



He Whenua Taurikura

New Zealand's Hui on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

HUI SUMMARY AND COMPENDIUM

15–16 June 2021

Christchurch Town Hall

Ōtautahi, Christchurch

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Hui Background

He Whenua Taurikura 2021 was New Zealand's first hui on countering terrorism and violent extremism.

The name 'He Whenua Taurikura' means 'a country at peace'. The name was presented to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) by Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori (the Māori Language Commission). We are grateful to the Commission for this name, which encapsulates the aim of the hui.

He Whenua Taurikura responds to Recommendation 16 of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjids: *that the Government... host an annual hui, to bring together relevant central and local government agencies, communities, civil society, the private sector and researchers to create opportunities to build relationships and share understanding of countering violent extremism and terrorism.*

The goals of the hui were to promote public conversation, understanding and research on radicalisation; look at how to challenge hate-motivated extremist ideologies; and cover priorities to address New Zealand's terrorism and violent extremism issues.

Over 340 people attended He Whenua Taurikura 2021 in person. Approximately one third of attendees were from academia, one third were from communities and civil society, and one third were representatives of central and local government. We thank all of those who took the time to attend the hui, and contribute their expertise and lived experiences, with the aim of contributing to a country at peace.

A welcome reception was held for all attendees on 14 June, with a mihi whakatau led by Ngāi Tūāhuriri (Ngāi Tahu) and words of welcome from the Honourable Lianne Dalziel, Mayor of Christchurch, and Professor Cheryl de la Rey, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Canterbury. This was followed by the two full days of the hui sessions on 15 and 16 June.

Videos of the sessions were made publicly available live and after the event for those who were unable to attend.

DPMC was the overall lead for the hui, supported by the Visits and Ceremonial Office (VCO) of the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) as the delivery lead.

He Whenua Taurikura will be an annual hui, to be held in future years at a variety of venues across Aotearoa New Zealand.

This hui summary and compendium has been produced by DPMC based on notes taken during the sessions. This record of the hui is not intended to fully capture all discussions and statements made by speakers. Videos of all panel discussions and other sessions are available on the DPMC website.

All statements should be attributed to the speakers that made them, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand government or any other organisation.



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Attendees and Speakers

Terrorism and violent extremism are complex issues, with many aspects that are at times contentious. The hui aimed to create space for active participation by a diverse range of contributors and stakeholders, including but significantly beyond traditional national security perspectives, and to encompass a range of Māori, social sciences and humanities disciplines, and those working on diversity and social cohesion.

As diverse a range of participants and attendees as possible was therefore sought through specific invitations, targeted promotion and wider publicity prior to the event. Given the widespread national interest in addressing terrorism, violent extremism and related issues, there was a focus on inviting participants who either have substantial academic or professional experience in this subject matter across government, academia, the private sector, and civil society, and/or are community leaders or members with lived experiences that are vital to conversations designed to address this threat.

In considering who would speak on the panel discussions and other sessions, we sought to have a range of views represented. We had an obligation to ensure that participants not only brought expertise in the topics they would be discussing but also that a diversity of backgrounds and range of perspectives were represented.

Across the five panel discussions, we sought to have a balance between different viewpoints, including across government, academia and civil society. We also aimed to ensure a gender balance and a cross-representation of different faiths and ethnicities.

As part of this process, prominent national organisations from communities in New Zealand that are recognised as being at heightened risk from terrorism and violent extremism were asked to nominate panellists. One nominee from each of these groups was selected to participate as a panel member.

None of the panel members were expected in any way to represent an entire community when they spoke. Other than providing guidance on the panel topics and facilitating the panel discussions, we did not seek to influence what any of the panel members said. Any views expressed by the panel members were their own.

Given the quantity of excellent potential speakers, we anticipate that future He Whenua Taurikura hui will seek to create space for a broad range of diverse and different speakers.



Session Summaries, Day One

Panel 1: Terrorism Challenges: the dynamic nature of the terrorism and violent extremism risk

Panel members: Cecile Hillyer (Chair), Dr John Battersby, Rebecca Kitteridge, Cameron Bayly, Dr Chris Wilson

Cecile Hillyer: Cecile leads the International Security and Disarmament Division in the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. She was appointed to the concurrent role of Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism in May 2020.

Dr John Battersby: John is a Teaching Fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Wellington, lecturing in Intelligence and Counter Terrorism.

Dr Chris Wilson: Chris is senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations and the Programme Director of the Master of Conflict and Terrorism Studies at the University of Auckland. He researches and teaches political violence.

Rebecca Kitteridge: Rebecca is Director-General of Security at the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS). She was appointed to this role in May 2014, having previously been the Secretary of the Cabinet and Clerk of the Executive Council, within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Cameron Bayly¹: is Chief Counter-Terrorism Adviser, National Security Group, New Zealand Police.

Summary of what the panel was asked to discuss:

- Terrorism and violent extremism are complex issues, whose nature and scale has changed dramatically as the world has become increasingly interconnected. The attacks in Christchurch on 15 March 2019 show how terrorism trends can manifest in Aotearoa New Zealand with tragic consequences, and have both national and international ramifications.
- This panel discussed the evolution of Aotearoa New Zealand's terrorism and violent extremism risk in a global context, looking at changing trends over time. It will examine the impact of these trends, and look to the national and international environment to identify the current and emerging challenges for Aotearoa New Zealand.
- Panellists discussed the nature of the risk in Aotearoa New Zealand, and shifts in recent years. They also discussed international trends and emerging forms of terrorism and violent extremism.

¹ Cameron Bayly kindly agreed to participate in this panel discussion at late notice, as a replacement for Detective Superintendent Greg Nicholls, New Zealand Police who was unavailable to attend.





Discussion highlights:

Dr John Battersby:

John began by discussing historical moments in modern terrorism such as plane hijackings, noting many terrorism trends aren't new. 24-hour TV coverage amplified terrorism incidents, creating a platform and response reaction. Now, social media provides an unedited stage where would-be attackers can also share and learn.

In New Zealand, counter-terrorism and other national security issues were seldom discussed before 15 March. Security is aspirational: we can never guarantee against incidents. There is no consensus around the definition of terrorism internationally, but in New Zealand the legal definition in the Terrorism Suppression Act is often used.

Perpetrators of terrorism who are socially and mentally vulnerable are encouraged to perpetrate crimes of others, blurring the line between victim and perpetrator.

He acknowledged the setting up of the hui, but noted that learning from the last terrorist attack will not necessarily prepare us for the next one.

Dr Chris Wilson:

15 March 2019 was a 'watershed' moment for New Zealand. It forces members of a movement to decide if they want to support the actions of an attacker and causes others to believe they can emulate attacks.

New Zealand doesn't collect hate crime data, so has no baseline of these actions and perpetrators. Chris has compiled some hate crime data from media reporting which shows that verbal and physical intimidation spiked after 15 March; terrorist attacks provoke certain members of society to act out.



The greatest risk is individuals acting alone, posing a challenge to our security agencies. It is difficult to know who will take the final step, some will do it for fame, others because they are facing a personal crisis.

The threat is also from extremist engagement online, where strands of extremism interact. They encourage each other, provide a space to cross-fertilise ideas, and create common enemies and a common identity.

Rebecca Kitteridge:

The Royal Commission of Inquiry concluded that New Zealand doesn't talk about national security, making these forums useful. We have a responsibility to learn and reframe what national security should mean for New Zealand: we all have a role.

New Zealand's violent extremism narratives are driven by overseas trends, but there is a realistic chance that 15 March could inspire another attack. The two most common forms of ideology are identity-motivated and faith-inspired, but increasingly diversifying and overlapping ideologies learn from each other. The NZSIS assesses that should another attack occur in New Zealand it will likely be carried out by a lone actor, and identity-motivated is more likely than faith-inspired. It is most likely that readily accessible weapons, like knives, would be used.

There are practical policy steps we can take:

- a. We can respond to threats by building public engagement and linking engagement to New Zealand values (openness, the importance of wellbeing, and the rule of law).
- b. We can all play our part in creating a confident and inclusive response. We need to communicate messages for awareness, but in a way to avoid panic. NZSIS has changed its terminology to avoid perceptions of targeting communities and help create relationships of trust with communities.
- c. New Zealand's response to COVID-19 tracing shows that there can be a good discussion about data use. Data use in a pandemic is different to that for national security, but the COVID-19 response shows us a 'measured and informed discussion about privacy is important'.

Cameron Bayly:

The internet gives reassurance to extremists that they can make their mark, and means people can assemble a grab-bag of ideologies. It removes the advantage of distance and allows people to frame local problems against international backdrops. In some cases, forums only contain one New Zealander.

Cameron discussed the importance of public reporting, including of hate crimes. NZ Police need to think about harm caused, but they must operate under a legal framework and whether a person has intent and capability to cause harm. Some constraints are important, even if frustrating. How fast or slow NZ Police can move depends on information at hand and technical barriers.



Reporting is only half the story; sometimes the report is a hoax, sometimes NZ Police find more alarming things than what was reported. New Zealand came close around the time of 15 March to having two other incidents. In both cases, NZ Police received only one public report. These could have been deprioritised, but staff decided to look further. The difference between these and the tragic events of 15 March is “one vague report”.

Thoughts on policy recommendations:

- a. We cannot always be successful, but we can build social cohesion and safer environments (e.g. firearms work, and working with social media platforms), and invest in our shared future. Communities have an important role to play.
- b. Detecting threats is vital, and this includes serious violent hate crimes.
- c. Public reporting is important.
- d. We must reflect on how dynamic the threat is, and we need broader conversations to understand how the threat is evolving.

Questions and comments:

There was a focus on New Zealand in the presentation, and lack of reference to international trends – as the threat is international, the outlook and response must be too.

The panellists agreed with the comment, and Rebecca and Cameron both mentioned work by government with international partners.

How is trust and confidence being built in New Zealand, and the degree of understanding of the issues here, noting trust is a precursor to dealing with terrorism.

Trust and confidence are important – and situations such as this hui and public engagement should help to build trust, in the longer-term.

What is the definition of young people in the context of Dr Wilson's presentation?

Chris said he defined this as late teens to early thirties, and he and John Battersby discussed the influence of the internet.

Hate crime data and the spike Dr Wilson mentioned may be connected to an increased willingness to report. Also questioned the term 'lone actor' as it doesn't reference the influence of online communities

Speakers clarified that lone actor refers to the planning of an attack, and agreed that lone actor terrorists will often have connections with others. Chris agreed there is likely a reporting bias, but the spike was so significant after 15 March it was worth noting.

What is the role of local governments and communities in prevention?

Structures are different overseas, including in the United Kingdom, but local bodies have a role to play, and are involved in social cohesion work

What are the definitions of terrorism – is there a single agreed one?

Panellists noted that definitions will differ, between individuals, agencies and countries.

Why was Aramoana not considered a terrorist attack?

Aramoana was the first mass killing with military weapons in New Zealand, and a missed opportunity to change gun laws. Panellists noted that the ideological motive is important in terrorism – NZSIS are specifically tasked to look at ideologically motivated violence.



Given New Zealand's terrorism history and the definition of terrorism, why are the Urewera raids not considered a terrorist incident – and why has the government not apologised for the raids, but does apologise for terrorist incidents?

John noted that we will all have different perspectives, and his presentation traversed a number of incidents that could fall under a general topic of terrorism.

Why isn't there a special unit to deal with those who want to report hate crimes?

Noting the specifics of the question that provided details of individual circumstances, Cameron apologised for the way the speaker was treated and noted that work was underway to address this, but it is a complex issue. Rebecca added that the help of the public is important; when investigating terrorism threats, the NZSIS relies on reporting to help us join the dots and work with NZ Police.

Opening Address

The Right Honourable Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand, provided the He Whenua Taurikura opening address. A summary of the Prime Minister's remarks is available at:

<https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/he-whenua-taurikura-new-zealand's-first-hui-countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism>



Building foundational Te Tiriti o Waitangi and Te Ao Māori approaches into prevention of and countering terrorism and violent extremism in Aotearoa

Panel members: Sacha McMeeking (Chair), Dr Lindsey Te Ata o Tu MacDonald, Dr Tracey McIntosh

Sacha McMeeking: Kāi Tahu. Sacha is Head of School at Aotahi – School of Māori and Indigenous Studies at the University of Canterbury. She is Co-Director of the Maui Lab, which offers scholarships and consulting opportunities to students studying at Aotahi. Sacha researches in the areas of Iwi Māori development, innovation and entrepreneurship, Iwi Māori future, social and cultural capital, comparative approaches to Indigenous peoples, and public policy.

Dr Lindsey Te Ata o Tu MacDonald: Ngāi Tūāhuriri, Ngāi Tahu. Lindsey is Senior Lecturer in the Political Science and International Relations Department at the University of Canterbury. Lindsey worked at Te Puni Kokiri and at the State Services Commission in the late 1990s before returning to the University. He completed his PhD thesis 'a political philosophy of property rights' while lecturing in the Māori Department at Canterbury (2003-7), and the political science programme at Auckland University. He publishes on indigenous politics and research ethics.

Professor Tracey McIntosh: Ngāi Tūhoe. Tracey is Professor of Indigenous Studies and Co-Head of Te Wānanga o Waipapa at the University of Auckland. She is the Chief Science Advisor at the Ministry of Social Development, and has previously been the Co-Director of Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga New Zealand's Māori Centre of Research Excellence, a member of the Welfare Expert Advisory Group and Te Uepū Hapai i te Ora - The Safe and Effective Justice Advisory Group.



Summary of what the panel was asked to discuss:

Te Tiriti o Waitangi is the foundational basis for the relationship between Māori and the Crown, and a core part of the constitution of Aotearoa New Zealand. It must be both honoured and incorporated meaningfully into the development of policy and programming solutions for the



prevention and countering of terrorism and violent extremism. How may this be considered effectively?

Te Ao Māori offers opportunities to see the world through the lens of the world of Māori and unique opportunities to build approaches such as whakawhanaungatanga, manaakitanga, whanaungatanga and mokopunatanga to how we mitigate alienation and polarisation that leads to extremism and seek to build cohesion, connection and peace for future generations. How can we enable te ao Māori approaches to listen, heal, build trust, and create safe spaces to hold difficult ideas in balance, whilst actively challenging ideas of hate and ideologies of extremism?

Discussion highlights:

Dr Lindsey Te Ata o Tu MacDonald:

We need to discuss Aotearoa's history, particularly the colonial history to understand what we are facing and how to address it. The government apparatus was built by settlers who then used their monopoly on violence to privilege property rights and secure them for white peoples. It's unsurprising then that the state's blind spot is white nationalism.

This is not only a historical behaviour but one that has continued to be perpetuated. Systemic disparities are hard for Māori to change – for example, when Māori got a change in customary title in the foreshore and seabed, the Crown changed the law. Actions such as these serve to sustain and perpetuate kāwanatanga and impedes the ability of communities to work with the Crown.

Rather than moving immediately to action, the State should stop and listen to the communities – to the Christchurch mosque community – if we are to counter terrorism rather than just engage in counter-terrorism strategies. Instead of seeking assistance with the development of such strategies, the State should reach to the people to listen to their shared experiences and to understand what it can do for these communities to make them feel safer.

The change we're talking about is huge. To address the issue of terrorism, the Crown shouldn't try to borrow Māori approaches or examine Te Tiriti, a partly-constitutional document but one focussed on the expansion of property rights. The restructuring of society and shaping political equality which will undermine terrorism is the work of relationships, of manaaki. If we can look into our hearts and make this change, then that will be a win-win.

Professor Tracey McIntosh:

Māori must play a leadership role in ensuring that the nuance of everyday racism and extreme forms of racism are collectively understood. Countering racism is most successful through disrupting the processes that lead to the inter-generational transfer of social inequalities and social, cultural, material and spiritual poverty. For Māori, Te Tiriti can be seen as the first immigration policy, in that through the signing of the Treaty, it allowed tangata Tiriti to come to live and to thrive in this country.

The 15 March 2019 terror attack, driven by racist narratives that were both extreme yet commonplace, when viewed through a Te Ao Māori lens, means that Māori as the hosts in this country and particularly mana whenua, have ties not only to those that have died or who have survived, but with families in all of the countries where those who died came from. These should be enduring relationships that form part of our collective narrative.

In a bicultural nation, what is the nature of our welcome? To have a home is to have a sense of place and of social standing, it signifies entitlements and rights. The lack of a place to stand can have enormous consequences – sometimes lethal.



Redress and response to harm must capture the context. In New Zealand, Māori have the longest experience of racism. In reflecting on violence, we must seek to address and redress colonial, neo-colonial, structural, legislative, economic, cultural, religious, institutional and collective forms of violence.

Violence is multi-faceted, incremental or explosive, unseen or overt. Slow violence is that which occurs gradually and out-of-sight, and is typically not viewed as violence. The concept can be useful when looking at global problems such as climate change, or in understanding the impact of violence of poverty, of racism, and other entrenched social issues. We need to address slow violence. This is the work of the Crown, but it demands Māori leadership that gives full expression to Te Tiriti and recognition and strengthening of relationships.

Questions and comments:

How would tikanga change the way in which we approach countering terrorism and violent extremism?

Tikanga can shape behaviours and practices, if given full expression, rather than high-level engagement. The humanity and relationships is so critical to not 'othering' those who are not like us.

What does slow justice or slow peace look like?

The need to create just conditions – a just criminal justice system requires a just society. We react to explosive violence, and often don't recognise the harms from slow violence. What it really means to listen and understand.

With respect to trust and confidence, much of the activity that occurs once an actual or potential offender has been identified is undertaken by government, who say 'have trust in us' – without reciprocal trust from government to the public, so no feedback loop. Is there an opportunity for Māori to be involved and have oversight of the government, particularly the security and law enforcement agencies? And how do they build the trust and confidence?

The Crown is small and constrained by laws and regulations, which can make it hard for them to listen to public input. Consultation has been defined within the law, but as envisaged by the Treaty, is empathetic engagement and this is what we should aim for – public servants sitting down with communities, listening and building trust slowly.

One of the teachings of Islam is that we are accountable to each other, both in action and in inaction – so terrorism has to be put on a spectrum, from those who do nothing about it, to those who act out with a violent ideology. Those who refuse to act, and those who do act, are therefore equally responsible.

The panels should have been in a different order, in order to ensure that Māori voices and Islamic voices were privileged. Māori have something to offer in this space because of their history of terrorism, so have experiences to share widely, to both victims and officials.

Sacha McMeeking:

In concluding, Sacha noted that tikanga says communities have answers. Communities with experiences / insights have more validity than experts, who *know about* rather than *know of*.

Ngāi Tūāhuriri in rebuilding after the earthquakes, gifted to Christchurch the phrase recounted by Pita Te Hori 'Atawhai ki te tangata' – care for people, which is fundamentally what we are being asked to do now.



Lunchtime Discussion: Understanding the New Zealand Online Extremism Environment

Participants: Jared Mullen (Chair), Milo Comerford, Carl Miller

Jared Mullen: Jared is Director of Digital Safety at Te Tari Taiwhenua, the Department of Internal Affairs. He has responsibilities covering violent extremism, online child sexual abuse and the proliferation of electronic spam. Jared was previously Deputy Chief Censor and has led policy capability in the Ministry of Justice and Corrections.

Milo Comerford: Milo is Head of Policy and Research, Counter Extremism, at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, based in the United Kingdom. Milo leads the Institute's work developing research approaches and policy responses to extremism, and advises governments and international agencies on building effective strategies for countering extremism.

Carl Miller: Carl is founder of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media and CASM Technology. He has written widely on social media intelligence, emerging technology, radicalisation, conspiracy theories and cyber-crime. Carl is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a Visiting Research Fellow at King's College London, an Associate of the Imperial War Museum, a member of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime and a member of advisory board of the Global Network on Extremism and Technology.

Discussion background:

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and CASM Technology have undertaken a data-driven snapshot of the online activities of extremists with a demonstrable link to New Zealand, as well as the digital platforms connecting New Zealand to an international extremist ecosystem. In this presentation, Milo and Carl spoke to their report, including the methodology used and their findings².



Discussion highlights:

Jared Mullen spoke to the origins of the report, which was linked to the new function with DIA to reduce harm from online extremism. With the new function, DIA made endeavours to better understand the level of extremism online, to provide a benchmark against which to calibrate their efforts. ISD was selected to undertake this benchmarking exercise, which was undertaken in the second half of 2020.

Carl Miller opened the presentation by introducing their findings on the nature, scale and scope of New Zealand extremist mobilisation online.

Their research identified accounts which satisfied their definition of 'extremism' – elevation of an in-group, dehumanisation of out-groups, and desire to mobilise to change society to deny equal rights to out-groups. 315 accounts were found which met these criteria and were

² The full report and detail on the methodology and research design is available at: <https://www.dia.govt.nz/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Online>



identifiably New Zealanders. The accounts were spread across Twitter, Facebook, Parler, Gab, websites and YouTube.

The team then built a continuously-operating data collection and analysis system to review these accounts and the 610,000 posts made by them. The posts were defined by theme, level of aggression, location and links to COVID-19. The data showed that of the 315 accounts, 192 were active in an average week across 2020. These accounts made 20,000 posts, over 200,000 'likes' and up-votes, 62,000 comments or replies, over 41,000 views on YouTube, 38,000 'retweets' and amplifications, and 136 aggressive posts or calls to action.

Carl noted that online spaces are noisy, and extremists are often shouting into an ether. In comparison, over the six months, the New Zealand accounts had 8 million responses, 5 million forms of engagement, 1.6 million responses, 1 million reshares and 750,000 subscribers. Extremists are noisier, more visible and angrier than the average New Zealand user; posts analysed showed 8-times the rate of aggressive language used by ordinary New Zealand social media users. Nonetheless, against the sheer size of social media, extremists comprise a small proportion. For example, the 172 extremist accounts on Twitter make up 0.02% of total accounts in New Zealand.

When compared internationally, in absolute terms New Zealand is small. However, on a per-capita basis, New Zealand fits an international pattern and is broadly consistent with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. New Zealanders sent the second-most QAnon-related tweets per capita, only surpassed by the United States, during the period analysed.

Milo Comerford then looked at how New Zealand extremism intersects with international comparison.

He noted that there is no single central platform used by extremists. In New Zealand, the most prominent was Twitter, followed by Facebook and the alt-tech platforms such as Gab and Parler. While new platforms that are dedicated to extremism are appearing, the existing platforms remain the way in which extremists can reach large numbers of people. On these platforms, over half of the extremist content was connected to the far right and white-identity extremism. The far left, Islamist extremism and conspiracy theorists were less visible on these platforms.

Milo noted the extent to which extremist posts were linked to international grievances and flashpoints, particularly the United States and Da'esh. Approximately one-sixth of posts were explicitly about events outside of New Zealand, and Donald Trump is mentioned more often than Jacinda Ardern. When locations in New Zealand are mentioned, over half of the time the location of interest is Christchurch, demonstrating the lasting impact of the terror attack on domestic and international extremists.

Questions and comments:

Has the methodology been explicitly created for New Zealand, or how is it linked with local knowledge? The research found less accounts than audience members were expecting – could this be due to a lack of local understanding?

The panellists noted that their report is one contribution, and they are working to make their methodology open-source and available for local researchers. The research was linked to specific platforms with good data availability, and doesn't cover the entire eco-system. The methodology and accounts were discussed with local experts and policy practitioners prior to being used.



How do you allow for individuals with fake and multiple accounts, who may be using numerous accounts to overstate support for their beliefs?

The panellists noted they undertook 'naïve de-duplication' whereby accounts with matching behavioural and other characteristics were removed from the data. They noted that under current settings, even platforms cannot link individuals to their accounts if the people don't want to be linked.



Panel 2: Addressing the Causes – How can embracing community and diversity approaches contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism

Panel members: Paul James (Chair), Professor Edwina Pio, Dr Sara Salman, Professor Paul Spoonley, Juliet Moses

Paul James: Paul is the Secretary for Internal Affairs and the Chief Executive at Te Tari Taiwhenua, Department of Internal Affairs. Previously Paul was the Chief Executive for Manatū Taonga Ministry for Culture and Heritage and the Deputy Chief Executive, Policy, Regulatory and Ethnic Affairs at Te Tari Taiwhenua Department of Internal Affairs. Paul is also Secretary for Local Government and the Government Chief Digital Officer.

Professor Edwina Pio: Recipient of a Royal Society medal and Duke of Edinburgh Fellowship, and Fulbright alumna, Edwina Pio is New Zealand's first Professor of Diversity, University Director of Diversity and elected Councillor on the governing body of the Auckland University of Technology. She is a trustee of the national Religious Diversity Centre, and Chair of the Academic Advisory Board of Te Kupenga.

Dr Sara Salman: Sara is a lecturer in criminology at the School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Te Heranga Waka. Sara is a PhD graduate from the City University of New York and a Fulbright alumna. Sara researches structural and political violence. She studies the relationship between state and citizen in western democratic regimes, and terrorism and mass shootings, with a focus on white supremacist and Islamist radicalisation.

Professor Paul Spoonley: Distinguished Professor Paul Spoonley was, until 2019, the Pro Vice-Chancellor of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Massey University. He retired from the university in April 2021. Paul was made a Fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand in 2011 and was granted the title of Distinguished Professor by Massey University in 2013. He is currently a member of the Marsden Fund Council, and a Senior Affiliate of Koi Tū: Centre for Informed Futures.

Juliet Moses: Juliet is the spokesperson for the New Zealand Jewish Council and a trustee of the Astor Foundation. She is the Honorary Solicitor to Auckland Chevra Kadisha Benevolent Society and Trust Board and the Aorangi Club, on the advisory board of So They Can and a patron of the Hashem Slaimankhel Charitable Trust.



Summary of what the panel was asked to discuss:

- What are the 'protective factors' that mean some people are more resilient to extremist ideologies? How can communities, civil society and government work together to grow these protective factors?
- What role do experiences and perceptions of injustice, inequality, diversity and inclusion play in individuals' radicalisation?
- How can strong and resilient communities reduce and challenge extremism where it may emerge?
- How does Aotearoa New Zealand's approach engage with both our bicultural underpinnings, and our multi-cultural reality and future?

Discussion highlights:

Paul James opened the session, framing social cohesion as a protective factor against terrorism. Where people feel valued, connected, and included, the pull factors to violent extremism are significantly reduced. Where polarisation takes hold, violent extremism takes hold.

Professor Edwina Pio:

Edwina framed an approach to violent extremism around the concepts of wounding, and nurturing.

Wounding included the structural and political pre-conditions that created violent extremism.

These, combined with personal motives and circumstances, such as age (youth were particularly prone to radicalisation); media (the algorithmic patterns of online platforms; and specifically-designed propaganda); and the unique experiences of women (for whom the push/pull factors to extremist activities were often different to those for men) created complexities in deploying counter terrorism measures.

Nurturing was required to bolster military and police responses to counter terrorism. This should be led by tangata whenua, and have a multi-stakeholder, whole-of-nation approach, with global solidarity.

Edwina proposed the following practical policies:

- Accentuate and incentivise diversity narratives
- Incentivise rationally compassionate disruptors ("those who are able to navigate hope")
- Legislate for nation-building courses as a prerequisite to permanent residency and citizenship

Dr Sara Salman:

Sara outlined the factors that led to the risk of people committing lone-actor white supremacist attacks, including conspiratorial thinking, a belief in the supremacy of one's culture, and a feeling that one's culture is endangered. She observed that attacks are generally undertaken by men under 20, but radicalisation starts earlier – and therefore outreach needs to start earlier.



A combination of personal and political grievances lead men to find this ideology appealing. Personal grievances generally included a lack of good employment, and troubled relations with women. Men who were “economic losers” often blamed immigration, women, diversity, and politicians for robbing them of something to which they felt entitled. The personal often metastasized into a political grievance online.

The internet, Sara observed, served as a space for these wounds to be opened, rather than healed. She argued however that the issues also existed in the “real world” – and so we must address white supremacist ideation, and rampant and casual dehumanisation, in societies. For instance, commonly-used terminology such as “Jihadi brides” and “queue jumpers” provided justification for grievances. An alternative narrative was that we are all immigrants, and that there is virtue in diversity and in multiple viewpoints.

Professor Paul Spoonley:

Paul compared his research in the 1970s with more recent work. There had been some significant societal changes over that time: the rise of Islamophobia, the rise of the internet and greater connectivity – which meant New Zealand was not disconnected from international extremist ecosystems. At the same time, he argued, many factors remained the same.

Paul highlighted that the core pillars from counter-terrorism work he had undertaken in 2005-2006 were still relevant today. These included approaches that were not unidirectional but interactive, included an indicator framework, did not assume that a consensus exists/operates (and did not assume that all social cohesion is good), and that recognised systemic and individual barriers (e.g. socio-economic barriers).

He reflected however that approaches should not focus entirely on immigrant/host relations, but should have foundations in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, be country-specific (consider what factors contribute to social cohesion in New Zealand, and what radicalises individuals here), and incorporate co-design – with community participation and leadership.

Juliet Moses:

Juliet outlined what she thought we should aim for as a society. She proposed that as a society we need to offer identity, purpose, and community – belonging, inclusion and empowerment. We need an approach that unites us all, but does not demand uniformity. She also observed that we need to ensure responsibility as well as rights.

Juliet suggested that current approaches focus more on what divides than what unites – and this brings segregation not integration. She then outlined how we should build the society we want. In her view, this included the following elements and considerations:

- a. It needed to be built from the bottom up and from the top down – a whole-of-society approach.
- b. We need to consistently model the values we want, and show personal leadership.
- c. We need to bring people along slowly, give them time to get used to new ideas, and engender trust and confidence. At the same time, we also need to put trust and confidence in the public.
- d. We need to ensure condemnation of all support for terrorism equally, despite the source or type, even when it was not politically expedient to do so.
- e. The media has a role to play in normalising, and telling, stories.
- f. There is no substitute for face-to-face dialogue, in order to interact meaningfully and thereby humanise the other, and discover shared values.



Juliet summarised a range of specific initiatives she had been involved in, particularly aiming to build relations between the Jewish and Muslim communities, and with other religious communities, as well as mentoring programmes for refugee students.

Questions and comments

We also need to look at educating youth from a young age. Traditional and social media are problematic – the framing of the issue blames Islam.

Agreement on issues of education, and the media. The history of Islam is history of immigration. The media is a problem – it is inconsistent. For instance, media are eager to name Muslim terrorists, but not white supremacist terrorists.

Has the portrayal of Muslims in the media improved since the attacks in New Zealand? The temptation might have been to close inwards – but it appeared the community instead invited people into the mosques, opened up, and engaged with media on their stories. Was that true?

It was true, but the focus on resiliency in times of trauma is different to the general depiction in non-traumatic times – life not defined by that trauma. More education, including on religion in schools, would support greater discussion.

How should the New Zealand counter-terrorism strategy differ to other international partners, given their engagement in international wars etc?

We need to understand the international ecosystem that produces terrorism – it must be a multi-country operation at government and community levels. But we also need to ask what we can do with our dynamics, our history, that would work here to limit and undermine the spread and the influence of international terrorist networks and ideologies.

Social inclusion happens in the built environment – in our cities. Who is responsible for designing the spaces in which people are meeting and interacting? How can we decolonise urban planning in New Zealand?

Co-designing public spaces is important. But the micro-aggressions and everyday racism that people encounter in these spaces is being brought in from homes or schools. So, we still need to understand why the perpetrators are doing it. And we need to understand how people respond if it does occur. Whose responsibility is it to counter racism?

Countering the bystander effect is important. We need to consider what we do when we see these things occurring. How do we call it out with dignity?

The New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils has been advocating for treaty-based multicultural legislation – is there a place for this in New Zealand?

Absolutely.



Panel 3: Role of the media: building cultural understanding and countering violent extremism

Panel members: Catherine Delore (Chair), Miriyana Alexander, Sinead Boucher, Khairiah Rahman, Richard Sutherland

Catherine Delore: Catherine has been the Director of Strategic Communications and Engagement at DPMC since 2017. Catherine also had a lengthy career in journalism, including as Chief Reporter at Radio New Zealand.

Miriyana Alexander: Miriyana is Head of Premium at the New Zealand Herald, and current chair of the Media Freedom Committee. She has studied journalism at Cambridge and Oxford universities and was previously the Herald's Weekends Editor.

Sinead Boucher: Sinead is Chief Executive Officer of Stuff Ltd, and has owned the organisation since 2020. Prior to becoming CEO, she held the position of Group Executive Editor for four years, and has worked for the Financial Times and Reuters. Sinead is on the executive and supervisory board of the World Association of News Publishers (WAN-IFRA).

Khairiah Rahman: Khairiah is Senior Lecturer at the School of Communication Studies, Auckland University of Technology. She is the Secretary for Media Education for the Asian Congress for Media and Communication and Assistant Editor of the Pacific Journalism Review. Khairiah has written on media representations of Islam and Muslims, culture and identity, crisis and intercultural miscommunication, and the Islamic perspectives of dialogue and persuasion.

Richard Sutherland: Richard is the Head of News for RNZ. Prior to that he was the Head of Broadcast for Newshub and has held senior editorial positions with Sky News, TVNZ and Newstalk ZB News. He sits on the Media Freedom Committee, and on the advisory boards for the Science Media Centre and the Asia New Zealand Foundation.



Summary of what the panel was asked to discuss:

- What do the media see as their role and responsibilities when discussing and covering issues relating to terrorism and violent extremism?
- How can communities and government agencies work with media to help ensure content is fair, balanced, and accurate?
- How does the Aotearoa New Zealand media environment compare with overseas examples, and what can we learn from that?
- Media signed a pledge to regulate their own content relating to the trial of the 15 March 2019 terrorist. How did this work, was it successful, and what could it mean for future coverage of this nature?

Discussion highlights:

The panel was asked to discuss several questions. Key themes of the discussion are summarised below.

The media needs to act responsibly in the way it informs the public

- The media's role is simply to inform, but in doing so it needs to balance interests, speak through more than one lens, listen to communities, and not exacerbate public safety issues. The increased pace of news requires media to behave very responsibly, and social media is a key challenge. Media needs to sift through that, to be a trusted source in times of crisis.

The media has come a long way, but there is still a long way to go

- The media has come a long way in recent years but there are still things to be learned, and negative stereotypes continue to appear. We need to do more to stop tokenism, ignorance and misrepresentation.
- It is important we do not lose sight of continued 'slow violence' against Muslims and marginalised communities. Trust needs to be built by media through genuine dialogue, educating itself, and owning up to errors.
- Relationships take time, and are not given as a right, but the openness and generosity of Muslim families after 15 March had a profound impact on media.

The protocol for covering the terrorist's trial was a positive development

- The protocol evolved out of very robust debate, but with a joint commitment not to give a platform to statements that actively champion white supremacist or terrorist ideology. This has never happened before, but it was possible due to high trust, good conversations, and a shared desire to be responsible members of the community.
- The groundwork has been laid for this in previous years when media agreed not to break news about Louisa Akavi, a New Zealand nurse being held hostage in Syria, to avoid jeopardising her safety.



- The protocol helped to build trust and confidence in the media. The Media Freedom Committee is working with government agencies to update media protocols around terrorism events.

The Aotearoa New Zealand environment has changed, but is different to other countries

- Pre-2019, we tended to view terrorism as quite abstract and distant, but there is now a much greater understanding of the realities of terrorism and violent extremism.
- We have generally resisted the move to polarisation that has happened in other countries, and the reporting protocol could not have happened elsewhere.

Questions and comments:

Sometimes political rhetoric can feed irresponsible messaging. Could there be a protocol that, where a politician says something outrageous, it's no longer news?

It is important that the community sees politicians at work, so this can inform their decisions, including voting. The media should not become censors or the arbiter of what is controversial.

You are fighting for audience share with social media. What are you doing to ensure all communities see themselves represented, even communities with extremists?

Social media is a threat, but our audiences are increasing, and there has been a return to trusted sources. We are working hard to change perceptions about representation.

There are still examples of bad behaviour and maliciousness, e.g. an example of someone calling a radio station and presenters making fun of them.

There are agencies to which complaints can be made and they need to be used so things can change.



Concluding Remarks: Day One

Concluding remarks were delivered by **Professor Robert Patman**, Professor of International Relations at the University of Otago.

Robert reflected on the growing complexity of the terrorist threat and noted that strengthening our communities in New Zealand, and our democracy, is the best long-term defence against terrorism – nationally and internationally.

He defined terrorism as ‘the deliberate and systemic use of the threat of violence to coerce change in behaviour’, and reflected on differences in types of terrorism – state sponsored and not, and between values-driven and that which is focused on gaining or liberating territory.

He reflected on the evolution of terrorism and the threat of trans-national terrorism, including the impact of the advent of the online era. This online environment provides a very good context for potential radical recruitment and lone-actor extremist figures online. The events of 15 March highlighted this point.

Robert spoke about the pattern of ‘alternative facts’ and declining levels of trust in authority, driven through a lack of shared information, noting that selecting where you get your news now means selecting your news. The role of social media as a provider of news plays a role in this too. Building community resilience and addressing injustice and inequality in our societies is the biggest protective factor to prevent radicalisation.

He spoke too about the international components of countering terrorism and violent extremism. Extremist movements are internationally connected and often transnational movements, so the solutions must be too. Robert noted that New Zealand is reliant on the rules-based order, as are most countries, and has a role to play in speaking up against injustice happening elsewhere in the world. Addressing structural inequalities internationally, including on bodies such as the United Nations Security Council, will assist in creating a world that is fairer and where injustices and bad behaviours are not tolerated.



Dinner Address

The Honourable Andrew Little, Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques, provided the dinner address. A summary of Minister Little's remarks is available at:

<https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-he-whenua-taurikura-new-zealand's-annual-hui-countering-terrorism-and-violent>



Session Summaries, Day Two

What Hate Looks Like Now – the aftermath of 15 March 2019

This session was organised by the Islamic Women's Council of New Zealand.

Designed specifically to inform public servants about the consequences of Islamophobia that Muslim women continue to face, including from government agencies, the session involved Muslim women from around New Zealand speaking about their experiences, particularly since 15 March 2019.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet is grateful to all Muslimah who shared their experiences and ideas, in order to raise awareness and understanding, and make New Zealand safer for all who live here.

Discussion highlights:

The women spoke about their personal experiences, focusing on issues that arose when they were engaging with government departments. Experiences include:

- Being asked to provide identification to prove that a child was theirs.
- Being asked to remove their headscarf in order to gain support that they were entitled to.
- Assumptions being made about levels of education or English-language fluency.
- Being shouted at and followed whilst using public transport or walking along the street.
- Difficulties accessing housing.
- Ongoing online harassment, including threats made against lives and property.

The women spoke about the impact these experiences had on them, and the challenges of raising children in this environment. All spoke of the need to be eternally vigilant about events happening overseas, noting that international events tended to exacerbate the Islamophobia they face in New Zealand. Participants noted that they lived in an ongoing climate of fear, but were making attempts to ensure that this was not visible to children around them.

Underlying these issues, was a public service that is uninformed of the specifics of Islam and the lived experiences of people facing Islamophobia. Several speakers detailed work they had undertaken to upskill officials and people in customer-facing roles within government, and one spoke about work she had undertaken to upskill herself when she felt her security concerns weren't being taken seriously by security and law enforcement.

The session concluded with expressions of strong support from those in the room.



Panel 4: Violent Extremism Online: new directions in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in the digital world

Panel Members: Paul Ash (Chair), Anjum Rahman, Dr Nawab Osman, Sanjana Hattotuwa, Nick Pickles, Jordan Carter, and Kate Hannah

Paul Ash: Paul is the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Cyber and Digital, and the Cyber Coordinator, based in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Paul led DPMC's National Security Policy Directorate from 2018-2019, and the National Cyber Policy Office from its establishment in 2012 to 2017. Prior to roles in DPMC, Paul was a career diplomat, serving as Deputy Head of Mission in Brussels from 2008 to 2012, and postings and secondments in Solomon Islands, Beijing, and Taipei.

Anjum Rahman: Anjum is the Project Lead of the Inclusive Aotearoa Collective Tāhono, and a Trustee of Trust Waikato. She is a co-chair of the Christchurch Call Advisory Network and a member of the Independent Advisory Committee of the Global Internet Forum for Countering Terrorism. She is a founding member of the Islamic Women's Council of New Zealand, a founding member and trustee of Shama, Ethnic Women's Trust, and a member of the Waikato Interfaith Council.

Dr Nawab Osman: Nawab is the Head of Counter-Terrorism and Dangerous Organisation team for Facebook APAC. He also leads the work in global programs on counter-speech and countering violence extremism. Nawab was previously an academic and has published widely on issues of terrorism, political violence and religious extremism in APAC.

Sanjana Hattotuwa: Sanjana is a PhD candidate at the University of Otago, studying the role and relevance of social media in the generation of hate as well as the fuller realisation of Sri Lanka's democratic potential. He has worked in South Asia, South East Asia, North Africa, Europe and the Balkans on social media communications strategies, web-based activism, online advocacy and social media research. He founded in 2006 and until June 2020 curated the award-winning Groundviews, Sri Lanka's first civic media website.

Nick Pickles: Nick is the Director of Global Public Policy Strategy and Development at Twitter, where he leads the company's thinking on critical issues at the intersection of tech, public policy, and politics. Previously, he was Head of Public Policy for Twitter in the UK and before that, the Director of the civil liberties and privacy campaign organisation, Big Brother Watch.

Jordan Carter: Jordan is the Chief Executive of InternetNZ — operator of the .nz domain space and a not-for-profit organisation keeping the Internet open, secure, and for all New Zealanders. InternetNZ is focused on making the Internet a place of good — and this means changes need to happen. InternetNZ played a role in the development of the Christchurch Call.

Kate Hannah is a cultural historian of science and technology at Te Pūnaha Matatini and Auckland University. She is Deputy Director, Equity and Diversity, within Te Pūnaha Matatini, a New Zealand Centre of Research Excellence for Complex Systems and Networks, a Research Fellow in the Department of Physics at the University of Auckland, and a PhD candidate at the Centre for Science and Society at Te Herenga Waka – Victoria University of Wellington.





Summary of what the panel was asked to discuss:

- How do violent extremists (ab)use the online environment? What effect does this have on our safety and security?
- What role do online environments – including social media and online algorithms – play in radicalisation? And in preventing radicalisation?
- How do we make positive change in the online environment? What are the roles for government, industry and civil society?
- This is a global problem. What international developments can we learn from in Aotearoa New Zealand? And what unique contribution can we make?

Discussion highlights:

Paul Ash:

Paul started the session by discussing the importance of the internet, and how governments might best intervene on difficult material. He noted the horror that can arise from the internet, including what had happened on 15 March in terms of spreading extremist messages.

There were New Zealanders picking up the extreme right-wing playbook and applying hate messaging towards groups like tangata whenua and LGBT+, as well as peddling misogynous and Islamophobic tropes.

Governments would be tempted to intervene, but equally important was the creation of a shared sense of responsibility between government, providers and communities (“multi-stakeholder engagement”).

Paul noted the importance of Te Tiriti as the founding document, an important perspective for engagement.

He also delivered a content warning on some of the material in the presentations, noting the need to take the conversation away from the abstract.

Anjum Rahman:

Anjum noted how the Christchurch terrorist was able to livestream the attack, and its proliferation resulted in Facebook removing 1.5 million copies of the footage. It is still online today. A New Zealand citizen was convicted for distributing it.

She also discussed ISIS’ use of beheading videos, and that some New Zealanders had been convicted for distributing this footage too. Those looking to proliferate material can simply use “hashes” (altered content) to defeat the content blockers.



Who is making the decisions about what gets blocked in the first place? Governments have a poor record on censorship. Tech giants can make questionable decisions – YouTube has taken down thousands of videos about the Syrian War, which might one day undermine attempts to establish war crimes cases. This is the loss of crucial evidence – as also seen in the recent Gaza War.

Anjum noted that women online are particularly vulnerable to death and rape threats, noting the infamous case of Lesley Jones receiving racist taunts. She noted a range of other intimidations, from online comments against the Hamilton Mosque (urging people to burn it down) to white supremacy posters going up at the University of Auckland.

She called for an audit of tech company algorithms and the assumptions that sat behind them.

Anjum noted the importance of Te Tiriti in New Zealand's story, and its implicit call for the greater participation of minorities in society.

Dr Nawab Osman:

Nawab noted that despite his company's (Facebook's) efforts, a lot of offensive material would simply shift away from the larger platforms. A lot of material is removed from Facebook and other large social media companies, the bulk of it proactively.

A narrative was needed with communities to understand the right search terms that might emerge – trust is needed to be built to achieve this.

Sanjana Hattotuwa:

Sanjana, whilst noting that Sri Lanka's ethnic tension was "an order of magnitude" greater than New Zealand's, nonetheless issued a challenge to the majority community and power structures: "racism is a feature not a bug" in the systemic abuse of power in New Zealand, as elsewhere. Similarly, the internet is not truly democratic but has a bias through algorithms which favour white, G7, OECD, Pakehā viewpoints.

There is a temporal disconnect between the long-term goals and approach of those he termed as "dis-information entrepreneurs", and governments that are centred on their shorter periods in power and therefore more focused on the "episodic moments" as they occur – single attacks and events.

Sanjana used an ecological perspective of networking in nature to demonstrate the networking in human society, as enabled by technology. He challenged the audience to create an entire eco-system that is healthy. Addition, cohesion and repulsion are features not only in bird swarms but in human cohesion too. We need to understand how dis-information entrepreneurs use this knowledge but also to consider how we can do so as well. We need to imagine what new communities should ideally look like.

Furthermore, in doing so, we need to consider what make Aotearoa unique. One way that Aotearoa is unlike all other countries is the way that it is responding to issues such as dis-information, but also our values and particularly the Māori perspective make us unique. Sanjana encouraged the audience to learn and listen also to the perspectives of those in Christchurch, who have lost so much in recent years due to both the mosque attacks but also the earthquakes.



Nick Pickles:

Nick stated that the internet was more decentralised than ever – removing hate sees it move elsewhere. He also noted that it used to be argued that technology was a mirror of society, but it is more than that – it refracts and changes perceptions. Democratic society will feature challenging speech, but we must prevent speech that leads to violence.

The Christchurch Call has done much to get many voices together – on an equal basis – to forge understanding among stakeholders.

The internet has its problems, but Nick remained an optimist about its potential to reach across ideological and cultural divides at the same time.

Jordan Carter:

Jordan argued that online technology is simply amplifying and worsening problems that already exist in our society, including white supremacy. He supported the views expressed by earlier speakers about the founding role of Te Tiriti and building a different society on values such as Manaakitanga, as the essence of where we could go and why New Zealand could play a disproportionate global role.

Tokenistic responses and tick box consultation on policy are no longer appropriate – true dialogue such as this hui and “deep listening” are essential. The internet is woven so deeply into our society now that we can’t expect the technology sector to fix the problem themselves. This is not an abdication of responsibility, but they don’t have the collective knowledge or perspectives to understand the problems and then solve them.

The internet is amazingly powerful and for the big platforms the scale of the audience and interaction is what really matters. Though there are smaller platforms, it is the big ones where the large propagation impacts and journeys towards extremism often occur.

Our collective goal is to preserve the good points and benefits of the internet, whilst mitigating the harms. Greater information and transparency from the platforms are at the heart of this, to diagnose the real problems for communities.

We needed to drop the “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me” mantra, and realise that words motivate people to kill. We must recognise that the role of moderation needs to happen not just by algorithms or people elsewhere, but by people here and in our context. This has to be grounded in the experiences of those communities who are facing the biggest challenges, and we must collectively act on these experiences.

Kate Hannah:

Kate discussed that imperialism – or the “imperial project” – rolled out from Europe over centuries, and formed and shaped by the doctrine of discovery, is the foundation of the structures and systems of New Zealand. These underlying and frequently invisible structures – including imperialism, colonialism, white supremacy, misogyny, Islamophobia, homophobia and anti-semitism – that we see online are only a reflection of those systemic violences towards “the other” that exist in the physical world we live in.

These are global issues, that play out here too. In Aotearoa, the groups we see targeted include Māori, diaspora and migrant communities, and LGBTQI+ communities. In the same way, these groups often become the target of disinformation and being blamed online for social problems. The internet presents this disinformation to others, largely Pākehā or white migrant communities, and enables real or – in this case (amongst some Pākehā) – imagined



grievances. The complainant can then become the problem, with those who report issues being blamed for drawing attention to the invisible structure of violence.

There are attempts now to reassess and revise the impacts of imperialism, as well as the beginning of a realisation of justice in the framework of Te Tiriti. This has generated many competing narratives and is being shaped by some online as a coming culture war, when in reality it should be an uncontroversial reckoning with New Zealand's history.

If we are to address the online hate, we must first reckon with our imperialist history. The review of the history curriculum in schools is an important step, but this reckoning will start from the margins not the centres.

Question and Comments:

There was extensive questioning on a New Zealand-based white identity extremist group that remained active on Twitter.

The Twitter representative undertook to ensure that the group was removed from the Platform.

Panellists noted that the monitoring of hate on-line should not be left to the companies themselves, as they worked to a commercial imperative.

Paul Ash:

In concluding, the Chair noted that the modern online world had not generated a utopia – it was more Hobbesian, with a competitive fight for individual interests.

He noted to communities present that what they needed in terms of concern about online content was a single door in government to push on to express their concerns.



Panel 5: Preventing and countering violent extremism: Aotearoa New Zealand's strategic approach

Panel members: Carolyn Tremain (Chair), Paula Attrill, Commissioner Andrew Coster, Tayyaba Khan, Dr Rawiri Taonui.

Carolyn Tremain: Carolyn is the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. She is also Chair of the Public Sector Auckland Career Board and a member of the Victoria University of Wellington – Te Herenga Waka Business School Advisory Board.

Commissioner Andrew Coster: Andrew has been Commissioner of Police since April 2020. He has 23 years' experience with the New Zealand Police, including serving in frontline and investigative roles in Counties Manukau and Auckland. He has also served as Deputy Commissioner: Strategy and Partnerships, Area Commander in Auckland City, and District Commander Southern District.

Tayyaba Khan: Tayyaba is the founder and CEO of Khadija Leadership Network, Deputy Chair of the Board of Amnesty International New Zealand, and holds Peace Ambassador roles with the European Muslim League and Universal Peace Federation New Zealand. She has worked and lived in New Zealand, Palestine, Australia and the United Kingdom.

Paula Attrill: Paula is the General Manager of International Casework and Intercountry and Domestic Adoption at the Ministry for Children, Oranga Tamariki. She has a long career in the New Zealand public service, throughout care and protection, youth justice and advisory roles. Paula was recently awarded the Te Tohu Ratonga Tūmatanui o Aotearoa New Zealand Public Service Medal for her contribution to the New Zealand Public Service.

Dr Rawiri Taonui: Rawiri is Te Hikutū and Ngāti Korokoro, Te Kapotai and Ngāti Paeahi, Ngāti Rora, Ngāti Whēru, Ngāti Te Taonui. He is an independent writer, researcher and advisor, and was New Zealand's first Professor of Indigenous Studies. He has written over 400 newspaper and magazine articles and book chapters, and has presented at the United Nations Experts Mechanisms on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.



Summary of what the panel was asked to discuss:

Reducing the risk of violent extremism requires a collective effort from government, civil society organisations, communities and all members of society. Working in partnership, the measures we can take include actively countering harmful violent extremist actions, supporting the disengagement of at-risk individuals, and building resilience to hate and violent extremism.



This session will look at how Aotearoa New Zealand can build a society resilient to violent extremism and support at-risk individuals. This will include lessons we can draw from comparative international responses to terrorism and violent extremism challenges, as well as the interplay between racism, xenophobia, hate incidents and violent extremism.

Discussion highlights:

Commissioner Andrew Coster:

Andrew began by noting that a resilient and socially cohesive society limits the space for violent extremism to exist and should be one of our main focuses. Where communities are strong, grievances can be heard and there will be less internal conflict. To do this we need to embrace diversity and our common values.

For its part, the Police aspires to make Aotearoa New Zealand fairer, safer and just for all. The response to the 15 March attack showed that communities are essential to achieving that vision. Andrew noted that diversity in the public service was essential to ensuring that Police, and other government agencies, can effectively engage and work with communities.

Programmes were already in development pre-15 March, however more needs to be done. There is a real need to strengthen public trust and confidence, so that communities feel safer and more confident to report, giving agencies a greater opportunity to prevent harm. This will also help Police to focus efforts beyond just enforcement, and look more at the drivers behind offending.

When it comes to the online environment, he noted that the volume of extremist content was staggering. Conspiracy theories and mis-/dis-information were also increasingly part of the issues Police were having to deal with, particularly with regard to incitement and hate speech directed at certain communities. The difficulty was finding the right balance between freedom of expression, monitoring and enforcement, and strengthening public trust and confidence.

Andrew closed by noting that in some overseas jurisdictions, online extremism was now too big a problem to effectively address. But we had an opportunity in Aotearoa New Zealand to address it through strengthening social cohesion and embracing our diversity.

Tayyaba Khan:

Tayyaba began by noting the racism and prejudice that exists within our universities in New Zealand, and the need for researchers to work more closely with communities. Academics often research *at*, rather than *with* communities, and this needs to change.

She also noted that language really matters in this work. If we are going to develop a unique approach in New Zealand, we need to stop using the international language developed during the Bush and Obama eras. When we use concepts and language that is well understood across our local communities, we can start to build trust and begin to work together more effectively. Adopting foreign concepts will not work.

Tayyaba referred to a panel the previous day that highlighted the impact of events overseas on local communities. New Zealand needs to pay more attention to these issues and how they can play out here. We need to hear about the experiences of the Palestinian and Uighur people, for example, to truly understand our local communities and their experiences.

Unfortunately, the 'War on Terror' created 'reactionary responses' in many countries, where counter-terrorism legislation was quickly adopted without being properly interrogated (including from a human rights perspective). Control Orders are one recent New Zealand example of this. As the government considers national security issues, it needs to drop this



reactionary model, and take more time for proper engagement and consultation with communities.

In closing she suggested that we need to “empower all facets of society to become digitally and politically literate for the current landscape” so that their voices can be heard. We need to address root grievances, counter disenfranchisement, and look at unique approaches to develop healthier, restorative responses to violent extremism.

Paula Attrill:

Paula began by discussing Oranga Tamariki’s role in relation to counter-terrorism. Social work is changing, and social workers are faced with complex challenges. Terrorism has a real impact on children and young people. Oranga Tamariki delivers statutory obligations, which means they are involved when notified of harm to children. Issues that were traditionally managed by Police are now traversing into Oranga Tamariki’s domain, including modern day slavery, movement of children across borders, and ‘501’ deportees from Australia.

Paula noted that the role of Oranga Tamariki includes care and protection matters, wellbeing, and abiding by domestic and international obligations. She noted that Oranga Tamariki is “learning hard lessons”, commenting on the current tribunal report.

She then discussed various legislative mechanisms. Te Tiriti principles are front and centre. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is also important, outlining the expectations children have. The Oranga Tamariki Act is complex, having been altered many times.

Paula then moved on to discussing what’s top of mind for Oranga Tamariki. She noted that young people are concerned about stigmatisation based on risk analysis. There are also issues of searching for identity and belonging, given New Zealand’s history of closed adoption. She talked about the challenges with extremism in the youth justice system.

Paula closed by noting the benefits of family engagement, and the need to make a space for young people to share their views.

Dr Rawiri Taonui:

Rawiri began by discussing the role of Te Tiriti in national security, noting that it needs strengthening. He described Māori as the first tribes and nations of New Zealand and the first Treaty peoples (referring to the 1835 Treaty): “we are tangata Tiriti tuatahi”. Pākehā are ‘tangata Tiriti tuatahi ano’; the first partner under the Treaty of 1840, which then served as the gateway for all future settlers. Our newer communities are also tangata Tiriti (‘tangata tiriti maha maha’), and so therefore ‘we are all tangata Tiriti’.

In policy, this means there is a leadership role for Māori at the diversity table, given they have endured racism for the longest time and understand that there are other communities suffering. Māori have a role to advocate on behalf of other communities, and these communities have a place at the table too.

“The table of diversity is the table of discussion.” He noted, however, that the Crown’s current approach is to talk to each community separately and then make decisions. But “the table of equality, under article 3 of Te Tiriti, is the table of decision making.” There is a need for someone to say that they understand how the other is feeling (“decision makers need to look like us.”). He commented that while he does not understand how those directly affected by 15 March feel, he does understand through his ancestors about loss.



He referred to the media panel that spoke the day before. That panel commented that the media is not racist, it is ignorant. Taonui challenged this narrative, pointing to examples that could be deemed racist. He talked about the challenges that come with a generation who grew up with segregated toilets, where there was support for a white New Zealand. A counter-narrative is needed. While the racist component of Pākehā is smaller than we think, it is still concerning.

Rawiri concluded by noting that 'the future lies in our youth', pointing out the openness by young people to engage and discuss racism.

Questions and Comments:

How can we increase diversity in government agencies, especially in the top levels?

Panellists agreed this was important, and noted the difficulties with leadership progression in our current system. Leaders need to recognise their biases.

How do we stop stereotyping young people under Oranga Tamariki care?

We need to take this seriously and respond in a way that does not stigmatise. Sometimes laws are needed to ensure safety.

Why is it so hard to report hate crime on Police's website, but easy to report a driving incident?

The 105 number and Police's digital platform should make this easier, but we do have a lot to do to improve our recording and responding to hate crimes.

There is a need for a one-stop-shop for assistance, at the moment it can be complex and frustrating.

A comment was made about the need for increased manaakitanga by public servants when engaging with Māori.

A question was asked about the experiences of Muslim children and those taken into state care.

Oranga Tamariki are trying hard to listen and there has been change. The law requires us to respond in a certain way, but I hope the feedback can change this and we can look to re-establish trust and confidence.

The Muslim community is growing regionally, but can the government meet this demand, as it is not inclusive in the regions.

Police have liaison officers and are doing their best. There are difficulties including managing the gathering of data.

A comment was made about incorporating restorative justice processes into strategic responses.

A comment was made about the abuse turban-wearing Sikhs face in New Zealand and the lack of discourse at the Hui around the issues that Sikhs face.



Lunchtime Discussion: Perspectives on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Participants: Manisha Bhikha (Chair), Cameron Sumpter.

Manisha Bhikha: Manisha is a Principal Policy Advisor at the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and leads policy advice across countering terrorism and violent extremism. Manisha is an experienced practitioner in prevention and countering violent extremism of all kinds, and for eight years programme managed coordination of multi-agency support for individuals at risk of radicalisation, community-based initiatives to build resilience to hate and extremism, and local responses to incidents of terrorism in high-risk inner London.

Cameron Sumpter: Cameron is a Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He analyses and writes about preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) policy and practice, including prison-based intervention strategies, reintegration initiatives, and multi-stakeholder community programmes in different nations. Cameron also co-coordinates CENS' function as a core member of the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET).

Discussion highlights

Manisha Bhikha:

Manisha spoke to the work occurring in New Zealand to develop a Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Strategy, and noted that while the New Zealand strategy will be based in domestic knowledge, including Te Tiriti and Te Ao Māori perspectives, it remains useful to look at international experiences.

Cameron Sumpter:

Cameron commenced by defining terms that he would use throughout his presentation:

- 'Terrorism' – most safely used in the context of its definition under national legislation.
- 'Violent Extremism' emerged in 2005, when a Bush administration internal review recommended a broader approach than just targeting al-Qaeda leadership.
- Programmes to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) started in Europe in the mid-2000s, where analysts had been devising theories of 'radicalisation'.
- The term countering violent extremism (CVE) was popularised by the Obama administration, which established its first working group on the issue in 2011. The United Nations prefers the term preventing violent extremism (PVE), and in 2015 the General Assembly issued its Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.
- The most common term in the literature now is P/CVE, but some have gone even further, preferring Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Leads to Terrorism, or PCVERLT.



Cameron noted that most P/CVE plans around today loosely follow the Public Health Model of Prevention. Primary preventions involve things like building resilience, promoting tolerance, online counter-messaging, and ideally addressing community grievances. Tertiary initiatives in prisons are often called 'de-radicalisation' or disengagement programmes, depending on levels of ambition, and then reintegration strategies for those exiting prison or returning from extremist activity abroad. The most contentious aspects of the model are secondary interventions, where someone is somehow identified as being 'at-risk' of radicalisation and then ushered into a tailored social support programme.

Cameron then spoke to international models, their histories and successes.

Netherlands

- The first 'multi-agency intervention programme' was established in the Netherlands following the murder of the film director Theo Van Gogh in late 2004 (described as the Dutch 9/11 for its divisive impact on society).
- Amsterdam developed a unit called the Municipal Information House on Radicalisation, which was intended to be an 'early-warning' system that would also conduct assessments and design appropriate interventions.
- The Information House would receive information on individuals who front-line practitioners considered to be at-risk, make an assessment, then hand over to a Case Management Team to work out a tailored plan for that person.
- Interventions would then be based on particular need, potentially involving assistance with housing, education and training, jobs, or finding constructive ways of expressing grievances. Programmes would often involve personal mentors to try to broaden their worldviews and steer them toward positive life decisions.
- Front-line stakeholders such as social workers and teachers initially opposed the idea of being the city government's 'eyes and ears', but authorities mostly convinced them that the programmes were purely social assistance, and that referrals would go to other social workers, not the police or security services. The language was also softened to avoid securitised terms such as radicalisation.
- No evaluation has been made public, but authorities have pointed to the Netherlands' relatively limited experience with terrorism, compared with neighbouring countries, over the past 10-15 years.

Aarhus Model, Denmark

- The Danish pilot started in the city of Aarhus in 2007 through the creation of an Information House, which aimed to improve local coordination in similar ways to those in Dutch cities. They collect information, decide whether a case is more appropriate for police investigation or a social intervention, and then proceed accordingly.
- The key difference is that Police are involved in Danish Information Houses, along with people from municipal social agencies. This arrangement is based on longstanding relationships developed through a system created in the late 1970s to prevent young people from joining gangs or committing crimes.
- The approach relies heavily on partnerships of trust between the stakeholders, and safe spaces for sharing information, which is helpfully regulated by an Act that prevents the use of shared information in criminal investigations.
- Another difference with the Danish model is that it doesn't directly involve non-governmental organisations in its interventions. Social assistance is provided by the municipal government. The use of mentors is also central to the Aarhus approach – carefully selected by the Information House for each person.



- Anecdotally, there have been some great success stories, but no formal evaluation has been made public.

Canada

- The third example examined by Cameron is Canada, which unveiled its counter-radicalisation strategy in late 2018. Similar to the Netherlands and Denmark, they've divided efforts into three categories: early prevention; 'at-risk' prevention; and disengagement.
- The focal point is the Canada Centre, which was established in 2015 to provide evidence-based policy guidance on violent extremism, but also to promote coordination among prevention stakeholders, and support community projects through a resilience fund.
- Similar to the European examples, different cities have their own multi-agency intervention strategies suitable to the given context. These essentially have the same function of collecting and coordinating relevant stakeholders, receiving referrals, making assessments, and potentially designing courses of action.
- Toronto alone has four Situation Tables, ensuring activities remain very local. They're also apparently layered into existing gang prevention processes, which aims to reduce the stigma attached to P/CVE, but also draws on relevant experiences and expertise on gang recruitment prevention. Some of Canada's municipal programmes involve Police in some capacity.

Variations

- All three approaches involve local hubs, which bring together stakeholders from a range of backgrounds like education, health, community leadership, law enforcement and academia.
- These hubs operate at the municipal or community level, which means that people understand local problems and can mobilise local solutions, ideally before they escalate.
- All three strategies rely on some kind of referral mechanism – this is the trickiest part because risk factors are complex and not consistently present, and false positives end up creating new problems like stigmatisation.
- One variation is the involvement of civil society organisations, which play a major role in most intervention strategies, with the exception of Denmark, where they view social services as the welfare state's responsibility.
- A major variation is the respective involvement of the Police, who lead in some contexts but are not involved in others.
- A common criticism of P/CVE interventions is that they can securitise social service initiatives, which depend on the context and respective levels of trust.

New Zealand context

- European countries have been dealing with large numbers of people for 10-15 years, which is not the case for New Zealand, so we can likely take a more judicious approach to referrals which minimises potential stigmatisation.
- It is not always ideal for Police to lead these 'pre-crime' intervention programmes – overseas experiences show people think the exercise is a ruse to gather information.
- The local Information House or Situation Table approach which involves multi-stakeholder assessment teams may create safer spaces for difficult conversations. They also make sure key stakeholders working in a city are all on the same page as much as possible, and draw on the comparative advantage of their different attributes.



- Success stories often involve finding the right people at the right time, keeping things low key and local, helping them out with practical problems, and introducing them to a good mentor. It's just that the right people at the right time part is so challenging.
- Low-key civil society interventions may be the best approach, if you can find good ways of organising and funding them, while not interfering with their work.

Questions and Comments

What are some of the challenges with the models outlined?

Cameron outlined three core challenges: coordination among the variety of stakeholders involved – especially difficult in post-authoritarian states; information sharing; and identification and referral. Essentially these programmes rely on people identifying other people who they think may be on a pathway to committing acts of violent extremism. Referrals will always create false positives, which can be harmful for the individual and even stigmatise wider communities.

What evidence base is there that any of the de-radicalisation initiatives work?

Often evaluations aren't made public, and either way, measuring a negative is always difficult. Evaluations that have been done and made public focus on changes to attitudes or behaviours. The work can have benefits beyond terrorism – e.g. different stakeholders working together on difficult social issues.

Airing of grievances – how is this done and how does it work?

Generally done in prisons and information houses. Group therapy sessions, including in prisons, which provide a safe space for discussing political views, to have discussions which are intolerant but not violent, can be controversial but may be useful.

How have indigenous or First Nations wisdoms have been incorporated, for example in Canada?

The Canada Centre is a 'think and do' tank as they build relationships through their research, conduct training, promote coordination among practitioners, and support local initiatives through a resilience fund. He didn't see concrete use of First Nations knowledge but wouldn't be surprised if it was being incorporated on a local level.



Workshop Reports

For the afternoon of the second day, participants were able to select between two workshops:

- The first was a scenario-based walk-through exercise on violent extremism in New Zealand and actions that sit with different parties.
- The second was a session on the objectives, operating model, and priorities for the National Centre of Excellence for preventing and countering violent extremism.

Summaries of these workshops have been published separately on the DPMC website.

Concluding Remarks: Day Two

Concluding remarks were delivered by Andrew Kibblewhite, Secretary of Justice and Chief Executive of the Ministry of Justice.

Andrew commenced by thanking everyone who attended He Whenua Taurikura. He specifically mentioned the session run by the Islamic Women's Council on 'What Hate Feels Like Now', and noted how important it was that people such as himself who are in positions of power and privilege, and do not experience Islamophobia, racism or sexism on a daily basis, listen to those who do and ensure that they are given a voice and platform.

Andrew spoke about He Whenua Taurikura as the start of a conversation. As the first hui, it represents a starting point for long-term change in the way that New Zealand thinks about and talks about counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. Everyone who attended the hui has a role to play in taking these conversations forward.

The expectations for government for consultation and engagement with communities was clear – both in feedback during the hui and in the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain, and agencies are working hard to deliver on them.



Feedback and Suggestions

He Whenua Taurikura 2021 was the first counter-terrorism and counter violent extremism hui in Aotearoa New Zealand. It marked the first time that such a national conversation has been attempted and, as such, many suggestions were provided that will be incorporated into the planning for future hui.

Feedback was sought from participants throughout the hui, and many attendees also took the time to provide suggestions and contributions after the event. We have separately sought feedback from all attendees, via a survey sent following the hui.

Feedback received included:

- Ensuring that tikanga is fully embedded into the design of the hui.
- Consideration of the order of panels, to ensure that voices of tangata whenua and people with lived-experiences of terrorism and violent extremism are prioritised.
- Ensuring space is provided for youth voices.
- Having more time for active participation, through workshops and break-out sessions.
- Focusing in future years on specific aspects of countering terrorism and violent extremism, rather than trying to cover a wide range of issues at a single hui.
- Linking sessions directly to the work undertaken by the National Centre of Excellence for preventing and countering violent extremism, for example by having researchers from the Centre reporting back on their findings.

Additional feedback, suggestions and contributions can be provided to HWT@dpmc.govt.nz.

