organisations across the country be established to lead and control emergency responses”. The reasons for this are not clear, however there appear to be difficulties in providing cross agency funding to develop the necessary deployment framework, training and equipment especially when there is a perceived lack of mandate for such a team. The viability and value of a rapid deployment of expert assistance was demonstrated with the deployment of the Ministry of Health’s Regional Emergency Management Advisor (Southern) on the first NH90 to Kaikoura to support the local health Incident Management Team (deployed along with specialist staff from NZ Police and NZDF). This was effective because of previous investment in relationship building, technical skills and access to personal equipment out of the NZMAT<sup>4</sup> programme supply cache.

#### Key Points and Recommendations

- A professional trained, experienced workforce for emergency management at all levels is essential.
- The emergency management workforce should be professionalised. Those leading emergency management within agencies should be expected to hold relevant tertiary qualifications, technical training (i.e. CIMS, NSS, and Controllers Course) and professional membership or certification, and participate in ongoing professional development. Role expectations across the 4Rs should be incorporated into position descriptions and personal development plans for these professionals.
- Current training initiatives (such as ITF, Controllers Courses and NSS courses) should be enhanced, made more frequently available and delivered on an all-hazards basis to the Incident Management team personnel from lead and support agencies, in order to provide as broad a pool of practitioners as possible.
- The second recommendation within the McLean Report (2012) regarding EMATs should be implemented. Further work is required to determine whether it operates in an assistance role or would take over control, however a clear mandate and funding direction would be beneficial.
- Support and lead agencies should also be expected to develop Standard Operating Procedures to deploy surge and support staff from one area to another outside of a formal EMAT structure. Previous Health examples have included Public Health technical staff and communication managers to support larger responses. These arrangements will be mutually beneficial and enhance deployment of all surge staff.

<sup>4</sup> New Zealand Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT)

## 2. Implementation of Unified Control

The incidents<sup>5</sup> highlighted within the terms of reference for the *Ministerial Review on Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand* had a range of agencies operating with various mandates and roles, and a resulting lack of clarity as to who the lead agency was. This situation had been anticipated in New Zealand incident management guidance within the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition CIMS manual.

The CIMS manual defines Unified Control as:

*“An application of command and control used to bring control of an incident to one combined decision making body when two or more agencies assume joint lead of a response”*

However, the guidance (ODESC p9, 2014) available to agencies to implement Unified Control is limited to three paragraphs within the CIMS manual:

*Unified Control is when the control of an incident is shared between two or more agencies by agreement through a combined decision-making body. The command appointments for each agency establish an agreed concept of operations and a single Action Plan. Unified Control is usually applied when:*

- *more than one agency has a mandate to manage a particular incident*
- *it is unclear if any agency is the lead, or*
- *the lead agency determines that a joint approach will be more effective.*

*Agencies applying Unified Control establish a joint coordination centre (CC), with key appointments filled by the most appropriate personnel from any agency. Agency command appointments do not have to be present at all times, but need to come together to agree on key decisions.*

*Other than a combined Control function, the joint CC follows usual CIMS practices.*

Whilst Unified Control is addressed as a topic within the current MCDEM/ Massey University CDEM Controllers Course, there is little doctrinal guidance or support to agencies at local or national level on how to implement it. The United States of America within the National Incident Management System, and other jurisdictions, have developed this concept significantly.

The CIMS 2<sup>nd</sup> edition recognised the complexity of events such as the Canterbury Earthquakes and Pike River by identifying the potential for multiple levels of command, in particular multiple incident sites within a local or regional response. This envisaged responses like multiple incident sites led by agencies such as Police or Fire at the operational level (the Incident Control Point), coordinated as a number of incident sites as part of a local or regional wide event under Civil Defence.

The current concept of lead agency within the CDEM Plan Order does not adequately reflect that an agency may be best placed to technically manage the immediate hazard but that the consequences (such as shortages of household goods and services, stakeholder confidence or the need to evacuate residents) may occur due to a range of hazards and is best led by an appropriately resourced, trained and equipped community focussed agency such as (a revised) Civil Defence Emergency Management agency.

For example, Health managed the consequences to the Havelock North Gastroenteritis outbreak and whilst it had legislative power to compel the Drinking Water Supplier to address the cause of the contamination, this was

<sup>5</sup> August 2016 Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis outbreak (lead agency Health); 2 September 2016 East Cape earthquake and tsunami (lead agency Civil Defence Emergency Management); 14 November 2016 Kaikoura earthquake and tsunami (lead agency Civil Defence Emergency Management); and 13 February 2017 Port Hills fire (lead agency Selwyn Rural Fire Authority).

not required. Health agencies would undertake the same actions to manage the consequences of a gastroenteritis outbreak following an earthquake or wide scale flood event, however there would unlikely be expectation for them to take over control of that incident.

This approach has been seen in other jurisdictions. In London, the "Gold Chair" of their Strategic Coordinating Group at regional level passed from the Metropolitan Police to the Local Authority Gold less than 12 hours after the 2005 London Bombings. This was in spite of an ongoing intelligence led police operation, complex scene investigation and disaster victim identification. In West Africa, coordination of the overall response to Ebola Virus Disease sat with a National Disaster Management Agency, typically within the Prime Minister's department and supported by Defence. This is because the consequence of the human disease outbreak were recognised as multi-sectoral.

There is therefore a need to develop guidance and supporting training material, reinforced by appropriate exercising at all levels, to enable responders to operate effectively within a Unified Control model.

Health recognises and supports its key role in managing the health consequences, regardless of lead agency, for any hazard and would welcome further development of this concept.

Current training and doctrinal guidance is weak on the management of concurrent events. Work led by DPMC over the last two years has quantified the range of national risks we face and it is highly likely that in some long duration events (such as a pandemic influenza) communities will experience shorter duration events such as simultaneous weather, technology or geological events.

Incident Management Teams at all levels need to be able to manage and respond to concurrent events which will mean competing demands on the same resources.

The Ministry suggests concurrent events need to be managed within the same Unified Control framework. At the national level an essential component of this will be the ability to service multiple stakeholders, in particular the public, and a range of Minister with differing responsibilities.

### **Key Points and Recommendations**

- In a Response Incident Management Teams need to be able to manage multiple concurrent hazard events that draw on resources controlled by a range of agencies with diverse stakeholders.
- Rapid deployment of Liaison Officers, to bridge the gap between local, regional and national level, and between Support and Lead agencies is vital
- Development of clear doctrine, and supporting resources for Unified Control and/or a single lead agency is required to manage this.
- Current CDEM optimised on a regional structure supported by the full range of agencies, are the most appropriate agency for a single lead agency model providing over-all coordination. This should be overlaid by an expectation that senior agency representation for technical hazards and consequences is available to support.

### 3. Leadership of emergency management

#### 3.1 Emergency Management, not Civil Defence or Civil Defence Emergency Management

Globally, emergency management is increasingly recognised as addressing comprehensive all-hazards management across risk Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery phases<sup>6</sup>. We suggest agencies should adopt terminology and branding that identifies them as “Emergency Management”.

Civil Defence is a cold-war specific concept that addressed an existential threat at the time. New Zealand now faces broader challenges from a much wider range of hazards and threats. Emergency Management is widely recognised as the managerial practice which addresses comprehensive (all hazards) integrated and risk based approaches to managing emergencies.

New Zealand consistently demonstrates emerging good practice in this field and therefore should be named appropriately.

##### Key Points and Recommendations

- Civil Defence Emergency Management should be replaced by Emergency Management in branding, doctrine and legislation, recognising it is a management function that a range of agencies undertake.

#### 3.2 Leadership and coordination in a response

Response must be considered as one part of the 4Rs and must always be tailored and delivered to local contexts. The Ministry therefore generally supports the concept of locally led, regionally coordinated and nationally supported responses. This means that all agencies involved in response activity at all levels must also be working across the other phases of emergency management, in particular readiness activity.

Many communities will be served by relatively small Local Authorities and CDEM in many cases will be delivered by a small number of appointed professional staff, however it must be remembered that in any response agencies will be reliant on Incident Management Teams drawn from across their organisation.

There is opportunity to improve the training and experience of these wider staff through initiatives (such as the Integrated Training Framework) and greater use of mutual aid and support between Groups in order to enable staff to gain experience.

Agencies need to incorporate these response roles (and the readiness elements to support this) into all staff positions to enable participation in training and exercising. Some staff position descriptions will also need to have recovery roles considered.

##### Key Points and Recommendations

- Strengthened Emergency Management arrangements with a centralised lead agency at local, regional and national levels should be developed. The practicalities of supporting small communities that will be reliant on response personnel from across council functions (and beyond), regardless of whether the emergency management professional lead is part of a national agency must be recognised.

##### ***Devolved decision making***

In general there is a need for events to be managed at the lowest practicable level as Incident Controllers at the most ‘local’ level will have the clearest picture of immediate events on the ground. There is a saying in health

<sup>6</sup> The majority of jurisdictions, and international agencies, describe this as Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery

'don't try and load the ambulance from the hospital'. In practical terms, this reflects that local operational decisions are best made locally - taking into consideration understanding of the local context and challenges, key relationships and community involvement.

These arrangements are supported by the multiple levels of coordination described in the CIMS 2<sup>nd</sup> edition however there is a need to up skill and professionalise the response workforce across all sectors in order to support this. Nationally consistent training and inter-operability are key and should be supported by better use of technology, such as a single EMIS platform (see below) to enable a common operating picture at all levels.

Local Incident Controllers and their Incident Management Teams must be empowered to succeed, however it must also be recognised that many natural hazards will have regional wide, or multi-region impact. Therefore, coordination at higher levels of command is a critical component of a response. Only national and regional coordination hubs can effectively prioritise finite resources which multiple local Incident Management Teams may be requesting.

This coordination mechanism worked reasonably effectively during the Kaikoura-Hurunui earthquake where the National Crisis Management Centre was effectively supporting three CDEM Groups (and the allocation of national resources to them) who in turn were supporting a number of local Emergency Operations Centres. Issues did not appear with the structure, rather with the competency, familiarity and depth of personnel in incident management teams and representative positions, as well as appropriate tools and technology to support this.

Opportunities to enhance this decision making, and visibility of responses (the Common Operating Picture) need to be improved at all levels. Whilst local responders are best placed to assess and respond on the ground, some emergent technology (such as aerial surveillance, satellite imagery, monitoring of national supply chain etc) will be available at higher levels and must be provided to local responders.

As previously discussed, it is inevitable that some local responses will need support to their Incident Management Teams and this is best achieved by the rapid deployment of appropriately skilled incident management staff to the activated local Emergency Operations Centre. A number of agencies, including Health, deployed staff in the morning following the Kaikoura-Hurunui earthquake.

There is a significant risk that media (including social media) reports may also focus response activities on specific areas to the detriment of others.

### **Key Points and Recommendations**

- Ensure that local response coordination and leadership is supported and enabled by appropriate training, tools and resources.
- Recognise that local controllers will manage with resources available to them and that regional and national coordination will set direction, and where necessary, manage finite national resources against competing response priorities.
- Proactive management of media (including social media) should be seen as a response priority.

### ***National and Regional Operations***

During the development of the CIMS 2<sup>nd</sup> edition some stakeholders felt strongly that Operations were only conducted at the local level, and did not occur at regional or national levels of coordination. The Ministry of Health strongly supports the current doctrinal position that Operations functions occurs at all levels, albeit with a

different focus of activity. Operational functions need to engage with functions in a similar role at coordination levels above and below them.

## **Section B: Feedback on specific items**

### **1. National Security System**

The Ministry strongly supports the codification over the last couple of years of the National Security System (NSS). The move of MCDEM from DIA to DPMC following the McLean Canterbury earthquake review was appropriate and has provided a national operational capability for current CDEM-led events that provides a sound basis for all hazards national operational capability, if appropriately resourced.

#### **Key Points and Recommendations**

- Further work is required to clarify the important distinction between the DPMC NSS Directorate managing the wider NSS (including ODESC and engagement with Ministers) and a revised National Emergency Management Agency. Simplistically, the National Security System Directorate could lead national strategic advice and direction, whilst an enhanced National Emergency Management Agency manages national operations (including the provision of the National Crisis Management Centre incorporating some but not all 24/7 watch functions) across concurrent events.

### **2. Technology silos**

The Ministry sees it as critical that emergency management agencies train and use the current civil defence emergency management information system (EMIS). Limited use is negatively influencing uptake and ongoing use of the Health EMIS system and limiting interoperability and the development of a common operating picture across agencies.

The CDEM system is currently being upgraded and will continue to be developed as a system for the use of CDEM agencies only, whether in lead or support. Health is cooperating on this upgrade and will also move to an EMIS 3.0 environment hosted within the same environment, therefore allowing greater information exchange.

In spite of this, New Zealand will still lack a common platform across all agencies. Health believes that in a country of our size there is a value proposition in a single EMIS platform that provides a cross agency, cross sector common operating picture at national, regional and local level.

Whilst the lack of ability in the current EMIS systems to manage information at the Restricted level has been put forward by some agencies as one reason to not use it in this way, we do not believe this is unsurpassable. Because CDEM have only anticipated the system for CDEM use, they have never specified the need for Restricted level information. Conceptually the use of 'Data Diodes' to allow the one way flow of sensitive information upwards has been used in other settings. Any system would still need to allow agencies to protect their own sensitive information or even compartmentalise it within their own agency. Patient or beneficiary information would be key examples of this.

It is also important to acknowledge that the majority of information in the response and consequence management phase could be managed at unclassified level and that enhanced response coordination is likely to outweigh other risks.



### Key Points and Recommendations

- The work to upgrade CDEM EMIS and Health EMIS to version 3.0 provides a holistic environment that enables the subsequent development of other products and common operating pictures such as GIS.
- There is an opportunity to extend this and implement EMIS 3.0 as an all hazards, all agency EMIS platform. Its use could be mandated and supported with appropriate training at all levels.

### 3. Social media

The challenges of social media on Public Information Management, Operations, Planning and Intelligence functions are becoming better understood, however solutions and new approaches to managing and utilising social media need exploration. Responders know that both mainstream and emerging media will report social media feeds (and often publish them directly) with little or no validation of information in real time. If there is an error, they do not necessarily have to acknowledge it or can correct it with little consequence.

This makes it extremely difficult for Ministries to maintain confidence of stakeholders as we traditionally rely on verified information within the Situation Report. In the response to the Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis outbreak (August 2016) Health experienced this issue when, despite direct engagement with the primary care branch of the DHB and Public Health Unit Emergency Operations Centre in the Hawkes Bay, we were asked on numerous occasions to confirm that primary care was managing, based on comments posted on social media from individual patients. The reality was the system was coping and resourced, but some patients were vocal about delays or perceived triage.

Whilst support to stakeholders is a key function, these rapidly emerging issues can be magnified by social media, or gain credibility through 'echo chambers'; and therefore see coordination efforts being driven by this need rather than necessarily the true requirements of all of those affected on the ground.

### Key Points and Recommendations

- Agencies need to develop response capability for social media and look at how Public Information Management is better integrated into Operational, Planning and Intelligence functions.
- This is not an activity that can be left to agency communications staff but needs appropriately trained staff in these functions with access to the right tools (social media monitoring) to engage in this two way communications process effectively.
- Given the rapid pace of change in this area, and the lack of in depth expertise in agencies at all levels, this function is one which would clearly be better resourced from across a range of agencies on a centralised model.

### 4. Psychosocial Welfare

We know that psychological health and well-being can be affected for those exposed to emergency events. For most people, these reactions will be in a range that would be expected when we consider the experiences of those who have been through comparable events.

What we know is that people's responses and recovery are linked to how their social, economic, built and natural environments around them have been affected. This is the 'social' part of 'psychosocial', expressed in its

widest sense. We also know that making sure that people immediate needs are met is vital in establishing a solid platform for recovery. This means we are making sure that access to food, water, sanitation, safety, shelter and connection with others is taken care of as far as possible. This works best when different partners in government and those in the community work together to identify needs of affected people and communities and work together to help them.

By providing basic needs to our people, as community members we can help reduce the negative effects such as fear, anxiety, anger, hopelessness and potential further psychological harm. We need to accept that people will have overwhelming feelings as above, but, in most cases they will dissipate as time progresses and some form of 'normalisation' starts to happen.

Under the new Welfare Plan Order 2015, Psychosocial support and the other sub-functions of Welfare, has seen a higher level of engagement in the latest events described within the terms of reference. While as a sector, we should be focusing our responses on the needs of our communities and the people, the dominance of the welfare (sub)function(s) is becoming more predominant in the way responses are structured and planned for. There is the heightened public awareness around issues such as financial, housing, psychosocial, animal welfare and other supports.

The manner in which information flows within the welfare structure seems to be duplicated and convoluted by nature when considering the 'act locally, coordinate regionally and support nationally'. The ability for support nationally seems to be more of an overseer's role and lacked any real construct to the response being delivered locally.

Knowledge of specific roles and responsibilities appear to still be blurred within the national and regional structures. The Guide and the Plan Order has been in place for 18 months and would benefit from a review to see how the practicality of the welfare measures best fits practice and coordination across all levels of response management.

### **Key Points and Recommendations**

- There is a need to review and document expected reporting requirements for Welfare functions. This should include clear articulation of the need for the information, those who are responsible for supplying information and what expectations there are for entities to act on this information.
- The Welfare section of Guide to the Plan Order should be reviewed in light of recent events and any necessary improvements made.

## **5. Business Continuity**

A number of hazards (such as national earthquake, tsunami or human health emergency) will present significant business continuity requirements on agencies concurrently whilst they are responding. The CDEM Act is clear that agencies are expected to plan to continue functioning to the fullest possible extent, but coordination of readiness and response activity in business continuity could be improved.

The results of the survey completed by the Continuity of Government Group following the Kaikoura-Hurunui earthquake indicated that Business Continuity Planning within individual agencies was variable and coordinated planning across agencies is not developed.

With no mechanism to be able to collectively identify, compare and prioritise critical activities across government, in a significant disruptive event this would limit ability to provide coordinated advice on restoration

priorities across agencies, or to support the best prioritisation and utilisation of limited resources (for example, prioritisation for accommodation, or restoration priorities for shared third party vendors).

From Health's perspective, a cross government approach to prioritising critical activities, and enabling coordinated continuance/restoration of these activities, would strengthen our own business continuity planning activity. In addition, it would increase assurance that agencies have the capability to support events we would Lead (such as a pandemic), where it is likely that agencies will need to activate some form of business continuity response in addition to their operational response requirements.

Coordinated planning would also be strengthened by establishing a coordinated response mechanism for business continuity. At this point when events occur, we rely on the existing relationships built with business continuity practitioners within other agencies to identify what action others are taking, or identify if any support is required/could be given. A centralised response mechanism where intelligence was collated from across agencies and consistent information and guidance disseminated would support a more coordinated and effective across government business continuity response.

### Key Points and Recommendations

- Business Continuity across agencies at national and local level is a key enabler to continue functioning to the fullest possible extent.
- Business continuity management underpins agencies ability to perform their emergency management functions.
- There is a pressing requirement to recognise an all of government business continuity response as a specific activity, and separate from the emergency management response. This needs to be supported by a consistent business continuity management cycle (such as within ISO 22301) across agencies to ensure readiness activity is completed and that all of government prioritisation of functions can occur.

## 6. Statutory and Emergency Powers

Like Civil Defence, the Health system endeavours to manage health responses with the consent of the public. We try to avoid the use of compulsion, relying instead on risk communication and good engagement. Health statutory officers have a broad range of routine powers which enable them to perform their roles and these will be used during the response to an emergency, if required. For example, medical officers of health have **routine powers** for which are very rarely used but enable health officers to:

- enter any premises
- medically examine any person
- detain a person for isolation – whether suffering from an infectious disease or not
- prescribe medical treatments
- undertake contact tracing activity or empower exclusion – for example specific children from school.

**Special powers**, which have never been used, can be authorised by the Minister of Health or as a result of a Local or National state of Emergency Declaration. These include measures to ensure that any large, or multiple outbreaks can be rapidly contained and provide for additional measures to:

- Examine
- Detain, isolate or quarantine
- Prescribe

- Requisition premises
- Close premises.

Health specific regulations may also have a range of levels of compulsion. For example, the use of a Drinking Water Emergency was not required as part of the Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis response (August 2016) as the drinking water supplier (Hastings District Council) was fully compliant with the directions of the Public Health Unit to mitigate the effect of the incident. Nothing within a Drinking Water Emergency would have provided access to Government compensation for affected residents or business (compensation only relates to goods requisitioned as part of the response).

There is a default position under CDEM Act 25 s.5 which allows a mayor or delegated member to declare a State of Emergency as well as other nominated officials. Strengthening the mandate of a revised CDEM as lead agency for all hazards would enhance the ability for declarations to be made in managing a range of hazards.

In preparing this submission, we noted that some CDEM groups have proactively published a list of their designated Controllers, however that the majority have not and there appears to be no easily accessible centralised list. Of the lists available, staff appeared to be predominantly council staff, suggesting there is further opportunity to identify and utilise the most appropriately skilled and experienced staff across agencies.

Emergency Declarations appear to be perceived in two opposing ways; one view point sees them as beneficial for ensuring agencies have the full range of resources and powers available to them and signalling confidence, whilst the other view is that it signals a lack of readiness and capacity to respond to (largely) foreseeable events.

### **Key Points and Recommendations**

There has been some commentary that a pro-active emergency declaration enhances public confidence and may also enable a mandatory evacuation to occur, where appropriate (i.e. Whanganui April 2017). The Ministry suggests:

- This must be countered against lost international confidence and the perception that NZ has declared a state of emergency.
- New Zealand is somewhat unusual compared to some jurisdictions in that there is no equivalent escalation point for 'major incident' declaration, although some sectors (such as Ambulance) have provision within their plans to declare a major incident for guiding their internal resourcing.
- There may be benefits in an intermediate level of declaration which is not required to access special powers, however is beneficial in conveying the severity of a situation and increasing confidence in stakeholders and engagement from agencies.

### **Regulatory powers**

Discussion at HRB on 1 June 2017 highlighted issues raised with the TAG on local responders frustration with bureaucracy. Food safety and driving time regulations were both discussed as examples of this from the Edgecumbe floods. The intent of this was unclear.

There are proven time & temperature requirements, as well as driving time regulations that exist for public safety reasons. Whilst these may be inappropriately enforced at times, the Ministry of Health would have significant concern at a recommendation that protective regulations or health & safety obligations are dispensed with in a response. There are numerous peer reviewed journal articles highlighting sanitary and food related

outbreaks in evacuees and first responders, as well as driver and vehicle related accidents during responses to identify just a couple of types of regulatory benefits.

Professional trained responders should understand this context and be able to manage it as part of the response activity. Regulation should be seen as enabling support and properly applied will stop an emergency getting worse.

The refusal of donated goods, such as prepared meals or baked goods may be problematic for some, however there may also be legitimate concerns when these goods have likely been produced in home kitchens that may themselves have been impacted by the emergency (i.e. lack of potable water, sanitation, and potentially contaminated food sources).

There are existing ways to clarify, confirm or amend any expert advice and application of regulations provided. We feel confident that these issues would be addressed by considering them in readiness activity, through training, exercising and role familiarity as well as ensuring the rationale for actions in this area are well communicated.

## 7. Role and Structure of CEGs

There has been some discussion on the inclusion or not of Ambulance providers on Regional Co-ordinating Executive Groups. The CDEM Plan Order mandates DHBs to lead local health emergency management across the 4R's and engage all health and disability sector providers within this. In doing so DHB's are expected to ensure they represent Ambulance, recognising that Health itself is defined as an Emergency Service and that Ambulance services are part of a health focussed continuum of care (i.e. it is a mechanism for providing pre-hospital and community care not an emergency service with a health focus).

The composition of CEGs does not preclude Ambulance participation, and they have participated on a number of CEGs. The effectiveness, breadth and level of participation of a CEG is reflective of the culture and functioning of the CDEM Group. Where a CEG or Group is not performing we do not see that mandating attendance of any agency is necessarily going to enhance it.

For ambulance in particular, we are most interested in ensuring that their emergency management activity is well integrated with emergency services sub-groups and with the DHB area in which they are operating.

The Ministry expects CDEM EOCs at all levels to plan for and accommodate Ambulance Liaison as part of their Liaison or Operations structure, alongside DHB representation as a minimum. The Ministry is concerned that some agencies had not undertaken this essential readiness work with key stakeholders prior to recent events.

## Annex 1: Structure of the Health and Disability Sector related to emergencies

The Ministry of Health has a strong legislative requirement to lead and coordinate the health sector response to emergencies, participate across reduction, readiness, response and recovery activities and ensure that the Ministry's critical functions can continue to be delivered in an emergency.

The Ministry of Health is the lead agency for pandemics and human health emergencies within the National Security System and the Civil Defence Emergency Management legislative framework. The health and disability sector is also a support agency to almost every other lead agency as inevitably almost any disaster, threat or hazard has a potential for human health consequence.

The emergency management work programme is strongly focused on increasing the capability and capacity of the health sector to deal with health emergencies and the health consequences of other hazards. This includes development of national policy and guidance, engaging with clinical and professional networks (including the bi-annual health emergency manager's forums), leading national projects, and maintaining strong working relationships within the health sector and across other government agencies at the national, regional and local level. The Ministry also hosts and maintains an MS Sharepoint based Health EMIS, similar to CDEM EMIS, which provides readiness and response collaborative workspaces for over 50 health agencies.

The emergency management activities of the health and disability sector sit within the wider Civil Defence Emergency Management structure for New Zealand. These are managed under the National CDEM Plan Order 2015 which describes the Roles and Responsibilities for the Ministry and the Health Sector.

Emergency Management in the Ministry of Health is led by a small team of professional emergency managers with relevant tertiary academic qualifications and professional certifications from the International Association of Emergency Managers<sup>7</sup>, ASIS International<sup>8</sup> and the Business Continuity Institute<sup>9</sup>. They also have significant experience at national, regional and local level across the four R's in a range of agencies including health, emergency services, and the military and emergency management agencies. The contractual framework with DHBs and Ambulance providers require their emergency management functions to also be led by a suitably qualified and experienced person. Health Emergency Managers work closely with other areas, in particular frontline clinical services, Public Health and communications teams as well as CDEM, Emergency Services and other partners.

For the health sector, the emergency management framework and response structure is outlined in the National Health Emergency Plan (2015). This overarching plan is supported by a suite of action plans and guidance documents. The NHEP 2015 is the 3<sup>rd</sup> version of this plan and reflects changes in roles and responsibilities of agencies under the National CDEM Plan Order 2015.

District Health Boards (DHBs) are responsible for providing, or funding the provision of, health and disability services in their districts. The Ministry of Health supports DHBs by providing coordination and leadership in Emergency Management and national policy advice, regulation, and funding.

The CDEM Plan Order requires DHBs to lead and coordinate local activity for reduction, readiness, response and recovery across DHB services, Public Health Units, land and air Ambulance providers and Health & Disability Service Providers.

<sup>7</sup> <http://iaem.com/>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.asisonline.org/About-ASIS/Who-We-Are/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.thebci.org/index.php/about/generalinfo>

These statutory obligations are reinforced through a range of contractual frameworks including emergency management sections of the DHB Operational Policy framework and Public Health Unit service plans, as well as standard clauses within service provider contracts at national and local level.

It is important to recognise that whether Lead or Support agency in a response, DHBs are expected to operate an “all of health” model. This means that functions including primary care, public health, community and vulnerable population, hospital facilities and ambulance are all expected to be coordinated and led by the DHB, though some of these functions may also establish their own subsidiary EOCs.

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## **Annex 2: Examples of Responses where Health was a lead or support agency**

### **Canterbury Earthquake (support agency)**

Following the 22 February 2011 Canterbury Earthquake all DHBs, PHUs and Ambulance providers activated Incident Management Teams and supported the national CDEM response. The McLean review identified that the health sector successfully provided timely and high quality treatment for those injured in the earthquake, mostly because of the high level of preparedness based on exercises and previous activation in emergencies.

Response activity included the national deployment of clinical staff including public health statutory officers from across the country to support Canterbury DHB, as well as the deployment of experienced emergency managers from the Ministry, DHBs and PHUs to support the Canterbury DHB Emergency Operations Centre. Aged Care residents and Disability Sector residents, as well as clinical groups such as at home dialysis patients were relocated outside Canterbury where required.

Health coordinated response activity with a range of agencies including Civil Defence at all levels and New Zealand Defence Force.

### **Ex Tropical Cyclone Debbie (support agency)**

In April 2017 Tropical Cyclone Debbie resulted in flooding in the Bay of Plenty area, with Edgecumbe most seriously impacted. While this was a Civil Defence-led response, Health was a key supporting agency at the local and national level.

As this was a local emergency, Bay of Plenty DHB led the operational Health response. The DHB activated their operations centre at Tauranga Hospital, to ensure appropriate readiness activities were supported and response activity was coordinated and resourced appropriately. Areas requiring consideration for Health were broad, including: ensuring ongoing access to health services, maintaining supply chains, staff resourcing and messaging, patient transport (including Air Ambulance operations), impact of lifelines utilities disruption, potential cancellation of elective surgeries and potential evacuation of Age Residential Care Facilities.

Psychosocial response activities were also led by the DHB. Provision of public health advice and support to the multi-agency response (led and coordinated by the Whakatane District Council) was also a priority, in order to help prevent and manage health risks related to the flood event.

The Ministry of Health Regional Emergency Management Advisor (Midland) was embedded in the Civil Defence Emergency Operations Centre to support the local response efforts and undertake the role of Ministry of Health Liaison. This provided an important conduit to connect local and national level activities. The Ministry of Health maintained active monitoring of the situation and engaged fully with the National Security System activities for the duration of the event.



### **Kaikoura-Hurunui Earthquake response (support)**

The Ministry of Health Emergency Management Team felt, and responded to the Kaikoura Earthquake as soon as it occurred on Monday 00:04 14 November 2016. Initial information on the severity of the impact in Kaikoura was scarce, although early information was gathered from social media, predominantly twitter, and national radio. The South Island REMA initiated contact with the Duty Managers in Canterbury, Nelson Marlborough, Capital & Coast and Hutt Valley DHBs.

At approximately 0100 the Director Emergency Management travelled into the Central Business District to check on the status of the three Ministry buildings in order to inform our Business Continuity response. 133 Molesworth St showed no structural and very superficial cosmetic damage. Freyberg house occupied floors could not be accessed due to power outages. The Terrace could be accessed via level 2 but had sustained significant non-structural damage, in particular along the seismic gaps and was assessed as not suitable for staff to occupy at the time.

At approx. 0230 NCMC Operations contacted Health's Director of Emergency Management to inform him that they were activating the NCMC. Director EMT contacted the South Island REMA (and both met in the NCMC at approximately 0330. Decision made to activate the NHCC from 0600.

St John deployed a senior manager to establish the ambulance liaison role in the NCMC from 0700hrs.

In the morning the South Island REMA was able to hand over to the incoming NHCC liaison officer and then deploy to Kaikoura on the first NZDF NH-90.

The NHCC activated from 0600 Monday 14 November until Friday 2 December 2016. 42 staff operated across CIMS roles including liaison officer functions within the NCMC and the secondment of the Ministry of Health Director Emergency Management as Alternative National Controller for 10 nights. Approximately 12 staff from support functions such as Human Resources, Technology and Digital Services and Business Continuity Response Managers also undertook critical roles in enabling the response.

Health EMIS was used to log and record appointments within the CIMS Structure and the majority of shifts were successfully recorded. As a result, we know that over the three weeks the Ministry resourced approximately 230 shifts within the (Health) Incident Management Team including attendances at ODESC and Watch Group meetings. Over 1000 staff hours were recorded by 43 staff.

The NHCC supported a Canterbury DHB led response which included ongoing support to public health and Kaikoura Hospital services.

### **Hawkes Bay Gastroenteritis Outbreak August 2016 (support)**

In August 2016, Havelock North experienced a significant outbreak of gastroenteritis, associated with contamination of the local water supply. This event had a number of facets that were led by different agencies, requiring active coordination across agencies including: Hawkes Bay District Council (the drinking water supplier management of source of the contamination, lead on public communications), Hawkes Bay District Health Board (Health response), Civil Defence Emergency Management (Welfare) and Ministry of Primary Industries (food safety).

In terms of the Health sector, Hawke's Bay DHB activated their emergency operations centre to coordinate the local response. Response activity was significant and included implementation of public health measures, public information management, local liaison with other agencies, management of cases in the community and

hospital, and management of surge staffing requirements to maintain health and disability services across primary and tertiary care.

The DHB implemented a CIMS based incident management team, with appropriate clinical and technical leadership.

One of the challenges of the response was an incomplete activation of the CDEM elements of regional council and local council as it was seen to be an infrastructure and communications issue. It took some time for the Welfare Coordination function led by CDEM to be activated and engaged.

At the National level, the National Health Coordination Centre provided support to the local response as required, including:

- coordinating the movement of staff from other regions to provide Public Health and Public Information Management staff as surge support to the DHB and Public Health Unit.
- Collaboration with Hawkes Bay DHB to design and implement a household survey to gather population-based information on the scale of the outbreak and the effectiveness of public messaging.
- Providing guidance and expertise.

The NHCC also had active engagement with other agencies and the National Security System at the national level throughout the response.

### **Pandemic Influenza A H1N1 2009 (lead)**

In 2009, the Health and Disability Sector were required to respond to the emergence of a novel influenza strain Influenza A H1N1 09. While a pandemic was not officially declared by the World Health Organisation until June 2009, the Ministry of Health and Health and Disability Sector were actively managing the response from 25 April 2009, after notification of a group of suspected cases arriving in New Zealand.

The Health and Disability sector response to the A H1N1 09 pandemic was significant. At the national level, the National Health Coordination Centre (NHCC), operating on a CIMS based Incident Management Team was activated on 25 April and remained operational for approximately nine months, managing the leadership and coordination of the both the health and disability sector response and response activity across government. The NHCC was located in the Ministry of Health No 1 The Terrace office, manned by approximately 25 staff per day shift and 8 overnight (predominantly sourced from within the Ministry of Health). The New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Action Plan (NZIPAP) was implemented, which includes essential activities required by agencies at each stage of a pandemic and the key decisions required by Government. All agencies had some level of involvement, ranging from support to their own staff and sector (health and safety, business continuity) through to operational response requirements.

The NHCC actively provided leadership and coordination of activities across the health and disability sector. This was a complex, evolving response over an extended period where at any one time different regions were managing a different stage of the pandemic wave. Activities included increased Border activity, contact tracing, cluster control activities, continuing on to management of pandemic influenza in the community and the subsequent impact on primary care (i.e. general practice and community care services) and tertiary care (hospital services). The collection and analysis of international and local intelligence data was also key activity for the NHCC, as well as active and ongoing communications with media and public on how to keep themselves and others safe and what to do if unwell.

Locally, all District Health Boards activated their emergency operations centres. District Health Boards and Public Health Units all undertook local activities to operationally manage the impact of pandemic influenza in their community. This included: identification and management of suspect and confirmed cases (including

isolation and quarantine, contact tracing, assessment, monitoring and care in the community, and hospitalisation if required), public information management, intelligence collection and reporting and activities to preserve core health and disability services.

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**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Derek PHYN
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>NO</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) N/A
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):  Please see PDF attachment in this email.

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

MINISTERIAL REVIEW – BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCIES IN  
NEW ZEALAND

07/07/2017

PLEASE NOTE ANY VIEWS EXPRESSED BELOW ARE MY OWN PERSONAL VIEWS AND DO NOT  
NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF WAIKATO REGIONAL COUNCIL OR THE WAIKATO CDEM  
GROUP.

My name is Derek Phyn. I hold a Bsc(Hons) and PGDipArts(GIS). I am a Senior Spatial Analyst and have been employed by Waikato Regional Council since 2001. From 2012-2015 I was employed by the Waikato CDEM Group as Information Systems Coordinator. I have been involved in implementing desktop based GIS solutions for emergency management since 2007. From 2012-2015 I was primarily involved in the implementation of EMIS, including sitting on the EMIS National Governance Group and forming and sitting on the EMIS Technical Advisory Group. I led the development of information and warning system implementation strategies and plans for the Waikato CDEM Group and trialled several emergency information systems including EMIS, WebEOC and Veoci. Since 2015 my focus has shifted to implementing web-based GIS solutions for Emergency Management using ArcGIS Online. My interest in emergency management relates to the use of information systems. I have completed CIMS2, CIMS4, ITF Foundational and ITF Intermediate training. I have participated in Exercise Ruaumoko in the intelligence function operating GIS, in Exercise Tangaroa as the Intelligence Manager and many smaller exercises. I have been deployed to assist with the 2012 Tongariro Eruption (to test EMIS) and with WRC's 2016 Velvetleaf Response.

I wish to discuss five core problems with the current CDEM situation, as I see it.

- 1.) Local government is too poorly resourced, staff availability for training is too infrequent, and staff turn-over is too regular, for there to be sufficient skilled, experienced and confident responders available to operate within a local or regional coordination centre. A core NZ emergency response unit needs to be formed under the umbrella of a national agency, maybe NZDF or FENZ, that lives and breathes Coordination Centre Response (and therefore internal Readiness too). This team should be on call 24/7, available to be deployed anywhere in NZ (or even internationally) at short notice to operate coordination centres (CC) for up to two weeks after an incident (after which local resources should be more capable of responding or moving to recovery). When the team is not deployed, they are constantly training, exercising and liaising with key local stakeholders in readiness for the next deployment.
- 2.) In an age of social media and real-time information flow the Intelligence function is hopelessly out-paced and overwhelmed by the sheer speed and volume of information during a response or recovery. There has been a massive change in information management in the last 10 years. The traditional paper-based SitRep is pointless. Information systems have to be built and utilised to automatically consume, file, aggregate, analyse, summarise and report on the vast quantities of information that are now in-coming, and do so in real-time. The human brain simply no longer has the capacity to do this given the volumes and speed of information. There are tools that can do this already and these need to be built and tested in readiness. Given the Media's willingness to consume unverified information (and do that faster than CDEM can) there also needs to be consideration of how the CDEM sector can better consume and utilise unverified information from the public in real-time (i.e. crowd-sourcing). After all, 99.9999% of the time your first responders on location are actually the public being impacted by the incident.

- 3.) There is a legacy within the CDEM sector of individuals used to the traditional protocols and tools within a CC who will always find it difficult to adopt and use information systems. This is systemic and will only change with younger generations coming in to the sector. We need to find ways to encourage younger, digital savvy, generations into the CDEM sector.
- 4.) Information systems have huge potential to increase the effectiveness of all four R's but especially response and recovery. I believe there are two key benchmarks against which information systems should be measured to determine their effectiveness:
  - I. **Does it improve the efficiency of the response?** While the entering of data into an information system has many benefits for situational-awareness and information management, especially in later stages of a response or during recovery. In the early stages of a response the priority at the forefront of responders' minds will ALWAYS be "what is the fastest way to get this information processed". If using an information system means that functions will face delays in processing information and/or receiving intel, even if the longer terms benefits are great, then those responders will not use that system. This means that any information system used needs to be so simple and intuitive that little, if any, training is required for any non digital-savvy responder to be able to use it. Obviously it has to be reliable too.
  - II. **Does it provide real-time situational awareness?** This is information that can be easily viewed on a big-screen from across the operations room to provide a clear and simple common operational picture (think maps, dashboards, charts, diagrams, infographics) in real-time. Excel spreadsheets, databases, tables, lists and libraries is not situational awareness.
- 5.) I believe NZ's EMIS has failed to meet these two key benchmarks. So much focus has been on delivering an information system that does everything, that too much was developed and launched all at once. This has resulted in a system that is overly large, complex and unintuitive and is difficult to navigate. The training required to use it is unrealistic. One or two key processes should have been focussed on and launched to start with. This would have allowed more time for thorough business requirements analysis and development and would have made adoption and refinement more feasible. "Learn to walk before you run". The EMIS platform (MS Sharepoint) does not currently lend itself to providing front-end situational awareness, rather it seems to be a platform for storing back-end information. Further, support from the previous international vendors was poor to put it politely. I have heard that EMIS 3.0 is in the pipeline and under the wing of a local vendor now, but unless there is a significant change to push for this new product to meet the two benchmarks I have described above then the CDEM sector will continue to founder at the baseline of everything it does, and that is information and communication.

# SUBMISSION

TELEPHONE 0800 327 646 | WEBSITE [WWW.FEDFARM.ORG.NZ](http://WWW.FEDFARM.ORG.NZ)



To: DPMC  
Wellington

Submission on: **Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand**

From: Federated Farmers of New Zealand

Date: 7 July 2016

Contact: DAVID BURT  
SENIOR ADVISOR PRIMARY SECTOR

Federated Farmers of New Zealand  
PO Box 715, Wellington 6140

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**Federated Farmers of New Zealand wishes to be heard in support of this submission.**

## **SUBMISSION TO DPMC ON THE MINISTERIAL REVIEW: BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCIES IN NEW ZEALAND**

### **1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- 1.1 Federated Farmers welcomes the opportunity to submit on the terms of reference of the Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand.
- 1.2 Federated Farmers believes that New Zealand has a good response system and that measures taken during a response are key to successful emergency management and in general supports the proposed terms of reference as stated.
- 1.3 The challenges faced by rural communities during and following natural disasters are significantly different to those faced by urban communities. These differences are largely those associated with the dispersed and isolated nature of the rural population.
- 1.4 Experience with a number of emergencies over at least two decades has demonstrated that responses to these events have not adequately taken into account the particular or specific characteristics and needs of rural communities. In some cases, the civil defence response has been overly focused on the needs of urban communities with relatively little attention given to the needs of the rural hinterland.
- 1.5 Assistance for rural residents following natural disasters and during other emergency events has, in some circumstances, relied heavily on self-organised volunteers and organisations such as Federated Farmers to step up and fill the shortfall in the official response effort for the benefit of all farmers and rural residents.
- 1.6 Overall, Federated Farmers believes that the wording of three of the Outcomes need changing to deliver a fit for purpose emergency management system for all New Zealanders.
- 1.6 Federated Farmers is pleased that MCDEM have more recently indicated a willingness to work with key rural stakeholder representatives, to remedy shortfalls in the very important area of rural needs assessment.
- 1.7 The current system has some significant weaknesses that need to be addressed with respect to providing assistance to rural sector communities which, to date has not been particularly well served, on occasion by what is in reality an urban-centric emergency management system.
- 1.8 Federated Farmers is of the considered view that changes are required to the natural disasters response framework. Given the isolated nature of rural communities, we consider there is a need for an additional, rural specific response to be integrated with the existing CDEM response framework. Ideally this will foster and utilise the existing and proven capacity and capability of rural communities and their



representative organisations such as Federated Farmers, integrating these resources with the civil defence and emergency management processes.

- 1.9 It is important that this review thoroughly evaluates the effectiveness of past responses with respect to rural communities, particularly isolated rural residents, identifies gaps in those responses and seeks to identify how any gaps and/or inadequacies in the current response framework can be addressed efficiently and effectively.

These concerns are discussed below and we would be pleased to discuss the matters raised with you in more detail should you believe this is necessary. Please contact David Burt, Senior Advisor, Primary Sector [dburt@fedfarm.org.nz](mailto:dburt@fedfarm.org.nz) [DDI 027 448 9170] in the first instance.

## 2. FEDERATED FARMERS RECOMMENDATIONS

- 2.1 Federated Farmers recommends that the wording of some of the Outcomes be changed

2.1.1 Outcome 1 to read [changes in **bold**]: "The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations [**across both rural and urban communities**] taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death injury and property damage and the fast moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies"

2.1.2 Outcome 2 [changes in **bold**] to read: "NZ has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.

- The response system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of location and scale of the emergency [**and whether rural and/or urban areas are affected**].
- Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action.
- Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, and surveillance, interpretation [**and community knowledge**] are knitted into the fabric of a response
- Business continuity across the whole of government supports an effective response and prompt recovery"

2.1.3 Outcome 4 [changes in **bold**] to read: "The chain of command and control, co-ordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate

- There is clear operating model and chain of command, and control and co-ordination during response including the recognition of lead and support agencies.
- [**At all stages of a response, work closely with stakeholders fully utilising and coordinating available skills and knowledge as required at local, regional and national levels**]
- The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.
- All participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response or as the event unfolds"

- 2.2 In addition, Federated Farmers makes the following Recommendations:
- 2.2.1 With respect to Outcome 2, that the assumptions inherent in the goals in this area are fully tested in both urban and rural contexts to determine what is needed.
  - 2.2.2 Also for Outcome 2, that organisations, such as the Federation that are active in leading response work in rural areas are better supported to deliver this work.
  - 2.2.3 With respect to Outcome 3, that, in circumstances, where more than one agency could be the designated lead (eg MCDEM – urban - or MPI – rural – there is a need for a clearly understood and communicated process about how the lead role is determined.
  - 2.2.4 With respect to Outcome 4, that collateral is developed to help stakeholders understand where they fit within the response system and how this may change over the course of the response.
  - 2.2.5 Also with respect to Outcome 4, that either the needed flexibility can be found within the current structure or that additional roles are developed, articulated and accepted in future editions of key documents such as the Guide to the National civil defence Emergency Management Plan.

### 3. GENERAL COMMENTS

- 3.1 Federated Farmers welcomes the opportunity to submit on the Terms of Reference into the “Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand” [DPMC, 2 June 2017].
- 3.2 Federated Farmers notes that the scope of the New Zealand Emergency Management framework is wide with the hazards and risks to be managed including not only weather or climate related events but also animal and plant pests and diseases and other causes<sup>1</sup>. The challenge this presents is that, while a generic CMIS system is broadly used to manage all responses, different frameworks and tools are used for managing emergencies outside weather and climate related events. Biosecurity incursion processes for example, are led by the Ministry for Primary Industries and include Government Industry Agreement partners in preparedness and response decision-making. While, ideally, a single system could manage all emergencies in New Zealand, and there is scope to better integrate services, Federated Farmers believes that this would be an overly challenging goal to meet at this time. Accordingly, the comments on the matter at hand below will be directed to weather and climate related events.
- 3.3 With one caveat. Federated Farmers commends the intent, of the Ministerial Review, to ensure that “NZ’s emergency response framework is world-leading, fit-for-purpose

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<sup>1</sup> Section 2 “Hazards and Risks” in the Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Version 2.0, 2015,

and well placed to meet future challenges”<sup>2</sup> but notes that to achieve this will require substantial investment in people and other resources.

- 3.4 The constraint relates to the use of the term “world-leading” which, for reasons explained below, has the potential to impede the development of a fit-for purpose New Zealand emergency response system.
- 3.5 While there are systems available, such as the “Index for Risk Management – INFORM”<sup>3</sup> that use open-source methodology to provide high level information for quantitatively assessing crisis and disaster risk, the Federation believes that the situation in New Zealand relating to response in emergency management is sufficiently distinctive to merit a response system that is purpose built for New Zealand conditions.
- 3.6 In support of this, while there are a number of countries with very similar population densities and land masses/populations, including Finland, Norway and Uruguay, these countries have very different INFORM risk profiles with respect to “Hazards and Exposure”; comprising floods, cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis and droughts. With INFORM rankings on a 0 -10 (Very Low to Very High) scale, Uruguay (1.3), Finland (0.1) and Norway (0.2) are all very significantly less than New Zealand (5.2) in this area.
- 3.7 Looking further at the detail of the New Zealand [5.2] score, the INFORM component risk scores are 8.2 for earthquakes, 6.7 for tsunamis, 3.7 for floods, 2.8 for cyclones and 2.1 for droughts, all of which, with the exception of the flood hazard in Uruguay at 3.9, are higher than the risk attributes in the other countries we may be considered similar to.
- 3.8 The Federation also notes that while New Zealand is relatively small country, with only 4.69 million people (as at June 2016) living in a total land area of 268,000 km<sup>2</sup>, it also has a very low population density<sup>4</sup>. Further, with 73% (3.4 million people) of the population living in the 17 main urban areas (with populations of at least 30,000 and which in total comprise ~5,500 km<sup>2</sup>, the remaining 27% (1.3 million people) of New Zealanders are widely dispersed over the rural parts of New Zealand at an even lower overall population density of <7 people/km<sup>2</sup><sup>5</sup>
- 3.9 The Federation believes that this situation, with a significant part of the population being widely dispersed over rural areas, yet being equally exposed to significant natural hazards, is what makes the New Zealand response situation unique and therefore merits a purpose built and fit-for-purpose civil defence response system. These matters are discussed further below.

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<sup>2</sup> Ministerial Review: Terms of Reference, 3. Project Definition

<sup>3</sup> INFORM is a collaborative partnership of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the European Commission <http://www.inform.org>

<sup>4</sup> Ranking 202 out of 246 countries with a density of 18 people/km<sup>2</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Excluding 80,000km<sup>2</sup> of conservation estate land

#### 4 **SPECIFIC COMMENTS**

- 4.1 **OUTCOME 1:** “The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death injury and property damage and the fast moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies”
- 4.1.1 Federated Farmers believes that the wording of this Outcome should be changed [changes in **bold**] to read:” The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations [ **across both rural and urban communities**] taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death injury and property damage and the fast moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies”
- 4.1.2 Overall, the current New Zealand emergency management system is based on the “4R’s”<sup>6</sup> of which response is a key component. Response is particularly important as this is the operational area that provides help to New Zealanders in their ‘hour of need’ when emergency situations are unfolding in real time causing dislocation, destruction or devastation to communities.
- 4.1.3 Federated Farmers also notes that, although outside the “response” scope of the document under consideration, the scale, efficiency and effectiveness of response activities will also depend on prior reduction and readiness activities which provide the foundations and the core structure of the emergency management framework.
- 4.1.4 Federated Farmers agrees, in principle, with the second part of this outcome statement (the need to “take account of the need to prioritise preventing death injury and property damage and the fast moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies”<sup>7</sup>) and accepts that there may be a need to prioritise where resources are used and to what end during response situations.
- 4.1.5 Federated Farmers strongly commends the intent of the first part of the outcome (to produce a ‘fit-for-purpose’ emergency response system that aligns with stakeholder expectation) as this is not currently the situation for rural communities, a situation that Federated Farmers has first-hand experience of.
- 4.1.6 As New Zealand’s largest membership based primary sector organisation, the Federation has been working with farmers and their communities for over a hundred years. Like most New Zealanders, the organisation was deeply affected by the 2010/2011 Christchurch earthquakes and the Federation has welcomed the learnings from those tragedies about how New Zealand’s civil defence practices can be improved.
- 4.1.7 These learnings have been primarily focused on urban applications of the New Zealand civil defence system, though the Federation did submit on the Civil Defence Emergency Management Amendment Bill that looked at recovery from medium scale events and which impacted on rural communities<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> (Risk) Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery

<sup>7</sup> To the Government Administration Committee, 24 March 2016.

- 4.1.8 Urban New Zealand has high expectation of emergency services in general and this extends to responses during natural disasters, expectations that have generally been met recently. Where adverse events directly impact rural areas however, such as was the case in the Kaikoura earthquakes, the urban-centric response model saw rural New Zealanders short-changed by response efforts.
- 4.1.9 Rural communities operate in a constrained environment compared to their urban counterparts. They are much more geographically dispersed and are much more likely to suffer infrastructure and critical service failures during emergencies. In addition, they have less emergency management related resource, such as fire and police personnel and equipment to call upon.
- 4.1.10 Organisations, such as Federated Farmers and Rural Support Trusts have therefore acted to fill the gaps that are created and have repeatedly stepped up in both response and recovery situations, to help farmers and their communities in a variety of ways. In the Kaikoura earthquakes for example, Federated Farmers provided information on the location of people and helped determine their needs, which can differ significantly from people in urban areas, and helped to organise the distribution of resources to farmers and their families in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake at a time when emergency services were preoccupied with the affected towns.
- 4.1.11 This and other recent experiences have confirmed Federated Farmers view that there is quite some way to go before it can be said, with any confidence, that the emergency response system is fit-for-purpose in rural areas impacted by adverse events.
- 4.1.12 In addition, and outside the response work that Federated Farmers does with farmers and rural communities, the organisation also has a defined, support agency role in respect of the animal welfare sub-function that is led by the Ministry for Primary Industries.
- 4.1.13 While in theory, the current response system, is able to meet animal welfare related needs, in practice this is not the case. This issue is discussed below.
- 4.1.14 Federated Farmers agrees with Outcome 1; emphasising that a fit for purpose system is needed which meets the needs of all New Zealanders. Both urban and rural community stakeholder needs should be the drivers of all phases of the CDEM framework.

- 4.2 **OUTCOME 2:** “NZ has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.
- The response system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of location and scale of the emergency.
  - Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action.
  - Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, and surveillance and interpretation) are knitted into the fabric of a response.

- Business continuity across the whole of government supports an effective response and prompt recovery”
- 4.2.1 Federated Farmers believes that the Outcome wording should be changed [changes in **bold**] to read: “NZ has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.
- The response system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of location and scale of the emergency [**and whether rural and/or urban areas are affected**].
  - Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action.
  - Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, and surveillance, interpretation [**and community knowledge**] are knitted into the fabric of a response.
  - Business continuity across the whole of government supports an effective response and prompt recovery”
- 4.2.2 Federated Farmers supports these goals, though noting that the scope of the last point [“Business continuity ...”] is extended to include recovery [“...prompt recovery.”] in contrast to the remainder of the document which has a response focus. Recovery is not currently the major focus for MCDEM, meriting just 10 pages in the ~250 page “Guide to the National CDEM Plan 2015” document. Federated Farmers believes that many of the short-comings in the current response system may be mirrored in the recovery area.
- 4.2.3 Federated Farmers strongly supports the intent, as described in the first three bullet points, to effectively engage with a range of organisations, with the necessary skill sets to ensure that the response system has the appropriate level of capability and capability.
- 4.2.4 As Federated Farmers can attest to this is not the default situation currently, with the problem due, in part to the constraints imposed by the response system. This is based on the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System [“CIMS”] that “establishes a set of consistent principles, structures, functions, processes and terminology that agencies can apply in an emergency response”.<sup>8</sup>
- 4.2.5 The strengths of the system are that it provides a common, i.e. shared, modular framework that is both scalable and flexible for agencies involved in response activities to use. It appears designed to be best suited for urban events and implementation by highly structured organisations such as the Fire Service and the Police. Outside such environments however, both scalability and flexibility also limit the extent to which CIMS structure can usefully be developed and this constraint can prove limiting under some circumstances.
- 4.2.6 This is the case currently in responses directly involve rural communities because the reality is that the CIMS system is both modular and ‘command and control’ based,

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<sup>8</sup> Foreword in “The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition April 2014 [ISBN 978-0-478-43500-9]

neither of which is best suited to an untrained and resource constrained local rural response environment.

- 4.2.7 The situation is exacerbated by the fact that many of the people working to help their communities in a response are volunteers and the necessary interface between paid and volunteer labour is neither well defined nor resourced.
- 4.2.8 In practice, the fact that rural based organisations that are active in response situations achieve a lot is due to their extreme willingness to do the right thing by their community, even at times, at significant personal, business or organisational cost, rather than the support or resources that the CIMS system might provide.
- 4.2.9 More critically still, in the rural response environment, there is a disconnect between mandated responsibilities and the ability of the responsible organisations - the Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) and the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) - to resource the necessary work.
- 4.2.10 In the past this situation has seen organisations such as Federated Farmers working with other rural groups to provide the expertise necessary to support rural communities during responses, but without any defined role, or recognition, in the CDEM system.
- 4.2.11 It is however pleasing to note the willingness of MCDEM to recently recognise the shortfall in important areas as rural needs assessments and be open to working with Federated Farmers, Rural Support Trusts (RST's) and MPI to improve this.
- 4.2.12 Federated Farmers has been and remains very active in the area of rural response and the organisation is investing heavily in developing both its capacity and its capability to lead around rural adverse events – in such areas as the provision information about rural families and their needs – in future.
- 4.2.13 For it to best help both rural communities and response efforts however, Federated Farmers and other organisations will either need to be assigned roles within the CDEM structure (for example an information provider) or the system will need to become less formal and more flexible around utilising stakeholders' knowledge and capability during responses.
- 4.2.14 The ability of the animal welfare sub-function to meet its responsibilities also needs to be developed as the current ability to do this is very much constrained by a lack of resource at both regional and local level.
- 4.2.15 Because the issues of response capability and capacity are so critical to effective response delivery, **Federated Farmers recommends** that the assumptions inherent in the goals in this area are fully tested in both urban and rural contexts to determine what is needed.
- 4.2.16 **Federated Farmers further recommends** that organisations, such as the Federation that are active in leading response work in rural areas are better supported to deliver this work.

4.3 **OUTCOME 3:** “Clear definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency

- A single lead role across any geographical area affected by natural disaster.
- The purpose and consequences of states of emergency
- Appropriate interventions and escalations are available”

4.3.1 As with the other goals, the Federation is supportive of these objectives.

4.3.2 With CIMS being a scalable and modular framework, the management of the response function is critical, to ensure that the appropriate resources are provided that will deliver the appropriate outcome and this may include, on occasion intervention by the Director Civil Defence Emergency management.

4.3.3 It may be that a decision-tree or similar tool may provide the necessary utility.

4.3.4 The need for a “single lead role” is not disputed but their needs to be a clearly understood process about how this is arrived at.

4.3.5 The critical factor in responses is the magnitude/severity of the event and geographical scale which will determine the area(s) impacted. The situation is compounded when both urban and rural areas are affected, as was the case in the 2016 Kaikoura earthquakes

4.3.6 **The Federation recommends** that circumstances, where more than one agency could be the designated lead (eg MCDEM – urban - or MPI – rural – there is a need for a clearly understood and communicated process about how the lead role is determined.

4.4 **OUTCOME 4:** “The chain of command and control, co-ordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate

- There is clear operating model and chain of command, and control and co-ordination during response including the recognition of lead and support agencies
- The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.
- All participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response or as the event unfolds”

4.4.1 The Federation believes that the Outcome wording should be changed to read:” The chain of command and control, co-ordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate

- There is clear operating model and chain of command, and control and co-ordination during response including the recognition of lead and support agencies.



- **[At all stages of a response, work closely with stakeholders, fully utilising and co-ordinating available skills and knowledge as required at and knowledge at local, regional and national levels]**
- The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.
- All participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response or as the event unfolds”

4.4.2 The Federation agrees with these goals also though there remains work to be done to get to this state, especially at the regional/local level. The Federation’s experience, in terms of dealing with both rural sector needs (in the Kaikoura earthquakes) and the animal welfare, welfare sub-function (during the Christchurch fires) is that the reality of how the CDEM structure operates does not always match the theory.

4.4.3 In the former, the important role performed by the Federation around providing key information about the location and the needs of rural properties and people was not always recognised as being valid until it was vouched for by a recognised agency (in this case MPI) and in the latter, an animal welfare related matter was unable to be dealt with through the formal structure but was successfully managed via another channel.

4.4.4 The timely availability and utilisation of information, by people who have sufficient knowledge, experience and “band-width” to deal with it, is key to effective decision-making during a response. Key designated support agencies, such Federated Farmers need to be better recognised within the CDEM system but the system also needs retain adequate flexibility to operate within a range of environments.

4.4.5 Federated Farmers would be keen to engage, with the appropriate authorities, to explore how our strengths can best be used in not only response situations, but also potentially readiness and recovery situations.

4.4.6 More generally, response operations are fluid with organisation’s or groups of organisations entering and leaving the process on an as needed basis. It is the Federation’s view that the response process would benefit from a better understanding, by stakeholders about their respective roles and how they fit into the response picture.

4.4.7 **Federated Farmers recommends** that collateral is developed to help stakeholders understand where they fit within the response system and how this may change over the course of the response.

4.4.8 **Federated Farmers also recommends** that either the needed flexibility can be found within the current structure or that additional roles are developed, articulated and accepted in future editions of key documents such as the Guide to the National civil defence Emergency Management Plan.

4.5 **OUTCOME 5:** “Information flows into, across and out of the emergency management response system effectively; allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies, officials, stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies.

- Recognition of the modern news cycle – immediacy of social media and power of factual decisive information delivered as speedily as possible.
- Stakeholder needs are understood (what information is required; where and how to get the information, providing it at the right time and in the right format).
- Official information maintains pace with media dialogue and social media activity”

4.5.1 The Federation recognises that the receipt and dissemination of information in a timely manner is important during a response for all stakeholders and that the management of social media channels can be a challenging process given the immediacy of the channel, its increasing uptake and the availability of the necessary technology (ie a mobile phone).

4.5.2 The Federation notes that many stakeholders have the legitimate needs of their own constituencies to manage but believes that any potential conflicts around information use can be adequately managed

## 5. ABOUT FEDERATED FARMERS

5.1 Federated Farmers of New Zealand is a primary sector organisation that represents farming and other rural businesses. Federated Farmers has a long and proud history of representing the needs and interests of New Zealand farmers.

5.2 The Federation aims to add value to its members’ farming business. Our key strategic outcomes include the need for New Zealand to provide an economic and social environment within which:

- Our members may operate their business in a fair and flexible commercial environment;
- Our members' families and their staff have access to services essential to the needs of the rural community; and
- Our members adopt responsible management and environmental practices.



Friday, 7 July 2017

by email

DPMC Ministerial Review  
[bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Tēnā koe

## **SUBMISSION - Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergences in New Zealand**

We wish to be heard on this submission.

This submission is made by Toi Moana | Bay of Plenty Regional Council, to inform the national Technical Advisory Group looking at better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. It is specifically focussed to reflect feedback received from hapū / iwi Māori in our region, and our shared experience working together in this space. It is structured around this experience and key observations from that interface. A separate submission on broader technical issues has been made by our Council.

The Bay of Plenty is home to more than 36 iwi, 260 hapū and over 220 Marae. Iwi-Māori and marae across our region play an integral role in supporting communities during and after emergencies and natural disasters. Key regional events where iwi-Māori have had significant involvement include: Edgcumbe earthquake, several medium scale flooding events, the Matatā debris flow, and most recently the Whakatāne floods of April 2017.

The role undertaken by Marae and iwi-Māori during the Whakatāne Floods is further detailed in *Appendix 1* and should be read in conjunction with this submission. The response to that event provides the setting for matters outlined in this submission.

### **1.1 Role of Iwi Maori**

The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the 'Act') makes no specific provision regarding the role (potential or otherwise) that iwi-Māori play in supporting communities during and after emergencies and natural disasters. Such matters are instead determined independently by local level authorities. Whilst there is practical merit in a localised approach to doing so, there is little within the CDEM legislative framework to ensure that role is appropriately recognised and supported by local authorities.

Similarly the Local Government Act 2002 includes an overarching provision that local authorities must foster the capacity of Māori to contribute to decision making, however, the practical implementation of this provision across the multitude of local level functions, is variable. We consider greater value to be had by broad based principles being specifically included in the Act, to better encourage recognition and provision for iwi-Māori contribution to civil defence and emergency management.

The frontline contribution of iwi-Māori is an integral part of emergency management. However iwi-Māori have expressed a clear desire that their participation in civil defence operations should be considered across all levels and invited at the outset of an emergency. While existing provisions within the Act may arguably be used to enhance iwi-Māori involvement in upper level CDEM structures ie. as a co-opted member to Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (s20), the underlying intent of such provisions appears contemplated towards emergency response agencies. We support further analysis as to the *practical* application of existing provisions to provide for iwi-Māori involvement across CDEM structures.

We support the point made by the Emergency Management Bay of Plenty in its submission, that acknowledgment and inclusion of iwi in emergency management is an important aspect that needs further development. Iwi in particular have shown that they will stand up and respond for their community and the structure needs to be able to support this.

In considering the role of iwi-Māori in emergency management, the multifaceted nature of Māori organisations should not be overlooked, as many offer a wealth of local knowledge, social networks and professional expertise i.e. as accredited social and health providers. Iwi Authorities have the ability to operationalise associated iwi service providers and are well placed to identify key contacts for marae, hapū and iwi representatives where a timely and direct response is required. Consolidating these functions through the development of tribal emergency response plans is an initiative that many iwi are keen to progress. We support a nationally led initiative to encourage and support this.

The participation of iwi-Māori must be appropriately supported through training and resourcing, as an integral part of effective emergency management planning. In addition to local level funding, we support central government initiatives such as Marae Ora Funding that will enable Marae to be better equipped for future emergency events. We also support a targeted programme to facilitate iwi-Māori understanding of the CDEM framework and enhance their capacity within this space.

## 1.2 Role clarity and engagement with Māori organisations

By nature, emergency management often involves a large number of central and local government participants, in addition to local voluntary and support agencies. Confusion as to the involvement of different agencies and the potential 'blurring of lines' around respective roles can become a cause for frustration and inhibit effectiveness. Ensuring a clear understating of an organisations role and mandate is integral to the smooth operation of a collective response to emergency management.

While the use of central government agencies to assist with engaging Māori organisations may be useful under normal circumstances, the delays with this approach in a civil emergency, can become time-consuming and unhelpful. There is greater value in response agencies working to develop relationships with key Māori organisations in advance, as an integral part of emergency management planning and preparation.

It is also important to recognise that Māori alone carry the mandate to determine the nature and extent of the role they may wish to play in response management. We support and encourage a nationally led approach to develop and enhance the relationship between CDEM response agencies (nationally and locally) and iwi-Māori. We also encourage a nationally led initiative to support the development of locally led protocols for iwi participation in emergency management.

Yours sincerely



Fiona McTavish  
**General Manager Strategy**

# Appendix 1



**Report To:** Komiti Māori  
**Meeting Date:** 20 June 2017  
**Report From:** Kataraina O'Brien, Strategic Engagement Manager

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## Marae and Iwi-Māori Support: Recent Flood Events

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### Executive Summary

Iwi-Māori and marae across the region have continued to play an integral role in supporting communities during and after emergencies and natural disasters.

Marae offer warm, safe accommodation, ablutions, communal cooking and dining facilities, and a venue to discuss important kaupapa. They can also transform into operational hubs for emergencies. Marae differ from mainstream emergency and welfare centres as they come with a unique cultural dimension based on Te Ao, Tikanga and Te Reo Māori.

Rautahi Community Marae in Kawerau was one of the few marae deemed as an Official Welfare Centre following the recent flooding event in April 2017. Many other marae self-activated and opened their doors to support individuals and whānau.

Iwi-Maori were key contributors in the recent flood events and provided support, advice and on the ground services, some of which are still continuing.

This report highlights the role that some marae and Iwi-Maori played following the April flood event with a particular focus on the support provided for te waipuke o Patutātahi (the Edgumbe flood).

Iwi-Māori have been invited to attend this meeting, including Ngāti Awa Social and Health Service staff who will be providing a short presentation.

### Recommendations

That the Komiti Māori under its delegated authority:

1. Receives the report, Marae and Iwi-Māori Support : Recent Flood Events;
2. Endorses a submission on behalf of Komiti Maori to the Civil Defence Regional Plan review. Submission points and/or feedback are to reflect Iwi-Māori perspectives. This may be prepared by the Māori Policy team.

### 1 Background

On 6 April 2017 a breach of the Rangitāiki River stop bank at Edgumbe resulted in the declaration of a State of Emergency in the Whakatāne District and an order to evacuate the

town. That evacuation affected some 580 households and a population of approximately 1600 people.

This weather event caused major flooding, slips and multiple road closures all the way up the valley to Ruatāhuna, down to Rotoiti, as far east to Ōpōtiki and as far west as Pāpāmoa. Access in and out of the Tāneatua town was restricted due to the rising water, which also affected the Waimana side of Tāneatua. Road closures were also in place heading into Murupara and up to Ruatāhuna due to major slips.

The arrival of Cyclone Cook resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency on 11 April. The region was already dealing with the effects of ex-Cyclone Debbie.

Emergency Civil Defence Centres were set up in Whakatāne (War Memorial Hall) and Rautahi Community Marae, Kawerau (Firman Lodge for one day and then to the Rautahi Community Marae) to accommodate displaced residents from Edgecumbe and around the Rangitāiki plains. Other Marae opened their doors and/or offered their Marae as potential evacuation and welfare centres should the need be imminent.

The Marae functioned in multiple ways providing:

- Accommodation, meals and washing facilities.
- Repositories for koha and donated goods.
- Health and medical support.
- Volunteer coordination.
- Security (via Māori Wardens).
- Kaumatua and cultural advice.
- Counselling support.
- Agency support stands.
- Youth/rangitahi mentors.
- manaakitanga to anyone who arrived and needed help, advice or company.

## 2 Marae Support

There were approximately ten marae that opened their doors during Cyclone Debbie and Cyclone Cook offering accommodation, food, support etc. Appendix 1 contains more information on the support from local marae.

### 2.1 Rautahi Community Marae

On 7 April 2017 Rautahi Community Marae in Kawerau was officially activated as a Welfare Centre by Civil Defence. The marae functioned in this capacity for 11 days supporting flood victims who were predominantly from Edgecumbe.



Rautahi was regarded as a “One Stop Shop”. People could turn up to a warm welcome; have a meal, sign up for emergency benefit support and leave with clothing and food parcels.

*Photo 1: BOP Regional Council working at Rautahi marae - from left; Sandy Hohepa, Lisa Tauroa and Jane Waldon.*

Approximately 30 different agencies were available on a rostered system for 11 Days (from 8am – 5pm) at Rautahi Marae ranging from Work and Income NZ, to Housing NZ, Te Puni Kokiri, Ministry of Health, Red Cross, and the District Health Board. Providing access to these services was crucial.

The team that lead, ran and facilitated operations at Rautahi consisted of staff and volunteers from the Bay of Plenty Regional Council, Whakatāne District Council, Kawerau District Council, Te Puni Kokiri, local tangata whenua, volunteers groups and individuals and Māori wardens. There were over 600 people who registered at Rautahi including 256 whānau registrations.




**Photo 2:**  
**Whānau gathered for a community hui at Rautahi marae**

Koha and donations arrived daily from locals and non-locals alike. Some expressions of koha included:

- Adventist Disaster Relief Agency from Auckland delivered a truck load of new clothing donated by Farmers and The Warehouse;
- Regular packages of kai from New World and Pak n Save.
- Fresh fruit, vegetables, baking and meat from local individuals and businesses.
- Locals from around the Kawerau District came to bring fresh fruit and vegetable, baking, clothing, blankets, pet food, shoes etc;
- A Linfox truck arrived with five pallets of goods from the local Kawerau Mill Ascaleo which included toilet paper, treasures, tissues, hand towels etc;

The infographics below give some details around statistics within the Rautahi.



## 2.2 Ruaihona Marae (Te Teko)

Ruaihona Marae in Te Teko became a central volunteer clean up hub. In collaboration with Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa (TRONA) and its hapū, the Bay of Plenty Regional Council and the Whakatāne District Council, the Ngāti Awa Voluntary Army (NAVA) was launched into action. Ruaihona catered for several hundred people over several weeks providing breakfast, lunch and dinner for the volunteer workers, hapū members and council and agency staff. NAVA assisted with cleaning up houses and properties of debris, ruined goods and furniture. Providing free manpower helped alleviate the stress that many Edgumbe residents were under. There were more than 1190 people who registered for the clean-up and nearly 5800 hours. Some came from afar including Germany and Czech Republic.



*Photo 3: 21 April 2017, Poroporoaki at Ruaihona Marae, Te Teko*

## 2.3 Kōkōhinau Marae (Te Teko)

Howard Morrison Jnr and Russell Harrison put a call out to all hunters from around the Bay of Plenty to donate their kills and qualified butchers for the Edgumbe whānau. On the 12 April they arrived with nearly 50 donated pig, deer, lamb and beef. To greet them on their arrival were local butchers from Te Teko, whānau members who were butchers. The Kawerau Mayor arrived with many of his own butchers from his local store. Meat and vegetable parcels were prepared at the Marae and distributed to evacuees, whānau who were looking after whānau members, Welfare Centres and other Marae around the district.



*Photo 4: Volunteer butchers at Kōkōhinau Marae*

## 2.1 Te Hokowhitu Marae (Whakatāne)

This Marae opened their doors to support the evacuees throughout the Eastern Bay of Plenty and as a drop off location for second hand clothing and other goods. The marae is still catering for displaced whānau.

## 2.2 Toroa Marae (Paroa)

Toroa Marae temporarily accommodated whānau who had flood damaged housing.



### 2.3 Rangatahi Marae (Murupara)

This Marae opened their doors to support the evacuees from Murupara and Galatea eastern Bay, providing shelter, clothing, food and information.

### 2.4 Marae as Evacuation Centres

Many marae put their hands up to be official evacuation including Rangitihi, Taiwhakaea, Hokowhitu and Rangataua Marae Te Puni Kokiri.

There was and continues to be a lot of positive feedback about the role of marae as 'manaakitanga' hubs.

Many marae can mobilise within a minimum of two hours. Marae generally come with a core workforce and a number of extended volunteers. Marae that self-activated received a basic level of financial and resources support from Civil Defence. However, greater support was provided for Rautahi Community Marae due to it being an official evacuation centre.

The poroporoaki held to close Rautahi Marae as an evacuation centre was a sensitive affair. The Marae brought people together, strengthened relationships and gave hope to the community. This made winding down and closing the Marae quite emotional for some, and if not all. Te Puni Kokiri assisted in this process.

## 3 Role of Iwi-Maori

The Civil Defence Act has no legislative provision for Iwi. Iwi-Māori staff played an important role in supporting the community and providing an important conduit on the ground.

Ngāti Awa representatives provided the support in the following ways:

- Iwi Liaison in the EOC or GECC.
- Conduit for communications with Marae and tangata whenua.
- Ngāti Awa Voluntary Army.
- Ngāti Awa Health and Social Services.
- Māori nurses and medical professionals.
- Social media communications out to iwi.
- Kaumatua and cultural advice.
- Check point officials and escorts.
- Financial relief funding (Ngāti Awa relief fund, Pūtauaki Trust, Omataroa No 2 Trust and Māori Investments Ltd).
- Temporary accommodation; Te Pahipoto hapu is currently in discussions with the Crown about funding for Papakāinga housing on marae land at Kōkōhinau Marae.

Some key points that have been noted by Iwi:

- Iwi-Māori, regardless of whether legislated or not, should be invited at the outset of an emergency into the CD operations structure at all levels.
- The use of non-local volunteers created issues on the ground. There was a lack of understanding of Māori culture such as concepts of 'whakamaa', difficulty in pronouncing Māori words, names and street names. Some people were turned away by non-locals because of such mis-understandings.
- CD training should be extended to community groups, hapū and marae free of charge.

- Communications from the EOC to the welfare centres, hubs and Marae were slow, inconsistent and at times inaccurate.
- Iwi are keen to develop tribal emergency response plans.
- Need to clarify the role of Te Puni Kokiri, Māori staff and Iwi-Māori.
- Marae preparedness planning should be appropriately resourced.
- Council staff undertaking iwi liaison must be connected to the iwi, have relationships or key networks.
- The Regional Civil Defence Plan being revised should recognise and provide for Iwi-Maori in a substantial manner.

### 3.1 Ngāti Awa Social and Health Services

At a Te Rūnanga of Ngāti Awa meeting held on 9 April, Ngāti Awa Social and Health Service (NASH) staff expressed their concern at being overlooked within the EOC. In their capacity as a social health service, their skills and experience were potentially invaluable. The following day, a group of NASH staff immediately went into action ensuring a presence.

Representatives from NASH will be in attendance at this hui and will provide a brief presentation.

### 3.2 Te Teko Community Hall

The Te Teko Community Hall also opened their doors to receive donations from the community.

The Te Teko Community Hall continued to operate and did limit their goods to food, clothing, linen and small household items.

Due to the generosity of the people giving clothing, the group decided to ask that donations of clothing stop until further notice.

This photo gives you an indication of amount of donations were received and how organised they look.



*Photo 5: Te Teko Community Hall volunteer Cilla Morrison*

### 3.3 Māori Wardens

The Māori Wardens were instrumental in supporting this event. They were operational at Firman Lodge in Kawerau around 3pm the day of the flood.

The Māori Wardens supported the Red Cross with a night shift to ensure that if evacuees were looking for a safe place to put their head, that there was someone available on their arrival. With them on alert, it came apparent that no one turned up during the night.

Key support provided:

- Directing traffic, directing manuhiri and point of call for donations.
- Security of facilities.
- Contributing to the Welfare Briefings twice daily on Māori Wardens activities.



*Photo 6: Māori Wardens taking a break Rautahi Marae*

- Supporting our volunteers with carting food parcels.
- Meet and greet our manuhiri on arrival of the Marae.
- Manaakitanga ki ngā manuhiri.

Overall the Māori Wardens made all our manuhiri, community members and volunteers that came to the Marae feel safe and welcoming.

## 4 Implications for Māori

There are 36 Iwi, 260 Hapū and over 220 Marae across the Bay of Plenty region. Māori are key economic players, land owners, ratepayers and Treaty partners.

Councils have responsibility through key legislation to provide for Māori. Treaty settlements accord Māori a legislative status greater than that of the general public. The Local Government Act requires councils to foster the capacity of Māori to contribute to decision making and to ensure they have adequate processes to do so. Mātauranga Māori and kaitiakitanga must be respected and can inform decision making.

There is opportunity to express iwi-Māori perspectives when the Regional Civil Defence Plan review is notified.

Marae expenditure relies on donations, fund-raising and koha. They are costly to maintain and run, but are essential to the cultural fabric of our region. The marae and the hau kainga, including kaumatua, kuia and kaimahi essentially volunteer their time and services to ensure that Tikanga Maori is upheld. Council funding for Marae is limited.

The Government has recently announced its intention to establish a Marae Ora Funding initiative through the Minister for Māori Development. This funding will enable Marae to be better equipped for future emergency events. The Chair of Komiti Māori provided a submission in support of this proposal (refer appendix 2).

A letter of thanks was sent to the Māori wardens and to the respective marae Chairs to acknowledge their support to the community (refer appendix 3, 4).

## 5 Financial Implications

### Current Budget Implications

Funding for marae during civil defence emergencies and marae preparedness training is undertaken within the current budget for the Civil Defence Emergency Management Activity. The Bay of Plenty Regional Council, Whakatane District Council and Kawerau District Council collectively provided financial and support 'in-kind'.

Māori Policy support is absorbed through the existing Māori engagement budget.

### Future Budget Implications

There are no known future financial implications.

## 6 Council's Accountability Framework

### 6.1 Community Outcomes & Long Term Plan Alignment

This kaupapa contributes to Resilience & Safety and Regional Collaboration & Leadership within our Community Outcome/s in the council's Long Term Plan 2015-2025.



*Photo 7: Poroporoaki for Rautahi Marae, 14 April 2017*

Sandy Hohepa  
Maori Policy Advisor  
for Strategic Engagement Manager

13 June 2017

Released by the Minister of Crown Defence

Clinton Naude

s9(2)(a)

7 July 2017

Roger Sowry  
Chair, Technical Advisory Group  
Ministerial Review  
Via email  
[bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

### **Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand**

This is a personal submission and the views and recommendations expressed here are my own and do not reflect the views of my employer.

#### **Introduction**

I am a serving emergency management professional within the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) sector. Highlights of my emergency management experience and roles are summarised as follows;

- Current CDEM Group Manager
- Appointed CDEM Group Controller
- Accredited by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM) as a CDEM Controller
- 30 years of emergency management experience across the fields of policing, CDEM and maritime oil spill.
- Have been involved in numerous responses at various levels including responses to the Christchurch earthquakes 2010 & 2011, the RENA Maritime disaster 2011, Kaikoura earthquake 2016 and Edgecumbe flood 2017.
- Member of the Maritime New Zealand National Response team.
- Certified Emergency Manager with the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM)
- IAEM National Representative for New Zealand

I wish to stress that while the terms of reference focus on the Response phase of emergency management, I believe that the critical phase is in fact the Readiness phase. All the key activities related to planning, training, exercising, resource and equipment allocations, and relationship building happen in the readiness phase. The Response phase is the "final exam" which ultimately determines how well the Readiness phase was managed.

### **Key recommendations:**

1. Develop legislation that is directive and clearly sets out roles and responsibilities for all agencies. This includes providing clear role clarification of Regional Councils and City/District Councils.
2. Mandate that response is led by a professional emergency management agency. While it may be considered a role for New Zealand Police or Fire & Emergency New Zealand, I believe that it should be mandated to a national emergency management agency which incorporates the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management with regional and local structure.
3. Implement and mandate a single nationally consistent cloud based emergency management information system to provide for the sharing of information, intelligence gathering, maintaining situational awareness, ensuring a common operating picture and reporting.
4. Clarify the declaration process to ensure that when a declaration is made that it is clear as to the lead agency is for that type of event.
5. Establish nationally consistent standards for training and training delivery aligned to the key emergency management roles and functions.
6. Ensure a nationally recognised certification process aligned to the key emergency management roles and functions leading to a national database of qualified and registered emergency management staff.
7. Establish a national framework for volunteers in emergency management which sets out roles, functions, training pathways, certification criteria and deployment protocols. Volunteers must be supported by a nationally consistent professional emergency management sector.
8. Establish a national response capability based on the recommendations of the *Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake*. This response capability to incorporate regional capability.
9. Ensure a nationally consistent capability of public information managers skilled and experienced in emergency communications.
10. Implement a nationally consistent suite of public alerting systems. These systems must ensure that no matter where you are in New Zealand that the alerts and warnings will be commonly understood.

### **Current Challenges:**

I have heard many views related to the current response structure of which the most common is that the system is not broken and just needs enhancement. I hold the view that the system is broken and is in fact held together through the efforts and commitment of the people involved across all sectors of community, iwi, councils, private sector and government.

In my experience some of the key challenges are summarised as follows;

- **Legislation**

- the current legislation is enabling rather than directive. Use of terms such as “may”, “recommended”, “guideline” only serve to create the view that emergency management activities are optional as opposed to required.
- when a lead agency other than CDEM requires a declaration for an event there is confusion as to whether said agency remains lead agency or whether CDEM becomes lead agency by virtue of the declaration being under the CDEM Act.
- The legislation places most emphasis on the concept of CDEM Groups being responsible for CDEM with no clear roles & responsibilities for the members of the CDEM Groups. Specifically there is no clear mandate of the roles of the Regional Councils and the roles of the City/District Councils. This leads to endless debates amongst members of the CDEM Group on roles & responsibilities.

- CDEM Controllers are appointed by CDEM Groups for specific local authority areas or CDEM Group areas. This creates a challenge when deploying Controllers from one jurisdiction to another as they are not appointed to that area and therefore may not be legally empowered to exercise the powers under the CDEM Act for that jurisdiction.
- **Command & Control**
  - CDEM Controllers are appointed under the CDEM Act yet there is no specific requirements mandated as to who should be in the role. Controller appointments are varied across the country with most controllers being appointed from within council structures. These appointments can vary in seniority within councils and may include external contractors being appointed to do these roles.
  - CDEM Controllers appointed generally have the function as an additional requirement to their business as usual role without any recognition for the commitment required to upskill, train, exercise and develop in the role.
  - The line of command between National, Group and Local Controllers is unclear. The CDEM Act provides some vague reference that Local Controllers must follow the direction of the Group Controller in an emergency. There is no clear command line in readiness and again waiting for an emergency to be able to exercise command is too little too late.
  - The role of the Director of the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management is recognised in the CDEM Act however there is no recognition of the roles and responsibilities of the respective CDEM Group Managers. No clear command line in the business as usual structure for CDEM.
  - Controllers appointed from lower seniority positions within councils may often face a conflict of interest when confronted with senior council managers, Chief Executives or elected officials wanting to direct operations or decisions.
- **Volunteers**
  - There is no clear structure or framework for CDEM volunteers. While there is some guidance on coordinating volunteers there is no nationally consistent framework which directs roles, functions, training pathways and deployment protocols. This is an area I believe is vastly underutilised and generally because there is no structure in place.
  - The lack of a nationally consistent volunteer structure became abundantly clear in my dealings with managing the volunteer training fund allocated by the Tertiary Education Commission to the Emergency Management Adult Continuing Education. Serving on the Governance Group for this fund demonstrated to me the lack of national structure and the totally fragmented approach to CDEM volunteers across the country.
  - To establish and maintain a skilled and capable volunteer service requires dedicated professional emergency management resource. Unfortunately this is non-existent as the current practice sees an ad hoc approach to CDEM volunteer management in business as usual and an attitude of we will manage them in a response if we need to.
- **Information Management**
  - A challenge in every event is the sharing of information, maintaining situational awareness, establishing a common operating picture and providing the required reporting. Every post event debrief will highlight this aspect as a challenge.
  - There is still no mandated emergency management information system for multi-agency responses. While MCDEM has been working to provide EMIS as a solution, the current approach is that the system is available for use with no requirement that it must be used. This optional approach means that many councils and agencies elect to remain with their own existing systems which do not allow for sharing to occur. It also means that often there is no commitment in terms of resource and time to implement, maintain, train and exercise the system.

- **Response Capability**
  - There is neither a CDEM “army” nor even a “territorial army”. Responses requiring surge capacity generally rely on the relationships established prior the event by emergency managers. Even then it requires an approach of “are you available to assist”. When capability is exceeded in any jurisdiction the current system requires that requests for assistance are escalated to the next level who in turn seek to “ask” for assistance. There is no quick, professional response capability.
- **Public Information Management**
  - The fast paced and instantaneous communications environment in which we find ourselves especially with social media means that we are always going to be challenged to be ahead of the game. CDEM is not a 24/7 service and will always lag behind in terms of mobilising and responding. The challenge is that the CDEM public information management structure relies on council communication staff who while attempting to deliver the best they can during a response are not skilled or experienced in this field.
- **Public Alerting**
  - Public alerting in New Zealand is a major concern. There is no nationally consistent approach to public alerting. The CDEM Act and MCDEM default to public alerting being the responsibility of CDEM Groups which results in 16 different approaches. In turn individual Territorial Authorities will implement their own systems further confusing what system is used where and how. This is specifically evident in the use of fixed external sirens which result in ad hoc systems across various communities with no agreed protocols for activation.

### **Conclusion**

Thank you for consideration of my submission and I am happy to meet with the Review Committee should further discussion be of benefit.

Regards



Clinton Naude CEM®





▶ **Submission to Civil Defence and Emergency Management**

**Submitted via email, 07/07/17**

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▶ **Contact Details**

This submission is by a group

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Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## ► **Background**

### **Volunteering New Zealand**

Volunteering New Zealand is the “voice of volunteering” in Aotearoa. Our vision is for a New Zealand that promotes, values and supports effective volunteering for the benefit of individuals and communities – and our mission is to promote, support and advocate for volunteering.

We are the only national organisation in New Zealand that focuses purely on volunteering. We hold the ‘big picture’ and are in a position to liaise, work with, and advise volunteers, government and business sectors. This helps ensure that volunteering occurs within a positive environment where it is encouraged and fostered.

Over the past 16 years, VNZ has raised the profile of volunteer groups, activities, and management. We promote volunteering and its value to New Zealand society through advocacy, sharing stories, and producing tools like the Best Practice Guidelines and Competencies for Managers of Volunteers.

We have a membership of 80 national and regional member organisations that involve volunteers in their work programmes. We advocate on behalf of these organisations and for other groups that are not members but are aligned to our mission and values.

### **New Zealand’s Voluntary Sector**

New Zealand has more than 114,000 non-profit organisations, contributing to 4.4% of GDP when taking into account the volunteer labour contribution, and is similar to the contribution of the entire construction industry.

The most up-to-date data on the volunteer sector states that in New Zealand there are more than 1.2 million volunteers who give more than 157 million hours of unpaid labour to the sector. In 2008, 67% of the Community and Voluntary Sector workforce was made up of volunteers; 90% of New Zealand non-profit organisations employ no staff, and rely solely on volunteers<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> From the *The New Zealand Non-profit Sector in Comparative Perspective*, 2008

## ► **Summary**

The Civil Defence and Emergency Management (“CDEM”) Ministerial Review: Terms of Reference (“MR: TOR”) sets out its intentions to create a workforce where New Zealand’s emergency response framework is ‘world leading, fit for purpose and well placed to meet future challenges.’

VNZ are encouraged that the MR: TOR problem definition includes reference to volunteers, but we additionally subscribe to the view that this MR: TOR is an opportunity for its volunteers and volunteering for CDEM to fulfil a more comprehensive set of outcomes in New Zealand.

## ► **Issues**

The MR: TOR states that ‘volunteers may not be adequately supported by a professional emergency management force.’ Volunteering New Zealand submits that unless there is a coherent national strategy for its CDEM volunteer workforce, it is likely that such issues will pervasively persist.

### **Leadership of CDEM volunteers**

From our understanding of CDEM, there appears to be issues of coordination and leadership of its volunteer workforce. There appears to be no senior management position directly responsible for coordinating and promoting volunteer interests within the CDEM. VNZ believes that for CDEM to be fit for purpose, volunteers need adequate leadership from the Board, through to the executive team and specifically positioned managers of volunteers.

### **Management of CDEM volunteers**

VNZ strongly believe that there should be a greater emphasis on including and engaging with volunteers.

Given the scope of CDEM duties, and the standards expected of its entire staff (paid and unpaid), structured and professional organisational management of volunteers is expected. However, it is our contention that volunteers’ recruitment, retention and recognition are often under-managed in both passive and active duty.

For example, a recent research Report for the Fire Services Commission found that most rural fire volunteers join because of a sense of responsibility and duty to their communities.<sup>2</sup> As the MR: TOR notes, an increase in being ‘supported by a professional emergency management force’ is fine, provided its management style is based on trust and interpersonal relationships.

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<sup>2</sup> New Zealand Fire Service Commission. (2013). *Motivating, recruiting and retaining volunteer fire fighters in Rural Communities in New Zealand*. New Zealand Fire Service Research Report. Wellington, New Zealand.

Other such reports emphasise that volunteers are distinct from paid employees: volunteers view their reward through a sense of purpose and achievement and not financial reward. Because of this, volunteers are less likely to embrace rigid directives that diminish or ignore their contributions.

To negotiate this organisational paradox, VNZ recommends that CDEM consider utilising the Volunteering New Zealand [Best Practice Guidelines](#) as a basis for approaching volunteer best-practice. The Guidelines provide a framework for organisations to assess their capability and capacity across the following four domains:

- How volunteers are viewed internally by the organisation?
- What steps the organisation can take to involve and recognise volunteers?
- Identify the support and resources needed for a strong volunteer programme.
- People with responsibility for volunteers have sufficient resources to effectively do their job.

We would also like to take this opportunity to reiterate the Government's Policy on Volunteering (2002) where the Government commits to "ensuring good practice in volunteer programs which government directly manages".

### **Valuing volunteering**

Volunteering is not a cost neutral exercise. Volunteers often make economic and/or social decisions to forego loss of income and/or personal time. Employers and the families of volunteers inevitable "pay" in similar ways.

For CDEM volunteers, the demands on their time are particularly high, as most volunteers are effectively on call 24 hours a day. VNZ believes that it is critical that communities therefore continue to support volunteers. Providing communities with an easy way to have input and engage with their local/regional CDEM branch is one way to develop stronger community links.

From the recent Fire Service review, we advocate for protection for the employers of volunteers from financial disadvantage when staff are responding to long duration events.<sup>3</sup> This type of indirect financial support may also encourage community support for volunteers.

### **► Conclusion**

Overall, Volunteering New Zealand supports any effort that improves the outcomes and efficacy of volunteer involvement.

Volunteering New Zealand is happy to present to the Governance Group should it be beneficial to clarify/extrapolate any point referenced in this submission.

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<sup>3</sup> Swain, P (2012) *Report of the Fire Review Panel*. Department of Internal Affairs. Wellington, New Zealand.



## Emergency Media and Public Affairs

7 July 2017

Technical Advisory Group Secretariat

s9(2)(a)

Dear Jeremy

Please find attached the Emergency Media and Public Affairs (EMPA) submission in response to the Minister of Civil Defence's review of civil defence in New Zealand. It is provided on behalf of the EMPA New Zealand Fellows. We would like to appear before the Technical Advisory Group to speak to the submission as part of the process.

If you require any clarification on any aspect of the submission, please contact:

Karl Ferguson, EMPA Fellow and Communication and Engagement Director,  
Auckland Council, s9(2)(a) or email at s9(2)(a)

Or

Michele Poole, EMPA Fellow and Acting Director, Stakeholder Engagement, Otago  
Regional Council, s9(2)(a) or email at s9(2)(a)

Yours sincerely,

Karl Ferguson and Michele Poole

## Submission to the Technical Advisory Group, Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand

### Section 1: Introduction

1. EMPA, a not-for-profit organisation dedicated to improving communication in emergency response and recovery aims to benchmark the best communications responses to disasters across Australia and New Zealand, and to share lessons learned by practitioners and researchers (we have included more information about EMPA under Section 5).
2. This submission is principally concerned with 'Outcome 5' of the Ministerial Reviews Terms of Reference, but will also highlight inter-dependencies of achieving effective communication outcomes in an emergency or disaster situation with the other outcome areas (Outcomes 1-4).
3. The submission comments broadly on communications' best practice and requirements in an emergency or disaster. It's not restricted to just civil defence emergencies, recognising that 'events,' especially where there is threat to human life, national security or similar, require a significant communications response to citizens.
4. Independent research co-funded by EMPA found that 20 percent of all deficiencies identified in emergency responses related to shortcomings in communication with the community.<sup>1</sup> However, effective communication outcomes are often not embedded as a core outcome within a response structure or operation.
5. Mark Crosweiler, Director General of Emergency Management Australia says that the 'greatest measure of success (in a disaster or emergency) is the securing and upholding of public trust and confidence... and the most critical factors of communication are our ability to connect through trust, compassion, vulnerability and the acknowledgement of shared values.'
6. EMPA supports the outcomes of the review, and the on-going development and effectiveness of the New Zealand emergency response public affairs and communication fraternity.

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<sup>1</sup> Barbara Ryan, *The Significance of Communication in Emergency Management: What's Changed since 2010*, published in the Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol 32, Issue 1, 2017; also summarised in the University of South Queensland's *PR Pulse*: <http://prpulse.usq.edu.au/putting-a-value-on-agency-communication-in-disaster/>

## Section 2: Executive Summary

7. Effective communication and engagement is a critical aspect of any emergency response, but this is not always well recognised or captured in formal emergency response structures and practice
8. Critical communication and engagement roles are not formalised within existing structures and there isn't clear integration between Public Information Managers (PIM) and All-of-Government (AoG) Communications managers
9. There is a significant gap between what is expected of communications professionals to deliver during an emergency or event, and the resources and capacity that is current available, both in central and local government
10. The changing media landscape and requirement for 'direct channels' means that our current response approach is often inadequate
11. Stakeholder and community engagement requires as much focus and effort as more traditional areas of communication focus, such as media

## Section 3: EMPA submission

### **Role of public affairs, communication and engagement, in an emergency or disaster is increasingly critical**

12. All governments are operating in an increasingly low trust environment. At the same time, citizens have higher expectations than ever of both elected members and officials in times of emergency or disaster. The effectiveness or quality of a response is increasingly judged on the *perception* of performance rather than *actual* performance. Similarly, citizens rely on a myriad of 'communication channels' on which to inform their perceptions. Information is expected in real time. Individuals increasingly wield more credibility and 'trust' than government organisations. 'Citizen' journalists can publish and broadcast footage and views widely, without requiring any fact checking, knowledge or supporting evidence. To illustrate, privately piloted drones can readily access areas previously inaccessible to members of the public in an emergency situation. Citizens can then provide commentary to support the published footage. These 'posts' increasingly shape public opinion.
13. Communication and public affairs plays a critical role in establishing the credentials of a response, directly supporting the principal goal of establishing citizens' trust and confidence. However, the role and purpose of

communications is not always well understood or supported in an emergency or disaster situation.

### **The role of controllers**

14. The review of the response to the February 2011 Christchurch earthquakes noted the substantial amount of time required of the controller to respond to media and other communication requirements. The review recommended that some of these duties be delegated.
15. EMPA wishes to emphasise the critical importance of establishing a credible 'face of the response.' Citizens place a high value on information and its accessibility, and who delivers the information also matters. Having an holistic awareness of the response is also very important. However, controllers too often prioritise their 'core' role at the expense of communication requirements, which can easily undermine the effectiveness of the response. Controllers need to understand and prioritise communication needs and ensure that critical areas like logistics, welfare and planning and intelligence are effectively staffed, and appoint 2ICs as required to support this outcome.
16. Meeting communication, media, community and stakeholder needs should be a core part of the role of controller.
17. Until recently, controller training provided little emphasis on the importance or scope of communication outcomes in an emergency or a disaster. While this has improved in recent years, there is still significant variation in both the capability and emphasis on this critical area amongst the controller group.

### **Embedding and formalising All of Government Comms manager role**

18. The Public Information Manager role (PIM) and function is well embedded in the current CIMS structure. The same is not yet true of the All of Government (AoG) communications manager role. This role was initiated as part of the response to the Christchurch earthquakes in February 2011. Its core purpose was to:
  - Provide strategic communications advice to the National Controller
  - Act as a key liaison point for the Prime Minister's Office and relevant Minister's offices on communication outcomes
  - Direct media relations at a strategic level
  - Coordinate communications activities between central government agencies and the PIM function
  - Provide advice and support to the PIM function as required



19. The role has been deployed in a number of other emergencies/disasters (Rena, Kaikoura) but there is a lack of clarity about when the role should be deployed (for example, there is often national public and Minister interest in a local event, such as Rena, and deployment in this instance was essential).
20. EMPA considers the AoG communications manager role adds significant value in an emergency or disaster response and should be deployed as a matter of course to events which are likely to exceed the capability of local or regional councils. The role enables the critical relationship between the response PIM and the multiple government agencies supporting the activation; it supports consistent and timely information sharing, aligned messaging and it provides an immediate point of liaison for Ministerial staff.

#### **Integration of PIM and AoG Communications manager role**

21. EMPA considers the PIM function and AoG communications manager role to be highly complementary. However, issues have arisen in the past where there is a poor understanding of the two roles; there is insufficient role clarity and definition; or, inadvertently, controllers are subject to competing streams of communication advice
22. Further work is needed to embed the AoG role into the emergency management response structure, including the development of detailed position descriptions and joint exercises.
23. EMPA is agnostic about reporting lines for these two roles, other than to say both need to have direct access to the Controller, and sit at the 'top table.' If the national controller is to be deployed forward, as occurred in Christchurch, the National Public Information Manager and the AoG Communications Manager both have roles to play. If the National PIM is also deployed forward, that role would take over the functions normally carried out by the EOC PIM. More detailed analysis may be required as to how these roles are effectively represented in the structure.
24. The importance of investing in and strengthening existing relationships remains a critical aspect of future success. While EMPA actively supports this by providing 'a bridge' between central government and local government communication professionals, more opportunities to train together are required.

### **Local government capacity and resource**

25. The PIM model requires, in effect, a “ready response force” to be on standby to undertake key roles in the event of an emergency or disaster at a local or regional level. In the case of Auckland Council and several other city and district councils, core BAU communications staff understand their public information management roles and responsibilities, and are equipped and trained to respond 24/7.
26. It is also understood that fully resourced councils like Auckland, will quickly provide resource and support to less well equipped territorial authorities as required.
27. Some CDEM Groups have included a fulltime PIM position within their permanent staffing, while other groups rely on communications staff from their constituent local authorities to activate in any event.
28. The level of training provided to PIMs is inconsistent. MCDEM has suspended its national training programme for Public Information Management team members while it completes development of a new programme under the integrated training framework. In the past, training has not catered for the multiple facets of the PIM function, nor did it differentiate between the role of the PIM in an EOC (local), ECC (Group) or in NCMC. Some groups are moving to establish their own PIM training, while there is a proposal for a pan-South Island PIM training and exercising programme. These initiatives are in response to the perceived vacuum.
29. Notwithstanding the willingness of many local authorities to share resources, recent events (Kaikoura earthquake, Port Hills fires, Bay of Plenty floods) have shown that some councils are reluctant to seek or accept external assistance, to the detriment of a sustained and effective PIM response. This is one consequence of the lack of a consistent national training and exercise programme, and inconsistent understanding by local controllers of the need to supplement their own resources with “fresh legs”.

### **Central government capacity and resource**

30. A similar lack of trained and experienced Public Information Management resource exists in central government. While there have been efforts in recent years by the State Services Commission to ensure core communications capacity exists to respond to a major incident, there is little formality in this arrangement. The model to support major incidents relies heavily on goodwill and existing relationships across the government communications network. In

the case of Christchurch, many agencies were dealing with their own immediate communication requirements. An all of government communication response was a secondary priority.

31. The introduction of a communications director position within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is encouraging. This indicates central government recognises the critical importance of having senior communications capability embedded within a core central agency. However, the role needs a broader mandate than just supporting ODESC. In order for chief executives and ministers to have confidence in a coordinated response, a network of communications responders needs to be formalised.
32. A coordinated effort is required between SSC and DPMC to more formally determine the capacity and capability of this network, including key roles such as stakeholder engagement, social media and channel expertise, media management etc.
33. Key staff need to be identified as being formally part of this network, and their responsibilities and roles recognised by their 'home' agency. Provision needs to be made for appropriate training, remuneration (especially if on-call or required to travel at short notice), and tools (iPad, smart phone, etc). Recent events (Kaikoura, for example) have further reinforced the need for a 24/7 response capability.
34. Some of this capacity exists across central government already. For example, NZ Police fully staff a media function between the hours of 6am-11pm, seven days a week. Maritime NZ have excellent communications capability on standby to respond to a major maritime incident as part of its National Response Team, drawn from trained regional council staff across the country. The new Fire and Emergency New Zealand organisation may also be able to play a significant role in this in the future. Via the direction of DPMC or SSC, some of this existing capacity could be 'folded in' to a more formal, all of government communications response model.
35. The integration of these two roles would be further strengthened by regular, resourced training and exercise opportunities between AoG and PIM staff.

### **Standing communication channel**

36. As above, the importance of immediate and direct communication to citizens, stakeholders and communities during an emergency or disaster is increasing. Given the decline in mainstream media, governments cannot rely on traditional media as a means to 'reach all citizens.'

37. Auckland Council and Christchurch City Council have in recent events used standing channels to good effect. In the case of Auckland, the 'OurAuckland' digital news channel, which provides news and information on a daily basis to Aucklanders, can be utilised – in conjunction with its Civil Defence website – to quickly and directly provide information in an emergency, as was the case with recent weather events. The site is fully integrated into its social media channels, ensuring reach to a wide range of Aucklanders in real time. The Christchurch City Council equivalent – 'Newline' – was used very effectively in the Port Hills fires. It quickly became a trusted source of news and information for Cantabrians – much of the published content was then replicated or re-published by mainstream media.
38. Central government lacks an equivalent, single 'standing channel' for New Zealanders in the event of an emergency, incident or disaster. While the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management maintain a website, it's not a common source of news or information in 'peacetime.' Where an event is of major public interest, like Operation Concord (the 1080 blackmail incident), the lead agency designation often determines which channels (in this case the MPI website) are used, but they may not be fit for purpose (ie can't be updated in realtime, not easily accessed by key officials outside the agency) or known to many citizens.
39. NZ Police have a substantial following across a wide range of social media, and are almost certain to have a direct involvement in any major event, and have a role communicating to citizens. Consideration should be given to developing a standard channel that integrates to the current NZ Police offering, and that can be promoted as a single source of truth during major incidents or emergencies. Integration with other agencies, such as MCDEM would also be required. There may also be this opportunity in future with FENZ, depending on its level of investment in communications functions.

#### **Stakeholder and community engagement**

40. Stakeholder and community engagement has emerged as a significant but often under-resourced component of any public information function in an emergency response. The failure to allocate sufficient resources to communicating directly with local communities is a concern as under-served communities can be very vocal if they consider their information and communication needs are not being met, and can quickly influence public opinion.

41. The provision for stakeholder and community engagement capacity and resource varies depending on the response agency. This is as much true for local government as it is for central government. Consideration needs to be given to how best practice can be standardised across the response framework to ensure these community needs are adequately addressed.
42. Maritime New Zealand, having reflected on the lessons of Rena, have fully embedded stakeholder and community needs into their response structure. This was ably demonstrated during the oil spill response 'Exercise Whakautu II' which was held in New Plymouth in 2016. The MNZ model would be an excellent benchmark for other government agencies. CDEM Groups and local councils' own emergency management response structures are more likely to include community relations and stakeholder engagement in their PIM function as a matter of course, but resources are often reallocated to the more pressing demands of media management or social media in the initial phases of a response.

### **Changing media landscape**

43. Traditional media is seeing an ongoing sharp drop in advertising revenue and most digital advertising is going to Google and Facebook, which have no newsrooms. A new generation of digital only news organisations is emerging, but the jury is still out as to whether these experiments can survive long-term and attract sufficient readership. Prime time television audiences are declining as both free-to-air and subscription television audiences move to streaming services such as Netflix and YouTube. This upheaval and fragmentation presents a difficult challenge for any organisation needing to reach the public with news and announcements.

### **Social media monitoring**

44. There is currently a gap in CDEM groups' ability to monitor and mine social media for intelligence gathering during a response. It is seen by some as the role of the PIM manager, but it requires resourcing which the PIM may not have at their disposal. It could also be argued it is the responsibility of the Planning and Intelligence function. One advantage of social media monitoring is the job can easily be done remotely; a virtual team could be located well away from the emergency, to assist a responding CDEM with social media intelligence and issues management advice.

## Radio stations and VHF

45. Radio continues to play a fundamental role in the early stages of an emergency. Radio is the first place that people turn to for information, particularly at night and if there is a power failure or internet outage. Radio broadcasts can still be accessed via a battery operated or car radio. While the radio and television broadcasters MoU arrangement between MCDEM is an excellent step forward, the reality is that many regions of New Zealand do not have regional or local newsrooms and are therefore unable to give specific local advice. This was apparent in Kaikoura, where all the radio stations were knocked out by power failure, digital network failure or transmitters suffering earthquake damage. The role of local CDEM groups in getting information out on social media, word of mouth and through their established community networks is even more important when virtually all broadcast media are unable to be received by the local population.
46. A key insight from Kaikoura was the critical importance of the emergency services' VHF network. Police and Rural Fire's VHF radio was the only working communications channel out of Kaikoura for the first 72 hours of the response. New Zealand's VHF radio network should be treated as a critically important piece of national infrastructure and resources made available to investigate whether the country is building adequate resilience into the network into the future.

## Section 4: Concluding comments

EMPA is encouraged by the inclusion and focus of this review on better communication and engagement outcomes in an emergency or an event. We believe that there is excellent capability in New Zealand, and that is borne out by many examples of best practice in recent events. However, public expectation continues to shift, and more needs to be done to ensure that these expectations are both understood and met.

## Section 5: EMPA purpose, objectives and rationale

EMPA is leading the evolution of effective communications and community relations before, during and after emergencies by providing a network for all who practise and research in this sector.

We are a not-for-profit organisation, operating principally in New Zealand and Australia with extensive connections in North America and Europe.

Through our annual conferences and workshops for practitioners, our research funding, and the development of a public information knowledge hub, we are

providing professional development for Public Information Managers and promoting good practice in communications across the emergency management sector.

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Submission for the Ministerial Review Terms of Reference June 1 2017

This submission is a response to the following:

- **Scope:** The work will examine response capability and capacity (pg2)
- **Outcome 2:** New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses (bullet point 1: *the system supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of the location and scale of the emergency* – pg 3)
- **Outcome 4:** The chain of command and control, coordination and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate (bullet point 3 – *all participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response* – pg 4)

### A Training View

To create a response system that supports the availability of appropriately skilled personnel who understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, regardless of the location and scale of the emergency, the following changes are recommended:

- **Governance**  
**Starting at the top: legal responsibility awareness for CEOs**

How can we enforce training if those in leadership positions do not take this mandatory responsibility of managing emergencies seriously?

When CEOs and executive groups do not enforce the legal responsibilities of local authorities (CDEM ACT 2002 – Part 3 ‘Duties of Local Authorities’ Section 64, 1 and 2), training attendance of Council staff is poor. CEOs need to be more proactive in establishing CDEM training as a key strategy for their respective councils. I feel that statutory obligations in the context of CDEM are not taken seriously at this level.

- **Policy Change**  
**Then the middle: influencing HR policy change for Councils**

CDEM training as a key strategy for local authorities can influence the following HR changes in councils:

1. implementing an effective CDEM induction program for all new Council staff
2. identifying a number of core teams of response personnel, including trainer (The number of core teams per council will depend on the total population of council’s communities and staff. A formula to calculate the required number



of response personnel per Council will be determined by CDEM professionals.)

3. including response duties in job descriptions of core response personnel
4. mandatory training, exercising and refresher training of core response personnel
5. contingency planning and tracking of the resignation of core response personnel

Again, this cannot happen if governance pay lip service to the CDEM Act 2002.

- **Training resources and infrastructure**

- **On the ground: more trainers, better tools and support for newly trained volunteers in response**

To support the above recommendations and to improve the current state of CDEM training delivery, the following tools and resources are required:

1. **Record keeping:** The database of training records currently in use is limited in its function to track the total number of personnel trained by council and support agencies. The database does not record other useful response skills set and contact information of trained personnel.

Highly Recommended: A database that is accessible (levels of access to be considered) to all Councils, support agencies and CDEM that will be able to:

- a. track and record the training, exercising and refresher training of all core response teams in the region, including trainers
- b. report training needs achieved by council
- c. report resigned response personnel and the urgency to replace personnel
- d. import assessment records from Takatu
- e. for quicker and efficient deployment in an event, record other useful response skill sets of core response personnel and current contact information

2. **Trained Trainers:** There is a current lack of trained trainers (in emergency response) in the region for the delivery of ITF courses. Budget constrictions have limited our access to trainer contractors. There is no structured train the trainer program for CDEM professionals and council staff identified to fill in the role of trainer.

**KEY POINT**

**We are seriously lacking trainers for the standardise ITF (Integrated Training Framework) courses. This needs addressing urgently. To fill this gap, staff without a training background have to upskill quickly. 'Quickly' is an**

ineffective way of training CDEM staff to deliver training. There are no structured train the trainer programs for all ITF courses. The quality of training is therefore compromised. This is unacceptable. The role of Trainer Coordinator is ineffective in satisfying required training delivery needs as well as fulfilling coordination and administrator responsibilities. More human resources is urgently needed in this area. Government must invest human capital here. NOW.

Highly Recommended:

- a. Open more CDEM roles for trainers. Hire more in this area and/or
- b. Increase budget allowances for contractor trainers and providers to deliver ITF courses
- c. To supplement contractor trainers, MCDEM to create and design a train the trainer program for all its ITF courses and then deliver training to a pool of ITF trainers (either CDEM professionals or Council staff identified to deliver training)
- d. MCDEM to change criteria of ACE (volunteer targeted) funding to include CDEM professionals. Emergency management training delivered under the ACE funding can be part of a train the trainer program for identified trainers.

**3. Support for trained volunteers in response:**

Highly Recommended:

- a. CDEM to provide support for newly trained volunteers in response
- b. CDEM to design a support system for newly trained volunteers – buddy system, shorter manageable shifts for newly trained volunteers, etc

Mere Taito

Hamilton

## Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

### Written Submission Form

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Association of Blind Citizens of New Zealand Incorporated
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>Yes</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) s9(2)(a)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): <p>Introduction The Association of Blind Citizens of New Zealand Inc (Blind Citizens NZ) is pleased to have this opportunity to comment on the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review - Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. Blind Citizens NZ is a disabled people's organisation (DPO). Our members are blind, vision impaired or deafblind, hereafter referred to as 'blind'. Thus, our comments in response to the terms of reference will predominantly be from a blindness perspective.</p> <p>DPOs contrast with other organisations in the disability (not-for-profit) sector, which predominantly provide disability-specific services and / or are led by non-disabled people. A DPO is an organisation that * is governed and led by disabled people; * focuses on representing the lived experience of disability in one or more impairment areas i.e. blind and vision impairment; and * have members who are disabled.</p> <p>Initial Comments our submission is brief, thus a placeholder to enable provision of more substantive comments.</p> <p>Blind Citizens NZ supports that there should be operational and legislative mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. Although we also support the purpose which is to ensure that "New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges", we believe much can be done to further enhance and strengthen the current system".</p> <p>UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities In 2008, New Zealand ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the Convention). This international treaty builds on conventional understandings of what is required to implement existing human rights as they relate to disabled people. Fundamental requirements of the Convention are a feature of New Zealand law e.g. the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all disabled people, on an equal basis with others, and without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability.</p> <p>Article 3-General principles, sets out eight overarching principles of the Convention each of which are significant. With respect to the secret committee's work, in our view the following are of specific relevance (a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one's own choices, and independence of persons (b) Non-discrimination (c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society. (d) Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity. (e) Equality of opportunity. (f) Accessibility.</p> <p>Although we aware officials may be familiar with the Convention, we take this opportunity to refer to the following article. For in our view these are of specific relevance and should be a guide for reference of the Technical Advisory Group</p> <p>Article 9 Accessibility (clause 1 sub-clauses [a] and [b]) follows 1. To enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate fully in all aspects of life, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and communications, including information and communications technologies and systems, and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in urban and in rural areas. These measures, which shall include the identification and elimination of obstacles and barriers to accessibility, shall apply to, inter alia (a) Buildings, roads, transportation and other indoor and outdoor facilities, including schools, using medical facilities and workplaces; (b) Information, communications and other services, including electronic services and emergency services.</p> <p>Article 11 Situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies (as follows) States Parties shall take, in accordance with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence of natural disasters.</p> <p>Conclusion The terms of reference acknowledge professionals and volunteers who play a role in responding to natural disasters and emergencies. Recognising the review is not a criticism of their contributions, and is about looking to see where the system can be made better, Blind Citizens NZ supports that an emergency response needs to prioritise the needs of the community. However this must include thus recognise the needs of people disabled people including those who are blind, deafblind and vision impaired.</p> <p>Blind Citizens NZ looks forward to the opportunity to engage with the advisory group. Our input addresses the needs of our community thus ensuring they are recognised and included as improvements are made to ensure New Zealand's response to natural disasters and other emergencies are fit for purpose for events we may face in the future.</p> <p>About Blind Citizens NZ. Founded in 1945, the Association of Blind Citizens of New Zealand Inc (Blind Citizens NZ) is New Zealand's leading blindness consumer organisation and one of the country's largest organisations of disabled consumers. Blind Citizens NZ's aim is to enlighten awareness of the rights of blind and vision impaired people and to remove the barriers that impact upon their ability to live in an accessible, equitable and inclusive society.</p>

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

## Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

### Written Submission Form

#### **Submission:**

Introduction: The Association of Blind Citizens of New Zealand Inc (Blind Citizens NZ) is pleased to have this opportunity to comment on the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review - Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. Blind Citizens NZ is a disabled people's organisation (DPO). Our members are blind, vision impaired or deafblind, hereafter referred to as blind. Thus, our comments in response to the terms of reference will predominantly be from a blindness perspective.

DPOs contrast with other organisations in the disability (not-for-profit) sector, which predominantly provide disability-specific services and / or are led by non-disabled people. A DPO is an organisation that:

- \* is governed and led by disabled people;
- \* focuses on representing the lived experience of disability in one or more impairment areas i.e. blind and vision impairment; and
- \* have members who are disabled.

Initial Comments: our submission is brief, thus a placeholder to enable provision of more substantive comments.

Blind Citizens NZ supports that there should be operational and legislative mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand. Although we also support the purpose which is to ensure that "New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges", we believe much can be done to "further enhance and strengthen the current system".

UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: In 2008, New Zealand ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the Convention). This international treaty builds on conventional understandings of what is required to implement existing human rights as they relate to disabled people. Fundamental requirements of the Convention are a feature of New Zealand law e.g. the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all disabled people, on an equal basis with others, and without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability.

Article 3-General principles, sets out eight overarching principles of the Convention each of which are significant. With respect to the select committee's work, in our view the following are of specific relevance:

- (a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one's own choices, and independence of persons.
- (b) Non-discrimination.
- (c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society.
- (d) Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity.
- (e) Equality of opportunity.
- (f) Accessibility.

Although we aware officials may be familiar with the Convention, we take this opportunity to refer to the following articles. For in our view these are of specific relevance and should be a guide for reference of the Technical Advisory Group:

Article 9: Accessibility (clause 1 sub-clauses [a] and [b]) follows):

1. To enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate fully in all aspects of life, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and communications, including information and communications technologies and systems, and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in urban and in rural areas. These measures, which shall include the identification and elimination of obstacles and barriers to accessibility, shall apply to, inter alia:

- (a) Buildings, roads, transportation and other indoor and outdoor facilities, including schools, housing, medical facilities and workplaces;
- (b) Information, communications and other services, including electronic services and emergency services.

Article 11: Situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies (as follows): States Parties shall take, in accordance with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence of natural disasters.

Conclusion: The terms of reference acknowledge professionals and volunteers who play a role in responding to natural disasters and emergencies. Recognising the review is not a criticism of their contributions, and is about looking to see where the system can be made better, Blind Citizens NZ supports that an emergency response needs to prioritise the needs of the community. However this must include that recognise the needs of people disabled people including those who are blind, deafblind and vision impaired.

Blind Citizens NZ looks forward to the opportunity to engage with the advisory group. Our input addresses the needs of our community thus ensuring they are recognised and included as improvements are made to ensure New Zealand's response to natural disasters and other emergencies are fit for purpose for events we may face in the future.

About Blind Citizens NZ: Founded in 1945, the Association of Blind Citizens of New Zealand Inc (Blind Citizens NZ) is New Zealand's leading blindness consumer organisation and one of the country's largest organisations of disabled consumers. Blind Citizens NZ's aim is to heighten awareness of the rights of blind and vision impaired people and to remove the barriers that impact upon their ability to live in an accessible, equitable and inclusive society.

Friday 7<sup>th</sup> July 2017.

To the Chair of the Technical Advisory Group into the Ministerial Review into Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand.

*This is a personal submission by Gavin Treadgold, and reflects his personal views, and not those of the Canterbury CDEM Group. Gavin is not intending to provide a verbal submission, unless the TAG requests it. For collective views of the Canterbury CDEM Group, please see the Group submission.*

### **Emergency management framework**

To simplify discussion in this document, I will refer to the Emergency Management Framework (EMF). This is a conceptual term that incorporates the wide variety of legislation, regulation, plans, guidelines, standards and other aspects that define how New Zealand prepares for an emergency, and how we actually respond to an emergency. I am avoiding using emergency response, as response is only the end result of readiness being applied to an event. The EMF covers the 4Rs of Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery.

### **Lack of overarching emergency response framework**

There are numerous pieces of legislation, standards such as the Co-ordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), plans and arrangements that collectively amount to the 'emergency response framework' outlined by the TAG. These components of the system however, are not tied together into a coherent national emergency response framework. Rather different plans and arrangements are in place depending on the central government lead agency - generally Police, MCDem, MOH, or MPI, such as the:

National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan (2015)

National Health Emergency Plan (2015)

This is a subtle distinction whereby there are very good existing arrangements in place for specific events, but New Zealand lacks the overarching response framework that describes how the system fits together, regardless of the agencies, plans, and legislation involved. There are also clear structures in place via the National Security System (NSS), but New Zealand lacks a unified emergency response framework that sits below the NSS that is consistent across all agencies and events.

In the United States, they have the National Response Framework (NRF). The purpose of the US NRF is:

*... a guide to how the Nation responds to all types of disasters and emergencies. It is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation.*

Existing plans such as the National CDEM or Health Emergency plans define how New Zealand responds for a subset of events, but not how we respond as a nation to "all types of disasters and emergencies".

### **The concept of Lead Agency**

The concept of having a lead agency for an event, is partially misleading. At its root, being a lead agency comes back to the agency that has a legislative mandate for response to a certain type of event - for example the responsibility for rural fire is currently defined in the Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977; for natural disasters it is the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

I believe we should be avoiding the concept of lead agency for an event, and perhaps follow a more functional approach, such as in use in the United States. In the US, there are a number of Emergency Support Functions (ESF), and these are consistently applied across all response events.

Using a functional approach, the newly formed Fire and Emergency NZ would become the lead agency for the firefighting and rescue functions. Local authorities may be the lead agency for the welfare and recovery functions, for example. Police may be the lead agency for crimes, security, and evacuations. This moves the legal mandate away from a specific hazard, and devolves responsibility for specific functions, regardless of the nature of the event. Existing legal responsibilities for specific events would still stand, such as FENZ would have a legal requirement to fight fire rural fires.

The National CDEM Plan 2015 does provide an excellent basis to build upon, but the author's point here is that this needs to be a true all-hazards AND all-agency approach. The National CDEM Plan is still 'limited' to CDEM events. A broader and more consistent approach that encompasses all the different types of events and emergencies needs to be developed.

### **Emergencies and declarations thereof**

The public does not understand that there is a complex existing suite of legislation that covers emergencies and emergency powers. Declarations of emergency are not always required to use emergency powers, such as using powers available under the Fire Service Act 1975. Existing legislation allows emergencies to be declared under a variety of acts, including:

Health Act 1956

Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977

International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987

Biosecurity Act 1993

Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996

Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002

There is an even wider range of legislation available for managing powers of evacuation.

The public possibly perceives, based on recent history, that declaration of an emergency is solely the right of CDEM, not realising that numerous other agencies are able to declare emergencies. I wonder if this piecemeal, act-by-act, approach to creating multiple types of emergency declaration only results in confusing the public, and whether the TAG needs to investigate the concept of an emergency declaration that can be applied by any authorised agency.

**Recommendation:** That the TAG consider whether New Zealand needs an overarching National Response Framework including Emergency Support Functions (or similar) that brings together all response agencies and defines how we, as a country, respond to all events, regardless of event-specific legislation.

**Recommendation:** That the TAG consider whether it is appropriate to review the existing acts that provide emergency declaration powers, and whether it is feasible to rationalise the emergency powers in a single act that forms a key component of the emergency response framework. **Potential outcome:** The same emergency declaration will carry far more weight with the public as it gets used more frequently, and for a wider range of

events. The same mechanic for declaring an emergency will be used, regardless of agencies involved, and the types of events.

### **The geographical complexity of response**

A fundamental challenge is the structural geographic inconsistencies that exist in all the organisations that have a role to play in response. To give an indication of the scale of the problem, I have outlined a number of agencies that have a role - emergency services, CDEM, health, welfare, and electricity.

NZ Police has 12 districts.

<http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/structure/districts>

NZ Fire Service has 5 regions. NZ Rural Fire Authority appears to be aligned with the NZ Fire Service regions.

<http://www.fire.org.nz/About-Us/All-Regions/Pages/All-Regions.html>

CDEM has 16 Groups

<http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/cdem-groups-and-councils-september-2013.pdf>

Local government sector consists of 78 councils - 11 regional councils, 61 territorial authorities (11 cities, 50 districts), and 6 unitary councils.

<http://www.lgnz.co.nz/nzs-local-government/>

The health sector consists of 20 DHBs and 12 Public Health Units

<http://www.health.govt.nz/new-zealand-health-system/my-dhb>

<http://www.health.govt.nz/new-zealand-health-system/key-health-sector-organisations-and-people/public-health-units>

There are 2 emergency road ambulance services

<http://www.health.govt.nz/new-zealand-health-system/key-health-sector-organisations-and-people/naso-national-ambulance-sector-office/emergency-ambulance-services-eas/emergency-road-ambulance-services>

Ministry of Social Development - Work and Income operates in 11 regions

<https://www.workandincome.govt.nz/about-work-and-income/regions/index.html>

Electricity distribution 29 lines companies

<http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/sectors-industries/energy/electricity-market/electricity-industry/electricity-distribution>

The number of agencies, and their different approaches taken to creating their internal regional structures, results in significant readiness challenges, especially the development of response arrangements that will be used for actual events.

Following the Kaikōura earthquake, whilst most agencies were Canterbury based and many regional offices head-quartered in Christchurch, the Work and Income welfare services were provided from Nelson. This is only meant to provide an example of the geographical complexity involved in planning and response, not to imply anything about the post-earthquake service provided in Kaikōura.

As an example, the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Fuel Plan [SP03/12] June 2012. Version 1.0 outlines:

National Fuel Planning (section 29)

Regional (CDEM) Group Fuel Planning (section 35)

Local Fuel Planning (section 41)

<http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/sp-03-12-national-cdem-fuel-plan-part-a.pdf>

This translates to 1 national plan, 16 CDEM Group plans, and 67 local plans - 84 plans in total for dealing with a single impact. If you start multiplying this across the number of hazards (e.g. tsunami, earthquake, flooding, storm) contingency plans that need to be developed, as well as impact/consequence-based plans (evacuation welfare, fuel etc), and finally general response arrangements for every organisation, and their emergency operations centres, the complexity in terms of number of plans that need to be developed and put in place scale rapidly to hundreds, if not more than a thousand across New Zealand.

Only now is CDEM in the South Island considering an overall plan for an Alpine Fault earthquake event, but this will still rely on hundreds of plans and arrangements across the 6 South Island CDEM Groups to support it, and the tens of territorial authorities. Response to a regional or distant source tsunami that threatens most of New Zealand leads to even more complex planning for response.

The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 was an attempt to remedy these challenges, but it is debatable whether it has been successful, when there are still as many agencies and plans required. The real measure of success in developing a robust emergency response framework for New Zealand, is reducing the complexity of planning for response, and coordination of emergency response activities. The fact that there are 16 CDEM Groups, when compared to 5 regions for Police and Fire, still signals that the emergency response framework, from a CDEM perspective, is too complex, and with widely disparate capabilities and capacities. The same is true for the health sector with a collective 32 organisations across primary care DHBs (20) and public health units (12).

**Recommendation:** That the TAG investigate options to simplify and harmonise response agencies boundaries in New Zealand for planning purposes and response activities. **Potential outcomes:** Reduced planning and response complexity; fewer plans clearer operating and coordinating structures and boundaries; reduced need for liaison personnel in EOCs.

Thank you for consideration of these issues that I believe are somewhat fundamental to the problems we face in achieving effective emergency response in New Zealand.

Kind regards,

Gavin Treadgold



**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

Written submissions must be received no later than **5pm, Friday 7 July 2017**

Please email the completed form to [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

To view the Terms of Reference of the Ministerial Review please

visit <http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/review-better-responses-natural-disasters-other-emergencies>

<b>Name:</b> Insurance Council of New Zealand
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission) John Lucas s9(2)(a) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email):  <b>Thank you for the opportunity to comment on The Ministerial Review “Better Response’s to Natural disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand”.</b>  <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. The Insurance Council (ICNZ) represents the interests of the fire and general insurance industry in New Zealand. Our 26 members insure over \$600 billion worth of New Zealand assets and liabilities.</li><li>2. ICNZ has for some time been raising awareness on the need for a coordinated, adaptation approach from the top of local government down to individuals for better management of natural hazards so to keep the transfer of risk to insurance affordable and available for all New Zealanders long into the future. Conversely, it’s important that those managing the response to natural disasters and emergency are well equipped and well supported. In a wildfire event, this would mean that the right management is in place to control the spread of fire.</li><li>3. It’s the Insurance Council’s view that Civil Defence Emergency Management response frame work does need improving.</li><li>4. The Port Hills fires in February 2017 saw a 48-hour delay in the Selwyn District Council declaring a state of Civil Emergency. This delay in declaring a Civil Emergency meant that the local Fire Service crews did not have the needed back up from other district fire crews to adequately fight the fires and this most likely contributed to the fire spreading and resulting in property losses including insured losses of \$17.7 million occurring.</li><li>5. The Insurance Council would recommend that for events such as wild fire, water supply contamination and floods where response time is of the essence in safeguarding health &amp; safety and property, then it should be the duty of the local</li></ol>

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**Civil Defence Authority to immediately report the event to a “Quick Response Team” within Civil Defence Emergency Management national office.**

- 6. The role of the Civil Defence Emergency Management national office “Quick Response Team” would be to provide immediate support to the local Civil Defence Authority. The support would be in the form of advice from specialist technical advisors from, National Fire Service command, National defence command, Ministry of Health and Met Service.**
- 7. The “quick response team” would be able to recommend that the local authority declare a Civil Defence Emergency at the appropriate time thus allowing for Civil Defence directives to call for the required support.**
- 8. In the event of any disaster, most of the costs will be met by insurance. The sooner insurance can respond, the sooner the inflow of insurance settlements that are critical to restoring properties and supporting the economy can occur. It is critical that the authorities-post disaster consult early with the insurance industry around access to properties to assess damage.**
- 9. More widely, authorities need to be mindful of how insurance responds post disaster and how they themselves take action. While assistance for people post-disaster is important, a moral hazard is created should the insured receive benefits that exceed those for the insured.**
- 10. We have experienced MCDEM seeking to prioritise residential areas for recovery efforts in Kaikoura. Insurers prioritise the most damaged properties and households based on vulnerability of people. Again, this points MCDEM needing to avoid cutting across established recovery effort processes.**

Should you have any questions about this submission, then please contact John Lucas on s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]

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<b>Name:</b> Andrew McKie New Zealand Red Cross
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>No</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): New Zealand Red Cross would like MCDEM to reconsider the decision to have New Zealand Red Cross outside the National Welfare Coordination Group at a National and Local level.  New Zealand Red Cross has a key supporting role in 6 Welfare sub function and it is imperative that we have a voice around the table before and during disasters/emergencies to ensure our capability and resources are known, recognised and utilised.  New Zealand Red Cross would encourage the review to consider some form of appropriate cost recovery for the New Zealand Red Cross during a response  New Zealand Red Cross would like to the opportunity for representation at the Welfare Desk in the NCMC, even if only on an as required basis, during a response.

We will use your personal information only in relation to this Ministerial Review.

Please note that all submissions may be made publicly available. Even if you request confidentiality, we may have to release your submission at a later date if a request is made under the Official Information Act 1982. In your submission please highlight the information you would prefer was withheld should a request be made. (While you may indicate the information you would like withheld, it can only be withheld if it meets the relevant criteria under the Official Information Act 1982.)

You have the right to ask for a copy of any personal information we hold about you, and to ask for it to be corrected if you think it is wrong. If you'd like to ask for a copy of your information, or to have it corrected, please contact us at [bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

**Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in  
New Zealand**

**Written Submission Form**

**Submission:**

New Zealand Red Cross would like MCDEM to reconsider the decision to have New Zealand Red Cross outside the National Welfare Coordination Group at a National and Local level.

New Zealand Red Cross has a key supporting role in 6 Welfare sub function and it is imperative that we have a voice around the table before and during disasters/emergencies to ensure our capability and resources are known, recognised and utilised.

New Zealand Red Cross would encourage the review to consider some form of appropriate cost recovery for the New Zealand Red Cross during a response

New Zealand Red Cross would like to the opportunity for representation at the Welfare Desk in the NCMC, even if only on an as required basis, during a response.

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<b>Name:</b> Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group
<b>Wish to be heard in support of this written submission</b> Yes / No <b>YES</b>
<b>Contact details:</b> (if wishing to be heard in support of submission)  s9(2)(a) s9(2)(a)
<b>Submission</b> (see below for more space, or please attach a separate document or email): See attached

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## Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Group Submission to the Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand

### Introduction

**“Human beings, who are almost unique in having the ability to learn from the experience of others, are also remarkable for their apparent disinclination to do so.” Douglas Adams**

The quote we chose to introduce this submission reminds us that we haven't always learned the lessons that experience offers. These two images, 80 years apart almost to the day, are telling:



The first people who died in the Napier earthquake were those who ran out of the buildings and were killed by falling masonry. Why was this allowed to occur in Christchurch 80 years later? The legislative framework designed to address earthquake prone buildings and the particular vulnerability of parapets and facades came into effect on 1 July this year.

**We talk about the need to learn the lessons of our experience – too often that means we need to re-learn them.**

This paper responds to the Ministerial Review **‘Better Responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand’** (the Review). The purpose of the Review is “to provide advice to the Minister of Civil Defence on the most appropriate operational and legislative

mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand” and “...to ensure that New Zealand’s emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges”.

We have approached this Review by taking a system-improvement approach. The image above should remind us that **response cannot be separated from readiness and risk reduction**. Investment in these is core critical to reducing the impact of an event and the response effort required.

The Terms of Reference state: “**In light of recent events** it is appropriate to see how we can further enhance and strengthen the current system”.

The Canterbury CDEM Group Joint Committee has been involved in two of those recent events, (14 November 2016 Kaikōura earthquake and 13 February 2017 Port Hills fire), and of course the not so recent, but still highly relevant, Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. We note with some concern that **this overarching Review is being undertaken before the reviews of each of these events are complete**. Those reviews may show that the perceptions that drove this Review are not entirely substantiated, so it is with that in mind, that we offer our recommendations.

We also note the assumption in the Terms of Reference that the lessons learned from the Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake<sup>1</sup> (February 22 Earthquake Review) have been embedded in the present-day system. This is not the case.

There also appear to be assumptions built into the scope of the Review, which indicate a desire by central government to take over a potential local event much earlier than may be necessary or desirable. The scope asks that you consider:

- The current devolved decision-making model from central to local government, and framework of lead and support agencies to manage response to emergencies arising from specific hazards.

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/Review-CDEM-Response-22-February-Christchurch-Earthquake.pdf>

- Decision making and chain of command, including:
  - who has the power to declare a State of Emergency, and
  - **whether there is a need for an interim mechanism to manage a localised event with significant consequences or that could evolve into a state of local emergency or a state of national emergency.**
- Response capability and capacity.
- Whether legislative changes are required to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (and other legislation related to emergency response).

In particular you have been asked to focus on:

- The underlying principle of “act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally”
- Decision-making, with reference to skill and experience, supported by best information available, given the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency, to determine the capacity and capabilities required for the response effort.
- Response capabilities required to be deployed as promptly and seamlessly as possible, taking advantage of economies of scale and the experience of senior responders.
- The interface between the professional emergency management force and volunteers.
- Timely, consistent and accurate communication to the public.

## Recommendations

We have taken a broad view of the scope, so we can focus on what could be improved based on our local experience. Our recommendations focus on the need for:

- recognition of Emergency Management leadership as a profession, with appropriate education, professional development and systematic review through an IG function;
- The development of a reconnaissance capability with logistics, scientific and EM expertise – Emergency Management Situation Assessment Specialist Team – that can provide early advice to local controllers and put national organisations on standby with an indication of assets that may have to be deployed (or order the deployment of assets on behalf of local controller whether or not a state of emergency has been called);



- The establishment of a cadre of highly trained EM leaders, who can support EOCs and ECCs throughout the country, whether a local state of emergency or a national state of emergency;
- Deployment planning might be a useful exercise, in the same way as the EM community does for USAR; and forming teams from the appropriate agencies, ready to deploy at any time seems to us to be a useful approach.
- Appropriate training for elected members, making decisions under pressure, and fronting the media during an event;
- Review the lines of accountability and reporting obligations between the declaring authority, the Group and the Director and the EOC, ECC & NCMC;
- Enhance the public, elected official, and media information capacity within the EM force to improve public-facing, and leadership communications using an all-channel approach;

### Impact Analysis

*“The Impact Analysis Requirements support and inform the government’s decisions on proposals for regulatory change. They are both a process and an analytical framework that encourages a systematic and evidence-informed approach to policy development.*

***The Impact Analysis framework involves defining the policy or operational problem that needs to be addressed, identifying the policy objectives and full range of feasible options for addressing that problem, analysing those options for their potential impacts and assessing their costs, benefits and risks, carrying out consultation, implementation planning and arrangements for ongoing monitoring, evaluation and review.***

*The Impact Analysis Requirements are intended to help advisers and decision-makers avoid the potential pitfalls that arise from natural human biases and mental short-cuts, including by seeking to ensure that:*

- *the underlying problem or opportunity is properly identified, and is supported by available evidence;*
- *all practical options to address the problem or opportunity have been considered;*

- *all material impacts and risks of proposed actions have been identified and assessed in a consistent way, including possible unintended consequences; and*
- *it is clear why a particular option has been recommended over others.”<sup>2</sup>*

We encourage you, in your report, to follow this framework, (which was only updated in June 2017), as it will facilitate you arriving at a set of recommendations founded on factual analysis, expert advice, international best practice and most importantly local knowledge and experience. **The first step is defining the problem that needs to be solved.** The Cabinet Minute highlights the risks of getting this wrong: *“Inadequate Impact Analysis often arises from incomplete problem definition, and unclear objectives and a failure to consider all feasible options.*

*As these are key foundations of policy analysis, inadequacies in these areas cannot be easily fixed at a later stage, with consequent impacts on the quality of the Impact Analysis.”<sup>3</sup>*

### **The ‘Problem Definition’**

The series of statements that define the ‘problem’ to be solved, along with the somewhat pejorative nature of the description of the status quo, which is headed ‘The Context’, have caused the Group some concern.

In describing the context, it is stated that “the effectiveness of the civil defence emergency management sector was called into question resulting in a loss of stakeholder, public and Ministerial confidence in the response system”. This statement alone represents the potential pitfall Cabinet warns of and why they insist that problem definition is based on ‘available evidence’. Without the specific reviews having been completed, it is not possible to reach that conclusion. In one of the examples, there were unhelpful public statements made, which not only undermined confidence, but also damaged morale on the ground. That some observers don’t agree with the decisions made by decision makers during emergencies isn’t evidence that the decisions are wrong; the problem may well be with the observer. A useful approach to issues arising during a response might be for influential observers to seek to understand the operating reality and to raise any concerns away from the public spotlight

<sup>2</sup> [https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-06/coc\\_17\\_3.pdf](https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-06/coc_17_3.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

until after the crisis is over. An automatic review after an event as we propose would help diffuse any potential political criticism being misunderstood.

It is important when reflecting on the context that in an emergency, 'civil defence' is not a specific skill-set or an agency; it is a way of working. A range of agencies come together – one or more taking the lead – the others in support. Outside of an emergency, 'civil defence' represents the local work with communities on readiness, risk reduction and building resilience.

Emergency management is on the other hand a specific skill set, and it is here that one of the most important recommendations of the February 22 Earthquake Review<sup>4</sup> needs to be implemented and that is to have a cadre of personnel to lead in senior emergency management positions during natural disasters, that they be highly trained in catastrophic event management (including staff and command training from NZDF and Police) and that they be drawn from CDEM groups and public and private sector organisations.

**'Act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally'**

This is the underlying principle of our EM arrangements, so its suitability in all circumstances isn't the issue. The real issue is how the three elements, local, regional and national, blend together. They operate best when relationships are well-established, there is a high-trust environment and there is a real commitment from all agencies at every level to full cooperation. It is not a tick box environment.

It is important that local decision-making is supported and enhanced by regional/national coordination and support and not threatened by command and control structures that undermine that role. But having said that, we need a mechanism for ensuring that any dysfunction in local and regional relationships as were identified in the February 22 Earthquake Review, (and in that case, the stalling of the recovery, post the September earthquake as well), is able to be resolved.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/Review-CDEM-Response-22-February-Christchurch-Earthquake.pdf>

The degree of regional co-ordination and national support will also change as the emergency scales down, so flexibility is required – there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’.

The focus on acting locally can raise questions around varying levels of capability across the country, but this can be resolved by sending in a **reconnaissance team (with expertise in logistics and intelligence gathering, coupled with familiarity with the Critical Incident Management Systems approach and the common operating picture)**. Such a team (call it an **Emergency Management Situation Assessment Team**) could consist of NZDF, scientific and trained EM expert personnel and offer advice locally and feed information through to central agencies, which could put assets on stand-by (or the team could order the deployment of assets on behalf of local controller whether or not a state of emergency has been called).

This would potentially solve the issue that seems to be driving an element of this review, and that is the view that insufficient attention is being given to the deployment of NZDF and other national assets at an early stage of an unfolding event. It also addresses the potential lack of capability in small areas that haven’t confronted a state of emergency before. A trusted source of expert advice can be on the ground, gathering information and supplying feedback nationally at the same time.

How cordons are implemented highlights the importance for decisions to be made in conjunction with local authorities, with advice from elected officials who know their communities.

Effecting immediate humanitarian responses to support isolated communities is challenging – is this something that would benefit from the reconnaissance capability? Is this a role that can be supported by elected members (who know their communities), health service providers, St John, Red Cross and related community-based organisations including Iwi and rural trusts? Iwi have a network of marae which, along with community-owned halls and schools provide places for communities to gather and be supported. To be effective, these agencies and Iwi need to be drawn into a collaboration at each of the respective levels of EM response; this is an EM function and ought not be left to chance.

This does not detract from the 'act local' element; it enhances it. It's important to remember that local knowledge is as critical to response as it is to readiness, recovery and risk reduction.

The four R's are integrally linked and should not be separated – nor should decision-making roles fundamentally change in a state of emergency. Accountability ought not to be confused with appropriate and necessary channels of communication either. Whether an agency is the lead or the support agency, an agreed way of working should ensure a seamless approach. The ability to act locally shouldn't be diminished and should in fact be enhanced by whatever intervention or assistance is offered nationally. We should always focus on ensuring that local agencies and communities emerge stronger from the experience – this helps build resilience.

As one of our Group said:

*The current legislation already provides a framework that currently empowers Group and local authorities while always providing for the possibility that events might scale from small to catastrophic; and so there is an ability to shift where delivery is lead from depending on the circumstances (demands of the emergency). Moves to regionalise or centralise will reduce the scalable flexibility that already exists and will more likely disempower not only the local authority but also its people. Given that most of NZ's CDEM emergencies have not been at the high end of the scale and have not required declarations of SOEs, surely the most appropriate framework going forward, is one that enables the majority of emergencies to continue to be managed by those most-affected by them.*

## **Emergency Management Framework**

Given our geography, population spread and exposure to natural hazards, New Zealand's EM system must be prepared for irregular, high-impact emergencies, where the effects on any community may vary enormously, along with the extent of the required response.

Our system of EM must therefore be designed to ensure that it:

- a. maintains the necessary professional expertise during periods of low activity; and
- b. enables and reflects citizen participation in the planning, preparation for, and response to emergencies; while

- c. assuring our communities that the government (central and local), and its agencies, can respond to emergencies as they arise, irrespective of where they occur in New Zealand.

New Zealand's geography and population distribution mean that it is likely many emergencies will occur in relatively sparsely populated parts of the country. So, an effective EM system must have at its base, a response arrangement which assumes that resources will be brought to an emergency event from outside an affected area.

Early deployment of specific competencies (such as civil and/or structural engineering, three waters engineers, and public health specialists) to supplement local authority capacity seems to be a reasonable expectation of both central government and local authorities, as these organisations hold the trained people within their organisations.

**Deployment planning might be a useful exercise, in the same way as the EM community does for USAR; and forming teams from the appropriate agencies, ready to deploy at any time seems to us to be a useful approach.**

As mentioned before, we do not agree that lessons have been learnt from the Canterbury Earthquakes; few, if any lessons have been embedded in ways of working across New Zealand. This may be because there is no active learning framework within and between the agencies involved in EM. **We have in mind a function for EM akin to the NZDF Inspector-General (IG) one which, among other tasks, assesses the readiness of operational units to deploy, their training state, testing performance, identifying lessons from training and operations, and then ensuring that lessons are built into future training effort (learning).** The NZDF IG role reports to the relevant commander, who is responsible for the fighting fitness of the force.

Within the EM system, the Director has a range of responsibilities (section 9 of the Act), but there isn't a clear task for the Director to carry out an IG-like function; nor are there matching accountabilities down through the subordinate regional and local roles. Post-event reviews are carried out, and papers are written; some points of learning may even find their way into courses and exercises, but there is no deliberate, disciplined, and mandated IG-like function. Periodic post-event reviews like this one don't meet the test of utility required of an IG function.

And even if there was to be an IG function, the EM community has no centralised training and education capacity through which to embed system change. The Ministry, local authorities and other agencies work very hard to build EM capacity and knowledge; but there is no EM 'school' in New Zealand within which reposes the responsibility to build and maintain a professional EM force capable of responding to all emergencies we face. Absent a central agency to do this, the Director and the EM community itself relies upon a mix of training and development efforts, using people (for much the greater part volunteers, paid and unpaid), from throughout New Zealand, and does it well.

**But if New Zealand is to style itself as a 'world leader' in EM, then it needs to catch up with other countries and professionalise<sup>i</sup> its EM community through directed education and professional development. Perhaps we do need a 'school of emergency management'.**

The aim of such an effort is to build competence and capacity across the EM force; which includes EM professionals as well as with the related first-responder community including NZ Police, NZDF, local authorities, volunteer agencies, the public sector and crown enterprises. The effect of such an effort is likely to build public trust in emergency responders.<sup>5</sup> And from trust springs confidence in the leaders within the EM force, which becomes an action-learning organisation upon which the public can rely when civil emergencies occur.

**We suggest that a useful consideration for the Review is to research the development of a professional body for EM, with the associated education and training base, along with enhancing the role of the Director to include employing and managing the EM profession. More detailed examination of the conception is necessary; but the overall goal is to build community trust and confidence in the EM system; and develop confident, competent EM leaders.**

The CDEM Controllers' Development Programme (Massey, AUT, JCDR), which was created in 2014 to meet capability development needs of controllers, would be a good place to start. It was established from the need identified by the reviews of responses to significant

<sup>5</sup> Choice theory research indicates that the overwhelming number of channels and sources of information, or opinion, now available lead consumers to become anxious about what is 'right' in their situation. During civil emergencies risks to life and property rise exponentially, getting the right answer from a trusted professional assumes greater meaning; so, developing a trusted profession is a core responsibility of government.

emergencies that New Zealand has experienced over the past decade, not the least of course being the responses to the Canterbury earthquake sequence, the Pike River coal mine incident, and the grounding of the MV Rena. These all indicated a need for enhanced development for senior response management personnel.

The 2014 revised manual for New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) and the MCDEM Competency Framework Role Map: CDEM Controller, provide substantial input and structure to this programme. This programme provides current and potential CDEM controllers at all levels with a comprehensive, engaging and challenging professional development experience.

Note: the Canterbury CDEM Group owns a PTE dedicated to Emergency Management Training<sup>6</sup>, which delivers bespoke courses for people involved in EOC functions and volunteers both professional and paid.

The EM system does not mandate specific competence and experience prerequisites for decision makers in emergencies; albeit the appointing authorities for controllers, and EM employees, consider individuals' knowledge, experience, and track record when making appointments. A professionalised EM community would to some extent respond to this.

Today, the EM community provides training and development opportunities for people to build their competence to perform as controllers and in other senior roles within the EM operating system. Actively deploying these trained people to national and international emergencies would add experience to their education, and we believe would enhance their ability to perform well under the pressure of emergencies at home.

### **Elected Officials**

There is a further education challenge for the elected officials who find themselves thrust into an emergency; a challenge which isn't likely to be met by briefings. With this comes a responsibility for elected officials to quickly learn their responsibilities once appointed to EM-related roles.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.emtc.ac.nz/>



**We recommend a requirement for elected officials to attend post-election emergency management training that instructs them in the elements of EM and the roles they play, and prepares them for decision-making under pressure and presenting to the media in a crisis situation.** This might be provided as a function of the responsible Minister's office, perhaps delivered by the Director; or it could be a function assigned to a centralised education 'school' however developed. Elected officials might also be accompanied by their respective CEs, and perhaps their local and regional controllers.

The aim would be to ensure that effective relationships are developed alongside an improved understanding of, and appreciation for their respective roles in the event of an emergency. Given the local and national impact of recent emergencies it seems reasonable to expect that this sort of investment would enhance the strength of a major link in the EM system.

### **Reporting and Accountability**

The EM organisational tool which responds locally is an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC); the coordination of resources to the affected area is done by an Emergency Coordinating Centre (ECC) run by the regional CDEM Group; and the National Crisis Management Centre (NCCMC) which draws in national and international support. It is difficult to contemplate an alternative arrangement which would manage the near-to-emergency action from afar or attempt to do all the coordination from the affected locality which could overwhelm the people there.

An option is to consider when it is more appropriate to collapse an EOC and ECC function into the same location. The Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake response is an example where the ECC in Christchurch responded to both EOCs which were dealing with challenges relevant to their communities, but it established separately from the Christchurch EOC, which was set up to provide support. When the Port Hills fire occurred the ECC co-located with the Christchurch EOC and that worked well.

It may be important to ensure that the roles of the various entities don't become confused; but it may be more important not to have wasteful duplication. It is usually a good principle to trust the people on the ground, as they can see what needs to be done. But the reporting

framework is problematic. An EOC can't communicate with the NCMC other than through the ECC. We think this requires further work.

We note that some first-responder agencies (fire and police) struggle at times to provide people to all the EM centres given demands on their staff from their primary functions. This is an operating reality which can be met in other ways, including the provision of liaison staff.

Central agencies are tasked with specific responsibilities when emergencies occur.

Acting locally connotes the need for central agencies - like Maritime NZ, civil aviation, MPI, MSD, EQC, ACC, and so on - to deploy people to the affected location to respond to the temporary increase in demand for their services from the people impacted by the event. And such deployments need to be sustained for the duration of the demand arising from the event; demand which may well endure beyond the period of the declared emergency. For deployed services to be effective, training is needed alongside the EM and local government teams.

### **Declarations of Emergency**

The authority to declare a State of Emergency (SOE) is contained in the Act; section 25, and Part 4. The Director does not have the power to declare an emergency. Nor is it considered necessary for the Director to have such a power.

The Minister, or a person appointed by a local authority for the purpose, or a mayor may declare an emergency in terms of the Act. Other legislation provides for complementary powers. Despite the assertion in the TOR of a lack of clarity about who may declare, and when they may declare, it is a matter of fact that the circumstances of an incident or event will conspire to warrant a declaration, or not. The closer to the event that the authority is, the more likely it is that the authorised person will be able to make an informed and timely decision.

The MCDEM Guidelines begin with an introduction, which is worth restating:

*"Declaring a state of emergency is a critical part of New Zealand's response arrangements. It is the declaration of a state of emergency that provides Controllers and others with extra-*

*ordinary powers designed to deliver an effective and swift response. When to declare however is often a matter of judgement and dependent on the developing situation and scale, the forecasted trajectory, the need for the special powers prescribed in the legislation, and the need to assure the public that the seriousness of the situation is understood fully and initiatives are in place to manage the response.”*

The Guidelines themselves note that a state of emergency is not required to be in place or appropriate government financial support to be provided, and remind us that the fact that an emergency exists does not necessarily warrant a declaration of a state of emergency. The primary consideration for declaring a state of emergency is whether the special powers provided by the Act under a state of emergency are required or deemed to be required to best manage the emergency.

**We think that the legislation should also focus on public assurance as a justification for calling a state of emergency even though the special powers (impose cordons, close roads, evacuate buildings/homes) may not be required.**

This may lead to more states of emergency being called, but given the need for public reassurance (especially in light of the social media storm that can ensue) and sending a signal as to the potential severity of the impact (given a change in wind direction for example), that will not necessarily be a bad thing.

There is almost an inference in the Terms of Reference that local authorities don't know the consequences of declarations of emergency; and that the system is an escalated one where the declaration process rolls up from local to regional, then to national in an orderly and sequential way. This isn't the way it works on the ground. The regional mayors, their CEs, and the EM professionals discuss and consider the need for a declaration and form a joint view about the need for, and implications of, a declaration in each circumstance. We expect that a Minister would also confer with local and regional elected officials before declaring a national emergency; which is envisaged by the legislation.

The consequences of emergencies on local communities are better appreciated by the communities themselves than by people in central government agencies. Local authorities must bear the financial cost and impact of community sentiment arising from emergencies.

If central government was to take over the role of local officials during emergency response (absent national emergencies), then it would have to accept the consequences and costs of so doing.

A consideration once a declaration is made by the relevant authority is to reflect on to whom the EM manager (controller) is responsible for the exercise of the authority which flows because of the declaration. In the existing system, local controllers are responsible to the regional controller, who is responsible to the Director during emergencies (or at least may not act inconsistently with a direction from the Minister or Director).

This seems unusual, when after a declaration is made, the declaring authority virtually steps aside leaving the Controller in charge until the declaration is lifted, at which point the local authority takes on the consequences. In practice, the way this works isn't as crisp as it appears, as there is ongoing communication and discussion between the elected officials, employed executives, and the EM managers throughout an emergency. But it does allow for a Minister, or the Director, to direct a regional or local controller to act in a way that may be at odds with the expectations or preferences of the local authority. A straightforward way to avoid this potential for avoidable tension is to change the Controllers' reporting relationships once a declaration is made, to the declaring authority for the period of the emergency. And should a Minister, or the Director, wish to intervene in the response, or override the declaration, it becomes a political decision in the first instance.

We believe that this is a matter worthy of further exploration; albeit unlikely that a Minister, short of a national declaration, will find it necessary to override a local authority decision.

### **Surge capacity to support smaller and isolated communities**

As one of our Group recommended, having a pre-determined and ideally exercised regional plan in place that provides surge capacity to address shortfalls in smaller and more isolated areas would help. This sort of regional arrangement will address critical gaps/vulnerabilities while preserving local delivery and regional coordination. The same thorough risk assessment and exploitation would be applied to the ability of TAs to escalate from low-moderate level events where they don't need regional augmentation; to high-extreme events where augmentation is critical; and the same for regional augmentation from a national resource.

## **The Intelligence Challenge**

This brings in the notion of effective information-gathering, and its analysis into intelligence. The CIMS operating system has a process for intelligence gathering, which is intended to inform decision makers, and thence application of resources to the threats. Sound intelligence is necessary for decision makers to make good decisions; but inevitably they will not have all the information about a threat before having to decide. In these circumstances seasoned, experienced, and capable EM-trained people are likely to make good decisions; but will always be subject to the after-the-event reviews which may find that an alternative decision might have been more effective.

Digital technologies offer additional means from which to elicit information, which may be turned into intelligence to help decision makers direct response efforts. To be effective, this function requires trained observers, with well-developed analytical skills. Much of the analysis will be technical in nature, or science-based (such as GNS assessments during earthquake events). And some of this analysis will be best done by agencies outside of the affected area.

Developing a more effective method to capture technical/professional information will be useful; as would development of an intelligence community within the EM force. The NZ Police and NZDF have skills in training analysts, which may transfer to the EM force through a training and education facility. And trained analysts would also contribute to emergency preparedness through working with people in sister agencies to develop contingency plans, which are always a very useful platform from which to respond to emergencies as they develop.

This poses specific challenges in the modern era which require more detailed consideration. It's important to remember that EM managers are one of the primary consumers of information to help them manage an event.

## **Social Media**

"If you can't beat 'em, join 'em" would have to be the mantra. Social media can create a frenzy in the face of a significant event and provide mainstream media with opinions that demand a

response. Recognising that not everyone has access to social media, mainstream media and other communication channels will always be important, but we need to be providing accurate information through all channels in a timely fashion.

As one of our Group said: There is the absolute need for accurate messaging directly to affected people in the disaster area; this could mean life or death at worst, unnecessary confusion at best.

Nature abhors a vacuum – so does Facebook and Twitter and there are plenty of people willing to fill that space. This needs to be taken seriously as not every district will have the same capacity to respond and where multiple areas are affected getting area specific information out is vital. And we agree that timeliness is not set by the news cycle, but by the need of the affected individuals, communities and general public.

The general theme of this section of the Review is that 'winning the information battle' requires more substantial commitment of resources than in the past. This being so, we offer that managing information for the public differs as a function from information for the media, including social media, and from the specific information requirements of Ministers, elected officials, and their agencies.

If this description of the communication is agreed, then it follows that the EM public information function (PIM) needs a careful look and potential overhaul.

An opportunity during emergency events is to offer media, or a liaison person on their behalf, the opportunity to locate themselves in the emergency operating centres. Having a journalist in the EOC/ECC may be helpful to at least enable them to see just how the EM people are going about their business.

Monitoring social media is of course a rich source of intelligence, as well as a communication tool. Digital tools are available which may help to predict emerging issues during emergencies. This is an area which could be contracted out to private sector agencies; conscious that the evolution of technology is likely to outstrip the speed with which the EM community can respond to it.

### **Volunteers and Professionals**

As one of our Group noted, *“recent emergencies have proved the importance of having volunteers (both trained and spontaneous) because they are the true form of first response; they come from the local community and therefore know the local area. A national mantra has been reinforced since the Feb 11 EQ of empowering our community to help look after itself and building community capacity up from the grass roots of our people. This is more than just the organised agency response (professional, paid, unpaid, volunteer and spontaneous); it’s the public in an organised fashion.”*

Without trained volunteers drawn from the community, the EM system would fail. And of course given the nature of our CDEM system, distinguishing between volunteers and EM professionals is not as straightforward as it appears.

Some ‘volunteers’ may be central to an effective response; for example, structural engineers were drawn from all around New Zealand in response to building damage in the Canterbury Earthquakes, many of whom had no prior connection with the EM community – true volunteers, and many self-funded their contribution in the very early days before a contract was established. Other EM people drawn from the local community also responded, also self-funded. Many ‘volunteers’ deploy to emergencies far from their homes, and for sustained periods. Urban Search and Rescue for example includes people from outside the fire service who have specific skills and training crucial to finding people in damaged buildings, drawn from throughout New Zealand.

Other ‘volunteers’ are drawn from public sector and local government agencies. Others come from utility providers (Lifelines organisations).

And of course there are Civil Defence/Red Cross trained volunteers, volunteer fire fighters and first aid volunteers (e.g. St Johns) throughout the country.

And finally, there are the spontaneous volunteers; like the Student Volunteer Army, and the Farmy Army’. An effective EM system must be organised to effectively utilise all sorts of volunteers, simply because communities need to respond to emergencies using all the human capabilities available to them.

All responses aim to mitigate and manage the consequences for the affected community. This requires response personnel to effectively communicate with communities, understand their needs, and base their response and recovery actions on these needs. Communities will actively participate in a response rather than wait passively for assistance. Community response actions need to be coordinated with the official response.

There is an inevitable pull from employers who want their 'volunteers' to return to their core business as soon as possible. Unpaid volunteers likewise need to return to their paid employment. The essential point is that while emergency events may go on for some time; there remains a natural tension for volunteers to return to their occupation and families as soon as they can, irrespective of the need for their expertise.

If it is the case that spontaneous volunteers are less likely to be available for longer periods of time, then it follows that the tasks they are employed on will not usually be central to the response effort. If they are (or become) central, then the EM system needs to quickly arrange to pay them; as was the case for structural engineers in the Canterbury Earthquakes.

Training and development of volunteers responds to national standards, and competency frameworks. Notwithstanding, the introduction of people from out of town into ECC/EOC isn't always straightforward, as ways of working are not the same across New Zealand. Establishing a national training and education facility may help to manage this.

Nonetheless, a common EM training and education platform across all relevant agencies is a model that has been adopted elsewhere to positive effect. We would benefit from closer examination of the potential to improve standardisation of operations across all the EM force.

Many EM tasks, like the management of logistic supplies are amenable to standard operating procedures (SOP), and/or might be delivered by agencies like the NZDF (which has a task to provide an immediately deployable force of about 100 personnel to emergencies in each region).

It may be timely to consider EM tasks as a core part of employment contracts in public agencies to support local authorities who already have this. Employers would become responsible for the training of their employees in the EM functions assigned to their employed



role; and the employees would know their EM responsibility as well in the event of an emergency.

But for much the greater part, the current arrangements within public agencies for individuals to respond to emergencies works well. Making volunteering too onerous might well have a perverse effect; and some who might otherwise offer themselves may be turned off because it becomes too structured. Effective relationships during emergencies tend to reflect the investment in shared capacity-building and understanding before them. This comes back to the affordability of, and priority afforded to EM capacity development by the agencies whose task it is to do this.

Unfortunate and inaccurate public criticism of 'volunteers', paid or unpaid, have led to some volunteers declaring that they will end their service to the EM community; reflecting a loss of morale, confidence and their perceived failure to support the voluntary effort. If we are to ensure a strong, committed, and effective volunteer EM community, we need to show our support for them.

The fact of this Review, and the background to it are well known by volunteers.

If an aim of this Review is to improve EM preparation and response, then it would be helpful to see one of the outcomes as a commitment to publicly invest in and supporting the EM community.

Lianne Dalziel

Chair

Joint Committee

Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group.

**Submission to the:**

**Ministerial Review: Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand**

10 July 2017

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Dear TAG members

Thank you for the opportunity to provide input to this timely and crucial review. The title of the review itself, focusing on broad “disaster response” rather than a narrower scope of “Civil Defence” or “Civil Defence Emergency Management”. The approach of the review represents a rare opportunity to take an appropriately broad and deep approach to enhancing the readiness and response aspects of comprehensive emergency and disaster response.

Many of the issues that have brought this review about have been apparent for quite some time to those of us with in depth, first-hand experience and knowledge of the emergency management context in New Zealand, informed by critical exposure to disaster risk and emergency management internationally.

The following observations are intended to assist the TAG in gaining a fuller appreciation of the current disaster response context in New Zealand, supported, where necessary, by some root-cause analysis, and followed by 36 constructive recommendations as to how to take the continual improvement of disaster response and disaster risk management forward into an increasingly hazardous and risk aware future. The objective of this submission is to assist in ensuring that substantially more effective responses can be delivered in the future, providing both the public and the government with increased confidence.

## 1. Context

It is essential to the success of this review to appreciate the wider context of the recent responses referred to as the impetus for the review.

The suggestion that the effectiveness of the “civil defence emergency management sector” was suboptimal in the recent responses indicates an overly narrow view of what the CDEM Act 2002 intended “civil defence emergency management” to mean, why the act came about, and what the act itself was intended to achieve. Although there are few senior personnel still involved in emergency management in New Zealand who were engaged in the development, introduction and initial implementation of the CDEM Act, it is crucial to locate the current context within the broader historical context of emergency management in New Zealand. Not appreciating that context risks the review recommending courses of action that will either repeat history and take us back to the less coordinated and less effective past, or even take New Zealand into an even more dysfunctional disaster response future.

Although the suggestion in the terms of reference for the review that “[m]any lessons from the Canterbury earthquake of 2010 and 2011 and other events have been successfully embedded into the operation of the civil defence emergency management system” (p. 1), may be true in some respects it is not necessarily supported by an objective assessment of current practice, capabilities, and, perhaps most importantly, organizational cultures. However, the terms of reference are entirely correct in the view that there has not yet been a “significant review of the organisational structures, roles and decision-making powers”, despite the National CDEM Plan being reviewed in detail in the interim period. The recent light-touch review of the National CDEM Plan should be regarded as a lost opportunity to introduce much needed operational enhancements across the broad emergency and disaster management sector.

The term “civil defence emergency management sector” itself tends to include only the Ministry of CDEM and local authority component of CDEM Groups, and exclude emergency services, social services, hospital and health services, lifelines utilities, commercial and community capabilities. This was not what was intended with the introduction of the “**Emergency Management Bill**” in the late 1990s and the eventual enactment of the “**Civil Defence Emergency Management Act**” (Emphasis added.) in 2002. The comprehensive emergency management approach intended back then was articulated well in the early versions of the National CDEM Strategy (2007. p. 6) where a considerably more collaborative and joint approach was expected than the exclusively local government-focused definition of CDEM Groups in particular, and civil defence emergency management more generally:

*The CDEM Act 2002 required the establishment of CDEM Groups - **consortia** of local authorities based on existing regional council boundaries, **working in partnership with emergency services (Police, Fire, Health), lifeline utilities and others** to deliver CDEM at the local level (Emphasis added.)*

It is unfortunate that this avowedly collaborative language and approach was removed from the National CDEM Strategy in its later review. Whatever the root cause of this change of direction, it has proven to be a retrograde step, as senior or influential personnel within some partner agencies have seen the signals in official documentation and actions from central, regional and local government that they have no longer had to engage as collaboratively as they may have once been expected to. This is despite the national-level success of the introduction of the National Security System (NSS), the benefits of which are considerably less apparent beyond the central government circles within the NSS operates, and the world-leadingly collaborative CIMS 2.0.

What we have lost in some regions, including Wellington, more recently in the 15 years since the introduction of the CDEM Act, has been some of the proactive, highly collaborative, risk-based, all-hazards intent and drive that heralded the repeal of the Civil Defence Act 1983. Departments, agencies and organisations, and, in some CDEM Groups, the local authority members themselves,

that initially engaged enthusiastically or at least actively in the formation of CDEM Groups and the development of the first round of CDEM Group plans have been allowed to slip back to less collaborative and integrated habits. It was this historical lack of collaboration, seen in numerous large-scale responses in the 1980s and 1990s, that brought about the need for the CDEM Act 2002.

It is worth reminding ourselves that the CDEM Act 2002 was intended to “repeal[] and replace[] the Civil Defence Act 1983” (CDEM Act 2002, s. 3.) and its sub-optimally cooperative and collaborative, overly reactive, regionally and nationally disorganized, poorly resourced, and underappreciated approaches that the historic Cold War-based “Civil Defence” model represented and encouraged. The missed opportunity to follow through on marking the shift from “Civil Defence”, and all of the negative connotations and expectations that it carries with it, to the international best practice approach of comprehensive, risk-based “Emergency Management”, with the retention of the “Civil Defence” brand, is something that the TAG should pay serious attention to. Language and its intended or received meanings is important.

Although it is often said that there is no hierarchy of legislation in the risk and emergency management space in New Zealand, such a view only encourages partner agencies, that work primarily under their own legislation, to act independently of lead agencies other than their own, often independent from or even in opposition to the Ministry of CDEM. This tendency is reflected in other aspects of comprehensive emergency management (or “civil defence emergency management”) in New Zealand, where most single-hazard lead agencies do not engage in the broad risk analysis, risk reduction, and readiness for smaller scale hazards, let alone large-scale response to hazards that will have particularly serious consequences. This is despite the CDEM Act 2002, in its extremely inclusive coverage of hazards that might result in “emergencies” (CDEM Act, s 4.) that are intended to be better managed within the structures, responsibilities, partnerships, and processes provided for in the CDEM Act and associated legislation.

The introduction of the Fire and Emergency (FENZ) Act 2017, particularly part 2 in relation to powers, introduces the potential for increased tension and confusion between agencies in all components of emergency management, but predominantly in response. That any Police officer also has the emergency powers of a CDEM Controller during a declared state of emergency under CDEM, without any requirement to so in coordination with the respective CDEM Controller, is also a matter of considerable concern.

Both of these statutory contexts not only raise the likelihood that emergency services may not act in a coordinated manner in response, but it may also lead them believe that they do not need to fully engage in risk analysis, resilience-building or readiness either. These issues should be addressed in future amendments or replacement of the CDEM Act 2002 and National CDEM Plan, and associated amendments to the FENZ Act 2017, so that it is abundantly clear that where a state of emergency (or “major incident”) is declared, another agency is acting as a “coordinating agency” or “lead agency”, or “unified control” is in effect, that the personnel of all agencies involved must work to the coordination and direction applied under the CDEM Act or respective legislation.

It is worth noting here that one hazard that has been particularly poorly planned for in New Zealand, with regard to large-scale emergencies (or perhaps “disasters”) and the consequences the hazard will generate from time to time, has been rural or wild fire. This is particularly so for rural fire risk analysis, management and reduction, which have not been as effectively addressed in district plans under the RMA as they could have been. This is due in part to the conflicts of interest inherent in commercial forest and agriculture industry having considerable influence within the rural fire community, its culture, and Rural Fire organisations. It is due also to the desire of rural fire stakeholders to avoid coming under the “control” of “Civil Defence” in risk analysis, risk reduction, readiness, response or recovery.

These realities played themselves out in the Port Hills this year and have not been improved by the introduction of the FENZ Act 2017, which in an avowedly response rather than risk-management

piece of legislation. In fact the FENZ Act may have exacerbated the situation as local government is now one further step removed from fire response planning.

The introduction of the National Security System (NSS) has been a much needed and welcome innovation for the nation. However, although the lead agency model currently used by the NSS may appear to be appropriate and effective from a central government agencies perspective, it may itself be at least a major contributing factor or perhaps even a root cause to some of the inadequate readiness and less than optimally led and coordinated regional and local responses recently.

Since the introduction of the CDEM Act in 2002, and later the NSS, we have experienced numerous complex and/or widespread emergencies, such as the wildfires, earthquakes, floods, ship groundings, severe weather, and mine incidents, to name a few, where the "lead agency" approach has been tested and found wanting. Although there may well be a well-defined "lead agency" for the primary hazard being responded too in most emergencies, in more challenging situation, such as larger wildfires and significant earthquakes, there are a wide range of consequences to be understood, responded to, and recovered from that the primary hazard agency may not have any appreciable experience, capability or mandate to manage.

In the response context, particularly perhaps for wildfires in the context of this review, when a hazard-based lead agency is leading the response to mitigating the direct behaviour and effects of the hazard itself, in most cases the designated "lead agency" lacks the capacity, capability, culture or mandate to coordinate the wider response to the actual and potential immediate, medium and longer-term needs generated from the consequences of the hazard on the respective communities, infrastructure, economies and environment.

It is interesting to note that the review terms of reference use contradictory terminology that should raise a red flag in relation to "lead agency", where collect ons of agencies at numerous jurisdictional levels are said to have been the "lead agency" (TOR, footnote, p. 1) in recent emergency responses. In reality, "Health" and "Civil Defence Emergency Management" are not agencies as such, but collectives of community, local, regional and national level organisations.

If "Health" was the lead agency in the Havelock North water crisis neither the respective DHB or the Ministry of Health delivered the wider response coordination and consequence management that the lead agency concept currently suggests they should have delivered. In the eyes of the media and the public, the leader of the response was the Mayor of Hastings District - as incorrect as that impression may be.

Elected officials acting as the managerial leaders of emergency responses, or being perceived to be so, is contrary to the State Services Act, the Cabinet Manual, New Zealand emergency-related legislation, the Local Government Act, and international best practice. More needs to be done to ensure that elected officials at all levels understand this, and restrict themselves to strategic governance, community reassurance, and political coordination and leadership, but not operational direction or management.

Elected officials should be absolutely clear that critiquing response and recovery efforts while they are underway is no-one's interests. The actions of mayors and ministers in several recent emergencies, including the responses to the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury and Christchurch earthquakes, the MV Rena grounding, and the significant events in the past 12 months, not only undermined the authority and effectiveness of duly appointed, in most cases highly competent response managers, but directly, immediately, and lastingly undermined responder morale and response effectiveness, and diminished the reputation of "Civil Defence" and emergency services in the eyes of the public.

Whether the Selwyn Rural Fire Authority was actually the "lead agency" in the response to the Port Hills fires and whether it delivered the responsibilities of that role is at best a moot point. However, given the reality that a declaration of a state of emergency under the CDEM Act was in effect for Christchurch City and Selwyn District, and that most of the consequences of the fires were born by

communities, infrastructure, organisations, and the environment within Christchurch City, it was not surprising that from some perspectives there was confusion as to who was in charge. If anything, "Rural Fire", more generally, was the "lead agency" in the response to the fires, but with no ability to or interest in managing the wider consequences of the emergency.

The CDEM Act is quite explicit in this regard, in that s28.1 stating that the regionally-mandated Group Controllers: *"... must, during a state of local emergency for the area for which the Group Controller is appointed, direct and co-ordinate, for the purposes of this Act, the use of the personnel, material, information, services, and other resources made available by departments, Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups, and other persons."*

Despite this requirement being clearly articulated and exercised in the current CDEM Controller Development Programme, resistance remains from some local authorities, a few local and group CDEM controllers, and, in some cases, senior response management personnel in partner agencies, to Group Controllers delivering to this fundamental requirement of the CDEM Act. That this been allowed to be the case reflects a lack of power to direct and to enable cultural change from the Ministry of CDEM and the government more generally. This has to change for improved outcomes to be realised.

It is imperative that the outcomes of this review result in enabling all involved to appreciate the coordination and direction role of Controllers<sup>1</sup> in situations such as the numerous responses we have experienced in the past decade and the considerably more severe emergencies and disasters we will have to deal with in the future, without undermining the crucial role of functional and hazard-specific "lead agencies" within larger coordinated responses.

If Selwyn Rural Fire Authority (in reality Selwyn District Council) was the "lead agency" in that particular fire response, then the Hawkes Bay District Health Board should have been identified as the "lead agency" in the Havelock North context, not the Ministry of Health. In the Hurunui-Kaikoura earthquake response the respective local authorities or, more correctly, Canterbury CDEM Group and its Group Controller should have been identified as the "lead agency", rather than "Civil Defence" or "CDEM". The current confusing definitions and applications of "lead agency" undermines rather than enhances response coordination / command and control.

With regard to other hazards, such as large-scale structural fires, bio-security emergencies, or counter-terrorism, consideration of the need for a partnership between the hazard-specific lead agencies (singular or plural) within an overall "emergency management" (or "response management") agency is needed urgently. The term for this elsewhere in the Pacific, as well as in the Sendai agreement, is "National Disaster Management Agency".

Although the National Security System approach has proven to be useful in providing connection, clarity and leadership for those involved in it, it has not yet been as helpful for those external to it, particularly those working at regional and local levels. A systems approach alone is not enough.

The narrowly defined "adaptive management" approach promoted within central government in the past decade, including during the CIMS review and the development of the NSS, has proven detrimental to the sort of organisational, relational, and command and control clarity that are essential to effective disaster response management. A contemporary, flexible, relationship/rapid trust, network-centric approach to disaster response management is crucial in the increasingly complex and demanding era we are in. The inference within the "adaptive management" model, as articulated at the time, that pre-existing structures and processes become redundant and can be put

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<sup>1</sup> Whether these be "Controllers" or similar roles within a revitalised CDEM Act and relatively disjointed emergency response management context or within a more streamlined, professionalised, and unambiguous national disaster management agency. Retaining "Civil Defence" in the title for these roles or the resultant organisation would indicate that little or nothing has changed.

aside in major emergencies or disasters, and new systems and legislation introduced as required, itself needs to be set aside if this review is to achieve its desired outcomes.

The CDEM Act 2002, despite recent significant and much-needed enhancements, particularly in relation to disaster recovery, is not directive enough in relation to local government or partner government agencies and non-government organisations being sufficiently engaged in collective readiness and response. This has been taken to extremes by some organisations, in seeking legal advice prior to the 2010 Canterbury earthquakes, to support a view that the powers of CDEM Controllers to direct and coordinate personnel and resources “made available” to responses (CDEM Act, s28) did not apply to resources that an agency might choose to not make available.

This less than optimal approach has been apparent, albeit subtly, in numerous responses, including the responses to the September 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquake responses where response agencies, including local authorities and emergency services, did not work as closely under the direction and coordination of Group and even National controllers as the legislation, CDEM Group plans, and best practice would expect.

An aspect of the current approach in New Zealand, where MCDEM “Regional Emergency Management **Advisors**” (REMA) (Emphasis added) provide advice within CDEM Groups prior to emergencies, and Group ECCs and occasionally local EOCs, during responses. Despite REMAs not necessarily being sufficiently competent or mandated to ensure that adequate and timely enough all-agency response coordination occurs. Alongside this, REMAs and CDEM Group Controllers are currently given little recognition by partner agencies, with Local CDEM Controllers generally receiving even less recognition. The lack of a credible, contemporary CDEM (or perhaps in future, “National Disaster Management Agency”) rank structure and uniform no doubt plays a part in this.

A successful example of a more proactive and mandated model being applied to improve and support local and regional responses is the US “Federal Coordinating Officer” model, where highly trained, experienced, and respected senior response managers are brought into local and regional (single or multi state) responses to ensure all-agency coordination is achieved and maintained.

The need for objective and independent evaluation, review and continuous improvement of the capabilities and attitudes of all organisations with a role in disaster risk and emergency management is well served if one of the emergency management partner agencies has dual roles within the comprehensive emergency management context and as the evaluator of all-agency capabilities. A solution to this that is working relatively well in the Victoria and Queensland, Australia, is a well-resourced office of an “Inspector General of Emergency Management”.

#### **Redefining “The Problem”:**

The review’s terms of reference set out “the problem” to be addressed in the review process. I will take some time here to discuss and add some context to the problem, before moving on to make some recommendations in relation to it.

**“The underlying principle of “act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally” may not be suitable in all circumstances.”**

This is a proposition well worth posing, although a question would probably be more appropriate. Such a statement cannot simply be accepted without question as the basis for a retreat from what is in fact international emergency and disaster management best practice, all the more so in the complex, infrastructure and information dependent communities, economies, and government agencies of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. A layered, mutually supporting response capability is essential to effective disaster response.

None of the significant emergencies that New Zealand communities have faced recently would have in any way benefited from predominantly centralised command and control. In fact, if one spends time becoming intimately familiar with disaster response at all levels, as some of us have had to over the past two decades, one cannot help but reach the conclusion that “act locally, coordinate

regionally, support nationally” is an essential element of effective disaster response. Experience in the most challenging emergency context that New Zealand has faced in the modern era, the September 2010 and February 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, demonstrated that mutually consistent local, regional and national responses are considerably more effective than remote or direct centralised intervention and control, on the condition that local and regional responses are working together well and are well connected to central coordination and leadership. Collapsing local, regional and local response management into one organisation may have seemed logical and expedient at the time, but there were at least as many limitations as there were benefits from that approach.

Could more effective direction and coordination, or “command and control”, be exerted at national and regional levels in readiness, response, and recovery though? Absolutely! However, the framework for this is already provided by the CDEM Act 2002. Despite the talent and professionalism within DPMC, MCDEM, and partner agencies, what is lacking is sufficient directive capacity at national and regional levels, and a lack of organic in-house knowledge, experience and confidence at the national level to ensure that all agencies involved take collaborative disaster risk management, capability-building, and response and recovery seriously enough to achieve the results that the CDEM Act, Parliament, and the public expect.

**“Decisions are not necessarily made by adequately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the appropriate level of government, and supported by the best information possible in the circumstances”**

This is a reality of all disaster responses when looked at in hindsight. By their very definition disasters create challenging and rapidly changing situations that are difficult for response management organisations to gain a clear picture of or to get ahead of. The Independent Review of the CDEM Response to the 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes (2013) reached a similar conclusion, as have all reviews of significant response in New Zealand and elsewhere.

In my 20 years of involvement in disaster response management, planning, education, and professional development, as well as being relatively familiar with half a century of literature on the subject, it would be fair to say that I have seen few if any disaster response reviews that found that everything went swimmingly. When I have I have been even more concerned. The problem is that most reviews, their recommendations and outcomes tend to be overly superficial; skirt the real and difficult to address issues and their root causes; usually look to do more with little or no more resources, and; avoid meaningful and honest discussion of organisational cultural and political issues at all costs.

The clear recommendation in the review of the 2011 Christchurch response was that management of all local emergencies be carried out by suitably trained and experienced disaster response managers at regional and national levels. That recommendation was not adopted by Cabinet at the time, on the basis that local authorities would be given the opportunity to simply carry out their local response management functions more effectively. In most cases local authorities have not increased resourcing to CDEM. In fact, removal of the Rural Fire function from local government has significantly reduced local investment in emergency response management and has constructed a new gap between local government emergency management and fire agencies, and in some cases a real reduction in local capability.

Areas where response management capability has improved across the nation is primarily where a regional model of emergency management has been established under the auspices of regional CDEM Groups, with local emergency management professionals now coming under the direct employment and control of fulltime CDEM Group managers and controllers. Some government agencies have also appreciably increased their investment in emergency response planning, capability, and response management expertise in the 5 to 8 years.



It is worth noting that the Canterbury and Marlborough CDEM groups, the locations and sources of management in the recent Port Hills fires and the Hurunui-Kaikoura quakes, have not taken the step to establish a fully regionalised emergency management model that is rapidly becoming the national norm. In Canterbury's case the politics of the region do not lend themselves to voluntarily support of a more regionally-led and coordinated model. These issues played themselves out in the 2010 and 2011 quakes responses, as much as they did in the November 2016 quakes response and the Port Hills fires.

For Marlborough, a small but competent unitary authority, the lack of regional level support and coordination is as much of a problem as the lack of coordination within a multi-authority region like Canterbury. In Marlborough's case the reality that most of the partner agencies are regionally headquartered in Nelson-Tasman is significant inhibitor to joined-up disaster response management. The same could be said to be true in Gisborne, where most emergency response management agencies have their regional head offices in Napier.

Organisational and individual competence enhancement is occurring across the disaster risk, emergency management and emergency response management contexts in ways that are considerably more relevant to improving disaster response management capabilities. Effective regionalisation and professionalisation of risk management and emergency response management is crucial to effective outcomes in the future. Simply handing comprehensive emergency management and the narrower emergency response management to a single-hazard agency, with no history, necessary relationships, current competence or capability in large scale or complex disaster response management, when more progressive steps are already underway, would make the situation worse, not better. That said, there is currently too little investment in the professionalization of emergency management within many local authorities and government agencies and, therefore, most CDEM Groups, despite 15 years passing since the passing of the CDEM Act and 5 years since the review of the responses to the Canterbury earthquakes.

Local and regional government have crucial roles in risk identification, analysis, reduction/mitigation, response and recovery. Although these contributions cannot be lost in any reorganisation of disaster response management, more consistent and progressive realisation of these responsibilities is likely to be enhanced with the development of a national disaster management agency, alongside a national risk management agency and a national recovery management agency.

The recommendation of the Independent Review of the ... Response to the Christchurch Earthquake (MCDEM. 2013), agreed to by Cabinet, that a "cadre" of highly trained "response managers" should be established has only really been realized through the successful development and delivery of the CDEM Controller Development Programme. Despite the passage of half a decade since that decision being made the cadre itself does not exist in any organised sense other than with CDEM Controllers.

The CDEM Controller Development Programme, introduced in 2014, is rapidly raising competence and confidence of National, Group and Local CDEM Controllers, but isn't yet being adequately promoted to response leaders at similar levels within other agencies – particularly within Police, FENZ, NZDF, or MSD. Although some progressive staff from DPMC NSS, MCDEM, MoH, MPI, and Department of Corrections have taken part, significantly more benefit would be gained from extending the programme to include and require involvement of relevant personnel in partner organisations.

Prior to the Independent Review of the CDEM Response to the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, CDEM Controller training consisted of a one or two-day workshop-based, predominantly lecture style, pass by attendance experience. The CDEM Controller Development Programme consists of an interactive 6-week online learning phase, an intensive case study and practical exercise based 5-day residential phase, and a 12-month self-directed, 360 feedback-informed, ongoing development phase. This programme represents the most substantial step change in emergency and disaster response leadership and management in Australasia in the past 30 years. More of this sort of training,

bringing more senior decision-makers and response managers across all relevant agencies to higher-level of knowledge and competence, is essential

The Controller Development Programme is currently delivered for the Ministry of CDEM by Massey University, using contracted and seconded subject matter expert teaching staff. The programme is now delivering an effective learning and development experience that is receiving a high level of satisfaction from most participants. There has been some negative feedback to the programme, but this has been predominantly from individuals who do not want to lift their knowledge and practice to the level of fully competent response leaders in full multi-agency contexts or who have another, less demanding training provider that they would prefer to work with.

Being the programme coordinator and primary instructor for the Controller Development Programme, I should declare a potential perceived conflict of interest.

**“Volunteers may not be adequately supported by a professional emergency management force.”**

The proposition could be said to imply that New Zealand has “a professional emergency management force” that could support all volunteers, when it simply does not. None of the uniformed emergency services can be deemed to be an “emergency management force”. An “emergency service”, such as a Fire Service or Police force for example, is not an “emergency management” agency or “force”.

Comprehensive emergency management, as envisaged in the CDEM Act and international best practice, is much more than the incident response role of traditional emergency services – despite attempts by the Australian Fire Authorities Commission (AFAC) to suggest otherwise. Although emergency services of course provide essential services, coordination and leadership within emergencies of all types, “emergency management” is far more comprehensive and strategic than emergency services are structured, trained, equipped or mandated to provide.

International experience and research (<sup>2</sup>Comfort et al, 2012) over the past few decades has clearly demonstrated that emergency services are not well suited to lead comprehensive disaster risk and emergency management, as intended under the CDEM Act 2002. Nor have emergency services proven to be particularly effective in leading and coordinating responses to large-scale or complex emergency responses beyond the normal scope of their agency, or, for that matter, for hazards that their agency has a mandate to be the “lead agency” for and has previous experience of. Comfort et al also demonstrate that attempts to impose traditional “command and control” over more holistic coordination significantly undermines the effectiveness of response to complex and large-scale emergencies and disasters.

The CDEM Act’s “direct and coordinate” was a conscious effort to avoid the risks and limitations of traditional “command and control” in the inherent chaos of emergencies and disasters. Perhaps a well-articulated definition what contemporary “command and control” might be would assist the discussion. What it cannot mean in disaster response management terms is fully centralised command and control.

Emergency services in New Zealand are very good at dealing with the smaller-scale threats to public safety that they are primarily established to address, but they struggle to also manage larger-scale responses to the consequences of those hazards on communities, the environment, infrastructure or economies. Tasking any emergency service with attempting to provide overall emergency management functions in New Zealand would make matters worse, not improve them.

The best practice solution, as outlined below, is not to focus on which emergency service to give a disaster response management hospital pass to, but how to develop appropriate emergency response management and more comprehensive disaster risk and disaster response management

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<sup>2</sup> Comfort, L. K., Waugh, W. L. and Cigler, B. A. (2012), Emergency Management Research and Practice in Public Administration: Emergence, Evolution, Expansion, and Future Directions. Public Administration Review, 72: 539–547.

structures, partnerships, legislation, capabilities, and technologies to deliver the public safety outcomes that our communities expect and deserve. A reconfigured, properly mandated and resourced centrally managed “National Disaster Management Agency”, with local and regional reach, is the only feasible option available.

What is intended to be included in the “volunteers” referred to though?

If the reference is to the numerous “New Zealand Response Teams” established and maintained by local authorities, the proposition may well be true. However, the value of local authorities having direct control of their own volunteer light rescue and response teams available to deliver responses over an extended period, with skill sets than FENZ brigades and parties currently do not, is something worth considering. Requiring FENZ to recognise and work with NZ Response Teams would be a significant step forward in some settings, but shifting these resources to FENZ control is likely to result in a net decrease in national capability.

In the Australian context, at least in the Eastern states, most similar to the New Zealand context, the equivalent set of capabilities is provided by the respective “State Emergency Service” (SES), under the overall coordination of the state emergency management agency. SES work alongside fire, police, other emergency services, local government, infrastructure providers, businesses and communities. Only in Western Australia has the SES been taken under the control of the state fire organisation, although with their own separate identity and command structure.

Most Western nations retain a separate, nationally-led and funded, regionally coordinated, volunteer-based disaster response capability separate from fire and police. In continental Europe this service is usually entitled “Civil Protection”, distinct now from the Cold War-era “Civil Defence”, that provides field response alongside fire, police, health and social services, as well as providing overall response coordination at local, regional/provincia /state, and national levels. European and Latin America Civil Protection agencies and Australian SES have rank structures and uniforms that gives them added status alongside their emergency services peers.

It is worth noting that international deployments of light rescue, health services, and fire response capabilities within Europe, and to support responses in non-EU countries, are coordinated under the European Civil Protection arrangements. Fire services are part of Civil Protection in Europe, they do not lead it.

The UK is an exception to the EU Civil Protection approach, where Civil Contingency is the collective function, with fire services being expected to carry out light rescue type functions, but not being adequately equipped, trained or nationally managed to meet the needs of large-scale emergencies. The UK model should be avoided at all costs.

The model of disaster response volunteers in the USA is quite complex. The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) model, which first developed in Los Angeles in the mid-1980s, is present in most communities. CERTs are sponsored by a local agency, usually local government emergency management or a local fire brigade, with training and accreditation supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. CERTs are intended to act within communities, largely independently of emergency services during disasters, such as major earthquakes, when normal telecommunications are unavailable, emergency services radios are overloaded, and “command and control” are impossible, as well as during less taxing emergencies when more standard communication and command are available options.

The US tend to rely considerably more on the Red Cross for the delivery of emergency social services or, in New Zealand terms, “Welfare in Emergencies” than is the case in New Zealand, where a wider range of agencies and community groups are involved, under leadership and coordination provided by a few managers in the Ministry of CDEM and predominantly volunteers (or “volunteered”) CDEM Group and Local Welfare Managers. Most social services in emergencies in New Zealand are provided by central government agencies, primarily those under the umbrella of MSD, with Red

Cross providing an flexible and expandable volunteer resource not able to be provided by government agencies themselves.

The role of marae and iwi in emergency readiness and response is gaining traction, but has a long way to go in many CDEM Group areas and iwi rohe. The most effective example of indigenous people being incorporated into readiness and response is probably the First Nations Emergency Social Services (FNESS) model that has been growing for several decades in British Columbia, Canada. A more structured and centrally coordinated supported approach, clearly positioned under a national disaster management agency flag, would significantly enhance responses to future emergencies and disasters.

The most effective approach to ensuring NZ Response Teams, Red Cross Response Teams, marae-based responses are effectively supported and led would be to put them under the coordination of local, regional, and national elements of a reconfigured Ministry of CDEM/National Disaster Management Agency. Further developing and supporting the volunteer-based NZ Response Teams to carry out a wider range of light rescue functions, more akin to their SES equivalents across the Tasman, would be a more effective and efficient investment than attempting to add this set of non-fire emergency response capabilities to FENZ.

If, on the other hand, if the proposition relates to the local authority and central government personnel who “volunteer” or are assigned emergency response management roles because of the business-as-usual roles they hold, to fill National, CDEM Group or Local Controller, management or functional roles in the NCMC, Group ECCs, local EOCs, Emergency Welfare, community-facing “Civil Defence Centres”, or other roles within civil defence emergency management, then some questions must be asked about the purpose of the proposition. Trying to read a constructive meaning to the proposition, in the wider context of this review, the recommendations for a properly resourced and mandated national disaster management agency, with regional and local reach, stands.

**Information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency, to determine the capacity and capabilities required for the response effort.**

The lack of situational awareness during emergencies and disasters is a fact of life that decision-makers should be more comfortable with than they are at present. Seeing images of an emergency, such as the Port Hills fires, unfolding in the electronic media, whilst clunky situation reports that focus on what has happened, rather than what is likely to happen in the emergency, may well give some decision-makers the impression that they don't have the most up to date information.

Information collection, analysis, communication, and sharing is particularly problematic in the current New Zealand context, where, generally speaking, emergency services do not regard themselves to be an integral part of the wider emergency management, emergency response management and certainly not part of an integrated “civil defence emergency management” organisation or partnership, do not engage adequately in readiness training and exercise programmes, and are unable to meet the information collation and sharing expectations of the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), the CDEM Act 2002, or the National CDEM Plan.

On the other hand, the lack of clarity in complex emergency or disaster contexts should be a given that response managers, executives, and senior elected officials are comfortable with working within and supporting each other to overcome. The lack of clarity is even more evident now that the media and social media can move at a pace and with a degree of flexibility that response managers simply cannot – and politicians should, given the potential impact of overly hasty, politically-driven decisions. This is particularly true of emergency services with centralised public communications policies and capabilities. Only local and regional authorities have the mandate, capability, and credibility to deliver effective community and media engagement in emergencies and disasters – as evidenced in the Port Hills fires, the Hurunui-Kaikoura earthquake responses, and most emergency responses in the past.

To expect emergency responses to always be ahead of the media and social media now, or to be able to do so through some simple organisational rearrangement, is simply not realistic. Although continuously improving capabilities that assist in keeping up with rapidly changing emergencies or disasters is certainly worth paying attention to and investing in. Responses can only get ahead of the media through effective pre-emergency hazard and consequence-specific planning, targeted professional development for PIM and response managers, forward-looking operational intelligence capabilities, joint information and response management facilities, and fit for purpose telecommunications and information management systems.

Hazard-specific planning has largely been off the table in New Zealand and elsewhere for several decades, in favour of generic "all hazards" planning and readiness. Where "all hazards" merely all hazards will be incorporated in the comprehensive disaster risk or emergency management approach, resilience, capabilities and responses have improved. Results are considerably less than optimal where it "all hazards" been taken to mean that planning, recruiting, training and resourcing for the smaller-scale, less taxing hazards partner agencies deal with on a daily basis will suffice when a much more complex and demanding hazard expresses itself.

The "all hazards" approach had been most strongly supported by fire agencies, despite emergency after emergency and disaster after disaster demonstrating that a narrow all hazard model has been a failure. The view that being able to effectively manage one hazard, such as relatively straight-forward structural or smaller rural fires, equips response managers with the experience and knowledge to manage any other hazard, even if it is a much larger situation involving hazards the agency is used to managing on a smaller scale, such as a major cool store or urban periphery fire, mine explosion and fire, ship-grounding or earthquake, is no longer tenable. It is time for the narrow all-hazards living experiment to be ended, as enough suffering and expense has been incurred in disproving it by now. The specific hazard and risk-based approach to response planning envisaged by the CDEM Act 2002, and currently being undertaken for Alpine Fault and Wellington earthquake maximum credible events, is the way to a more resilient and effective response management future.

What is missing from current New Zealand emergency and disaster response practice, although well provided for in response management doctrine in the current CIMS 2.0 manual, is a well-planned, efficiently executed, properly resourced, highly trained and competent disaster management intelligence capability. It is worth noting here that fire agencies argued against introducing a specific "Intelligence" function in the 2007 to 2013 CIMS review, despite the innovation being included in non-fire response management enhancement discussions in Australia at the time and the function now being included in the fire agency dominated Australian Interagency Incident Management System (AIIMS-4) 2017 manual. Broader operational Intelligence and multi-agency operational Planning have not been strengths of NZ Fire agencies.

Although several agencies have considerable in-house intelligence and operational coordination capabilities, including the Police, NZDF, NZ Customs, SIS, NSS, NZ Post, MSD, Treasury, MBIE, IRD, regional council environmental monitoring, that are currently not well plugged into the emergency and disaster management organisation or system. On the other hand, the naturally narrow focus of each of the currently established approach to response intelligence in readiness does not prepare any of them well to provide overall coordination of disaster impact and response intelligence. The power that a more integrated approach to operational and strategic intelligence management, under the leadership of a National Disaster Response Intelligence Unit, would provide to assist in making future response more effective would be game-changing. It will require concerted national leadership to get this function to the standard required to be near world leading or even to adequately meet current information management and response intelligence needs.

**There is a need for timely, consistent and accurate communication to the public.**

This is absolutely true, and is recognised in the National CDEM Plan, CIMS 2.0, response management training, and operational procedures. What is currently missing to achieve this is sufficient collaborative effort to adequately resource the public information management function

in large-scale or complex emergencies. That fact that FENZ agencies have refused to adopt CIMS 2.0, including its enhanced public information management (PIM) and community engagement functions, or the international best-practice CIMS 2.0 concept of “Unified Control” goes a long way to explain the suboptimal performance of FENZ agencies in this respect in the Port Hills fires and other emergency responses. It is not helpful that “civil defence emergency management” or local authorities have been blamed for responses that were rendered less effective due to inadequate management, public communication, and multi-agency leadership of the respective hazard-specific lead agencies.

It is essential that we all understand that one significant inhibitor to timely public information management in significant emergencies since the September 2010 Canterbury earthquakes has been efforts to control and manage messages at central government agency-level. What is perhaps gained in consistency and arguably in accuracy is immediately lost in terms of community-level relevance and timeliness when centralised control is attempted.

Again, the all-hazards approach has been a severe limiting factor in ensuring that communication with (not only “to”) the public is achieved consistently across all agencies and communities, let alone in a timely manner. Without gaining a sufficiently mature understanding of the consequences of significant hazards on communities and telecommunications capabilities, and the needs of communities in those contexts, the respective information needs and alternative communication pathways cannot be adequately understood, planned for, resourced, or delivered to.

There have been substantial gains in emergency public information management in the past decade in New Zealand, led predominantly by communications professionals in local and regional government, with some support from central government agency communications personnel. It is crucial that this review captures, retains and builds on those gains, and at all costs avoids undermining them.

**Response capabilities are not necessarily deployed as promptly and seamlessly as possible, taking advantage of economies of scale and the experience of senior responders.**

An interesting proposition. Given the lack of engagement of senior emergency service leaders in CDEM in many regions it is perhaps not surprising that there is occasionally suboptimal initial engagement of senior responders when the pressure comes on early and later in responses. Much of this can be sheeted back to the lack of implementation of the CIMS 2.0 concept of “Unified Control”, and the intent of CIMS more generally since its inception that response managers at all levels of response will work in close collaboration before and during emergencies. Examples of exceptions to this include the relationships, arrangements, and increasingly collaborative response management approaches and outcomes in the Northland and Bay of Plenty CDEM Groups, where consummate emergency management professionals, who are also trained and experienced Group controllers, are leading the way.

All too seldom do emergency services provide sufficient response intelligence or response activity information at the outset of large-scale, complex multi-agency responses. There are practically no emergency coordination centres at local, regional or national levels that incorporate personnel into the CIMS-based functions of Intelligence, Planning, Operations, PIM, Welfare, or Logistics, leaving the respective territorial authority or regional council to staff these functions. Far more integrated, multi-agency CIMS-based coordination centres at all levels are crucial to effective initial and ongoing response. Simply placing liaison officers in the proliferation of single- and multi-agency coordination centres is unrealistic, inadequate, and unsustainable.

Continued application of the now defunct original CIMS placement of partner agency “Liaison” roles separate from Operations within coordination centres is directly contributing the suboptimal responses. CIMS 2.0 now places liaison staff within the Operations functions, or wherever else in the respective coordination organisation that they would best be located, to ensure that partner agencies are sufficiently integrated into both higher response management and responses in the

field. This in no way restricts commanders of emergency services and their equivalents from regularly meeting with the respective overall controller(s), but provides a basis for appreciably more effective multi-agency leadership and coordination throughout responses. The view that “There is no operations” above site management has to be finally put to bed.

Again, that FENZ agencies reluctance to adopt CIMS 2.0 has been a key contributor to suboptimal responses in this respect. The lack of higher-level CIMS 2.0 training has also contributed to unsatisfactory progress in implementing the appreciably improved approaches the manual introduced.

#### **Outcome analysis and recommendations:**

**Outcome 1:** *The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies.*

The emergency response management system in New Zealand is at least as fit for purpose as those in place in other national settings. The problem here though is primarily that the system is not currently effectively led, coordinated, supported or implemented.

The NZ Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) was reviewed after the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence, the MV Rena response, and the Pike River mine incident, informed by significant contemporaneous responses in Australia and North America. With the system now including key features and recent innovations of the Australian Interagency Incident Management System (AIIMS) and the US National Incident Management System (NIMS).

An unfortunate element of the review process from its original inception in 2007, was the resistance to change from fire agencies. This resistance continued throughout the review, through to eventual the adoption of CIMS 2.0 in 2013, and into implementation of the revised system. The basis of the resistance appears to have been the desire of fire agencies for New Zealand adopt the fire-focused AIIMS here. Somewhat ironically, the features of CIMS 2.0 that were most strongly resisted (separation of intelligence and planning, and “Unified Control”) are now largely included in the latest iteration of AIIMS.

Following the 2011 Pike River mine incident, in which CIMS was not effectively applied, an Underground Mines Emergency Protocol was produced in 2013 to ensure that such incidents were managed more effectively in future. Unfortunately, although the protocol was developed in parallel to the review of the CIMS manual, the protocol development process was carried out without reference to the CIMS steering committee. This has resulted in the Underground Mines Emergency Protocol being inconsistent with CIMS 2.0 published at the same time, apparently taking little account of the likely impact of a significant mine emergency on wider communities and the environment, and the demanding response management environment that would ensue – an unsettling state of affairs.

The Minister of Internal Affairs appears to have been offering a what seems to be a predetermined view of the future of response management in New Zealand. A recent iteration of this view was contained in a "Homeland Security News" article in the Autumn edition of Line of Defence: New Zealand's Defence and National Security Magazine, where the Minister was quoted as desiring an eventual absorption of Civil Defence into FENZ. The article reflects comments from the Minister earlier in the FENZ establishment process and more recently.

A concerning feature of the approach is the suggestion that Fire agencies regularly take the lead in major responses and that their doing so overcomes all of the issues that otherwise arise in complex or large-scale emergencies. Where the Minister gets that idea from is a mystery to anyone involved in large-scale response management in New Zealand or elsewhere.

Although a range of emergency service leaders step into initial leadership roles, particularly as larger responses begin to roll out, there is little evidence of fire officers having any more aptitude in leading complex, large-scale, multi-agency responses than appropriately trained and experienced CDEM Controllers appointed by CDEM Groups or anyone else who is suited to the role. In fact, there are numerous examples of the risks and drawbacks of single-hazard agencies taking the lead in complex situations, due to their tendency to take overly narrow response approaches, less than ideally integrated or "unified" approaches to response coordination and leadership. The 2011 Pike River mine explosion, 2017 Port Hills fire, 2014 Hazelwood mine fire in Victoria, Australia, and numerous other Australian flood and fire responses, provide ample evidence of the limitations of single-hazard agencies attempting to manage larger-scale complex responses.

Suggesting that Fire officers took overall leadership within the Port Hills fires and Hurunui-Kaikoura quake responses, and that they led the wider multi-agency response in both cases, does not reflect the reality of those situations. The Port Hills fires are not really an example that anyone would want to use to support the argument for fire agencies assume responsibility for larger-scale, community-wide responses.

Fire agencies, like all organisations with roles in emergency management, have highly professional and talented personnel, paid and volunteer, who are committed to protecting public safety and property. Fire services provide crucial resources at the operational and incident site management levels in all sorts of responses. However, realistically expecting any individual to step up to manage complex multi-agency responses requires significant investments in skill, knowledge and capability development that few organisations currently invest - and cannot do so on their own. It is more than that though.

The fact that some agencies argued so strongly against Unified Control, enhanced Public Information Management, Intelligence, Planning, and community engagement in all responses, and were resistant to broader view of higher level coordination and control in the CIMS review indicates a cultural issue that means that some agencies are not well placed to assume leadership roles, at least at present.

The same has been found in Australia and North America, where fire agencies are seldom the lead agency in non-fire emergencies, for good experience-based reason, although former and current fire officers are often in leadership roles for which they have subsequently been intensively retrained. Where single-hazard agencies are left to coordinate complex, large-scale responses, even fires, the outcomes, as indicated in numerous reviews, are all too often sub-optimal.

The Hazelwood coal mine fire was an example of fire agencies struggling to manage complex and demanding fire responses beyond their previous experience and scope, let alone the wider immediate and ongoing community, health, environmental and economic issues. These consequences are not within the mandate of any single agency, and no single agency can address any of them a one or in relative isolation. A more collaborative, "unified" approach is needed in such cases, best delivered by a properly mandated disaster or emergency management agency and professionals that the emergency services work under the coordination of.

The rhetoric that accompanied the initiation of the current review, that the CDEM Act 2002 is predominantly about "command and control", when it is, in fact, the National CDEM Plan and NZ CIMS that set the multi-agency, multi-level response management doctrine, is unhelpful. Legislation can only go so far, particularly when those with duties under it are neither supported, resourced or held to account to deliver their designated response management responsibilities. The CDEM Act and any legislation that may follow it should be clearly structured to provide the legal and organisational structure for comprehensive disaster risk and disaster response management, and not return the focus to reactive response management.

Perhaps the most significant, and much needed, organisational, readiness and response management change in the CDEM Act 2002, from the preceding 1983 Civil Defence Act, was the



introduction of compulsory establishment of regional or unitary CDEM Groups. Within these arrangements, the new concept of "Group Controllers" was introduced, to whom all response agencies and any Local Controllers are required to work, and who are required to "direct and coordinate" during any significant emergency. More rigorous comprehensive, risk-based 4Rs planning is also required under the CDEM Act, but has not been delivered on to anything like the standard anticipated in 2002 - in response or any other "R".

The reluctance of Rural Fire and NZ Fire to adopt CIMS in 2013, and the unilateral paths taken to supposedly build multi-agency response coordination by those agencies using the defunct CIMS 1.0 and fire-dominated AIIMS, played themselves out in the Port Hills fire response. The current review should bring these and all agencies into a fully-collaborative response management tent - as CIMS, to some extent, and the CDEM Act 2002 intended, numerous subsequent major response reviews have recommended, and Cabinet has agreed to, but has not yet been adequately realised.

It is a matter of concern that some agencies are either using a quite different incident management system than is not suited to the New Zealand context, the British "Gold-Silver-Bronze" system. The Department of Corrections are currently using Gold-Silver-Bronze, which causing coordination problems with Police and other agencies in incidents where common terminology, and mutually understood roles and processes are essential. It is crucial that all agencies be required to adopt the current version of NZ CIMS principles, language, roles, and processes for their day-to-day responses and for disaster response.

CIMS is not a set of structures and functional titles alone, although it is often articulated as if it is intended to be, as much as it is a set of tools, processes and relationships. This reality has to be recognised in the review and any reorganisation, enhanced legislation and regulation, and improved investment recommendations that follow.

Far more rigorous all-agencies Action Planning, proactive intelligence-informed Forward Planning, more detailed deliberative Task Planning, and substantially enhanced all-agencies professional development to support these key functions, are crucial to improving future response outcomes. These are all much better provided for in CIMS 2.0 than the original CIMS, AIIMS-4, or Gold-Silver-Bronze.

The lack of a meaningful, state of the art, all-agencies, current and future-state situational awareness platform, including rapid assimilation of media and social media, should be developed urgently. Leaving the development and maintenance of this to one agency to develop whilst all other agencies maintain their own separate capabilities is not going to meet the needs of disaster response. Attempts to have the single-hazard and site-focused Fire agencies attempt to develop such a platform in the past has resulted in Fire having a somewhat more functional platform, but not one that meets the more complex information, intelligence, and coordination needs of moderately or considerably more complex or widespread emergencies and the response to them.

Seeing the media as a partner in response will help to produce better situational awareness, but more effective collaborative forward planning is also crucial. The current systems, as they are practiced, and their supporting IT platform(s), cannot this at present, as it they all are based too much on the 1950s "information flow" approaches that the Minister is, quite rightly, so keen to move beyond.

The current approach, whereby "Civil Defence" is seen almost exclusively as a local government responsibility, and where response management training tends to focus on local government staff within EOCs and ECCs, should be finally put to bed and a fully integrated model introduced, supported, and led from the DPMC, NSS, and a reformed Ministry of CDEM/NZ Disaster Management Agency.

It is a matter of considerable concern that National CDEM Plan has not been allowed to meet the statutory requirement set out in s39 of the CDEM Act 2002 to identify the "hazards and risks" the nation faces, and to then link that risk analysis to the various reduction, readiness, response and

recovery arrangements and initiatives that should then follow. Although the National CDEM Plan s2.1 does now list a range of national hazards, the plan currently includes no meaningful analysis of the (context, likelihood, nature, or consequence) risks associated with those hazards. Nor does the rest of the plan use risk analysis to inform the remaining unduly response-focused sections of the plan, relying instead on the disproven generic, all-hazards approach. The lack of connection of hazards and risks, including the risks of suboptimal coordination, communication, and information sharing, to readiness, response and recovery sets up the National CDEM Plan, and emergency and disaster management in general, to be likely to fail when major hazards express themselves.

**Recommendation 1.**

***That the CDEM Act 2002 and National CDEM Plan be immediately amended to unambiguously require all organisations with current or potential roles in response management to adopt and adapt CIMS 2.0 as the system to which all responses are planned to be managed, all personnel are trained to use at their respective level of response management, and with which all multi agency responses are managed.***

**Recommendation 2.**

***That incident management innovations from similar systems elsewhere may be included in organisation or sector specific application of CIMS 2.0, but that any modified system and its terminology must remain sufficiently compatible with CIMS 2.0 to allow ready interoperability and avoid confusion when working with all partner agencies.***

**Recommendation 3.**

***That the National CDEM Plan be amended to ensure that no agencies or organisations with response management roles can avoid their readiness and response responsibilities and obligations under the CDEM Act or any subsequent legislation.***

**Recommendation 4.**

***That KPIs in relation to commitment to and engagement with disaster risk and response management be added to performance contracts for CEOs of all relevant state sector agencies, including but not limited to NZ Police, FENZ MoH, ambulance services, NZDF, MSD, MBIE, Customs, MPI, Immigration NZ, Department of Conservation, Department of Corrections, Transit, Transpower, NZ Rail, Maritime NZ, MoT, TPK, Ministry of Education, Oranga Tamarika.***

**Recommendation 5.**

***That a new sub-section be added to section 93.6 of the Local Government Act 2002 that requires local authorities to outline how they intend to meet their obligations under the CDEM Act 2002 (and any legislation that may later replace it), the RMA, the Building Act, and any other relevant legislation, in the management of risk and emergency/disaster response and recovery within their jurisdiction.***

**Recommendation 6.**

***That audits of local authority long term plans under section 94 of the Local Government Act include qualitative and quantitative assessments of the intended actions and expenditure of local authorities on risk and emergency/disaster management obligations under the Local Government Act and all other relevant legislation.***

**Recommendation 7.**

***That the Underground Mines Emergency Protocol be reviewed by the CIMS Steering Committee, under the coordination of the Director of CDEM, to bring the protocol into line with current response management best practice, doctrine and terminology.***

**Recommendation 8.**

*That outmoded and ambiguous “aid to civil powers” (s9) and CDEM Act-related (ss 39, 40, and 42) provisions of the Defence Act 1990 be urgently reviewed to enable NZDF leadership, personnel, resources and facilities to be more actively and consistently engaged in domestic emergency and disaster readiness and response functions and activities.*

**Recommendation 9.**

*That the National CDEM Plan be amended to considerably more adequately meet its s39.2.a CDEM Act 2002 requirement to identify the significant hazards and risks that New Zealand faces, and directly connect this with the rephrased s39.2.b “[the disaster risk management, reduction, readiness, response and recovery] necessary [] to manage the hazards and risks described under paragraph (a)”.*

**Recommendation 10.**

*That the title of the foundation and connecting legislation for disaster risk and emergency management in New Zealand be amended to capture the totality and intent of the functions covered, to: “Disaster Risk Management”, with a set of complimentary or two comprehensive national strategies and plans: “National Resilience Strategy”; and a plan entitled “National Disaster Risk Management Plan, with the following sectional titles or separate plans entitled “National Risk Reduction”, “National Disaster Readiness”, “National Disaster Response”, and “National Disaster Recovery”.*

**Outcome 2:** *New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.*

- *The system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of the location and scale of the emergency.*
- *Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action.*
- *Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, aerial surveillance and interpretation) are knitted into the fabric of a response.*
- *Business continuity across the whole of government supports an effective response and prompt recovery*

It is a little curious that the “civil defence emergency management” term has been retained here, when the review is entitled the “Disaster Response Review”. Other than the reality that the “Civil Defence” brand is itself holding back modernisation of response management capabilities, the current overall response capability is not fit for purpose.

The so-called “all-hazards” approach to emergency management, without any meaningful reference to the significant hazards and risks that our communities, regions, and the nation faces, have led all agencies involved to believe that simply having generic response structures, roles, appointments, and processes will be sufficient to meet the needs thrown up by large-scale and complex emergencies or disasters. The events since at least the January 2008 Mt Cook Station Fire, April 2008 Tamahere cool store fire, September 2010 Canterbury earthquake, Pike River mine incident, MV Rena grounding, February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, September 2016 Havelock North water supply crises, November 2016 Hurunui-Kaikoura earthquakes, April 2011 Edgumbe flood, several MPI-led foot and mouth disease exercises, and the Police-led Exercise Rauora cruise ship emergency series, have all demonstrated that the generic, all-hazards model inhibits capabilities to prepare for and respond to hazards that can be and are foreseen.

The missed opportunity to move on from “Civil Defence” with the passing of the “Emergency Management Bill” as the “Civil Defence Emergency Management Act” in 2002 encouraged stakeholders to think that little had changed, other than the requirement for CDEM Group plans and

the appointment of group controllers, was historically underfunded, inadequately coordinated, and poorly mandated "Civil Defence" business as usual.

A considerably more joined-up, clearly structured, unambiguously mandated, adequately resourced, and distinctly branded readiness and response management organisation is required urgently.

The most significant hazard that New Zealand is recognised as facing is large-scale earthquakes, reinforced through seriously damaging quakes from 2010 to 2017 and rapidly improving scientific understanding of quake hazards elsewhere. Despite this numerous government agencies and critical service providers were caught out when the buildings in the Wellington area from which they had anticipated they would manage their responses to emergencies were taken out of the equation by the impact of the quake.

Although the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) is more resilient to earthquakes than many other facilities, it is neither designed to be operational after major local quake impacts or adequate to accommodate, connect and support the range of organisations and personnel necessary to manage any significant emergency.

Near and distant source tsunami, usually also associated with earthquakes, are another hazard that response agencies have not been able to respond to as effectively as expected and desired recently. This limited capability is at least partially attributable to the lack of adequately equipped, multi-agency staffed 24/7 response coordination centres in Wellington or most of the regions.

A similar situation is apparent for other hazards, including significant maritime emergencies and wild fires, where response organisations have had to try to manage the emergency as it grows in front of them and establish make-shift or at best sub-optimal response management facilities.

If New Zealand is going to be able to immediately mount the scale and effectiveness of response that is expected and needed a considerably more concerted approach to ensuring capabilities are in place will be required. Some of this investment will need to be in establishing a fully professional disaster risk, response and recovery management agency or set of agencies, supplemented by personnel from partner agencies. Some will have to be in hazard resistant response management facilities, technology, and processes.

#### **Recommendation 11.**

***That the a more multi-agency approach to intelligence management, shared situational awareness platforms be developed with some urgency and appropriate financial support, relying wherever possible on current business as usual information management and GIS platforms, complimenting purpose-built emergency management information systems - avoiding agency-specific solutions that do not meet wider all-agency response coordination and management needs.***

#### **Recommendation 12.**

***That enhanced directive powers given to the Director of CDEM be used to require agencies to only use response management-related training programmes that have been mandated by the Director.***

#### **Recommendation 13.**

***That the generic all-hazards approach currently applied to emergency and disaster readiness, response and recovery in New Zealand be modified to encompass the risk management model expressed in the purpose of the CDEM Act 2002, enabling planning and resourcing for the major hazards and associated risks that our communities and the nation face.***

#### **Recommendation 14.**

***That a full review of response management centres be initiated immediately, with a view to establishing secure, post-quake and other significant hazard operational national coordination***

**centres in Wellington, Auckland, and Canterbury, with a back-up facility in Palmerston North, with a view to 24/7 response capability.**

**Outcome 3:** *Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency.*

- *A single lead role across any geographical area affected by natural disaster*
- *The purpose and consequences of declarations of states of emergency are clear*
- *Appropriate interventions and escalations are available.*

As discussed above, there is clearly a need for the sort of solutions suggested in outcome 3. The need to have people appointed to declare states of emergency or, for less complex and wide-spread situations, "major incidents", to ensure significant coordinated responses occur, emergency powers are unlocked, and responders and response organisations are protected from liability, without the local political and inter-organisational inhibitions that all too often get in the way of effective response activation and declarations at present.

Establishment of FENZ, and its inclusion of "emergency" in their title creates further potential for confusion between responsibility for managing smaller-scale, less complex emergencies and incidents, that all emergency services deal with on a daily basis, and more challenging contexts that are dealt with through the activation of special emergency powers and the enhanced coordination, command and control required. New Zealand should take this opportunity to apply the internationally accepted term of "disaster" to capture the reality of what we are encouraging communities, businesses and government organisations to be more resilient to, prepare for, respond to and recover from.

**Recommendation 15.**

***The complex range of impacts, needs, roles, responsibilities, and consequences of the more challenging and damaging hazard countenanced in what is now termed "civil defence emergency management" be re-cast as "Disaster Management" or, more consistently with our commitment to the Sendai Agreement, "Disaster Risk Management", with any changes to the primary legislation including a change in title and purpose.***

**Recommendation 16.**

***That the disaster risk and emergency management functions of the all CDEM Groups and local authorities (including Auckland Council) be absorbed into a reformed "NZ Disaster Management Agency", retaining a close relationship with local authorities but ensuring professional standards are applied, necessary response capabilities and relationships are made, and disaster risk and emergency management plans are developed consistent with national requirements.***

**Recommendation 17.**

***That any future emergency or disaster management legislation and interim amendments to existing legislation enable the responsible government agency and, if necessary, the respective minister, to require amendments to plans and other arrangements of response organisations at all levels if they are deemed deficient by the responsible agency.***

**Recommendation 18.**

***That an office of "Inspector General of Emergency Management" be established, to work alongside the "Director of Disaster Management" and all key partner organisations, to provide objective, constructive and independent assessment, evaluation, review and developmental guidance of disaster risk and emergency management capabilities, cultures and attitudes.***

**Recommendation 19.**

*That legislative review include having the authority to declare a states of emergency at local, regional, and national levels given, respectively, to Local Disaster Management Coordinators, Regional Disaster Management Directors, and the National Director of Disaster Management – in consultation with local senior elected officials and emergency services. The preference being to declare when doing so may be of assistance to response effectiveness and community confidence.*

**Recommendation 20.**

*That a new class of response management be introduced to revised legislation enabling a “Major Incident” to be declared at local, regional or national levels, to enable and require significant coordinated responses to be delivered without the need for the emergency powers provided with a declaration of a state of emergency. Anticipating that major incidents will be more readily declared without the connotations of a declaration of a state of emergency, but with the ability to readily escalate the declaration if necessary.*

**Outcome 4:** *The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.*

- *There is a clear operating model and chain of command and control and coordination during response, including the recognition of lead and support agencies.*
- *The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.*
- *All participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response or as the event unfolds.*

Although current emergency and disaster management operating model and chain of command may have seemed to have been clear and effective from the perspective of some stakeholders until now, several experienced and visionary emergency management professionals have been submitting for the past few decades that the current approach is nowhere near as effective as it believed to be, should be, or could be.

The assumptions and limitations of the so-called “lead agency” model and the inappropriateness of single-hazard agencies taking an overall coordination, and command and control role in large-scale or complex emergencies have been explored elsewhere in this submission. Recommendations in part of the submission instead cover the structure, functions and mandate of a reconfigured and upgraded Ministry of CDEM to a “NZ Disaster Management Agency”.

Although there is confusion some quarters about the role of emergency response in non-declared emergency responses. Lessons should be learned from the Canterbury experiences over the past decade, where very effective regional-level response coordination was provided by an emergency management office, a highly trained and competent Group Controller and Group ECC, supported by solid relationships with functional lead agencies to the region-wide snow emergency in 2006. That response did not require a declaration of a state of emergency to bring about a “significant coordinated response” or for the Group Controller to “direct and coordinate resources made available”, although the prospect of a declaration was used to encourage some agencies, NGOs, and at least one local authority to become part of the region-wide coordinated response, and follow the direction of the Group Controller.

The Canterbury snow response was able to be achieved by relying on s6 of Canterbury CDEM Group Plan<sup>3</sup>, where a declaration of a state of emergency is not required for all of the partners to the Group Plan to be required to work together as if a declaration is in effect but the emergency powers of the CDEM Act are not required. New Zealand's emergency and disaster management system would benefit from this type and scale of emergency being included in the levels of response, as a "Major Incident" requiring the identification of "Coordinating Agency", or "Coordinating Agencies" in a "Unified Control" context. The "Adverse Event" title is already embedded in agricultural emergency response management, rendering it confusing and inappropriate for use in other contexts.

Reluctance to declare a state of emergency has inhibited numerous responses in the past, including responses in Marlborough and Greater Wellington following the November 2017 Hurunui-Kaikoura earthquakes. Local authorities refused to recognise the role of the Group Controller in the initial stages of the September 2010 Canterbury earthquake response. More clarity and confidence is required in the declaration process, applying a life and property safety conscious precautionary principle, and avoiding political interference or indecision. Although s7 of the CDEM Act already requires a precautionary approach be applied throughout comprehensive emergency management where certainly cannot be achieved, all too often the an inhibited rather than precautionary approach is taken. The current guidance on the declaration process is not effective in leading decision-makers to take proactive measures to use the powers and coordinated response intent of the CDEM Act.

It is now almost a decade since the 2009 M7.8 Dusky Sound earthquake that marks the beginning of the current period of earthquake activity. Quakes since then, including the devastating toll of the 22 February 2011 quake and disruption to the North East of the South Island and the capital in November 2016, should have convinced disaster response management stakeholders and decision-makers to ensure their organisations are able to deliver their core warning and response functions following a significant earthquake. New Zealand is not currently able to meet that expectation. Considerably more investment in resilient response management infrastructure is required urgently.

#### **Recommendation 22.**

***That the current Ministry of CDEM, CDEM Group emergency management offices, and, where they exist, local emergency management offices be reformed into a new "NZ Disaster Management Agency", with staff from partner agencies seconded into key roles within the agency on a rotational basis to build inter-agency relationships, awareness, capability, and trust.***

#### **Recommendation 23.**

***That any new or revised legislation be written to clearly enable a new "NZ Disaster Management Agency" to support, coordinate and direct all other agencies in risk analysis, risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery, with urgent amendments to CDEM Act giving powers of direction to the Director of CDEM. This may require a separate pre-disaster resilience-focused "National Risk Management Authority" and a resilience-building recovery-focused "National Disaster Recovery Management Agency", to work alongside the readiness and response focused "National Disaster Management Agency".***

#### **Recommendation 24.**

***That CDEM Groups be retained following the review, reframed as "Disaster Risk Management Groups", to provide regional and local governance input, but that these be combined with "Coordinating Executive Groups" (CEG) to provide a more compulsorily inclusive, all-agencies form***

<sup>3</sup> <http://cdemcanterbury.govt.nz/media/34987/canterbury-cdem-group-plan-2014.pdf>

*of executive-led collaboration and coordination than the current local government-centric tending model.*

**Recommendation 25.**

*Local authorities should have a significant response role in the future, but focused more on ensuring the hazards and services they are responsible for, and human, technical and physical resources they have at their disposal are integrated into disaster risk, readiness, response and recovery management.*

**Recommendation 26.**

*That the CDEM Act be amended to include a section to clarify the governance leadership role of elected officials, including mayors and ministers, and unambiguously limiting the ability of elected officials at all levels of government from directly involving themselves in the management of responses to incidents, emergencies and disasters.*

**Recommendation 27.**

*That the new "NZ Disaster Management Agency" remove the current Regional Emergency Management Advisor roles and replace them with more highly trained and appropriately mandated "Regional Disaster Management Commanders" and "Local Disaster Management Controllers". Local Disaster Management Controllers being recruited from locally available, appropriately professionally trained and experienced managers from the respective local authorities, emergency services, and partner organisations, to provide command and control for protracted periods locally and to be deployed to assist readiness and response activities elsewhere.*

**Recommendation 28.**

*That the CDEM Controller Development Programme and Integrated Training Framework be extended to include response managers from all relevant response organisations, including crown entities and private businesses, that both programmes be continually improved, linked to professional development in all partner organisations, and made a compulsory element of the National Security System.*

**Recommendation 29.**

*That the training facilities of NZDF, NZ Police, FENZ, MPI, NSS, and relevant partner universities, wananga and polytechnics become integral components of a virtual "Disaster Risk Management Professional Development Centre of Excellence", led by a reformed "NZ Disaster Management Agency", to enable consistent, accessible, accredited, cost-effective online, residential, and self-directed professional development and tertiary education to be delivered across the nation. Addressing calls for expenditure on a stand-alone "Disaster Management School", in the image of the defunct, expensive, and inaccessible "Civil Defence School" of a bygone century. (A resilient National Coordination Centre network, suggested in Recommendation 34, could be designed and constructed to also provide an suite of all of government disaster response management training centres.)*

**Recommendation 30.**

*That the concept of "lead agency" and "support agency" be independently reviewed, with the consideration of the need for designated "coordinating agencies" identified for larger-scale and more complex responses, supported by proper risk analysis processes. "Functional lead agencies" be retained for specific hazards and functions, which will be located within wider responses under*



*“coordinating agencies” – in most cases a reformed “NZ Disaster Management Agency” with national, regional, unitary and local reach.*

**Recommendation 31.**

*That a linked set of secure all agencies operational and strategic intelligence “fusion centres”<sup>4</sup> be established and staffed on rotation from all key response organisation, in association national response coordination centres, to: meet multi-agency operational needs between emergencies; develop and disseminate a range of operational intelligence products on a daily basis, and; continually maintain and build the capacity and capability to meet shared situational awareness needs in multiple concurrent emergency and disaster responses.*

**Recommendation 32.**

*That a new class of emergency response of “Major Incident” be introduced to the CDEM Act, associated emergency services legislation, and any subsequent legislation, whereby “significant coordinated response” required from all relevant agencies and organisations, but other powers are not required. Declaration of a “Major Incident” being the responsibility of a “Local Disaster Management Controller”, “Regional Disaster Management Commander”, or “National Director of Disaster Management”.*

**Recommendation 33.**

*That the CDEM Act, National CDEM Plan, and associated guidance in relation to declarations of states of emergency (and “Major Incident”) be amended to provide more decision-making tools enabling the declaration of a (Major Incident or) state of emergency when there may be benefit in doing so, to ensure a coordinated response is achieved information is shared, and the public and governance are assured that an effective response is underway.*

**Recommendation 34.**

*That an urgent all of government project be initiated with the objective of acquiring a suitably resilient site in the Wellington area, to locate the design and rapid construction of a lightweight, flexible, resiliently connected, safe, self-sufficient and accessible multi-agency National Coordination Centre (NCC), including a 24/7 warning centre already agreed to, large enough to provide CIMS 2.0-based multi agency workspace for fully-staffed multi-hazard responses. The NCC should have adjacent sleeping and recreation space to enable full 24/7 staffing for a protracted response, when local infrastructure and communities are unable to meet that need.*

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-emergency-operations-centers>

**Outcome 5:** *Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies.*

- *Recognition of the modern news cycle – immediacy of social media and power of factual decisive information delivered as speedily as possible*
- *Stakeholder needs are understood (what information is required; where and how to gather the information, providing it at the right time and in the right format).*
- *Official information maintains pace with media dialogue and social media activity.*

Given the reality of contemporary media and social media, the concept of “news cycles” is increasingly out-moded. Believing that response management agencies can keep up with contemporary media is unrealistic. The challenge today and into the future is to work with, and get and remain ahead, of social and more traditional media, as the distinction between the two becomes increasingly blurred and citizens have ever more sophisticated communications tools at their disposal.

All too often the media, their needs, demands and capabilities are not adequately factored into readiness or response activities. The surprise that the then Director of CDEM, acting in the role of National Controller in the response to the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, about the demands of the media and social media on response management reflected an institutional lack of appreciation this critical aspect of contemporary emergency and disaster management. A symptom of the tendency to appoint personnel to senior disaster response management roles who, although otherwise highly confident and trusted, do not have sufficient professional grounding in contemporary comprehensive disaster risk and emergency management.

Significant advances have been made in the risk communication and emergency PIM spheres in New Zealand in the past decade, with the New Zealand component of the Australasian Emergency Media and Public Affairs (EMPA) collective setting international benchmarks for excellence in this growing sub-profession. It is crucial to note that much of the capability and expertise resides in regional and local government in New Zealand. It is crucial that local and regional PIM, and other emergency management expertise, is retained and built upon in any reorganisation of disaster readiness and response.

**Recommendation 35.**

***That an integrated, collaborative, all-agencies, all-levels approach be taken to emergency public information management (PIM) in future, with the Director of CDEM/NZ Disaster Management Agency taking responsibility for setting standards and coordinating PIM in readiness and response.***

**Recommendation 36.**

***That a 24/7 media and social media monitoring office be established to assist in meeting all of government crisis communications needs between emergencies, staffed by a core management team supplemented by communications and social media personnel rotated through the office on a regular basis, with additional experienced personnel drafted in during extended responses.***

He tono nā



Te Rūnanga o NGĀI TAHU

ki te

**TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP TO THE MINISTER OF CIVIL DEFENCE**

e pā ana ki te

**MINISTERIAL REVIEW: BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCIES IN  
NEW ZEALAND**

12 July 2017

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

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**Contact Person**

Rakihia Tau | General Manager – Strategy and Influence | Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu

s9(2)(a) | Phone s9(2)(a) | 15 Show Place, Addington | Christchurch

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 1.1. Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (Te Rūnanga) thanks the Committee for the opportunity to comment on the terms of reference of the Ministerial Review (the Review) to provide better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand.
- 1.2. Te Rūnanga supports the intent of the Review itself to, “ensure that New Zealand’s emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges.”
- 1.3. Poor performance by critical civil defence stakeholders exacerbates the vulnerability of affected constituencies and prolongs the recovery phase. The committee must drive legislative reform that is focused on accountability at all levels.
- 1.4. Te Rūnanga was involved in developing responsive and enduring legislation by reviewing the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act & Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act. The changes adopted reflected our views and our role as kaitiaki (stewards) in our takiwa. Te Rūnanga is very disappointed that this level of meaningful and impactful engagement did not materialise following the Hurunui/Kaikōura event.
- 1.5. In the Ngāi Tahu takiwā, Civil Defence must recognise and provide for our treaty partnership status.

## 2. TE RŪNANGA O NGĀI TAHU

- 2.1. This response is made on behalf of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (Te Rūnanga). Te Rūnanga is statutorily recognised as the representative tribal body of Ngāi Tahu whānui and was established as a body corporate on 24th April 1996 under section 6 of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Act 1996 (the Act).
- 2.2. We note the following relevant provisions of our constitutional documents:  
Section 3 of the Act States:  
*“This Act binds the Crown and every person (including any body politic or corporate) whose rights are affected by any provisions of this Act.”*  
Section 15(1) of the Act states:  
*“Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu shall be recognised for all purposes as the representative of Ngāi Tahu Whānui.”*
- 2.3. The Charter of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu constitutes Te Rūnanga as the kaitiaki of the tribal interests.
- 2.4. Te Rūnanga respectfully requests that the Justice and Electoral Committee accord this response the status and weight due to the tribal collective, Ngāi Tahu whānui, currently comprising over 50,000 members, registered in accordance with section 8 of the Act.

- 2.5. Notwithstanding its statutory status as the representative voice of Ngāi Tahu whānui “for all purposes”, Te Rūnanga accepts and respects the right of individuals and Papatipu Rūnanga to make their own responses in relation to this matter.

### **3. GENERAL STATEMENT OF POSITION ON THE REVIEW**

#### **3.1. Evolution:**

The current civil defence emergency management system must be updated and enhanced to give full effect to the Review’s intent.

#### **3.2. Performance Management:**

Poor performance – by critical civil defence stakeholders – is unacceptable in a disaster response scenario. It exacerbates the vulnerability of affected constituencies and prolongs the recovery phase. The committee must drive legislation that is focused on accountability at all levels.

#### **3.3. Coordination:**

Poor inter-organisational coordination between critical civil defence stakeholders must be improved. Te Rūnanga is of the view that poor coordination directly contributed to the much maligned performances of New Zealand Civil Defence in recent years. Responding to disaster scenarios is difficult enough without an internal culture that stymies effective coordination.

### **4. KEY COMMENTS**

- 4.1. Te Rūnanga brings a unique perspective to this matter. Our voice must be given credence as we were actively involved in the following emergency response situations: the Canterbury earthquakes, Hurunui/Kaikōura earthquakes and the Port Hills fires.
- 4.2. Our marae are often seen as community hubs, where affected and displaced members of the public congregate and receive care and attention (manaakitanga). In November 2016 at Kaikōura, Te Rūnanga supported manawhenua (Ngāti Kurī) by, providing volunteers, food supplies and emergency resources to uphold the mana of our people. Work undertaken by the iwi during the immediate response was directed at the wider community, which included catering over 10,000 meals to the all affected by the devastating effects of the earthquakes. For example: overseas tourists, visitors, local community, media and emergency services staff (Police, Army, Government personnel and Civil Defence).
- 4.3. Te Rūnanga was involved in developing responsive and enduring legislation by reviewing and commenting on the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act & Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act. The changes adopted not only reflected our views but that of our role as kaitiaki (stewards) in our takiwa. Te Rūnanga is very

disappointed that this level of meaningful and impactful engagement did not materialise following the Hurunui/Kaikōura event.

- 4.4. As a Treaty partner, Te Rūnanga was very disappointed that iwi were not provided for on the Technical Advisory Group of the Review.

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 5.1. An amendment to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 and other legislation related to emergency response is made to specifically reference the principles of Ti Tiriti o Waitangi. Ensuring iwi are recognised as partners in emergency response and recovery.
- 5.2. Iwi are acknowledged as having a significant role in emergency response and recovery.
- 5.3. Relationships, Memorandum of Understanding and protocols between Te Rūnanga o Ngāi o Tahu and Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management are embedded as soon as possible, with clarity on key points of contact agreed.
- 5.4. Increased Ministry involvement, direction and support from a national level is necessary following significant disaster situations to support small local councils recovery i.e. Hurunui/Kaikōura earthquakes.

## 6. CONCLUSION

- 6.1. In the Ngāi Tahu takiwā, Civil Defence must recognise and provide for our treaty partnership status. Civil Defence must take the necessary steps to create a culture and an internal understanding that views Te Rūnanga as an important part of the emergency response eco-system
- 6.2. Te Rūnanga will continue to operate and respond to the needs of our constituency autonomously from the Civil Defence system. However, Civil Defence need to provide for the value, resources and connections that Te Rūnanga possess and could therefore lend to an emergency response scenario.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me,

Nāku noa, nā



Rakihia Tau  
**GENERAL MANAGER, STRATEGY AND INFLUENCE**

- Encl.** Appendix One: Text of Crown Apology  
Appendix Two: Map of Ngāi Tahu takiwā

## APPENDIX ONE: TEXT OF CROWN APOLOGY

The following is text of the Crown apology contained in the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998.

### **Part One – Apology by the Crown to Ngāi Tahu**

#### **Section 6 Text in English**

The text of the apology in English is as follows:

- 1 The Crown recognises the protracted labours of the Ngāi Tahu ancestors in pursuit of their claims for redress and compensation against the Crown for nearly 150 years, as alluded to in the Ngāi Tahu proverb ‘He mahi kai takata, he mahi kai hoaka’ (‘It is work that consumes people, as greenstone consumes sandstone’). The Ngāi Tahu understanding of the Crown’s responsibilities conveyed to Queen Victoria by Matiaha Tiramorehu in a petition in 1857, guided the Ngāi Tahu ancestors. Tiramorehu wrote:

*“This was the command thy love laid upon these Governors ... that the law be made one, that the commandments be made one, that the nation be made one, that the white skin be made just equal with the dark skin, and to lay down the love of thy graciousness to the Māori that they dwell happily ... and remember the power of thy name.”*

The Crown hereby acknowledges the work of the Ngāi Tahu ancestors and makes this apology to them and to their descendants.

- 2 The Crown acknowledges that it acted unconscionably and in repeated breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in its dealings with Ngāi Tahu in the purchases of Ngāi Tahu land. The Crown further acknowledges that in relation to the deeds of purchase it has failed in most material respects to honour its obligations to Ngāi Tahu as its Treaty partner, while it also failed to set aside adequate lands for Ngāi Tahu’s use, and to provide adequate economic and social resources for Ngāi Tahu.
- 3 The Crown acknowledges that, in breach of Article Two of the Treaty, it failed to preserve and protect Ngāi Tahu’s use and ownership of such of their land and valued possessions as they wished to retain.
- 4 The Crown recognises that it has failed to act towards Ngāi Tahu reasonably and with the utmost good faith in a manner consistent with the honour of the Crown. That failure is referred to in the Ngāi Tahu saying ‘Te Hapa o Niu Tireni!’ (‘The unfulfilled promise of New Zealand’). The Crown further recognises that its failure always to act in good faith deprived Ngāi Tahu of the opportunity to develop and kept the tribe for several generations in a state of poverty, a state referred to in the proverb ‘Te mate o te iwi’ (‘The malaise of the tribe’).
- 5 The Crown recognises that Ngāi Tahu has been consistently loyal to the Crown, and that the tribe has honoured its obligations and responsibilities under the




Treaty of Waitangi and duties as citizens of the nation, especially, but not exclusively, in their active service in all of the major conflicts up to the present time to which New Zealand has sent troops. The Crown pays tribute to Ngāi Tahu's loyalty and to the contribution made by the tribe to the nation.

6. The Crown expresses its profound regret and apologises unreservedly to all members of Ngāi Tahu Whānui for the suffering and hardship caused to Ngāi Tahu, and for the harmful effects which resulted to the welfare, economy and development of Ngāi Tahu as a tribe. The Crown acknowledges that such suffering, hardship and harmful effects resulted from its failures to honour its obligations to Ngāi Tahu under the deeds of purchase whereby it acquired Ngāi Tahu lands, to set aside adequate lands for the tribe's use, to allow reasonable access to traditional sources of food, to protect Ngāi Tahu's rights to pounamu and such other valued possessions as the tribe wished to retain, or to remedy effectually Ngāi Tahu's grievances.
7. The Crown apologises to Ngāi Tahu for its past failures to acknowledge Ngāi Tahu rangatiratanga and mana over the South Island lands within its boundaries, and, in fulfilment of its Treaty obligations, the Crown recognises Ngāi Tahu as the tangata whenua of, and as holding rangatiratanga within, the Takiwā of Ngāi Tahu Whānui.

Accordingly, the Crown seeks on behalf of all New Zealanders to atone for these acknowledged injustices, so far as that is now possible, and, with the historical grievances finally settled as to matters set out in the Deed of Settlement signed on 21 November 1997, to begin the process of healing and to enter a new age of co-operation with Ngāi Tahu.”

APPENDIX TWO: NGĀI TAHU TAKIWĀ



Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

**From:** [Jake Brookie](#)  
**To:** [Better Responses to Natural Disasters & Other Emergencies \[DPMC\]](#)  
**Subject:** Feedback for Advisory Group  
**Date:** Friday, 21 July 2017 2:15:18 p.m.

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21<sup>st</sup> of July 2017

To whom it may concern,

My name is Jake Brookie and I submit these comments on the Ministerial Civil Defence Review. I am employed by and volunteer with a Territorial Authority (but am making this submission as an individual) and my duties include educating the public about Civil Defence and natural hazards. Since talking to the public it has become obvious that a great deal of confusion exists regarding who is 'in charge' of Civil Defence in New Zealand and I believe such confusion is not in anyone's interest, particularly in a disaster.

Civil Defence is one of the most important duties any government agency undertakes. However by its very nature Civil Defence involves preparing for the unexpected and trying to 'manage' a disaster- no one system will be perfect every time and there will never be a 'one size fits all' approach to preparing for an emergency. Our current system still needs streamlining and simplifying in such a way that balances clean lines of communication with local flexibility.

Current practice for Civil Defence is that of 'act locally, coordinate regionally support nationally' and has been in place since the 1950's. Since then, new communication and transportation options have reduced the likelihood of a Territorial Authority being cut off for a substantial amount of time. In addition many Territorial Authorities are placed close together so having two distinct 'chains of command' can cause confusion in a disaster, as has been reported after the 2011 tragedy in Canterbury. Therefore, I would support a new mantra of 'plan locally, respond regionally and support nationally'.

Such practice would be achieved by giving CDEM Groups the powers of emergency response that currently rest with Territorial Authorities. The reasons for this are three-fold. Firstly, this would reduce the number of Civil Defence units currently active and strike a balance between streamlining the Civil Defence system and ensuring local input. Secondly, Regional Council boundaries are based around river catchments and natural features increasing the likelihood of their jurisdiction encompassing localized disasters. Territorial Authorities, on the other hand, are based around communities of interest and not the fault lines and geological features that may pose natural hazards. Lastly, by retaining the statutory membership of CDEM Groups Territorial Authorities still have a role in preparing for a disaster.

To minimize confusion over who is in charge of Civil Defense I propose that each CDEM Group operate a website and 'head office' where information about all local agencies is presented- it shouldn't matter if submissions are sought from the Regional Council, a Territorial Authority or Central Government as the CDEM Group is the 'one-stop shop' for

everything to do with Civil Defence in that region.

This being said, Territorial Authorities need recognition in a new Civil Defence structure beyond membership of CDEM Groups. Territorial Authorities should have legal duties to make Civil Defence plans and objectives for their areas to submit to each CDEM Group for approval. As Territorial Authorities have responsibilities to monitor natural hazards (under the RMA) ensure a safe drinking water and sanitation (under the Health Act) and to gauge the risks from earthquake prone buildings during a disaster (under the recent Building Act amendment) they are well placed to draft these plans. In addition, Territorial Authorities should ensure that space is made available for those evacuated during a disaster and their elected members are briefed by relevant agencies on the status of any recovery efforts in the event of a disaster. The powers of Territorial Authorities to inspect buildings after an earthquake should be retained, as should their duties to ensure that they can operate as well as they can during and after a disaster. All local authorities should be able to declare an emergency in the manner that they do now.

The role of central government should remain more or less the same as it is currently. Disasters impact different areas to different degrees and areas may need to plan and respond differently depending on natural hazards, the scale of the emergency and demographics. Giving CDEM Groups the powers to respond to an emergency strikes the right balance between local input and central control. But above all this should not be a matter of politics, rather a matter of saving lives and protecting communities.

I thank those involved in the review for allowing submissions and I wish you all the best in your report.

Jake Brookie

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Hon Nathan Guy  
Member of Parliament

R D 3  
Whakatane 3193

s9(2)(a)

19 July 2017

Civil Defence Review

Please find attached a report from our Branch outlining the problems we had with Civil Defence during the April 2017 Edgumbe flooding.

It was disappointing also as we had a branch meeting with two people from Civil defence in March, but their responses during an emergency were never discussed with us. This made the coordination problems even more frustrating. I had the rural community together at the meeting so we had some organisation in place. But this fell apart with this civil defence action as they were out on their own, dictating everything from in Whakatane, and they did not come to talk to us at our emergency base at Wilson James' house.

From talking to people at Waimana yesterday, they didn't have cellphones for 3 days as the battery was low at the cellphone tower. Could radio telephones be placed in rural towns in key areas, to aid communication? They were isolated due to flooding, and could not have called for help eg for a rescue helicopter.

Your faithfully



Robyn Askey  
Branch Chair Whakatane and District Federated Farmers

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Civil Defence Emergency Management

### Notes for the Review of Rangitaiki River Scheme

#### ACCESS & EVACUATION RESPONSE

##### Introduction

On the 6<sup>th</sup> April 2017, there was a breach of the bank of the Rangitaiki River and we had to urgently truck 600 of our Cows and R2Yr Heifers off our farm situated at <sup>s9(2)(a)</sup> [REDACTED]

To load 600 animals off our farm requires 12 truck and trailers. A stock truck and trailer takes 1 hour to load, it took approx. 12 hours to remove all cows and in calf heifers. It was lucky that Corrie made the decision early, despite being under immense pressure.

##### How the events unfolded.

The morning of the 6<sup>th</sup> April 2017 began with Corrie visiting our runoff at 241 Otakiri Road, he saw a neighbour on Otakiri Road, waiting for a fire engine to rescue his family. Corrie saw the plight of this family and returned quickly with his tractor and hay trailer, backing the trailer up to the family home, he was able to get the wife and 5 children out of their section and reunited with their car on Otakiri Road.

He then took his tractor and trailer into the Edgumbe Township to help evacuate members of the public. When the water levels on Railway road got too high he then inspected the Omeheu Adjunct Canal and decided it was time to get his 500 cows and 100 R2Yr Heifers off the farm. There were no trucks available right then, however after what seemed like an eternity the trucking company (Heikell's) understood the urgency and co-ordinated a well-oiled rescue effort. We trucked the cows to the close farms first and the furthest away last to ensure all stock could be removed. We shared the available trucks with other farmers in the same predicament and Heikell's called in the help of other carrying companies in a co-ordinated effort. We understand that 3,500 cows were removed in a 24 hour period.

The cows were moved to our friends who we asked to help and later to other farmers outside the district who offered to help.

##### Things that hampered our ability to save our farm and animals.

###### CATTLE TRUCKS TURNED AROUND

Within a couple of hours of the decision to evacuate our farm, the police had set up cordons in the Edgumbe Township. These cordons stopped cattle trucks from reaching our farm. There was one route into our farm that was safe and yet the cordon turned a truck away. This action was wasting valuable time, the water was rising, (at one period at a rate 100mm an hour), it could have caused a massive animal welfare issue, and common sense needs to be used.

Corrie had to stop loading trucks and convince the Police that the trucks had to be let through.

### HELP WAS NOT ALLOWED IN

Our neighbour and friend Bernard Virbickas was turned away at the safe route into the farm, by the Police cordon, there was not co-ordination or use of good judgement. Our phones were going mad with offers of help but it was near impossible to get in.

### NO LOCAL KNOWLEDGE

The cordon's would not let anyone in.

There was no place you could go to get a pass. There was no system to let legitimate, law abiding citizens into their properties. Even with ID and proof of where we lived, we could not check on our farm. There are things that farmers can do, if allowed in, things like:

- Checking water levels. We were able to ask the Regional Council to cut a hole in the Omeheu canal bank, once the water level of the canal was lower than that of the farm. If we could have got into our farm earlier this could have drained our farm and Edgecumbe township earlier. The Regional Council staff are busy and they need local farmers with practical knowledge of levels and things to assist.
- Culverts need to be checked and flood gates shut or opened. We have a Regional council flood gate on our farm, which assists with removing water from the southern part of Edgecumbe Township. There was an article in the local paper, how a flapper gate was open when the flood hit, this gate is operated by BOP Regional Council, we were concerned about our cows, we did not give the flapper gate a second thought, but no one could shut this gate because we couldn't get back onto our farm.
- Reduce Loss - our house, did not flood, you could safely enter our drive, our power was turned off as a precaution for 9 days, if we could have got into our property we could have saved items in our fridge and deep freeze.
- Reduce Risk – we know of incidences where farmers and their families found ways around the cordons to get in. These were riskier paths into their farms, but with a cordon that you cannot get through with common sense there was no alternative. Passports had to be got to allow family members to get to work overseas. The drive to our farm was dry and yet we could not enter to get clothes for our farm work, there were a lot of statutory days (Easter and Anzac day) we were busy drying off and checking on cows, there was little time to shop! The alternative was to run through a maize paddock, cross a bridge, row to our farm house, when all the time we could have safely driven in, if only we were allowed to get through a cordon.

### Solutions

- When there is a civil defence emergency there should be somewhere local farmers can register to get through the cordons.
- We need farmers looking after farming neighbours. We had visits from several agencies, to check on our well-being. We are a resilient lot. In an emergency, Farmers are the best people to look after Farmers, not people from the city that don't know about animals or farming or the local geography.
- Why were people like Massey University representatives allowed onto our farm? These people entered our property and had no knowledge of the reasons why a lame cow was left behind? Farmers are the best people to look after their livestock, let them in!
- In fact it can be a bit annoying having numerous people who we don't know driving into our property asking us "how we feel" when there are important tasks like draining water, picking up rubbish, restoring fencing and under-sowing paddocks to do. What we need is real physical help like pumps, seed and fertiliser. This whole wellbeing aspect has got out of hand!
- We understand that Civil Defence is concerned about looting, but there should be a system where trust worthy people can accompany farmers to check on canals, culverts, flaps, lame cows, water levels etc. **We need farmers looking after farmers with passes to get through the cordons.**

Corrie & Donna Smit  
Flood Affected Farmers  
s9(2)(a)



To: Jeremy Corban.  
Head of the Project Team

Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disaster and Other Emergencies in New Zealand.

This is not a formal submission as I am aware that the closing date has passed.

Having only just become aware of this important review I offer the attached information input document which is relevant to Outcome 5 of the Terms of Reference of the Review.

As part of my past professional life I represented the UK at the DVB developing technical standards for broadcast and I remain aware of current DVB projects, one of which is relevant to New Zealand.

The DVB EWS project is currently in its information and requirements gathering stage which is why it will be best for New Zealand to be directly involved from an early stage along with the other thought leaders such as Finland and countries in the Pacific region.

I am currently travelling in the UK, Malaysia and Singapore, on business and will be back home in New Zealand by the 9<sup>th</sup> September and look forward to an opportunity to discuss this further with the Commission or its secretariat.

Chris Hibbert.

s9(2)(a)



Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

## Information Paper: Digital Emergency Warning Systems and Public Networks

### Digital Video Broadcasting


The Geneva-based DVB is a consortium of 160 of the world's leading digital technology companies, and includes manufacturers, software developers, network operators, broadcasters and regulators. It designs open technical standards for the delivery of digital broadcast and IP-related services.

The DVB Project uses member working groups to develop the specifications for digital delivery systems, which international standards bodies such as ETSI or CENELEC then adopt. The DVB then promotes those standards for worldwide adoption and deployment. The outcome is a consistent approach by Regulators, with the benefit of mass, low cost manufacturing equipment to stable standardised specifications.

### Digital Emergency Warning System (EWS)

The DVB has just begun to producing the requirements for a digital specification for EWS that, like other DVB work, can be expected to become the international norm. The Asia Broadcasting Union, and the Myanmar and Finnish Governments are already participating.

The DVB has adopted the following level model:



The DVB is welcoming input from all interested parties who wish to influence the specification and of digital EWS systems, standards and operations.

## DVB in New Zealand

DVB systems are deployed in New Zealand for Digital Terrestrial and Digital Satellite broadcasting providing regional and national reception coverage. DVB specifications are also used for carriage of media and data over Internet Protocol (IP) systems

A DVB Early Warning System deployed by DVB broadcast and IP delivery would seem to be a natural fit with the major infrastructure already in place in New Zealand.

## Chris Hibbert

Chris Hibbert has over 40 years experience in broadcasting and communications engineering having held senior technical management positions in the UK and roles in New Zealand, including:

Principle Engineer with the Independent Broadcasting Authority.

Technical Consultant for the UK Government Department of Trade & Industry.

Technical Director - Independent Television Networks.

Technical Director – Independent Television Digital

Vice President for Media Technologies - The Walt Disney Company.

Member of the DVB Steering Board and Chair of a number of DVB sub groups.

Special Technical Advisor to The NZ Digital Television Group which developed as NZ Free View.

Chris Hibbert is a NZ citizen who emigrated from the UK in 2008. He is based in Dunedin, from where he continues to operate as a technical consultant on digital specifications and standards, system design and technical development, related regulatory issues and implementation.

[ends]

s9(2)(a)



Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence





18 August 2017

The Secretariat  
Technical Advisory Group  
CDEM Response Review

By email:  
[bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz](mailto:bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz)

Dear Sir/Madam

As Chair of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Coordinating Executive Group, I wish to strongly support the attached submission from our Rural Advisory Group (RAG).

In his submission, Mr Clough has pointed out that the strong emphasis and importance that was placed on rural response and recovery during and following an emergency event disappeared with the demise of the former Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in the late 1980s. Following a number of significant climatic events in the 1990s and early 2000s, a Rural Advisory Group was established in Taranaki to fill the gap.

There is no doubt that the Taranaki RAG has worked well for our region. In recent years the RAG has been an important and effective partner in assisting with a prompt and appropriate response for our rural sector. Its success can be judged by the fact that several other regions are currently establishing their own Rural Advisory Groups.

As Chair of the Taranaki Coordinating Executive Group, I strongly endorse the submission that Rural Advisory groups be established throughout NZ as part of the current review.

Yours sincerely

**Craig Stevenson**  
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## Submission

### Submission on Ministerial Review:

### Better responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand

From: Rural Advisory Group, Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management

Date: 18<sup>th</sup> August, 2017

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# Submission to DPCMC on the Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand

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## 1. Executive Summary

1.1 The Rural Advisory Group of Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management welcomes the opportunity to submit on the terms of reference of the Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disaster and Other Emergencies in New Zealand.

1.2 The Taranaki Rural Advisory Group recommends that:

- 1.2.1 That the “Rural Sector” be recognised as a separate identity in the planning process for Civil Defence Emergency Planning
- 1.2.2 That the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), model be updated to recognise the importance of Rural impact within the CIMS Functions. This will give effect to the development of formal recognition and incorporation into the Group Plans and response and recovery efforts.
- 1.2.3 That MCDEM acknowledges the critical importance of Rural Advisory Groups, and encourages all other CDEM Groups to establish such groups in their regions, so that emergency response and recovery can be managed more effectively for rural disaster impact.

## 2. Background

- 2.1. Prior to the early 1990's, the responsibility for managing civil defence emergencies in the rural sector was the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
- 2.2. The Advisory Services division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was responsible for managing climatic adverse events and required to have comprehensive plans in place to manage such events.
- 2.3. Bio-Security emergency management was handled by the Animal Health division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, who were also required to have comprehensive plans for response to bio-security breaches.



- 2.4. In the late 1980's the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was significantly restructured, and both of these divisions ceased to exist – and their replacements were very clear that they no longer had responsibility for civil defence management in the rural areas.
- 2.5. From this point onwards, there was a huge vacuum in the rural areas in relation to civil defence emergency management responsibility.
- 2.6. In Taranaki, when civil defence emergency exercises were held, this became very evident that this huge gap was a serious anomaly in the civil defence plans for a region that had the majority of its area as rural.
- 2.7. This was the motivation for establishing a Rural Advisory Group within the Taranaki Group area.

### 3. Membership of the Taranaki Rural Advisory Group

- 3.1. Co-ordination and advisory groups ensure effective liaison between CDEM and key stakeholders in the community, and are a key pathway to sector networks. They are a source of interested, trained, experienced personnel who provide specialist advice on operational planning and expertise to assist emergency management.
- 3.2. The Rural Advisory Group provides a forum for discussion and planning, for issues relevant to the rural sector, and has the responsibilities of:
  - Providing advice to the CDEM CEG and Joint Committee on rural issues and reduction initiatives
  - Developing and maintaining a network of contacts for the rural sector throughout the Taranaki region
  - Providing technical agricultural advice to the Controller during an emergency that may enhance emergency response efforts
  - Assisting the emergency response effort to establish priorities for assistance to rural communities and individuals affected
    - Encouraging continuity planning across the rural sector
  - Liaising with the Welfare Co-ordination Group
  - Assisting the Civil Defence and the Ministry of Primary Industry (MPI) recovery effort to establish priorities for assistance to rural communities and individuals affected by the adverse event.
- 3.3. The membership of the Taranaki Rural Advisory Group includes the four Taranaki Councils, significant rural industry organisations and organisations with significant networks through the rural area are also members of our rural advisory group.

3.4. The members comprise:

- Fonterra
- Meat industry representatives
- Poultry industry
- Federated Farmers
- Taranaki Rural Support Trust
- Road Transport Association
- Taranaki Veterinary Associations
- Livestock Improvement Corporation
- Dairy NZ Consulting Officer Service
- Beef and Lamb Advisory Service
- Rural Neighbourhood Watch
- Stock and station industry
- Ministry for Primary Industries
- Assure Quality
- Four Taranaki Councils (1x Regional, 3x TLAs)

3.5. This advisory group has terms of reference and has an operations procedure manual to direct its operations, and these are regularly updated.

## 4. Organisational Capability

4.1. Some members of the Rural Advisory Group, specifically Fonterra and the Meat Processing companies have trained emergency response teams ready to respond to a civil defence emergency once it occurs.

4.2. These teams are trained to a very high degree, and at least to the same level as members of civil defence organisations, and it is vitally important that the capabilities of these organisations can be efficiently used and co-ordinated within a whole civil defence emergency response programme.

4.3. These organisations are very willing to be involved in our rural advisory group, because they can see the benefits not only to themselves, but how they can help their clients in civil defence emergencies.

4.4. Part of our work in the Rural Advisory Group is to get a comprehensive database of each of our contributing members, and a full understanding of their capabilities, so that they can be harnessed in such civil defence emergencies.

## 5. Effectiveness of the Rural Advisory Group

- 5.1. The effectiveness of having a working Rural Advisory Group was demonstrated in the 2015 floods covering Taranaki and the Horizons district.
- 5.2. As soon as the floods hit, a meeting of the Rural Advisory Group was convened in New Plymouth. All the major players concerned with this event were all present at this meeting. This enabled the compilation of all intelligence in relation to the event from the networks of the various organisations to gain a strong picture of the size and intensity of the event, and determine the priorities for the initial response.
- 5.3. The collaborative process with the Rural Advisory Group and its members enabled the capabilities of various organisations to be co-ordinated and managed, so that these organisations could be used to maximum effect in supporting the rural sector, and also that duplication of effort would be minimised.
- 5.4. The Rural Advisory Group continued to meet frequently over the next month, and was the focal point of the response to this emergency in Taranaki. This process was generally regarded as enhancing the ability to respond and to lead into the recovery situation for Taranaki.
- 5.5. As a result of this experience, the Horizons Civil Defence organisation has begun the process of establishing a Rural Advisory Group in their region, having recognised the significant advantage Taranaki had in its organisation in the emergency situation. Waikato CDEDM Group is likewise in the process of establishing and developing a Rural Advisory Group for the Waikato in their emergency management system and Wairarapa is doing the same for that region.
- 5.6. **It is our submission that Rural Advisory Groups should be established throughout the country.**
- 5.7. Rural Advisory Groups would provide a comprehensive cover of the rural areas in terms of emergency management, as it was back in the pre-1990 period when the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries had responsibilities for this.

## 6. Update to the New Zealand CIMS Model

- 6.1. It is the observation of the Taranaki Rural Advisory Group of the number of adverse weather events that occur in New Zealand.
- 6.2. Statistics New Zealand reveal that main urban areas cover 5,078 square kilometres, 1.9 percent of New Zealand's land area, the majority of these (80%) located in the North Island.
- 6.3. 45% is comprised of rural areas with high, moderate or low urban influence – the productive rural sector.
- 6.4. Highly rural/remote areas dominate New Zealand's remaining land area (139,468 km<sup>2</sup> or 53.1 percent of the total area). Much of this area is uninhabited, or very sparsely settled, since it includes mountainous areas and New Zealand's vast conservation estate.
- 6.5. Statistics New Zealand states that in 2012 pricing agriculture contributed 5.0 percent (\$10.6 billion) to New Zealand's gross domestic product (GDP) in the year ended March 2012, and employed 105,576 (5.3 of people employed).
- 6.6. Given the significant land mass of New Zealand used in rural related activities, adverse weather events impact a substantial area of the New Zealand, and given its contribution to the New Zealand to gross domestic product and employment, to the economy.
- 6.7. The rural sector therefore is an important component of the Nation's community make up and needs to have a comprehensive organisation in place to be ready for adverse events that do occur, and will occur in the future.
- 6.8. In Taranaki CDEM Groups experience the rural advisory structure gives a significantly enhanced capability through its relationship with all the key players in the rural sector, and we believe that the formation of Rural Advisory Groups across the CDEM Groups will add substantially to the ability to do that.
- 6.9. To give greater effect to the rural sector, and reflect its significance to New Zealand economy, it is recommended for this structure to be recognised within the total CDEM structure, and that the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) model be updated to recognise the importance of Rural impact within the CIMS Functions.

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